#1.

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION vs THE PROVINCE OF

BENGUET, G.R. No. 183137 April 10, 2013
FACTS :
Petitioner owns Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for recreation
and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls.
On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet
approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the
Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X
of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on
gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

ISSUE:
Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes
on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the
Local Government Code.

RULING: NO.
The Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory
construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear
definition of amusement places:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:
xxx
(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to
entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia
are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are all
venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public
shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be
viewed by an audience. Accordingly, other places of amusement must
be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues
"where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing
the show or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage
spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other
events meant to be viewed by an audience.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, show means "a
spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one"; while
performance means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert,
or other form of entertainment."24 As such, the ordinary definitions of
the words show and performance denote not only visual
engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing
(e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are
manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues
primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or
viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be
venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or
present shows and/or performances.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the other places of amusement
contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be
subject to amusement taxes.

#2. GAMBOA vs TEVES., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

FACTS:

This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine

Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government
of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc.
(MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a
Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and
a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also

involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of
the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT
increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This,
according to the petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40%, thus:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of

authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither
shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in
its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE:

Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the

Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting
preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?

RULING:

[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public
utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.]

Considering that common shares have voting rights which

translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have
no voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to
participate in the control or management of the corporation is
exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In
short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the
election of directors.

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding

capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the
State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

#3. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN GR 148560, Nov 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails the RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),as amended by RA 7659 on the
grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c)
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
HELD:
No. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conducts and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law
affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. The court discerns nothing in
the law that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent
and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner
is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him
to prepare for an intelligent defense. As regards the assailed statutory
definition of the terms combination" and "series" in the key
phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in the
law, the court ruled that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein. Congress is not
restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words.

A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes

have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.

#4. DOMINADOR JALOSJOS vs COMELEC, GR No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on
6 December 2009 a petition to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was
eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Jalosjos and his co-accused were found guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum.

The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 15 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification
produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular
elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Art.
32 of the RPC perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering
from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so
run.

Article 32, RPC, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during
the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.

ISSUE:

WON the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of
the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.
RULING:

YES. As instructed in Lacuna v. Abes, the word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the
term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents;
thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while
the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special)
are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into
one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which
means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special
disqualification.

#57-60 STATCON CASES --IBAA Employees Union vs. Inchiong

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)

Facts:

On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment
of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon
the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975.
On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the
above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment of holiday pay.
Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with
the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending,

among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay.
Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and
regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section
thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein,
with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be
presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. On 23 April
1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now
Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid
down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the
arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October
1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order
enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On
17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc
dismissing the banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of
execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of
Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution.
On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research
and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA
employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter
dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor,
through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the
resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for
lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid
employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held:

From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and
Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on
holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid
employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the
implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein,
with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be
presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. Even if
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose
duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is
so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are
valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed.
A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation
is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein
or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter
Ricarte T. Soriano.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS

sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it
to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined
in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-

executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second

par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.
If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and opera

77. Berces vs Guingona

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases

against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision
suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President
questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in
accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of
the President thru the Executive Secretary directed stay of execution. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer
for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the
President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner
argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed. Stay of execution applied.

RATIO:

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an appeal shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory. As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists
in the terms of the new and old laws.
79. Mapa vs Arroyo

FACTS:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in
ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so
despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the
contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four
contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the
lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that
P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision plans.

ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the
doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale
incorrect.

HELD:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7
of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment
from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the
execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20,
no further written commitment was made by the developer. The words which are
offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to
other forms of development but also to facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.

80. People vs Martin

Facts:
Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the
Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union, specifically
in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the
ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in
Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the
same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous
offense with concealing and harboring.
Ruling:
No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four
acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act possesses its own distinctive,
different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a
non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. The
words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere
surplusage. A well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated
that The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. Utile per inutile non vitiatur.

#68
EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC. G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012
FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from
Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to
settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over
several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots
already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said
water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30)
years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag.
As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the
latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently
wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the over
headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling
was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the
existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block
5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated.
However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board
found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open
space as defined in P. D. 1216.
RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space.
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area
falls under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis - states
that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind
or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found
out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the
community.
Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted
in like manner. It is without
a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a
basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.

#73
Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was
issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M.
Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting
insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to
renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note
on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14
August 1974, the trial courts decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-
GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On
20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of
Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or
intent of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute
as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section
189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation
or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third
paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate
courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of
Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of
insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189,
which is any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within
the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly,
received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be
held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION VS. RUFINA AND COMPANY

G.R. NO. 160191JUNE 08, 2006

Facts:
On 3 December 1991, Twin Ace Holdings Corporation (Twin Ace) filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent injunction
and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin, temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina and Company
(Rufina).

As alleged in the complaint, Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged

in the manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name and style "Tanduay
Distillers."

On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation

and manufacture of patis and other food seasonings and is engaged in the
buying and selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic
use or for export to other countries.

In its Answer with counter-application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina

claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products were
purchased from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.

It is worth noting that Lorenzana Food Corporation which prevailed in the case
filed by Twin Ace against it is certainly not a small scale industry. Just like Rufina,
Lorenzana Food Corporation also manufactures and exports processed foods
and other related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food
seasonings.

It is a basic rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has
been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for
application.

Notably, attempts to amend the protection afforded by Section 6 of Republic Act

No. 623, by giving protection only to small scale manufacturers or those with a
capitalization of five hundred thousand pesos or less (P500,000.00), through then
House Bill No. 20585, and subsequently through House Bill No. 30400, proved
unsuccessful as the amendment proposed in both Bills was never passed.
In view of these considerations, we find and so hold that the exemption contained
in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 623 applies to all manufacturers of sisi, bagoong,
patis and similar native products without distinction or qualification as to whether
they are small, medium or large scale.

In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the
bottles in question and consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it
of due compensation.

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of
continuing ownership over the subject bottles. In United States v. Manuel [7 Phil.
221(1906)] we held that since the purchaser at his discretion could either retain
or return the bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the bottles
when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and decided not to return
them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard practice today
that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of the product such
that the buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not required to
return the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container that possession of
the bottle is retained by the store

#75
Richard Brian Thornton vs. Adelfa Francisco Thornton
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were

married and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored
as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub.
One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told
her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed
because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didnt find them
and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer
residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition
was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case
since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases

involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing
in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cannot be affirmed because it will result
to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The
minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case
will be left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases
within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of exclusive will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote
welfare of children.

#76
Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and
that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the
Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the
notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land
registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who
have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only
for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication
in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

#85
Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa
committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin,
Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527. The
5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983.
Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each
criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a
probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation
under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than
P200). The court denied the application for probation. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due
course to the petitioners application for probation; without costs.
1. Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime
The statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the
commission of the crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no
previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only
conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application.
Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime.

#17 Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative vs. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue FACTS:
1. Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit cooperative
with the following objectives and purposes: (1) to increase the income and
purchasing power of the members; (2) to pool the resources of the members by
encouraging savings and promoting thrift to mobilize capital formation for
development activities; and (3) to extend loans to members for provident and
productive purposes.

2. (BIR) Operations Group Deputy Commissioner, issued Letters of Authority

authorizing BIR Officers to examine petitioners books of accounts and other
accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the taxable years 1999 and
2000.

3. On 2002, DCCCO received Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency withholding

taxes for taxable years 1999 and 2000. The deficiency withholding taxes cover
the payments of the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial
services, legal and professional fees, and interest on savings and time deposits
of its members.

4. DCCCO informed BIR that it would ONLY pay the deficiency withholding taxes
corresponding to the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial
services, legal and professional fees for the year 1999 and 2000, EXCLUDING
penalties and interest.

5. After payment, DCCCO received from the BIR Transcripts of Assessment and
Audit Results/Assessment Notices, ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency
withholding taxes, INCLUSIVE of penalties, for the years 1999 and 2000.
6. DCCO's contention:
Under Sec. 24. Income Tax Rates. x x x x (B) Rate of Tax on Certain Passive
Income: (1) Interests, Royalties, Prizes, and Other Winnings. A final tax at
the rate of twenty percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest
from any currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from
deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements; x x x applies
only to banks and not to cooperatives, since the phrase "similar arrangements" is
preceded by terms referring to banking transactions that have deposit
peculiarities. Therefore, the savings and time deposits of members of
cooperatives are not included in the enumeration, and thus not subject to the
20% final tax. Also, pursuant to Article XII, Section 15 of the Constitution 25 and
Article 2 of Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938) or the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines, cooperatives enjoy a preferential tax treatment which exempts their
members from the application of Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DCCCO is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on
interest from savings and time deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999
and 2000, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum?

HELD:
DCCCO is not liable. The NIRC states that a "final tax at the rate of twenty
percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank
deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes and
from trust funds and similar arrangement x x x" for individuals under Section
24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1). Considering the
members deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank deposits nor
deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1), therefore, do not
apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations,
respectively.

Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of

the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle
for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment
of economic development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the formation of
cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their growth and
development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.

#18 Olympio Revaldo vs People in the Philippines

FACTS: 1.Petitioner Olympio Revaldo was charged with the offense of illegal
possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Code. On june 18, 1992, Maceda together with the other policemen
went to the house of the petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had
in his possession lumber without necessary documents. The policemen were not
armed with a search warrant on that day and confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of
different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner.The petitioner
contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted !y the police officers
was illegal and thus the items seized should not have !een admitted in evidence
against him.-.The respondent contends that even without a search warrant& the
personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut& gathered or taken by an
offender pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code Issues: 1. Whether or not
the mere possession of the lm!er withot legal docments gives rise to criminal lia!
ility
2. Whether or not the arrest of Olympio Revaldo was illegal. Ruling: The decision
of the of the CA was affirmed convicting the petitioner for violation of Section 68
(now Section 77) of the Forestry code and as amended with MODIFICATION as
regards the penalty in that petitioner Olympio Revaldo is sentenced to suffer
indeterminate penalty of fo r4 months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum and to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional and as
maximum. The arrest of Olympio Revaldo was not illegal. Section 68 of the
Forestry Code provides that a forest officer or employee of the area or any
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary or Philippine National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. =e shall also confiscate& in
favor of the Government and the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense and the forest products cut& gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.

#19 In Re Petition for adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years
and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was
not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly
exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-
being.

#20 Dantem Polloso vs. Hon. Celso Gangan Facts:

In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr.
Francisco L. Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A.
Satorre. Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the following services for
the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC:
On 12 January 1995, Unit Auditor Alexander A. Tan, NPC-VRC, Cebu City issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the payment of the services
rendered by Atty. Satorre for the period covering March to December 1995 in the
total amount of P283,763.39. The following reasons were cited for said
disallowance:
1)....The contract for services did not have the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and concurrence
of the Commission on Audit as required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated
April 2, 1986.
2)....The contract was not supported with Certificate of Availability of Funds as
required under Sec. 86 of P.D. 1445.
3)....The contract was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for final
review and was not forwarded to the Compensation and Position Confirmation
and Classification Bureau, DBM for appropriate action as required in CSC MC #
5 Series of 1985.3
Issue : Whether or not that the circular requiring the approval of the SOLICITOR
GENERAL was UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it restricted to practice LAW.
Ruling: The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, and extravagant or unconscionable expenditures.We cannot grant the
prayer of the petitioner that Atty. Satorre should be compensated based on the
principle of quantum meruit, on the ground that the government will be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another. We do not deny that Atty. Satorre has indeed
rendered legal services to the government. However to allow the disbursement of
public funds to pay for his services, despite the absence of requisite consent to
his hiring from the OSG or OGCC would precisely allow circumvention of COA
Circular No. 86-255.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of showing that the
respondents committed a reversible error.

# 12 Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of
Laoag, Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to
have and hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by
law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying
that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice
Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which
he asserted that he will not cease from the office because he was appointed as
justice of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold
office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos
Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of
quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with
regard to his petition for quo warranto

Held: No.

Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise.
Section 216 provides Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against
a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five
years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be
brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after
the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose. The Supreme
Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has
no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point
the court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the
said provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence after the word
committed; should not be treated as a separate thought from the preceding
phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.

StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the

English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree
greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must
have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for
the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of
continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The
comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide
sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.
#9.THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B.
ACERON, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG, [G.R. NO. 186993 -
August 22, 2012]

Facts

On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan

in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from
Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed
a promissory note5 in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the
latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to
pay the petitioners.

Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter
asking them to pay their outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted
to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars
and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent (10%)
annual interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt
of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation.

On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles,
California, United States of America (USA), executed their respective Special
Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron)
for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On
September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint7
for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the
respondents.

On November 21, 2006, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint filed by the petitioners on the grounds of improper venue and
prescription.8 Insisting that the venue of the petitioners action was improperly
laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed
in the court of the place where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred
that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in Los Angeles,
California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint
against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT MUST BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT VENUE WAS NOT PROPERLY LAID

Held:

The petition is denied.

chanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to the CA s disposition, the petitioners maintain that their complaint for
collection of sum of money against the respondents may be filed in the RTC of
Quezon City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they insist that
Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the
case below and can prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case,
the petitioners assert, the said complaint for collection of sum of money may be
filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the RTC of
Quezon City.

On the other hand, the respondents in their Comment18 assert that the
petitioners are proscribed from filing their complaint in the RTC of Quezon City.
They assert that the residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative, is
immaterial to the determination of the venue of the petitioners complaint.

41 ONG VS ALEGRE FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a
Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive
term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged
the duties thereof for three consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections. The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a
resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might
have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and
2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be
considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided 1 It is a general rule of law that an
incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion or expiration of his term
until the appointment of his successor 2 The laws of Australia at that time
required any person over the age of 16 who is granted citizenship to take an oath
of allegiance 2 his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that
Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San
Vicente, Camarines Norte."
ISSUE: Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for themayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full
service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD: Affirmative. Ong is
disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only
took place AFTER the expiration of the contested office

42 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

INC.,
[G.R. No. 150947. July 15, 2003]
FACTS:
Revenue
Code. Its protest having been unacted upon, Lhuillie
ISSUE
HELD
the same way as lending investors, since the amendment of the NIRC treated
both tax subjects different

ISSUE
HELD

RMO

44 G.R. No. 171427: March 30, 2011

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA LAKE

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) and JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in his
capacity as General Manager of LLDA, Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its

products are manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion
Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.)
Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City.

For creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant,
one of petitioners neighbors filed a complaint with the Barangay. During
conciliation proceedings, petitioners management undertook to relocate its
operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that effect.
However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and continued to
manufacture its products in its Brgy.

Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor filed a complaint before the

barangay and a formal complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of
Violation and a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) were served on petitioner after it
was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as
required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850.

Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. Contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt
from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. The RTC denied the
petition. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appeals to the
CA. The CA however dismissed the appeal. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to

obtain a clearance from the LLDA to operate its business.

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed.

Political Law- Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible
and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of
action which belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a
decedent.
In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset
requirements, it is crystal clear that the same is a defining element in determining
if an enterprise is a cottage industry.

Petitioner argues that its assets amount to onlyP312, 500.00, representing its
paid-up capital at the time of its SEC registration. The law then in force was R.A.
No. 6977, which, to recapitulate, states:
SEC. 3. Small and Medium Enterprises as Beneficiaries. "Small and medium
enterprise" shall be defined as any business activity or enterprise engaged in
industry, agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship,
cooperative, partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those
arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business
entity's office, plant, and equipment are situated, must have value falling under
the following categories:
xxx
cottage:P50,001 P500,000
Accordingly, it should be considered as a cottage industry, petitioner insists.

The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already
subscribed and paid up by the company's stockholders. It does not, however,
represent the totality of its assets, even at the time of its registration. By the
expert opinion of petitioners own consultant, independent CPA Maximiano P.
Sorongon, Jr., it does not mean that the paid-up capital is the only source of
funds of the corporation for it to support its recurring operational requirements, as
well as its increased financial requirements later on, as and when the business
grows and expands.

In other words, its paid-up capital is not the only asset of the company. Under
R.A. No. 6977, the term total assets was understood to mean "inclusive of those
arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business
entity's office, plant, and equipment are situated."

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible,
including, inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which
belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is
the entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate that is
applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or its debts.

Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine
its assets. The law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance
sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other
than its paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented
by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and
P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the
maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage

industry. Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance
requirement of the LLDA.

DENIED.

#37 PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS,

COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000
FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (CIR) for the payment of deficiency amusement tax.

The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied
the same. The PBA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), in which they held against the PBA.

The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES:

Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.

Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises,

Inc. subject to amusement tax.
RULING:

YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but
rather in PD 1959. It is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of
professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax of 15% of
their gross receipts to the BIR, which payment is a national tax.

YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of
advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the
proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. The law being clear, there
is no need for an extended interpretation.

#38 (this is what i found)

Q: Guinhawa sold a Mitsubishi van to Spouses Silo. He told the spouses that the
vehicle was brand new when in fact he knew that it isnt. It already figured in an
accident and he just had it repaired. The Spouses discovered the concealment
and filed a complaint for violation of paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC, or the
crime of OTHER DECEITS. Is Guinhawa liable?

A: Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for
sale is brand new is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Art.
318 of the RPC. This provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than
those enumerated in Arts. 315 to 317 of the RPC. It is intended as the catchall
provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment. It is evident that
such false statement or fraudulent representation constituted the very cause or
the only motive for the spouses to part with their property. (Guinhawa vs. People,
G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005)

6. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List,
et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation
of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal
protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in
the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates
to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the
amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
Tan vs. Del Rosario
237 SCRA 324
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the
simplified income taxation scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III
(1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different
treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional
for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution.
Issue:
Is the contention meritorious?
Ruling:
No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal
protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly
situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity,
does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it
is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax
system towards the scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers
and maintain the present global treatment on taxable corporations. This
classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company had earlier appointed
Algue as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil
manufacturing process. Pursuant to such authority, Alberto Guevara, Jr.,
Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith, O'Farell, and Pablo Sanchez,
worked for the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation,
inducing other persons to invest in it. Ultimately, after its incorporation
largely through the promotion of the said persons, this new corporation
purchased the PSEDC properties. For this sale, Algue received as agent a
commission of P126, 000.00, and it was from this commission that the
P75, 000.00 promotional fees were paid to the a forenamed individuals.
The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of P75, 000.00 was
properly disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable or
necessary business expense. The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it
differently. Agreeing with Algue, it held that the said amount had been
legitimately paid by the private respondent for actual services rendered.
The payment was in the form of promotional fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75, 000.00 deduction claimed by private respondent Algue as legitimate
business expenses in its income tax returns.
RULING:
The Supreme Court agrees with the respondent court that the amount of
the promotional fees was not excessive. The amount of P75,000.00 was
60% of the total commission. This was a reasonable proportion,
considering that it was the payees who did practically everything, from the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual
purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.
It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes,
the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate
and operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of
one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities, every person who is
able to must contribute his share in the running of the government.

[G.R. No. 153866. February 11, 2005]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. SEAGATE
TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Business companies registered in and operating from the Special
Economic Zone in Naga, Cebu -- like herein respondent -- are entities
exempt from all internal revenue taxes and the implementing rules relevant
thereto, including the value-added taxes or VAT. Although export sales are
not deemed exempt transactions, they are nonetheless zero-rated. Hence,
in the present case, the distinction between exempt entities and exempt
transactions has little significance, because the net result is that the
taxpayer is not liable for the VAT. Respondent, a VAT-registered enterprise,
has complied with all requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the
input VAT it paid on capital goods it purchased. Thus, the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that it is entitled to
such refund or credit.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the May 27, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 66093. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for review is
DENIED for lack of merit.
The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as
follows:
As jointly stipulated by the parties, the pertinent facts x x x involved in this
case are as follows:
1. [Respondent] is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines,
with principal office address at the new Cebu Township One, Special
Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu;
2. [Petitioner] is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed
and empowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among
others, the duty to act and approve claims for refund or tax credit;
3. [Respondent] is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority
(PEZA) and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 66, as amended, to engage in the manufacture of
recording components primarily used in computers for export. Such
registration was made on 6 June 1997;
4. [Respondent] is VAT [(Value Added Tax)]-registered entity as evidenced
by VAT Registration Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on 2 April
1997;
5. VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999 have been filed
by [respondent];
6. An administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of
P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the
P12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was
filed on 4 October 1999 with Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay Cebu;
7. No final action has been received by [respondent] from [petitioner] on
[respondents] claim for VAT refund.
The administrative claim for refund by the [respondent] on October 4,
1999 was not acted upon by the [petitioner] prompting the [respondent] to
elevate the case to [the CTA] on July 21, 2000 by way of Petition for
Review in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period.
For his part, [petitioner] x x x raised the following Special and Affirmative
Defenses, to wit:
1. [Respondents] alleged claim for tax refund/credit is subject to
administrative routinary investigation/examination by [petitioners] Bureau;
2. Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with
laws and regulations, the [respondent] has the burden of proof that the
taxes sought to be refunded were erroneously or illegally collected x x x;
3. In Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 459 (1997), the
Supreme Court ruled that:
A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or
her claim for tax credit/refund.
4. Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for refund/credit
[partake of] the nature of an exemption from tax. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the [respondent] to prove that it is indeed entitled to the refund/credit
sought. Failure on the part of the [respondent] to prove the same is fatal to
its claim for tax credit. He who claims exemption must be able to justify his
claim by the clearest grant of organic or statutory law. An exemption from
the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon vague implications;
5. Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business is
not subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. ([RA]) 7916
in relation to Section 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. As [respondents]
business is not subject to VAT, the capital goods and services it alleged to
have purchased are considered not used in VAT taxable business. As
such, [respondent] is not entitled to refund of input taxes on such capital
goods pursuant to Section 4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations No. ([RR])7-95,
and of input taxes on services pursuant to Section 4.103 of said
regulations.
6. [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204
(C) and 229 of the 1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund
within two (2) years from the date of payment of tax.
On July 19, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for
refund.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the CTA granting the claim for refund or
issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in favor of respondent in the
reduced amount of P12,122,922.66. This sum represented the unutilized
but substantiated input VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period
covering April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.
The appellate court reasoned that respondent had availed itself only of the
fiscal incentives under Executive Order No. (EO) 226 (otherwise known as
the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987), not of those under both
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 66, as amended, and Section 24 of RA 7916.
Respondent was, therefore, considered exempt only from the payment of
income tax when it opted for the income tax holiday in lieu of the 5 percent
preferential tax on gross income earned. As a VAT-registered entity,
though, it was still subject to the payment of other national internal revenue
taxes, like the VAT.
Moreover, the CA held that neither Section 109 of the Tax Code nor
Sections 4.106-1 and 4.103-1 of RR 7-95 were applicable. Having paid the
input VAT on the capital goods it purchased, respondent correctly filed the
administrative and judicial claims for its refund within the two-year
prescriptive period. Such payments were -- to the extent of the refundable
value -- duly supported by VAT invoices or official receipts, and were not
yet offset against any output VAT liability.
Hence this Petition.
Sole Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax
Credit Certificate in the amount of P12,122,922.66 representing alleged
unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period April 1,
1998 to June 30, 1999.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.