EVIDENCE

CASE DIGESTS: HEARSAY KKMD

PEOPLE v. VALERO
112 SCRA 661

Accused: Lucila nad Alfonsonito Pipe (deafmute case vs. him was dismissed)
Case: Double murder + frustrated murder
Minor children of Velasco died of poisoning (poisoned bread)

Topic-related incidents:
Prosec witnesses Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco = Pipe pointed to her sister Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread

TC: Guilty

SC: Acquitted
Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never presented as a witness either for the
prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned
from Pipe by sign language.
o The evidence is purely hearsay.
o The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the principle of res inter alios acta. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
o With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by claiming that it is a part of
the res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the source of the poisoned bread was the defendant,
the children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no startling occurrence yet.
o With reference to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe made the extrajudicial revelation spontaneously
when he was still under the influence of a startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not spontaneously but
after an interview through the complicated process of sign language.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
To give weight to the said testimonies, whether considered as hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis
for the imposition of the death penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face to face
and to subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and
in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to communicate with the outside world. In conflict
between a provision of the constitution giving the defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no
choice but to give effect to the constitution.
No motive on the part of the defendants to commit such heinous crime.


PEOPLE v. DAMASO

Accused: Damaso aka Bernie Mendoza/Ka Dado
Case: Violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of subversion
The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City. They put under surveillance the
rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of
Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant. Together with Morados, they
reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. They requested the
persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the
lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated.

SC: Acquitted
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that
the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M -14 rifle and other subversive items were found or
the owner of the said items.
o Quijardo and Gomez: According to Luz the lessee and the owner of the materials is Bernie Mendoza
o Clearly, the said testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal knowledge.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS: HEARSAY KKMD

OSG argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to
object thereto.
o It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be
misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
Argument that - appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's house; and that since
the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
o No merit.
o The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
o In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. We find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was
indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence,
the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.


AGCAOILI v. MOLINA
249 SCRA 482

Case: Grave Ignorance of the Law

The complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned criminal case:
failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama, based as it was, merely on
the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the offense charged.
Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must be something more
concrete.

Molinas Answer: findings of complainant judge in his 9 August 1993 order is his opinion-argument and contended that "the proper remedy for
a seemingly weak probable cause finding is a reinvestigation.

Office of the Court Administrator: Guilty
Respondent Judge should be reminded that under Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence, "A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception

SC: Affirmed. Respondent is reprimanded.
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in determining probable cause, an
elementary legal principle must not be compromised hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause. The rules on
evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever.
Yet, in the case at bench, respondent judge found probable cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the basis of the testimonies of
Mencelacion Padamada and Rosita Castillo which were obviously hearsay.
o Testimonies: Wilma Anama told them that it was his brother, Rogelio Amana, who killed Virgilio Capa. They were not present
during the killing incident happened.
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The determination of probable cause is a function of the
judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination.


PEOPLE v. BRIOSO
37 SCRA 336

Accused: Brioso + Taeza
Case: Murder
Victim: Silvina Daria

Bernals Testimony (niece and neighbor of Sps. Daria)
Saw Brioso and Taeza outside Darias residence with Taeza holding a gun
Witnessed each appealed point a gun to Darias house
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS: HEARSAY KKMD

Widows Testimony: right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano
Taeza

Motive: disapproval by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to
Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza.

The defense of both the accused is alibi. Mariano Taeza's own account was that in the evening of 23 December 1966 he was at the barrio clinic
of Tiker playing the guitar with Antonio Daria (son of the deceased), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais. While in the said place, they heard two gun
explosions. Soon afterwards, Macrino Arzadon and Taurino Flores came running towards them, informing Antonio Daria that his father was
already dead.

TC: Guilty

SC: Affirmed
Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said
affidavit was identified by the Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he did not know
Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office.
Moreover, the said exhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-
examine him.
As stated in People vs. Mariquina, affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this
reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are
generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
In view hereof, We find Exhibit "2" of no probative value, and that the lower court did not err when it rejected the same. In this
connection, it is markworthy that the prosecuting attorney stated in open court that Antonio Daria had also executed another affidavit
(Exhibit "D") in the Fiscal's office "to the effect that he went to the office of defense counsel, ...... and there affixed his thumbmark on
a statement that was never read to him."
Be that as it may, not one of the other persons who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso Valera and
Jose Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano Taeza's testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has been
repeatedly held that in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if uncorroborated. It is
worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons mentioned by the accused but they are not presented.