THIRD DIVISION

APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA - versus -

SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR.,
G.R. No. 169700
July 30, 2009

Facts:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 17, 2005 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53929,
and the August 17, 2005 Resolution[2] denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof.

Narrated in brief are the antecedent facts and proceedings, to wit:

Facts
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner, who was named
as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3,
1991, for the allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the decedent.
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the
allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989
and another dated September 28, 1989.[5]
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its
Decision[6] declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the
November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of
Moisess estate.[7]

On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision, [8] modified the decision of
the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the
November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real property was
concerned.[9]

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration in the further assailed August 17,
2005 Resolution,[10] petitioner elevated the case before us via Before the court is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 17, 2005
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON RTC has acquired jurisdiction of the holographic will

No, RTC has no jurisdiction. In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moisess
holographic will was instituted, the then Sections 19 and 33 [14] of Batas
[15]
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 were in force, thus

SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,

where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00);

SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
 (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant
of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand
does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest
and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the
amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That
where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions; and

Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate.
Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. [18] The RTC
therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction
despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before

the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District)
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA
and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

DIZON, J.:

Facts
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite alleging therein, inter alia, that,
as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said
decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly
authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced
Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to
be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396
pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the
petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion
was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss
and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. L-21938 against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte,
and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila,
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders
issued by the Negros Court

Issues The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not
the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on
the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros Court.

Held

We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no
jurisdiction to consider said petition, as he knew that Uriarte, he knew before filing the
petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding
pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961
when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition that he filed.
To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is
not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not
the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated
in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late. To allow him now to assail the exercise
of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings
is raised too late.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001]
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA
MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO,
ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al.,
seeking to annul the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the Orders[3] of the Regional Trial
Court and the Resolution [4]which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts[5] are as follows:

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Cl;ra Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal
age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located
in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine
Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty
Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, filed a petition [6] with the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila[7] for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
declaring the whole world in default, However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial
court upon motion of herein
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in
the filing of an Omnibus Motion[8] on July 23, 1993

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order [9] which resolved, thus:
 A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only
for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses
as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant
and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the trial court in its Order [10] dated September 15, 1993.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution[11] promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed. [12] hence this present petition This is a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition
but that the same have failed.

held
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction [20] and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).[22]

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. The Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special proceeding and,
as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.[26] The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact
of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said
deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of
the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE,
MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE,
RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-
INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL
CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN
R-INFANTE, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 13
January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et al.,
petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents," dismissing petitioners' petition
for certiorari and prohibition as-, sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No. 9995,
entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of Montserrat
R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."

facts
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166,
a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat
R-Infante y G-Pola
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 5
May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12
May 1986, on which date,
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and
placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the
proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.

On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration for no notices were sent to
them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the
reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was,
however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. 5Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

won Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the
known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

held
We grant the petition:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally. The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines
at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the
person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person
named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known.
Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence
be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the wig itself
indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But
despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the
determination of the quantity of evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.

The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from (Rec. App. pp. 22-
24):
"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that
facts
on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to
be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of
the holographic will, submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros
Azaola was made the sole heir as; that witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the
holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the
same was handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that he recognized all
the signatures appearing in the holographic.

The respondents filed an opposition to the probate on the ground that (1) the execution of
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to
be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature
are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness
presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written
in the handwriting of the testatrix." Hence the present appeal of the petitioner

Issue: WON petitioner is bound to prduce more than one witness to prove authenticity of the
will

Held

Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be
avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the
Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court
should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact
it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered
remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this
opinion. But evidence already on record shall not be retaken. No costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999]
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE
R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established and the
handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal
of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called
for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the
defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the
facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order
to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his
behalf (Sec. 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for
appellant in the instant case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the
probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. [2]

facts
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition[3] for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and personal property
was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.[4]

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition [5] to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible.

Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after
every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will,
and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the
dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners
instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer [6] to evidence, claiming that
respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased

On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, granting the demurrer to evidence
and denying the probate of the will, by the petitioner.

On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, [8] and in support of their
appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita
Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.

To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of

their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the
special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He
produced and identified the. records of the case. The documents presented bear the
signature of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis
for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce and
identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters affidavit was not produced
for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal
was her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the latter lived with her in her
parents house for eleven (11) years, from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of
close association with the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal) in
collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and the deceased
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the
deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the
deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde
Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally
and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein,
the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the
deceased in connection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband, as a result of
which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the
application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the
deceased, since the deceased signed documents in her presence, when the latter was
applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with
the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of
time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seo
Vda. de Ramonal.

The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as

follows:Instruction

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision [9] ruling that the appeal
was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned
by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:

x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the
opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied.

According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and
signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself. Thus, upon the
unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal
Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the
handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence, this petition.

issue
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code
are permissive or mandatory.

held

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to
probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic
will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, [31] ruling that the requirement is merely
directory and not mandatory.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years
before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of
the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The
only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the
lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the
signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will. Even the former lawyer of the
deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator
in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and
erasures on the will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo
Vda. de Ramonal.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE
HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
facts
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of
land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303).
 On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was
notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out
of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax
liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the
heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied [4] sold and
eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. [5]

Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty
and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983 [6] upon payment of the
reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000.[7]

On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa
Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on
August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. [8]

On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty
compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. [9]

On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a
petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes
which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes
where the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties
pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the
other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his
appointment as administrator.

Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which
included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters. [13]

On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the
Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who
subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds. [14]

After hearing the parties respective arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated
January 26, 1994, of the submission of the inventory

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied
for being unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny
Bernardo, which he is hereby directed to turn over to the administrator within thirty (30)
days from finality of this Order.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order
dated May 30, 1994.[17] He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While
the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.

On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the
probate courts order. It ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that the
inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael
Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any action
to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties;
 Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated
July 28, 1999. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the
Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the estate
of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to
determine the issue of ownership.

Held
We find no merit in this argument.
Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for
the merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of
Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine
for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In
fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for resolution is the matter of the inventory of
the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what
should not be included. Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate
court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. [22]
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its
final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.

A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate
court, does not consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat
property.

Finally, anent private respondents allegation that the instant petition was filed one day
late, hence should be dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners received
copy of the decision denying their motion for reconsideration on August 13, 1999, thus they
have until August 28, 1999 within which to file petition for review. Petitioners filed their
motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying for 30 days extension from August 28,
1999 or until September 27, 1999 to file their petition which this Court granted. Petitioners
filed their petition on September 27, 1999, which is within the period given by the Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.