Mississippi Univ vs Hogan

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Hogan (Respondent), was denied admission to
Mississippi University for Womens (MUW) nursing program solely on the basis of
gender. He now alleges this is a denial of equal protection.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from
participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender.

Facts. MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of
Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the schools
nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male.

Issue. Does the operation of a female only nursing school by a State violate Equal
Protection?

Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.

Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day OConnor (J. OConnor) notes
that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for
operating a single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not
lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of
MUW.

J. OConnor also argues that the means to achieving even an important

governmental objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows male
auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state is not
technically operating a single-sex nursing program.

Dissent. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not suffered
a cognizable injury, as there were state-operated nursing programs that accepted
men elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a state-run university
close to ones hometown.

Discussion. The majority focuses on whether Mississippi may discriminate against

men in admission to nursing programs. However, there are two powerful arguments
brought up by the dissent. The first is the lack of injury argument without injury a
case is not ripe, and the constitutional issue may not be reached. There is also the
argument that as there is no unique educational opportunity here (there are nursing
programs accepting men in the State college system), the state is not denying
opportunities to men.
Board of Directors vs Rotary Club

Facts of the case

When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting
three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was
expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court
decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act
prohibiting sexual discrimination.

Question

Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violate
Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association?

Conclusion

No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's

membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was
not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection.
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of
Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of
strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying
out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if
there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that
minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling
interest" in ending sexual discrimination.
Fragante vs City and County of Honolulu

Facts:

Fragante applied for a clerks job with the City and County of Honolulu. Although he
placed high enough on a civil service eligible list to be chosen for the position, he
was not selected because of a perceived deficiency in relevant oral communication
skills caused by his heavy Filipino accent.

Fragante brought a Title VII suit, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of
national origin.

History:

The district court dismissed Fragantes complaint.

The oral ability to communicate effectively and clearly was a legitimate

occupational qualification for the job in question.

There were no proof of a discriminatory intent or motive by the defendant.

Issue:

Was this a case of discrimination on the basis of national origin?

Holding:

No. Affirmed.

Reasoning:

Using the McDonnell Douglas Framework:

(1) P established a prima facie case.

The court assumed this was satisfied.

(2) D articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ps nonselection.

There is no doubt from the record that the oral ability to communicate effectively
in English is reasonably related to the normal operation of the clerks office.

(3) The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was not a mere pretext.

The hiring process involved scores on a variety of categories, and Fragante was
given a 3 on a scale of 1-10 for speech.

Furthermore, the record does not show that the jobs went to persons less qualified
than Fragante: to the contrary.

In sum, the court noted, Fragante was passed over for employment because of the
deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not
merely because he had such an accent.

Rule: An adverse employment decision may be predicated upon individuals accent

when but only when it interferes materially with job performance.
Boy Scouts of America v Dale

Facts of the case

The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster
James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a
homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy
Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual
conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young
people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public
accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of
public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from
forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate
Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy
Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with
various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's
membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal
constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion
would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose.
Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy
Scouts to express any message.

Question

Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from
serving as troop leaders?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held
that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to
admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional
right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's
presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both
to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

Gratz vs Bollinger

Facts of the case

The University of Michigans Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a

number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades,
standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and
leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified
applicant from certain groups determined to be underrepresented minorities.
Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an
additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and
beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to
provide an additional level of consideration.

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the
University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as
residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied
admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive
enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and
Bollinger filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and
James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against
certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court
held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student
body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of
1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to holding seats for certain
minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners
with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with
respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and
upheld the Universitys admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case
then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower
court, to resolve the issue.

Question
Did the University of Michigans use of racial preferences in undergraduate
admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The
Court held that the OUAs policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the
strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy did not provide individual consideration,
but rather resulted in the admission of nearly every applicant of underrepresented
minority status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by previous
jurisprudence on the issue.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day OConnor wrote that the record
showed that the only individualized consideration in the admissions process came
through the Admissions Review Committee. Because the Committee played only a
small part in the overall admissions process, it was not sufficient to satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in
which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits any racial discrimination
for the purposes of higher education admission. The admission policy in question
failed because it did not allow for sufficient consideration of non-racial factors in
determining the admissibility of a candidate from an underrepresented minority
group. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen Breyer
wrote that, in cases dealing with the Equal Protection Clause, the Court should
distinguish between policies of inclusion and policies of exclusion because the
former are much more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the Clause.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that,
because neither of the petitioners could receive any benefit from the relief being
requested, precedent required that the case be dismissed. While they are entitled to
relief for past wrongs, they cannot seek injunctive relief to prevent future harms to
other parties. Justice David Souter joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent,
Justice Souter wrote that, by making race only one of a number of factors to be
considered, the admissions policy meets the requirements established by previous
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Because the point system and the
Admissions Review Committee operate in conjunction with each other, there cannot
be the holding of seats phenomenon that the majority opinion fears. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion in which she argued that, because there is no evidence that the
OUA policies attempt to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular racial or
ethnic group and there is no evidence of saving seats, the policies do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Racial information about an applicant can be useful in
admission considerations because it often serves to show what a student has
accomplished and why the student is worthy of admission. Justice Souter joined in
the dissent.