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G.R. No.

184528 April 25, 2012 In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus
Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23,
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA 2006.5 (Citations omitted.)

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27,
petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc.
No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260. WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to
establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is
several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a DISMISSED.6
stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo
girlfriend. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the
Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for
hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7
report thereon.
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive
study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently portion of which reads:
submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk
to the social worker.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders
of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On
August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that petition was filed.
of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma
Altaya.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS
his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE
PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have
waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without
since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from
merit.
the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals
should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the
erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various
evidence presented by him showing respondents incompetence. banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care
following wise: and management;

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore
called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards
well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had
custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. the money earned from the sale of the old car;

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered
as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries
provision reads:
and furniture, despite protests from his children.14

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word "incompetent"
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical
reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid,
and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document
take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and
deceit and exploitation.
administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum16 to
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:
clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged
and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x
in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual matters:
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested.
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences
over ten (10) years already; on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy
geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical on the Clock Drawing Test.
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who
was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills,
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition
to problem situations. x x x. for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts." We only take
cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances; 21 however, we find
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial
fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule,
were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed
caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record."22 We
include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that
petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
filed by respondent. obtaining in the case at bar.

Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to
decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed
of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for guardianship but he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report,
as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to
evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows
was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, that he is not entitled to the relief sought."241wphi1
expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled
with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice." There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for
guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is,
motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and
trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of
respondents physical and mental state, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his
own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening
Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the
domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide OROPESA VS OROPESA GR No 184528 25 April 2012
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and the CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed Nilo
able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Oropesas, peitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent,
Cirilo Oropesa.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent herein, Pelagio Francisco, in
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent, Cirilo his stead.
Oropesa.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals showed
In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with several maladies that:
and has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment
and memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization. That due to "Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in
his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over by
and has become easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first
girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata. cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the
incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment in his
Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring and stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other grounds, the petition was based on the
loving) son. failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an
accounting.
During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and
respondents former nurses testimony. "It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed to submit an
inventory, for which reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days within
After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from guardianship. Petitioner thereafter
offer of evidence. submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the
ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not
Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived
P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in his inventory. The
the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally
respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order of April 17, 1980 relieved the
offered; To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the
petitioner as guardian.
Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evidence. A subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted.
"On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered his finding, relying on
MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.
the deed of sale as the best evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. In his order
Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be dated September 12, 1980, respondent Judge acknowledged that his finding was 'rather
placed under guardianship? harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian.' Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered
the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age. The order states in part as follows:
Decision: No. The only medical document on record is the Report of
Neuropsychological Screening. Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had '...considering the rather advanced age of the present guardian, this Court is inclined and so
negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he is hereby, retired to take effect upon the
finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. appointment by this court and the assumption of office of his replacement, who shall be
taken from the recommendees of the parties herein. For this purpose, the present guardian
is hereby given twenty (20) days from receipt of a copy of this order within which to submit
his proposal for a replacement for himself and to comment on petitioner's recommendee,
[ G.R. No. L-57438, January 31, 1984 ] add the latter a like period within which to comment on the present guardian's proposed
FELICIANO FRANCISCO VS. HON COURT OF APPEALS AND PELAGIO FRANCISCO substitute, after which the matter will be deemed submitted for resolution and final action by
the court:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and resolution of
the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 27, 1981 and 'SO ORDERED.'
June 26, 1981, respectively, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano "Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72 years of age
Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172 entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge and still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his ward as he had done with
Jesus R. De Vega and Pelagio Francisco." In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated November 13, 1980 the court denied his
Feliciano Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of motion. Accordingly, on December 17, 1980, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 'from the
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting execution order issued by the court on November 13, 1980' and paid the appeal bond. On February 2,
pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian of 1981 he filed the record on appeal.
"Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private respondent, required "Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of a court.
petitioner to submit within three days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as Appellate courts will not interfere to modify, control or inquire into the exercise of this
required in its order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the order, the court stated that 'an discretion, unless it be shown that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (2 Moran,
indefinite discontinuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of Comments on the Rules of Court, 260 (1979).
September 12, 1980 relieving the present guardian.'
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
"Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. (referring to CA- costs.
G.R. No. SP-1217)"
"SO ORDERED."
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed an
"Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain guardian from Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing the following
exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all properties of the ward; and arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render petitioner's appeal moot
appoint new guardian. and academic; that "advanced age" was not one of the grounds raised by private
respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abused its discretion in appointing
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion claiming that the respondent as guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than
same was premature.[3] The trial court, however, disregarded the opposition and required petitioner.
petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within three (3) days his nomination for guardian of
Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980, the court holding that The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied petitioner's
"an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to repeat the discussion of the
September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." arguments which it had already considered and only entertained the argument regarding the
competency of the respondent as the new guardian. On this point, respondent Court ruled:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order,[5] but the trial court overruled the
same on March 4, 1981.[6] Subsequently, on March 11, 1981, the court a quo appointed "The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as guardian was never
respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the person and property of the assailed in the petition in this case. As already stated, this case concerns the validity only of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. the orders of January 27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required petitioner to recommend
his own replacement, otherwise the court would appoint a new guardian. It does not appear
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari that petitioner objected to the appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now
challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does it appear that
of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 11, 1981, calling attention
the fact that respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. No. to the fact that respondent Francisco is older than petitioner. In short, the point now raised
12172. does not appear to have been urged in the lower court so that the latter could have rectified
the error, if it was error at all. For this reason, it is not proper ground for certiorari before this
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent portion of its Court, much less for a motion for reconsideration.
decision reading as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
"The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal 'upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order.' (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case at bar, the retirement of petitioner was "SO ORDERED."
ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay of
the petitioner in the making of an accounting and the submission of an inventory, the order In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of Appeals has
amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering his 'rather advanced age,' was no longer committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal of petitioner as guardian of
capable of managing the estate of his ward. (Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age is a good ground for the execution
that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the best interest of the ward. of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave
misapprehension and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner did not
"It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final. Considering the time it normally question the appointment of private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground that
takes for appeals to be finally determined, as well as the purpose of the order under appeal, the latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
which would be frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we cannot say that respondent
acted with grave and irreparable damage and that the order of September 12, 1980 is not A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
yet final, petitioner has not demonstrated that in ordering execution pending appeal, the "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. managing his own affairs.[11] A guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being,
not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward's property, as well as to render in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving
any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody the present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities,
but those of one in loco parentis as well. As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court in denying in its resolution
of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
questioning the appointment of private respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also find no
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of the abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court.
ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in
determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues brought before it
physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs.
character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597; Director of Lands vs. Dano, 96 SCRA 160).
as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full
period during which guardianship will be necessary. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by mental AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented
from properly discharging the duties of his office.[14] A guardian, once appointed may be
removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
FELICIANO FRANCISCO vs. CA G.R. No. L-57438 January 31, 1984
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days
after it is due to render an account or make a return. FACTS:
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need far petitioner Feliciano Francisco (Feliciano) is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent
Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of Estefania San Pedro (Estefania) in Special Proceedings No. 532 of CFI Bulacan
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court about the presided over by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 Pelagio Francisco (Pelagio),
"rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania, petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano
him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate and for the appointment in his stead. Among other grounds, the petition was based on
court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to
petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. render an accounting. The respondent judge found the claim to be true, ordered the
While age alone is not a controlling criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification retirement on the ground of old age. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration. contending that he was still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his
ward but the court denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a guardian, We
sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian affirming ISSUE:
thereby the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court.
Whether the trial court is correct in ordering the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent Pelagio age.
Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal was still pending, We
hold and rule that respondent appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said RULING:
execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal
is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court,[17] and the appellate court will YES. In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial
not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness,
abuse thereof, which We find none herein. the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective
appointee, as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection of duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. A
the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise
court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian. We agree with the reason given incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
by the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal that "an indefinite continuance mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an
account or make a return.
There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the deceased be appointed, and that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of
person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. As correctly pointed out by the Benedick, as follows:
appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made
by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. a. declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.
While age alone is not a controlling criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification
b. ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the Plaintiff as the illegitimate
to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.
G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
c. ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and distributing the same in favor
of the Defendants and herein Plaintiff in a manner provided for by law.

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, d. granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the law.4
MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by
In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in
his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO
behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous
relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge
or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in an action for the
of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito settlement of the estate of their deceased parents.
Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died
intestate on July 27, 1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion,6 praying that the court order a mental
guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito examination of the Dy Chiao brothers, who were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez
Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The case was docketed Mental Hospital, and for the appointment of their sister as their guardian ad litem in the
as Civil Case No. RTC 96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of the court. case. It was, likewise, prayed that the director of the hospital be summoned to appear
before the court to inform it of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers.

Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following allegations in
his complaint: On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion7 set for hearing on December 9, 1996,
reiterating his plea for the appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad litem of her brothers.
During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business That same day, however, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise Agreement"
name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in dated November 24, 1996, with the following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo,
1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college education would for the plaintiff and assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy Chiao-
be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and De Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty. Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf
assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. of her brothers.
True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot located in
Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided; he also financed her college Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)8 dated
education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995, "Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, September 20, 1995, notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo L. Simando, purportedly
was born, the product of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still confined in the hospital. Mary Jane
son. He also continued to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support. was therein appointed to be their attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:

It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of 1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with power to sign Agreements
their father. Moreover, when he died intestate, Benito, Sr. left behind residential lands and or Contracts of Lease involving property and/or assets belonging to the estate of our late
commercial buildings worth P100,000,000.00, more or less; as such, there was a need for father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. while said estate is not yet settled between (sic) all heirs; as well
the appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve his (Benedick's) rights over the as to collect rentals and other money due to the estate by reason of said agreements or
same before its partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint, Benedick's contracts;
mother be appointed as his guardian ad litem, that an administrator of the estate of the
2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of represented by:
our late father, and to ask for letters of administration in her favor as a next of kin or as
someone selected by us, next of kin, to be the administrator. (SGD.)

On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment on SHIRLEY AREVALO
the basis thereof, quoted as follows:
Natural Guardian & Guardian
Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by and between the
Ad Litem
parties in this case which is herein below quoted, thus:
Assisted by:
"COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
(SGD.)
Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly assisted by their respective
counsels hereby submit the following Compromise Agreement: AMADOR L. SIMANDO
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the Counsel for the Plaintiff
illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;
(SGD.)
2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiff's claim from the estate of the late Benito
Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of her ADAN MARCELO BOTOR
brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case, hereby agree and bind herself to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito Counsel for the Defendants"
Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall be payable under the following terms and conditions:

a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this Compromise WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the law between the
Agreement; parties, not being tainted with infirmities, irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the same
b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one year from the not being contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals and good customs, JUDGMENT
date of signing of this Compromise Agreement and for which the defendant Maryjane Dy is hereby rendered APPROVING the same.
Chiao-De Guzman shall issue twelve (12) checks corresponding to the said balance in the Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of the foregoing
amount of P375,000.00 per check; Compromise Agreement.
3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each other; No pronouncement as to costs.
4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be SO ORDERED.
immediately executory.
It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy Chiao brothers
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the foregoing to the "Benito Commercial Building, Naga City."
Compromise Agreement be approved and a decision be rendered in accordance therewith.
On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick in
Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996. Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612), filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of
(SGD.) her father and for her appointment as administrator thereto. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of the court; it was later
BENEDICK AREVALO transferred to Branch 19.

Plaintiff On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution,10 of the Decision dated November
24, 1996, on the allegation that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations
MARYJANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN under the compromise agreement. The trial court granted the motion in an Order11 dated
April 7, 1997. Conformably, it issued a Writ of Execution12 for the enforcement of the said
Defendant
decision.
On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since he was Mary Resolution20 dated July 14, 1997, the appellate court granted their plea for a writ of
Jane's counsel in Special Proceedings No. 96-684. preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows:

On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property13 over (a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent court to deposit before the
five parcels of land titled under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., including the improvements thereon. Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the proceeds of the
public auction sale held on June 3, 1997 and to submit to this Court within five (5) days from
The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then filed with the notice, proof of compliance therewith;
CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997, assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil (b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the respondent court, to refrain
Case No. RTC'96-3612, as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. The from issuing any certificate of sale over the properties sold at the public auction sale
petition alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they conducted on the aforementioned date;
were of unsound mind, which impelled their uncle Henry to file a petition for guardianship
over their person and property, now pending in the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, docketed (c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the properties affected by
as Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695. They did not authorize their sister Mary Jane to [the] public auction sale conducted on June 3, 1997 and cause its registration with the
execute any compromise agreement for and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation with Register of Deeds concerned within five (5) days from notice.
Benedick's counsel, she was able to secure a judgment based on a void compromise
The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from issuing/effecting
agreement. It was further alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers were unaware of the complaint
any further certificate of sale over the affected properties.21 On August 15, 1997, the RTC
against them and that they did not engage the services of the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo &
issued an Order22 directing the Register of Deeds of Naga City to comply with the CA
Fernando Associates to represent them as counsel in said cases. As such, the said counsel
resolution.
had no authority to file the answer to the complaint for and in their behalf. It was further
pointed out that less than a month before the said compromise agreement was executed by Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997.23 His brother, Benito, Jr. then filed a
their sister, she filed purportedly in their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a petition for the Notice of Death and Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to Admit an Amended Petition to
settlement of the estate of their parents in the RTC of Naga City, with the assistance of Atty. drop Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion of his sister Mary Jane, as party respondent, as
Simando (Benedick's counsel), as well as for the issuance of letters of administration in her well as those who participated in the public auction, namely, Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero,
favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC'96-684.14 There was thus collusion Amalia Rivero and Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution24 dated
between Mary Jane and Atty. Simando. January 14, 1998.

Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Jane's new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion
to Dismiss,25 alleging, inter alia, that an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of the
The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the
spouses Dy Chiao had already been executed. Benito, Jr., represented by his uncle Henry,
administrator of their parents' estate.15 The verification and certification of non-forum
opposed the motion,26 alleging that a dismissal grounded on the extrajudicial settlement
shopping in the petition was signed by their uncle Henry as their representative.
alone was improper, since what was being assailed was a decision of a court based on a
On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was compromise agreement involving one who is not a party thereto, with third-party bidders
served on Benedick, several lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in acting in bad faith. In a Resolution27 dated February 27, 1998, the CA directed Mary Jane
the name of Benito, Sr. had already been sold at public auction: Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero to submit her reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of
for P6,400,000.00; Lot No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and Lot No. 5, for Benito, Jr.
P7,000,000.00, to Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been
In her compliance and comment/manifestation,28 Mary Jane declared that there appeared
sold to Consuelo Dy for P310,000.00.16 The buyers at public auction had already remitted
to be a sound basis for the nullification of the assailed decision since the illegitimate filiation
the amounts of P15,319,364.00 and P162,836.00 to the executing sheriffs,17 who later
of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that
remitted P5,711,164.00 to Benedick through his mother, Shirley, in satisfaction of the
the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in
decision,18 and the remainder given to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial
On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio executed a Provisional settlement.29
Certificate of Sale19 over the property to the buyers at public auction.
Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate court an SPA
The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the issuance of a dated October 31, 1996 executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by Atty. Simando, authorizing
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary Atty. Botor to enter into a compromise agreement in the RTC.
restraining order, informing the CA of the recent developments in the case below. In a
On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the
and nullifying the assailed decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the authority to file the amended petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether or not the RTC
sale at public auction of the property of the deceased. The appellate court ruled that the had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of
RTC had no jurisdiction over Benedick's action for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and distribution of the
Benito, Sr. and for the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could latter's estate; and (3) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise
not be the subject of a compromise agreement; hence, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in agreement is null and void for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
rendering judgment based thereon. It concluded that the said compromise agreement was
procured through extrinsic fraud. On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping contained in the petition with the CA was executed by Henry; hence, it was he and
The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the trial court within not Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition. Moreover, Henry had no proof of his
ten days from finality of said judgment, the amount of P15,482,200.00, together with all authority to file the petition for and in behalf of the brothers. The petitioners assert that there
interests earned therefrom, and to thereafter distribute the aggregate amount to the buyers was no need for Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the
of the said properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It also ordered Benedick, legal capacity to do so, as admitted by their counsel, and Henry himself. Moreover, there
through his mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten days from finality of was no law mandating Henry to represent his nephews in all actions which may redound to
judgment, the amount of P5,711,164.00 received from Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together their benefit.
with all other amounts that she might have been paid pursuant to the compromise
agreement. This was, however, without prejudice to the buyers' right of recourse against The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation by filing an
Mary Jane, who was declared subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise, directed to amended petition praying that he be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Dy Chiao
return to the buyers the aggregate amount in the same proportion as above stated; brothers, the CA did not take cognizance of the allegations in the petition. The CA was
thereafter, the properties would be delivered to the intestate estate of Benito, Sr. for proper correct in so doing, since the matter of whether one is incompetent should be threshed out
disposition by the intestate court. in the guardianship proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695, and not in the CA
via a petition to annul the judgment of the RTC, where Benito, Jr. is also a party respondent.
Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
decision, on the following grounds: On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling the decision of
the RTC based on the compromise agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud; the alleged
fraud was committed by Mary Jane as an incident to the trial. What the CA should have
done was to dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of the Dy Chiao brothers to
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE file an action against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS INVALID DUE TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD; agreement and also a principal party to the case; hence, was bound by it. As a matter of
fact, the petitioners aver, Mary Jane was appointed by her brothers as their attorney-in-fact
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
to negotiate for and execute the compromise agreement in their behalf.
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE
ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE; The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition filed by
Benedick in the RTC, and that the latter's recourse was based on paragraph 1, Article 172
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PUBLIC
of the Family Code, although his putative father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., was already dead
AUCTION SALE CONDUCTED ON JUNE 2, 1997 WAS VOID; AND
when the complaint was filed.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff on the
RESPONDENTS JOSE, JESSIE AND AMALIA, ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD NOT
subject properties was valid.
HAVE LEGALLY BECOME THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD AT THE PUBLIC
AUCTION SALE.32 In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA holding that the
compromise agreement was vitiated by extrinsic fraud is correct. She claims that she was
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the present petition for
made to sign the agreement, but was not informed of its intricacies. She insists that she
review on certiorari.
does not have any liability to Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, despite her being a
signatory to the said agreement.

The Present Petition For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the latter's authority
to file the amended petition before the CA in their behalf was never questioned by the
petitioners. He asserts that the CA admitted the amended petition containing the prayer that
his uncle Henry be appointed as his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA found that he and promote the interest of justice.40 The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to
his brothers were not of sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad assist the court in its determination of the incompetent's best interest.
litem in the person of his uncle. He further alleges that the compromise agreement was the
product of connivance between his sister and Benedick, and their respective counsels. He The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of Mary
further points out that Atty. Simando, Benedick's counsel in the RTC, was likewise the Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and
counsel for Mary Jane when she filed her petition for letters of administration in the RTC of his brother, Benson Dy Chiao, before the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
Naga City on December 17, 1996. He further insists that the ruling of the CA on the issues
It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from appointing Henry as
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC is in accord with law, and that the
guardian ad litem for the respondents, merely because of the pendency of his petition for
decision based on the compromise agreement was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.34
appointment as guardian over their person and property before Branch 61 of the RTC. Time
was of the essence; the RTC had issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its
decision based on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was
The Ruling of the Court bent on enforcing the same, and had in fact caused the sale of five parcels of land
belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr. worth millions of pesos. Indeed, the sheriff was able to
The petition is denied for lack of merit. sell at public auction prime real property of the estate of the deceased for P20,000,000.00
before the status quo order of the CA reached him.

It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the respondents is
On the first issue, we reject the petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who
without prejudice to the outcome of the petition in Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695.
filed the amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were
"Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." The petitioners' claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate court's finding that
Moreover, Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA
certification on non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was
appointed him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. This was in the January 14, 1998 incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised
Resolution of the CA, where the following findings were made: before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
nature and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the allegations of the
x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because there is an obvious
complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and the character of the relief
necessity to amend the petition; and secondly, because the representation of an
prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of
incompetent need not be by a duly appointed judicial guardian. A guardian ad litem may be
the action. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only
appointed by the court. In the instant case, the members of this Court who conducted the
and undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has no
several hearings herein, are convinced from an observation of the petitioners that they are
application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
not of a sound or disposing mind.
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the appellate court
The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of
needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was proposed was so
Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to
incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for the
execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear
and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Jane's recognition of Benedick as the
that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian.36 A finding illegitimate son of her father was not a compromise, but an affirmation of the allegations in
that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own the complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had, in effect, recognized him as the illegitimate
personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough. son of their deceased father. The petitioners posit that the admissions in the compromise
agreement are likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings.
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office of
such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor.38 Whether or not The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so holds that the
to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null
court where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or and void.
the minor.39 The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers,
agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from
A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or the estate of their deceased father. However, a cursory reading of the SPA on record will
put an end to one already commenced.44 Like any other contract, it must comply with the show that the Dy Chiao brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the
requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the illegitimate son of their father. They could not have agreed to pay P6,000,000.00 to be taken
contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) from the estate, because they had denied that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their
cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and father in their answer to the complaint.
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order.45 Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20, 1995,
public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It a cursory reading of the compromise agreement will show that they did not specifically
produces no legal effect at all.46 Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion empower their sister to enter into a compromise agreement with Benedick in Civil Case No.
than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick RTC'96-3612. It bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 20,
was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. 1995, while the complaint was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on August 27,
1996.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise.
Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the compromise
drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not agreement. The records show that at about the time when it was executed by Mary Jane,
duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment her brothers were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and Benedick
based on such compromise agreement is null and void.47 The judgment may thus be had accused her of being a spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction to drugs.
impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it
is sought to be enforced.48 A compromise must be strictly construed and can include only
those expressly or impliedly included therein.49 On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even filed a motion for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for them, and for the examination of Mary Jane for
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by
drug addiction, as follows:
Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing, an
which was the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other order be issued, as follows:
claims from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their
counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise 1. Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao
agreement was executed despite the siblings' unequivocal allegations in their answer to the [Sr.];
complaint filed only two months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor:
2. Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants Benito, Jr. and Benson Dy-
11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that they have not recognized Chiao;
any person or impostor who pretends having a filial relation with their deceased father by
reason of herein Defendant's father's incapacity to bear children or to engage in any carnal 3. Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical examination by a medical
act considering the age and physical state of their father at that time alluded to by the expert on drugs to be commissioned by the Honorable Court to determine whether or not
Plaintiff. said defendant is a drug dependent.

To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao siblings to appear
void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect. before the RTC at 8:30 a.m. of November 18, 1996. He, likewise, prayed that the Director of
the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital be directed to bring the clinical records of the
It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son brothers, which the trial court granted per its Order dated November 12, 1996.
of her deceased father
Upon Mary Jane's failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to have her cited
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the in contempt of court. Despite his charge that Mary Jane was a drug addict and a spendthrift,
illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. he, nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated December 5, 1996, that she be appointed the
special administratrix of the estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad litem of her brothers,
thus:
RIVERO (JOSE, JESSIE, AND AMALIA) V. CA, MARY JANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN,
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most respectfully prayed of AND BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., AS REPRESENTED BY HIS UNCLE HENRY DY CHIAO
this Honorable Court that Maryjane Dy Chiao- De Guzman be appointed as Special (2005)
Administrator over the Estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian Ad Litem of
defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao. Facts:

Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman Aug 27, 1996: Benedick Arevalo filed a complaint against the Dy Chiaos (Mary Jane,
(whom Benedick branded as a spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise Benito Jr., and Benson) for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father,
agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers, who were confined in Benito Dy Chiao Sr. and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died
the hospital and whom Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a intestate (so he left his P100mil estate up for grabs). At that time, Benedick Arevalo was a
guardian ad litem. The trial court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the minor so his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on
compromise agreement without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the Dy Chiao his behalf. Their counsel was Atty Simando.
brothers were indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad
Benedick Arevalo alleges that his parents (Benito Sr and Shirley) were lovers who
litem for them.
cohabited in a house provided by Benito Sr. in Camarines Sur. He was born 4 yrs into this
What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor, did not even relationship. He also alleges that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized him as Benito Sr.s illegit
bother to file any pleading in his clients' behalf, relative to the motions filed by Benedick. son.
Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao brothers were in the mental hospital and needed a
In their answer, Mary Jane (for herself and in behalf of her brothers) denied the story of
guardian ad litem, and that Mary Jane was a spendthrift and a drug addict, Atty. Botor still
Benedick (that he was the illegitimate son and that they recognized him).
proceeded to sign the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said
counsel knew that it was he who had been empowered by the Dy Chiao brothers to At this time, the brothers were confined in a mental hospital. Benedick filed a motion
compromise Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612 (based on the SPA dated October 31, 1996); yet, praying that the court order a mental exam for them and to appoint their sister (Mary Jane)
he still allowed Mary Jane to execute the same based on an SPA dated September 20, as their guardian ad litem. That same day, Benedick filed a compromise agreement with
1995 notarized by no less than Benedick's counsel, Atty. Amador Simando. the following signatiories: Shirley, Atty. Simando, and Mary Jane (assisted by counsel, Atty.
Botor), for and in behalf of her brothers.
The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty.
Simando, because it was he who notarized the SPA dated September 20, 1995 purportedly The compromise agreement:
executed by the Dy Chiao brothers. He later became the counsel of Benedick against the
Dy Chiao siblings in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612. He signed the compromise agreement as o That Mary Jane recognizes Benedick as the illegitimate son of Benito Sr
Benedick's counsel, despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and
needed a guardian ad litem. Barely 11 days after the execution of the compromise o That they agree to pay Benecik P6mil
agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Dy o That they waive claims and counterclaims against each other
Chiao, Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It bears stressing that Mary Jane was the
defendant in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, and that as counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
the said civil case, Atty. Simando had accused her of being a drug addict and a spendthrift. Sept 20, 1995 (almost a yr before the complaint filed by Benedick) notarized and certified
By then of course, his client (Benedick) had already received P6,000,000.00 from the estate by Atty. Simando, signed by the brothers, who were then still in the hospital. Mary Jane was
of his alleged putative father. therein appointed to be their attorney-in-fact. Her powers were:

Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto 1. To represent them and be the representative with power to sign Agreements involving
and the subsequent sale at public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito property
Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void.
2. To file the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate
Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to still resolve
the other issues that were raised. RTC approved the compromise agreement.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against 11 days after the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for the
the petitioners. Settlement of the Estate of Benito Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane.
Benedick terminated Atty. Simando since he was Mary Janes counsel in the special impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it
proceedings for the settlement of the estate. is sought to be enforced.

Later on, the Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their Uncle (Henry) filed with the CA to It is conceded that Mary Jane agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick to be taken
annul the decision of RTC alleging that they had no legal capacity to be sued because they from the estate of their father. However, a cursory reading of the SPA will show that the
were of unsound mind and that they did not authorize their sister to execute any brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son.
compromise agreement and that she did this in confabulation with Atty. Simando. This They could not have agreed to pay P6mil because they had denied that Benedick was the
impelled their Uncle to file a petition for guardianship in Naga. illegitimate son of their father in their answer.

The CA issued a status quo order but before the order was served on Benedick, On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20,
several lots have already been sold at public auction (to the Riveros). The CA nullified 1995, a cursory reading of the compromise agreement will show that they did not
the RTC decision, including the public sale of the lots. empower their sister to enter into a compromise agreement with Benedick. It bears
stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 1995, while the complaint
The petitioners (the Riveros) insist that the public auction sale was valid. was filed with the RTC almost a year after, August 1996.
Issue/Held: Whether the public auction is valid? NO. Barely 2 wks earlier (November 1996), Mary Jane (whom Benedick branded as a
spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise agreement, not only in her
behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers, who were confined in the hospital and whom
Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem. The trial
court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the compromise agreement
without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the brothers were indeed incompetent, and
whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad litem for them.
Ratio:
RE: Atty Simando
RE: whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for Benito, Jr.
SC is convinced that the compromise agreement was the work of Atty. Simando,
CA needs only to determine whether the individual was so incapable of handling because he was the one who notarized the SPA then he later became the counsel of
personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for a temporary guardian. It only Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings.
needed to make a finding that, based on clear and convincing evidence, Benito, Jr. is
incompetent and that it is likely that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a He signed the compromise agreement as Benedick's counsel, despite his incessant
temporary guardian. (A finding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed a guardian ad litem. And after 11
is incapable of managing his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his days after the compromise agreement, he became Mary Janes counsel.
mental illness is enough.)

Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the
office of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

Whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all
discretion of the court where the petition was filed, taking into account the BEST surnamed PABALE
INTEREST of the incompetent or the minor.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
RE: the SPA filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well
NCC 1878 provides that an SPA is required for a compromise. as the Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of
its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the
The power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave
such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not duly (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale
authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered
based on such compromise agreement is null and void. The judgment may be by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside
the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC co-defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the
declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married
by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale at the time of the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the
siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Naves Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
successor-in-interest. Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to
the Court of Appeals to be as follows: Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the
Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on
Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding
1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo.
Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave
[Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 [Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No.
(27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein as a defense her mental
Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave] deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract
involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the
latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale
agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] siblings] should be admitted.
prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of
Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages. Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case
was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No.
corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision
was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of
her property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately "Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the Brosas
returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at the National Mental Hospital, the
Her repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986
partial down payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987
sold the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby finds
surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of
filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that Court, a person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental
[Fernando] has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. processes cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties,
Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell . Even becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having
assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in become severe since the year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under
representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian
authorized to do so. without need of bond, until further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office
as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial
now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms.
include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other
court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion personal effects.
stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to
[Fernandos] amended complaint. SO ORDERED."

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appeal
Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for
failure to pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. b. the costs.
Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave]. S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and
the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146- severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996
with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the
that (1) they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale
be bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground
executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case. that Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.

The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M.
Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission for his substitution for the late Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:
defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty
trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri]
Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal
alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo
interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case
refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed
No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding
is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that
the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.
the same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for
substitution should be denied. No pronouncements as to costs
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling as Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court,
to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings,
heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition
dispositive portion of which reads: becoming severe since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian.
Said Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and
Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect; void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave
in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect; According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its
22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCT No. guardianship proceedings through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC
111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna; explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held
on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property in favor of filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so
Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale
been declared null and void; siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration
and to account for its income from the time they took over possession to the time the same of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting
is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to the latter; Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his
right to the subject property as owner upon Naves death in accordance with the laws of
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
supposed transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
refrained from ruling thereon. or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the
Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo. same capacity; and
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors: is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon
its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
I
necessary thereto.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows:
NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22,
(1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the
1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
II right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination
of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject
RESPONDENTS PABALES. matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as
III evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
PABALES.9

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following
the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which
This Court is not persuaded. was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while
the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.10 judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
which read: the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
order, may be as follows:
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA No identity of parties
201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the
upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her
bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same incompetence.
parties on a different claim or cause of action.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil interdiction
and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to
having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment
wit:
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Rule 93
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further
differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows: APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. Any relative,
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United
as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director
cause of action before the same or other tribunal of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated
leper.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the show, so far as known to the petitioner:
concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an (a) The jurisdictional facts;
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their (b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is convenient;
the same. (c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or of the persons having him in their care;
question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed (d) The probable value and character of his estate;
provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of (e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
causes of action.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the issuance of letters of guardianship.
instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C. SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in
the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established
incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given. that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests
contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in
alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was
pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates.
suitable person named in the opposition. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the
father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition the alleged hearings on their behalf.
incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice
has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark
their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.
appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties
hereinafter specified. It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts
resides or where his property or part thereof is situated. hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.17 It must
be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence
i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146- as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted
86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said
Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s. case on 10 April 2001.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available
the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed
those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new
or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition. evidence after having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain
finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule
Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier.
93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or
Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to
an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and,
present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of
second, who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably
procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to
assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those
expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his
harking on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to
relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application
given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or of the rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith. must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.20
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took
part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to
for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution,
dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
grounds: incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings] his mind.23 The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon
participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary presumed.24
evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot
bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986,
allegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21 when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially
declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus,
that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts
November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the
would still not confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri,
stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the
February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
affect their right to the subject property. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become severe since the year 1980."25
But there is no basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86- Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2) by
C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C. Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their examination, Nave
was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with
No identity of issues
psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment. There was nothing in the said medical
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental
675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Naves condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and
competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which made him realize
the Pabale siblings. that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions
when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
over her person and estate. invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did
not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the
675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.
Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,
rendering the said sale void. All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves incompetency
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case
two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984
in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the
Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February
trial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that 1984 Deed of Sale.
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap
herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
of 1984 given the intervening period. Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
of land in Calamba, Laguna. However, Nave reneged on their agreement when the latter
refused to accept the partial down payment because she did not want to sell her property to
ALMAYRI V. PABALE him anymore. Thereafter, Fernando filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages before RTC Laguna. Nave filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of Fernando because she
Facts: repudiated the contract and besides she already sold the property in good faith to the
Pabale siblings before she received a copy of the complaint. Subsequently, the Pabale
1. Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision. siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject
property. Unfortunately, the trial court denied Naves Motion to Dismiss.
2. Cesnando Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific
Performance with Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land Unsatisfied, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (Atty. Gesmundo) filed another motion,
which the former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on
allegedly reneged on their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of the psychological evaluation report conducted by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical
Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings. psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo.
Temporarily, the proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for
3. Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship Guardianship of Nave with the RTC, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna with Atty. Gesmundo
proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent. as the petitioner. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in the said guardianship
4. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave proceedings, finding Nave an incompetent placing her and her estate under guardianship.
was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals Accordingly, Atty. Leonardo C. Paner (Atty. Paner) is appointed as her regular guardian
granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the without need of bond, until further orders from the Court.
Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated February 20, 1984. Hence this petition. On December 9, 1992, Nave died. Upon her death, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, Naves sole
Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all heir, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from
contracts that she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void. Nave. In this connection, Atty. Gesmundo filed an issuance of a writ of execution of the
petition for guardianship. The Pabale siblings filed their Opposition on the grounds that they
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the
Decision and that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale was never raised in the
RULING: No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special guardianship case. Surprisingly, out of nowhere, Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) filed a
proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former motion for substitution alleging that the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Gesmundo.
on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in In his answer, Atty. Gesmundo refuted by stating that what he executed is a Deed of
the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and had capacity when she entered Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was already revoked.
into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings. Subsequently, the trial court rendered its Decision recognizing Alamayri as the owner of the
property. Fernando filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. CA, granted the appeals and
Herein, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata,
uphold the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo sought
namely; 1) bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by
reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate court but were denied for lack of merit.
previous judgement means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second
Hence, this petition.
case due to the identity of parties, subject-matter, and cause of action. While a bar by
virtue of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact ISSUE:
or question already settled in a previous case. Hence, even of there is identity of parties,
but no identity of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to the Whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject
those matters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved property in favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void.

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all RULING:
surnamed PABALE G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
NO, Nave was not incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property
FACTS: in favor of the Pabale siblings.

A handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was
between Sesinando M Fernando (Fernando) and Nelly S. Nave (Nave) involving a piece so in 1984. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid
since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to
intervening period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. The burden of proving incapacity to enter Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review,
into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this declared valid the deed of sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the
effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. Nave was examined and diagnosed by spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the
doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986 and she was not judicially declared an children demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale of
incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, such property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged
resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to orders, starting with the two elder children not being notified of the petition for guardianship,
1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts even if they were already above 14, as pointed out and stressed in their petition for review.
such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of There is need then for the exercise of the corrective power of this Court. The original
the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the
Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do. Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court,
evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the Deed of Sale over there is a corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So we
the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void. decide.

The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After hearing the
evidence, the lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the
guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the minors
who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them being over 14 years of age; that as
the inventory submitted by the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily rendered the
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON vs. ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be
PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the land belonging to the
minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972 deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest
relatives, the third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all action had not prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing
surnamed LORENZO vs. MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the respondent the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to
the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon 1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land, Bienvenida and the other half to their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."
four (4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque, Rizal. The vendor, Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this way: "It is
Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of unquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his
their children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, 2 who three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and brother, Meliton. When, after the death of
thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention that Florentino, that is, on December 6, 1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang
notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court on June 2, 1953, it Lupang-Bukid', ... was executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of
could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship Agueda and married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of
proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children, Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the participation of said sellers,
Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years of equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said land, and became a co-owner to that extent with
age. The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in Silvestra who did not execute said document and, therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided
question, 3 intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co- portion of the said land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed, upon her demise in 1952, to
owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by the widow being her nearest relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica,
considered null and void insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased
sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this
purchase made by her deceased husband, and she had no right to mortgage the whole land which the English language has endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the
which, for taxation purposes was declared in her husband's name, without the consent of ordinary reader would accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where
aforenamed successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
to the defendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has
guardianship court, said authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation, caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
contained in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's herein, were understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable
the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the other 1/2 pertaining to her. measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as
However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the owners in common of 1/2 of found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making
3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other 1/2, to their mother and guardian, the them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should
orders of the guardianship court authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting,
minors, and approving the deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority must be trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their
construed as referring to the correct real property of the said minors." clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some
court for its 'interpretation and construction.' "
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed judgment is
hereby modified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption that the
favor of the defendants valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question probate court could have authorized the sale in question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too
is concerned, as to which portion, the defendants are declared owners, and that the third- patent to be overcome. It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason
party plaintiffs, Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive
surnamed Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion feature of our law, one that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be
of the said land. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs." affected, its solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely
their stage of immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed before their
interest in property to which they have a claim could be adversely affected. It does not
matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in Salunga v. Evangelista, 12
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the deceased Leoncio
Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an "interest opposed to that
Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being satisfied with the above decision
of her children." That may not have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from
instituted the petitions for review. As noted at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of
the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been better
Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship
protected if they were notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then why there
proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The
should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is
rights of the children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be
it.
maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is subject to
modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower court decision sustaining the claim of Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty
the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any infirmity. of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what
1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was the
concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation
lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance to the
the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion
applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a
of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." 8 The late Chief
liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be
Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These are his words:
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
"Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
protect themselves."
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian."
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and respondent
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a
Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer 15 being entitled to
1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need for interpretation or
construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased Leoncio
construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning with Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity of trustee for them.
At the time then that the settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his being notified although. In the said case the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally
widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert any other right, except that owned one-fourth of the property in question filed an intervetion.
traceable to her late husband. Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin
S. Nery is a lawyer. As a member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his The lower court ruled that it acquired no jurisdiction over the guardianship
vendor could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is much too late in proceedings of the minors over 14 years of age who were not notified of the
the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee being incapable of acquiring proceedings and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the
interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced in Severino v. Severino. 16 minors and could not have validly authorized its sale. Petitioner spouses elevated the
That is in conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and conscience. He case to the respondent Court of Appeals which decided the case in its insofar as the
should thus be held to the strictest degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned and declared the intervenors
to well-deserved criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery as owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. Dissatisfied,
spouses ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its authoritative force both parties instituted the petitions for review to this Court.
whenever called for.
ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its inapplicability by guardianship proceeding
the two principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the
RULING:
property as far back as 1943 and that even if it were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo
and thereafter his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is NO. The CA is not correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship
obvious that on the face of such alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus proceeding. Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the
precluded from inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was decided by incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to
respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to the alleged prescription, the appoint a guardian.
issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court in this fashion: "The action of said
children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because from the death of Silvestra The failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the
years had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio as upheld by the
Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. When a petition for the appointment of a
possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion corresponding to general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same,
Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive prescription." 17 Consequently, it was and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in
appropriate for the Court of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or
recognized the rights of the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold. the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be
given."
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that Dionisio,
Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the
extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in question, as was decreed by the [G. R. No. 4898. March 19, 1909.]
lower court, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Sanchez Muoz, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LEOPOLDO TERAN

On the 18th day of March, 1908, the Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON vs. ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, to recover the sum of P4,129. 56 and costs. This amount was claimed by the Plaintiff from
PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO the Defendant upon the theory that the Defendant had been the administrator of the estate
of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from the 1st day of September, 1901, until the 22d day of
FACTS: October, 1906. The Plaintiff made a part of his complaint the following items of
indebtedness:
Bienvenida de la Isla (Bienvenida), the guardian of her minor children sold a parcel
of land to Spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon (hereafter, the Spouses). Difference, account of the property Bonga P10. 55
The validity of the sale was however challenged by her two elderly children on the ground
that they were not informed of such a move notwithstanding the order issued by the court. Difference, account of the property Basag 218. 75
Moreover, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was heard without them
Difference, small accounts Bonga and Basag 8. 80 3. The court erred in declaring in the judgment that the difference in the weight of the
scales was illegal.
Difference, account estate of A. Sanchez 150. 00
4. And the court erred in sentencing the Defendant to pay the costs specified in the
Difference, account heirs of J. M. Ceballos 224. 81 judgment.
Difference, account hemp of La Trinidad 82. 87 With reference to the first above assignment of error, from the record to this court the
following facts appear:
Difference, account workmen at La Trinidad 80. 70
First. That the Defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September, 1901,
Difference, account lates of Ligao 2. 00
appointed as administrator of said estate. The record also discloses that the Defendant
Small accounts of Bonga and Basag 3,676. 84 entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his
duties as such representative of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz.
Cost of 1 lamp and 1 barometer 33. 50
Second. The record further discloses that upon the 18th day of March, 1902, the Court of
Workmen at La Trinidad 5,709. 90 First Instance of the Province of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez as guardian for the
said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz, and that the said Maria Munoz
Excess of salaries paid account general expenses at La Trinidad 670. 00 y Gomez gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
Account of cockpit 34. 15 Third. While there are some indications in the record that the Defendant continued to act as
Account late Caualog 220. 10 the administrator of said estate after the appointment of the said Maria Munoz y Gomez, up
to and including the 6th day of October, 1906, yet the fact exists and must be accepted as
Account Jesus Teran 235. 92 true that the said Maria Munoz Gomez was the actual representative of the said Maria
Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz in the administration of their interests in
Account Antonio Moreda 1,029. 83 the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Munoz, from and after the 18th day of March, 1902,
until the 6th day of October, 1906, and therefore the said Maria Munoz y Gomez, as such
Total 12,388. 72
guardian and administratrix of the estate of the said minors, must be held responsible for
In answer to the said complaint, the Defendant admitted certain allegations and denied the property belonging to said minors during the period while she (Maria Munoz y Gomez)
others. The Defendant admitted that he owed the Plaintiff P188. 39 but claimed that the was the actual guardian of said minors.
Plaintiff owed him the sum of P482. 14, and that the Plaintiff, therefore, still owed to the
Fourth. On the 6th day of October, 1906, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay,
Defendant the difference between P188. 39 and P482. 14, or the sum of P293. 75, for which
for the reason that the said Maria Munoz y Gomez was not a resident of the Philippine
latter amount the Defendant prayed for judgment, with interest and costs against the
Islands at the time of her appointment (the 18th day of March, 1902) removed her as such
Plaintiff.
guardian and appointed as guardian of said minors Felix Samson, and required from said
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court found from Samson, as provisional guardian, a bond in the sum of P2,000. On the 18th day of October,
the evidence that the Defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz, 1906, the said Samson duly executed the bond as required.
or that part of the said estate belonging to the Plaintiff, owed the Plaintiff the sum of P3,447.
From the order of the judge annulling the appointment of the said Maria Munoz y Gomez
46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same amount should be fully paid. From this decision
her lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, which appeal was subsequently withdrawn.
of the lower court the Defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error:
The order therefore revoking the appointment of the said Maria Munoz y Gomez became
1. The court erred in holding that the Defendant, from September 17, 1901, to final. The mere fact, however, that she had been removed as said guardian did not relieve
October 6, 1906, managed and administered the estate of Sanchez Muoz as a judicial her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting
administrator or executor. as said guardian. It must be clear, therefore, that the said Maria Munoz y Gomez is
responsible to said minors for the administration of their interests in the estate of the said
2. The court erred in holding that the Defendant was responsible to the Plaintiffs for Antonio Sanchez Munoz from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on the 18th
the loans made to different persons for different accounts, and for credits against the day of March, 1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of October, 1906. If during
persons mentioned in the complaint. this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any
mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her.
Unquestionably, she may have an action against the persons to whom she entrusted the
direct management of said estate for any loss which they may have negligently and However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
corruptly occasioned her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the Plaintiff between the 18th question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased
day of March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a right of action only persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
against the said Maria Munoz Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
administratrix of the property of their estate. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to
In the claim presented by the Plaintiff against the Defendant no dates are given showing the the jurisdiction of our courts here.
time of the particular loss or losses occasioned by the Defendant. As was said above, the
Defendant was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error for the reason that there
representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from the 17th day of is no evidence in the record indicating any liability on the part of the Defendant other than
September, 1901, up to the time that he was superseded by the aid Maria Munoz y Gomez, his admission above indicated.
on the 18th day of March, 1902. There is no proof showing that any of the losses
constituting the amount which the Plaintiff claims occurred within this period. However, the For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, without
Defendant acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the Plaintiff, he owes to them the any special finding as to costs.
sum of P188. 39.

There is no claim of any loss or that the estate has not been properly managed since the
GUERRERO V. TERAN
appointment of the said Felix Samson on the 6th day of October, 1906.
Summary: Present guardian of the minors collects from the administrator of the estate from
From a consideration of all of the evidence brought to this court, we reach the following
whom the minors had interest. However, it appears that the former guardian of the minors
conclusions:
took over the management of their interests in the said estate for some time before being
First. That the Defendant, Leopoldo Teran, was the duly appointed and recognized replaced. Court held that the guardian, and not the administrator of the estate from whom
representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz in the the minors had interest, is liable for the indebtedness collected by the present guardian of
administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Munoz from the the minors, as she did give a bond and the mere fact of removal did not relieve her from any
17th day of September, 1901, until the 18th day of March, 1902. liability.

Second. That the said Doa Munoz y Gomez was the duly appointed representative of the *The bond of the guardian is a continuing one against the obligors and their estates
said minors in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez until all of its conditions are fulfilled. The mere fact that defendant was removed as
Munoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906. guardian did not relieve her or her bondsmen from liability during the time she was
duly acting as such guardian (Duration of liability. R94.3)
Third. That the said Leopoldo Teran was responsible to the Plaintiff (the said minors) for the
fruits and profits resulting from their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Facts:
Munoz from the said 17th day of September, 1901, to the 18th day of March, 1902.
-Antonio Sanchez Munoz died. His estate was administrated by LEOPOLDO TERAN from
Fourth. That the said Doa Maria Munoz y Gomez was responsible to the Plaintiff (the said SEPT 1901, entering a bond of $10k gold for faithful compliance.
minors) for the fruits and profits resulting from the management of the estate of the said Don
-it appears that Antonio Sanchez Munoz had the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del
Antonio Sanchez Munoz from the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October,
Carmen Sanchez Munoz as heirs.
1906.
-March 1902: MARIA MUNOZ y GOMEZ was appointed, after paying bond for faithful
The record not disclosing that any of the amounts claimed by the Plaintiff were due as a
compliance of duties, as the GUARDIAN of the 2 minors
result of the management of the aid estate during the time while the said Defendant was
administering their interests therein, except the sum of P188. 39, admitted to be due by the -OCT1906: MARIA MUNOZ y GOMEZ was removed as guardian because she was not
Defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the only amount which the Plaintiff is a resident of the Philippines at the time of her appointment. Felix Samson was
entitled to recover in this action is the said amount of P188. 39. appointed as guardian for the heirs, executed a bond for faithful compliance.
Doa Maria Munoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her -March 1908: SALVADOR GUERRERO, the present guardian of the minors (though no
appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing info when he was appointed) filed action for recovery of P4,129.56 and costs from
in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. LEOPOLDO TERAN
ANSWER: only admitted P188.39 plus alleged the plaintiff owed him P482.14 so the G.R. No. L-22796 June 26, 1967
plaintiff even owes him P239.75
DELFIN NARIO, and ALEJANDRA SANTOS-NARIO vs. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
TC: TERAN liable to the plaintiff for only P3447.46 with 6% LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

-TERAN appealed Direct appeal, on pure question of law, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in its Civil Case No. 54942, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint as well as from a later
Issue: Whether TERAN, as the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from order of the same court, denying a motion to set aside and/or reconsider said decision of
September 1901 until October 1906, is liable to the plaintiff for the items listed (comprised of dismissal.
loans made to different persons for different accounts)? NO
The facts of this case may be stated briefly as follows:
Ratio: Teran was the administrator of the estate of the minors only from September
1901 when he was appointed, until March 1902, when MARIA MUNOZ y GOMEZ was Mrs. Alejandra Santos-Mario was, upon application, issued, on June 12, 1959, by the
appointed as guardians for the minors and the latter's estate. Philippine American Life Insurance Co., a life insurance policy (No. 503617) under a 20-year
endowment plan, with a face value of P5,000.00. She designated thereon her husband,
-as such, MARIA MUNOZ y GOMEZ was the actual guardian of the minors and their Delfin Nario, and their unemancipated minor son, Ernesto Nario, as her irrevocable
estate and therefore, is responsible to the minors for the administration of their beneficiaries.
interests in the estate
About the middle of June, 1963, Mrs. Nario applied for a loan on the above stated policy
-if during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards, with the Insurance Company, which loan she, as policy-holder, has been entitled to avail of
and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon under one of the provisions of said policy after the same has been in force for three (3)
her years, for the purpose of using the proceeds thereof for the school expenses of her minor
son, Ernesto Nario. Said application bore the written signature and consent of Delfin Nario
-The mere fact that she had been removed as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her
in two capacities: first, as one of the irrevocable beneficiaries of the policy; and the other, as
bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said
the father-guardian of said minor son and irrevocable beneficiary, Ernesto Nario, and as the
guardian.
legal administrator of the minor's properties, pursuant to Article 320 of the Civil Code of the
-MARIA MUNOZ GOMEZ may have a COA against the persons to whom she entrusted the Philippines.
direct management of the estate.
The Insurance Company denied said application, manifesting to the policy holder that the
-summary of liabilities (no dates when amounts were due) written consent for the minor son must not only be given by his father as legal guardian but
it must also be authorized by the court in a competent guardianship proceeding.
TERAN liable to plaintiffs for the fruits and profits from their interests in the estate of
ANTONIO SANCHZ MUNOZ from September 1901 to March 1902 - which is only P188.39 After the denial of said policy loan application, Mrs. Nario signified her decision to surrender
her policy to the Insurance Company, which she was also entitled to avail of under one of
DONA MARIA MUNOZ liable to plaintiffs for the fruits and profit resulting from the the provisions of the same policy, and demanded its cash value which then amounted to
management of the estate from MARCH 1902 until OCTOBER 1906 P520.00.
[OBITER] Whether it was proper to remove DONA MARIA y MUNOZ as the guardian on the The Insurance Company also denied the surrender of the policy, on the same ground as
ground that she was not residing in RP? YES that given in disapproving the policy loan application; hence, on September 10, 1963, Mrs.
Alejandra Santos-Nario and her husband, Delfin Nario, brought suit against the Philippine
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as American Life Insurance Co. in the above mentioned court of first instance, seeking to
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory compel the latter (defendant) to grant their policy loan application and/or to accept the
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting surrender of said policy in exchange for its cash value.1wph1.t
the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in
complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally Defendant Insurance Company answered the complaint, virtually admitting its material
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts allegations, but it set up the affirmative defense that inasmuch as the policy loan application
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are and the surrender of the policy involved acts of disposition and alienation of the property
not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. rights of the minor, said acts are not within the powers of the legal administrator, under
article 320 in relation to article 326 of the Civil Code; hence, mere written consent given by
the father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without any court authority therefor, alienation of property rights and not merely of management or administration because they
was not a sufficient compliance of the law, and it (defendant Insurance Company) was, involve the incurring or termination of contractual obligations.
therefore, justified in refusing to grant and in disapproving the proposed transactions in
question. As above noted, the full face value of the policy is P5,000.00 and the minor's vested interest
therein, as one of the two (2) irrevocable beneficiaries, consists of one-half () of said
There having been no substantial disagreement or dispute as to any material fact, the amount or P2,500.00.
parties, upon joint motion which the lower court granted, dispensed with the presentation of
evidence and submitted their respective memoranda, after which the case was considered Article 320 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
submitted for decision.
The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
The lower court found and opined that since the parties expressly stipulated in the to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos,
endorsement attached to the policy and which formed part thereof that the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

It is hereby understood and agreed that, notwithstanding the provisions of this Policy to the and article 326 of the same Code reads
contrary, inasmuch as the designation of the beneficiaries have been made by the Insured
When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
without reserving the right to change said beneficiaries, the Insured may not designate a
shall be considered a guardian of the child's property, subject to the duties and obligations
new beneficiary or assign, release or surrender this Policy to the Company and exercise
of guardians under the Rules of Court.
any and all other rights and privileges hereunder or agree with the Company to any change
in or amendment to this Policy, without the consent of the beneficiaries originally
designated;
The above quoted provisions of the Civil Code have already been implemented and clarified
that under the above quoted provision, the minor son, as one of the designated irrevocable in our Revised Rules of Court which provides
beneficiaries, "acquired a vested right to all benefits accruing to the policy, including that of
obtaining a policy loan to the extent stated in the schedule of values attached to the policy
(Gercio vs. Sun Life Assurance of Canada, 48 Phil. 53, 58)"; that the proposed transactions
in question (policy loan and surrender of policy) involved acts of disposition or alienation of SEC. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is
the minor's properties for which the consent given by the father-guardian for and in behalf of worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court
the minor son, must be with the requisite court authority (U.S.V.A. vs. Bustos, 92 Phil. 327; appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than
Visaya vs. Suguitan, G.R. No. L-8300, November 18, 1955; 99 Phil. 1004 [unrep] and in the two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child's
case at bar, such consent was given by the father-guardian without any judicial authority; property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the
said court, agreeing with defendant's contention, sustained defendant's affirmative defense, petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint
and rendered, on January 28, 1964, its decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. another suitable person. (Rule 93).

Unable to secure reconsideration of the trial Court's ruling, petitioner appealed directly to It appearing that the minor beneficiary's vested interest or right on the policy exceeds two
this Court, contending that the minor's interest amounted to only one-half of the policy's thousand pesos (P2,000.00); that plaintiffs did not file any guardianship bond to be
cash surrender value of P520.00; that under Rule 96, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of approved by the court; and as later implemented in the abovequoted Section 7, Rule 93 of
Court, payment of the ward's debts is within the powers of the guardian, where no realty is the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiffs should have, but, had not, filed a formal application or
involved; hence, there is no reason why the father may not validly agree to the proposed petition for guardianship, plaintiffs-parents cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on
transaction on behalf of the minor without need of court authority. them, as legal administrators of their child's property, under articles 320 and 326 of the Civil
Code. As there was no such petition and bond, the consent given by the father-guardian, for
The appeal is unmeritorious. We agree with the lower court that the vested interest or right and in behalf of the minor son, without prior court authorization, to the policy loan
of the beneficiaries in the policy should be measured on its full face value and not on its application and the surrender of said policy, was insufficient and ineffective, and defendant-
cash surrender value, for in case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are paid on the appellee was justified in disapproving the proposed transactions in question.
basis of its face value and in case the insured should discontinue paying premiums, the
beneficiaries may continue paying it and are entitled to automatic extended term or paid-up The American cases cited by appellants are not applicable to the case at bar for lack of
insurance options, etc. and that said vested right under the policy cannot be divisible at any analogy. In those cases, there were pending guardianship proceedings and the guardians
given time. We likewise agree with the conclusion of the lower court that the proposed therein were covered by bonds to protect the wards' interests, which circumstances are
transactions in question (policy loan and surrender of policy) constitute acts of disposition or wanting in this case.
The result would be the same even if we regarded the interest of the ward to be worth less years. The purpose of such loan was for the school expenses of Ernesto. The
than P2,000.00. While the father or mother would in such event be exempt from the duty of application bore the written signature and consent of Delfin Nario in two capacities first, as
filing a bond, and securing judicial appointment, still the parent's authority over the estate of one of the irrevocable beneficiaries of the policy; and the other, as the father-guardian
the ward as a legal-guardian would not extend to acts of encumbrance or disposition, as of said minor son and irrevocable beneficiary, Ernesto Nario, and as the legal
distinguished from acts of management or administration. The distinction between one and administrator of the minors properties, pursuant to Article 320 of the Civil Code of the
the other kind of power is too basic in our law to be ignored. Thus, under Article 1877 of the Philippines. PHILAMLIFE denied the loan application contending that written consent of
Civil Code of the Philippines, an agency in general terms does not include power to the minor son must not only be given by his father as legal guardian but it must also
encumber or dispose of the property of the principal; and the Code explicitly requires a be authorized by the court in a competent guardianship proceeding. Mrs. Nario then
special power or authority for the agent "to loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be signified her decision to surrender her policy and demand its cash value which then
urgent or indispensable for the preservation of the thing under administration" (Art. 1878 no. amounted to P 520. The Insurance Company also denied the surrender of the policy on the
7). Similarly, special powers are required to required to effect novations, to waive any same ground as that given in disapproving the loan application. Mrs. Nario sued
obligation gratuitously or obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety (Do., nos. 2, 4 and PHILAMLIFE praying that the latter grant their loan application and/or accept the surrender
11). By analogy, since the law merely constitutes the parent as legal administrator of the of said policy in exchange for its cash value. On September 10, 1963, Mrs. Nario and her
child's property (which is a general power), the parent requires special authority for the acts husband, Delfin, sued PHILAMLIFE praying that the latter grant their loan application and/or
above specified, and this authority can be given only by a court. This restricted accept the surrender of said policy in exchange for its cash value. Defendant PHILAMLIFE
interpretation of the parent's authority becomes all the more necessary where as in the case contends that the loan application and the surrender of the policy involved acts of
before us, there is no bond to guarantee the ward against eventual losses. disposition and alienation of the property rights of the minor, said acts are not within
the power of administrator granted under Art. 320 in relation to art. 326 CC, hence,
mere written consent given by the father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son,
without any court authority therefor, was not a sufficient compliance of the law. The lower
Appellants seek to bolster their petition by invoking the parental power (patria potestas)
court ruled agreeing with defendants contention, sustained defendants affirmative
under the Civil Code of 1889, which they claim to have been revived by the Civil Code of the
defense, and rendered, on January 28, 1964, its decision dismissing plaintiffs
Philippines (Rep. Act 386). The appeal profits them nothing. For the new Civil Code has not
complaint. Unable to secure reconsideration of the trial Courts ruling, petitioner appealed
effected a restitutio in integrum of the Spanish patria potestas; the revival has been only in
directly to this Court, contending that the minors interest amounted to only one-half
part. And, significantly, the Civil Code now in force did not reenact Article 164 of the Civil
of the policys cash surrender value of P520.00; that under Rule 96, Section 2 of the
Code of 1889, that prohibited the alienation by the parents of the real property owned by the
Revised Rules of Court, payment of the wards debts is within the powers of the
child without court authority and led the commentators and interpreters of said Code to infer
guardian, where no realty is involved; hence, there is no reason why the father may not
that the parents could by themselves alienate the child's movable property. The omission of
validly agree to the proposed transaction on behalf of the minor without need of court
any equivalent precept in the Civil Code now in force proves the absence of any authority in
authority.
the parents to carry out now acts of disposition or alienation of the child's goods without
court approval, as contended by the appellee and the court below. ISSUE: Whether PHILAMLIFE was justified in refusing to grant the loan application and the
surrender of the policy.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants Nario. So
ordered. HELD: YES. The decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants Nario. The
appeal is unmeritorious.

SC agreed with the lower court that the vested interest or right of the beneficiaries in the
DELFIN NARIO vs. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
policy should be measured on its full face value and not on its cash surrender value, for in
G.R. No. L-22796, June 26, 1967 case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are paid on the basis of its face value and
in case the insured should discontinue paying premiums, the beneficiaries may continue
FACTS: paying it and are entitled to automatic extended term or paid-up insurance options, etc. and
that said vested right under the policy cannot be divisible at any given time. SC likewise
Mrs. Alejandra Santos-Mario was, upon application, issued, on June 12, 1959, by the agreed with the conclusion of the lower court that the proposed transactions in question
Philippine American Life Insurance Co., a life insurance policy under a 20-year endowment constitute acts of disposition or alienation of property rights and not merely of
plan, with a face value of P5,000.00. She designated thereon her husband, Delfin Nario, management or administration because they involve the incurring or termination of
and their unemancipated minor son, Ernesto Nario, as her irrevocable beneficiaries. contractual obligations. The full face value of the policy is P5,000.00 and the minors vested
About the middle of June, 1963, She then applied for a loan on the above policy with interest therein, as one of the two (2) irrevocable beneficiaries, consists of one-half () of
PHILAMLIFE w/c she is entitled to as policy holder, after the policy has been in force for 3
said amount or P2,500.00. Applying laws (CC and rules of Court),the father a must file a We find it unnecessary to determine, in the instant case, whether the Crystal Arcade is or is
petition for guardianship and post a guardianship bond. not a public building, for, even if it is, the loan are valid. It may be said, in passing the
evidence is sufficient to show that the Secretary of Finance and the Bank Commissioner
In the case at bar, the father did not file any petition for guardianship nor post a had knowledge of the loans and of the security given therefor, and that they have impliedly
guardianship bond, and as such cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on him as legal approved the same. On the other hand, under the legal provision above quoted, a loan
administrator of the minors property. The consent gives for and in behalf of the son without given on a property which may be considered as a public building, is not, in itself, null and
prior court authorization to the loan application and the surrender was insufficient and void. It is unlawful to make loans on that kind of security, but the law does not declare the
ineffective and PHILAMLIFE was justified in disapproving the said applications. Assuming loan, once made, to be null and void. The unlawful taking of the security may constitute a
that the property of the ward was less than P2,000, the effect would be the same, misuser of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter, for which it may be
since the parents would only be exempted from filing a bond and judicial made to answer in an action for ouster or dissolution; but certainly the stockholders and
authorization, but their acts as legal administrators are only limited to acts of depositors of the corporation should not be punished with a loss of the money loaned nor
management or administration and not to acts of encumbrance or disposition. the borrower be rewarded with it. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
similar case:

The statute does not declare such a security void. If congress so meant, it would have been
G.R. No. L-45963 October 12, 1939
easy to say so; and it is hardly to be believed that this would not have been done, instead of
CARLOS PARDO DE TAVERA and CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA MANZANO vs. EL leaving the question to be settled by the uncertain result of litigation and judicial
HOGAR FILIPINO, INC., TAVERA-LUNA, INC., VICENTE MADRIGAL decision . . ..

On January 17, 1931, defendant corporation, Tavera-Luna Inc., for the purpose of We cannot believe it was meant that stockholders, and perhaps depositors and other
constructing the Crystal Arcade building on its premises at Escolta, Manila. To secure this creditors, should be punished and the borrower rewarded, by giving success to this defense
loan, the corporation executed a first mortgage on said premises and on the building whenever the offensive fact shall occur. The impending danger of a judgment of ouster and
proposed to be erected thereon. On February 11, 1932, Tavera-Luna, Inc., secured from dissolution was, we think, the check, and none other contemplated by congress.
El Hogar Filipino an additional loan of P300,000 with the same security executed for
That has been always the punishment prescribed for the wanton violation of a charter, and it
the original loan. The Tavera-Luna, Inc., thereafter, defaulted in the payment of the
may be made to follow whenever the proper public authority shall see fit to invoke its
monthly amortizations on the loan: whereupon, El Hogar Filipino foreclosed the
application. . . . (Union Nat. Bank of St. Louis vs. Matthews, 98 U.S., 621; 25 L. ed., 188.) In
mortgage proceeded with the extra-judicial sale of the Crystal Arcade building, at which
the same case it has been likewise held that:
it was the highest bidder for P1,363,555.36. One day before the expiration of the period
of redemption, Carlos Pardo de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano, in Where it is a simple question of authority to contract, arising either on a question of
their capacity as stockholders of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and El Hogar Filipino, Inc., to regularity of organization or of power conferred by the charter, a party who has had the
annul the two secured loans as well as extra-judicial sale made in favor of the latter. benefit of the agreement cannot he permitted, in an action founded upon it, to question its
Vicente Madrigal was included as party defendant because of his having signed the validity.
second contract of loans aforementioned. From the judgment dismissing the
complaint and cross-complaint, plaintiffs and cross-complainant took the present Fletcher on this matter says:
appeal.
There is a direct conflict in the decisions as to the effect of a charter or statutory prohibition
The most important question raised by appellant is whether the two secured loans are null against discounting or lending money on certain securities. If the statute expressly declares
and void. It is contended that they are, on the ground that the Crystal Arcade building, given that securities taken in violation of the prohibition shall be void, such securities cannot be
as security form the loans, is a public building. This contention is predicated upon section enforced. Some courts have gone further and have held that the mere fact of prohibition
171 of the Corporation Law which reads as follows: renders them unenforceable; but this construction is not supported by the weight of
authority. The better opinion is that where the charter of a corporation or some other statute
It shall be unlawful for any building and loan association to make any loan after the date prohibits it from lending money on certain kinds of security, but does not declare that
when this Act, as amended, shall become effective upon property that is able for use only as prohibited securities taken by it shall be void, they are not void, and may be enforced by it.
a manufacturing plant, theater, public hall, church, convent, school, club, hotel, garage, or The taking of such security is a misuser of the powers conferred upon the corporation by its
other public building. To facilitate the investment of the idle funds of a building and loan charter, for which the state may enforce a forfeiture, but the misuser cannot be set up by the
association, however, the Bank Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of borrower to prevent the corporation from enforcing the security. In case of a state statute
Finance, may, in special instances. waive the provisions of this paragraph. prohibiting savings banks from lending their funds on the security of names alone, it has
been held that a savings bank may enforce payment of a promissory note taken for money The amended Complaint 5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner
loaned in violation of the statute. (Vol. 7, Fletcher Cyc. Corp., sec. 3616, pp. 744, 745.) of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
It is contended that the contracts in question are not of mortgage, but of antichresis. The reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account
distinction, however, is immaterial, for even if the contracts are of antichresis, the extra- of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
judicial foreclosure of the security is valid. Stipulations in a contract of antichresis for the support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked
extra-judicial foreclosure of the security may be allowed in the same manner as they are the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and
allowed in contracts of mortgage and of pledge. (El Hogar Filipino vs. Paredes, 45 Phil., that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in
178; Peterson vs. Azada, 8 Phil., 432, 437.) question, they . . (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because,
while they . . (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . .
Appellants contend that El Hogar Filipino has been given the possession and administration
(was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was
of the Crystal Arcade building, so that it may apply the rentals thereof to the payment of
that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of of first letter of demand
interest and the capital owed by Tavera-Luna, Inc., and that due to the negligence of El
dated February 3, 1990."
Hogar Filipino, no rental sufficient to cover the monthly amortizations on the debt had been
realized therefrom. The alleged negligence is made to consist in the failure of El Hogar In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in
Filipino to advertise the rooms of the Crystal Arcade building for rent and to employ agents Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
to solicit and attract tenants. But the evidence presented to this effect has been sufficiently considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic
contradicted by the evidence adduced by the defendant-appellant. Besides, it appears that will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in
El Hogar Filipino appointed Jose V. Ramirez as its representative in the management and question.
administration of the Crystal Arcade building, and the appointment was made in agreement
with Tavera-Luna, Inc. The ability of Ramirez to do the work entrusted to him is not disputed. Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor, 6 the Estradas
As a matter of fact, Ramirez, during his management of the building, was a stockholder and being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
director of the Tavera-Luna, Inc., and was serving that corporation as its secretary and
treasurer. Under all these circumstances, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the But on appeal, 8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch
lower court. 96. 9 By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC held that the "action by which
the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellants. factual and legal situation . . demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of
possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."

Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but
G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997 failed in that attempt. In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court 12
affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the
EVANGELISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
"defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will,
spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of
Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment 1 of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, 2 in a guardianship proceeding Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. 3 She was so adjudged because of her possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency can not be said to have
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out."
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she
17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving
Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."
Estrada from said premises. 4 The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the Estradas insist
Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since
possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or 12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the
implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of house, but they still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up to this time residing in
the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never the said place;
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be
deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with 13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand
the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal
full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." guardian Amparo Evangelista;
They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the
to oust them from the disputed premises.
house in question, they are enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent plaintiff
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs the aforementioned guardian, because, while they are saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is
Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively were losing much money as her house could not be rented by others;
by this Court's leave, substituted for her. 17
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate could be raised to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment;
judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b) assuming
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had
Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for
authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions,
justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.

I
Its prayer 21 is quoted below:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen Caiza,
18 An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this Honorable
order. 19 Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
The amended Complaint alleges: 20 1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other
persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias,
6. That the plaintiff Carmen Caiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot
Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the plaintiff Carmen Caiza; and
at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this complaint
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
xxx xxx xxx
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were allowed to
live temporarily in the house of plaintiff Carmen Caiza, for free, out of her kindness;

10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants, for In essence, the amended complaint states:
them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the
defendants refused to vacate the same. . . 1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house by tolerance having been
"allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Caiza's) kindness;"
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made
another demand on the defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay 2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health . . (was) failing and
Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) she . . (needed) funds . . to meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of the treatment;"
Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990, issued by said Barangay Captain is attached,
marked Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof; 3) that through her general guardian, Caiza requested the Estradas several times,
orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Caiza, option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
to her continuing prejudice; and meanwhile in the premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian alleges that
the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand dated
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate. February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact
a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is
inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate.
in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for
permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably
vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 23
clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they
when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right
virtue of any contract, express or implied" they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live
to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could
temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Caiza's) kindness" in no sense could there be
not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended. They could not
an "expiration or termination of . . (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as
express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no
owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had
claim that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the possession of . . (her property) by force,
allegedly been bequeathed to them an event which still has to take place; in other words,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, inefficacious.
rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was
favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that
that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It
act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on
is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but
the Estradas of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this
accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the
Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
right to possession de jure.
permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. 24 The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease
expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is II
deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the
demand to vacate. 25 In other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her
deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave. 26 intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial
Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it inconsistent with the ward's will.
after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed
demand and its repudiation, . . (its) continuing possession . . became illegal and the
or revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy. property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,
id.). 31 An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime
demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the
reckoned from the date of the last demand, 28 the reason being that the lessor has the
owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords
no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship 32 dated Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in
December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41
said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all
other acts necessary for the management of her properties . . " 33 By that appointment, it Sec. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time
relatives and friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
incompetency. 35 That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, 36 and bring and defend such involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
actions as may be needful for this purpose. recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her
by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.: To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. A being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now
guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being promulgated on June 2, 1993 affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and
authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
such maintenance. Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in
Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment action,
that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
THE INCOMPETENT CARMEN CANIZA V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO AND
competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the issue of
LEONORA ESTRADA
possession." 38
G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997

Facts:
III
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The
College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically
incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian,
niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
without merit.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject Ruling:
the spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint
pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, 1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her
covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial
their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and inconsistent with the ward's will.
failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be
medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either
defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question,
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while
Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent **
(was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for
demand dated February 3, 1990." any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house
the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
extreme age.
considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will by which she "bequeathed". Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Caiza but it was reversed on
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent
appeal by the Quezon City RTC.
CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all
attempt. other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".

It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to
RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person
the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get
there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it
to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his
has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it
to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and
that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in
2. As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The
her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on those
Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically
postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the
terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian,
disputed premises.
and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is
Carmen Caiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, without merit.
and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave,
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
substituted for her.
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords
Issue: no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one
of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
1. Whether Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.
2. Whether Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the private respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by TCT No. 16944
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, containing an area of 63,598 sq. meters, more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of
or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said the three (3) lots being absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal petitioners.
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the sale of Lot
The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing Nos. 3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent petition in the Court of First
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or of Court, praying that an order be immediately issued requiring petitioners to appear before
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. the court so that they can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in question which are
allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to
G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982 do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith to hold them in
contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read as follows:
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), 1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the abovenamed incompetent and upon
CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent authorization by this Hon. Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses LUIS
SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan, Quezon, the titles over the
following realties belonging to his ward, namely:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 1 which revived and declared in full force and a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) with the improvements
effect its decision on August 20, 1970 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari with preliminary thereon situated in the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of Six Hundred Thirteen
injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732, entitled "Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of (613) sq. meters, more or less;
First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the decision dated April
15, 1969 3 and all subsequent orders 4 issued by respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be declared as null and Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of Four Thousand And Sixty-Eight (4,068) sq.
void. meters, more or less;

This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a guardianship c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya, Quezon, which originally Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of Sixty-three Thousand Five Hundred and
pertained to Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Quezon, then presided by the late Hon. Ninety-eight (63,598) sq. meters, more or less.
Judge Vicente Arguelles, 5 later on succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he transferred the titles thereto
(now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent Judge of Branch IV-
in favor of the recited spouses under a loan agreement (not an absolute sale thereto and
Calauag of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Hon. Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance
with the express commitment in writing that he can recover the same within three (3)
of Special Proceedings No. 2641 when the Secretary of Justice authorized respondent
months from December 19, 1966, ...
Judge to help unclog the docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.
That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three months, he tried to recover the stated
For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and material dates as it
two parcels of land from them, however, the same was not carried out because he was then
appears in the records from the time respondent Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First
transacting with them the sale of PARCEL THREE and under the Agreement that they will
Instance of Quezon took cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641.
not sell cede, or convey the mentioned two (2) lots to anyone (except to petitioner now
On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of private respondent herein) and once the stated PARCEL THREE has been sold at the price
Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez), hereinafter referred to as private of P48,000.00 the borrowed amount of P4,400.00 shall be deducted therefrom and said two
respondent, the sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista, hereinafter referred to as the parcels shall be returned to him;
petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and 4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT
3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in bad faith and in violation of
Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively, for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support, maintenance
their agreement and of the trust and confidence which he had reposed upon them, have
and medical treatment of the ward Soledad Rodriguez.
fraudulently ceded and transferred the titles over the stated two parcels of land to another
person, allegedly for a price of (over P30,000.00) and in spite of his repeated request upon
them to reconvey to him the titles thereto or to turn over to him the total proceeds they have thus, asked for the transfer of the incident sought before Branch IV to Branch I for proper
received (minus the sum of P4,400.00), they have maliciously and unjustly refused to do so, action.
and are intending to keep and retain said amount for their own personal use and benefit;
On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for reconsideration well-
4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph hereof, the mentioned couple grounded, issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to
induced him to transfer to them the title of parcel three, so that they can sell the same for the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Lucena City, quoted below:
the agreed price of P48,000.00 and believing in good faith that the cited spouses are honest
and trustworthy, he agreed and executed the requisite document transferring the title to ORDER
them subject to the following conditions:
Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel for the respondent on February 4,
a. They shall pay to him the amount of Twelve Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos after they have 1969, considering that Hon. A. Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch 1, CFI, Lucena
secured a buyer of the property, ... City, issued an order on July 29, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is quoted as follows.
'WHEREFORE, it is hereby confirmed that this court will henceforth take cognizance of this
b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and PURA AGCAOILE (who are private respondent's case,' and considering that this special proceedings actually belongs to Branch I, although
agents and representatives in negotiating the sale of parcel three) the sum of Fifteen incidents therein were taken cognizance of by the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV when
Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos after they have sold the realty, ... he was holding court session in Lucena City and notwithstanding Administrative Order No.
261 dated October 7, 1968 which states that 'This administrative order shall not apply to
5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have already sold and ceded the cases pending in the different salas which have been partially tried and shall remain therein
mentioned parcel three to another person, and despite his repeated request upon them to for final disposition', because to case was originally filed during the incumbency of the late
pay and deliver to him or to Nieves Alcala the sum of money specified in the foregoing Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding therefore the said petition to be well-grounded, the Clerk of
paragraph, they have maliciously and unjustly failed and refused to do so, and have Court is hereby authorized to transmit these records to the Deputy Clerk of Court, CFI,
fraudulently retained the said amount of money for thier own personal use and benefit; Branch I, of Lucena City.
6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all the proceeds derived SO ORDERED.
therefrom, undeniably belonged to his ward as trust properties, which are subject to the
disposition of this Hon. Court, and due to the mentioned fraudulent, malicious and dishonest Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February, 1969.
acts of the above- named couple, are in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and
embezzled; (SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge

xxx xxx xxx

In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others, that the On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a counsel, filed before
three lots have been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which were duly approved Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon an amended petition praying that the three (3)
by the guardianship court. lots subject matter of the original urgent petition be ordered reconveyed to the ward in said
Special Proceedings No. 2641 for he was informed that petitioners win transfer and
Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on September 6, properties to third person.
1968 but was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on petitioners' counsel motion. On
October 9, 1968, both parties and their counsels appeared but failed to reach any amicable On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon,
settlement. Again, the pre-trial hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968 but was issued the notice of hearing of the amended petition filed by private respondent dated
likewise postponed to January 8, 1969 at petitioners' counsel motion. March 24, 1969 notifying counsel for both parties that the case will be heard before Branch
IV on April 10, 1969 at 2:30 p.m. at Calauag, Quezon. On the date set for hearing, counsels
On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear although there was for both parties appeared but for failure of the petitioners to appear respondent Judge
a telegram requesting for postponement, respondent Judge issued an order, 6 authorizing issued an order 8 reiterating its previous order dated January 8, 1969 allowing private
private respondent to present evidence before the Clerk of Court who was instructed to respondent to present his evidence ex-parte and considered the case submitted for
make the corresponding report which shall be made as the basis of this decision. resolution.

In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the order On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision 9 on the basis of the report of the
of January 8, 1969 pointing out, among others, that there was a First Order dated July 29, Clerk of Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners to reconvey the three (3)
1968, 7 issued by then Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of parcels of land to private respondent.
First Instance of Quezon that said branch "will henceforth take cognizance of this case" and
On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating, among others, that of the ward; that if the court finds sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the
respondent Judge has no authority to take cognizance of the case which, according to ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action.
petitioners, is an issue raised in the petition for reconsideration of the court order of January
8, 1969, and that the decision was without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the case or On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 9,
incident be transferred to the proper court which had taken cognizance of this case. 1969 was filed by petitioners claiming that all the pleadings related to the intended appeal
were filed within the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Court. After an opposition was
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for reconsideration for lack of filed, respondent Judge issued an order on 13 July 18, 1969 denying the second petition for
merit. Petitioners' counsel received the said order of denial on June 26, 1969. reconsideration for lack of basis and on the ground that the period to appeal either the
decision or any of the previous orders had already expired.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion in Branch IV
praying that petitioners be required to appear before the court to be examined as regards On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with
the properties of the ward and to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for not preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the decision of the Court of First Instance, Branch
complying with a final order of the court directing the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels IV,
of land to private respondent.
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion, issued an order 10 in denying their right of appeal.
directing petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt of court pursuant
to par. (b) Section 3 Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for lack of merit. 14 On
motion by petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in a split resolution dated December
On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the urgent motion for 15, 1969 thereby giving due course to the petition, and private respondent was required to
contempt of court was premature considering that the decision ordering the reconveyance answer.
of the properties in question has not yet become final and executory and is still subject to
appeal. In their prayer for the setting aside of the order of June 23, 1969, petitioners After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their respective
informed the court that they win appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals and that the memoranda, the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote decision 15 dated August 21, 1970
corresponding notice of appeal, appeal bond and the record on appeal will be filed in due dismissed the petition.
time.
On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in a split resolution
The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal and appeal bond with 16 dated October 10, 1970 granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the
a manifestation that the record on appeal will be filed in due time. decision dated August 20,1970.

On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order 11 denying for lack of merit petitioners' However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the Court of Appeals,
urgent motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the order dated June 23, 1969 stands in a three-to-two vote resolution 17 dated January 20, 1971, reverted to its decision of
considering that petitioners' right to appeal has already lapsed. In the same order, August 21, 1970 dismissing the petition.
petitioners were given ten (10) days upon receipt to explain why they should not be cited for
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
contempt pursuant to Section 4, Rule 71 in relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days to expire on July
20, 1969 within which to file the record on appeal. In an order 12 dated July 9, 1969,
respondent Judge denied the said petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary I
period.
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for reconsideration of the ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RETENTION BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF BRANCH
decision dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July 3, 1969 contending that Branch IV lost its IV-CALAUAG OF THE CASE OF BRANCH I-LUCENA CITY AFTER HE ORDERED THE
jurisdiction over the raise from the time the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued by RETURN OF THE CASE TO BRANCH I,LUCENA CITY TO WHICH THE CASE BELONGS
Judge A. Melencio- Herrera; that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not authorize AND AFTER THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED
the Hon. Court (Branch IV) to determine the question of right over the property or to order AND EXERCISED HER JURISDICTION OVER SAID CASE.
delivery thereof; that the purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the
person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property II
ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD LEGALLY AND VALIDLY RETAIN ward) that the ward Soledad Rodriguez died on September 15, 1970 and private respondent
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY DESPITE THE Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. died on October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the ward be
CIRCUMSTANCES ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR, THE MAJORITY substituted as the private respondents in this case was noted. To begin with, the principal
OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN issue al hand is whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION TO Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take further action in Special Proceedings
ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR ORDER RECONVEYANCE OF No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I-
PETITIONERS' PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED IN THEIR NAMES, Lucena City asserted its jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 and
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF A GUARDIANSHIP COURT. respondent Judge correspondingly ordered the return of the case to Branch I in an order
dated February 20,1969.
III
Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS has no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 which, at
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE its inception, originally pertained to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon.
SALES ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE VALIDITY AND REGULARITY OF SAID SALES To support such chum, petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29, 1968
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST. requiring private respondent for an inventory and accounting of the ward's property confirms
that the Presiding Judge of Branch I has resumed its jurisdiction over said case, more so,
IV
when respondent Judge ordered on February 20, 1969 the transmittal of the records of the
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS case to the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch I-Lucena City.
ERRED IN SANCTIONING BY SILENCE THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE
Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of jurisdiction by respondent
RESPONDENT JUDGE ENFORCING HIS DECISION BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
Judge over Special Proceedings No. 2641 contending, among others, that the two (2)
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS orders dated July 29, 1968 issued by then Judge A. Melencio-Herrera are not sufficient
ERRED IN SANCTIONING DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO APPEAL. bases for claiming that Branch IV has been deprived of its, jurisdiction because jurisdiction
is vested upon the court not upon any particular branch or judge thereof and the issuance of
This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during its trial stage such orders constitute undue interference with the processes and proceedings already
where, as borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the Court of First Instance of undertaken by respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty of estoppel when they failed to
Quezon Province, 9th Judicial District assert jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and when they voluntarily appeared
2641, which, when the decision rendered by one branch was brought in the Court of before respondent Judge, filed their answer and other pleadings, and moved for
Appeals on certiorari with preliminary injunction, the Special Division of Five Justices, in a postponements of the scheduled dates of hearing.
three-to-two vote resolution in four (4) occasions after its dismissal for lack of merit on
September 27, 1968, reconsidered the same and was given due course on December 15, We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any
1968, again dismissed on August 21, 1970, but again reconsidered on October 10, 1970, particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First
until finally dismissed on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five reverted to its Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts 19 one branch stands on
August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally split on the issue whether or the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes
not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag, Quezon, acting with limited jurisdiction of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various branches of the
as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority to Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority
adjudicate the question of ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are
land in question to private respondent, guardian of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. On these not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
two (2) principal issues, We are called upon to finally resolve the legal controversy peculiar judgments. 20 A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder
on this case. the administration of justice. A judge is competent to act so long as the case remains before
him, but after it passed from his branch to the other, the case could be acted upon by the
After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed submitted for judge of the latter branch. 21 Otherwise, an anomalous situation would occur at the
decision on October 28, 1971. detriment of the party litigants who are likewise confused where to appear and plead their
cause.

In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch IV of the Court of
In a Resolution 18 of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent manifestation and First Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the subject matter, a guardianship
motion of Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of Mario Rodriguez (brother of the proceedings under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court and Section 44(a) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. While it is recognized that when a case is filed in one branch, clogged docket or vacancy exists. The detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as if
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of he is the Presiding Judge of the branch where he is originally or permanently designated. In
the other branches, 22 We are of the view however, considering the unusual circumstances the case before Us, respondent Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the
and incidents attendant in this case the situation in the case at bar is different. Here, it must docket of Branch I stationed in Lucena City, Quezon which at that time was rendered vacant
be noted that the Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and resumed its prior jurisdiction by due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When respondent Judge Kayanan took
issuing two (2) orders, one of which requires private respondent to render an inventory and cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending the designation of a replacement,
accounting of the property of the ward. On the other hand, respondent Judge of Branch IV, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. In the
in confirmation of such resumption of jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of event of designation of a new Presiding Judge of Branch 1, accepted practice and
Special Proceedings No. 2641 to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon, procedure of speedy administration of justice requires that the detailed judge turns over the
but, instead of regularly relinquishing jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge continued cases he took cognizance of to the new Presiding Judge. Justification for the continued
to take further action on the case in total disregard of the two (2) orders of the Presiding retention of jurisdiction over those cases in the case at bar appears to be not convincing.
Judge of Branch I. Should one branch be permitted to equally assert, assume or retain
jurisdiction over a case or controversy over which another coordinate or co-equal branch We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against petitioners. It is true that
has already resumed its jurisdiction, We would then sanction undue interference by one petitioners filed their answer to the urgent petition of private respondent and appeared
branch over another. With that, the judicial stability of the decrees or orders of the courts before respondent Judge of Branch IV without questioning the latter's authority to hear the
would be a meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice. case. The answer to the urgent petition of private respondent dated May 13, 1968 was filed
by petitioners on June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before Judge Melencio-Herrera of
There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by respondent Judge were Branch I issued the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 asserting jurisdiction over the case.
valid and regular as they were admittedly authorized by the Secretary of Justice. It must be The appearances of petitioners and counsel in the sala of respondent Judge during the
emphasized however, that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 intervening period from July 29, 1968 were apparently due to the fact that petitioners came
when respondent Judge ordered the return of the records to Branch I after having been to know only of the two orders of Branch I when they examined the records of the case
informed in a motion for reconsideration filed on January 30, 1969 of the existence of the prompted by the manifestation of the counsel of private respondent, in the course of the
two (2) orders issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point of time, all proceedings in Branch IV, to submit for an accounting in connection with the administration
subsequent proceedings and processes in connection with or related to Special of the properties of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. Petitioners manifested such information to
Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge became irregular. It amounted respondent Judge in a petition for reconsideration of the order of January 8, 1968
to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of Branch I. authorizing the presentation of evidence ex parte. The silence or inaction of petitioners was
therefore due to their lack of knowledge of respondent Judge's lack of authority to retain or
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it may be observed that take further action on the case. Such lack of authority was confirmed when respondent
the detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV stationed permanently in Calauag, Quezon to Judge, acting on the petition for reconsideration dated January 30, 1969, issued on
Branch I in Lucena City, Quezon authoritatively rests on the provision of Section 51 of the February 20, 1969 an order authorizing the return of the records of the case to Branch I. In
Judiciary Act of 1948 which reads: claiming that the records referred to by the order concern the first portion of the records of
Special Proceedings No. 2641 and not the second portion containing the urgent petition
Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.-Whenever a judge stationed in.
filed by private respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent would then encourage split
any province or branch of a court in a province shag certify to the Secretary of Justice that
jurisdiction of courts which is abhorred by the law.
the condition of the docket in his court is such as to require the assistance of an additional
judge, or when there is any vacancy in any court or branch of a court in a province, the Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has jurisdiction over
Secretary of Justice may, in the interest of justice, with the approval of the Supreme Court Special Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the attendant circumstances adverted to
and for a period of not more than three months for each time, assign any judge of any court earlier, We now dwell on another issue, which standing alone would decisively resolve the
or province, whose docket permits his temporary absence from said court, to hold sessions assigned errors raised in this petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited
in the court needing such assistance or whether such vacancy exists. No judge so detailed and special, jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of
shall take cognizance of any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the objection Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery or reconveyance of the three parcels of land in
is sustained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied) question to the ward, represented herein by private respondent.
xxx xxx xxx In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs. Piccio et al, 91 Phil.
712, this Court laid the rule on the issue raised before Us as interpreted in the light of
Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of
Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court which reads:
1948 occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the court needing such assistance or
where such vacancy exists as if he is the presiding judge of that particular branch where the
Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing property of the was donated to her through compromise agreement approved by the court which title had
ward. Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or the authority of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the
prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is properties in question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a separate ordinary
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or action.
interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the
suspected person to appear for examination touching such money, goods, interests, or Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by laches to raise the
instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, issue of jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such claim, private respondent invoked the
concealment or conveyance. exception laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to the rule that the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings; that it is conferred only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or objection on the lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties; and the infirmity cannot
conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, or win of the parties. 24
may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the
ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter case of Rodriguez
actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the case at bar. In Tijam case, the
conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property appellant had all the opportunity to challenged the court's jurisdiction in the court a quo as
clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, well as in the Court of Appeals but instead invoked its jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief
may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In effect, there can only be delivery or and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15) years later from the
of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be inception of the case that it finally chose to raise the question of j jurisdiction. I t is clear that
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of t the circumstances present in Tijam case are not present here. The petitioners in the instant
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or case challenged the authority of the trial court to take further cognizance of the case the
conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in moment they become aware of Branch I assuming jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was
guardianship proceedings. raised in a petition for reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1969, in a petition for
reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969, in a second petition for reconsideration
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on of the said decision, and alleged as an additional ground in the petition for certiorari in the
the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Court of Appeals. In any case, the operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction. If it
What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question were duly had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on selling and jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the
encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or
noted that while the original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination by estoppel. 25
of petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the
questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24, 1969 asked for reconveyance. As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the
assigned errors raised in the petition.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first
two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 is hereby
subject to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to reversed and set aside, and the decision rendered by respondent Judge of Branch IV-
petitioners, the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since new Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon dated April 15, 1969 and the orders issued
transfer certificate of titles were issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt thereafter are declared null and void, and the case is hereby remanded to Branch I-Lucena
as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the City, Court of First Instance of Quezon for further proceedings.
determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary
action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio supra. PARCO V. COURT OF APPEALS
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private respondent finds G.R. No. L-33152 January 30,1982
no application in the instant case. As differentiated from the case at bar, in Castillo case, the
right or title of the ward to the property in dispute was clear and undisputable as the same Facts:
1. This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the guardianship of incompetent ISSUE: W/N the CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship
Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding originally pertained to Branch 1, CFI of court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of ownership and order the reconveyance and
Quezon. Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, CFI of Quezon, where delivery of the property to the ward?
respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case.
RULING: No. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited
2. The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was the appointed guardian. jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
Respondent judge approved the conveyance of three (3) parcels of land belonging to the embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In categorical language of this Court, only in
ward to the petitioners, the spouses Parco. extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto
has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
3. Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale', the private In effect, there can only be delivery or return of embezzled, concealed or conveyed property
respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of the subject conveyance of the lots of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However,
to the petitioners, by virtue of the transfer of title to third parties. He argued that the where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute ,
conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right to recover while the spouses as in this case, the determination of said title or right whether in favour of the person said to
alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute. have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate
ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
Issue: Whether a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the
properties to the ward Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed
properties. This, the Court believes, requires the determination of title or ownership of the
Ruling: No, unlike in previous court decision, the facts of this case is not in all fours as
three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court
there is a cloud over the titles of the properties in question. A reconveyance would require
and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not in a guardianship proceeding.
the determination of the ownership or title of the subject three parcels of land, which
is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must be threshed out in a
separate and ordinary civil action.
G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
In previous decisions, the court approved the reconveyance to the ward of properties
embezzled, concealed or conveyed when there is not question as to the ward's title BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES
and ownership to the property. Herein, it is premature to say based only on the pleadings
that the ward has clear and undisputable title to the properties. "Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes.
PARCO V. CA
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of
FACTS: The Judge of CFI Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag authorized and approved, upon Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie
motion of Francisco Rodriguez Jr, guardian of Soledad Rodriguez, the sale to spouses Luis and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only
Parco and Virginia Bautista 3 parcels of land to answer for the medical expenses of the 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors
ward Rodriguez. are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their
fathers death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
Almost a year and five months later, the guardian of Rodriguez filed a petition in the CFI
invoking Sec. 6 Rule 96, praying that an order be issued requiring the couple Parco and "Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-
Bautista to appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards to the 3 lots consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.
which are allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed, and embezzled
and upon failure to do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in relation
therewith. The guardian alleges that the transaction was in fact a loan to be paid in 3
months but upon the expiration of the period thereof, the couple refused to sell back "On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian
such property of the ward. over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Sec 6 "On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
Rule 96 ruled in favor of the of the guardian and ordered the reconveyance and opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a
delivery of the property to the ward.
similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional "2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the
Trial Court of Pagadian City. biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputed
proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Oppositors live-in partner.
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at "3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner
Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the
Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
a naturalized American citizen. clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."

"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15,
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on
instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate.3 Respondent thus prayed that this
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of
reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1 guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its
Resolution dated November 11, 1998.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of
October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect
to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.

The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of
The Court of Appeals held: minor Vincent should be his guardian.
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother
absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:
Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the
Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights
as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
constitution on family solidarity."2
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
following "legal points": relationship."

"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to
existing jurisprudence. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense
that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their of respondent Helen Belmes.
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."
VANCIL VS BELMES
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very G.R. No. 132223, June 19 2001
much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to
FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial
prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner,
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be
son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for
the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as
removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother
guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several
in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the age of
proceeding.
majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who between
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of RULING:
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian.
Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision
Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No.
CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has
only two years is not certain. exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove
Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero
Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held: vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her
appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing Bonifacia P. Vancil, vs. Helen G. Belmes
in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians.
However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder
persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Petitioner commences before the RTC a guardianship proceeding over the persons and
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the properties of minors Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2 years old. She was appointed legal
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of said children. The natural mother of the
the jurisdiction of our courts here." minors, herein respondent, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship. The trial court
rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian.
The subsequent attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of
Ruling: Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of exercised by the surviving grandparent. The ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals is
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the reiterated herein that the law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
contrary. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. The ruling in Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death,
Appeals is reiterated in this case that of considerable importance is the rule long accepted absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the grandparent.
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The
right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but Hence, actual custody of and exercising parental authority over minor Vincent is vested on
derives from the nature of the parental relationship. the natural mother.

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