EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental
budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide
for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner,
have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute.[2] The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law
appropriating public funds[3] because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for
the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. [4]
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of
citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the
petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to
the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the Court held:
Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the
cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the
Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these
petitions.[6]
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right
of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by the
vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a
government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as required by
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the constitutional issues
raised by the petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
1
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that it is
illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy
actual and ripe for judicial resolution.[8] In yet another case, the Court said that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues,
it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done.
In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its
conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal
motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions.
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and
Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the hammer fall heavily, where the acts of these
departments, or of any official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution . . . [9]
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987
Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant
petition[10] and determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if
it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it. [11]
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and
the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section
25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section
1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
.........
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals [12]to
support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote
in a political exercise;[13] that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the
requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which
in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to
vote.[14] He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date
of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue. [15]
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his comment for
all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must
fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of law is
repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the
doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming respect for
the acts of the other two departments; all laws are presumed to have adhered to
constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is
a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus,
he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives [16] wherein the Court held
that the term residence has been understood to be synonymous with domicile under both
Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one domicile but he can have
two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary; [17] and that the
definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to absentee
voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Courts ruling
in Faypon vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or
permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile. [20]
Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are considered to
have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General suggests that the Court may
have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[21] in so far as it relates to immigrants
and permanent residents in foreign countries who have executed and submitted their
affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through the
execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines with the concurrence of
the President of the Republic had in fact given these immigrants and permanent residents the
opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in
fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they would have formally and
categorically expressed the requisite intentions, i.e., animus manendi and animus
revertendi; that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad possess the
unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution upon approval of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189. [22]
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase,
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest
and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot.Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:
a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
2
f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she
executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence
in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said
Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify
the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines to
live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising
those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given period,
risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered.[23] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC,
the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is first
determined by the legislative department of the government itself. [24]
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be
clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear
showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be
done.[25]
 As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves
the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A.
No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be
construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,[26] the Court held that a constitutional
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone,
but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions
are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest. [27] The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from
the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the
intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional convention. [28]
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section
2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the
exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions,
Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the significance
of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from
the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that
previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. The right of
absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; absentee
voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to
accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable for
them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the privilege of absentee voting
may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in some
jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by
soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district or
precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute
right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality
among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in their
application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of
any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their
texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they
should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted;
and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their
provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the
court should look to the whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire
plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every portion thereof.
[29]
(Emphasis supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. [30] However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to
his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs.
Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. Based on the
3
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country.The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this
country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to
require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which here
has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing or working abroad.
Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought to be about two million
such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions
are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of
the last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now
described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and employees,
and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of workers are to be found in
the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, the
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no insuperable
obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos overseas. Those who have
adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to
embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure
of economic necessity here, find that they have to detach themselves from their families to
work in other countries with definite tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract
employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence
on a permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in
their countries of destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens an
effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying that, I
would like to make a comment on the meaning of residence in the Constitution because I think
it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly
in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of
residence in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying goes, to
improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation,
reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his
professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not willing
to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home,
to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence
of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such residence of
origin.
In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications: residence in
the Philippines and residence in the place where he will vote. As far as residence in the
Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but as far as residence in the
place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different.He
could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and
he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee
voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast
in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy the right of
suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino communities. The
Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and
unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a
logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect, this will require budgetary and
administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine government, mainly through the
COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of
this mechanism that will be put in place to make effective the right to
vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient
to meet the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I
want to thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained
at the proper time. . . . . . . . . .
[33]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos
reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure
to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this
countrys leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering
the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos
with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially because the
Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the term
absentee voting also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us say, studying in
4
Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for instance, in Mindanao, to cast their
votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where they are
registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing students and
military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote. I believe that those
situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The reason we want absentee
voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by
allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.[34]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the
inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems
that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly
mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency
requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed system of
absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain qualifications for
the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the elections.
What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right
of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that the
domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence requirement
or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For instance,
one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the requirement of
residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change the word
Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD, it should be
QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD,
would that not satisfy the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
ABROAD because QUALIFIED would assume that he has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed amendment, I
specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable
qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote. According to Commissioner
Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already took that into account as its
meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to registration we
will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If
it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be continuously abroad for a long time,
perhaps, there can be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to
preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to provide a
system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new qualifications for
these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress
the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as
stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the
reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with
respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by
Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad,
the assumption is that they have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote. In
fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed how
the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in the case of
qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast
their votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered to vote in the
Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are registered in Angeles
City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only for
the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner
Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the
amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually
residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that
the day before the elections he has to fly to the United States, so he could not
cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a
hotel for two days and comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos
temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the
date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that
situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we
need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily abroad, it
need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa.
Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in
Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles,
but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for registration, like
5
listing ones name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad. That is still possible
under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees
with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting
age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he
register? Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with
the registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name
is then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a
registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to
comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are
more clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered
Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close the period of amendments.
[36]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that
they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines,
and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional
provisions,[37] the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor,
thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the
Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this
committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill
will have any effect on this?
 Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various
fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to ones
home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example,
but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a
resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that
Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical
presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our
offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it
reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words, anything
that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on
the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot
vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card holders, but the
Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate
cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am talking
about the Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so.
But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference
here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I think this is
so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it residency has been
interpreted as synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the interpretation
of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a
franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country,
which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise
to enfranchise them and empower them to vote.
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting
process, to wit:
6
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law
which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged
allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of
an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who
have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of
the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments
issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this
Act.Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by
competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies,
consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority
subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of ones
residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent
resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of
the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but
more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under
Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a
voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise.
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their
intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment
of Philippine domicile shall remain.
 Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another reason why
the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to exercise the option
to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin and not to preempt that
choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent
resident status abroad, a requirement for the registration is the submission of a
Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy
or consulate official authorized to administer oath
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this
Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of returning to
be qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has
no purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right
to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be expansive
and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no matter whether
he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote. But if
he is already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanent
residency in the United States, then he must indicate an intention to return.
This is what makes for the definition of domicile. And to acquire the vote, we
thought that we would require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . .
Mr. President, the three administration senators are leaving, maybe we may ask
for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for
the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an
affidavit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an
immigrant or a green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country
any more and that contradicts the definition of domicile under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to the
voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the
family, may decide No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United
States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back. But we want to give him
the opportunity to make that decision. We do not want to make that decision
for him. [39] (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are
disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because
the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos
who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still
be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of
suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines;
otherwise, their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their names from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently
residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who has
not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her intentions
7
to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the
Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the place which has
jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration has
been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in
every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form
prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote
within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in
triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter
certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the
embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas absentee
voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee voter.
Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system
of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in
the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has
not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by
Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would affect
the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those
who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the opportunity
and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
enough resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted
pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to
the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d)
would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the
affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on their promise to
return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a ground to contest the
proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further confusion and doubt on the
integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has
exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year
from the execution of the affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to
determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As expressed in Taada vs. Tuvera,[40] the Court
is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it
impractical.
 Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the
expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who
fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a
registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his
name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the votes
cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three years as
promised?What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the winning
candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years
shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but
their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants or
permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
.........
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken
place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in
which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only
8
proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and Vice-
President.[41]
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for
the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by
the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-
president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board
of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission
equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the
Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of
canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for
the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common
Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power
to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a
constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments
of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may
be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules
promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the
same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees
with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the
petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and
regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.[42] where this Court held that the power
of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement
regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C [43] of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the
petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review
COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making power, to
wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more
than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude
multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates
and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence
of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional
challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and
unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on
Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to
enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio
unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally
enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1
are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the independence of the COMELEC, as
a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the
Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be
designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the
remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate
the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for
prior approval.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the
authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189 is geared
towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid
of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the
JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b)
subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
9
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by
other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be
independent.
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution
wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. [44] In an earlier
case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political
questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The
Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions,
orders and rulings.[46] In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue
the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within
sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in
drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in
recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.
[47]
Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only
if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve,
review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence
of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from
its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress, in
both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions
brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee
in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by
mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon
review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second
paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself
the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed,
as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A.
No. 9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of
Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and the
powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and
party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to
be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

10

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30705 March 25, 1929
MACARIO E. CAESAR, contestant-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO GARRIDO, contestee-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This proceeding is a contest over the office of president in the municipality of Cabalian,
Province of Leyte, a sequel to the general election held on June 5, 1928. As a result of said
election the contestee, Filomeno Garrido, was proclaimed elected with a plurality of 27 votes
over the contestant, Macario E. Caesar. A third candidate for the same office, but he has not
participated in the contest. Upon hearing the case the trial court reversed the result reached
by the board of canvassers and found that the contestant had been elected over Garrido by a
plurality of 71 votes. Judicial declaration was accordingly made to the effect that Macario E.
Caesar had been elected to the office and judgment was given against the contestee Garrido
for costs and expenses, including the fees of the commissioners. From this judgment Garrido
appealed.
The contest was instituted by a motion beginning with the statement that the contest was a
duly qualified elector in the municipality of Cabalian and was a registered candidate who had
received votes for the office of municipal president in the election mentioned. Upon the filing
of this motion, the contestee moved to dismiss on the ground that it was not alleged in the
contestant's motion that the contestant was, at the time of the election, eligible to the office
for which he was a candidate. This motion to dismiss was overruled by the trial court on the
two grounds that the allegation that the protestant was a duly qualified elector and registered
11
candidate should be taken as implying that he was eligible to the office, and that, at any rate,
the ineligibility of a candidate is not proper matter of exception or defense in a contest over
an election. To this ruling the contestee excepted, and error is here assigned thereto.
To dispose of this preliminary matter at once, we may say that we concur in the conclusion of
the trial court that it was unnecessary for the contestant to allege in his motion that he
was eligible to the office of president. The allegations of the motion in this case are in a form
approved by the majority of the court in Viola vs. Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and
Adolfo (47 Phil., 859), and Tabada vs. Zandueta and Vergara (47 Phil., 859); and we are of the
opinion that no more is necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the matter. The case of
Verceles vs. Araneta Diaz (47 Phil., 843), contains nothing in support of the contention of the
appellant to the contrary. The point decided in that case was merely to the effect that it is not
necessary for the contestant to allege in his motion that the contestee was a registered
candidate who had been voted for in the election. It is enough to make this allegation with
respect to the contestant only. Furthermore, as the trial court observed, the question of the
eligibility of a candidate for office is not properly involved in a proceeding of contest. But of
this more will be said in our discussion of the defenses set forth in the contestee's answer.
We now proceed to inquire into the number of votes received by the two respective opponents
who are concerned in this litigation. In this connection we note that the contestant challenges
the returns from one precinct only, namely, the first precinct of Cabalian. It is proved that,
when the votes were counted in this precinct, the inspectors counted 135 votes for the
contestant, Macario E. Caesar, and these were duly noted on the tally sheets. Nevertheless,
when the official returns were made out, two of the three inspectors, constituting a majority of
the board, ruled that these votes could not be returned for the contestant, for the reason that
his name did not appear in the official list of enrolled voters in any precinct in the
municipality, it being supposed that this fact rendered him ineligible to the office and
disqualified him from being considered a candidate. The 135 votes received by him in this
precinct were therefore treated as scattering votes cast for persons not registered as
candidates.
When the contest with respect to this precinct came on to be tried in the Court of First
Instance, commissioners were appointed by the court to open the boxes from the first precinct
and count the votes found therein. When the votes were thus recounted by the
commissioners, it was discovered that the contestant had received 139 votes, and though
exception was taken to twelve of these by the contestee on some ground or other, there
remained in favor of the contestant 127 unexceptional votes. When confronted with this
report, the trial judge correctly held that these 127 votes should be counted for the
contestant; and after adjusting the votes cast for the contestee in the same precinct, his
Honor found that in the entire municipality the contestant had gained the election over the
contestee by the plurality of 71 votes.
In this ruling the trial judge was correct. While it is admitted that the name of the contestant
was not entered as that of a qualified voter in the registration list of any precinct of the
municipality of Cabalian, for the election in question, this circumstance did not justify the
election inspectors of the first precinct in discarding the votes obtained by the contestant in
that precinct. In Yra vs. Abano (52 Phil., 380), this court held that while a candidate, in order
to be eligible for municipal office, must have the general qualifications pertaining to voters, he
need not be actually enrolled in the list of voters. It clearly appears from Exhibit A that the
contestant was duly registered as a candidate to the office of municipal president in the
election in question, and the inspectors had no right to go behind that certificate. The
certificate of registration of a candidate for municipal office must be considered conclusive of
the inspectors as regards the right of such candidate to be credited with the votes which he in
fact receives in the different precincts of the municipality. The general question of the
eligibility of the candidate for office is one with which the inspectors have no concern, their
duties being confined to the conduct of the election, the counting of the votes, and the
certification of the results in so far as relates to the certified candidates.
In the answer filed by the contestee after his motion to dismiss had been overruled it is
alleged, by way of special defense, that, prior to the election, the contestant had not been a
resident of the municipality of Cabalian either for the period of one year necessary to make
him eligible for municipal office or even for the six months necessary to entitle him to be
enrolled among the qualified voters of the municipality. The trial judge, however, held that the
issue, or issues, thus tendered were irrelevant to the contest, and he ignored the testimony
submitted by the contestee tending to establish the fact that the contestant had not been a
resident of Cabalian for the time requisite to make him eligible to the office. In this there was
no error. The ineligibility of the mover of an election contest, supposing him to have been a
duly registered candidate, is not available as a defense in the contest proceeding. The reason
is that the contest raises merely a question as to the number of votes received by the
opposing candidates. Eligibility is a matter wholly apart from the question of the number of
votes received by a candidate, and its solution depends upon considerations quite different
from those involved in a contest. As the law formerly stood, under section 12 of Act No. 1582
and section 2 of Act No. 1726, the ineligible official, being a provincial officer, was removed by
the Governor-General; while in the case of municipal officers, removal was effected by the
provincial board of summary order of the Governor-General. As long as the law remained in
this state, it was a rule that the eligibility of a candidate could not be considered in an election
contest (Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil., 238). The law concerning the removal of ineligible
officials has, however, been charged; and it is now provided that when a person, alleged to be
ineligible, is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right thereto is to be tried, upon the
relation of any elector of the province or municipality concerned, in a special proceeding in
12
the nature of an action of quo warranto; and this proceeding must be instituted within the two
weeks after the proclamation of the election of the person whose right to office is questioned
(Election Law, sec. 408, as amended by Act No. 3387). The result is that, as the law now
stands, the question of eligibility may be tried in a judicial proceeding. But the proceeding in
which it maybe tried is not a contest; and the defense based on the alleged ineligibility of the
contestant is completely incongruous with the issue of an election protest.
Moreover, it is to be observed that the proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to try the
question of the eligibility of a candidate is to be instituted within the two weeks after the
proclamation of the person whose right to office is challenged. In the proceeding now before
us the contestant has never been proclaimed at all and will not be proclaimed, in the sense of
the law, until the decision of this court is published. The issue of ineligibility which is
attempted to be raised in the answer is premature.
Another reason readily suggests itself why the ineligibility of the contestant is not available as
a defense in this contest. This consists in the fact that, if the person who has received a
majority of plurality of votes in any election is found to be ineligible, the result is that the
office is declared vacant and a new election has to be held to fill the vacancy. In the case
before us, if we should accept the defense of the ineligibility of the contestant and adopt the
course of dismissing the contest for that reason, the result would be that the contestee would
be in office though he in fact received fewer votes than the contestant.
But it is said that the court should admit the defense in this proceeding for the purpose of
avoiding circuitry of action. The suggestion is worthy of consideration, because it is a
cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy
in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. But this
rule cannot be applied in a case where the suggested defense is incongruous and premature.
The eligibility of the contestant must, we think, be made the subject of a separate proceeding
at the proper juncture.
In the appealed decision we find an observation to the effect that the contestant's certificate
of candidacy (Exhibit A) is conclusive of the question of the eligibility of the contestant. His
Honor no doubt intended that observation to be understood in connection with this contest,
and in that sense the statement is true. But of course said exhibit would not be conclusive in
any proper proceeding, in the nature of quo warranto, instituted, under section 408 of the
Election Law, for the purpose of testing the eligibility of the contestant to office.
From what has been said it follows that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, and it
is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

13
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 84843-44 January 22, 1990

NURHUSSEIN A. UTUTALUM, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARDEN S. ANNI, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioner, Nurhussein A. Ututalum, prays for the reversal, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, of the 19 April and 31 August 1988 Resolutions of public respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), in Case Nos. SP 87-469 and 87-497, which declined to reject the
election returns from all the precincts of the Municipality of Siasi, Sulu, in the last 30 May
1987 Congressional elections and to annul respondent Arden S. Anni's proclamation.

The undisputed facts follow:

14
1. Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in
the last 30 May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. 30 May was the
date reset by the COMELEC from the 11 May 1987 elections.
2. The election returns from Siasi showed that Petitioner Ututalum obtained four hundred and
eighty-two (482) votes while respondent Anni received thirty-five thousand five hundred and
eighty-one (35,581) votes out of the thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and one (39,801)
registered voters (pp. 13, 187, Rollo). If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner Ututalum
would have a lead of 5,301 votes.
3. On 4 June 1987, during the canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of verbal
objections, filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to
be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of votes" appearing in said returns.
He then claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters per precinct, there
should have been only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their votes,
thereby exceeding the actual authorized voters by 23,947 "ghost voters." (In his Petition,
however, he admits that an error was committed since "in the May 30,1987 elections, Siasi
had 148 precincts" (p. 6, Rollo). He then prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of any
election returns from Siasi.
4. On the same day, 4 June, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed petitioner's
objections because they had been "filed out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass
had already been canvassed by the Board and because the grounds for the objection were not
one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code" (See Order, p. 155, Rollo). Also
on the same day, 4 June 1987, petitioner filed with the Board of Canvassers his Notice of
Appeal from said Resolution to the COMELEC.
5. On 5 June 1987, petitioner filed his first Petition with the COMELEC seeking a declaration of
failure of elections in the Municipality of Siasi and other mentioned municipalities; that the
COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct another election thereat; and order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to desist from proclaiming any candidate pending a final
determination of the Petition.
6. On 8 June 1987, the Provincial Board of Canvassers forwarded Petitioner's appeal as well as
its Order dismissing the written objections to the COMELEC, with the request for authority to
proclaim Respondent Anni as the winning candidate.
7. On 11 June l987, in Case No. SPC 87-180, the COMELEC resolved that there was no failure
of elections in the 1st and 2nd Districts of Sulu except in specified precincts in the 1st District.
8. On 14 June 1987, the Sulu Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Anni as
the winner. He subsequently took his oath of office and entered upon the discharge of its
functions in July 1987.
15
9. On 16 June 1987, petitioner filed a second Petition with the COMELEC praying for the
annulment of Respondent Anni's proclamation and for his own proclamation as Congressman
for the Second District of Sulu.
10. While those two petitions were pending, one Lupay Loong, a candidate for Governor of
Sulu, filed a verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for
purposes of the election of local government officials (docketed as SPC Case No. 87-624, p.
9, Rollo). This Petition was opposed by Respondent Anni. Petitioner Ututalum was not a party
to this proceeding.
On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC issued, in said SPC 87-624, a Resolution annulling the Siasi
List of Voters "on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof
and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new registration of voters for the local
elections of 15 February 1988 (p. 41 Rollo).
Said Resolution was affirmed by this Court in Anni vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81398, 26 January
1988 (p. 43, Rollo). A new Registry List was subsequently prepared yielding only 12,555
names (p. 228, Rollo).
11. Immediately after having been notified of the annulment of the previous Siasi List of
Voters, Petitioner Ututalum filed a supplemental pleading with the COMELEC entreating that
such annulment be considered and applied by the Commission in resolving his two Petitions
against Respondent Anni (p. 319, Rollo).
12. On 19 April 1988, in a consolidated Per Curiam Resolution, the COMELEC (First Division)
denied Petitioner Ututalum's two Petitions "for lack of merit, with the advise (sic) that he may
file an election contest before the proper forum, if so desired." Declared the COMELEC inter
alia:
While we believe that there was padding of the registry list of voters in Siasi, yet to annul
all the votes in this municipality for purposes of the May 30, 1987 elections would
disenfranchise the good or valid votes. As held in Espaldon vs. Comelec (G.R. No. L-78987,
August 25, 1987), this Commission is not the proper forum nor is it a proper ground in a
pre-proclamation controversy, to wit:
Padded voter's list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues that may
be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an election
protest.
Petitioner Ututalum is now before us assailing the foregoing Resolution.
Petitioner contends that the issue he raised before the COMELEC actually referred to
"obviously manufactured returns," a proper subject matter for a pre-proclamation controversy
and, therefore, cognizable by the COMELEC, in accordance with Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides:
 Sec 243. The following shall be the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Further, that the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the
results since its original List of Voters had already been finally annulled; and, lastly, that there
is no need to re-litigate in an election protest the matter of annulment of the Registry List, this
being already a "fait accompli."
It is our considered view, however, that given the factual setting, it can not justifiably be
contended that the Siasi returns, per se, were "obviously manufactured" and, thereby, a
legitimate issue in a pre-proclamation controversy. It is true that in Lagumbay
vs. COMELEC (L-2544, 31 January 1966, 16 SCRA 175), relied upon heavily by Petitioner
Ututalum, this Court ruled that the returns are obviously manufactured where they show a
great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast. The Siasi returns however, do
not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess
of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually
voted out of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the Lagumbay case dealt with the "manufacture" of
returns by those charged with their preparation as shown prima facie on the questioned
returns themselves. Not so in this case which deals with the preparation of the registry list of
voters, a matter that is not reflected on the face of said returns.
Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters,
which, indeed, is not a listed ground for a pre- proclamation controversy.
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.The following shall
be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
16
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.
As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC, L-78987, 25 August 1987:
Padded voters' list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly not among the issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an election
protest.
And as held in the case of Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78994, March 10, 1988:
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive
(see also Sanchez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-78461, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67).
But petitioner insists that the new Registry List should be considered and applied by the
COMELEC as the legal basis in determining the number of votes which could be legally cast in
Siasi. To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively, however, would be to empower it to annul
a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned registry in a
proceeding where petitioner himself was not a party. This cannot be done. In the case
of Bashier vs. COMELEC (L-33692, 24 February 1972, 43 SCRA 238), this Court categorically
ruled:
The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding initiated motu
proprio by the Commission and in which the protagonists here were not parties, cannot
retroactively and without due process result in nullifying accepted election returns in a
previous election simply because such returns came from municipalities where the
precinct books of voters were ordered annulled due to irregularities in their preparation.
Besides, the List of Voters used in the 1987 Congressional elections was then a validly existing
and still unquestioned permanent Registry List. Then, it was the only legitimate roster which
could be used as basis for voting. There was no prior petition to set it aside for having been
effected with fraud, intimidation, force, or any other similar irregularity in consonance with
Section 145 of the Omnibus Election Code. 1 That list must then be considered conclusive
evidence of persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election
(Abendante vs. Relato 94 Phil. 8; Medenilla vs. Kayanan, L-28448-49, 30 July 1971, 40 SCRA
154).
Moreover, the preparation of a voter's list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers.
A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of
Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors (Sanchez vs. COMELEC, ante), and such
challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should have
made specific verbal objections (Sec. 245, Omnibus Election Code; Pausing vs. Yorac, et al.,
G.R. No. 82700, 4 August 1988, Endique vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 82020-21, 22 November Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, a discussion of the other peripheral issues raised
1988), but did not. has been rendered unnecessary.

That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolutions are
Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a AFFIRMED. No costs.
pre-proclamation controversy either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted,
the proper course of action is an election protest. SO ORDERED.

Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an election
contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to
disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of
only a relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant
disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and
terrorism (GAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665).

Petitioner Ututalum's other submission is that the Siasi returns should be excluded since the
List of Voters on which it was based has been conclusively annulled. He thus asks for the
application of the rule on res judicata. This is neither possible. Aside from the fact that the
indispensable requisites of res judicata, namely, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action are not all present, the ruling desired would, as the COMELEC had opined,
disenfranchise the good and valid votes in the Congressional elections of 30 May 1987.

Finally, this Petition has to fail if only on the basis of the equally important doctrine enunciated
in Padilla vs.COMELEC (L-68351-52, 9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424), reiterated in Baldo
vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 83205,14 July 1988) that:

Where the respondent had already been proclaimed as the elected representative of the
contested congressional district, and has long assumed office and has been exercising the
powers, functions, and duties appurtenant to said office, the remedy of the petitioner lies
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-proclamation controversy
becomes moot and academic.

and in the more recent case of Antonio vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 84678, 29 March 1989):

Where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation

controversies cease. A pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point in
time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy thereafter is an election protest
before the proper forum. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matter in
controversy conclusively and once and for all.

17
 It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
decide the babys fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in half. For that is what the
COMELEC exactly did in this case.

On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

(LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only
the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse
the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated
that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on
indefinite forced leave. In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated
Acting Secretary General. The Manifestation concluded with this prayer:

A. The Honorable Commission recognizes [sic] only those Certificates of Candidacy to

which are attached Certificates of Nomination executed by LDP Party
Chairman Edgardo J. Angara or by such other officers of the LDP whom he may
authorize in writing, and whose written authorizations shall be deposited with
the Honorable Commission by the LDP General Counsel.

B. The Honorable Commission declares [sic] as a nullity, denies [sic] due course or
cancels [sic] all Certificates of Candidacy not endorsed by LDP Party Chairman
Angara or by such other LDP officials as may be authorized by him.

C. The Honorable Commission takes [sic] note of the designation of Ambassador Enrique
Ike A. Zaldivar as Acting Secretary General of the LDP, and for the Honorable
Commission to honor and recognize the official acts, to the exclusion of
everyone, of Ambassador Zaldivar for and in behalf of the LDP as Secretary
General.[1]

On December 16, 2003, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party
Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary
EN BANC
General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino
asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.
[G.R. No. 161265. February 24, 2004]

On December 17, 2003, the parties agreed to file a joint manifestation pending which the
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its
proceedings were deemed suspended. On December 22, 2003, however, only the LDP General
Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA VS. THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO
Counsel filed an Urgent Manifestation reiterating the contents of the December 8,
2003 Manifestation. The COMELEC also received a Letter from Rep. Aquino stating that the
parties were unable to arrive at a joint manifestation.

TINGA, J.:
The Bible tells the story of how two women came to King Solomon to
decide who among them, is the babys true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary wisdom,
awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim after he threatened to split the baby
into two.
The next day, the LDP General Counsel filed a Second Urgent Manifestation disputing
newspaper accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended Sen. Angara as Party Chairman.
On December 26, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Order requiring the parties to file a
verified petition. It turned out that, two days before, Sen. Angara had submitted a

18
verified Petition, in essence, reiterating the contents of its previous Manifestations. Attached
to the Petition was a Resolution[2] adopted by the LDP National Executive Council, stating:
WHEREAS, on September 25, 2003, the National Executive Council of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) convened and unanimously passed a resolution granting full
authority to Party Chairman Edgardo J. Angara to enter, negotiate and conclude a coalition
agreement with other like-minded opposition parties, aggrupations and interest groups with
the sole purpose of uniting the political opposition and fielding a unity ticket for the May 10,
2004 elections;
WHEREAS, on December 3, 2003, the LDP, together with the Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino
(PMP) and the Partido Demokratiko ng Pilipinas - LABAN (PDP-LABAN) forged a coalition to
form the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP);
WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of the KNP subsequently adopted its resolution entitled:
Resolution Choosing Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as the Standard Bearer of the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10,
2004 National Elections;
....
WHEREAS, the process of unification of the political opposition and the actions taken in
connection therewith by Chairman Angara and by other governing bodies of the LDP required
the taking of immediate and forceful action by them to preserve and protect the integrity,
credibility, unity and solidarity of the LDP, and ensure the attainment of unification of the
political opposition;
WHEREAS, such immediate and forceful action include those that have to do with pre-emptive
efforts to diffuse the chaos, confusion and disunity projected by the pronouncements and acts
of some officers and members to the general membership of the LDP and the electorate, such
as the one taken by the Regional Committee for Region VI (Western Visayas) on December 6,
2003; the enforcement of order in the LDP through the voice of a central leadership in
command in an otherwise extraordinary and emergency situation, such as the one taken by
Party Chairman Angara on December 6, 2003; the filing of the Manifestation with the
COMELEC on the matter of the authorized signatories for the nominations and, the adoption of
resolutions by the regional committees affirming their trust and confidence in Chairman
Angara, and authorizing him to choose the presidential standard bearer for the May 10, 2004
elections; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT
RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, By the National Executive Council, to ratify and
confirm the Covenant of National Unity, the Declaration of Unity entered into by Party
Chairman Edgardo J. Angara, and all acts and decisions taken by him to enforce and
implement the same;
19
RESOLVED, FURTHER, To ratify and confirm all other acts and decisions of Chairman Angara
and other governing bodies to preserve the integrity, credibility, unity and solidarity of the
LDP; and,
RESOLVED, FINALLY, To reiterate the vote of confidence of the National Executive Council in,
and support to, the continued efforts of Chairman Angara to unite the political opposition. [3]
Rep. Aquino filed his Answer to the Petition on December 30, 2003. The COMELEC heard
the parties on oral arguments on the same day, after which the case was submitted for
resolution.
Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate
for President was filed with the COMELEC. The Certificate of Nomination was signed by Rep.
Aquino as LDP Secretary General.
On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came to a decision.
The Commission identified the sole issue as who among the [LDP] officers [are]
authorized to authenticate before the Commission that the person filing the certificate of
candidacy as party nominee for a certain position is the official candidate of the party chosen
in accordance with its Constitution.[4]
The COMELEC recognized that it has the authority to act on matters pertaining to the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers. [5] In the same
breath, however, it held that internal party matters and wranglings [sic] are purely for the
party members to settle among themselves and any unsettled controversy should be brought
to the proper forum with jurisdiction. The question of who was suspended by whom was thus
left for such proper forum to resolve. [6] Noting that the intramurals in the LDP as an internal
party matter seems to be irreconcilable for the present when the filing of Certificate of
Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination are about to reach the deadline, the COMELEC
disposed of the Petition in the following fashion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED with LEGAL EQUITY for both
Petitioner and Oppositor. The candidates for President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan
Kagawad nominated and endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the
Commission as official candidates of LDP Angara Wing. The candidates from President down to
the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and endorsed by LDP Secretary General
Agapito Butz Aquino are recognized as official candidates of LDP Aquino Wing.
Consequently, each faction or Wing is entitled to a representative to any election committee
to which it may be entitled as created by the Commission for the May 10, 2004 elections.For
the copies of the election returns, the Angara Wing will be entitled to the copies corresponding
to odd number of precincts, that is, Precinct Nos. 1, 3, 5, etc., and for the Aquino Wing to
the even number of precincts, that is Precinct Nos. 2, 4, 6, etc. This is on the assumption that
the LDP or as a party within a registered Political Coalition becomes a recognized and
denominated as a Dormant [sic] Minority Party under the Election Laws. The two LDP Wings
are further entitled to and be accorded the rights and privileges with corresponding legal
obligations under Election Laws.[7]
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. concurred in the Resolution authored by Commissioner Rufino S.B.
Javier. Chair Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., joined by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, submitted
dissenting opinions.
Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari[8] assailing the
COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Thereafter, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment.
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation and Motion praying for the
granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus filed a separate Comment to the Petition.
The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party
and its legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the
power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election.[9] In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the
Commission is endowed with ample wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was
created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.[10]
Thus, in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections which involved the leadership fight in the
Liberal Party, [11] this Court held:
that the respondent [COMELEC] has jurisdiction to hear and decide SP Case No. 85-021
[involving a petition to prohibit Eva Estrada Kalaw from usurping or using the title or position
of President of the Liberal Party] in view of its powers under Article IX-C, Section 2, of the
Constitution to, among others, enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, decide all questions affecting elections, register and regulate political parties, and
insure orderly elections. These powers include the determination of the conflicting claims
made in SP Case No. 85-021, which are likely to cause confusion among the electorate if not
resolved. Additionally, the COMELEC is mandated by the Election Code to inter aliarequire
candidates to specify their political party affiliation in their certificates of candidacy, allow
political parties to appoint watchers, limit the expenditures of each political party, determine
whether or not a political party shall retain its registration on the basis of its showing in the
preceding elections, etc. These matters include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution of such
controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into two wings
under separate leaders each claiming to be the president of the entire party. [Emphasis
supplied.]
20
Likewise in Palmares v. Commission on Elections,[12] to which the
assailed Resolution made reference and which involved the Nacionalista Party, [13] this Court
ruled
that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-
C.] Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of
such political party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the
power to register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers
are. Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper
case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.
This Court then proceeded to quote from Kalaw, supra.
The two cited decisions find support in Sumulong v. Commission on Elections [14] and Sotto
v. Commission on Elections,[15] where this Court, in resolving the issue as to who between the
factions of a political party was entitled to nominate election inspectors, necessarily settled
claims to the partys leadership. Both cases were decided without question on the COMELECs
power to determine such claims. In conformity with jurisprudence, this Court did not identify
the COMELECs jurisdiction as an issue when this case was heard on oral argument.
There is no inconsistency between the above cases on the one hand and this Courts more
recent ruling in Sinaca v. Mula[16] on the other. In the latter case, this Court held:
A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to
select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference. Political
parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this
common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free
association, serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without
undue interference. Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party
nominations rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the courts [sic] jurisdiction.
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court
will not assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but
will leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the
electors at the polls. Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative
regulations defining how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being
made in certain ways, political parties may handle such affairs, including nominations, in such
manner as party rules may establish. [Emphasis supplied.]
Sinaca, unlike previous cases, did not involve the question of party identity or leadership;
hence, it was not necessary for the COMELEC to delve therein. None of the candidates
involved in that case were claiming to be the political partys sole candidate.
 In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that
under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary
General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General
vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party
identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the
candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not.
The repercussions of the question of party identity and leadership do not end at the
validity of the endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be the
partys standard bearer. The law grants a registered political party certain rights and
privileges,[17] which, naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. It is also for this
significant dimension that Sinaca is not applicable in this case. As conceded in Sinaca itself,
the Court will have to assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a
political party where a controlling statute or clear legal right is involved. [18] Verily, there is
more than one law, as well as a number of clear legal rights, that are at stake in the case at
bar.
The law accords special treatment to political parties. The dominant majority party, the
dominant minority party as determined by the COMELEC, for instance, is entitled to a copy of
the election returns.[19] The six (6) accredited major political parties may nominate the
principal watchers to be designated by the Commission. [20] The two principal watchers
representing the ruling coalition and the dominant opposition coalition in a precinct shall, if
available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.
[21]
Three (3) of the six accredited major political parties are entitled to receive copies of the
certificate of canvass.[22] Registered political parties whose candidates obtained at least ten
percent (10%) of the total votes cast in the next preceding senatorial election shall each have
a watcher and/or representative in the procurement and watermarking of papers to be used in
the printing of election returns and official ballots and in the printing, numbering, storage, and
distribution thereof.[23] Finally, a candidate and his political party are authorized to spend more
per voter than a candidate without a political party.[24]
It is, therefore, in the interest of every political party not to allow persons it had not
chosen to hold themselves out as representatives of the party. Corollary to the right of a
political party to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard
bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference [25] is the right to exclude
persons in its association and to not lend its name and prestige to those which it deems
undeserving to represent its ideals. A certificate of candidacy makes known to the COMELEC
that the person therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized political group
empowered to act and that it reflects accurately the sentiment of the nominating body. [26] A
candidates political party affiliation is also printed followed by his or her name in the certified
list of candidates.[27] A candidate misrepresenting himself or herself to be a partys candidate,
therefore, not only misappropriates the partys name and prestige but foists a deception upon
the electorate, who may unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken belief that
he or she stands for the partys principles. To prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC has the
power and the duty to step in and enforce the law not only to protect the party but, more
21
importantly, the electorate, in line with the Commissions broad constitutional mandate to
ensure orderly elections.
Having revisited and clarified the jurisdiction of COMELEC to rule upon questions of party
identity and leadership as an incident to its enforcement powers, this Court cannot help but
be baffled by the COMELECs ruling declining to inquire into which party officer has the
authority to sign and endorse certificates of candidacy of the partys nominees.
The only issue in this case, as defined by the COMELEC itself, is who as between the
Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy
of the official candidates of the party. Indeed, the petitioners Manifestation and Petition before
the COMELEC merely asked the Commission to recognize only those certificates of candidacy
signed by petitioner Sen. Angara or his authorized representative, and no other.
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It
need not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need
only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.
The LDP has a set of national officers composed of, among others, the Party Chairman
and the Secretary General.[28] The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party,
whose powers and functions include:
(1) To represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for
and on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the
National Congress and the National Executive Council. [29]
The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the
day-to-day operations of the Party. Among his powers and functions is:
(1) When empowered by the Party Chairman, to sign documents for and on behalf of
the Party. [30]
The Secretary Generals authority to sign documents, therefore, is only a delegated
power, which originally pertains to the Party Chairman.
Rep. Aquino claims that he was authorized to exercise to sign the party candidates
certificates of candidacy in the previous elections. Indeed, the COMELEC found that:
In fact, during the May 14, 2001 elections, oppositor Agapito Butz Aquino, as LDP Secretary
General, was authorized by the LDP to sign for the Certificates of Nomination of the LDP
Senatorial Candidates, including the Certificate of Nomination for Senatorial Candidate
Edgardo J. Angara, a copy of said Certificate of Nomination and a copy of the Certificate for
Senator Edgardo J. Angara are attached as Annexes A and B, respectively. This action by
Secretary General Aquino is in accordance with the Constitution and By-laws of LDP, not
questioned by the LDP signed by its Secretary General. This revocation has not been revoked
or recalled by the National Congress of the LDP which is the one authorized to nominate
candidates for President and Vice-President, respectively. [31]
Assuming that Rep. Aquino previously had such authority, this Court cannot share the
COMELECs finding that the same has not been revoked or recalled. No revocation of such
authority can be more explicit than the totality of Sen.
Angaras Manifestations and Petition before the COMELEC, through which he informed the
Commission that Rep. Aquinos had been placed on indefinite forced leave and that
Ambassador Zaldivar has been designated Acting Secretary General, who shall henceforth
exercise all the powers and functions of the Secretary General under the Constitution and By-
Laws of the LDP.[32] As the prerogative to empower Rep. Aquino to sign documents devolves
upon Sen. Angara, so he may choose, at his discretion, to withhold or revoke such power.
Both respondents Rep. Aquino and COMELEC also cited Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 6453[33] as basis for the Party Secretary Generals authority to sign certificates of
candidacy. Said Section 6 states:
SEC. 6. Certificate of nomination of official candidates by political party. The certificate of
nomination of registered political parties or coalitions of political parties of their official
candidates shall be filed not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, which
is January 2, 2004 duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman,
secretary-general or any other duly authorized officer and shall bear the acceptance of the
nominee by affixing his signature in the space provided therein. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.]
Clearly, however, the above provision presupposes that the party president, chairman or
secretary-general has been duly authorized by the party to sign the certificate of
candidacy.COMELEC Resolution No. 6453 cannot grant a party official greater authority than
what the party itself grants, lest such Resolution amount to a violation of the partys freedom
of association.
Neither does the Party Secretary General have the power to nominate the official
candidates of the LDP. That power resides in the governing bodies of the Party. [34] In particular,
the National Congress, which is the highest policy-making and governing body of the Party,
has the power
(6) To nominate the official candidates of the Party for President, Vice President, and
Senators, and, whenever the corresponding conventions fail to meet or to
make the requisite nominations, to nominate the official candidates for
municipal city, congressional district, provincial and regional elective offices.
[35]
Not only does Rep. Aquino insist on his power to sign Certificates of Candidacy on behalf
of the LDP but he would also deny Sen. Angara that power on account of the latters
22
preventive suspension. It seems, however, that respondent has abandoned this tack by the
silence of his Memorandum on the matter.
In any case, it appears that on November 28, 2003, Representative Rolex Suplico, LDP
Region VI Regional Chairman, filed a complaint with Rep. Aquino against Party Chairman Sen.
Angara for disloyalty to the Party, gross violation of the Party Constitution, and other divisive
acts inimical to the interest of the party and its members. Rep. Aquino, as Secretary General,
created a committee composed of three (3) members of the LDP National Executive Council to
investigate the complaint and recommend appropriate action thereon. On December 12,
2003, the investigating committee issued a resolution placing Sen. Angara under preventive
suspension effective immediately and directing him to refrain from performing acts in behalf
of the party until the committee finishes its investigation and submits its final
recommendations.
The authority to create the investigating committee supposedly rests on Section 9 (4),
Article VI of the LDP Constitution, which enumerates the powers and functions of the
Secretary General:
(4) With the concurrence of the Party Chairman, to enforce Party
discipline. {Emphasis supplied.]
Evidently, just as Rep. Aquino has no power to sign and nominate candidates in behalf of
the LDP, neither does he have the power to enforce Party discipline or, as an incident thereto,
to create an investigating committee, without the Party Chairmans concurrence. Much less
does the investigating committee so created have the power to place the Party Chairman
under preventive suspension since its authority stems from a nullity. Simply put, the spring
has no source.
The lack of Rep. Aquinos authority to sign documents or to nominate candidates for the
LDP would not result in the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the certificates of
candidacy he may have signed on behalf of the LDP. [36] The exclusive ground for the denial of
due course to or the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy for any elective office is that any
material representation contained therein as required by law is false. [37] Since the signature of
Rep. Aquino was affixed either prior to, or on the basis of, the
challenged Resolutionrecognizing his authority to sign on behalf of the LDP, the same would
not constitute material representation that is false. In such case, the candidates are simply
deemed as not nominated by the LDP and are considered independent candidates pursuant to
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6453:
SEC. 7. Effect of filing certificate of nomination. A candidate who has not been nominated by a
registered political party or its duly authorized representative, or whose nomination has not
been submitted by a registered political party shall be considered as an independent
candidate.
 COMELEC Commissioner Sadain referred to the above provision in his Dissenting Opinion,
and this Court finds refreshing wisdom so sorely wanting in the majority opinion in his
suggestion that:
All other party members representing themselves to be candidates of the party shall not be
deprived of their right to file their respective certificates of candidacy and run for office, if so
qualified, but that they shall not be accorded the rights and privileges reserved by election
laws for official nominees of registered political parties. Instead, they shall be treated as
independent candidates.[38]
From the foregoing, it is plain that the COMELEC misapplied equity in the present
case. For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement.[39] Equity is described as justice without legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant, although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. [40] The COMELEC
should have decided the case on the basis of the party constitution and election laws. It chose
not to because of its irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino put it, on unchartered
territories.[41] But, as shown above, these territories have long been charted by jurisprudence
and, in any case, the COMELEC need not have sailed far from the shore to arrive at the correct
conclusion. In truth, the COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity.
Worse, the COMELEC divided the LDP into wings, each of which may nominate candidates
for every elective position. Both wings are also entitled to representatives in the election
committees that the Commission may create. In the event that the LDP is accorded dominant
minority party election status, election returns of odd-numbered precincts shall be furnished
the Angara wing and those of even-numbered precincts, the Aquino wing.
By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs strength and
undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the Commissions nod as the dominant
minority party.
By allowing each wing to nominate different candidates, the COMELEC planted the seeds
of confusion among the electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two candidates from a
single political party. In Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[42] this Court declared that the
electoral process envisions one candidate from a political party for each position, and disunity
and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery
thereof. The admonition against mocking the electoral process not only applies to political
parties but with greater force to the COMELEC.
By according both wings representatives in the election committees, the COMELEC has
eroded the significance of political parties and effectively divided the opposition. The
COMELEC has lost sight of the unique political situation of the Philippines where, to
paraphrase Justice Perfectos concurring opinion in Sotto, supra, the administration party has
always been unnecessarily and dangerously too big and the opposition party too small to be
an effective check on the administration. The purpose of according dominant status and
representation to a minority party is precisely to serve as an effective check on the
23
majority. The COMELEC performed a disservice to the opposition and, ultimately, to the voting
public, as its Resolutionfacilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority party.
By splitting copies of the election returns between the two factions, the COMELEC has
fractured both wings. The practical purpose of furnishing a party with a copy of the election
returns is to allow it to tally the results of the elections at the precinct level. Ultimately, it is a
guard against fraud. Thus, resort to copies thereof may be had when the election returns are
delayed, lost or destroyed,[43] or when they appear to be tampered or falsified. [44] A split party
without a complete set of election returns cannot successfully help preserve the sanctity of
the ballot.
It bears reminding respondent Commission of this Courts pronouncement in Peralta v.
Commission on Elections,[45] which, while made in the backdrop of a parliamentary form of
government, holds equally true under the present government structure:
political parties constitute a basic element of the democratic institutional
apparatus. Government derives its strength from the support, active or passive, of a coalition
of elements of society. In modern times the political party has become the instrument for the
organization of societies. This is predicated on the doctrine that government exists with the
consent of the governed. Political parties perform an essential function in the management of
succession to power, as well as in the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of
public policy.They amass sufficient support to buttress the authority of governments; or, on
the contrary, they attract or organize discontent and dissatisfaction sufficient to oust the
government. In either case they perform the function of the articulation of the interests and
aspirations of a substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be
promotive of the national weal.
The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, but subverts, this philosophy behind
political parties.
As if to rationalize its folly, the COMELEC invokes the constitutional policy towards a free
and open party system.[46] This policy, however, envisions a system that shall evolve
according to the free choice of the people,[47] not one molded and whittled by the
COMELEC. When the Constitution speaks of a multi-party system, it does not contemplate the
COMELEC splitting parties into two. For doing just that, this pretender to the throne of King
Solomon acted whimsically and capriciously. Certiorari lies against it, indeed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is
GRANTED IN PART. Respondent Commission on Elections is directed to recognize as official
candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy
are signed by LDP Party Chairman Senator Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized
representative/s.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast
in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or
24
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19,19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA
No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition: 6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a
citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after
the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for
his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on
June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon
to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-
317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was
no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-
Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
 On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the
Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as
Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass,
proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered
the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to
hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996,
the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant
the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof
retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of
which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo
from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is
not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the
proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
25
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics
supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition
for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal
issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to
the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared
a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of
having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by
repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the
prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00
p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects,
which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility
as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics
be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the
copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist." 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once
createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as
26
is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only
on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application.
On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under
these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of
his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not
difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself
requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said
decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire
his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who
openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the
United States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches
of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of
the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were
granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid,
nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of
his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R.
10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that
only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a
mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or
not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid,
then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all
by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
 * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of
at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day 32 the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as
of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from
a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the
time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications
unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this
Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,
i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted
but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to
the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or
for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter." And, under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he was
not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as
another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to
govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In
other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
27
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo
has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous
elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from
the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on
how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo
Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate.
Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995),
Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance
earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed
as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence,
at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule,
such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement.They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to
correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for
a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725
expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship
xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to
these womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new
remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs.Securities
and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon
the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A.
63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and
thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation.
"(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should
so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof."45It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence.
And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative
intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t
has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident
purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some
constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
28
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right
or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice
to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.48The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated,
should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e.,
on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May
8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became
final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been
issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor
on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo.
Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct")
declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995
elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in
the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can
no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its
assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However,
there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for
the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated
March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court,
however, was in connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or
for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in
SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by
the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again,
Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-
317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary
period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or
a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power
to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length
on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is
one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
29
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs.COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only
six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not
the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx
just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this
Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even
allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for
the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this
case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others
can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate
of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to
"bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was
ineligible. If Labohas any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Leeshould be
proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the
choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his
citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and
should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December
19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any
rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong." (Italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension
(not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is
a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the
first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court
abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not
see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally
cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of
the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992,
which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false
material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel.
Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were
issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide
disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
30
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within
the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated
by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed
beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining
his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995
elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who
are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own
citizens not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a
finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be
arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in
all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for
such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only
of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there
be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not
elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest
of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same
way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on
the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in
reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's
thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather
extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the
Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue
is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
 At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of
upon this Court's conscience. Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic
EPILOGUE every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal
term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines
effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of
time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful
right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once
of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself,
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the overwhelming choice.
start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as (1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a (2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we event, it has no merit.
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to No costs.
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations. SO ORDERED.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political
laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice,
this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to
the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled
by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court
could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible
due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995
elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the
time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from
running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from EN BANC
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the
31
[G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001]
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was
issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May
14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en
banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001,
[1]
while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.[2]
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition [3] to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said
consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the
sum of P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence,
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public
office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
106709.However, in its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed
the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. [7] Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that
he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due
course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction
has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the
trial court for promulgation in his presence. [9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction
was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
32
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was
forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas petition, issued
the challenged Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for
and from holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following
the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11]
Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a
Resolution[12] dated May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis ours)
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in
Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[13]
In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for
the Supreme Court to determine.[16] We further pronounced therein that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves
moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of whether a crime
involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can
be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime
of fencing punishable by a special law.[18]
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal
to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No.
958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of
P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court. (Emphasis ours).
33
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. [21] The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,[22] through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. [23]Thus,
paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,
insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not
[24]
apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuandas conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and
28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension
was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There
we said in part:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of
which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x.[25] (Emphasis ours)
 Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer
or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when
committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member.

We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this Courts ruling in Tuanda has been
abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, [26] which
reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted by this
Court. Only a fine was imposed.Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence,
the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is
what we said in Rosa Lim:

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on
them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that
petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was
committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best
serve the ends of criminal justice.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in

issuing the assailed Resolutions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

34
 [G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996]

ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARCIAL

VILLANUEVA, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification
of two resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in SPA No. 95-047, a case for
disqualification filed against petitioner before the COMELEC. [1]

The first assailed resolution dated May 6,1995 declared the petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8,1995 elections, citing as
the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991)[2] which provides as follows:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence;

(b) x x x x x x x x x.

In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that:

Documentary evidence x x x established that herein respondent (petitioner in this case) was
found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court, x x x in Criminal Case No. 14723 for violation of P.D.
1612, (otherwise known as the Anti-fencing Law) in a Decision dated June 1,1990. Respondent
appealed the said conviction with the Regional Trial Court x x x, which however, affirmed
respondents conviction in a Decision dated November 14,1990. Respondents conviction
became final on January 18,1991.

xxxxxxxxx

x x x, there exists legal grounds to disqualify respondent as candidate for Mayor of Cavinti,
Laguna this coming elections. Although there is dearth of jurisprudence involving violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 or P.D.1612 x x x, the nature of the offense under P.D. 1612 with
which respondent was convicted certainly involves moral turpitude x x x. [3]
EN BANC
35
 The second assailed resolution, dated August 28, 1995, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In said motion, petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the
MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and
all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. [4]
The two (2) issues to be resolved are:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)s applicability.
Particularly involved in the first issue is the first of two instances contemplated in Section
40 (a) when prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification - i, e., when the
conviction by final judgment is for an offense involving moral turpitude. And in this
connection, the Court has consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary
of moral turpitudeas:
x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[5]
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. [6] In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in
se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not[7], the rationale of which was
set forth in Zari v. Flores,[8] to wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited. [9]
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for
in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC,[10] the Court admitted that it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but
rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding
the violation of the statute.[11]
36
The Court in this case shall nonetheless dispense with a review of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, inasmuch as petitioner after all does
not assail his conviction. Petitioner has in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
fencing. At any rate, the determination of whether or not fencing involves moral turpitude can
likewise be achieved by analyzing the elements alone.
Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D.1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) as:
a. x x x the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. [12]
From the foregoing definition may be gleaned the elements of the crime of fencing which
are:
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft ; and [Underscoring
supplied.]
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. [13]
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the
fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are
crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking
differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the
robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the
process private duties they owe their fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x
accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good
morals. The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with
malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on Human
Relations and Solutio Indebiti,to wit:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. [17] Clearly then,
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. petitioners theory has no merit.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 6,1995 and August 28,1995 are AFFIRMED in toto.

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, SO ORDERED.
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have actual knowledge, but
merely should have known the origin of the property received. In this regard, the Court held:

When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high probability of its existence unless he
actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know denote the
fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists.[14] [Italics supplied.]

Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that
the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with
the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact
that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest
the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the
presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that mere possession of any goods, x x x,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing- a presumption that is, according to the Court, reasonable for no
other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of x x x possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. [15] All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying
the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously
convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude.

Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of
suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it to say
that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.
[16]
Petitioners conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists
and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation,

37
38
 On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less
than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by
a certain Nena Tordesillas. The Court held:

WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY
COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS
HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND
WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

x x x x x x x x x[2]

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.

After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national
elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City
Councilors.However, his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his
successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who
wanted to dislodge him from his position.

One such case was a petition for quo warranto[3] filed before the COMELEC by Cenon
Ronquillo, another candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility
to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two
EN BANC more cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the Ombudsman and in
the Department of Interior and Local Government. [4] All these challenges were, however,
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997] dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos continued stay in office.

WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HUMBERTO Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for
BASCO, respondents. councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he
beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his
right to office was again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a
registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for the suspension of his
ROMERO, J.:
proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected
Councilor of Manilas Second District.
The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996,
On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly
dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the
furnished with a copy of the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this
COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995, which also dismissed the petition for
petition only two days later.
disqualification[1] filed by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private respondent Humberto Basco.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the
The essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.

39
 Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC
proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. [5] Basco immediately
took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to
annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by
the Manila City BOC. He reiterated Bascos disqualification and prayed anew that candidate
Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by
filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with Reservation to Submit Answer and/or
Motion to Dismiss Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with Temporary Restraining
Order).
On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the
reservation he made earlier, summarizing his contentions and praying as follows:
Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the following
reasons:
1. The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of the Local
Government Code because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res
judicata, lis pendens, bar by prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis;
2. Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to persons
who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of
attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation
and unconstitutional on the account.
3. Respondent had already been proclaimed. And the petition being a preproclamation contest
under the Marquez v. Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be dismissed by virtue of said
pronouncement.
4. Respondents three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by
the people of previous misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec G.R. 105128; Rice v. State 161 SCRA
401; Montgomery v. Newell 40 SW 2d 4181; People v. Bashaw 130 P. 2nd 237, etc.).
5. As petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed; it was
premature as an election protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest as such
protest.:
PRAYER
40
WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant motion to
dismiss the prayer for restraining order denied (sic). If this Honorable Office is not minded to
dismiss, it is respectfully prayed that instant motion be considered as respondents answer. All
other reliefs and remedies just and proper in the premises are likewise hereby prayed for.
After the parties respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELECs First Division
resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that the
administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on October 31,
1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him and that on account
of Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected councilor of the Second
District of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable. [6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its assailed resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. [7] Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position
since he had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to
Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the
Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992.[8]
Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:
1. Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to
those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992;
2. Whether or not private respondents election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City
Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him;
3. Whether or not private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on
May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by
COMELEC, is void ab initio; and
4. Whether or not Romualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates
for City Councilor of Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646.
While we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the COMELEC in
the assailed resolution, nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in
dismissing the petition for disqualification. The instant petition must, therefore, fail.
We shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim.
I. Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner anchors Bascos
alleged disqualification to run as City Councilor states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x x x x x x.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1,
1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Bascos
dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as
worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in
order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court
that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case,
regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies.[9] To him, this interpretation is made more evident by the manner in
which the provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating
the grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision must have also
referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code. [10]
We do not, however, subscribe to petitioners view. Our refusal to give retroactive
application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. Thus, in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC,[11] reiterated
in the more recent cases of Reyes vs. COMELEC[12] and Salalima vs. Guingona, Jr.,[13] we ruled,
thus:
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) which
provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local positions:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.
41
The rule is:
xxxxxxxxx
x x x Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is
equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so
as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and
necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. x x x (Jones vs. Summers, 105 Cal.
App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. vs. Whyel 28 (2d) 30; Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55 SCRA 533 [1974],
cited in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 [1974]. See also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA
789 [1989]; Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,
et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8, 1992).
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to
the present case. (Underscoring supplied).
That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates
removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the
applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only
prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute,
despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events
or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks
forward, not backward.[14]
II. Did private respondents election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992
and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus
restoring his eligibility for public office?
Petitioner maintains the negative. He quotes the earlier ruling of the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC[15] to the effect that a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate
alone through the instrumentality of the ballot. Thus:
x x x (T)he qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. x x x
At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioners
argument. However, the issue of whether or not Bascos triple election to office cured his
alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the
assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous
elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to
any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we
said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of
the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court to still
dwell on the matter at length.
Anent Bascos alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against
reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and
instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view
that petitioners contention is baseless. Neither does petitioners argument that the term any
position is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit
any consideration.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running
for any elective position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the
Court couched the prohibition in this wise:
x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term reinstatement. Under the
former Civil Service Decree,[16] the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was
administratively dismissed from office, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning,
referring only to an appointive position. Thus:
ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.
SEC. 24. Personnel Actions. -
xxxxxxxxx
(d) Reinstatement. - Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the
career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated
therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified.
x x x x x x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on
November 10, 1975,[17] provides a clearer definition. It reads:
RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS.
42
SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINMENT of a person who was previously separated from
the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career
service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise
barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the
prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.
III. Is private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995,
while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab
initio?
To support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section 20,
paragraph (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our
ruling in the cases of Duremdes v. COMELEC,[18] Benito v. COMELEC[19] and Aguam v. COMELEC.
[20]
We are not convinced. The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of
context. For the sake of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.
Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.-
xxxxxxxxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by
the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the
losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the
contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
x x x x x x x x x.
The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much
patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to
contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.
Next, petitioner cites Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (Underscoring supplied).
This provision, however, does not support petitioners contention that the COMELEC, or
more properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The
use of the word may indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is
merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.[21] What is merely
made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the
question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of
proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith
and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and
capriciously.[22] The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional
body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, [23] has more than
enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even
given finality.[24] The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the
records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this
Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion.
It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure [25] states that:
SEC. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning
number of votes in such election.
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead
remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement.Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant
nor to modify, the law.[26] Thus, in Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr.,
[27]
the Court ruled that:
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect
what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908
in the case of United States v. Barrias. The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power
was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, decided in 1914, thus: Of
course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So
long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law,
they are valid.
43
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said power of
administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-
28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v.
Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations,
see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655,
676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
xxxxxxxxx
x x x The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word may, it is, therefore, improper and
highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word shall in its rules.
Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco
as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election
returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a
mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes
based on such returns and declare the result. This has been the rule as early as in the case
of Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Laguna [28] where we clarified the nature of the
functions of the Board of Canvassers, viz.:
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent
result of the voting. All other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for
contesting elections or in quo warranto proceedings. (9 R.C.L., p. 1110)
 To the same effect is the following quotation:
x x x Where there is no question as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the returns
are before them, the powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the mechanical or
mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns
before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. (20 C.J., 200-201)
[Underscoring supplied]
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all
irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose
than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not in any manner refer to void
proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.
conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his
alleged disqualification.[30]
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been
attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private
respondents continuance in office as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is
SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made
contrary to the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of
proclamation in cases of contested election returns.

In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board
of Canvassers violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes and pave the way to succession in office. In said case, the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of
Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere
second-placer, the mayor.

Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was
based only on advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could
not have been a proper and legal basis for proclamation.

With no precedent clearly in point, petitioners arguments must, therefore, be rejected.

IV. May Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate?

Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified
candidate pursuant to our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning
number of votes which put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioners emphatic reference to Labo v.
COMELEC,[29] where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may be
declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated
on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number
of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however,
are absent in this case. Petitioners allegation that Basco was well-known to have been
disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and

44
EN BANC

45
 RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE
CASTRO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]

JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RENATO U.

REYES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

For resolution are special civil actions of certiorari. The petition in G.R. No. 120905 seeks
to annul the resolution dated May 9, 1995 of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections, declaring petitioner Renato U. Reyes disqualified from running for local office
and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the resolution dated July 3, 1995 of the
Commission en banc, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the
petition in G.R. No. 120940, filed by Julius O. Garcia, has for its purpose the annulment of the
aforesaid resolution of July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc insofar as it denies his motion
to be proclaimed the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

On August 1, 1995, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the
Commission on Elections en banc to cease and desist from implementing its resolution of July
3, 1995.It also ordered the two cases to be consolidated, inasmuch as they involved the same
resolutions of the COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994,
an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr.
Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and collected
P50,000.00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks
issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of
Interior and Local government were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in
the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle
from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the
cattle for seven months.

In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner
guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
[G.R. No. 120905. March 7, 1996]

46
 It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the
proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch
42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be
heard. A temporary restraining order was issued by the court on February 7, 1995, enjoining
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following
the expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by
the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel
in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve
the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.
On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice
Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and
peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon
petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the Office
of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong.
On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter
of Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which states:
40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner
Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
On May 9, 1995, the COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent having been removed from office by virtue of Administrative Case
006-94, he is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for public office, in conformity with Section
40, paragraph (b) of the 1991 Local Government Code. The respondents Certificate of
Candidacy is CANCELLED in conformity with this resolution. The Election Officer of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro is ordered to amend the official list of candidates in Bongabong to reflect the
respondents disqualification and to IMMEDIATELY circulate the amendment to the different
Boards of Election Inspectors in Bongabong upon the receipt of this decision.
47
On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware
of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the COMELECs Second Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en banc declared
him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his
proclamation as municipal mayor of Bongabong. Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120905, which
was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground
that the decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final
and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. It is contended
that the charges against him were rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term
during which the acts complained of had allegedly been committed. Invoking the ruling in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Santos,[1] petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his
disqualification.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second
highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes in the same elections of May 8, 1995,
intervened in the COMELEC on June 13, 1995 (after the main decision
disqualifying Renato Reyes was promulgated), contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
In its resolution of July 3, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied Garcias prayer, citing the
ruling in Republic v. De la Rosa [2] that a candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes in an election cannot be declared winner. Hence the petition in G.R. No.
120940. Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC en banc should have decided his petition
at least 15 days before the May 8, 1995 elections as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections
Code, and that because it failed to do so, many votes were invalidated which could have been
for him had the voters been told earlier who were qualified to be candidates; (2) that the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final and executory and resulted in the
automatic disqualification of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need much time to decide
the case for disqualification against Reyes since the latter did not appeal the decision in the
administrative case ordering his removal; (3) that the COMELEC should have considered the
votes cast for Reyes as stray votes.
After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases, the Court resolved to dismiss them
for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
resolutions in question.
G.R. No. 120905
First. Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering
him removed from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.
It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of
its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As the
secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated in his certification, repeated
attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail,
but Reyes refused to receive the decision. Manzos certification states:
On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila to furnish a copy of the
decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V. Garcia, which said counsel refused to
accept.
On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again went to the office of
the Mayor of Bongabong to serve the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes, himself present,
refused to accept the ORDER enforcing the decision citing particularly the pending case filed
in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as the basis of his refusal.
On [sic] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
unable to serve the ORDER, mailed the same (registered mail receipt No. 432) on
the BongabongPost Office to forward the ORDER to the Office of Mayor Renato U. Reyes.
left on the Mayors Office with comments from the employees that they would not accept the
same.[3]
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and
judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his
attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence,
if his office is not known.[4] Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon
petitioners counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on
petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service
was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.[5]
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him,
service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served
as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for
his or his counsels refusal to receive it.

On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned to Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the following inscriptions on the back by the Postmaster: rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for
the Sangguniang Panlalawigannot to have the decision served upon him and his client while
1) 1st attempt - addressee out of town - their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. [6] His refusal to receive the
decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
9:15 a.m., 3-23-95
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the
pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect
2) 2nd attempt - addressee cannot be
his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before
the decision becomes final.
contacted, out of town, 8:50

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other

a.m., 3-24-95 papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him
to its legal effect.[7]
3) 3rd attempt - addressee not contacted -
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence
out of town, 8:15 a.m., required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken
an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. [8] But petitioner
3-24-95 did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first
service upon petitioner.
4) 4th attempt - addressee refused to accept
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of
8:15 a.m., 3-27-95 the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision from
On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went to Bongabong to serve the attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
same ORDER enforcing the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not present so the copy was interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period
involved in the proceeding.[9]
48
 Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the
certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
from the appellate court directed to the lower court.[10]
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional
Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining
order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to
the service of the decision upon petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at the hearing
held on February 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the counsel of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect service of the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari.
The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal. And
it would have been no less illegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried it out
because R.A. No. 7160, 66(a) makes it mandatory that [c]opies of the decision [of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be furnished to respondent and/or
interested parties. It was the Sangguniang Panlalawigans duty to serve it upon the parties
without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the service of the decision would have resulted in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to perform a legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in
having its decision served upon petitioner Reyes.
Second. The next question is whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the
administrative charges against him moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling
in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,[11] in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for
misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as
a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the
validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office
during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. [12] Removal cannot extend
beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not
removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes
brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary
restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was
served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed
to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant
to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision
similar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the
49
ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect. Said the Court
in the first Aguinaldo case:[13]
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160)
which provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local positions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992 x x x. There is no provision in the
statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the
present case.
Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the decision
of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court and
that to date, the petition remains unresolved x x x.
At any rate, petitioners claim that he was not given time to present his evidence in the
administrative case has no basis, as the following portion of the decision of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan makes clear:
On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from respondents counsel a motion for
extension of time to file a verified answer within 15 days from November 23, 1994. In the
interest of justice another fifteen (15) day period was granted the respondent.
On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing his answer, respondent instead filed
a motion to dismiss and set the same for hearing on December 22, 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit and the order of
denial was received by respondent on January 7, 1995. Considering the fact that the last day
within which to file his answer fell on December 5, 1994, respondent is obliged to file the
verified answer on January 7, 1995 when he received the order denying his motion to dismiss.
In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995, the counsel for the complainant
manifested that he be allowed to present his evidence for failure of the respondent to file his
answer albeit the lapse of 19 days from January 7, 1995.
 The manifestation of complainants counsel was granted over the objection of the
respondent, and the Sanggunian in open session, in the presence of the counsel for the
respondent, issued an order dated January 26, 1995 quoted as follows:
As shown from the record of this case, Mayor Renato U. Reyes of Bongabong failed to file his
answer within the time prescribed by law, after the motion to dismiss was denied by
this Sanggunian. The Sanggunian declares that respondent Mayor Renato U. Reyes failed to
file his answer to the complaint filed against him within the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days. Counsel for respondent requested for reconsideration twice, which oral motions for
reconsideration were denied for lack of merit.
Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to present
evidence in his behalf.
It is important to note that this case should be heard in accordance with what is provided for
in the constitution that all parties are entitled to speedy disposition of their cases. It is pivotal
to state that the Sanggunian Panlalawigan will lose its authority to investigate this case
come February 8, 1995 and therefore, in the interest of justice and truth the Sanggunianmust
exercise that authority by pursuing the hearing of this case.
Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto L. Manalo, et al., will present his
evidence on February 2, 3, and 6, 1995, and the counsel for respondent will be given a chance
to cross-examine the witnesses that may be presented thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel despite due notice in open session,
and by registered mail (registry receipt No. 1495) dated January 27, 1995, failed to appear.No
telegram was received by this body to the effect that he will appear on any of the dates
stated in the Order of January 26, 1995. Indeed, such inaction is a waiver of the respondent to
whatever rights he may have under our laws.
All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of sixty
one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the
end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy
of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his
behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of
1991). All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He
failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his
evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the
50
witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because
he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays
the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.
G.R. No. 120940
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying
petitioner Julius O. Garcias petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification
of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. [14] The doctrinal
instability caused by see-sawing rulings [15] has since been removed. In the latest ruling[16] on
the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be
to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast
for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that
reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. [17] The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for
him.
As for Garcias contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in not
deciding the case before the date of the election, suffice it to say that under R.A. No. 6646, 6,
the COMELEC can continue proceedings for disqualification against a candidate even after the
election and order the suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. For the same reason, we find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have
seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have disqualified him before
the elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. 120905 and G.R. No. 120940 are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one
was Gabriel V. Daza III.The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, [2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen
based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

51
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration
No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino
father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on
September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to
run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The pertinent portions
of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws
under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as
his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine
52
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.
citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on
May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who
obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper
notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano
as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City.Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was
already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on
7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner
even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was
not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore,
cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action or
proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation
nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of
Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in
the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of
53
the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner
came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in several cases, [7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate
may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for
Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for
[an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent
to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right
to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also
with the substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for
vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
 The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who
sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible
given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and
I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double
54
citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function
of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double
citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections
of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of
the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China
in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound
by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It
can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with
dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in
the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us
who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and
which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to
that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it
is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the
wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their
oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected
a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double
allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising
from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will
the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. [12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: [13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any
person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under
the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority,
must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
55
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect,
be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in
the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her
in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that
he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we
would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but
what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at
birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections
is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation
was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his
American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political
election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress
to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,
contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-
BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
56
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local
position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interimwhen
he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but
before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that,
to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching
the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made
upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered
as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22,
1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21,
1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the
assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What
this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the
case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation
of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;

that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of
his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

57

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND
YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the
petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she
left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for
and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en bancdismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that
respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late
58
father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of
Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other
evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner
are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First
Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise
dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when
she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA
No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on
the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has
presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-
066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed
upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No.
92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in
character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of
the present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We
find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions
promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES
as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no
avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15,
1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning
the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a
Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father,
Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she
was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No.
92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for
the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR),
and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for
alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for
elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified
to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not
automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to
petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply
with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
59
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino
citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become
a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines;
petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the
principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim
Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the
Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle
of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 [4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
60
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is
a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress
this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was
put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado
vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena
was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no
longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
 Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of
an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim
of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express
renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most,
private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not
hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent
had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing
Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual
citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with
Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. [9] Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a
citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly
pronounced:
61
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.[11] This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she
is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.Such declaration,
which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of
candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And,
as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was
cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were
enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must
go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial
or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing
the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the
same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle
of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,[13] an exception to this
general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case
did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance
may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really
binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. [14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis
to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and
EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the
procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot
prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, EN BANC
dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 182701
AFFIRMED. - versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,
for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs. July 23, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

SO ORDERED.
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless
he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate
of candidacy.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing
the (1) Resolution[1] and (2) Omnibus Order[2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division,
disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman.

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections held on October 29, 2007.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition [3] before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground
that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,
[4]
petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
[5]
He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner. [6]
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and
respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.

SO ORDERED.[7]

62
 In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino
citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate
in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming
the office of Barangay Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,[8] petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of
candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are substantially
different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by
accident of birth on foreign soil. [9] Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows
the principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but
she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9225[10] in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.(Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides
that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC
observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual
citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such
proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the
instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by
the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that
he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that
63
he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified
from running for an elective position in the Philippines.[11] (Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of
Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [12]
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for
Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
NESTOR A. JACOT, G.R. No. 179848
- versus November 27, 2008
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September 2007 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution
dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division [2] disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States
(US) citizenship.
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. [3]
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval[4] of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines before Vice Consul Edward
C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate
No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.[6]
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. [7]
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification [8] before
the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to
renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which
reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May 2007, petitioner
countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution[11] disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The
COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for
any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division
did not consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado v. Manzano[13] applicable to the instant
case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his
Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the
aforementioned Resolution that:
ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National
and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office
of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. [14]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCGand his oath
in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of
his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship dated 27 June 2007,
wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.[15] The COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioners Motion in a Resolution[16] dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first
time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship[17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of
his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he
took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby
changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation
of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that
said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an
identical document entitled Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and
Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on 27 June 2007 after he had already filed his
Certificate of Candidacy.[18]
64
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2)
AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE
PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
III
WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT
WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF
CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether
petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different
purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to
the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.Precisely,
a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship
by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in
the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for
public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated
herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer
an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. [20]
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2)
for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
65
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of
the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August
2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath
of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking elective public
office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. I think its very good, ha? No problem?
REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those
seeking elective office in the Philippines.
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking
that ano
CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one
citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to
take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy,
which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does
not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act
No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for
all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of
foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21] and Mercado,[22] wherein the
filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of
allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this
Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially
governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private
respondent Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, which reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--vis the concept
of dual allegiance. At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercadoon 26 May
1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature. [23]
Lopez v. Commission on Elections [24] is the more fitting precedent for this case since
they both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born
Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No.9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed
his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having
garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a
candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply with the requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship,[25] which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in
the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat he complied with the requirement of making a
personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of
Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took
before the COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. [26] Courts have neither the time nor
the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly. [27]
66
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.
Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings
[28]
before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In the absence
of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in
the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect. Section 34
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had
no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due
process. [29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly
justice.[30]
The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an
identical document, Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation
of Any and All Foreign Citizenship executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June
2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en
banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was
extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit
of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC, considering
that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before
the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.
The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against
presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7
February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner himself,
could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for
petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of
presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit
of 7 February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioners case.
It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. [31] The only exceptions to the
general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds
acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones
property through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case.
The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent
in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness;
the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden
of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless
they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, and if
constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such
acts of their counsel.[33] disqualification. Costs against petitioner.

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the SO ORDERED.
fact that petitioner continuously used his former counsels theory of the case. Even when the
COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that
his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law
requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only
demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his
former counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly
negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel
was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel
earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC,
instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued
dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame
on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of
his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel. [34]

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner De Guzman

was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to
evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful
insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of
any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case
in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively
defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on
petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but
because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost
due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are
bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.[36]

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes
for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a
candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and
failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not
dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement. [37] The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a
candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of thePhilippines,
he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state.[38] The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of
the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
67
 VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the
provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law
states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in
the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying
for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private
respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that
country.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's
certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e)
of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992,
the COMELEC dismissed the petition.

Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992
EN BANC resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court, in its
resolution of 02 June 1992, held:

Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the
G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the
Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has ceased to be a pre-
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,
proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63
vs.
and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable
at this point of time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to
pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding.
68
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin ang
the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten (10) days from constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
notice. 1
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith,
petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed
the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a reconsideration of the Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad.
resolution.
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected, focuses on pending, unserved. . .
whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to
date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano what is a fugitive? It is
his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the
not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby
ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further
interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.
submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive from
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a long time ago. So can. .
Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. .
Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin
vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
general and ordinary connotation of the term.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight
Committee which, conformably with Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160, was convened by the MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the
efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very important.
compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy. Manny, can you come up?

Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations: MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.

CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed. THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Okay,.
Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39. the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN, Oversight Committee, 07
May 1991).
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?

69
 THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang gumawa
nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What "fugitive"? Sino ba
ang gumawa nito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word
"fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or means
one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been convicted by
final judgment.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final
judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the
case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final judgment. 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible
constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein
meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A
similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral
conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:
. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo
bothered ako doon, a. 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
70
(a) . . .
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by
final judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge
of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when
there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict
the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some
personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations),
that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person
(the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in
the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed
outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of
facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to
proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the foregoing opinion. No
special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996]
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O.
MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
 Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon
Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC
(EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed
on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court
for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property.Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so
argued Marquez.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of
February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him (as
previously mentioned).
In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC"
promulgated on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538 of the SCRA and
hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that:
x x x, fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (x x x), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term." [1]
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not
passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the
case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with
the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a reconsideration thereof. He also filed an "Urgent
Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration" to which
was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left
the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a
reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision.
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same
position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez
is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification (SPA No. 95-089) was filed by
71
Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) from where the
April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court.
On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC
promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA No. 95-
089 (disqualification case). In justifying a joint resolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC
explained that:
1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases;
2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases
3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common
issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice"
4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously
agreed that a consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally
flawed.
Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly having
kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be
one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez' documentary evidence consisting of
1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the
Los Angeles Municipal Court against Rodriguez, and
2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint
which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the
hearing of the case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of Rodriguez' motion for
postponement. With the walk-out, the COMELEC considered Rodriguez as having waived his
right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez' aforementioned documentary evidence. The
COMELEC thus made the following analysis:
"The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the pendency of a
criminal complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., and the fact that there is an outstanding warrant against him amply proves
petitioner's contention that the respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot
look with favor on respondent's defense that long before the felony complaint was allegedly
filed, respondent was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same
nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a sense, thru this
defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice,
because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his
disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may
reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant. This allegation in
the Answer, however, was not even fortified with any attached document to show when he left
the United States and when he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of
absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On the contrary, the fact
of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud Bureau
investigators in an apartment paid for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever
presumption of knowledge there is against the respondent."[2]
And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:
"WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from justice, he is
hereby ordered disqualified or ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of
Governor of Quezon Province. Respondent is ordered to immediately vacate said
office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from running for Governor for Quezon Province in the
May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is
hereby set aside."
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995
election for the position of governor.
On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12, 1995.
The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and the May
11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995.
On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation Of
Rodriguez To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt"
before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089).
Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23, 1995,
nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province
Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for
disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation. But
with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation, the COMELEC deferred action until after
this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099).
Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid
COMELEC June 23, 1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995 Resolutions
(Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation, respectively).
As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition (G.R.
No. 120099) on July 13, 1995.
72
Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion For Temporary Restraining Order Or
Preliminary Injunction" which sought to restrain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the
powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon x x x." Acting favorably thereon,
the Court in a Resolution dated August 8, 1995 issued a temporary restraining
order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion To Lift Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For
Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another similar
urgent motion was later on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.
In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court
"x x x RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections ('COMELEC') to
designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE
such legally admissible evidence as herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to
present by way of refuting the evidence heretofore submitted by private respondent
Bienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which can tend to establish petitioner's contention that he
does not fall within the legal concept of a fugitive from justice. Private respondent Marquez
may likewise, if he so desires, introduce additional and admissible evidence in support of his
own position. The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may be applied
in the reception of the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have the proceedings
completed and the corresponding report submitted to this Court within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof."
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a
report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the
COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive
from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-
degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new
conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ
Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has
established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal
charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes as
its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ
Decisiondefinition of "fugitive from justice". So as not to miss anything, we quote the
COMELEC's observations in full:
x x x. The main opinion's definition of a 'fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.' It proceeded to state that:
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary Third Edition,
p. 399 by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King v. Noe, 244 SC 344;
137 SE 2d 102, 103; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin v. Casaus, 275 Pacific
Reporter 2d p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term.
But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term 'fugitive from justice'
contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion. Black's Law
Dictionary begins the definition of the term by referring to a 'fugitive from justice' as:
(A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime
was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the
district. x x x
Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a 'fugitive from justice'
as:
x x x a person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its
jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the
criminal process of the former state. (our emphasis)
In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as:
a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be subjected to
criminal process, is found within the territory of another state.
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. considers the term as an:
expression which refers to one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in one
jurisdiction and is absent for any reason from that jurisdiction.
Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment x x x (Italics ours)
From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight
from justice are: (a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission
thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was
committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive
from justice. Mere commission of a 'crime' without charges having been filed for the same and
flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition. Attention is directed at the use of
the word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission
thereof. Justice Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that the
disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of
innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought
within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded
73
service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based
on his flight from justice.
Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that intent and
purpose for departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts, which are persuasive in our
jurisdiction, are more unequivocal in their pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729),
citing Roberts v. Reilly (116 US 80) the United States Supreme Court held:
x x x it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where
the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of
avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having committed a crime within a state or
district, he has left and is found in another jurisdiction (Italics supplied)
Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakable language:
The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the
state to answer its criminal process when required renders them, in legal intendment,
fugitives from justice.
THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R. NO. 112889, THE MERE
FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT PETITIONER
RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A 'FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.'
From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive
from justice hinges on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be measured against the two
instances mentioned in the main opinion, or is to be expanded as to include other situations
alluded to by the foreign jurisprudence cited by the Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray
between the parties in this case focused on each camp's attempt to construe the Court's
definition so as to fit or to exclude petitioner within the definition of a 'fugitive from
justice'.Considering, therefore, the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the
Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it most conformable to
said decision to evaluate the evidence in light of the varied constructions open to it and to
respectfully submit the final determination of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the
final interpreter of the law."
The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a " fugitive from
justice, the determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in
the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how
such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive
from justice":
"x x x includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the
Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations dated April 27[3] and June 26 of 1995, [4] preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date
of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the
time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction
to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately
running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from
justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the
circumstances of Rodriguez.
With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the. same analysis
in its "x x x COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations consistent
with such analysis made by the poll body that are equally formidable so as to merit their
adoption as part of this decision, to wit:
"It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez'
intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an
investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed
which led to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of
establishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said
investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because
investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost
secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who
would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be nothing
short of a well-publicized announcement to the perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges
against them. And having been forewarned, every effort to sabotage the investigation may be
resorted to by its intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez'
intent to evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all,
it will be nothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent to evade
the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive.
"The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that
charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The
same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact
as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the
absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidence of petitioner
Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his
desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President
74
Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval
wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of
the more colorful events in Philippine history. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former
Pres. Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these
developments, petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988
and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992
and the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a
period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against
the Marcos government, then for the governorship. And serving the people of Quezon
province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the
office.
"Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at
the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to
determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a person
flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was
issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is
altogether a different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state
not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in
the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to
the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
"The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject
himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be disqualified
from office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner's case. The criminal process of the
United States extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left
said country when the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's
fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner had every
right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. No
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the
United State and return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to unduly
burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be faulted for the
circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory at the time he was sought to be
placed under arrest and to answer for charges filed against him.
"Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges
only later, and under his circumstances, is there a law that requires petitioner to travel to the
United States and subject himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending
himself before the country's courts?
"It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of
political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are supererogatory in
nature. We do not dispute that an alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not
to be so categorized. Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against
him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a
particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of commission.However, as in
petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar
obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the
jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive
from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to
the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of
his office. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor
could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he
serves. To require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is
compelled to violate the very functions of his office."
However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as earlier
quoted) seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice." They espouse the broader
concept of the term as culled from foreign authorities (mainly of U.S. vintage) cited in
the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact
that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether
or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight.
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded
re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and
proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. The various definitions of that doctrine
have been laid down in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999, to wit:
"'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)
"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or
succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all
matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on
all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C.J.S. 1267)
"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite
determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to
examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand,
or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has
proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not
be questioned on a second appeal.
75
"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the
case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself
aggrieved being to seek a rehearing." (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law
of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the
opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point
decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the
opinion." (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez
is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant
petition.The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo
warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal from EPC No.
92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition
for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we
specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in
the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which
Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.
Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our
jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or
ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in
the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." (Italics
ours.)"
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there
has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of
flight.Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated Resolution), May 11,
1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and June 23, 1995 (Resolution
nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the Quezon Province Provincial Board of
Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt) are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent,
Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was

76
elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of
the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No.
87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision
dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition
for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card
holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by
the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently
indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his
having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent
meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not
done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
77
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R.
Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied
Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals
ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo
warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC
has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no
legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the
Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the
holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had
waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local
elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the
present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign
countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a
question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer
was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of
Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies
him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the
following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A pp.
189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the
United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States
with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by
the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose
of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give
a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during
the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general
entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and
to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are
entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and
property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are
entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection
of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary
occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth
78
Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel
for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to
public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified
to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective
public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not
possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he
resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,
1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast
their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The
assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public
duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country
of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the
United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a
green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have
this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all
this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines.
Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting
him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of
such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence
that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on
January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-
551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The
election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
79
[G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002]
PANGKAT LAGUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA NINGNING
LAZARO, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
In this specie of controversy which involves, to a large extent, the determination of the
true will of the electorate and, which by its very nature, touches upon the ascertainment of
the peoples choice as gleaned from the hallowed medium of the ballot, this Court finds
cogency to reiterate at the outset that the factual findings and determinations of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ought to be accorded great weight and finality, in the
absence of any remarkable trace of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated tasks.
Sought to be reversed in this special civil action for certiorari is the Resolution[1] of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in S.P.A. 01-218 promulgated on 24 May 2001,
which set aside the Resolution [2] of the COMELEC Second Division dated 11 May 2001,
ordering the disqualification of herein private respondent Teresita Ningning Lazaro as
candidate for Governor of the Province of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections.
The antecedents unfold.
On 30 January 2001, respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna,
assumed by succession the office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D. Lina,
Jr. was appointed Secretary of Interior and Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. On 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacy [3] for the
gubernatorial position of Laguna.
On 04 May 2001, herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed
with the COMELEC a petition [4] which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in
the gubernatorial race. Docketed as SPA No. 01-218, the disqualification petition alleged in the
main that respondent Lazaro committed acts violative of Section 80 (Election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and Section 261(v) (Prohibition against
release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of the Omnibus Election Code.
In its petition for disqualification, petitioner Pangkat Laguna specifically alleged that
private respondent Lazaro, upon assuming by succession the Office of the Governor on 30
January 2001, publicly declared her intention to run for governor in the May 2001 elections.
Thus, according to petitioner, respondent Lazaro on 07 February 2001, ordered the purchase
of 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts,
allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty Six Thousand and Five Pesos
(P4,556,005.00) serving no public purpose but to promote her popularity as a candidate. [5]
80
In addition, petitioner alleged that on 08 February 2001, respondent directed the
purchase and distribution of 1,760 medals and pins valued at One Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (P110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna, serving no meaningful public purpose but
to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.[6] According to petitioner, the abovementioned
acts, in effect, constituted premature campaigning inasmuch as the same were done prior to
the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001. Petitioner adds that these acts constitute
a ground for disqualification under Section 68, in relation to Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent Lazaro violated Section 261 (v) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter
caused the bidding of seventy nine (79) public works projects on 28 March 2001.
On 08 May 2001, respondent Lazaro filed an answer denying the allegations in the
petition for disqualification. In a Resolution dated 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division
granted the petition to disqualify respondent as candidate for the gubernatorial post of
Laguna, prompting respondent Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proclamation Under Sec. 6, R.A.
6646.[7]
On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the
duly elected Governor of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections. On 22 May 2001,
petitioner Pangkat Laguna filed a Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or to Suspend Effect of
Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646.[8]
On 24 May 2001, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion
of which declares:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Lazaro
is hereby granted. The resolution issued by the Second Division dated 11 May 2001 is hereby
correspondingly REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner now assails the
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated 24 May 2001, for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave
abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. [9] Stated differently, factual
findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are
conclusive upon the Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of
the same. The COMELEC, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and
administration of election laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with
respect to the elections.[10]
First, as to the issue of premature campaigning, this Court holds that respondent Lazaro
was not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association
of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period: Provided, that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the
campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.
On this score, it bears stressing that the act of respondent Lazaro as Chief Executive of
the Province of Laguna in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent
distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the local government units
sports and education program, is to our mind not constitutive of the act of election
campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly proscribed under the
pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To this end, we quote with affirmance respondent COMELECs observation on the matter:
Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered campaigning. The term
campaigning should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person
to vote for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the meaning of the term.
Examining the definition and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity
found in COMELEC Resolution 3636, the Commission is convinced that only those acts which
are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition and enumeration.
In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law,
which duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of the questioned
sports and education programs. The number of items purchased and the amount involved
were within the regular purchases of the provincial government. How the funds were sourced
and how the program was implemented, as correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for
us to resolve for such issue is way beyond our constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.
[11]
(Emphasis ours).
81
In Lozano vs. Yorac,[12] this Court in upholding the findings of the COMELEC negating the
charge of vote-buying, in effect, affirmed the dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed
against Makati mayoralty candidate Jejomar Binay, thus:
We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent
COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and
convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying.
The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas Season is not
refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time
does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his
constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too
far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of
the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of
vote buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence, or, at least, strong circumstantial
evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are
convinced that the evidence presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do
not warrant such finding. (Emphasis ours.)
Notably, upon a close perusal of the entirety of circumstances attendant in the instant
case, this Court is of the firm view that herein petitioner failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the questioned purchase and distribution of the aforesaid items
were, in any significant way, perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of
respondent Lazaro or were, in any manner, calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on
behalf or in favor of respondent. Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing
proof that the purchase and distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to
influence and induce the constituents of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
To us, respondents acts do not fall within, and are not contemplated by, the prohibition
embodied in Section 80 of the Code so as to effectively disqualify her from the elections and
bar her from holding office.
Second, as to the charge of violation of the 45-Day Public Works Ban,[13] petitioner asserts
that respondent Lazaro transgressed the provisions of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election
Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused or directed
the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001.
We do not agree. Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is explicit:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official
or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxx

(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract
awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, that work for the purpose
of this section undertaken under the so-called takay or paquiao system shall not be
considered as work by contract; x x x.

Beyond this, evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate petitioners

bare allegation that in furtherance of the public bidding conducted on 28 March 2001 public
funds were ever released, disbursed or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period
provided under the law and the implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof,
we find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of respondent
COMELEC the constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental law to decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections. [14]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated 24 May 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

82
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The applicability to private respondent Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66 of the Election Code is
what is chiefly involved in the case at bar. Said section reads as follows:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development
Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co., from September 17, 1981,
when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his employment was terminated. The
events leading to his dismissal from his job are not disputed.

In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,

Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City,
Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections
scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the
position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was
shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The mayor
communicated with the PNOC-EDC thru Engr. Ernesto Patanao, Resident Manager,
Tongonan Geothermal Project to express the view that Pineda could not actively participate
in politics unless he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC. 1 Nothing seems to have resulted from
this protest.

83
The local elections in Leyte, scheduled for January, 1988, were reset to and held on February
1, 1988. Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed
elected to, the office of councilor. Some vacillation appears to have been evinced by Pineda at
about this time. On February 8, 1988, he wrote to the COMELEC Chairman, expressing his
desire to withdraw from the political contest on account of what he considered to be election
irregularities; 2 and on March 19, 1988, he wrote to the Secretary of Justice seeking legal
opinion on the question, among others, of whether or not he was "considered automatically
resigned upon . . . filing of . . . (his) certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in case he
was elected, he could "remain appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-owned or
controlled corporation." 3 Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as
councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. 4 And despite so qualifying as councilor,
and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan
Geothermal Project, Ormoc City.
On June 7, 1988, Marcelino M. Tongco, Department Manager of the Engineering and
Construction Department, PNOC-EDC, addressed an inquiry to the latter's Legal Department
regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as employee in view of his candidacy for the office of
municipal councilor. 5 In response, the Legal Department rendered an opinion to the effect that
Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. 6
Pineda appealed the PNOC-EDC Legal Department's ruling to N.C. Vasquez, the Vice-President
of PNOC-EDC, on July 14, 1988. In his letter of appeal, 7 he invoked a "court ruling in the case
of Caagusan and Donato vs.PNOC-Exploration Corp. . . . (to the effect that) while the
government-owned or controlled corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law (as is
taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985) ( sic), the subsidiaries or
corporate offsprings are not." In the same letter he declared his wish to continue resign from
his position as councilor/member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
He also wrote a letter dated October 1, 1988 to the Department of Local Government inquiring
about the status of his employment with PNOC-EDC in relation to his election as member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. He was advised by DLG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillo, Jr., by letter
dated March 31, 1989, that there was no legal impediment to his continuing in his
employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at the same time the elective position of municipal
councilor. Cited as basis by Undersecretary Rubillo was Section 2(1) Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution and this Court's ruling in NASECO vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122. Undersecretary
Rubillo went on to say that Pineda could receive his per diems as municipal councilor as well
as the corresponding representation and transportation allowance [RATA] "provided the PNOC-
EDC charter does not provide otherwise and public shall not be prejudiced." 8
The PNOC-EDC did not, however, share the Undersecretary's views. On January 26, 1989, the
PNOC-EDC, through Marcelino Tongco (Manager, Engineering and Construction Department),
notified Manuel S. Pineda in writing (1) that after having given him "ample time" to make
some major adjustments before . . . separation from the company," his employment was
84
being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, effective upon receipt
of notice, and (2) that he was entitled to "proper compensation" for the services rendered by
him from the time he filed his certificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the
service. 9
On October 16, 1989, Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VIII, NLRC, Tacloban City. Impleaded as respondents were the PNOC-
EDC and the Manager of its Engineering and Construction Department, Marcelino M. Tongco. 10
After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Araceli H. Maraya, to whom the case was assigned,
rendered a decision on December 28, 1990, 11 declaring Manuel S. Pineda's dismissal from the
service illegal, and ordering his reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and payment of full back wages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal
up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Arbiter pointed out that the ruling relied upon by
PNOC-EDC to justify Pineda's dismissal from the service, i.e., NHA v. Juco, 12 had already been
abandoned; and that "as early as November 29, 1988," the governing principle laid down by
case law in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution 13 has been that
government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation Code, the
general law as distinguished from those created by special charter are not deemed to be
within the coverage of the Civil Service Law, and consequently their employees, like those of
the PNOC-EDC, are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code rather than the Civil Service
Law. 14
The PNOC-EDC filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The latter
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a decision dated April 24, 1991. 15 PNOC-EDC sought
reconsideration; 16 its motion was denied by the Commission in a Resolution dated June 21,
1991. 17
It is this decision of April 24, 1991 and the Resolution of June 21, 1991 that the PNOC-EDC
seeks to be annulled and set aside in the special civil action for certiorari at bar. It contends
that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion:
1) when it ruled that Manuel S. Pineda was not covered by the Civil Service Rules when he
filed his candidacy for the 1988 local government elections in November 1987;
2) when it ruled that Pineda was not covered by the Omnibus Election Code at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1988 local elections;
3) when it ruled that Pineda was illegally dismissed despite the fact that he was
considered automatically resigned pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code;
and
4) when it ruled that Pineda could occupy a local government position and be
simultaneously employed in a government-owned or controlled corporation, a situation
patently violative of the constitutional prohibition on additional compensation.
Acting on the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent NLRC from implementing or enforcing its decision and resolution dated April 24,
1991 and June 21, 1991, respectively.
In the comment required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General expressed agreement with
the respondent Commission's holding that Manuel Pineda had indeed been illegally separated
from his employment in the PNOC-EDC; in other words, that his running for public office and
his election thereto had no effect on his employment with the PNOC-EDC, a corporation not
embraced within the Civil Service.
Petitioner PNOC-EDC argues that at the time that Pineda filed his certificate of candidacy for
municipal councilor in November, 1987, the case law "applicable as far as coverage of
government-owned or controlled corporations are concerned . . . ( was to the following
effect): 18
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issue of jurisdiction had been
resolved in a string of cases starting with the National Housing Authority vs. Juco (134
SCRA 172) followed by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
vs. Hernandez (143 SCRA 602) and the comparatively recent case of Quimpo
vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72553, Dec. 2, 1986) in which this Court squarely ruled that
PNOC subsidiaries, whether or not originally created as government-owned or controlled
corporations are governed by the Civil Service Law.
This doctrine, petitioner further argues, was not "automatically reversed" by the 1987
Constitution because not "amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the
Congress;" 19 and this Court's decision in November, 1988, in National Service Corporation
vs. NLRC, supra 20 abandoning the Juco ruling "cannot be given retroactive effect . . . (in
view of ) the time-honored principle . . . that laws (judicial decisions included) shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (Articles 4 and 8 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines)."
Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Implicit in the provision is that government-owned or controlled corporations without original
charters i.e., organized under the general law, the Corporation Code are not
comprehended within the Civil Service Law. So has this Court construed the provision. 21
In National Service Corporation (NASECO), et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc., decided on November
22
29, 1988, it was ruled that the 1987 Constitution "starkly varies" from the 1973 charter
upon which the Juco doctrine rested in that unlike the latter, the present constitution
qualifies the term, "government-owned or controlled corporations," by the phrase, "with
85
original charter;" hence, the clear implication is that the Civil Service no longer includes
government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, i.e., those organized
under the general corporation law. 23 NASECO further ruled that the Juco ruling should not
apply retroactively, considering that prior to its promulgation on January 17, 1985, this Court
had expressly recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to government-owned or
controlled corporations. 24
Lumanta, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 25 decided on February 8, 1989, made the same
pronouncement: that Juco had been superseded by the 1987 Constitution for implicit in the
language of Section 2 (1), Article IX thereof, is the proposition that government-owned or
controlled corporations without original charter do not fall under the Civil Service Law but
under the Labor Code.
And in PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo, etc., et al., 26 promulgated on July 5, 1989, this Court ruled that
conformably with the apparent intendment of the NASECO case, supra, since the PNOC-EDC, a
government-owned or controlled company had been incorporated under the general
Corporation Law, its employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
It is thus clear that the Juco doctrine prevailing at the time of the effectivity of the
fundamental charter in 1987 i.e., that government-owned or controlled corporations were
part of the Civil Service and its employees subject to Civil Service laws and
regulations, 27 regardless of the manner of the mode of their organization or incorporation is
no longer good law, being at "stark variance," to paraphrase NASECO, with the 1987
Constitution. In other words, and contrary to the petitioner's view, as of the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, or,
as Mr. Justice Cruz insists in his concurring opinion in NASECO v. NLRC, 28 a legislative charter
(i.e., those organized under the Corporation Code), ceased to pertain to the Civil Service and
its employees could no longer be considered as subject to Civil Service Laws, rules or
regulations.
The basic question is whether an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations
without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls
within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in
connection with its deliberations on and subsequent enactment of related and repealing
legislation i.e., Republic Acts Numbered 7166: "An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991), 6646: "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms
in the Electoral System and for Other Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An Act
Resetting the Local Elections, etc., (effective November 6, 1987), it was no doubt aware that
in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or
controlled corporations were of two (2) categories those with original charters, and those
organized under the general law and (b) employees of these corporations were of two (2)
kinds those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in
corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the
Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized under the general law, or the
Corporation Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of
government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election
Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee " in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." 29

Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled

corporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter
but organized under the general law. If a corporation's capital stock is owned by the
Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling
the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or controlled
corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute; EN BANC
and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are
nonetheless "employees in government-owned or controlled corporations," and come within
G.R. No. L-24721 November 3, 1925
the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned
from . . . office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."
TOMAS DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LA UNION and JUAN T. LUCERO, respondents.
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the
general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and
VILLAMOR, J.:
even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth
in the Labor Code, as amended. This proceedings is for the purpose of having this court issue a mandamus addressed to the
provincial board of canvassers of the Province of La Union, ordering it to meet and reject and
annul all the votes adjudicated to the respondent Juan T. Lucero, and after correcting the
The conclusions here reached make unnecessary discussion and resolution of the other issues
election return, to proclaim and certify the petitioner elected for the office of provincial
raised in this case.
governor of La Union in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public respondent National Labor
As ground of the petition, it is alleged that the respondent provincial board of canvassers met
Relations Commission dated April 24, 1991 and its Resolution dated June 21, 1991 are
on June 22, 1925, for the purpose of counting the votes cast in the election for provincial
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE; and the complaint of Manuel S. Pineda is DISMISSED. No costs.
officers and certifying the result of the count, and after gathering all the election returns, it
found that the petitioner had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Juan T. Lucero, 8,771
SO ORDERED.
votes; that the original of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent Juan T. Lucero, a
certified copy of which is Exhibit A, was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman, the original of which is Exhibit B,
was prepared and filed in accordance with the requirements of the law; that notwithstanding
that Juan T. Lucero did not file a certificate of candidacy duly sworn to, as provided in section
404 of the Election Law, the respondent provincial board of canvassers willfully and illegally
86
adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the respondent, and afterwards illegally proclaimed and
certified him as governor-elect of the Province of La Union; that in view of these facts the
respondent Juan T. Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal candidate for the office in
question, and could not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.
To this complaint the respondent filed a demurrer on the ground: (a) That the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in litigation; (b) that the court had no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendant members of the extinguished provincial board of canvassers of La
Union; and (c) that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action.
The question to be decided in this proceeding is whether or not the respondent has filed a
certificate of candidacy in accordance with the law, and in case he has not, whether the writ
applied for should be issued.
Section 41 of Act No. 3030, amending section 471 of the Election Law, provides that the
provincial board of canvassers or the Governor-General, as the case may be, shall certify
elected for the offices of senator or member of the House of Representatives and for
provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the highest number of votes, and filed
their certificates of candidacy in accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law. And
said section 404, as amended by section 3 of the same Act No. 3030, provides that no person
shall be eligible for the office of senator, representative or any provincial office, unless within
the time fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly verified. The meaning of
the phrase "a certificate of candidacy duly verified," is explained by this court in Viola vs.
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo, (47 Phil., 849), to the effect that ". . . only
when the corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate filed can it be presumed
that it has been duly verified and filed."
In the instant case, according to the allegations of the petitioner the respondent Juan T. Lucero
filed his certificate of candidacy in the office of the secretary of the provincial board of La
Union on April 15, 1925, the provincial secretary having issued the proper receipt for the filing
of said certificate, together with a statement of the expenses attached thereto (Exhibit 2). It,
therefore, seems clear that the respondent filed his certificate in accordance with the Spanish
text of section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of act No. 3030.
But the petitioner argues that section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of Act
No. 3030, is mandatory in its terms, and therefore must be complied with the provincial board,
respondent herein. Granting that the English text of the law in this case makes clear the
Spanish text "Certificado de candidatura debidamente acreditado" (certificate of candidacy
duly verified), it will be seen that said section 3 of Act No. 3030 requires the candidate to file a
"certificate of candidacy duly verified," indicating by these two words that the certificate of
candidacy must be sworn to. In the case before us the certificate of the respondent Juan T.
Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity might have justified
the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial
governor, if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in
due time. Yet we are of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for
87
the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero
had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.
This court in the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil., 521), following authoritative decisions
of the United States, which establish rules of interpretation of election laws, said:
The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election
procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose
and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the
prescribed method, are mandatory.
When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will
be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of
the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such
departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the
intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression
of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered
a harmless irregularity. lawph!1.net
And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, (39 Phil., 208), this court laid down the following doctrine:
It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of
elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after
the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they
are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault
on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to
assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to
defeatthat object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not
be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and
guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by
criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the
honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
We hold that the legal provision here in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as
candidate. But after the people have expressed their will honestly, the result of the election
cannot be defeated by the fact that the respondent who was certified by the provincial
secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy. The situation is somewhat like that of a voter placing his ballot in the
box. There are certain requirements of the law, affecting the vote, which have been
considered by this court as of a mandatory character until the ballot is placed in the ballot
box; but we have held that the validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote
stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance
with such provisions. After the termination of the election, public interest must be made to
prevail over that of the defeated candidate, and we cannot declare that the election of the
respondent Juan T. Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the office for which he was
elected, simply by reason of a defect in his certificate of candidacy, which defect could have
been corrected before the election, but which cannot be cured after its termination, and after
the result of the election was published by the provincial board of canvassers, respondents
herein.
Of course the conclusion which we have arrived at tends to sustain the third ground of the
demurrer of the respondent. We will not enter upon the discussion of the two first grounds of
said demurrer, for it may be seen that they are clearly untenable.
The demurrer of the respondent is therefore sustained upon the third ground, and considering
that in view of our ruling upon the only legal question raised in this proceeding, the complaint
cannot be amended, this case is definitely adjudicated, and the writ of mandamus applied for
is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105436 June 2, 1994
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY, MEDINA, MELENCIO
CASTELO and GODOFREDO LIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA, MELENCIO
CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were among the candidates in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six (6) positions of councilor for the Second
District of Quezon City.
On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections
his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he
gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City." However, he did not indicate
on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay
where he was a registered voter. 1 His biodata submitted together with his certificate of
candidacy gave his address as "Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City," 2which is part of the
Fourth District of Quezon City. 3 In other words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata
filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or
that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:
88
Sec. 39. Qualifications (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy of private respondent,
petitioners herein challenged his qualification before public respondent COMELEC explaining
however that since they became aware of the grounds for private respondents qualification
only after the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. 4
On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition for
disqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646, which
pertains to nuisance candidates. 5Hence the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC in issuing the
assailed resolution of 2 June 1992.
It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of
1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state
in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered.
Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he
intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.
In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet
assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a
registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was
already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of
Quezon City.
In his Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of Second District, Quezon City,
private respondent explained that
. . . since 1990, he is a resident of Block 26, Lot 1, New Capitol Estates
(formerly Capitol Bliss), Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City; that he failed to
register as a voter during the general registration held at Quezon City on
March 14 and 15, 1992 because he was sick of Acute Gastroenteritis as
evidenced by the Medical Certificate duly issued by Dr. Angelito S. Regala,
M.D., of the Family Clinic, Inc.; that he was a previous registered voter of
Manila . . . that he would like to transfer and to register as voter in Quezon
 City, particularly at Precinct 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City because
he is now a resident of Quezon City. 6
Confirming the explanation of private respondent, Barangay Captain Manuel Laxina testified
that he was the Barangay Captain of New Capitol Estates (formerly Capitol Bliss), Barangay
Batasan, Quezon City, since 8 October 1986; that petitioner (private respondent herein) was a
resident of New Capitol Estates for two (2) years as of the time he testified.
After due notice and hearing, and without any written opposition, the petition was granted by
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City the dispositive portion of the order stating that
WHEREFORE . . . and it appearing that petitioner Antonio Viana Hernandez
also known as Anthony Alonzo possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter plus the fact that there was no opposition at all, the
court resolves to grant his petition. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates (formerly
Capitol Bliss), Quezon City, is hereby ordered to include in the official list of
voters the name of Antonio Viana Hernandez also known as Anthony Alonzo
and to allow him to cast his vote in the coming May 1992 election. Let copy of
the Order be furnished the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of
Precinct 233-B, New Capitol Estates formerly Capitol Bliss, Quezon City,
Election Registrar, Commission on Elections, Quezon City, Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, for their information and
guidance. 7
Consequently, as a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon
City, as judicially confirmed, the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare that he was
eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in question.
COMELEC referred to the action taken by petitioners herein as one to declare private
respondent a "nuisance candidate" and intimating that they should have instead petitioned
COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which provides:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon
a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been
filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates
or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.
89
Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance
candidate" is erroneous because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by
which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein
provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at
any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent
Hernandez should be treated as a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its
conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the candidacy of private respondent
he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan Hills,
must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Commission
on Elections in issuing its questioned resolution of 2 June 1992, the instant petition is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 165983
JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA,
Petitioner, V.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
April 24, 2007
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari [1] with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction or status quo order questioning the 4 June
2004 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division and the 22
November 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA Case No. 04-306. The 4 June 2004
Resolution denied due course to the substitution of petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna (Luna) for
Hans Roger Luna (Hans Roger) and declared the substitution invalid. The 22 November
2004 Resolution denied Lunas motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor
of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on
the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans
Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.
On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, Solomon Lalugan III, Nelia Lazaga,
Anthony Layao, Cipriano Lapez, Jr., Victoria Layao, Moderno Lapez, Rodrigo Parias,
and Eugenio Caber Donato (private respondents) filed a petition for the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna
made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private
respondents also claimed that Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the
substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger
was only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor
and cannot be substituted by Luna.[2]
The COMELECs Ruling
In the 4 June 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the petition and denied due
course to the substitution of Luna for Hans Roger. The COMELEC First Division ruled that, while
Luna complied with the procedural requirements for substitution, Hans Roger was not a valid
candidate for vice-mayor. The COMELEC First Division pointed out that Hans Roger, being
underage,[3] did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, Hans Roger was not a valid
candidate for vice-mayor who could be substituted by Luna. The COMELEC First Division also
ruled that Luna was not a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra and that this was sufficient to
disqualify Luna from running as vice-mayor.
On 28 June 2004, Luna filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. Luna
added that the 4 June 2004 Resolution was issued in violation of her right to due process
because she was not given the opportunity to present evidence on her behalf with the
COMELEC First Division.
In the 22 November 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for
reconsideration and affirmed with modification the 4 June 2004 Resolution. The COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage, may not be validly substituted by
Luna. The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that Lunas right to due process was not violated
because Luna was notified of the petition and was given the opportunity to be
heard. However, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that Luna was a registered voter
of Lagayan, Abra.
Hence, this petition.
In a Resolution dated 11 January 2005, we required the parties to maintain the status quo
prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolutions pending the resolution of
this petition.[4]
The Issues
Luna raised the following issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that there was no violation of Lunas right to due process; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
90
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Lunas Right to Due Process was not Violated
Luna contends that her right to due process was violated because she was not given the
opportunity to present her evidence before the COMELEC First Division.
Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates
that the candidates must be notified of the petition against them and should be given the
opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.[5] This is the essence of due process.
In this case, the COMELEC En Banc stated that the records showed that three days after the
petition was filed, the Provincial Election Supervisor, as hearing officer, with the assistance of
the Philippine National Police Provincial Command, tried to personally serve a copy of the
petition to Luna. But Luna refused to formally receive the petition. On 26 April 2004, the Office
of the Provincial Election Supervisor sent the notice via registered mail and still Luna did not
file an answer.
The Court finds that Lunas right to due process was not violated. The COMELEC notified Luna
of the petition filed against her and Luna was given the opportunity to present evidence on
her behalf. This constitutes compliance with the requirements of due process.
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid
Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon
Hans Rogers withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna.
On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate
who could be substituted by Luna.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code)
provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.- The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004,[6] the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy.[7]
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code
allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the
election by submitting a written declaration under oath. [8] There is no provision of law which
prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. [9]
On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section
77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last
day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.
- If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections
not later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal
or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-
day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case
of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
course.[15] However, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due
course by the COMELEC.
Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC
declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election
Code, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by
Luna.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the ruling of the COMELEC En
Banc that there was no violation of petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Lunas right to due
process. We SET ASIDE the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that the substitution by petitioner
Joy Chrisma B. Luna for Hans Roger Luna was invalid. Petitioner Joy Chrisma B. Luna validly
substituted for Hans Roger Luna.
SO ORDERED.

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna
complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, [10] Luna can validly
substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC
may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy filed in due form. [11] In Sanchez v. Del Rosario,[12] the Court ruled that the
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.

Section 74[13] of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among
others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78[14] of the Election Code
provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material
representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his
certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election
Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel
Lunas certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without theproper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans JOSE P. MONSALE, protestant-appeal,
Rogers certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of vs.
candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no PAULINO M. NICO, protestee-appellant.
91
 The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the
OZAETA, J.: expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty
This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the filed dies or becomes disqualified.
protestant elected municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can
November 11, 1947. no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the
It appears that the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but case Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court sustained the ruling of
on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The commission on said commission upon similar facts that "by own voluntary act and deed petitioner has
Election, however, rules on November 8 thatthe protestant could no longer be a candidate in nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the light of the election laws such certificate of
spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence nonexisting."
Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a
protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not been provincial or municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the
counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was province by any candidate voted for insaid election and who has presented a certificate of
proclaimed elected. candidacy." This clearly implies that a candidate voted for who has not presented a certificate
The pivotal question presented in this appeal is whether a candidate who has withdrawn his of candidacy has no right to contest the election. In other words, the herein protestant, not
certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by being a registered candidate, has no standing before the court.
filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such The judgment appealed from is reversed and the protest is ordered dismissed with costs
certificate. against the appellee. So ordered.
Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall
be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of
candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and thirty
days at least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices
shall be filed with the municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the
polling place concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on
Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate
of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die or become
disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the office for
which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding
section on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and the midday of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of inspection of the political division where he is a
candidate or in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the
Commission on Elections."
In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947,
and requested the Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has never been
filed at all." There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw or annul his own
certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore,
on October 10, or thirty-on days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by
his own voluntary act, and as a matter of facts the boards of election inspectors of the
municipality of Miagao we duly notified of his letter to the Commission on Election dated
November 6, 1947, which subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7,
whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as
a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election,
could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate
should be filed at sixty days before the election.
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing
a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular
election the candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion
and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice
or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted
for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a
mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.

92
 [G.R. No. 147741. May 10, 2001]

REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V. MONTEJO and
ARVIN V. ANTONI, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

In her petition for certiorari,[1] petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of
Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both
positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty
eight minutes from the deadline.

Forthwith, we issued an order [2] to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing
petitioners certificate of candidacy for governor in the meantime.

In its Comment,[3] the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioners
affidavit of withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was
ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes late at the office of the
municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office at
12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the office of
the municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be
filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy for mayor.

The Facts

Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose
term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.

On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor
of the province of Leyte.Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial
election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of
EN BANC
93
Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the
affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file
it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to
Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax [4] to
her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the lection
officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. [5] On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the
election officer of Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. [6]
On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of
candidacy of petitioner.[7]Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition to disqualify petitioner.
[8]
The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two
positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus,
making her ineligible for both.
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by
1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department,
on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the
petitioners affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.[9]
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made
a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit
responsive pleadings.On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the
COMELEC en banc.[10]
The report and recommendation reads:
Submitted for due consideration is the petition filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V.
Antoni on March 5, 2001, before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte,
seeking to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Catalina L. Go for
Governor of Leyte.
Both petitions which are exactly worded in the same language allege, as follows:
This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the COMELEC RULES
OF PROCEDURE and Section 15, as well, of RESOLUTION NO. 3253-A of the COMELEC EN BANC
promulgated on November 20, 2000. Ditto, this petition is filed within the reglementary period
following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy on February 28, 2001.
94
Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of voting age, Filipino, Lawyer by profession, married, and a
resident of #50 Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City, of which locality he is a registered voter.
Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the other hand is likewise of legal age, married, resident of
Baybay, Leyte, of which locality she is a registered voter, and the incumbent Member of the
House of Representatives representing the 5th Congressional District of Leyte.
Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor of the
Municipality of Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. Without cancelling or withdrawing the
said certificate of candidacy this time for the office of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February
28, 2001. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to declare under oath the office for which she desires
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office.
'Verily, at the time respondent filed her certificate of candidacy for Provincial Governor, she
knew fully well that she was ineligible for the said office, having filed, a day earlier, a
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. Hence, respondent falsely represented in
her certificate of candidacy for Provincial Governor, and under oath, that she is ELIGIBLE for
the said office; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of
candidacy. In fine, respondent likewise falsely represented in her certificates of candidacy,
under oath, that she will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES; a
material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy.
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is
anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted hereunder.
'No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein.
'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices.
"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:
'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. x x x x x (b) No person shall be eligible for more than
one office to be filled in the same election. If he files a certificate of candidacy for more than
one office he shall not be eligible for either. However, before the expiration of the period for
the filing of certificate of candidacy, he may declare under oath the office for which he desire
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the office or offices.'
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO is ineligible to run for
either Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7,
2001, the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of
Leyte was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at
11:47 p.m. the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the
affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on March 01, 2001 at the
Office of the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for Mayor for the
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence from my political leaders urging me to run for
Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my
political constituents;
"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the
Municipality of Baybay, Leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of
Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for
Governor of Leyte Province, although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit
of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March 1,2001 or one (1) day after
the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed
by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte, both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and Governor of Leyte
were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on
different elective positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for both positions, in accordance with
Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS as follows:
"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V. Antonio
against the certificates of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-Go for Governor of Leyte; and
"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte and the Election Officer to
delete/cancel the name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified list of candidates
95
for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay, Leyte, and to accordingly notify
the parties and the above-named Comelec Officials." [11]
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director,
Law Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph
of this decision.[12]
Hence, this petition.[13]
The Issues
At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined the following issues to be
addressed by the parties:
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
II. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified
for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The
filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1
March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. [14]
We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for
governor.[15]
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the aware of the proceedings before Director Ibanez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation,
approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the
them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent. Indeed, Section
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other explicitly provides:
office or offices."
"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it "x x x x
can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election
director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the "Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said notice. (emphasis supplied)
municipality.
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law. [22] The COMELEC, acting
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in
where the certificate of candidacy was filed,[16] such requirement is merely directory, and is resolving cases before it.[23]
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution
can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC Resolution No.
[17]
Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay
3982, adopted on 23 April 2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's certificate of candidacy for
with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such
Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commision on Elections, Manila, and the provincial election
candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner
supervisor of Leyte shall immediately order the inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified
ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
list of candidates for Governor, province of Leyte, to be posted in each polling place/voting
booth in every precinct throughout the province of Leyte, in the voters information sheet to be
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution given to each registered voter therein, in the election returns, statement of votes by precincts,
canceling petitioner's certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural and certificate of canvass, and all other election papers.
due process of law.[18] The petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy or to deny due course
to both were filed before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and
The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.
referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC,
First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition and
required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the This decision is immediately executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for entertained.
hearing.[19] On 18 April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibaez issued
summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and No costs.
counter affidavits including position paper within three (3) days from notice. [20] On 23 April
2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position paper. [21] On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., SO ORDERED.
Director Ibaez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.

In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study
of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required
to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of
candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was not even

96
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13001. March 18, 1958.]
ALFREDO ABCEDE, Petitioner, v. HON. DOMINGO IMPERIAL, GAUDENCIO GARCIA, and SIXTO
BRILLANTES, Commissioners of Elections, Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MINISTERIAL DUTY TO RECEIVE CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY;
MANDATORY DUTY TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE SAME. When the Revised Election Code
imposes upon the Commission on Elections the ministerial duty to receive certificates of
candidacy, it implies thereby that said certificates should be given due course.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF DECISION LIMITED TO PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS.

While the Constitution has given the Commission on Elections the "exclusive charge" of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of
decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Art. X, Sec. 2,
Constitution.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote." It may not
even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47
Off. Gaz., 2851). For more reason, it cannot determine who among those possessing the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural
requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to enjoy the
full benefits intended by law therefor. This is a matter of policy, not of administration and
enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its
97
legislative functions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY
LIKEWISE MINISTERIAL. Whether or not the Commission on Elections should incur the
expenses incident to the preparation and distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy
of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of votes, is
another question of policy for Congress, not the Commission, to settle. Compliance with the
provision of law requiring the preparation and immediate distribution of copies of the
certificates of candidacy is, likewise ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the
effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the
remedy is to call the attention of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals,
recommendations, or suggestions for such amendments as may be deemed best.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on Elections,
his certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in connection with
the elections to be held on November 12 of the same year. On or about said date, Abcede and
other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to appear before the same
on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be
considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their
failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said
certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto. After
due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a
resolution dated October 4, 1957, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of the persons
therein named, including that of said petitioner, "shall not be given due course." A
reconsideration of such resolution having been denied, Abcede filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be annulled and that his
aforementioned certificate of candidacy be given due course. Upon motion of petitioner
herein, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondent to refrain and
desist from carrying out the resolution above referred to, pending the final disposition of the
case at bar.
Insofar as petitioner herein is concerned, the action taken by the Commission on Elections is
based upon the following facts, set forth in its said resolution, from which we
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes
were nil. In this election he presents his candidacy for President of the Philippines, with the
redemption of the Japanese war notes as his main program of government. It is of record that
the Bureau of Posts, by Fraud Order No. 2, dated November 2, 1955, banned from the use of
the Philippine mail all matters of whatever class mailed by, or addressed to, the Japanese War
Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and its agents and representatives, including
Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede, which order was based on the findings of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice, that said entity
and its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede, are engaged in a scheme to
obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is
convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than
a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In holding that it has, under these facts, the power not to give due course to petitioners
98
certificate of candidacy, the Commission on Elections gave the following
reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon
the Commission the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the
law leaves to the Commission a measure of discretion on whether to give due course to a
particular certificate of candidacy should it find said certificate of candidacy to have been filed
not bona fide. We also believe that a certificate of candidacy is not bona fide when it is filed,
as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person who is incapable of understanding the full
meaning of his acts and the true significance of election and without any political organization
or visible supporters behind him so that he has not even the tiniest chance to obtain the
favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, or when the one who files the
same exerts no tangible effort, shown by overt acts, to pursue to a semblance of success his
candidacy.
"The law requires the certificate of candidacy to be under oath in acknowledgment of its
serious character as an indispensable segment in the process of election, the first step that a
citizen has to take in seeking public trust and in avoiding service to the common weal. It is a
solemn matter, not to be taken lightly.
"The giving due course to a certificate of candidacy is a process of no mean proportion,
particularly for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines and Senator which
involve the printing at public expense of around 136,000 copies of each certificate of
candidacy; the printing of the names of the candidates in several election forms; the mailing,
sorting, and distribution of the copies of said certificates of candidacy and forms among the
34,000 polling places throughout the country; the entering of the names of the candidates by
the board of inspectors in still other forms; etc. Considering all these, the Commission is
satisfied with the view that Congress could not have meant to make as a ministerial duty of
the Commission to give due course to every certificate of candidacy, no matter how senseless
said certificate of candidacy may be, thus in effect authorizing a meaningless expenditure of a
considerable amount of public funds, and in the process put added routinary burden on the
already heavily burdened election machinery, as well as shear off the election much of its
dignity as a solemn process of democracy.
"Based on existing records of the Commission and on evidence adduced during the hearing on
the certificates of candidacy mentioned above, the Commission finds, and so declares, that
the said certificates of candidacy have not been filed in good faith on grounds hereunder
stated."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that "certificates of candidacy of candidates
for President . . . shall be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the
preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the
Philippines . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
It further provides that said certificates shall be distributed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the Commission on Elections . . . shall immediately send copies thereof to the secretary
of the Provincial Board of each province where the elections will be held, and the latter shall in
turn immediately forward copies to all the polling places. The Commission on Elections shall
communicate the names of said candidates to the secretary of the provincial board by
telegraph. If the certificate of candidacy is sent by mail, it shall be by registered mail, and the
date on which the package was deposited in the post- office may be considered as the filing
date thereof if confirmed by a telegram or radiogram addressed to the Commission on
Elections on the same date."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal
secretary, in their respective cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates
of candidacy referred to in the preceding section and to immediately acknowledge receipt
thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course
to petitioners certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the
"ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy. Of what use would it be to receive it
if the certificate were not to be given due course? We must not assume that Congress
intended to require a useless act that it would have imposed a mandatory duty to do
something vain, futile and empty.
Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said
certificates to the secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this
requirement, evinced by the imperative character generally attached to the term "shall", is
stressed by the peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately."cralaw virtua1aw library
Again, the Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest magistrate of the
land. All possessors of such qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire
to such office and to run therefor, provided that they file their respective certificates of
candidacy within the time, at the place and in the manner provided by law, and petitioner
herein has done so.
Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President
to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of
the Philippines.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote." It may not
even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, *
47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could whether, if so granted in the
vague, abstract, indeterassert the greater and more far-reaching authority to determine who
among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have
complied with the procedural requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy
should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefor. The question whether in
order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must be capable of "understanding the full
meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have over a month
prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) "the tiniest chance to
obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a matter of
policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by
Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific
statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious
minate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied
upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed made, in the absence of clear
and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) the legislative
enactment would not amount to undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)
The case of Ciriaco S. Garcia v. Imperial, L-12930 (October 22, 1957) cited in respondents
answer is not in point. That case referred to the certificates of candidacy of Ciriaco S. Garcia of
99
San Simon, Pampanga, Carlos C. Garcia of Iloilo City, and Eulogio Palma Garcia of Butuan City,
all for the Office of the President of the Philippines, filed in September, 1957. The facts therein
are set forth in the pertinent resolution of the Commission on Elections from which we
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ciriaco S. Garcia, . . . admitted, . . . that he had not up to the date of the hearing held any
public meeting relative to his candidacy; had not posted any handbills or posters or banners
announcing his candidacy; had not established any national headquarters; and had no line-up
for vice-president, senators, or members of Congress. In connection with the case of Ciriaco S.
Garcia, counsel for the intervenor presented documents as exhibits. . . . all showing that
Ciriaco S. Garcia had not shown any active interest in his candidacy. Relative to the case of
Carlos C. Garcia, counsel for intervenor presented a witness, Salvador del Rosario, who
testified to the effect that he knows personally said Carlos C. Garcia as a former dress maker
and now maintains a bar in the city of Iloilo that he has not done anything to promote his
supposed candidacy; and that he is a brother- in-law of Atty. Tomas Vargas, a prominent
Liberal Party leader in the province of Iloilo. He also submitted as evidence the telegram of the
provincial commander of Iloilo reporting that said Carlos C. Garcia is not a well known person
in Iloilo. And as regards Eulogio Palma Garcia, counsel for intervenor likewise submitted a
telegram of the provincial commander of Agusan to the effect that said Eulogio Palma Garcia
is an unknown person in Agusan. He further pointed out that the address of said Eulogio
Palma Garcia, as appearing in this certificate of candidacy, is c/o Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., a
nephew of ex- congressman Calo, and official candidate of the Liberal Party for Senator."
(Emphasis ours.)
The findings of the Commission were as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Commission is convinced that the failure of Carlos C. Garcia, a bar tender, and Eulogio
Palma Garcia, a person who has not even a residence of his own, to appear before the
Commission, notwithstanding the mandatory statement issued them, which had been
received in their behalf, to the effect that failure to appear on their part before the
Commission as required would be sufficient for the Commission to consider their certificates
of candidacy, as filed in bad faith, shows that they are not actually interested in the outcome
of their pretended candidacy, and/or that they fear that their personal appearance before the
Commission would not expose too clearly the true motives behind the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
"As regards Ciriaco S. Garcia, a former chief of police, with no visible property to his name, . . .
the Commission is likewise satisfied . . . that his certificate of candidacy was filed without the
least idea of actively pursuing the same, but simply to prejudice a legitimate and bona fide
candidate, President Carlos P. Garcia.
"Each of said three certificates of candidacy is a well fitted piece in an overall conspired
scheme to fairly prejudice the candidacy of President Carlos P. Garcia. Even the circumstances
of geography and of course of names have been suitably played upon to achieve in the most
of active way the desired objective of destroying legitimate votes for the bona fide candidate.
Ciriaco S. Garcia hails from Central Luzon; Carlos C. Garcia is from Central Visayas; and
Eulogio Palma Garcia is from Northern Mindanao. The names used are such that all votes for
Carlos Garcia, C. Garcia, P. Garcia, and Garcia would be declared stray. The mischief
aimed to be realized by the plan is too plain to be missed by any impartial mind. . . . .
"The Commission, . . . is clear in the conclusion that all said three certificates of candidacy
have been filed not for the purpose of winning the election or even to obtain a substantial
number of votes for the presidency of the Philippines but for the purpose of prejudicing the
candidacy of a candidate in good faith by nullifying the votes cast for the same name and/or the Commission as regards petitioners certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its
surname of said candidate in good faith. jurisdiction, and, hence, void.

... Wherefore, the aforementioned resolution of the Commission on Elections is hereby annulled,
insofar as petitioner Alfredo Abcede is concerned, and the writ of preliminary injunction
"We reiterate here what the Commission has already said in the similar case of Re-Certificate heretofore issued made permanent, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
of Candidacy of Eduardo A. Barreto. (Case No. 179):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ordered.

The duty of the Commission under these circumstances is too plain to be mistaken. The law Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L.,
could not have intended nor will the Commission allow itself to be made a party to fraud Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
against the integrity and purity of election. Election is not a game of mean political tricks
where deceit wins a premium. It is an honest process, governed by fair rules of law and good
conduct. In election as well as in any other field of fair contest, deceit cannot be allowed to
clothe itself in legal technicalities end demand a prize. It must be condemned and never
tolerated." (Emphasis ours.)

In other words, the candidates in question did not really aspire to be elected President of the
Philippines. Their certificates of candidacy were filed merely for the purpose of nullifying, in
effect, all votes cast in favor of "Garcia", "C. Garcia", and "P. Garcia", even if the voters
intended to vote for Carlos P. Garcia, the incumbent of said office. The objective was,
evidently, to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. Had the
certificates of candidacy in question been given due course, maintained, whether or not such
tax, penalty, or sum has been paid election inspectors, who would be at a loss as to whom to
credit the votes cast for "Carlos Garcia", "C. Garcia", "P. Garcia", and "Garcia" or whether said
votes should not be counted, as stray votes. Thus, an opportunity would be created to subject
the election officers throughout the Philippines to complaints, either by the opponents of the
incumbent President, if the votes were credited to him, or by the Nacionalista Party, if the
votes were counted in favor of either Ciriaco S. Garcia, or Carlos C. Garcia, or Eulogio Palma
Garcia, or considered as stray votes. What is more, this could have led to, or given an excuse
for, public disorders which may not have been altogether unlikely, in the light of the
conditions then existing. Worse, still, there would have been no means, under the law, to
ascertain whether the aforementioned votes were intended for the incumbent President
Carlos P. Garcia, or for the petitioners in said case. The action of the Commission therein
tended, therefore, to insure free, orderly and honest elections, which is its main concern,
under our fundamental law and the Revised Election Code. Such, however, is not the situation
obtaining in the case at bar.

Whether or not the Commission on Elections should incur the expenses incident to the
preparation and distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its
opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of votes, is another question of
policy for Congress, not the Commission, to settle. When the Revised Election Code imposes
upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive those certificates and provides that said
Commission shall immediately prepare and distribute copies thereof to the offices mentioned
in section 36 of said Code, it necessarily implies that compliance with the latter provision is,
likewise, ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the effect thereof is to
unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the
attention of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals, recommendations,
or suggestions for such amendments as may be deemed best, consistently with the
democratic nature of our political system.

Needless to say, the vigilant attitude of the Commission on Elections and the efforts exerted
by the same to comply with what it considers its duty, merit full and unqualified recognition,
as well as commendation of the highest order. In this particular case, however, the action of
100
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004]

ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND
OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY SITUATED), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO, JR., 1 st District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG
PAOLO ALCERA in his capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay City, EDNA TIBAR a
minor assisted by parents, KRISTAL GALE BONGGO a minor assisted by parents, SK
Chairman RUEL TAYAM DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS
AND YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED and THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to
enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? This
is the issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose certificate of
candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she was not a
registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.[1]

101
 On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363
adopting the recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including
petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and
all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in
the barangay where they intended to run.[2]
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was
not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
38, Pasay City.[3] She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002.[4]
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of
candidacy may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any
registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the report
of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel ones
certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing.
Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of
the Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only be removed by a
petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.[5]
On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781, [6] resolving petitioners
motion for reconsideration. It cited its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to
Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584 its policy on proclaimed
candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they were
elected. It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the procedure adopted by the Commission in
denying due course the certificate of candidacy of a candidate. It reads:
Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers were given the duty to: (1) verify
whether all candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered
voters of the barangay where they filed their certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the
entries of the certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries whether the
candidate concerned possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by registered mail and by rush telegram to
the Law Department of this Commission the names of candidates who are not registered
voters in the place where they seek to run for public office within three (3) days from the last
102
day for filing of certificates of candidacy. The names of these candidates, however, shall still
be included in the certified lists of candidates until the Commission directs otherwise.
By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes a recommendation to the
Commission En Banc, and the latter, by virtue of an En Banc Resolution either gives due
course to or denies/cancels the certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on the eligibility of candidates starts from
the time they filed their certificates of candidacy. The candidates, by virtue of the publication
of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin
are deemed to have constructive notice of the said administrative inquiry. Thus, the
Commission, by virtue of its administrative powers, may motu proprio deny/cancel the
certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to be not registered voters in the place
where they seek to run for public office.
Any registered candidate for the same office may also file a verified petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Section 69 (nuisance candidate) or
Sec. 78 (material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus Election
Code either personally or through a duly authorized representative within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election Officer concerned.
Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the alleged ineligibility in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy was filed within the reglementary period, the fact that the Resolution of this
Commission, denying due course to or canceling the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible
candidate, was not promulgated or did not arrive prior to or on the day of the elections is
therefore of no moment. The proclamation of an ineligible candidate is not a bar to the
exercise of this Commissions power to implement the said Resolution of the Commission En
Banc because it already acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility of the
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy even before elections by virtue of either
the report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate
of candidacy filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
are likewise clear: (1) A verified petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility
or under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed at anytime before
proclamation of the winning candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for the same
office, (2) All disqualification cases filed on the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although
the candidate has already been proclaimed.
Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the proclamation of a candidate who is
found to be disqualified is also not a bar to the Commissions power to order a proclaimed
candidate to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to
which he was elected.
By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates who were found to be ineligible only
after they were elected and proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code are clear: The remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition for quo warranto before
the metropolitan or municipal trial court. This is logical The Commission did not acquire
jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates prior to election (i.e., There was no report from
the Election Officer regarding their ineligibility and no petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy and/or petition for disqualification was filed against them.) Thus, the
Commission has no jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground of ineligibility,
except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and void for being based on incomplete
canvass.
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy
as follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or
cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not
arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission
deleting the name of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking
his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected
candidates and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation. [7]
The Commission further stated:
Considering that there are queries as to the status of the proclamation of disqualified
candidates as an offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the same was amended by virtue of
Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive portion of which now reads:
Considering the above-quoted provision, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to amend Resolution No. 5584
promulgated on 10 August 2002 with modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as follows:
103
I
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified
candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his
disqualification or despite the pending disqualification
case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of
said disqualified candidate is hereby declared void from
the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the
resolution disqualifying him or canceling his certificate
of candidacy does not provide for such an annulment. [8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:
a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated
on 15 July 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on October 7, 2002
and any other COMELEC actions and resolutions which are intended to summarily
oust and remove petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City without any
notice, inquiry, election protest, petition for quo warranto, investigation and hearing,
and therefore a clear violation of due process of law.
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions sitting en banc which does not
have authority to decide election related case, including pre-proclamation
controversies, in the first instance, in consonance to this Honorable Courts ruling in
the cases of Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and Garvida
vs. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age
of membership and its officers of the KK or SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in
accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and other provisions of R.A. 7160
otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.
d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as constitutional to direct all SK Officers
and Members who are now more than 18 years old to cease and desist from
continuously functioning as such SK Officers and Members and to vacate their
 respective SK Officers position, as they are no longer members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan organization or Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being over age
upon attaining the age of 18 years old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance and other benefits of the petitioner
as SK Chairperson of Barangay 38, Pasay City.[9]
Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is the validity of Resolution No.
5363 of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process when the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was
intended to oust her from her position as SK Chairman without any appropriate action and
proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by invoking its administrative
power to enforce and administer election laws. Thus, in the exercise of such power, it
may motu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to
be unqualified for the position they are seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of the Barangay and SK
elections in two newspapers of general circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates
regarding the Commissions administrative inquiry into their certificates of candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of
elections and to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is
mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. [10] As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for
example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections; register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens arms of
the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for
violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. [11] Its legislative authority is
found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer.[12] The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was
granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
104
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangayofficials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.[13]
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other
powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to
deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority,
however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioners certificate of candidacy.[14] The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission
may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of said body.[15]
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before
the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition shall be heard summarily after
due notice.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must be notified of the
petition against him and he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
This is the essence of due process. Due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after
the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.[16] In a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits,
and other documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When there is a need for
clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.[17]

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of
ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but
rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.[18] We have earlier enumerated the scope of the Commissions administrative
functions. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of
judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. [19]

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is

false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of
ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and
that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed
that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he
must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the
qualifications for the office he seeks.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No.
5781, canceling petitioners certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.

We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as regards the constitutionality of
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is
not the lis mota of this case.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on July 15, 2002 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

105
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004]

ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND
OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY SITUATED), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO, JR., 1 st District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG
PAOLO ALCERA in his capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay City, EDNA TIBAR a
minor assisted by parents, KRISTAL GALE BONGGO a minor assisted by parents, SK
Chairman RUEL TAYAM DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS
AND YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED and THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to
enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? This
is the issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose certificate of
candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she was not a
registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

106
 On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.[1]
On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363
adopting the recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including
petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and
all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in
the barangay where they intended to run.[2]
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was
not deleted from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
38, Pasay City.[3] She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002.[4]
On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of
candidacy may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any
registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to petitioner, the report
of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel ones
certificate of candidacy. Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing.
Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of
the Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only be removed by a
petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.[5]
On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781, [6] resolving petitioners
motion for reconsideration. It cited its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to
Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584 its policy on proclaimed
candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they were
elected. It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the procedure adopted by the Commission in
denying due course the certificate of candidacy of a candidate. It reads:
Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers were given the duty to: (1) verify
whether all candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered
voters of the barangay where they filed their certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the
entries of the certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries whether the
candidate concerned possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
107
Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by registered mail and by rush telegram to
the Law Department of this Commission the names of candidates who are not registered
voters in the place where they seek to run for public office within three (3) days from the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy. The names of these candidates, however, shall still
be included in the certified lists of candidates until the Commission directs otherwise.
By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes a recommendation to the
Commission En Banc, and the latter, by virtue of an En Banc Resolution either gives due
course to or denies/cancels the certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on the eligibility of candidates starts from
the time they filed their certificates of candidacy. The candidates, by virtue of the publication
of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin
are deemed to have constructive notice of the said administrative inquiry. Thus, the
Commission, by virtue of its administrative powers, may motu proprio deny/cancel the
certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to be not registered voters in the place
where they seek to run for public office.
Any registered candidate for the same office may also file a verified petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Section 69 (nuisance candidate) or
Sec. 78 (material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus Election
Code either personally or through a duly authorized representative within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election Officer concerned.
Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the alleged ineligibility in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy was filed within the reglementary period, the fact that the Resolution of this
Commission, denying due course to or canceling the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible
candidate, was not promulgated or did not arrive prior to or on the day of the elections is
therefore of no moment. The proclamation of an ineligible candidate is not a bar to the
exercise of this Commissions power to implement the said Resolution of the Commission En
Banc because it already acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility of the
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy even before elections by virtue of either
the report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate
of candidacy filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
are likewise clear: (1) A verified petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility
or under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed at anytime before
proclamation of the winning candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for the same
office, (2) All disqualification cases filed on the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although
the candidate has already been proclaimed.
Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the proclamation of a candidate who is
found to be disqualified is also not a bar to the Commissions power to order a proclaimed
candidate to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to
which he was elected.
By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates who were found to be ineligible only
after they were elected and proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code are clear: The remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition for quo warranto before
the metropolitan or municipal trial court. This is logical The Commission did not acquire
jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates prior to election (i.e., There was no report from
the Election Officer regarding their ineligibility and no petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy and/or petition for disqualification was filed against them.) Thus, the
Commission has no jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground of ineligibility,
except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and void for being based on incomplete
canvass.
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy
as follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or
cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not
arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission
deleting the name of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking
his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected
candidates and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation. [7]
The Commission further stated:
Considering that there are queries as to the status of the proclamation of disqualified
candidates as an offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the same was amended by virtue of
Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive portion of which now reads:
108
Considering the above-quoted provision, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to amend Resolution No. 5584
promulgated on 10 August 2002 with modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as follows:
I
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED
VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified
candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his
disqualification or despite the pending disqualification
case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of
said disqualified candidate is hereby declared void from
the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the
resolution disqualifying him or canceling his certificate
of candidacy does not provide for such an annulment. [8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:
a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated
on 15 July 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on October 7, 2002
and any other COMELEC actions and resolutions which are intended to summarily
oust and remove petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City without any
notice, inquiry, election protest, petition for quo warranto, investigation and hearing,
and therefore a clear violation of due process of law.
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions sitting en banc which does not
have authority to decide election related case, including pre-proclamation
controversies, in the first instance, in consonance to this Honorable Courts ruling in
the cases of Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and Garvida
vs. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age
of membership and its officers of the KK or SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in
 accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and other provisions of R.A. 7160
otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.
d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as constitutional to direct all SK Officers
and Members who are now more than 18 years old to cease and desist from
continuously functioning as such SK Officers and Members and to vacate their
respective SK Officers position, as they are no longer members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan organization or Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being over age
upon attaining the age of 18 years old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance and other benefits of the petitioner
as SK Chairperson of Barangay 38, Pasay City.[9]
Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is the validity of Resolution No.
5363 of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process when the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was
intended to oust her from her position as SK Chairman without any appropriate action and
proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by invoking its administrative
power to enforce and administer election laws. Thus, in the exercise of such power, it
may motu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to
be unqualified for the position they are seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of the Barangay and SK
elections in two newspapers of general circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates
regarding the Commissions administrative inquiry into their certificates of candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of
elections and to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is
mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. [10] As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for
example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement
agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections; register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens arms of
the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for
violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. It also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. [11] Its legislative authority is
109
found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer.[12] The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was
granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangayofficials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.[13]
Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other
powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to
deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority,
however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioners certificate of candidacy.[14] The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission
may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of said body.[15]
Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before
the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition shall be heard summarily after IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on July 15, 2002 and
due notice. COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.

It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must be notified of the SO ORDERED.
petition against him and he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
This is the essence of due process. Due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after
the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.[16] In a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits,
and other documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When there is a need for
clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division, the
parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.[17]

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of
ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but
rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.[18] We have earlier enumerated the scope of the Commissions administrative
functions. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of
judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. [19]

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is

false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of
ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and
that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed
that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he
must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the
qualifications for the office he seeks.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No.
5781, canceling petitioners certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.

We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as regards the constitutionality of
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is
not the lis mota of this case.

110
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 121139. July 12, 1996]

ISIDRO B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AUGUSTO

GARCIA, respondents.

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc dated June 30, 1995[1] in SPA No. 95-034 entitled "Isidro B. Garcia vs.
Augusto M. Garcia," for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The assailed resolution reversed the previous Resolution of the
Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated on May 4, 1995, [2] wherein respondent Augusto
M. Garcia was declared a nuisance candidate resulting in the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat of Tagig.

During the May 8, 1995 local elections, petitioner Isidro B. Garcia and respondent
Augusto M. Garcia were both candidates for mayor in Tagig, Metro Manila. Claiming that

111
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for no other legitimate purpose but to cause
confusion and disarray among the voters of Tagig considering the similarity in their surname,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for the declaration of respondent as a nuisance
candidate pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, the COMELEC (Second Division) granted the petition
and declared respondent as a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC based its ruling on the
following: 1) dubious veracity of respondent's certificate of nomination by the PDP-LABAN; 2)
failure of respondent to actively campaign; and 3) the absence of any campaign materials.
On May 10, 1995, two days after the election, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration[3] with the COMELEC seeking the reversal of the aforementioned resolution. In
the meanwhile, the canvassing of the election returns proceeded which eventually resulted in
the proclamation of petitioner on May 23, 1995 as the winning candidate. However, another
losing candidate, Ricardo Papa filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation, and an
election protest as well, with the COMELEC and the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, respectively,
against petitioner.
On June 30, 1995, the COMELEC en banc promulgated the assailed resolution, granting
private respondent's motion for reconsideration and reversing the previous resolution
declaring him a nuisance candidate, despite admitting that the motion has been rendered
moot and academic as a result of petitioner's proclamation on May 23, 1995 as winning
candidate.
The COMELEC discarded petitioner's claim that respondent lacked the logistical means
and machinery to pursue a serious political campaign due to the absence of propaganda
materials, and ruled that such assumption has no bearing on the qualification of respondent
to seek public office.
Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use
or value.[4]
Surprisingly, despite respondent COMELEC's admission that private respondent's motion
for reconsideration has already been rendered moot and academic due to petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected mayor of Tagig in the May 8, 1995 elections, it nevertheless
resolved to grant the motion.
Obviously, the assailed resolution would no longer be of any practical use or value to
private respondent considering that he did not even dispute the proclamation of petitioner as
the winning candidate. In fact, even private respondent's sole purpose in filing his motion for
reconsideration to regain his legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public
office has been rendered inconsequential as a result of petitioner's proclamation.
Petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Tagig as early as May 23, 1995, while the assailed
resolution was promulgated by respondent COMELEC on June 30, 1995. Undoubtedly, there
was more that ample opportunity for the COMELEC to be apprised of supervening events that
rendered private respondent's motion moot and academic, which in turn should have guided it
to properly deny the motion. But having failed to do so, respondent COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of the COMELEC dated
June 30, 1995 in SPA No. 95-034 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered denying private
respondent's motion for reconsideration for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner is now before us seeking to nullify and set aside the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc.

It is argued that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it granted respondent's
motion for reconsideration despite having been rendered moot and academic by the
proclamation of petitioner as duly elected mayor of Tagig. Petitioner bewails the fact that the
motion was granted with the end in view of benefiting the pending electoral protest filed by
losing candidate Ricardo Papa who, according to petitioner, was the one who instigated and
conspired with respondent to run for mayor to confuse the voters and undermine petitioner's
chances of winning.

Private respondent however denies the abovementioned imputation and contends that
his only purpose in filing a motion for reconsideration from the resolution declaring him a
nuisance candidate was solely to reacquire his legal status as a legitimate and qualified
candidate for public office.

112
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997]

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR
NOLI PIPO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the
duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was
scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as
member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that
petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit

113
for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824.
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang
Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg,
Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. [1] The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. [2] The presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to
his close association with petitioner.[3]
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of
Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per
advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, [4] disapproved petitioner's certificate of
candidacy again due to her age. [5] Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional
Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to
run.[6]
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified;
that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must
be cancelled;
x x x."
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the
Board of Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she
garners the highest number of votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his
petition and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED."[9]

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not
respondent's votes of 76.[10] In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en
be disapproved.[7] Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang
petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age
qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile [8] and registered On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner
mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila. for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. [11] The
proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or
any other interested party." [12] On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner,
mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor
the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. [13]
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event
she won in the election. The order reads as follows:
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the
"Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of
second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded
Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received
the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:

I
xxx

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for
SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus
the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she
Election Code.[14] The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure
was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, a copy of which is
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
hereto attached and marked as Annex "A";

114
 "Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with
the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false
material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by
any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself.[15]
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a
decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by
the COMELEC en banc.[16] It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and
decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. -- The Commission shall sit in two (2)
Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions,
special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in
accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission."[17]
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions
upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. [18]
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not
comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.These requirements are:
"Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. -- Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed
in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or
protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the
petition or protest as there are additional respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. -- The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section
must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally,
115
or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case,
the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of
copies must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. -- (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be
printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in
English or Filipino.
x x x."
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal
size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly
with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the
petition were filed with the COMELEC. [19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on
the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction
of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. [20] The
current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and
the correct shade.[21] The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.[22]
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. [23]
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It
may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading
should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the
questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed
by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975
as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the
barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. [24]
 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express their views
and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. [25] Its affairs were
administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who
were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of
age.[26]In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the
maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not
more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P.
337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. [27] The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7)
members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan.[28]
The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.
A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for
[29]
cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. [30]
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down
by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. -- The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed
of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6)
months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and
who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang
Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. -- An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be
a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident
of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least
fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day of his
election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not
have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude."
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six
months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that
an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a
qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of
116
age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. -- To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK
elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day, that is, he
must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections."
xxx
"Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. -- An elective official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the
city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final."
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK
elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election
day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at
least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK
must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter
in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner's age
is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner,
however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond
the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that
the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election
day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-
one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an
elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years
only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of
age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official
is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his
election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on
election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective
official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is
understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. [31] The
courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.[32]
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991.In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. [33] Since
a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a
"qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does
not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined
on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra
vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the
day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age
on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not
months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days
each.[34] One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on
the 365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year. [35] In computing years, the first year is
reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the
second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two
years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th
day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the
entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year
begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22
years old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21
years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a
fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21
117
years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law
does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a
barangay youth official was expressly stated as "x x x at least fifteen years of age or over but
less than eighteen x x x." [36] This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at
least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age
of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of
the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make
the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was to
include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving
the matter open to confusion and doubt.[37]
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan
was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not all,
Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino
assumed power.[38] They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991
fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21 years [39] and the only exception is in the
second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
"Sec. 423. Creation and Election. -- a) x x x;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed
the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of
the term for which he was elected."
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the
official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows
him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator
Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday." [40] Conversely,
the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b]
together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21
years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must therefore be
exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK
official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days
old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old
and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified
as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member
of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members
Sangguniang Kabataan elections. of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office ofSangguniang
Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public of the term.
policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. [41]
SO ORDERED.
In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the
election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age
requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. [42] The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. [43]

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected.
[44]
A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. [45] Moreover, despite his
claims,[46] private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew
of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of
misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival
candidate.[47]

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next
highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. [48] Section 435 applies when a
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, [49] is convicted of a
felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has
been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. [50]

Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen."[51]

Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. [52] Ineligibility is not one of the
grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that
the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member
chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall
discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said
office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
118
119
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 177927 February 15, 2008

FLORANTE S. QUIZON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (SECOND DIVISION), MANILA, ATTY. ARNULFO H. PIOQUINTO
(ELECTION OFFICER, ANTIPOLO CITY) and ROBERTO VILLANUEVA PUNO, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction seeks to compel the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division to resolve the petition and supplemental
petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed by Florante S.
Quizon against Roberto V. Puno.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May
14, 2007 national and local elections.

On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy1 against Puno docketed as SPA-07-290. Quizon alleged that Puno is not qualified to
run as candidate in Antipolo City for failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day
of election; and that Punos claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident of

120
1906 Don Celso Tuazon, Valley Golf Brgy. De la Paz, Antipolo City for four years and six months
before May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was in fact a resident
of Quezon City.
On April 24, 2007, Quizon filed a Supplement2 to the petition claiming that Puno cannot validly
be a candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated
in his COC that he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal which is a different
legislative district.3
Subsequently, concerned residents of the First District of Antipolo City wrote a letter dated
April 27, 20074 seeking clarification from the COMELEC on the legal and political implications
of the COC of Puno, who was seeking public office in the First District of the Province of Rizal
but waging his political campaign in the City of Antipolo, which is a separate and distinct
legislative district. They prayed that Punos COC be declared as invalid and that the same be
cancelled.
On June 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the COMELEC had not
rendered a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that the unreasonable delay in
rendering judgment deprived him of his right to be declared as the winner and assume the
position of member of the House of Representatives. 5
Meanwhile, on July 31, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification and
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Roberto V. Puno is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent is a resident of the 1 st District of Antipolo City, and is thus
qualified to run as a Member of the House of Representatives of the same district. 6
Quizon filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc which remains
unresolved up to this date.
In his Comment, Puno argues that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the July 31,
2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. He also alleged that the petition must be
dismissed for the act sought to be performed is a discretionary and not a ministerial duty; and
for failure of Quizon to show that he is entitled to the writ.
The Office of the Solicitor General agrees that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the
July 31, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. It likewise posits that any question
regarding Punos qualifications now pertains to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
In the instant petition, Quizon prays that the Court order the COMELEC to resolve his pending
petition for disqualification.
121
We dismiss the petition.
The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate.7Here, Quizon prayed that COMELEC be ordered to resolve the petition for
disqualification. However, pending resolution of the instant petition for mandamus, the
COMELEC issued its Resolution on the petition for disqualification rendering the instant case
moot.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review,8 none of which are present in the instant case.
Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been accomplished, there is nothing
else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform.
Moreover, the petition failed to meet the requisites for mandamus.
As a general rule, the writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.
When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may
only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. 9 The denial of due
course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers
of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. 10Hence, the
Court may only compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it
may not control the manner of exercising such discretion. However, as previously discussed,
the issuance of a writ commanding COMELEC to resolve the petition for disqualification will no
longer serve any purpose since COMELEC has issued its decision on the matter.
Moreover, petitioner has not adequately shown a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
warrant the granting of the petition. He asserts that the unreasonable delay in resolving the
petition deprived him of his right to be proclaimed as the winning candidate since all votes
cast in favor of respondent are stray due to his invalid candidacy. Accordingly, COMELEC must
consider that only he and Amarante Velasco were the candidates in the said election and
since he received a higher number of votes than Velasco, petitioner argues that he should be
proclaimed the winning candidate.
Petitioners assertion is bereft of merit.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code11 provides that petitions to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election. In construing this provision together with Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, 12 this Court declared in Salcedo II v. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
COMELEC13 that the fifteen-day period in Section 78 is merely directory. Thus:
SO ORDERED.
If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently
declared by final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is merely
directory.14 (Emphasis supplied)

It has long been settled in Codilla Sr. v. De Venecia15 that pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, a final judgment before the election is required for the votes of a disqualified candidate
to be considered "stray." In the absence of any final judgment of disqualification against Puno,
the votes cast in his favor cannot be considered stray.

As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to note
that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of the election law regarding certificates of
candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to
be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are
regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people. 16 In the instant case, Puno
won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat
the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself,
as in this case.17

Moreover, following Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,18 a subsequent

disqualification of Puno will not entitle petitioner, the candidate who received the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner. It has long been settled in our
jurisprudence, as early as 1912, that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for
the office for which he was elected. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in
the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. 19

Finally, petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
After a resolution on the petition for disqualification, a motion for reconsideration may be filed
before the COMELEC En Banc as what was done by petitioner. Only then can petitioner come
before this Court via a petition for certiorari. 20 These rules of procedure are not without
reason. They are meant to facilitate the orderly administration of justice and petitioner cannot
take a judicial shortcut without violating the rule on hierarchy of courts.

Clearly, petitioner failed to show that he met all the requirements for the issuance of the writ
of mandamus.

122
123
 PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was
issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May
14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en
banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001,
[1]
while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.[2]

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition [3] to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said
consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the
sum of P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence,
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public
office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
106709.However, in its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed
the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. [7] Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that
he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due
course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction
has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the
trial court for promulgation in his presence. [9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction
was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

EN BANC After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was
forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
[G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001]
124
 On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas petition, issued
the challenged Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for
and from holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following
the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11]
Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a
Resolution[12] dated May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis ours)
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in
Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.[13]
In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for
the Supreme Court to determine.[16] We further pronounced therein that:
in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely
125
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves
moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of whether a crime
involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can
be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime
of fencing punishable by a special law.[18]
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:
That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal
to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No.
958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of
P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court. (Emphasis ours).
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. [21] The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,[22] through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. [23]Thus,
paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,
insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not
[24]
apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this Courts ruling in Tuanda has been
abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, [26] which
reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted by this
Court. Only a fine was imposed.Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence,
the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is
what we said in Rosa Lim:
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on
them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that
petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was
committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best
serve the ends of criminal justice.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

This argument is erroneous.

In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuandas conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and
28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension
was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There
we said in part:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of
which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x.[25] (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer
or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when
committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member.
126
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992

127
BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 15 May 1990 of
the Commission on Elections (Second Division), issued SPA No. 90-006 entitled "Nur Hussein
Ututalum, petitioner vs. Benjamin Loong, respondent," a petition to disqualify Benjamin Loong,
candidate for Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government in Muslim Mindanao.
Said assailed resolution ruled that the respondent Commission has jurisdiction to hear and
decide SPA No. 90-006.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the respondent Commission his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the
election held on 17 February 1990 (15 January 1990 being the last day for filing said
certificate); herein two (2) private respondents (Ututalum and Edris) were also candidates for
the same position.
On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the
respondent Commission (Second Division) a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006)
seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the
latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
On 7 March 1990, the other candidate, respondent Edris, filed a "Petition in Intervention" in
the said SPA No. 90-006, raising therein issues similar to those raised by respondent Ututalum
in his main petition.
On 19 March 1990, 1 petitioner Loong filed in SPA No. 90-006 his answer to the petition,
seeking the dismissal of the petition, and alleging the following:
1. that it has not been the practice among the Muslim people in the
community where respondent was born to record the birth of a child with the
Office of the Civil Registry; that following such practice, respondent's parents
did not also record his birth with the said office; that, to be sure of his age
qualification, respondent, before filing his certificate of candidacy consulted
his mother and other persons who have personal knowledge of his date of
birth and all assured respondent that his correct date of birth is July 4, 1954.
2. that respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction because such petition is
actually one which is to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy which, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), as
128
amended by Election Reforms Law of 1987, should have been filed within 5
days following the last day for filing of the certificate of candidacy.
On 30 March 1990, petitioner Loong also filed his "Answer to Petition for Intervention." 2
On 15 May 1990, the respondent Commission (Second Division) rendered the now assailed
Resolution 3 (with two (2) Commissioners Yorac and Flores concurring, and one
Commissioner Dimaampao dissenting), holding that:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections
(Second Division) holds that it has jurisdiction to try the instant petition and
the respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is
hereby denied.
In its questioned resolution, respondent Commission held that, in consonance with the ruling
of this Court in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC 4 to wit
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistaken believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified.
Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 5
(in relation to the said Frivaldo ruling) should now mean
that:
1. When there is an allegation of falsification of an entry in a candidate's
certificate of candidacy, and such alleged falsification refers to a fact
concerning the candidate's eligibility to run for and hold an elective public
office, a petition to declare such candidate ineligible is seasonable if it is
brought within a reasonable time of the discovery of ineligibility.
2. Such petition for a declaration of ineligibility is seasonable even if filed after
the period prescribed by law for attacking certificate of candidacy and before
the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified. The substantive
issue of qualification cannot be subordinated to or defeated by the gap in
procedural rules. ..." 6
Denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution, the respondent
Commission issued Resolution dated 3 July 1990, 7 stating among others that
While the Frivaldo case referred to the questioned of respondent's citizenship,
we hold that the principle applies to discovery of violation of requirements for
eligibility, such as for instance the fact that a candidate is a holder of a green
card or other certificates of permanent residence in another country, or, as in
 this case, that the candidate does not possess the age qualification for the
office.
On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. 8 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July
1990 to annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3
July 1990, issued in SPA No. 90-006.
The principal issue in the case at bar, as we see it, is whether or not SPA No. 90-006 (a
petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed within the period
prescribed by law.
The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on 15
January 1990 (The last day for filing the same), the election for officials of the Muslim
Mindanao Autonomous Region being on 17 February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum
filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-
nine (49) days from the date Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990),
and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 was filed out of time because it was filed
beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the
other hand, private respondent Ututalum alleges that SPA No. 90-006, though filed only on 5
March 1990, was filed when no proclamation of winner had as yet been made and that the
petition is deemed filed on time as Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
states that the petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds of ineligibility "shall be filed any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation."
On the part of respondent Commission, it held in its assailed resolution that the petition in SPA
No. 90-006 was timely filed, applying Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, 9 and Section
2, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which states that the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within five (5) days following the
last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, both read in the light of the Frivaldo ruling
of this Court.
We find the present petition to be meritorious.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person running for the
office of Vice Governor for the autonomous region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the
day of the election. Private respondent Ututalum alleges that petitioner Loong falls short of
this age requirements, hence, on 5 march 1990, he filed a petition to disqualify the petitioner.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for brevity) provides that the certificate of
candidacy of the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth of said person.
129
Section 78 of the same Code states that is case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has
committed false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person
may be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the time the certificate was filed.
Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule
25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and
Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits any act declared by law to be
a ground for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The grounds
for disqualification as expressed in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code are the following:
SEC. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public official
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election compaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if
he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election law.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify
petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided
for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which
allows the filing of the petition at nay time after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by
respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers.
Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative
enactment.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the
provisions of Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25 -day period prescribed by Section
78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the
ineligibility.
Section 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. ny candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court of Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881."
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modified or alters the 25-day period prescribed
by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy
on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms
and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based
on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act
No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases
filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Section 6 and 7 Rep. Act. No 6646 is
mentioned made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is
because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition
relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed,
and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever
reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to
130
raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10)
days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the
Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter
contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10)days from
the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in
a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of
the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who
discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate
committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a
gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made
after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the
proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be
petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do
except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against
the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him.
Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to
it, it unnecessary and should be remedied.
At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative
branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to
eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, 10 as seen in Section 78 and 253 of
the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
"procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what the law does not provide, its function
not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too
short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.
We are aware that in Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 11 this Court held that a petition to disqualify an
elective official, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, may be file at anytime, even
beyond the period prescribed by law, and office and in fact had long been discharging the
duties of said office. But we disagree with respondent Commission that the Frivaldo ruling
applied to the case at bar in all its connotations and implications. For one, the ground for
which disqualification is sought in the present case is misrepresentation as to the required
age of the candidate, whereas, in Frivaldo the ground for disqualification was lack of
Philippine citizenship. This is an overriding and fundamental desideratum matched perhaps
only by disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., in his concurring opinion in Frivaldo vs. Comelec 12
said:
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the
filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory
and jurisdictional.
 As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election SO ORDERED.
and proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the
proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the
filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and
definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be
filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes.

xxx xxx xxx

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of

an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is
based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe
that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

In Aznar vs. Comelec, 13 the records show that private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy on 19 November 1987 and that the petitioner filed his petition for disqualification of
said private respondent on 22 January 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed
beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Code, it was clear that the
said petition had been filed out of time. The Court also ruled that the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent could not also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it was unquestionably premature,
considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on 3
March 1988. However, as a matter of public interest to ascertain the
respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he had been
proclaimed elected, the Court ruled on the merits of the case.

But the Court, in another case, in an EN BANC Resolution 14 affirmed the dismissal by the
COMELEC of the petitions for disqualification. It appeared that on 2 March 1990, a petition to
disqualify Padilla Pundaodaya (SPA No. 90-004) was filed because of an allegedly falsified
certificate of candidacy which he could not have personally filed on 15 January 1990 since he
had been in Saudi Arabia since 24 July 1987 and arrived in Manila only on 24 January 1990.
The Court held that the disqualification petition was correctly treated by the Commission on
Elections as a petition to cancel a defective certificate of candidacy but the petition was filed
out of time and could not anymore be entertained.

In sum, SPA No. 90-006 was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-day period
(from the filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy) prescribed by
Section 78 of the Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for disqualification is
warranted. Further it would appear that we can not treat SPA NO. 90-006 as a petition for quo
warranto (Section 253 of the Code) for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no
proclamation of election results had as yet been made, it was premature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of respondent Commission, dated 15

May 1990 and 3 July 1990, rendered in SPA No. 90-006 are hereby SET ASIDE.

131

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002]
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the
people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her
insistence that she should continue governing the people of Leyte against their will. The
enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of
the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker
Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives
to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a)
administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for
usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the
basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the
position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was
the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine
de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a
Petition for Disqualification[1] against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles
owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or
corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,
[2]
Danilo D. Maglasang,[3] Cesar A. Laurente;[4] (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and
132
Rogelio T. Salvera;[5] (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police
Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;[6] and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks,
haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the
intercession of the respondent.[7] The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to
the COMELECs Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of
Region VIII.[8] On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the
petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was
remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation. [9]
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to
hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates
for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the
winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as
intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent [herein petitioner] with the COMELEC Second Division. [10] Respondent Locsin
alleged that the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted
remains. She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification case and prayed
for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic. A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on
petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.[11]
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent stating there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by
the respondent. A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry
receipt was attached to the pleading. [12] The records, however, do not show the date the
petitioner received the motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte
Order[13] directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of the seriousness of the
allegations in the petition for disqualification. [14] It also directed the Regional Election Director
to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records
together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission. [15] As a result,
petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsins 53,447 votes. [16]
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his
proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for
disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001
that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with the
Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with
the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram
sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and
that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and receive evidence
therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8
at his own instance.[17] Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were
undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He
attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; [18](b) Copy of the
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico; [19] (c) Affidavit of
Wilfredo A. Fiel;[20] (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;[21] and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y.
Padayao.[22]
 On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,[23] alleging that (a)
he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied
the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of
the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the
petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c) that he received the
telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May
22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension
of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion. [24]
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioners Motion and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. [25] On June 4, 2001, petitioner
submitted his Memorandum[26] in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his
proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no
legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of
suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional
candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue
upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following additional evidence in his
Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;
[27]
(b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; [28] (c) Copy of certification
issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc; [29] (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and
Pepito Restituto;[30] and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion, [31] Igmedio Rita[32] and Gerardo
Monteza.[33] Respondent Locsins memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his
witnesses.[34]
Petitioners Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on
June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution [35] in SPA No. 01-
208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered
his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes xxx. A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of
petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day. [36]
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were
declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent
Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives stating
that MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast
in the legislative district for said office. [37] Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June
18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration[38] from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which
ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration.
[39]
Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division
erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of
procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote
getter. Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration.[40]
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Proclamation,[41] docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the
proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of
votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the
election, returns, and qualification of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House of
133
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first
instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3)
the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes
cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived
of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence
adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of
his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification
case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the
disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses [43] which he claims would
refute and substantially belie the allegations of petitioners/intervenors witnesses. A Reply,
[44]
Rejoinder[45] and Sur-Rejoinder[46] were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the
motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC
No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a Resolution penned by Commissioner Rufino
S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla. [47] Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and
Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions [48] to the Javier
resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after
considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality of
the evidence was clearly in petitioners favor. Equally worth mentioning is the fact that
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division,
also dissented and voted to grant Codillas motion for reconsideration on the ground that [T]he
people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorates will. x x x. [49]
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Vote and
Opinion and Summary of Votes reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring
the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C.
Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the
resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001, disqualifying
Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla,
Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla,
promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for
insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having
been issued without hearing and without any finding that the
evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and
void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for (t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes, to the exclusion of respondent and the concurrent order for the
Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene
 and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes counting out the Respondent the same being
violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions
of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are considered stray and invalidsaid ruling being
issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality
of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district
of Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate
who garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that
position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this
resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the House of
Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte
and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through
the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and
guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null
and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the
proclamation being violative of election laws, established
jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA
No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and without any
finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and,
thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
for (t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent and the
concurrent order for the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte
to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the
Respondent the same being violative of election laws, established
jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
that the votes of respondent Codilla are considered stray and
invalid said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable
decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality
of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district
of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives
134
representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this
purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the
Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of
Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA
No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to
grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC
No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken
together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases; and the Resolution submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K.
Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the
majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority decided that
no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his own
separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted
separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on his vote.[50]
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a Vote of Adoption signed by Commissioners
Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. [51]
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead,
she filed a Comment and Manifestation [52] with the COMELEC en banc questioning the
procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin
requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and
Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office
since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members
of the House.[53] Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged
speech to the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that
she will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution
ordering her to vacate her position.[54]
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order[55] constituting the
members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid
decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and proclaim the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of
Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte x x x.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte, having
obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.
[56]
On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.[57]
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent
Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en bancresolution
annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.[58] Petitioner also served notice that I am
assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of
Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my
constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all
physical facilities and staff support. On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum [59] dated
October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza,
Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly
promulgated and now final and executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x.
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of
the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001,[60] no action was taken by the House
on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter[61] addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated
October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General
Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the
House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner can avail of
whatever remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive.
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter[62] dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However,
Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE
Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall openly defy and disobey the COMELEC
ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the decision would result in the spectacle of
having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation, the only
consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSEs liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a
matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which,
hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously. (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has
become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has
become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its
Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative
district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the
House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name
of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin has been
usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of the 4 th legislative district
of Leyte considering that her premature proclamation has been declared null and void by the
COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived
him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte.
In his Comment,[63] public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will
not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a
ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House
considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in the
Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the House Speaker to
implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,[64] public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading
the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before
the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was
merely performing official acts in compliance with the opinions [65] rendered by House of
Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void
since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House. He also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of
the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by
mandamus.
135
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, [66] alleged that the Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot issue the writ of
mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating the principle of
separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as
a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a
legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled by
mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed against the
Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and
implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after
her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in
the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of Representatives. Second, the
petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and the
COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation
controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is
actually a hodge-podge decision because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC
disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has
been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed
against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria
Locsin, on the ground that the allegations stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition
for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives under section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late. [67]
In his Reply,[68] petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the
COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an
opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the HRET has no
jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based not on
ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain
the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-
proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881[69] and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that
respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but
has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement
and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not
encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as
Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by
the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said
proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize
petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of
respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
 First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 [70] sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant
to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of
qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the
date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any
candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by the Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office.
xxxxxxxxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the
offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number
which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the
year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office,
i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and
its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten
(10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for
Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties
shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary
evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of
the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the
Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports
and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing
and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission
shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle
to a division;
136
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the
same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the
date of consultation.
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to
answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this
requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together
with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been
completed, viz:
Rule 14. Summons
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall
give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return the
summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of
service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner
provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines.
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer,
must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission
his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the
hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do
not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding
proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated
assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he
never received summons.[71] Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from
the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to
suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the
COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23,
2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall
give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office. (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the
elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct
hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in
office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most
Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion
contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through
registered mail.The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service.
[72]
This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all
parties, viz:
Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned,
at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For
good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which
the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the
hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof
of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the
rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
Respondents Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service
of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which
the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646[73] requires that the suspension must be upon motion by the complainant or any
intervenor, viz:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial or hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly
affected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a
mere scrap of paper.[74] It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., [75] respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent
Motion for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the
Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt [76] was attached evidencing service
of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner
received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order
suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order
was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner
could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time
as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when
evidence of the winning candidates guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second
Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioners guilt is strong. Its only
basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the seriousness of the allegations in
the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2 nd Division), pursuant to
Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx
and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further
orders.[77] (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong,
the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to
adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
137
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for
disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the
COMELEC to continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest. This is also in
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete
the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and
to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion
of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25,
2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file
their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was
based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification;
(b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although
intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main
disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The
parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only on the hearing
for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the
hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the
hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to
support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute
the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the COMELEC en
banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the
additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to disqualify the
petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second
Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of
Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the parties respective
memoranda was in lieu of the parties oral argument on the motion. This would explain the
fact that Codillas Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the order of
suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion
for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent
Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other
Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to consider Codillas affidavits. This
time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary
documents from both sides.[78] (emphases supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioners Memorandum shows that he confined his
arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum,
petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due process,
and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order of
suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part
is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation. [79] He
urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main
disqualification case should the suspension be lifted. [80]
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not
based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on
substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits
without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly
observed:
Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based
mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided
evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no
choice. Codilla was disqualified.[81]
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence
coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was
charged.[82]
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing
as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be
proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or
other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration
must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the
extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and
influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the
petition reads:
[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current
elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the
prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City
Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the
residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the
territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without
period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various
voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4 th legislative district of Leyte, for the precise
purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte
to cast their votes for said respondent.[83]
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these
allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler
dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings Ormoc City Government extracting
and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla
family.[84]
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they
saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the
road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel
unloaded by the white trucks.[85]
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government
of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City
Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the
source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said
that its not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the
property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand and gravel to
whoever requests from Mayor Codilla.[86]
138
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the
petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking City Government
of Ormoc came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that
the driver of the truck told him to vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election.
[87]
His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the supposed order of the
petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him.
The same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin, [88] Alfredo C. De la Pea,
[89]
Miguel P. Pandac,[90] Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios, [91] Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,
[92]
Abner Casas,[93] Rita Trangia,[94] and Judith Erispe[95] attached to respondent Locsins
Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses [96] of respondent Locsin, all similarly
worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay
San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be
held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification. More
importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the petitioner based on
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against
the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment,
franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxxxxxxxx
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses
under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle,
facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political
subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any
partisan political activity x x x.
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. [97] They are criminal and not administrative in
nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the
COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of
justice, viz:
Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice
for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction
to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those
relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case
based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the
opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes received
by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest number of votes. On
this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15,
2001[98] when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest
the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is
plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of
that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two
dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of
Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of
the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent
[herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however,
that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division
to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis,
proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final
judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered
stray.Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. [99] For in voting
for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the
people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.[100]
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner
has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the
elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not
attain finality, and hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of
Decisions and Resolutions reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc
shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and
139
Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their
promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a
Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or
proceedings, following its promulgation. (emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, [101] issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification
cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,
citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day
of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall
tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed.
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the
petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration shall
suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling. (emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine
that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. [102] In every election, the peoples choice
is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect.
When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number
of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.
[103]
In Domino v. COMELEC,[104] this Court ruled, viz:
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed.
xxxxxxxxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election
fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to
the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to
make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to
take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice. [105]
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal
circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election
offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based on election
offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be
invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the votes cast in
his favor should not be considered.[106]
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,[107] this Court
ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based
on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the
second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to
review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to question her membership to the
House of Representatives is the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued
that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in
directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote getter.
(emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that the Second Divisions
directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and executory. [108] Clearly, the validity
of respondent Locsins proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for
140
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has
the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could
still rule on the nullity of respondents proclamation because it was properly raised in the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to
review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed
on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that
the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and
shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or
ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned
shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner.
The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk
of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof. (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no
jurisdiction in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and
eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.[109]
We reject respondents contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has
not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
 To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of
his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In Puzon vs. Cua,[110] even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials
Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the
or en banc. duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House
Locsin. of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition executory.
for quo warranto with the HRET. SO ORDERED.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. [111] In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no
issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility
is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be
the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by
a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the
height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to
unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [112] For a petition for mandamus to
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.[113]
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are
settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin
who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division
141
 (g) Merlinda Degala Member of the SB

(h) Gabriel Aranas Member of the SB

EN BANC (i) Ernesto Bito-on Member of the SB

[G.R. No. 163302. July 23, 2004] (j) Juvic Deslate Member of the SB[1]

ROBERTO ALBAA, KATHERINE BELO, GENEROSO DERRAMAS, VICENTE DURAN, RICARDO
ARAQUE, LILIA ARANAS, MERLINDA DEGALA, GABRIEL ARANAS, ERNESTO BITO-ON AND
JUVIC DESLATE, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PIO JUDE S. BELO, RODOLFO
DEOCAMPO AND LORENCITO B. DIAZ, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On June 23, 2001, the private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with
the COMELEC Law Department, alleging that the latter committed acts of terrorism punishable
by Section 261(e)[2] of the Omnibus Election Code, and engaged in vote-buying, punishable
under Section
261(a)[3] of the Omnibus Election Code. The private respondents prayed that the petitioners be
charged of the said crimes and disqualified from holding office under Section 68 [4] of the said
Code, and Section 6[5] of Republic Act No. 6646. The case was docketed as Election Offense
Case No. 01-111.

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for the nullification of the Resolution The Law Department of the COMELEC found a prima facie case and issued a Resolution
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, dated October 21, 2003 annulling on January 15, 2002, recommending the filing of an Information against the petitioners for
the proclamation of the petitioners as the duly-elected municipal officials of Panitan, Capiz, violation of Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 28 of Republic
during the May 14, 2001 elections, and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 5, Act No. 6648. It, likewise, recommended the disqualification of all the petitioners from further
2004, denying their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners aver that the public holding office, and the reconvening of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) in order to
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proclaim the qualified candidates who obtained the highest number of votes. [6]
issuing the assailed resolutions.
Acting on the said resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued, on February 28, 2003, a
The Antecedents Resolution directing its Law Department to file the appropriate Information against the
petitioners for violation of Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code and directing the
Clerk of the Commission to docket the electoral aspect of the complaint as a disqualification
During the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioners and private respondents ran for the
case. The dispositive portion reads:
positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan in
the Municipality of Panitan, Capiz. On May 18, 2001, the petitioners were duly elected and
proclaimed winners to the following positions: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We DIRECT the LAW DEPARTMENT to FILE THE NECESSARY
INFORMATION against ROBERTO ALBAA, KATHERINE BELO, GENEROSO DERRAMAS, VICENTE
DURAN, RICARDO ARAQUE, LILIA ARANAS, MERLINDA DEGALA, GABRIEL ARANAS, ERNESTO
(a) Roberto Albaa Mayor
BITO-ON and JUVIC DESLATE before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) Katherine Belo Vice-Mayor

The Clerk of the Commission is likewise directed to docket the electoral aspect of the
complaint as a disqualification case and immediately assign the same to a division which shall
(c) Generoso Derramas Member of the Sang[g]uniang Bayan (SB) resolve the case on the basis of the recommendation of the Law Department. [7]

(d) Vicente Duran Member of the SB The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration [8] thereon, alleging that the COMELEC
did not make any findings of fact in its resolution, and that there was even no disquisition as
(e) Ricardo Araque Member of the SB to the merits of the affidavits of their witnesses and the evidence presented by them. The
petitioners also alleged that the COMELEC erred in ordering the docketing of the electoral
(f) Lilia Aranas Member of the SB aspect of the complaint, in light of Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

142
 On June 3, 2003, the COMELEC issued a Resolution[9] denying the said motion for lack of
merit and for having been filed out of time. The Clerk of the Commission docketed the
disqualification case against the petitioners as SPA No. 03-006.
On October 21, 2003, the COMELEC First Division rendered the assailed resolution in SPA
No. 03-006 annulling the petitioners proclamation on the ground that they violated Section
261(a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, and directing the election officer of Panitan to
constitute a new municipal board of canvassers, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the proclamation of respondents Roberto Albaa,
Katherine Belo, Generoso Derramas, Vicente Duran, Ricardo Araque, Lilia Aranas, Merlinda
Degala, Gabriel Aranas, Ernesto Bito-on and Juvic Deslate as Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panitan, Capiz, are hereby annulled on the ground that they
committed election offenses as provided for under Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 28 of RA 6646 and Section 261 (e) of the same Code in relation to
Section 68 thereof. The Election Officer of the municipality of Panitan is hereby directed to
constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers which shall disregard the votes garnered by
the respondents, prepare a new Certificate of Canvass on the basis of the votes of the
candidates for the position held by the respondents to the exclusion of the latter and
immediately, proclaim the winners.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The petitioners motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for
reconsideration were denied by the COMELEC En Banc in the Resolution of May 5, 2004,
declaring that the disqualification case was the result of the findings of the Commission En
Banc. It also held that as an aftermath of petitioners violation of Section 261(e) in relation to
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, they are considered disqualified candidates and,
therefore, the votes they received are deemed stray votes. [11] Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain
and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. filed separate dissenting opinions.
On the same day, the private respondents moved for the execution pending appeal of the
assailed resolutions on the ground that decisions on election contests rendered by the
COMELEC may be executed pending appeal for good reasons. They contended that a good
reason existed in this case, considering that their terms of office were about to expire. [12]
The Present Petition
On May 13, 2004, the petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to nullify the two Resolutions dated October
21, 2003 and May 5, 2004. Since the Court did not issue a temporary restraining order, the
COMELEC declared the assailed Resolutions as final and executory and directed the Regional
Election Director to implement the same in an Order dated May 27, 2004.[13]
143
On June 1, 2004, the Municipal Election Officer issued a Notice to the Members of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers informing them that the Board shall convene on June 8, 2004.
[14]
On June 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the private respondents as
the winners in the May 14, 2001 elections, with Pio Jude S. Belo as Mayor, Rodolfo Deocampo
as Vice-Mayor and Lorencito B. Diaz as a Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. [15]
The threshold issues raised by the parties in this case are the following: (a) whether the
petition was mooted by the election and proclamation of the new set of municipal officials
after the May 10, 2004 elections; and, (b) if in the negative, whether the COMELEC committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, we agree with the COMELEC that the petition for the nullification of its
October 21, 2003 and May 5, 2004 Resolutions and the proclamation of the private
respondents on June 10, 2004 was mooted by the election and proclamation of a new set of
municipal officials after the May 10, 2004 elections. In fact, the records show that petitioner
Katherine Belo was elected as Mayor, petitioner Generoso Derramas as Vice-Mayor, and
petitioners Ricardo Araque and Ernesto Bito-on as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The
expiration of the challenged term of the offices renders the corresponding petition moot and
academic.[16]
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. [17] Nonetheless,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.[18] In this case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in the petition
in order to prevent a repetition thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and peaceful
elections. For this reason, we resolve to grant the petition.
On the second issue, the petitioners aver that since they were already proclaimed the
duly-elected municipal officials of Panitan, Capiz, on May 18, 2001, the COMELEC should have
dismissed the complaint for their disqualification which the private respondents filed only
on June 23, 2001, more than a month after such proclamation. They aver that such dismissal
was mandated by Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, adopted on November 3, 1988,
which reads:
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has
already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case . However, the
complainant shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the
commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt
and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the
court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension
of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners cite the ruling of this Court in Bagatsing vs. COMELEC,[19] and the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Mehol Sadain, that after the COMELEC directed its Law Department on
February 28, 2003 to file the appropriate Informations against the petitioners for violations of
Section 261(a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, it should have refrained from making a finding
of disqualification before the petitioners conviction by final judgment, since by so doing, the
COMELEC preempted the decision of the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the petition at bar, considering the
petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, was designed to eschew criminal prosecution for
violation of Section 261(a)(e) of the Omnibus Election Code.
We rule for the petitioners.
Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is as clear as day: the COMELEC is mandated to
dismiss a complaint for the disqualification of a candidate who has been charged with an election
offense but who has already been proclaimed as winner by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for
disqualification cases;[20] hence, should be applied and given effect. In Bagatsing vs. Commission on
Election,[21] this Court ruled that a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a
candidate before or after his proclamation as winner shall be dismissed by the COMELEC, viz:
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against
a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been
proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but
shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification against private respondent in the case at bar
was lodged on May 18, 1998 or seven (7) days after the 1998 elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Resolution No. 2050, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case and shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the COMELEC. Under this scenario,
the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election which may be either before or after
the proclamation of the respondent candidate.[22]
It bears stressing that Resolution No. 2050 was approved precisely because of the
variance in opinions of the members of the respondent COMELEC on matters of procedure in
dealing with and evaluating cases for disqualification filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646. [23]
144
Under the said resolution, if a complaint is filed with the COMELEC against a candidate
who has already been proclaimed winner, charging an election offense under Section 261 of
the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Rep. Act Nos. 6646 and 8436, and praying for the
disqualification of the said candidate, the COMELEC shall determine the existence of probable
cause[24] for the filing of an Information against the candidate for the election offense charged.
However, if the COMELEC finds no probable cause, it is mandated to dismiss the complaint for
the disqualification of the candidate.
If the COMELEC finds that there is probable cause, it shall order its Law Department to
file the appropriate Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which has territorial
jurisdiction over the offense, but shall, nonetheless, order the dismissal of the complaint for
disqualification, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case. If the trial court finds
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall also order his
disqualification pursuant to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Section
46 of Rep. Act No. 8189 which reads:
SEC. 46. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any Election offense under this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years and
shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a
foreigner, he shall be deported after the prison term has been served. Any political party
found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine not less One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
In this case, the petitioners were proclaimed winners on May 18, 2001. The private
respondents filed their complaint for violation of Section 216(a) and (e) of the Omnibus
Election Code and for the disqualification of the petitioners only on June 23, 2001. The
COMELEC found probable cause against the respondents for the offense charged and directed
its Law Department to file the appropriate Information against the petitioners. Patently then,
the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing its assailed resolutions disqualifying the petitioners from the positions
they were respectively elected, in defiance of Resolution No. 2050.
The plaint of the Office of the Solicitor General, that the petitioners filed their petition merely
and solely to eschew criminal prosecution for violation of Section 216(a) and (e) of the Omnibus
Election Code, as amended, has no factual basis. In fact, the petitioners stated in their petition that
inasmuch as the COMELEC had already directed the prosecution of the herein petitioners in a
criminal case which is now pending in the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, their supposed
disqualification should be adjudged by the latter court and not by the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, likewise, committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it ordered the
Municipal Election Officers to convene a new Board of Canvassers and proclaim the winners after
the petitioners were declared disqualified.
It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the
disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. [25] As we held in Reyes vs. Commission
on Elections:[26]
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under the circumstances. [27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated October 21,
2003 and May 5, 2004 are hereby NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. As a necessary consequence,
the proclamation of the private respondents on June 10, 2004 by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Panitan, Capiz, respectively, is, likewise, NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147909. April 16, 2002]
MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FAHIDA P.
BALT, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 8, 2001, of the Second
Division[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B.
Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor of the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of
Lanao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections, and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
dated May 12, 2001, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who
was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas. Respondent Balt
sought the disqualification of petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent
resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit, dated February 14,
[2]
2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two members of the Sangguniang
145
Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner
never resided in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran as they personally knew all the registered voters
of the said barangay; that petitioner omitted to own nor lease any house in Barangay Tangcal;
and that petitioners father, the late Mauyag Papandayan, Sr., who was a school
superintendent, and his family were permanent residents of Bayang, Lanao del
Sur. Respondent also submitted a similar affidavit, [3] dated February 17, 2001, of Samoranao
Sarip, a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal. She averred that petitioner did not
state in his Voter Registration Record,[4] accomplished on May 8, 1999, the number of years
and months (Annex D-1) he had been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.
In his answer,[5] petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in
Tubaran; that he was the son of the late Mauyag Capal Papandayan, Sr., a former school
superintendent, and Hadja Khalida Magangcong Balt; that both the Capal and Papandayan
clans were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran, and the Magangcong clan were from Boribid, Tubaran
while most of the Balt clan were residents of Bayang; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile
from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife Raina Guina Dimaporo, whose family
and relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that he managed an agricultural
land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his certificate of
candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.
To support his allegations, petitioner presented the following:
1. Affidavit,[6] dated March 8, 2001, of Taha C. Ali, Municipal Election Officer of the Office
of the Assistant Regional Election Director of the COMELEC, Region XII, Iligan City, stating that,
based on the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife
lived at No. 13 Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran.
2. Affidavit of Witness,[7] dated March 8, 2001, of Delgado Caontongan, stating that he
was an elementary school teacher of Tubaran and that he was appointed Chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran in the May 8, 1999
registration of voters; that he personally received the Voter Registration Record of petitioner
whom he knew to be a resident of Tubaran; and that he knew petitioner to be a qualified voter
and, for that reason, he approved petitioners Voter Registration Record and included his name
in the master list of voters in Precinct No. 28-A.
3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor[8] of petitioner, filed on January 11, 2001, with the
COMELEC stating, among other things, that he was born on October 14, 1964; that his place
of birth was Marawi City; that he was employed as a municipal employee of a local
government unit in Bayang; that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; that he
was a registered voter of Precinct No. 28-A in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; and
that his length of residency in the Philippines was 36 years and 10 months (Annex 3-A).
4. Affidavit of Witness,[9] dated March 8, 2001, of Rafael Guina Dimaporo (brother of
petitioners wife), stating that his family and the family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal,
Tubaran; that his relatives on the maternal side (the Andag and the Guina clans) were natives
of Barangays Tangcal and Datumanong, both in the Municipality of Tubaran; and that during
the May 11, 1992 national and local elections, he was one of the mayoralty candidates who
garnered the second highest number of votes.
5. Affidavit of Witness,[10] dated March 8, 2001, of Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a
farmer and one of the share tenants of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by
petitioner and the latters siblings; that petitioner had been managing the land and residing in
Tangcal, Tubaran since 1990; and that he knew petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy in
the 1998 mayoralty election in Tubaran.
6. Certification,[11] dated March 7, 2001, by Salem Buzar, Election Officer in Bayang,
Lanao del Sur, certifying that petitioner was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11,
1998 and May 14, 2001 elections.
7. Affidavit of Desistance, [12] dated March 8, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he
was withdrawing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, which he had earlier executed,
together with Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, as he did not understand the
consequences of signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him;
that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case against
petitioner who was a first cousin of his grandchildren; that he knew petitioner to be a
registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran; and that petitioner is a
native of Tubaran because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the
paternal side and a legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal
side.
8. Affidavit of Desistance, [13] dated March 8, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he
was withdrawing the affidavit, dated February 17, 2001, which he had earlier executed, as he
did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit and its contents had not
been explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a
disqualification case against petitioner; that he knew petitioner to be a registered voter and a
candidate for municipal mayor of Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of Tubaran because
he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a
legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.
In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114
declared petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of
candidates and all votes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray
votes. Citing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher
Batawe, and Saadori Buat and the affidavit of Samoranao Sarip stating that petitioner had not
at any time been a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, the COMELEC ruled that it was the fact of
petitioners residence, not the statement in his certificate of candidacy, which determined
whether or not he had satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the May
14, 2001 elections. In finding that petitioner never intended to relinquish his former domicile
in Bayang, the COMELEC took note of the testimony of petitioner in the exclusion proceedings
against him before the municipal trial court (Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T), in
146
which petitioner stated that he was living in Marawi City where he was the private secretary of
Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.
On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by
the electorate for the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a
telegram[14] from the COMELEC notifying him of the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for reconsideration.
On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division)
in SPC No. 01-039 seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 2001
elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution N. 4116. The said resolution provides that if the
disqualification case has not become final and executory on the day of the election, the BEI
shall tally and count the votes of the candidate declared disqualified.
On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (SPC No. 01-259) in the
COMELEC.
On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order
suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the
resolution of this present petition. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on
June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent, therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order,
dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of petitioner, without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate charges against the members of the Board responsible for the proclamation.
[15]
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January 30, 2002, sustaining
the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for being moot
and academic. It appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor of
Tubaran assumed the position of mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated
January 30, 2002.
On May 22, 2001, this Court required the COMELEC and respondent Fahida Balt to
comment on the petition and, upon the posting of a bond by petitioner in the amount
of P10,000.00, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from
implementing its resolutions of May 8 and May 12, 2001.
In a manifestation,[16] dated May 28, 2001, petitioner submitted the certificates of votes
(Annexes A to A-30), duly signed by the BEI Chairman and his two members, showing that in
the 31 precincts of Tubaran, he obtained 1,744 votes [should be 1,730] votes, while
respondent Balt and Bantuas obtained 1,528 votes [should be 1,540 votes] and 974 votes
[should be 967 votes], respectively. Respondent countered that, despite these results,
petitioner could not be proclaimed mayor as she had appealed from the ruling of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran, wherein she sought the exclusion and the
annulment of the election returns from certain precincts in Tubaran because of massive fraud,
terrorism, and substitution of registered voters.
After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a
Municipal Certificate of Canvass[17] showing the following results:
Petitioner Papandayan 1,744 votes
Respondent Balt 1,540 votes
Maiko Hassan Bantuas 968 votes
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment, recommending
that this Court grant the present petition. It contends that the joint affidavit, dated February
14, 2001, of Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Sangguniang Barangay members
Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner had not at any time been a
resident of Tubaran, constituted hearsay evidence as the three affiants were never presented
during the proceedings of the case. In fact, one of the affiants, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, later
executed an Affidavit of Desistance, dated March 8, 2001, retracting his earlier statements. As
for the statements made by petitioner in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T,
pending before the municipal trial court, that he was then not residing in Bayang but in
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur although living in Marawi City, the Solicitor General says that the same
does not necessarily mean that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran as such answer
merely means that he was previously living in Marawi City.
In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of
Bayang. She contends that petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a
registered voter in the May 11, 1998 elections; that when petitioner registered as a voter in
Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on May 8, 1999, he refused to fill out the space
corresponding to the period of his residency in Tubaran; that it was unusual for the BEI
Chairman to execute an affidavit, stating therein that he allowed the registration of the
petitioner because he had known the latter to be a legitimate resident of [Tubaran] even prior
to the May 8, 1999 registration; that it was doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really
conducted a continuous verification of household members of Tubaran; and that the
certification of the election officer of Bayang that petitioner was not a registered voter in
Bayang during the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001 elections does not prove that he was a
registered voter in Tubaran. Respondent argues that the COMELEC did not commit any error of
jurisdiction to justify the grant of this petition for certiorari but, if at all, only an error of
judgment, which is correctible by ordinary appeal.
In his reply to respondents comment, petitioner points out that respondent did not
appear at the March 9, 2001 hearing of the disqualification case before the COMELEC; that of
the six witnesses whom respondent said she was presenting, only two Hadji Taher Batawe and
147
Saadori Buat appeared, and both merely affirmed their joint affidavit; that, although the cross-
examination of the two was reset on March 12, 2001, they nevertheless failed to appear and
thus deprived petitioners counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine them; that respondents
four other witnesses Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Sultan Sarip Bilao, Osio Balbal, and Puno Balbal did
not appear either; that instead Sultan Sarip Bilao later executed an affidavit [18] denying his
earlier statement that the petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran; and that the Second
Division of the COMELEC and the COMELEC en banc did not conduct any hearing in the
disqualification case and merely relied on the recommendations submitted by the hearing
officer. According to petitioner, while he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran
in the May 11, 1998 elections, the same was later withdrawn on his behalf by Casim A. Guro,
his brother-in-law. This fact was corroborated by Macawaris P. Masanang, a sultan in Tubaran,
who stated that he had been an Election Assistant of the COMELEC since 1978 and that, as
such, he received petitioners certificate of candidacy, which was later withdrawn by Casim A.
Guro on behalf of petitioner.
After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be
correct. Hence, his petition should be granted.
First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en
banc was not yet final and executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001.
Consequently, the Board of Election Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial
duty, had to count the votes cast in his favor. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the
assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5)
days thereafter, on May 17, 2001, as its enforcement had not been restrained by this Court
within the said period. The temporary restraining order should thus be set aside, the same
having been issued by this Court only on May 22, 2001.
At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May
12, 2001, had not become final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
was duty bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of petitioner. As R.A. No. 6646, 6
provides:
Effect of disqualification. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, promulgated on May 7, 2001, in
pertinent parts reads:
RESOLUTION NO. 4116
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification cases).
Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or Resolutions
provides:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies, and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
bancshall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a
Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions
and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its
promulgation.
Special Actions cases refer to the following:
a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;
b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;
c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
....
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on Special Actions cases (disqualification cases); the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably
filed;
148
3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence , citizenship,
violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the
resolution has not become final and executory, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of such
disqualified candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by this Court within five (5) days after the date of the promulgation of the
assailed resolution on May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc is the operative act that
prevents it from attaining finality. The purpose of temporary restraining order was to enjoin
the May 12, 2001 resolution of the COMELEC from being enforced despite the fact that,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, par. 3, as above quoted, the said resolution had
not attained finality.
Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring
him disqualified on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the other hand,
respondent argues that whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a factual issue
which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by the Second Division of the
COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc.Respondent echoes the ruling of the COMELEC
in its resolution of May 12, 2001, which said that, as an administrative body and a specialized
constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,
it has more than enough expertise in its field, and its findings or conclusions are generally
respected and even given finality.
With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient
to sustain its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner
has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he
later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual
and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of
a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
language or dialect.
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or
not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The
principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an
intention to return to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a
determination whether there has been an abandonment of his former residence which
signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court set aside
the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of
the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his
status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, [20] respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2 nd District of Northern Samar. The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he
was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining
the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,[21] applied the concept of animus
revertendi or intent to return, stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue
studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration
as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of
residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang
revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections,[22] it was
explained that the determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case,
petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local
elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected
governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration
qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC
ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the
election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of
the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This
Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established
her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for
the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to
show that she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte
and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through
the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[23] the Court held that domicile and residence
are synonymous. The term residence, as used in the election law, imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case,
petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980s in Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner,
because of the EDSA Peoples Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United
States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute
149
an abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in
1990, they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part
of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with
his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows
that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended
Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the
mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof of animus
manendi.
Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered
as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later
withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a
voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran.
In addition, the following bolster petitioners claim that since 1990 he has been a resident
of Tubaran: (a) the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the
election officer showed that petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in
Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner co-owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (c)
Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted their previous affidavits which they had
earlier executed and said that they did not understand the contents thereof and did not know
that the affidavits would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner.
Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the Constitutions residency qualification requirement. In holding
petitioner not to be a resident of Tubaran, the COMELEC said:
Three (3) disinterested senior citizens, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori
Buat, all from Tangcal, Tubaran executed a joint affidavit (Exhibits A to A-1) stating that the
respondent has not at any time resided or lived in said barangay. Moreover, in Election Case
Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, the respondent admitted that he was living in Marawi City and
was private secretary to Mayor Abdillah Ampatua (T.S.N., Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to
2001-244-T). As opined by Hearing Officer Atty. Cristeto J. Limbaco, these statements made by
the respondent in open court are considered judicial admissions which do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted unless proved to have been made through palpable mistake,
citing Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat (L-23-23, August 31, 1968). On May 3, 2001, respondent through
counsel submitted a Motion to Admit Supplemental Memorandum alleging that respondent
could be a domicile of Tubaran even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places citing the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, 302. The fact remains though
that respondent in open court admitted that he was living in Marawi City. (T.S.N. of Election
Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T).[24]
A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place where he
seeks election for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. Herein
respondent is wanting in this respect.
In citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat,
the COMELEC overlooked the fact that Hadji Bashir Ayonga subsequently repudiated his
affidavit on the ground that the same had not been explained to him and he did not know that
it would be used to disqualify petitioner. Hadji Bashir Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a
resident of Tubaran. Indeed, in its findings of fact, the COMELEC stated:
On March 8, 2001, witness for petitioner Hadji Bashir Ayonga executed an Affidavit of
Desistance thereby withdrawing his affidavit and stated that he did not know the
consequences of signing the affidavit he executed on February 14, 2001 as the same was not
explained to him and would be used in a disqualification case against the respondent. A
similar affidavit was also filed by Samoranao Sarip withdrawing his prior affidavit and stating
that he did not know the consequences of his signing said affidavit of February 17, 2001. [25]
Apparently, the COMELEC (Second Division) forgot its own findings.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an
elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected.[27] For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters. [28] To successfully challenge petitioners disqualification,
respondent must clearly demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote.[29] Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible
to be mayor of Tubaran.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC
(Second Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a
candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the resolution, dated May 12,
2001, of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent claims that in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T for exclusion of
petitioner as a voter of Tubaran, petitioner admitted that he was not a resident of that
municipality but of Marawi City. Petitioners testimony is as follows:

Atty. P. Dimaampao: MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, Jr., what is your job now?

WITNESS: Im the private Secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: For how long?

WITNESS: Since he was elected Mayor of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Atty. P. Dimaampao: Are you residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

WITNESS: No, Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. And I was living in Marawi City.[26]

Petitioners statement that [he] was living in Marawi City cannot be read as saying he was
a resident of Marawi City, because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang, Lanao del
Sur, he replied: No, Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. What he seems to be saying is that although
he worked as a private secretary of the Mayor of Bayang, he was not a resident of Bayang,
because he was living in Tubaran.

150
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992

RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA, respondents.

G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992

ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAMON L. LABO, Jr., respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is the second time 1 that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of Ramon
Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio
City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992.

Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992.

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega filed on March
26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.

Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27, 1992 to
petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer
within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.
151
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer.
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio
City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992, the disqualification case was set for
reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo
v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the
Philippines. Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any
evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino
citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to
grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate of candidacy is hereby DENIED due
course and ordered CANCELLED; the City Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
directed to delete the name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of candidates for City
Mayor of Baguio City. (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he
shall have raised the matter before this Court.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:
Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification", filed by respondent (Labo) on May
9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after
five (5) days from promulgationpursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City
Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the
event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. (Rollo, p.
53; GR No. 105111; emphasis supplied)
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. (Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR
No. 105111)
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set
aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as
a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the
event he wins in the contested elections.
152
On the same date, or on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an urgent
motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy.
After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26, 1992,
denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No. 105111) earlier filed by Labo of
the same nature before this Court.
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. 105384 praying
for the implementation of the Comelec's May 9, 1992 resolution.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when
it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said
resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and executory.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the Court, on June 16, 1992,
Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision.
I. GR No. 105111
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. Alleging lack of
trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard in Labo v. Commission on
Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner that he can prove his Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it was held that
in proving expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the
Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No. 92-
029 which denied him adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case.
Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later,
May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the
questioned resolution on May 9, 1992.
If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel, records disclose
that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed by a
telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came April 15, 1992,
petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him
(Labo) the benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued another order dated April 24,
1992, this time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the
summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to
petitioner Labo and no one else. Thus, the respondent Comelec in its resolution dated May 9,
1992 stated:
On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called this case for reception of
evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date respondent had not yet filed his Answer, a
lawyer appeared for him.
The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of respondent Ramon L.
Labo, Jr., which contained in item 9 thereof the verified statement that respondent is a
"natural-born" Filipino citizen. To prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner
submitted the decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner, v. Comelec,
et al.," GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio
City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of
Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory.
No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had no Answer as of the
hearing.
On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino
citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he does not
hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in
citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of
Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling
in the Labo v. Comelec case and the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine
citizenship.
No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and
supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision. (emphasis
supplied)
The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
"natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No.
105111)
Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his claim
before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to state that
petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec (supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no
pressing need to re-examine the same and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.
153
At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if
there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or the
Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a
Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec (supra).
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a
legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as
the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the
election was held.
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In the first place,
Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to
wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis
supplied)
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend
the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes
notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any evidence
before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It
does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point
to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was
disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his
Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding
public office (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).
Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the respondent
Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his
application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor
General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270 3 (Rollo, pp. 116-119; G.R. No.
105111).
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special
Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed,
such fact is even admitted petitioner. In the absence of any official action or approval by the
proper authorities, a mere application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
II. GR No. 105384
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as
regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the
view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
We agree with Ortega's first proposition.
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had
already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having
been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and
in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless
stayed by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure, to wit:
154
Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to
disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation
as Mayor of Baguio City.
To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification
for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage the very essence which strikes at the
very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien
and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of
no moment. As we have held in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
. . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the
disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest
number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as
the Mayor of Baguio City.
We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he alleges that:
. . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein petitioner (Roberto
Ortega) and respondent LABO having been voted for the position of Mayor and
unofficial results indicate that if the name of respondent LABO were deleted
from the list of candidates, herein petitioner (Ortega) will be entitled to be
proclaimed as Mayor-elect of Baguio City. (Rollo, p. 7, GR No. 105384;
emphasis supplied)
and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City the candidate who
may have garnered the most number of votes after the exclusion of the name of respondent
candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore, is petitioner Ortega's desire to be
proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City.
As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer devoid of merit.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v.
Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of
Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as
a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere
belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her
votes was counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net
effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected
position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position.
(emphasis supplied)
155
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to
depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot.
The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and
Aquino JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana
and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435),
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court (Gutierrez, Jr.,
J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring), without any
dissent, . . . . There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they did not choose him.
 Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes
to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in the sincere belief that that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void
or meaningless.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles,
52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of
being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without
any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified
to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under
no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office.
Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471
votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p.
109; GR No. 105111).
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
156
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none
was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less
the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even
allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for
the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final
outcome of this case.
As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. Ortega failed to
satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a majority or mere plurality of
votes sufficient to elevate him in public office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the
election for mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:
Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. . . . (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being
ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in
said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby declared
Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
157
 G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to
be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed
through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give
effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a
challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility
ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among
others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE,
MAKATI.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will
obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
EN BANC
158
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed
another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time,
petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of
the disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease
contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor
Feliciano dated April 28,1995 7 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office
of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED. 9 banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates
vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight
thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto
Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
The dispositive portion of the order reads:
159
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Board
of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of
election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of
respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed to
inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, PICC
Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED. 11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to
Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he
manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination
of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances
of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but
to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow
the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before
the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is
GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the
constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of
suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning
 number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made
permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates, who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2,
1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner's raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
B SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE
REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM
WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17,
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE
THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE
FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY
NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
160
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT
THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED
CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR
PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL
WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER. 15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8,
qualifications to run for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction
over the petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers
that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the
suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District
of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the
House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes
in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate
or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath
of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section.
17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation
under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct
of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from
the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate
allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but
his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of
the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the
evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas
Pambansa 881.
II
161
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate
for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives
should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one
(l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in
our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of elections. So my question
is: What is the Committee's concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not less
than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at
the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
 Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that the provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence
for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers
or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While
there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him
to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either
by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the
threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one
year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of
his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11,
1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in
1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. 24 His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his
parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution
noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract
162
maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for
only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon
City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro
Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium
unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of
(petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence
or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicileunder the conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual
or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed
out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular
lease agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 30 These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and
positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic.
A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and
existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived
or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied.
Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be
noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running
in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place
where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for
the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the
Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next
higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified
candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic
electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters'
preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing
the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive
disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they
believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified
before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino
given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to
second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the
other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a
disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate
believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified,
eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who
obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this
Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is
the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
163
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in
view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification)
cannot be considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category
of invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is
not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the
only candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the
portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority
or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative
of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it
is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramosand pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category
of invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the
eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito
v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo
v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared
elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo
v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for
the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people
of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella
v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal
and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact
remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province
of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained
the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner
lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . .
What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected
position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number
of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility,
requirements at the time of the election as provided by law,
the candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated
position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in
the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus
Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
164
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos
v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985.
In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed
elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of
the Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and
Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
acting C.J.,Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on
official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435),
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.Paredes (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified,
the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be
considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the
people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without any
intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be
disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
 deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner
Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo
(as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No.
105111).

This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in
another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in
which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified
candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the
possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection.
Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to
proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances
where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically
insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result
among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible
winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the
second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be
construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible"
candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District
on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence
in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a
government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in
government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

165
 G.R. Nos. 122250 & 122258 July 21, 1997

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN,
and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8,
1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent
Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes. 1 Edgardo
Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.

On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own "private
army" at his aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police
assigned with the Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted
search warrant no. 95-147 by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May
1995. A copy of the said search warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.

5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the
PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan
Provincial Command, backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force,
accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still
cameras, raided the house of respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at
Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.

7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino
Blanco where they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.
EN BANC
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various
high powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long

166
 arms. These persons composing respondent's "private army," and the unlicensed 10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the
firearms are as follows: composite police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant
(Annex "B-6") so that they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife
1 PYTHOM (sic) Cal . 347 SN 26946 and respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of
with six (6) Rounds of Ammo. respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the
locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay
2 INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
Suppressor SN: 45457 with two
(2) Mags and 54 Rounds of Ammo. 12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco,
were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon
13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they
1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when
Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo. examined contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened
contained the amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent's brother Mariano
Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of
C. Roberto Santos y Sacris
money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.

1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn:

14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as
522218 with six (6) Rounds of
respondent's bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is
Ammo.
the cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the
teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil

15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-
1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) buying activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is
Rounds of Ammo. the envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations
totalling one thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY."
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his
1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) organization called "MTB" or "MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS." The
Rounds of Ammo. chairman of this movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted
to the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag Meycauayan, Bulacan.

1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869
Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass
window, respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject
premises.
167
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct
77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is
perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and
return it to respondent's headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the
bribe money after voting for respondent during the elections. The voter will initially be
given a down-payment of 500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar
use of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated
 8 May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were
paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers, to vote for other voters in
the voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another
scheme as follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of
voter and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in
Precinct No. 26, Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of
one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote,
her name was already voted upon by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia
T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito Poll
Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the
good graces of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the
petition of the people of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the
3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled "1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar."
19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms
and thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to
terrorize the population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent's
massive vote buying and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the
teachers ensured the implementation of his vote buying ballot box switching,
impersonations, and other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes "I-1" to "I-2" are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and
ammunitions seized from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the
same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification
under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at least
P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a "probable
commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the
provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support
of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the
168
canvassing of election returns of the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend
proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain the winning number of votes
for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time when the petitions for
disqualification against him shall have been resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The
parties thereafter submitted their position papers. 2 Blanco even replied to the position paper
of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-
buying, viz.: 3
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein
Respondent is now made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed.
SO ORDERED.
Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as
vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. 4 He moved for reconsideration of that part of the
resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-
mayor he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions
were heard on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with
right of reply. On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for
reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari, 5 Blanco contends:
xxx xxx xxx
 18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as
its own the majority decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of
Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without
the benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's
constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the
procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts
mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable
Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC)
violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other
respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by
COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their
proclamation an act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.
18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in
violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-
BUYING, terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest
where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing
of the issue in a summary proceeding;
18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage
in VOTE-BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a
disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the
provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down
by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was
reiterated only recently in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari 6 that he should be declared
as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo
vs. COMELEC. 7
We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.
Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in
169
suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the
suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. It is
akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under exigent
circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the
Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to
disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position
paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC considered the evidence of the
parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is that
due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC
gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to
summary hearings. 8
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the
respondent candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary
investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the
evidence of guilt is strong.
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation
and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the
all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an
election . . . ." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations. 9 Our laws are no less explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code) provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is
a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
 campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the elections laws.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the
procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be
straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was
passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise
to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The May 8,
1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the
COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco
directly and without referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise
of its discretion. The action of the COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. The presentation of a
complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 supported by affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by
or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives,
leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to
be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized
legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
170
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the
view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to resolve
disqualification cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." 10 Clearly too,
Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not the
object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his
disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of disposing
the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of
Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be
heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects.
Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of
summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be
disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in
character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of
Blanco.
The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows: 11
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the
affidavits and sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of
hearsay; inadmissible because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res
Inter Alios Acta and the offense of vote-buying requires consummation.
We are not impressed.
A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the
Reply of the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3]
would reveal that they are in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals
closely associated or related to respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper
[Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders
and private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to
how the alleged vote-buying was conducted.
 Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB
[Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and
allegedly used as a means to facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for
Respondent [Annexes "E-2", "E-3" , "E-4" , "E-5" ,"E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote
for Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A
criminal complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr.
Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan.
The same was docketed as Criminal Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of
the suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same
[Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the
two suspected flying voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate
their names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered
by Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11,
1993, 222 SCRA 684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense"
[page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993,
221 SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the
positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. [page
754].
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in
evidence against him [affiants who executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against
Respondent.
There is no merit in this contention.
171
The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature
of witnesses who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating
Section 261 [1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and
not by any law enforcement agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he
filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary
Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against the Persons Who Executed
Exhibits E-1l to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election Offense. If they were
the accused, why file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not irrelevant?
xxx xxx xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a
huge amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to
his own admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What
were the peso bills doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and
kept in shoe boxes with the word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof ?
There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB
cards when one considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these
cards, which is equivalent to more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by respondent; that there are only 443 precincts
in Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is allowed only one watcher per
polling place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no explanation at all by
the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00 each.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of
giving must be consummated.
Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises
money . . ." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as
well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of
section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: . . . .
While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising
something in consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the
votes of said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of
vote-buying.
These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of
Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort
to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of
evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially where the
law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart
from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot
review the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing
of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution." 12
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the event
Blanco is finally disqualified. 13 We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor,
mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each distribution the
immediately preceding election.
172
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. (a) What constitutes
permanent vacancy A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice
mayor
(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice
mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor,
vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined in this Article.
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case
of Reyes v. COMELEC, 14 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying
petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The
doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the
latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
 conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under the circumstances.

Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified
and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.

Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed

to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC. 15

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign
judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the
peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, 16 "each time the enfranchised citizen goes
to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into
living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and
application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the
unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law,
the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the
democratic process."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23,
1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as
Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

173
174
 amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed another letter-complaint [3] with the COMELEC charging
Trinidad this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats, intimidation,
terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus Election Code, in addition to the earlier
violation imputed to him in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended
Petition[4] for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two (2) letters-complaint,
including vote buying, and providing more specific details of the violations committed by
Trinidad. The case was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, [5] the COMELEC 2nd Division referred the
complaint to its Law Department for investigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga
adduced evidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit
any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of
votes, while Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of

EN BANC Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor,
prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both
[G.R. No. 125629. March 25, 1998] motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2nd Division.

MANUEL C. SUNGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND B. On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted its Report [6] to the COMELEC
TRINIDAD, respondents. En Banc recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violation of the following penal
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on vote buying; (b) Sec. 261,
DECISION par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par.
(o), on use of any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of its political
BELLOSILLO, J.: subdivisions. The Law Department likewise recommended to recall and revoke the
proclamation of Ferdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of Iguig, Cagayan; proclaim
Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayor; and, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to
the duties and functions of the office.
annul and set aside, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division
in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213,[1] dismissing the petition for disqualification against The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the
private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 filing of the corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against
promulgated 3 November 1988, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4) informations[7] for various elections offenses were filed in the
8 August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 17 May Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The disqualification case, on the other hand, was
1996 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division. referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the
Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondent Proclamation with Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996
Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition for disqualification, holding in its
municipality. Resolution No. 2050 that

On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint [2] for disqualification 1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the
against Trinidad, accusing him of using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in grounds specifically enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly
violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code, as with the Commission before an election in which respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired
175
into by the Commission for the purpose of determiningwhether the acts complained of have in
fact been committed x x x x
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu
propio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the
Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a
preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws x x x x
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already
been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the
complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this
Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification
case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt
and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the
court before which the criminal case is pending and said court may order the suspension of
the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003, Resolution No. 2050 provides for
the outright dismissal of the disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification case
was filed before the election but remains unresolved until after the election; (2) The
disqualification case was filed after the election and before theproclamation of winners; and
(3) The disqualification case was filed after election and after proclamation.
If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt by the COMELEC of the letter-
complaint on April 26 1995, it nevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it is
deemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on 11 May 1995, it was clearly
filed after the election. In either case, Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of the
disqualification case.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the COMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed
the instant petition contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 requires the
COMELEC to resolve the disqualification case even after the election and proclamation, and
the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad did not deprive the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction; second, COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 of
R.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filing of four (4) informations
against private respondent for violation of the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
shows more than sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad, and he should have
176
been so disqualified; and fourth, since Trinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if
petitioner was the only candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December 1996, the Solicitor General
concurred with petitioners arguments.
Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia that Sungas letters-complaint
of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 were not petitions for disqualification because no filing fee
was paid by Sunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by the COMELEC; and, no
summons was ever issued by the COMELEC and private respondent was not required to
answer the letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitioner filed the so-called
Amended Petition, docketed for the first time as SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly
dismissed the disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8 May 1995 elections
and the proclamation of private respondent on 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution
No. 2050.
COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily on Resolution No. 2050 and
the Silvestre v. Duavit[8] ruling in support of the dismissal of the disqualification case. The
COMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of a disqualification case was warranted under
any of the following circumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before the election
but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b) the disqualification case was filed
after the election but before the proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification case
was filed after the election and after the proclamation of the winner.
The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the disqualification case against private respondent Trinidad.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We find private respondents arguments on the propriety of the letters-complaint
puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized in its Resolution that the petition was filed before
the 8 May 1995 election in the form of letters-complaint, thus
This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on 26 April 1995 in a form of
letter from petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign
and praying for the latters immediate disqualification. Another letter dated 7 May 1995 and
addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II reiterated petitioners prayer while
alleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorism and violated the gun
ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the
Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the previous letters but
supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence.
That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, or after the elections, is of no
consequence. It was merely a reiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against private
respondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before the elections. Consequently, the
Amended Petition retroacted to such earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplements
and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the
commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired
after the service of the original complaint.[9]
The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal procedural lapse on the part
of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, If the fees above
described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid
and may dismiss the action or proceeding. The use of the word may indicates that it is
permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the COMELEC whether to entertain the
petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did not
dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of fees was not considered by it as a
legal obstacle to entertaining the same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been
cured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and private respondent was served with
summons, albeit belatedly, and he submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private
respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was paid, no summons served upon
him, or that he was not required to answer.
Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. We discern nothing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaring, ordering or directing the dismissal of a
disqualification case filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
election. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for the Commission to refer the
complaint to its Law Department for investigation to determine whether the acts complained
of have in fact been committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. The findings of the
Law Department then become the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally
different from the other two situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a
disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that
filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by
the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646,[10] which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong (underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing
of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word
shall signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive
177
duty which must be enforced. [11] The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion
but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,
Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to
a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for
having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial
bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such
interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be
limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by
the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body
was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses
were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant
would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the
commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is
productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did
not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually
decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC[12] this Court held -
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such
power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since
private respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated
by the Constitution and law to COMELEC x x x x Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be
precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of
office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate.Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the
quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral
aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified
from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character
and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." It
is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate may
be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction. [13]
It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sungas motion to suspend the
proclamation of Trinidad. The last sentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares
that the Commission may order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate sought to
be disqualified whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of
doubt that the evidence of Trinidads guilt was strong as shown in the Report and
Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department
Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioners petition against the respondent for disqualification
for the alleged commission of election offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
such as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation and coercion of voters, massive
vote-buying and others, duly supported by affidavits of witnesses and other
documents. Consequently, the petitioners evidence supporting the disqualification of
respondent remain unrebutted simply because respondent has expressly waived his right to
present evidence in SPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to the presentation of
evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June 1995, thus the waiver is the intentional
relinquishing of a known right of respondent TRINIDAD.
In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation the COMELEC directed the filing
of four (4) criminal informations against Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indication
that there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation of election laws.
However, Sungas contention that he is entitled to be proclaimed as the duly elected
Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is
disqualified finds no support in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the office to which he
was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes
to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified person may
not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.[14]
Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoral process as well as the
sociological and psychological elements behind voters preferences. Election is the
process ofcomplete ascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimate purpose is
to give effect to the will of the electorate by giving them direct participation in choosing the
men and women who will run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnant to the
178
basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of whom have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.[15]
While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains
that he was not the choice of the people of Iguig, Cagayan. The wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected.[16] In Aquino v. COMELEC,[17] this Court made the following pronouncement:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be
to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the express mandate of Sec. 44, RA No.
7160,[18] which provides in part -
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-
Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-
Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governor or Mayor x x x x
For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office x x x x
This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for
interpretation but merely application. This is the basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event
that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of
the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-
mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[19]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17 May 1996 and 30 July 1996
Resolutions of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered to REINSTATE
SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, for disqualification, and ACT on
the case taking its bearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

179
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of
private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground
that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by
the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers
from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him
until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following
exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien
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Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3,
1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that
he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines
since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has
been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised
under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
 'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition
for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19,
1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on
January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day
period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was
filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition
for quo warrantounder Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature,
considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on
March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship
and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is
enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is
not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or
by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must
have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p.
81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does
not concern Us here.
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By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had
lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively
establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to
the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but
claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the
persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of
involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as
Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and
that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian
Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of
sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the
Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer
owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total
allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance
of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport
and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he
was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having expressly
renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still
a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario
states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have
a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities,
namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of
University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the
case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation
of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
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Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had
already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually
existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the
COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.