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R0-1 Sante v J. Claravall & Kalashian (2010) Jurisdictional Amount
ACTION: Complaint for damages for oral defamation.
FACTS: 1. 2004-04-05 Kalashian filed before Baguio RTC a complaint for damages. Prayer for 300K
moral, 50K exemplary, 50K attys fees, 20K litigation expenses, costs of suit.
1a. Sante filed M2D for lack of jurisdiction Claim for moral damages is the main action. Claim for
exemplary damages being discretionary should be excluded.
1b. 2004-06-24 RTC denied M2D total claim = P420K > jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Manila.
1c. 2004-08-24 Sante filed petition for certiorari & prohibition before CA 7th Div.
1d. 2006-01-23 CA granted petition, annulled RTC orders, dismissed civil case for lack of jurisdiction.
- totality of claim rule does not apply because claim for exemplary damages was not a separate & distinct
COA from claim of moral damages, but merely incidental.
2. 2004-07-14 Kalashian filed Amended Complaint increasing claim for moral damages to P1M.
2a. Sante filed M2D w/ Answer ad cautelam (because questioning jurisdiction) & counterclaim.
2b. 2004-09-17 RTC denied M2D.
2c. Sante filed filed petition for certiorari & prohibition before CA 17th Div RTC committed GAD in
allowing amendment.
2d. 2006-01-31 CA affirmed RTCs denial of M2D.
- total/aggregate amount demanded in complaint constitutes basis of jusrisdiction
- Kalashian can amend complaint (matter of right under Rules) because RTC had jurisdiction over original
complaint.
2e. Sante filed R65 petition for certiorari before SC (SC treated it as R45 petition for review on certiorari
in view of the issues raised)
ISSUES: (1) Did RTC acquire jurisdiction? Yes. (2) Did RTC commit GAD in allowing amendment to
complaint? No.
HELD: (1a) In cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
(1b) Administrative Circular No. 09-94 The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under BP 129 Sec 19(8) & Sec 33(1) applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
(1c) Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs COA.
(1d) Where it is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that the main action is for damages, the
other forms of damages being claimed e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses,
are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed
for in the complaint.
(2) An amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and
the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. But here, the RTC clearly had
jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.

R1-1 Fr. Alonso, plaintiff-appellee v Villamor et al, defendants-appellants (1910)
FACTS:
HELD: (1) Courts are authorized and directed to allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding at
any stage of
the action, in furtherance of justice and upon such terms, if any, as may be proper; Code prohibits the
reversal of any judgment on merely formal or technical grounds or for such error as has not prejudiced
the rights of the excepting party. Court has the power to amend by substituting the name of the real party
in interest.
(2) Technicalities, when not an aid to justice, deserve scant consideration. No litigant should be permitted
to challenge a record of a court because of a defect of form which has not prejudiced his substantial
rights.

R1-2 Negros Merchants, petitioner v China Banking, respondent (2007)
FACTS: 1. NM obtained credit from CB, secured by REM; NM defaulted, property XJFd; NM filed complaint
for Annulment of Foreclosure.
2. NM filed Amended Complaint impleading Sps Tan & CB Manager
HELD: (1) An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable,
nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial.
(2) The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and failure to comply with
this requirement cannot be excused. The certification is a personal responsibility of the party. If plaintiff
is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the corporation, by a
specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be established by the documents.
(3) If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is
not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
(4) An amended complaint supersedes the complaint it amends and is thus an initiatory pleading.

NOTE Compare w/ Blossom v Manila Gas case
R2-1 Rubio-Llarena, plaintiff-appellee-lessor v Villanueva, defendant-appellant-lessee (1928)
ACTION: Appeal from CFI decision re Recovery of Rent
FACTS: 1. 1924 case SC affirmed rescission of lease, awarded unpaid rent & possession of land to
Llarena.
2. 1924-09-30 Record returned to CFI, writ of execution issued, but before levy parties agreed
(document) to satisfy money judgment by payment of P10K & transfer of house.
2. 1925-04-13 Llarena brought another action
3. 1927-06-17 Llarenas last amended complaint w/ 3 COAs
1st COA While 1924 case on appeal to SC, Villanueva knew that CFI rescinded lease & he was not
entitled to possession, yet he continued in possession during agricultural year 1922-24 &
appropriated for himself the harvest, which he refused to pay on demand. -> Llarena asks for P21.8K
2nd COA breach of lease contract by failing to return tools, agricultural implements, draft animals &
other effects -> Llarena prayed for P3.6K + P500 damages.
3rd COA In 1925 Villanueva illegally harvested 1924 ratoon (buds/nodes left from w/c new
shoots/ratoons grow) sugar cane -> Llarena demands P20.9K.
4. Villanuevas defense/claims:
1st & 3rd COAs COAs already in pleadings in 1924 case, & although no express determination made in
the decision, nevertheless regarded as res judicata.
2nd COA pleads general issue (stuff missing) but sets up special defense that loss due to total
extinction by ordinary use
For all 3 COAs special defense document executed by Llarena on 1924-09-30 acknowledging
satisfaction of judgment in 1924 case.
5. CFI sustained Villanuevas special defense & absolved him from complaint, w/ costs against Llarena.
ISSUE: May Llarena file another action for payment of rent due after judgment on earlier past due rent?
HELD: Yes.
(1) 1st COA not res judicata because
R39S47 The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
X X X
(c) Conclusiveness of judgment
In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
=> that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
1which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
2which was
aactually and necessarily included therein or
bnecessary thereto.

Villanuevas argument not really based on res judicata but splitting a single COA
R2S3 ( A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.) &
R2S4 (If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
1the filing of one or
2a judgment upon the merits in any one

=> is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.)


But that (splitting COA) is not this case.

(2) Not splitting a single COA because
When a contract of lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments,
=> each installment may be considered an independent cause of action,
but in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent,
=> the installments due at the time the action was brought must be included in the complaint, and
failure to do so => constitutes a bar to a subsequent action for such overdue rent.

(3) A party will not be permitted to split a cause of action and make it the basis of several suits,
but that rule applies only to cases where the cause is in existence at the time the action is brought.
Rent for agricultural year 1922-24 had not become due at the time of the trial of the 1924 case.
1930-09-30 document merely a receipt for money judgment in 1924 case & has nothing to do w/ present case.
(4) Re 2nd COA CFI affirmed. Last amended complaint showed increased claim. Evidence shows missing draft
animals died from rinderpest & other personal property turned over to sheriff.
(5) Re amount of damages in 1st COA No bad faith on Villanueva. Contract had no special provision on how to
effect rescission => only by final judgment of court => damages = only the stipulated P8K rent w/ interest.
(6) Re 3rd COA relates to period after termination of lease by final judicial order => bad faith.
DECISION: 1st COA Villanueva to pay unpaid rent only. (Llarena partially wins)
2nd COA CFI affirmed. (Villanueva wins)
3rd COA pay rent & fruits, adjusted for payment to Central. (Llarena wins)

NOTE Compare w/ Llarena v Villanueva case
R2-2 Blossom & Co, plaintiff-appellant v Manila Gas Corp, defendant-appellee (1930)
Anticipatory Breach of Contract
ACTION: Appeal from CFI decision
FACTS:
1. 1918 Contract for Manila Gas to sell & deliver to Blossom water gas tar & coal gas tar at P65/ton for 4 yrs.
2. Contract amended to run for 10 yrs. As consideration Blossom purchased land from MG & executed a mortgage
as security.
3. MG breached contract by refusing to deliver (because prices went up).
4. 1923-11-23 Blossom sued MG before CFI for damages & specific performance.
5. CFI 1ordered MG to pay damages,
2but refused to order MG to resume delivery,
3but leftplaintiff w/ its remedy for damages against defendant for the subsequent breaches ofcontract.

6. MG filed foreclosure proceedings & sold land, but Blossom able to redeem.
7. No deliveries from July 1920 to March 1926 (when SC affirmed judgment for damages of P26K).
8. March 1926 MG offered to resume & Blossom accepted deliveries, but under protest & w/ reservation because at
much higher prices.
9. 1927-03-03 Blossom filed complaint for breach of contract.
10. MG filed demurrer but overruled. Parties stipulated court-appointed referee to take evidence & report findings
to court.
11. MG filed amended Answer w/ affirmative defense complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a COA
because 1prior adjudication has been had for all issues in this action
2Blossom had recovered damages in previous case for the same COA.
12. Referee found that Blossom entitled to P57K damages, but trial court awarded only P2K.
ISSUE: Is the prior judgment a bar to another action to recover damages for the remainder of the contract?
HELD: Yes. (1) As a general rule,
a contract to do several things at several times
=> is divisible, and
a judgment for a single breach of a continuing contract
=> is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.
Rule on Anticipatory Breach of Contract
But where
1the contract is entire, and
2the breach total,

=> there can be only one action in which plaintiff must recover all damages.
(2) When the defendant terminated a continuing contract by absolute refusal in bad faith to perform,
=> a claim for damages for a breach is an indivisible demand, and
where a former final judgment was rendered,
=> it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.
(3) In an indivisible contract plaintiff should prove in the first action
1not only such damages as it has then actually sustained,
2but also such prospective damages as it may be legally entitled to recover by reason of the breach.

DECISION: Plea of res judicata sustained; CFI judgment affirmed.


NOTES: (1) Procedural Law Rule of Anticipatory Breach of Contract
(2) Civil Law Losing the benefit of a period
NCC Art 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:
(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security for
the debt;
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their establishment, and when through
a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period;
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond. (1129a)

R2-3 & R10-2 Swagman Hotels & Travel Inc, petitioner v CA & Christian, respondents (2005)
ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision & resolution.
FACTS: 1. 1996-97 Swagman Pres Atty Infante & VP Hegerty obtained loans from Christian, evidenced by
3 $50K PNs dated 1996-08-07, 1997-03-14, 1997-07-14 payable 3 yrs from date w/ 15% int p.a. payable
every 3 mos.
2. 1998-12-16 Christians letter to Swagman terminating loans, demanding $150K payment & $13.5K
unpaid interest.
3. 1999-02-02 Christian filed w/ RTC a complaint for sum of money & damages against Swagman,
Hegerty & Infante. Per complaint:
a. Swagman paid 15% int p.a. every 3 mos, but from Jan to Dec 1998, paid only 6% int p.a.
b. Prayed that S, H & I J&S pay $150K loan, $13.5K unpaid int from Jan to Dec 1998, P100K moral
damages, P50K attys fees, & cost of suit.
4. Swagman, Hegerty & Infante filed Answer raising as defenses
1lack of COA (3 PNs not yet due & demandable) &
2novation of principal obligations (in Dec 1997, Christian agreed to waive 15% int p.a. & accept

payment of principal in installments)


Swagman paid Christian capital repayment of $750 per month from Jan 1998 until complaint filed in Feb
1999
S, H & I prayed that complaint be dismissed & Christian be ordered to pay P1M moral damages, P500K
exemplary damages, & P100K attys fees.
5. 2000-05-05 RTC
1ruled/declared
afirst 2 PNs already due & demandable, &
binterest on loans reduced by parties to 6% p.a.;
2ordered Swagman to pay Christian
a$100,000 principal obligation,
bplus 6% int until fully paid,
cminus all int payments already paid.

RTC ratio:
1. No novation but mere modification.
2. R10S5 - a complaint w/c states no COA may be cured by evidence presented w/o objection.
3. Hegerty & Infante not personally liable, merely acted in representation of Swagman.
6. 2003-09-05 CA denied Swagman appeal & affirmed RTC.
7. 2003-12-04 CA denied Swagman MR.
8. Swagman files w/ SC a petition for review on certiorari of CA decision & resolution.
ISSUE: May a complaint that lacks a COA at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a COA during
the pendency of the case? No.
HELD: (1) Essential elements of a COA:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
(2) Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 in order that the actual merits of a case may be
determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all
other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity
of suits. Sec 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings
is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may
be cured by evidence presented during the trial.
[Example: If a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the cause of action
depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the complaint was filed may be
presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter.]
(3) However, the curing effect under R10S5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time
the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
(4) A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued
=> cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or
accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending.
(5) A person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are
immature. There are reasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up
litigation. An action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.
(6) Unless plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a
supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA 1decision affirming RTC decision & 2resolution denying Swagmans MR
reversed & set aside; Complaint dismissed for lack of cause of action.

R2-4 Ada, Adanza, Flora Baylon et al v Florante Baylon (2012)
ACTION: R45 petition for review on certiorari of CA decision reversing & setting aside RTC decision
rescinding donation inter vivos. ; Rescission & partition (Rule 69)
FACTS:
Spouses Baylon +
Rita +
Victoria +
Luz B Adanza
Dolores +
Panfila
Ramon + ---------- Flora
Florante Ramon Jr, Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino, Ma Ruby
Lilia Ada
1. 1996-07-03 Petitioners filed w/ RTC Complaint for partition, accounting & damages vs Florante, Rita &
Panfila.
Petitioners claim Rita
took possession of 43 parcels of land owned by Spouses Baylon
appropriated for herself the income from them
used income to buy 2 parcels of land (Lots 4709 & 4706)
refused to effect partition of said parcels of land
Defendants Answer:
Defendants & Petitioners co-owned 22 of 43,
Rita owns 10,
11 owned by Florante, Lilia, 2 Adanzas, Adalia, Mendez
2 lots acquired by Rita w/ her own money
denied Rita appropriated
no objection to partition but only wrt co-owned parcels
2. 1997-07-06 During pendency of case, Rita conveyed 2 lots to Florante via Deed of Donation
3. 2000-07-16 Rita died intestate & w/o any issue
4. 2002-02-06 Upon learning of donation inter vivos, Petitioners filed Supplemental Pleading praying that
donation be rescinded per NCC Art 1381(4); alleged Rita was sick & very weak, couldnt have consented
Florante & Panfila opposed rescission, asserting that Art 1381(4) applies only when there is already a
prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under
litigation.
5. 2005-10-20 RTC rendered decision:
declared existence of co-ownership over 20 lots & directed partition among heirs of Sps Baylon
declared existence of co-ownership over over 10 lots owned by Rita & directing partition among
her heirs (plaintiffs & defendants)
rescinded donation inter vivos & directing 2 lots be included in estate of Rita to be partitioned
excluded 9 lots from co-ownership
6. Florante sought recon of rescission denied.
7. 2007-10-26 CA reversed & set aside RTC decree of rescission & inclusion of 2 lots in Ritas estate;
remanded to RTC for determination of ownership.
CA held:
1that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable

judicial ruling that the 2 lots actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until
then, an action for rescission is premature.
2Action for rescission cannot be joined with the action for partition, accounting and damages through

a mere supplemental pleading. (Issue #2) SC disagrees.


8. Petitioners sought recon denied.
9. Petitioners file petition for review on certiorari w/ SC.
ISSUE: (1) May the court adjudicate misjoined causes of action?
HELD: (1) Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal.
Yes. If: a. no objection from the parties
b. Court did not motu propio direct a severance
c. Court has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action notwithstanding misjoinder
=> there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Objectives of joinder R2S5
1to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by

effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between
the parties involving one subject matter, and
2to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost.

The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to
the rights of the litigants.
Objective of R2S5(b) The variance in the procedure 1in the special civil action of partition and 2in the
ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single
proceeding to avoid confusion
1in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as
2in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

(2) A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the original
cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. Its usual office
is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or
change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further
develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental
complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
The fact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar
to its allowance but only a matter that may be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion.
DECISION: Petition partially granted; CA decision modified; RTC rescission reinstated, case remanded to
RTC for determination of ownership.
NOTES: (1) Kinds of rescissible contracts according to reason for their susceptibility to rescission:
1because of lesion or prejudice
2on account of fraud or bad faith
3by special provisions of law


R3-1 Banda + 66, petitioners v Ermita et al, respondents (2010)
ACTION: R65 petition for certiorari & prohibition
FACTS: 1. GMA issued EO 378 removing NPOs exclusive jurisdiction over printing services reqt of govt
agencies & instrumentalities (i.e., opened to bidding).
2. 67 of 549 (12%) NPO employees filed class action suit re constitutionality.
ISSUE: Does the petition qualify as a class suit? No.
HELD: (1) Board of Optometry v Colet held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a
class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no
difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the
decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives
would certainly claim denial of due process.
(2) Ibaes v Roman Catholic Church) held that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other
members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, => the class suit will not prosper.
Of 67 petitioners:
32 executed Affidavits of Desistance (1 of them is President of NPO Workers Assn)
1 signed a letter denying ever signing the petition
67 signed Verification/CAFS, only 20 mentioned in jurat as having subscribed before notary public =>
only 20 (<4%) effectively instituted the case.
(3) R3S12 - Requisites of a class suit are:
1. the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2. the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3. the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
(4) MVRS Publications v Islamic Dawah In determining the question of fair and adequate representation
of members of a class, the court must consider
(a) whether 1the interest of the named party
is coextensive with 2the interest of the other members of the class;
(b) the proportion of 1those made a party, as it so bears, to 2the total membership of the
class; and
(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
DECISION: Petition dismissed.

NCC Art 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Upheld in Navarro v Escobido because co-owners won.
Rejected in Bacalso v Padigos because defendants won & 9 vs 20

R3-2 Navarro, lessee-petitioner v J. Escobido, Karen Go/Kargo Enterprises, lessor-respondent (2009)
CONCEPTS: spouses, unknown defendant, representative, indispensable & necessary parties
ACTION: R45 petition for review on certiorari of CA decision & resolution
FACTS:
1. 1998-09-12 Karen filed 2 complaints for replevin &/or sum of money vs Navarro & John Doe; prayed
that RTC issue writs of replevin for seizure of 2 MVs in Navarros possession.
1st Complaint: 1997-08-08 Contract of lease w/ option to purchase crane truck between lessee Navarro &
lessor Kargo, represented by Manager/Husband Glenn; 4th & 5th rental payment checks bounced.
2nd Complaint: 1997-10-01 Same contract for 2nd truck; 3rd PDC bounced.
2. 1998-10-12 & 10-14 RTC issued writs of replevin; Sheriff seized 2 trucks & delivered to Karen.
3. Navarros Answer alleged as special affirmative defense 2 complaints stated no COA since Karen is
not a party to the lease agreements (actionable documents)
4. 1999-12-13 On Navarros motion, both cases consolidated.
5. 2000-05-08 RTC order dismissed case on ground that complaint did not state a COA.
6. 2000-07-26 Upon Karens MR, RTC issued order setting aside order of dismissal.
RTC presumed leasing business is conjugal => Karen had sufficient interest to file action.
Karen should have included husband Glenn in complaint per R3S4
=> ordered Karen to file motion for inclusion of Glenn as co-plaintiff
7. 2001-03-07 RTC denied Navarros MR.
8. Navarro filed petition for certiorari before CA
A complaint w/c failed to state a COA could not be converted into one w/ a COA by mere amendment
or supplemental pleading.
9. 2001-10-16 CA denied Navarro petition & affirmed RTC order
10. 2002-05-29 CA resolution denied Navarro MR.
11. Navarro filed R45 petition for review on certiorari:
(1)Even if lease in name of KarGo, since it did not have requisite juridical personality to sue
=> actual parties are himself & Glenn.
Since it was Karen who filed complaint & not Glenn
=> she was not a RPI & complaint failed to state a COA.
(2) Inclusion of Glenn as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of the complaint, to his great
prejudice.
ISSUE: Is Karen a RPI? Yes. Is Glenn an indispensable party? No.
HELD:
(R3S3) Glenn signed as representative.
(Case) In sole proprietorships, doing business as XXX may be added to the title of the case, as is
customarily done.
(R3S2) As the registered owner of Kargo, Karen is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured
by a judgment in this case => Karen is the RPI.
(FC Art 93 on ACP)
By law, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in one or both
spouses,
=> is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved.
vs only Navarros bare allegation that paraphernal
(FC Art 124) The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. => either Karen or Glenn may speak & act w/ authority in managing their conjugal
property KarGo.
(FC Art 108) The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements. I.e., CGP > marriage settlement > Partnership
(NCC Art 1811 on Partnership) A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
property. The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has
an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes;
xxx
(NCC Art 487 on Property) Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (Case: covers all
kinds of action for the recovery of possession)
=> Only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property,
=> is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties,
for a complete relief can be accorded in a suit
even without their participation,
since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
=> since Glenn is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased
vehicles, => he only needs to be impleaded as a pro forma party to the suit, based on R4S4 (Husband and
wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law).
(R3S11) Even assuming that Glenn is an indispensable party, SC held in a number of cases that the
misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action.
=> RTC order requiring Karen to join Glenn as co-plaintiff is in order.
DECISION: Navarros petition denied.
NOTES: NCC Art 44 The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants
a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

R3-3 Bacalso + 8, defendants/-petitioners v Padigos + 19, plaintiffs/-respondents (2008)
ACTION: R45 Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS: Padigos are heirs of co-owners; Bacalsos are heirs of Alipio Sr.
1. Padigos filed before RTC a complaint vs 2 Bacalso/s for 1quieting of title, 2declaration of nullity of
documents, 3recovery of possession, & 4damages.
Complaint alleged:
1. Alipio Bacalso Sr secured Tax Declarations w/o legal basis.
2. Rosendo & Rodrigo Bacalso leasing portions of lot to persons who built houses thereon.
3. Rosendo living in a house built on a portion of lot.
4. Demands to vacate & efforts at conciliation futile.
R&R Bacalsos Answer:
1. Alipio Sr purchased via deed of sale some shares.
2. Alipio Sr acquired other shares by extraordinary acquisitive prescription through continuous, open,
peaceful, and adverse possession thereof in concept of owner since 1949.
Padigos Reply & Answer:
1. Deed of sale spurious; & assuming not, laches had set in.
2. Other shares cannot be acquired through laches or prescription.
2. Padigos, w/ leave of court, filed Amended Complaint impleading A Srs other heirs as additional
defendants; Later filed a 2nd Amended Complaint, w/ leave of court, impleading as additional plaintiffs
other heirs of a co-owner.
Bacalsos Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint:
2AC s/b dismissed for failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners of the lot who are
indispensable parties.
3. Padigos filed 3rd Amended Complaint, w/ leave of court, impleading remaining heirs as additional
plaintiffs.
4. RTC ruled in favor of Padigos:
1. Declared Padigos entitled to ownership & possession.
2. Declared Deed of Sale void.
3. Ordered Bacalsos to pay damages, attys fees, litigation expenses & costs of suit.
5. On Padigos Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, RTC issued writ of execution, demolished houses.
6. On Bacalsos appeal, CA affirmed RTC decision.
7. Bacalso files w/ SC R45 Petition for review on certiorari
Bacalsos faulted CA for impliedly sanctioning RTC order of demolition of houses belonging to old lessees
who were not even joined as parties in the case. Well taken by SC but may not consider any grant of
relief, lessees not being parties to the case.
Respondents contend that the omission did not deprive RTC of jurisdiction because per NCC Art 487
any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
ISSUE: Are all of the co-owners indispensable parties?
HELD: Yes. SC rejected Padigos invocation of NCC Art 487. The action is for quieting of title, declaration
of nullity of documents, recovery of possession and ownership, and damages.
(Arcelona v CA, 1997)
R3S7 Indispensable parties are parties-in-interest w/o whom there can be no final determination of an
action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule re the making of parties in a civil action requires
1the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and
2the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions,

their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
=> renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
1not only as to the absent parties
2but even as to those present.

The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint w/c specific portion of the property is owned by
NOTE: (1) Failure to implead indispensable parties aside, the resolution of the case hinges on a
determination of the authenticity of the documents on which petitioners in part anchor their claim to
ownership of the lot. SC ruled genuine & authentic based on evidence.
(2) Respondents guilty of laches. Petitioners tilling land since 1950. While, by express provision of law,
no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
DECISION: Bacalsos petition granted; CA decision reversed & set aside; RTC case dismissed.
NOTE: (Arcelona v CA, 1997) Formerly, Art 487 of the old Civil Code provided that any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment. It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an
action in ejectment without joining all the other co-owners. Former CJ Moran explains: xxx. As held by the
SC, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an
undivided interest in any given tract of land,
=> a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not
parties to the suit, and => thus the defendant in possession of the property might be harassed by as many
succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him.
The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right
against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as codefendants, all persons standing
in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one
litigation.

R3-4 Valdez-Tallorin, defendant-petitioner v Heirs of Tarona + 2, plaintiff-respondents (2009)
ACTION: R45 petition for review on certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS: 2/98 Heirs filed before RTC action for cancellation of Tallorins & 2 other womens (not
impleaded) Tax Declaration over a parcel of land.
Heirs alleged:
1. Assessors Ofc cancelled TD in the name of their father Juanito.
a. cancellation based on unsigned but notarized Affidavit that Juanito executed in favor of Tallorin
& 2 Valdezs (tenancy rights)
b. Assessors Ofc issued TD in favor of the 3 women.
c. Affidavit missing, no copy found in Assessors Ofc.
2. W/o affidavit => Juanitos TD illegally cancelled & Tallorins +2 TD illegally issued.
3/98 Heirs filed motion to declare Tallorin in default for failing to Answer w/in allowed time.
Before RTC could act, Tallorin filed a belated Answer alleging:
1. She has copy of Affidavit; Juanito a mere agricultural tenant who surrendered & waived in Affidavit
his occupation & tenancy rights to Tallorin et al for P29K.
2. Affirmative defense of 1noncompliance w/ reqt of conciliation proceedings & 2prescription.
3/98 RTC set Tallorins defense for hearing; Heirs sought recon; RTC denied MR (because it received
Answer before it could issue a default order)
Heirs filed certiorari w/ CA w/c ruled:
1. RTC committed GAD in admitting Tallorins late Answer in the absence of motion to admit it.
2. Even if Tallorin had filed her late Answer, RTC should have heard Taronas motion to declare
Tallorin in default.
3. Remand case to RTC
RTC 1heard & granted Taronas motion to declare Tallorin in default, & 2directed Taronas to present
evidence ex parte.
1/02 RTC:
1. Annuled TD in name of Tallorin et al.
2. Reinstated TD in name of Juanito.
3. Ordered issuance of new TD in names of Heirs
4. Juanitos Affidavit not binding because unsigned.
Tallorin appealed to CA, alleging:
1. Land titled in her name + 2 co-owners
2. Juanitos affidavit only dealt w/ surrender of his tenancy rights & did not serve as basis for
canceling TD in his name.
3. Although Juanito did not sign the Affidavit, he thumbmarked and acknowledged the same before a
notary public.
4. RTC erred in not dismissing the Complaint for failure to implead Valdezes who were indispensable
parties in the action to annul Juanitos Affidavit & the TD in their favor.
5/06 CA affirmed RTC decision, but notably did not address issue of non-joinder of indispensable parties.
ISSUE: Did CA err in failing to dismiss Taronas Complaint for not impleading Valdezes in whose names
the annulled TD had been issued? Yes.
HELD: (1) Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Joining
indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without their
presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
(2) Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the
absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all
indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
(3) But the Taronas action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v CA, the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. R3S11 prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the
ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of
the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA & RTC decisions set aside; case remanded to RTC, directed to have
Valdezes impleaded by plaintiffs as party-defendants.

R5-1 Miguel, petitioner-complainant-creditor v Montaez, respondent-defendant-debtor, 2012-01-25
FACTS: 1. 2001-02-01 Montaez secured P143K loan, payable in 1 yr, gave his H&L as collateral.
2. Montaez defaulted; Miguel filed complaint w/ Lupon in Rizal; Parties entered into a settlement (Kasunduang
Pag-aayos) where Mon will pay P2K per month
3. Montaez still failed to pay; 2004-12-13 Lupon issued Certification to file action in court
4. 2005-04-07 Miguel filed w/ Makati MeTC complaint for collection of sum of money; Montaez in Answer w/ CC
raised defense of improper venue (Miguel resides in Caloocan)
5. 2006-08-16 MeTC decision ordered Montaez to pay P148 (principal + legal int from maturity date) + P10K
atty fees/costs; On appeal RTC affirmed.
6. Montaez appealed to CA, alleged: 1. Venue improperly laid, 2. KP effectively novated orig loan agreement
7. CA reversed RTC: Dismissed complaint, w/o prejudice to Miguels right to file action to enforce KP; No novation,
only change in terms of payment, KP merely supplemented orig loan agreement; KP has force & effect of court
judgment, w/c per LGC Sec 417 may be enforced 1. by execution w/in 6 mos from date of settlement by the Lupon
or 2. by court action after lapse of such time = > remedy of Miguel was to file an action for execution of KP in court,
not for collection of sum of money => CA deemed it unnecessary to resolve issue on venue.
ISSUE: Is complaint for sum of money the proper remedy, notwithstanding the KP?
HELD: Yes. 1. Because Montaez failed to comply with the terms of KP, said agreement is deemed rescinded per
NCC Art 2041, & Miguel can insist on her original demand.
2. LGC Sec 417, is only applicable if the parties have not repudiated such settlement w/in 10 days from the date
thereof per Sec 416. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by 1 party, either expressly or impliedly, the other
party has 2 options, namely, to enforce the compromise per LGC or ROC as the case may be, or to consider it
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
3. LGC Sec 417 uses may => merely optional
DECISION: CA decision set aside, RTC affirmed
NOTES: 1. Art 2041. If 1 of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded & insist upon his original demand.
2. Art 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

R6S7 Sps Antonio v Vda de Monje (2010)
HELD:
(1) A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have
against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint.
It is compulsory in the sense that it
1is within the jurisdiction of the court,
2does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties

over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and


3will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case.

Any other counterclaim is permissive.


(2) The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as
compulsory if there should exist a LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP between the main claim and counterclaim.
The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship
1when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties

would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
2when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or
3when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.

(3) The CRITERIA to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory


or permissive are as follows:
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim
as well as defendants counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
(Bungcayao v Fort Ilocandia, GR 170483, 2010)

R6S14 Sapugay v CA, 1990
HELD: A counter-claim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may
have against an opposing party. However, the general rule that a defendant cannot by a counterclaim
bring into the action any claim against persons other than the plaintiff admits of an exception under
Section 14, Rule 6 which provides that when the presence of parties other than those to the original
action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counter-claim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be
obtained. The inclusion, therefore, of Cardenas in petitioners counterclaim is sanctioned by the rules.

R7-1 Traveo +16, petitioners-workers v Bobongan Cooperative, Timog Agri Corp (TACOR), Diamond
Farms Inc (DFI), Dole Asia Phils, respondents (2009)
ACTION: R45 Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS: 1. Petitioners allege:
a. TACOR & DFI hired them to work in a banana plantation,
b. T&D schemed to make it appear they work for independent contractor (eg, reqd to join Bobongan
Coop),
c. T&D changed compensation from daily to pakyawan & stopped paying salaries.
2. 3 complaints for illegal dismissal (ID) w/ NLRC for unpaid salaries, OT pay, 13th mo, Service Incentive
Leave (SIL) pay, damages & attys fees; impleaded Dole because it then supposedly owned TACOR.
3a. DFI answered for itself & TACOR (merged) alleged it had arrangement w/ landowners who formed a
Coop; it is not in a position to state whether Petitioners working for landowners R8S10 3rd mode of
specific denial.
3b. Bobongan failed to file position paper despite notice => LA considered it to have waived its right to
adduce evidence in its defense R9S3 in default
3c. Nothing heard from Dole.
4. 2002-10-30 Labor Arbiter consolidated decision, found Coop guilty of ID, ordered to pay backwages,
reinstatement or SIL, 10% of award as attys fees; dropped complaints vs TACOR & Dole.
4a. LA relied on previous Orders submitted by DFI: Order of DOLE Regl Ofc Director declaring Coop as
employer of 341 workers; & Order of DOLE Secy affirming same R8S6 Pleading a judgment or decision
5. On partial appeal to NLRC: dropping of other respondents sustained (no showing that Order of DOLE
Secy set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction); granted money claims (remand to LA for
computation); Petitioners MR denied.
6. 2001-12-20 Petitioners appeal to CA via certiorari dismissed on ground that verification & CAFS was
defective only 19 of 22 petitioners signed; Petitioners MR denied.
7a. Petitioners R45 PR on certiorari Procedure: CA should have at most dismissed petition only wrt non-
signers ( per SC); Merits: Coop employer on paper but other respondents exercised control &
supervision; Coop a labor-only contractor; Order of DOLE Secy not applicable because it pertained to a
certification election case involving different parties & issues.
7b. DFI/TACOR not the employer; cant comment on money claims because no evidence submitted
7c. Cooperative has been dissolved.
ISSUE: Is non-compliance w/ verification requirement fatally defective? No.
HELD: Not in this case. Altres v Empleo:
(1) A distinction must be made between
1non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
2noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective CAFS.

(2) Non-compliance w/ verification or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may be served thereby.
(3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
1when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or

petition signs the verification, and


2when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

(4) Non-compliance w/ certification or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
1substantial compliance or
2presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.

(5) The CAFS must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the CAFS substantially complies with the Rule.
(6) The CAFS must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a SPA designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
(7) Relationship between Coop & TACOR more of a JV, not a job contracting arrangement. DFI / TACOR /
Dole cannot be held solidarily liable w/ Coop.
DECISION: Petition dismissed.
NOTES: (1) SC by Resolution reqd Dole Phils to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its
failure to heed the Courts directive to file required comment w/in 10 days from notice. DPI stated its
Davao City received Resoln but addressed to DAP (non-SEC regd). Petitioners commented that DPI raised
the matter for 1st time even if received all pleadings & court processes from inception. SC found DPIs
posturingdoes not lieDPI is intended recipient, there is no doubt.
(2) Instead of remanding to CA, SC deemed it more practical to decide the substantive issue raised in the
petition so as not to further delay disposition of the case (deviated from general rule that factual Qs are
not entertained in PRs on certiorari of CAs decision).

R7S5 Bondagjy v Artadi, 2008
HELD: As for the omission by respondent to include in the certification the dismissal of the annulment
case she filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, it is not fatal. An omission in the certificate of non-forum
shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal as to merit
the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be prevented by the
said certification are not present (Roxas v CA, 2001)

R10-1 PPA, petitioner-defendant v William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc, respondent-plaintiff (2008)
ACTION: R45 PR on certiorari of CA decision & resolution
FACTS: 1. WGA leased from PPA the Marine Slip Way port area from 2001-01-01 to 06-30 or until PPA turns over
operation to winning bidder for North Harbor modernization.
1a. Later (after 6-30) PPA asked WGA to vacate & turn over improvements; PPA denied WGA letter to reconsider.
2. 11-28 WGA sued for Injunction before RTC, claimed PPA unjustly, illegally & prematurely terminated lease
contract. Prayer for TRO to arrest evacuation, recovery of damages for breach of contract & attys fees.
3. 12-11 1st Amended Complaint ( after 13 days, matter of right?) same denomination (Injunction) & prayer
(TRO), but added statement that PPA estopped from denying lease period untilturned over to winning bidder;
+3rd COA addl relief in prayer that should WGA be forced to vacate, it should be refunded the value of
improvements it introduced to the leased property.
3a. 2002-01-23 PPA Answer; 1-16 RTC denied TRO; 2-11 WGA MR on TRO denial
4. Shortly after 2-11 WGA filed Motion to Admit 2nd Amended Complaint Injunction with Prayer for TRO &/or
WPI and damages &/or Reformation of Contract; +4th cause of action & addl relief in prayer reformation of
contract (because it failed to express or embody true intent of parties).
4a. PPA strongly opposed Motion - reformation sought by WGA a substantial amendment, w/c if granted, will
substantially alter WGAs COA & theory of the case.
4b. 3-22 RTC Order denied WGAs Motion; 4-26 denied WGAs MR
5. WGA filed Petition for certiorari w/ CA to nullify RTC Order
5a. 10-24 CA granted P4C; directed RTC to admit 2nd Amended Complaint per R10S3; 2003-05-15 denied PPA MR
ISSUE: Did CA err in ruling that RTC committed GAD when it denied admission of 2AC? No.
HELD: Under (1997) R10S3, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally
promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
DECISION: PPC Petition denied; CA Decision & Resolution affirmed.

R10-2 Swagman Hotels & Travel Inc, petitioner v CA & Christian, respondents (2005)
See R2-3

R14-1 EB Villarosa & Partner Co Ltd, petitioner-defendant v J. Benito & Imperial Devt Corp, respondent-plaintiff
CODAL: R14S11 Service upon domestic private juridical entity; R14S20 Voluntary appearance
ACTION: Petition for Certiorari & Prohibition w/ Prayer for issuance of TRO &/or WPI seeking to annul & set aside
the 8-05 & 11-20 Orders of RTC & Prayer that RTC desist from further proceeding with Civil Case.
FACTS: 1. Deed of Sale w/ Devt Agreement - Ltd Partnership Villarosa to develop IDCs CDO parcels of land into
low-cost housing subdivision.
2. 1998-04-03 IDC filed complaint (Civil Case) for Breach of Contract & Damages vs Villarosa before Makati RTC
(per Agreement) because no substantial devts other than a few unfinished houses.
3. Summons w/ complaint served upon Villarosa through its CDO Branch Manager.
4. 6-09 Villarosa filed Special Appearance w/ M2D on ground of improper service of summons (Branch Manager
not one of those named in R14S11) & lack of jurisdiction over person of defendant.
5. 6-10 IDC filed Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (M2DDD) for Villarosas failure to file Answer despite
receipt of Summons & Complaint
6. 6-22 IDC filed Opposition to M2D on grounds that Villarosa actually received summons & purpose of the rule is to
bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
7. 8-05 RTC denied Villarosas M2D, denied IDCs M2DDD, gave Villarosa 10 days to file responsive pleading; since
the summons & complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its Branch Manager, there was
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons & consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.
8. 8-19 Villarosa, by Special Appearance, filed MR 1997 ROC did not liberalize, but restricted service of summons
(see NOTES).
9. 8-27 IDC files Opposition to MR: Villarosas Branch Manager did bring home to the corporation the notice of the
filing of the action & by virtue of w/c M2D was filed; & that it was 1 month after receipt of the summons &
complaint that Villarosa chose to file a M2D.
10. 9-04 Villarosa, by Special Appearance, filed Reply, contending changes in 1997 ROC substantial, not just general
semantics.
11. 11-20 RTC denied Villarosas MR, hence Villarosas Petition for Certiorari
ISSUE: (1) Did RTC acquire jurisdiction over person of Villarosa upon service of summons on its Branch Manager?
(2) Is Villarosas inclusion in M2D of other grounds aside from LJ/PD deemed a voluntary appearance?
HELD: (1) No. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited & more clearly specified in R14S11. A strict compliance with the mode of
service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The purpose is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the
summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do
with the legal papers served on him. In other words, to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
Action. The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements
as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.
(2) No. Per R14S20, The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (vs old Rule says Yes)
DECISION: Petition granted; RTC Orders annulled & set aside; RTC declared w/o jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case & all its orders & issuances in connection therewith annulled & set aside.
NOTES: Changes in 1997 R14S11: president; added managing partner; manager general manager; secretary
corporate secretary; cashier treasurer; removed agent & any director, added in-house counsel.

R14-2 Sps Galura, petitioners-defendant v Math-Agro Corp, respondent-plaintiff, 2009-08-14
CODAL: R14S7 Substituted service; R47 Annulments of Judgments or Final Orders & Resolutions
ACTION: R45 petition for review on certiorari w/ prayer for issuance of WPI &/or TRO. Petition challenges the
2005-01-25 & 2005-02-28 Resolutions of the CA.
FACTS: 1. 1997-03 Sps Dante & Teresa Galura purchased broiler starters & finishers worth P426K from MAC, paid
P72.5K, but despite several demands, failed to pay P353.5K unpaid balance.
2. 2000-06-21 MAC filed Complaint w/ Malolos RTC, stated addresses of Galuras in Tarlac & Sta Mesa Heights, QC.
3. 2000-08-15 RTC Clerk issued summons
4. 2000-09-17 Process Server (P/S) went to Sta Mesa Heights, but told by Dantes father that Galuras presently
reside in Tandang Sora, QC.
5. 2000-09-22- P/S went to Tarlac, but learned property has been foreclosed & Galuras no longer reside there.
6. 2000-09-26 P/S went to Tandang Sora & served summons on Teresas sister.
7. Galuras failed to file their Answer.
8. 2001-01-23 RTC Order declared Galuras in default & allowed MAC to present evidence ex parte.
9. 2001-06-27 RTC ruled in favor of MAC; ordered Galuras to pay unpaid balance, P30K attys fees, litigation
expenses, legal interest from date of 1st demand letter; RTC believes failure of Galuras or their refusal to file any
Answer to the Complaint is a clear admission on their part of their obligation to MAC. It may even be safely
presumed that by their inaction, Galuras have no valid defense against the claim of the MAC such that under the
circumstances, RTC has no other alternative but to pass judgment on the issues based on the evidence on record.
10. 2004-11-10 RTC issued W/X to implement 2001 decision
11. 2004-12-13 Galuras received copy of 2004-11 Order
12. 2005-01-06 Galuras filed w/ CA R47 PAJ/FO, with Prayer for issuance of WPI or TRO. Grounds were (1) RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because substituted service of summons invalid & (2) there was
extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe it would not file a case vs them.
13. 2005-01-25 CA Resolution dismissed petition for lack of merit; valid SSS
14. 2005-02-14 Galuras filed MR; CA denied on 02-28; Galuras petition SC
ISSUES: (1) Valid SSS? (2) Extrinsic fraud? (3) Should Galuras have availed 1st of ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal or petition for relief?
HELD: (1A) No. Per Sandoval II v HRET: Requisites of a valid substituted service:
(a) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible;
(b) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant;
(c) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion;
(d) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place of residence; &
(e) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service.
P/S did not state (a), (c) & (d) in his return of service.
(1B) Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating 1the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and 2the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of
service is in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only
as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other
than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
(3) No. If R47 PAJ/FO of RTC is grounded on lack of jurisdiction 1over the person of the defendant or 2over the
nature or subject of the action, the petition need not allege that the ordinary remedy of NT or MR of J/FO or appeal
therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a
direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA Resolutions set aside; 2005-04-27 TRO made permanent; 2001-06 & 2004-11 RTC
Orders set aside.

R14-3 Citizens Surety, petitioner v J. Herrera, Sps Santiago & Josefina Dacanay, respondents, 1971-03-31
CODAL:
ACTION: Petition to review an order of the CFI
FACTS: 1. Surety issued 2 surety bonds for P5K each to guarantee payment of 2 PNs executed by Santiago. In
consideration, Dacanays executed Indemnity Agreements binding themselves solidarily to indeminify Surety for
any losses, costs & expenses, w/ 12% int pa; as addl security Dacanays mortgaged their Baguio land to Surety.
2. PNs not paid; Surety paid; Dacanays failed to reimburse; Surety caused XJ foreclosure of mortgage; Surety
highest bidder at P2K, seeks to recover balance of P11K, +10% atty fees, & costs.
3. At Suretys request, CFI caused summons to be made by publication in a newspaper, but Dacanays did not appear
w/in 60 days from publication.
4. Surety asked that Dacanays be declared in default, but instead CFI asked them to show cause why action should
not be dismissed, suit being in personam & defendants not having appeared; 1970-05-16 CFI dismissed.
ISSUE: In an action strictly in personam, may a court validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant
absent a personal service of summons within the forum?
HELD: No. (1a) In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. Summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause confer upon the
court jurisdiction over said defendants. (1b) Although a state legislature has more control over the form of
service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in actions in personam * * * service by
publication on resident defendants, who are personally within the state and can be found therein is not due process
of law, and a statute allowing it is unconstitutional.
DECISION: CFI Order of dismissal set aside; proceedings ordered suspended until Citizens succeeds in ascertaining
whereabouts of defendants &/or locating their property to enable proper summons.
NOTES: (1) The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or
personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under R57S1f, in
which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by
publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective.
(2) The tolling of the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter
of court record, and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from
his own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.

R14-4 Santos, petitioner-defendant v PNOC Exploration Corp, respondent-plaintiff (2008)
FACTS: 1. 2002-12-23 PNOC filed a Complaint for a sum of money vs Santos in RTC P700K balance of car loan
advance to Santos when he was Corps Board Director.
1a. Service in person failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts.
1b. On PNOCs Motion, RTC allowed service by publication.
1c. 2003-05-20 PNOC caused publication of summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the Phils; submitted
affidavit of publication & affidavit of service by registered mail to Santos last known address.
1d. Santos failed to Answer; PNOC moved that case be set for reception of evidence ex parte; 9-11 Motion granted
1e. PNOC ex parte presentation & formal offer of evidence; 10-15 case deemed submitted for decision.
1f. 10-28 Santos filed Omnibus MR (of 9-11 Order) & to Admit Answer alleged (a) PNOCs affidavit of service failed
to comply w/ R14S19 because it was not executed by the Clerk of Court & (b) he was denied due process as he was
not notified of 9-11 Order
1g. 2004-02-06 RTC denied MR (a) R14S19 did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered
mail to be executed by the Clerk of Court, (b) due process observed, Order mailed to Santos last known address;
denied Motion to Admit Answer filed way beyond reglementary period
2. Santos filed Petition for Certiorari of 9-11 & 2-6 RTC Orders (a) lack of J due to improper service of summons, (b)
no notice of Orders & Processes, (c) technicality over equity & justice
1h. During pendency RTC rendered Decision ordering Santos to pay P700K + legal int + costs of suit
2a. 9-22 CA Decision sustained 9-11 & 2-6 RTC Orders; denied MR
3. Santos filed PR on Certiorari of CA Decision & Resolution claims R14S14 on service by publication applies only to
actions in rem, not actions in personam
ISSUE: Proper service of summons by publication? Yes. Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of Santos?
Yes. Denial of due process? No.
HELD: R14S14 Where the defendant could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate
his whereabouts, he may properly be served with summons by publication. In rem/in personam distinction was
significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this
has been changed it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
R14S19 The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
Defendants last known address; While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to
service by publication.
R14S20 RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santos by his own voluntary appearance in the action when
he filed the Omnibus MR & to Admit Answer equivalent to service of summons.
Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement. Equity may be applied only in the absence of
rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.
DECISION: Petition denied.
NOTES: (1) 2-6 RTC Order Santos effectively in default RTC could not validly do as an Order of Default can be
made only upon motion of claiming party
(2) Re no notice when whereabouts unknown, nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility.

R14-5 Rapid City Realty, petitioner-plaintiff v Spouses Villa, respondents-defendants (2010)
CODAL: R14S20 Voluntary appearance
FACTS: 1. 2004 Rapid filed Complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans vs some defendants incl Villas.
1a. Process Server failed once at personal service of summons; resorted to substituted service upon Villas 2
Househelps who did not acknowledge receipt & refused to divulge names.
1b. Villas did not Answer; 2005-05-03 RTC granted Rapids M2DDD.
1c. 2006-01-27 (8+ mos later) Villas filed Motion to Lift Order of Default they officially received all papers on 1-27,
denied existence of 2 helpers & even if true had no authority to receive docs.
1d. 7-17 RTC set aside Order of default & gave Villas 5 days to answer; No Answer.
1e. 2007-02-21 RTC grants Rapids 2nd M2DDD.
1f. Villas filed Omnibus MR of 2nd OD & to vacate proceedings claimed RTC did not acquire J over their persons
due to invalid service of summons.
1g. 5-22 RTC denied Omnibus & proceeded to receive ex parte evidence for Rapid.
2. Villas filed w/ CA Certiorari of RTCs Orders.
1h. 9-4 RTC Decision rendered in favor of Rapid.
2a. 2008-04-29 CA annulled RTCs 2nd OD Villas never raised any other defense in avoidance of Rapids claim,
and instead focused all their energies on questioning RTCs jurisdiction. The latter motion clearly stated prefatorily
their counsels reservation or special appearance to question jurisdiction over the persons of the Villas;
8-12 CA denied Rapids MR.
3. Rapid files w/ SC PR on certiorari Villas, in filing 1st MLOD, voluntarily submitted themselves to J of court.
ISSUE: Was Villas filing of 1st MLOD deemed voluntary submission to jurisdiction of court? Yes.
HELD: PCIB v Sps Dy (2009) one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. X X X the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with MR, is considered voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority. X X X It is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA Decision reversed & set aside; Records remanded to RTC.

R14-6 Palma, petitioner-plaintiff v J. Galvez & Agudo, respondent-defendant (2010)
CODAL: R14S16 Residents temporarily out of the Philippines; R14S20 Voluntary appearance
ACTION: R65 Petition for Certiorari
FACTS: 1. 2003-07-28 Palma filed w/ RTC a Complaint for damages vs Phil Heart Center, Drs Giron & Cruz, alleged
defendants committed professional fault, negligence & omission (removed her right ovary); Defendants filed
respective Answers.
1a. Palma filed Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, prayed to implead additional defendants, all PHC
nurses including Agudo; Summons issued.
1b. 2004-02-17 Process Servers Return stated alias summons served upon Agudo thru her husband Alfredo who
received & signed as she was out of the country.
1c. 3-1 Agudos counsel filed Notice of Appearance & Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
1d. 3-15 Counsel filed Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer, prayed for another 20 days.
1e. 3-30 Agudo filed M2D RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served w/ summons
per R14S16; Palma filed Opposition - substituted service of summons on Agudos husband valid & binding on her;
service of summons under R14S16 not exclusive & may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by personal or
substituted service.
1f. 5-7 RTC granted M2D & denied Palmas MR service of summons by publication (only) per R14S16 Wrong!
ISSUES: Valid service of summons? Yes. Did RTC acquire jurisdiction over person of Agudo when her counsel
entered her appearance w/o qualification & filed 2 Motex? Yes.
HELD: (1) Montefalcon v Vasquez (2008) we said that because R14S16 uses the words may and also it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is
temporarily out of the country, any of thefollowing modes of service may be resorted to: 1R14S7 substituted
service; 2personal service outside the country, with leave of court; 3service by publication, also with leave of court;
or 4in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
(2) Montalban v Maximo (1968) we held that substituted service of summons under the present R14S7 in a suit in
personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of
summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.
(3) The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief such as to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
DECISION: Petition granted. RTC Orders set aside; Agudo directed to file Answer.
NOTES: R41S1 no appeal may be taken from (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, crossclaims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;

R14-7 Chu, petitioner-defendant v Mach Asia Trading Corp, respondent-plaintiff (2013)
FACTS: 1. Chu purchased heavy equipments from MATC 3. Installment check payments bounced. MATC sent formal
demand letter.
2. 1999-11-11 MATC filed Complaint before RTC for sum of money, replevin, attys fees & damages. Prayer for
P1.66M unpaid balance, 25% of total amt to be recovered as attys fees, litigations expenses & costs.
2a. 11-29 RTC Order allowing issuance of writ of replevin (W/R).
2b. 12-9 Sheriff went to Chus address to serve summons, complaint, W/R & bond. Chu wasnt there, so Sheriff
resorted to substituted service received by Security Guard.
2c. Chu failed to file any responsive pleading; MATC moved to declare Chu in default; 2000-01-12 RTC issued Order
declaring Chu in default, & thereafter allowed MATC to present evidence ex parte.
2d. 12-15 RTC ruled against Chu Ownership & possession of 3 heavy equipments to MATC, 25% attys fees, P15K
litigation expenses, P11K premium of replevin bond.
3. Chu petitions CA substituted service not valid.
3a. 2007-07-25 CA affirmed RTC, reduced attys fees to 10% in the interest of fairness, process servers neglect or
inadvertence in the service of summons should not unduly prejudice MATCs right to speedy justice; Chu failed to
set up a meritorious defense; 2008-08-28 CA denied Chus MR.
4. Chu files w/ SC PR on certiorari on CA Decision & Resolution.
ISSUE: Improper substituted service of summons? Yes.
HELD: (1) As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.
(2) Casimina v Legaspi In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendants behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.
(3) It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized
and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of
service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance
with the requirements of substituted service.
(4) The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not
been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them
is null and void.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA Decision & Resolution reversed & set aside; 12-15 RTC Decision null & void; RTC
ordered to validly serve summons to Chu.
NOTES: CA if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of due process
would have nevertheless been complied with. x x x. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take possession of the equipments without
the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would
not have given his permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by
the lower court, which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin. SC
said based merely on conjectures & surmises.

R14-8 Robinson, petitioner-defendant v Miralles, respondent-plaintiff (2006)
FACTS: 1. 2000-08-25 Miralles filed w/ RTC a Complaint for sum of money vs Robinson. Miralles alleged Robinson
borrowed $20K per 1-12 MOA.
1a. Summons served but per Sheriffs 2001-03-05 return, Robinson no longer resides at address.
1b. 7-20 RTC issued alias summons to be served at Robinsons new address in Muntinlupa.
1c. Summons could not be served. Per Sheriffs return, subdivision Security Guard on 2 occasions refused entry to
him (despite explanations) per Robinsons instructions not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around.
Sheriff served summons by leaving copy w/ Guard who refused to sign the original.
1d. Miralles moved to declare Robinson in default for failure to Answer seasonably despite service of summons.
1e. 2003-02-28 RTC granted Motion declared Robinson in default & allowed Miralles to present evidence ex parte
1f. 6-20 RTC Order in favor of Miralles - $20K + stipulated interest, P100K moral damages, P50K + 1.5K/appearance
attys fees, costs of suit; copy of Order sent to Robinson by registered mail at new address
1g. 8-8 RTC, upon Miralles Motion, issued Writ of Execution.
2. 9-26 Robinson filed Petition for Relief from Judgment by Default claimed improper service of summons
2a. 2004-02-11 RTC denied Petition; 5-11 denied Robinsons MR
3. Robinson filed w/ SC PR on certiorari of RTC Resolutions - claims service of summons upon the subdivision
security guard is not in compliance with R14S7 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover,
he is not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of
summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
ISSUE: Valid substituted service of summons? Yes.
HELD: (1) We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully,
and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we
frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that
governs.
(2) It was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner.
We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons
through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences.
DECISION: Petition denied. RTC Orders affirmed.

R16-1 Figueroa, petitioner-accused v People, respondent-plaintiff (2008)
FACTS: 1. Bus driver Figueroa hit & killed Lopez;
2. 1994-07-08 Info for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed vs Figueroa before RTC;
2a. 1998-08-19 RTC found Figueroa guilty;
3. Figueroa on appeal before CA questioned for 1st time RTCs jurisdiction;
3a. CA held Figueroa actively participated in the trial and belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC => already
estopped by laches from asserting RTCs lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Estopped by laches? No.
HELD: (1) The general rule should be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel estoppel by laches, to bar a
litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu of Tijam v Sibonghanoy.
(2) Wisdoms Admr v Sims Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches
unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them
until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced,
due to 1loss of evidence, 2change of title, 3intervention of equities, and 4other causes.
(3) Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied 1rarely, 2only from necessity,
and 3only in extraordinary circumstances; When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.
DECISION: Criminal case dismissed without prejudice.

R16-2 Soliven, petitioner-plaintiff v Fast Forms Phils Inc, respondent-defendant (2004)
FACTS: 1. 1993-06-02 P170K loan from Soliven to FF; FF defaulted;
2. 1994-05-20 Soliven filed Complaint before Makati RTC for P195K actual damages, 200K moral, 100K exemplary,
100K atty fees, & costs of suit.
2a. 1995-07-03 RTC held in favor of Soliven, but awarded no moral & exemplary
2b. FF filed for MR on ground of lack of jurisdiction because amount does not exceed P200K
2c. 10-11 RTC denied MR: 1It has jurisdiction because totality of claim > P200K () & 2FF estopped ()
3. 1999-02-08 CA reversed RTC: 1claim only P195K & w/in MeTC jurisdiction (), & 2FF may assail jurisdiction
anytime
3a. 6-17 CA denied Solivens MR.
ISSUES: (1) Which Court has jurisdiction? MeTC. (2) Is Fast Forms estopped? Yes.
HELD: (1) The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under BP
129 Sec 19(8) & Sec 33(1) applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195K. The damages being
claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in
determining the jurisdictional amount. => MeTC has jurisdiction.
(2) A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA reversed; RTC affirmed.

R16-3 HSBC, plaintiff-appellee v Aldecoa, defendants-appelants & Urquhart, intervener-appelant (1915)
CODAL: R16S1(e) Litis pendencia
FACTS: a. 1903 Defendant Isabel emancipated her 2 sons Joaquin & Zoilo w/ their consent & acceptance.
b. J & Z participated in management of Aldecoa & Co as partners
c. 1906 Aldecoa obtained P450K credit from HSBC; mortgaged property
d. 1906-12-31 Aldecoa went into liquidation on account of expiration of term for w/c it was organized; Urquhart
elected liquidator
e. 1908-10 Joaquin & Zoila filed for annulment of mortgage on ground that the emancipation by their mother was
null & void & therefore they were minors incapable of creating a valid mortgage; CFI dismissed Complaint as to
Joaquin (ratification after becoming of age), but annulled mortagages wrt Zoilo.
f. 1911 - HSBC successfully sued for recovery of money, CFI ordered Aldecoas mortgage foreclosed
ISSUE: Litis pendencia? No.
HELD: (1) The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the later action is deemed
unnecessary and vexatious.
(2) Watson v Jones Requisites of litis pendencia:
1There must be the asame parties, or at least such as represent the bsame interests.
2There must be the asame rights asserted and the bsame relief prayed for.
3This relief must be founded on the asame facts, and the title or bessential basis of the relief sought must be the

same.
4The identity in these particulars should be such that if the pending case had already been disposed of, it could be

pleaded in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties.
(3) A plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior action is of such a character that,
had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits, such a judgment would be conclusive between the parties
and could be pleaded in bar of the second action. The rule is applicable, between the same parties, only when the
judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that, regardless of what party is successful, it
will amount to res adjudicata against the second action.
(4) A pending action to annul a mortgage is not a bar to an action for foreclosure of the same mortgage, for the
reason that, although the parties are or may be the same, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for in the two
actions are entirely dissimilar.
DECISION: CFI Order of foreclosure affirmed.

R16-4 Tijam et al, plaintiffs-appellees v Sibonghanoy et al, defendants & Manila Surety, defendant-appellant 1968
DOCTRINE: Laches Exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings;
FACTS: 1. 7-19 (1 month after effectivity of 1948 Judiciary Act) Sps Tijam sued Sps Sibonghanoy before CFI for
recovery of P1,908.
a. As prayed for, Writ of Attachment issued vs Sibonghanoys property, but soon dissolved upon filing of counter-
bond by Sibonghanoy & Manila Surety.
b. Sibonghanoys filed Answer w/ some admissions & denials, & interposed counterclaim; Tijams answered.
c. CFI ruled in favor of Tijams; Writ of Execution vs Sibonghanoys returned unsatisfied;
d. Tijams moved for IWX vs Surety
e. Surety opposed on ground of failure to prosecute & lack of demand, & prayed for affirmative relief (from liability
under counter-bond).
f. Tijams MIWX denied for lack of demand; later made demand, then filed 2nd MIWX vs counter-bond.
g. Surety moved to extend time to answer but still failed; CFI granted Motion & issued W/X
h. Surety moved to quash writ on ground it was issued w/o reqd summary hearing
i. CFI denied Suretys M2Q & MR;
2. Surety appealed to CA from CFIs denial of its M2Q & MR; 1962-12-11 CA affirmed CFI Orders;
a. 1963-01-08 Surety moved to extend time to file MR; 1-10 granted
b. 1-12 Surety filed M2D on ground of CFIs lack of jurisdiction per 1948 Judiciary Act (P2K jurisdictional amount).
c. CA required Tijams to answer M2D, but Tijams failed to do so.
d. 5-20 CA set aside its Decision & certified case to SC SC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: May a M2D on ground of lack of jurisdiction over subject matter be barred by laches? Yes.
HELD: (1) The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and
as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, a party may be
barred by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done
in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea.
(2) Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
(3) The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
(4) It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. We frown upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
DECISION: CFI Orders affirmed; M2D denied.
NOTES: Kinds of estoppel in pais; by deed or by record; by laches.

R17-1 Shimizu, petitioner-plaintiff v Magsalin, FGU IC, respondents-defendants
CODAL: R17S3 Motu propio dismissal on the ground of non prosequitur
FACTS: 1. Shimizu alleged Magsalin (Karens Trading) breached subcontract for supply & install of tiles in condo &
refused to return unliquidated advance payment. Shimizu sent notice to Surety FGU demanding damages per
surety & performance bonds it issued for the subcontract.
2. 2002-04-30 Shimizu filed complaint with Makati RTC vs Magsalin & FGU, seeking P2.3M in actual damages.
3. FGU duly served with summons but Magsalin could not be located at their given address, new address could not
be determined.
4. 2002-08 FGU filed M2D, Shimizu filed opposition; M2D & ensuing MR denied; FGU obliged to file Answer.
5. 2002-10 Shimizu filed M4L to serve summons on Magsalin by publication
6. 2003-01 Shimizu filed Reply to FGUs Answer
7. 2003-02 FGU filed M4L to file 3PC vs Baetiong & Garcias as counter-guaranties; RTC admitted 3PC & denied
Shimizus M4L to serve summons by publication on ground that action is in personam.
8. 2003-05 RTC issued notice setting hearing for 2003-06-20, FGU filed motion to cancel on ground that 3rd party
defendants had not yet filed Answer, motion granted.
9. 2003-06 Baetiong filed Answer denying personal knowledge; Garcias could not be located at their given
addresses.
10. Shimizu claims (a) it was not served w/ copy of Baetiongs Answer, (b) FGU failed to exert efforts to serve
summons to Garcias & should have filed motion to serve summons by publication, (c) RTC should have scheduled
hearing to determine status of summons to 3rd party defendants.
11. 2003-12-16 RTC tersely ordered case dismissed for failure of Shimizu to prosecute; denied Shimizus MR.
12. RTCs order of dismissal did not state if it was issued upon respondents motion so SC assumed motu propio.
13. Shimizu filed R41 P4R w/ CA; FGU moved for dismissal on ground of lack of jurisdiction because the appeal
raised pure Q of law; Shimizu insists it involves Qs of facts based on the records of the case (i.e., need to examine all
pleadings & orders of lower court to determine if there was failure to prosecute.
14. CA dismissed appeal & subsequent MR; Shimizu filed R45 petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Valid dismissal order? No.
HELD: (1) Dismissal order null & void for violation of due process; Shimizus appeal to challenge dismissal order
properly filed under R41; Dismissal for failure to prosecute not supported by facts/records of the case.
(2) When a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits.
(3) A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaints dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing
court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.
(4) A void decision is open to collateral attack. SC is vested with ample authority to review an unassigned error if it
finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in an appeal.
(Shimizu did not raise validity of dismissal order wrt R36S1.)
(5) The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part
of the plaintiff to prosecute.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA reversed & set aside; RTC order null & void; Complaint reinstated

R19-1 Metrobank, petitioner-plaintiff v Pres. Judge, RTC Manila Br 39, CA, & Raycor Aircontrol, respondent-
defendant, 1990-09-21
FACTS: 1. Good Earth Emporium executed chattel mortgage in favor of Metrobank over A/C units installed in GEE
bldg; Uniwide & BPI-Consortium acquired bldg in auction sale.
RTC:
2. Metro filed complaint for replevin vs Uni/BPI for recovery of possession of A/Cs or for Uni/BPI to solidarily pay
unpaid obligations on the A/Cs; alleged loan of 4.9M (4.25M Raycor A/C System + 625K installation cost).
3. 1986-07 Uni/BPI filed Answer.
4. 1986-07-17 Raycor filed M4L to intervene, alleged it has a direct and immediate interest on the subject matter
of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. (Raycor
seeks 150K from the 625K sought by Metro as installation cost.)
5. 1986-08-08 RTC admitted intervention complaint after no opposition.
6. 1986-11-19 Metrobank filed Answer to Intervention Complaint.
7. 1987-08-03 RTC set case for trial on merits on 09-15, but on 09-07 Metro & Uni/BPI filed motion for
postponement & asked for 30 days within w/c to submit compromise agreement.
8. 1988-03-15 Metro & BPI filed joint M2D
9. 1988-03-18 RTC issued order dismissing case with prejudice.
10. 1988-04-19 Raycor filed MR of dismissal order, claimed it was not furnished copy of JM2D & that it received
dismissal order only on 04-04.
11. 1988-06-02 RTC issued order granting Raycors MR.
12. 1988-08-02 Raycor filed motion to admit amended complaint & attached Amended Intervention Complaint.
13. Metro filed opposition; Raycor filed Reply; Metro filed Rejoinder
14. 1989-01-11 RTC issued order admitting amended complaint in intervention.
15. 1989-02-09 Metro filed Motex for 15 days to file Answer to AIC; 02-17 Raycor filed opposition to Motex &
motion to declare Metro in default on the AIC; RTC granted Motex; 02-18 Metro filed Answer to ACI w/
Counterclaim.
CA:
16. 1989-04-14 Metro filed petition for certiorari & mandamus w/ CA, contended RTC committed GADALJ in
allowing intervention suit to survive despite dismissal of main action & in admitting ACI.
17. 1989-07-19 CA found no merit & dismissed petition.
ISSUES: (A) GAD in reversing dismissal order? (B) GAD in admitting ACI?
HELD: (A) No. (1) There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The 1988-06-02 RTC order has the effect not
only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of dismissal. The
reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper. The joint
motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the
intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the said original parties inter se, but the
same cannot in any way affect the claim of intervenor Raycor which was allowed by the court to intervene without
opposition from the original parties.
(2) Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either (a) joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or (b) uniting with
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or (c) demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or
proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of
court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party
thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.
(3) A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
or has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any
other party. A claim in intervention that seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a voluntary
dismissal of the main action. Where a complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiffs action had been
expressly dismissed, the intervenors complaint was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action was
pending, since dismissal of plaintiffs action did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal of
intervenors complaint. An intervenors petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be preserved and
heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action.
(4) To require Raycor to refile another case for the settlement of its claim will result in unnecessary delay and
expenses and will entail multiplicity of suits and, therefore, defeat the very purpose of intervention which is to
hear and determine at the same time all conflicting claims which may be made on the subject matter in litigation,
and to expedite litigation and settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy among the
persons involved.
(B) No. (1) Granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion
ofvthe trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action. The
amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of
action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute. Contrary to Metros contention, it
does not substantially change intervenors cause of action or alter the theory of the case, hence its allowance is in
order.
(2) In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what is to be
ascertained is whether the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different
from that which was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause
of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same
transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where
averments which were implied are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability
sought to be enforced remains the same.
(3) Leave of court may be refused if it appears that the motion was made with intent to delay or that the cause of
action is substantially altered. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint in intervention was made before
trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
DECISION: Petition denied; CA affirmed.

R37-1 NEYPES, et al, petitioners-plaintiffs v CA, Heirs of Bernardo, Land Bank, respondents-defendants (2005)
ACTION: Annulment of judgment & titles of land &/or reconveyance &/or reversion w/ preliminary injunction
FACTS: 1. Heirs filed M2D on the ground of prescription; 97-5-16 RTC denied M2D; Heirs filed MR; 98-2-12 RTC
dismissed complaint on ground of prescription; 3-3 Neypes received order of dismissal; 3-18 (+15 days) Neypes filed
MR; 7-1 RTC dismissed Neypes MR; 07-22 Neypes received order of dismissal of MR;
2. 07-27 (+5 days) Neypes filed notice of appeal; 8-3 paid appeal fees; 8-4 RTC denied appeal, filed 8 days late;
8-31 Neypes received order denying appeal; filed MR; 9-3 RTC denied MR;
3. Neypes filed R65 certiorari & mandamus before CA reglementary period started to run on 7-22 (receipt of order
of dismissal of MR); CA dismissed 15-day period s/b reckoned from 3-3 (receipt of order of dismissal of complaint);
Neypes filed MR; CA denied MR
4. Neypes files R45 petition for review
ISSUE: Did Neypes appeal on time? Yes. What is final order in R41S3? Ans. Order denying MR
HELD: (1) The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
(2) An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Per jurisprudence => final order is order denying MR.
Intramuros Tennis Club v Philippine Tourism Authority: A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be
an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
(3) Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional, except substantial justice, extraordinary situations.

(4) Fresh Period Rule or NEYPES RULE Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules;

New rule applies to Rules 40, 42, 43, & 45


DECISION: Petition granted; CA reversed; case remanded to CA
NOTES: (1) BP 129 Sec 39 15-day appeal period except 48 hrs for habeas corpus

R37-2 Dinglasan, petitioner-defendant v CA et al, respondents (2006)
FACTS: 1. Antrom financed Elmyras prawn business for P1.476M. Elmyra/Dinglasans P515K PDC bounced.
2. 85-12-16 Information for violation of BP 22 filed before RTC; 91-12-16 Dinglasan convicted; 92-09-04 RTC denied
Dinglasans MR.
3. 92-09-25 Dinglasan appealed to CA; 98-10-26 CA dismissed appeal, affirmed RTC decision
4. Dinglasan filed Petition Review on Certiorari before SC; 99-06-28 SC denied PR/C; 99-08-26 Dinglasan filed MR;
99-09-13 SC denied MR, with ad cautelam that denial is final
5. Dinglasan filed 2nd MR, but SC merely noted without action; 99-12-16 SC Resolution that no further pleadings
shall be entertained in the case; 99-10-14 SCs 06-28 Resolution became Final & Executory, evidenced by Entry of
Judgment;
6. 00-09-19 Prosecution filed motion w/ RTC for issuance of Warrant of Arrest & Writ of Execution, prayed for HDO vs
Dinglasan; 00-09-21 RTC issued W/A & W/X
7. 00-10-30 Dinglasan filed Petition for New Trial or Reopening of Case based on NDE (affidavits re P150K check &
transmittal letter)
ISSUE: (1) Was Petition filed on time? No. (2) Should a NT or Reopening of case based on NDE be allowed? No.
HELD: (1a) The prohibition against second MR is justified by public policy which demands that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at some definitive date fixed by law.
(1b) To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the
second MR would result in an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue order or resolutions
denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place.
(1c) After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of judgment, the case shall be laid to rest.
(1d) The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the party.
(2a) BERRY RULE Requisites for NDE in R121S2:
(a) evidence was discovered after the trial;
(b) evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; &
(c) 1it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
2is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

(2b) The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects 1a temporal one, ie when was the
evidence discovered, and 2a predictive one, ie when should or could it have been discovered.
(2c) It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked an evidence which was decisively claimed to have such
significance that might probably change the judgment.
DECISION: Petition dismissed.

R37 Cansino v CA, 2003
HELD:
(1) R135S5(g) provides that courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to
law and justice. This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate amendments that are
substantial in nature (Unidad v CA, GR 129201, 2003). They merely cover formal changes or such that will not affect
the crux of the decision, like the correction of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they
make substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party the right to contest the new
evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration.
(2) It is implicitly clear from Rule 37 that a motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new
evidence.
(3) For newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial,
(a) it must have been discovered after trial,
(b) it could NOT have been discovered or produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence,
(c) it must be material and not merely collateral, cumulative, corroborative or purely for impeaching a witness,
merely important evidence being not enough, and
(d) if presented, would probably alter the result of the action. (Pantig v Baltazar, 191 SCRA 830, 1990).

R37 People v Del Mundo, 1996
HELD: (1) While the NBI Medico Legal report cannot be considered new and material evidence which accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, we grant the motion for NEW TRIAL on the
broader ground of substantial justice, taking into account the variance in the two aforesaid reports. It is the sense
of this Court that such serious discrepancy raised substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused-appellant.
Furthermore, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is death. Here is a situation where a rigid application of
the rules must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice to secure to every individual all possible
legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.
(2) The rule for granting a motion for NEW TRIAL, among others, should be liberally construed to assist the parties
in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and
a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the
best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.

R37 Cuenca v CA, 1995
HELD:
(1) Although in Goduco v CA (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is
not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion
for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved
therein,
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like Helmuth, Jr. v People and
People v. Amparado.

R37 People v Amparado, 1987
HELD: While, as contended by the Solicitor, the testimony of Violeta Amparado could not be considered as newly-
discovered nor could it materially affect the judgment, said testimony being merely cumulative in character, We find
the proposed testimonies of Antonio Cachin, Jr., and Manuel Henry Auza to be newly discovered and of sufficient
weight and character as to alter the outcome of the case.
DECISION: Accuseds motion for NEW TRIAL granted.

R37 Helmuth v People, 1982
HELD: While an affidavit of a co-accused (subsequently acquitted) executed after trial has no probative value as to
the conviction below based, on circumstantial evidence, of the petitioner, the Supreme Court may brush aside
technicalities and consider the existence of said affidavit as basis for NEW TRIAL.

R37 PAL v Salcedo, 1967
HELD: (1) Where1the testimony is newly discovered and 2respondents were not negligent in securing the same,
=> grant of NEW TRIAL was proper.
(2) The granting or denial of a NEW TRIAL is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

R38 Redea v CA, 2007
HELD: (2) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. Hence, a petition for relief may not
be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or
appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the
appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by counsel.

R39-1 DE LEON v Public Estates Authority/Paraaque (2010, GR181970) R45 PR/C of CA decision
PEA/Paraaque v J. Alaras & De Leon (GR182678) R65 Certiorari

FACTS:
93-1-15 De Leon filed w/ Makati RTC a Complaint for Damages w/ Prayer for PI vs PEA hinged on alleged unlawful
destruction of De Leons fence & houses. He prayed that/for (a) lawful possession of land be awarded to him, (b) PEA
be ordered to pay damages; (c) injunctive relief to enjoin PEA from violating his lawful & peaceful possession.
2-8 RTC granted De Leons application for WPI => PEA filed w/ SC R65 Certiorari, prayer for RO; SC referred to CA.
9-30 CA denied PEAs Certiorari => PEA appealed to SC via R65 Certiorari (GR112172) lot was salvage zone until
reclaimed thru government efforts in 82; De Leons documentary evidence procured only in 92 negating claim of
occupation since time immemorial.
00-11-20 SC ruled lot was public land; reversed CA; dismissed De Leons Complaint w/ RTC.
=> No MR filed by De Leon => SC decision became Final & Executory => PEA moved for issuance of WX praying that
De Leon vacate & surrender possession.

04-9-15 RTC issued WX => De Leon filed MR & Quashal of WX w/ RTC it deviated from 00-11-20 SC Decision which
did not categorically direct him to surrender possession.
05-4-29 RTC denied De Leons motions.
05-7-1 De Leon filed (2nd?) MR w/ RTC; 05-7-27 RTC denied MR.
=> De Leon filed R65 Certiorari w/ CA (90328) assailing RTC Orders (issue WX, deny 1st MR); also filed Urgent-
Emergency Motion for TRO & Issuance of WPI but was denied on 06-4-24.
=> De Leon filed 2nd R65 Certioari w/ CA (90984) seeking to annul & set aside RTC Orders (WX, deny 1st/2nd MR).

06-7-26 PEA filed Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition praying that RTC issue a Special Order
directing De Leon to remove all improvements &, in case of failure to remove, that a Special Order & WD be issued
directing the Sheriff to remove & demolish the said improvements.
06-10-11 RTC issued Order holding in abeyance resolution of PEAs MWD.
=> PEA filed MR, but denied by RTC on 07-1-12.
07-2-27 PEA filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative, Resolve Petitions in CA 90328 & 90984.
07-3-21 CA dismissed De Leons 90984 Petition on the ground of forum shopping.
07-11-21 CA dismissed De Leons 90328 Petition earlier SC Decision holding De Leon has no title & legal right to
property has already attained finality; De Leons MR denied on 08-3-4.
=> PEA filed Urgent Motion to Resolve MWD.
07-12-28 RTC issued Order holding in abeyance resolution of PEAs Motion to Resolve MWD pending receipt of
entry of Judgment re CA90328; PEA filed MR, denied on 08-3-4.

08-4-23 De Leon filed R45 PR/C (GR181970) assailing 07-11-21 CA Decision (finality)
08-5-15 PEA filed R65 Certiorari (GR182678) questioning 07-12-28 & 08-3-4 RTC Orders (2nd abeyance)
09-10-14 SC granted 2-25 Motion for Substitution by PEA & Paraaque.

De Leons Arguments: (1) he can only be removed through ejectment proceedings; (2) SC Decision in GR112172
merely dismissed his Complaint for Damages; (3) Even if not owner & w/o title, mere prior possession is only
requirement to establish his right.
PEAs Claim: RTC committed GAD in holding in abeyance resolution of MWD?

ISSUE: Has the question of ownership & rightful possession been settled in GR112172 SC Decision? YES.

HELD:
(1) General Rule: A Writ of Execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed;
=> an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. A WX must conform strictly to
every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
(2) Exception: Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was
decreed in the judgment, => the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the
decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
Furthermore, => adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not
shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected.
(3) A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in
possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession, => the sheriffshould oust him.
No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision
that in such event the sheriff shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the
defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these
circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court
(4) A judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto. R39S47(c)
(5) R65S7 provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does NOT stay the proceedings therein in the
absence of a WPI or TRO; It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no WPI or TRO issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial
courtesy, but this principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule. Go v Abrogar the
precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the
relevance of R65S7. (Note: Amendment re last par of R65S7 re administrative charge against Judge for failure to
proceed with principal case not yet effective at the time.)
(6) The Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition
appears to be a circumvention of the provisions of R58S5, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders
issued by the courts.
(7) The Court does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance a case. To get the
true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the
same must be considered in its entirety. PEAs right to possession of the subject property, as well as the removal of the
improvements, fully follows after considering the entirety of the Courts decision in PEA v CA. This is consistent with
R39S10 pars (c) & (d) which provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts.
(8) This case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of this Courts judgment in PEA v CA has
been delayed for almost 10 years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTCs order of
execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of
the final judgment in its favor. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of
the judgment, which is the life of the law. To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to
frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write
finis to this litigation.

DECISION: In favor of PEA. De Leons Petition denied (CA Decision & Resolution affirmed); PEAs Petition granted
(RTC Orders annulled & set aside); RTC directed to hear & resolve PEAs MWD with utmost dispatch.


R39-2 Spouses NOCEDA, petitioner-defendant v Arbizo-DIRECTO, respondent-plaintiff (2010)
FACTS:
1. 86-9-16 Directo filed w/ Iba, Zambales RTC Br71 (CC RTC-354-I) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
& Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of Donation against her nephew Noceda; alleged that she donated a
portion of Lot 1121 to Noceda but he occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership since Sep 1985.
1a. 91-11-6 Br71 ruled in favor of Directo: (a) declared extrajudicial partition valid, (b) revoked Deed of
Donation, (c) ordered Noceda to vacate Lot 2 & reconvey, (d) ordered Noceda to remove house at his
expense or pay rental.
1b. Noceda appealed to CA.

2. 95-1-5 Sps Dahipon filed Complaint for Recovery of Ownership & Possession and Annulment of Sale and
Damages against Sps Noceda & Directo w/ Iba RTC Br70 (CC1106-I); alleged they were registered owner,
Nocedas & Directo purchased lot w/o paying full amount.
2a. Dahipons & Nocedas entered into Compromise Agreement => Deed of Absolute Sale executed, TCT issued
in name of Nocedas.
2b. Directo filed adverse claim questioning Dahipons alleged ownership.

1c. 95-3-31 CA affirmed Br71 decision & ordered Nocedas to vacate Lot C portion of Lot 1121.
1d. Nocedas filed Petition for Review w/ SC;
1e. 99-9-2 SC denied (Nocedas act is an act of usurpation & ingratitude);
1f. SC decision became final & executory; 01-3-6 RTC issued Writ of Execution.

3. 03-12-4 Nocedas instituted action for quieting of title, admitted losing in CC RTC-354-I but claimed that
disputed land therein was the same parcel owned by Dahipon from whom they purchased a portion with
TCT issued in their name; prayed for (a) issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injuction to enjoin implementation
of 01-3-6 Writ of Execution, & (b) declaration that Lot 2 was formerly part of Lot 1121 covered by TCT in
the name of Dahipon.
3a. Directo filed Motion to Dismiss on ground of res judicata; averred that Nocedas aware of defeat in Br71,
surreptitiously negotiated w/ Dahipons for sale of land & sued to subvert execution.
3b. RTC denied Directos Motion to Dismiss no identity of Cause of Action.
3c. 06-1-25 After Nocedas presented evidence, Directo filed Demurrer to Evidence claim of O&P of Nocedas
on basis of Dahipons title already raised in CC354-I.
3d. 06-2-22 RTC granted Demurrer; CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Does res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment apply? YES.

HELD:
(1) R39S47(b) Bar by Former Judgment:
The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
=> 1concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and
2constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action

either before the same or any other tribunal;


R39S47(c) Conclusiveness of Judgment:
Any right, fact, or matter in issue 1directly adjudicated or 2necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits
=> 1is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
2cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies

whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same.

(2) Calalang v Register of Deeds of QC
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which
1was in issue in a former suit and
2was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,

=> 1is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them are concerned and
2cannot be again litigated in any future action

between such parties or their privies,


in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction
on either the same or different cause of action,
while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the ISSUE be identical.
If 1a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and
2the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question,

=> a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second
3if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. (Nabus v CA)
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

(3) Smith Bell & Co (Phils.), Inc. v CA
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action => are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings
and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule,
1if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding

the particular matter, => it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties and
2if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, => they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.


(4) SC in previous case held Nocedas have no right of ownership or possession. Under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties.
1When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
2when an opportunity for such trial has been given, => the judgment of the court, as long as it remains

unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Thus, petitioners can no
longer question respondents ownership over Lot 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

DECISION: Petition denied; CA affirmed in toto.


R39-3 INFANTE, petitioner-defendant v ARAN BUILDERS, respondent-plaintiff (2007)
CODAL: R39S6
FACTS:
01-6-6 Aran Builders (Makati resident) filed w/ Muntinlupa RTC an action for revival of judgment (CC 01-
164) rendered by Makati RTC in an action for specific performance & damages (CC 15563) w/c became final
& executory on 94-11-16 (6+ years), and prayed for issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Makati RTC judgment: ordered Infante (Paraaque resident) to deliver various documents (plans, power
of attorney, RE tax clearance, etc); execute Deed of Sale of lot (located in Munti) in favor of Aran
Builders; pay CGT & doc stamp taxes re sale; secure written conformity of Ayala Corp to sale; register
Deed w/ RD & deliver TCT to Ayala Corp.;
Infante filed Motion to Dismiss action for revival on ff grounds: (a) Munti RTC has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties & (b) improper venue.
01-9-4 Munti RTC denied Motion to Dismiss Makati decision rendered when there was still no Munti RTC.
01-9-28 Infantes MR denied, files R65 petition for certiorari with CA.
Infante claims complaint before Makati RTC is a personal action, thus venue s/b Makati or Paraaque.
Aran Builders claim action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem because it involves or affects vested or
adjudged right on real property, thus venue lies in Munti.
02-8-12 CA ruled in favor of Aran Builders since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an
action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment
is then an action in rem.
03-1-7 CA denied MR.

ISSUE: Action in rem or in personam? In rem.

HELD:
(1) The proper venue in an action for revival of judgment depends on the determination of whether the
present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action.
If the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
=> then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located.
If such action does not fall under the category of real actions,
=> it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place
where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
(2) The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a real action or a
personal action; Where the sole reason for action to revive is the enforcement of adjudged rights over a
piece of realty, the action falls under the category of a real action for which the complaint should be filed
with the RTC of the place where the realty is located.
(3) A branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory defined by the SC.
(4) Aldeguer v Gemelo (1939) x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court
where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.

DECISION: Petition denied; CA decision & resolution affirmed.

NOTES: The doctrine of res judicata has no application where the latter action is for revival of a prior
judgment. (Caia v CA, [1994])


R39-4 FLORES, petitioner-plaintiff-mortgagee v Spouses LINDO, respondents-defendants-morgagors
(2011)
CODAL: R2S3, R39S47; ACTION: R45 Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision and resolution

FACTS:
95-10-31 Edna Lindo obtained a P400K loan from Flores payable on Dec 1, secured by REM in the name of
Edna & husband Enrico. Edna signed the Deed of REM & PN for herself & for Enrico as his atty-in-fact. Edna
issued 3 checks, all dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Flores filed Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage w/ Damages, raffled to Manila RTC Br33.
03-9-30 RTC33 ruled Flores not entitled to judicial foreclosure of mortgage Deed executed without consent
& authority of Enrico whose SPA was dated only on 95-11-4 (+4 days after Deed); Flores not precluded from
recovering loan, he could still file a personal action, but Br33 has no jurisdiction (should be place where
Flores or Edna resides per R4S2); denied Flores MR. Lindos win, no foreclosure.

04-9-8 Flores filed Complaint for Sum of Money w/ Damages, raffled to Manila RTC Br42.
Sps Lindo in Answer admitted Loan but for only P340K; alleged Enrico not party to Loan; prayed for
dismissal on grounds of improper venue, res judicata & forum shopping invoking RTC33 decision;
05-3-7 Lindos filed Motion to Dismiss on grounds of res judicata & lack of cause of action.

05-7-22 RTC Br42 denied Lindoss Motion to Dismiss - res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or
demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter, 1constitute separate or distinct causes of
action (wrong!) and 2were not put in issue in the former action;
06-2-8 denied Lindo MR. Flores wins, no res judicata, may sue for collection

Lindos filed before CA a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for WPI and/or TRO

08-5-30 CA set aside RTC42 decision & resolution RTC42 acted w/ GAD in denying Lindos Motion to
Dismiss Per R2S3 Flores had only one COA vs Edna for her failure to pay & he could not split the single COA
by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding & a collection case;
08-8-4 CA denied Flores MR. Lindos win, Flores barred by res judicata

Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before San Pedro, Laguna RTC Br93 which declared that
Deed of REM is void, but principal loan subsists.

ISSUE: Did CA commit reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the
ground of multiplicity of suits? Yes.

HELD:
(1) The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to
recover the debt.
The mortgage-creditor has the option of either
1filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or
2instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

An election of the first => bars recourse to the second,


otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to
another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.
(2) But both Br33 & Br93 misapplied the rules. Per FC Art 124, if conjugal property encumbered without
authority of court or consent of spouse, transaction should be construed as a continuing offer by consenting
spouse & 3rd person; SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as
binding. However, Flores allowed the Br33 & Br93 decisions to become final & executor without asking the
courts for alternative relief.
(3) Nevertheless, Flores still has a remedy under the law, applying the principle in NCC Art 22 that no person
may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Considering the circumstances of this case, the
principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on
multiplicity of suits.
(4) The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (a) that a person is benefited without a
valid basis or justification, and (b) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.

DECISION: CA decision & resolution set aside; Br42 directed to proceed with trial of collection case.
Flores wins, may sue for collection

NOTES: x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can
by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a
personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even
including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy
against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue
for deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged
property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is
complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the
other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that
would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits
so offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v.
San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place
of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.

R39-5 FGU IC, petitioner-plaintiff v Makati RTC Br66 & GP SARMIENTO TRUCKING, respondent-
defendants (2011)

FACTS:
94-6-18 GPS undertook to deliver 30 refrigerators for Concepcion. GPS truck driven by Eroles collided with
another truck, damaging its cargo. FGU indemnified Concepcion and sought reimbursement from GPS; GPS
refused;

FGU filed Complaint for Damages & Breach of Contract of Carriage against GPS.
SC ruled GPS not a common carrier but still liable under doctrine of culpa contractual.
Entry of judgment issued certifying that 02-8-6 SC decision became final & executory on 02-10-3

02-10-14 FGU filed Motion for Execution w/ Makati RTC Br66 praying that a Writ of Execution be issued to
enforce 02-8-6 P204K SC judgment award.
02-11-5 GPS filed Opposition to M4X on the ground that FGUs claim was unlawful, illegal, against public
policy & good morals, & constituted unjust enrichment after Concepcions claim paid in full, it transferred
ownership of the refs to FGU who sold them to 3rd parties => FGU should not be allowed to doubly recover.
03-1-13 GPS filed Comment w/ Motion to Set Case for Hearing on the Merits.
03-7-1 RTC granted GPS Motion; denied FGU MR.

FGU filed directly w/ SC Petition for Mandamus argued Decision already final & executory, thus WX
should issue. RTC66 should not be allowed to hear the matter of turnover of the refs to FGU because it was
not an issue raised in the Answer of GPS. Neither was it argued by GPS in the CA & SC. It was only brought
out after the decision became final & executory.

ISSUE: May RTC Br66 still hear the issue of refs turnover even if the decision is already final & executory?

HELD: YES, as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgment.
(1) Where the judgment of a higher court 1has become final and executory and 2has been returned to the
lower court, => the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing
the Writ of Execution.
In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not
originally included. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court or reexamine it for
any other purpose other than execution; much less may it review the same upon any matter decided on
appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded.

(2) Doctrine of FINALITY of Judgment or IMMUTABILITY of Judgment:
A decision that has acquired finality
=> 1becomes immutable and unalterable, and 2may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

(3) EXCEPTIONS to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc (now for then) entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
The exception to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment has been applied in several cases in order to
serve substantial justice.

(4) The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.

DECISION: FGUs Petition for Mandamus dismissed.

NOTES: (1) City of Butuan vs Ortiz
When 1after judgment has been rendered and
2the latter has become final,
3facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust,

=> the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment
to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
(2) Candelario v Caizares
1After a judgment has become final,
2if there is evidence of an event or circumstance

which would affect or change the rights of the parties thereto,


=> the court should be allowed to
1admit evidence of such new facts and circumstances, and
2thereafter suspend execution thereof and
3grant relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant.



R39S3 Diesel Construction v Jollibee, 2000
HELD:
(1) Petitioner argues that under R39S3, the discretionary power to order a stay of execution is
compartmentalized in the court that granted execution pending appeal. Petitioner further contends that
when it filed its Motion for Issuance of Premature Execution, it effectively asked the CA to perform a
ministerial duty to implement the trial courts Special Order.
We disagree. The CA may not be compelled to enforce a Special Order issued by the trial court (R135S6).
The CA has its own separate and original discretionary jurisdiction to grant or to stay execution pending
appeal, except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure and in other cases when the
law or the Rules provide otherwise (R51S11, R42S8).
This writ of execution is similar to that which a RTC may issue for the protection and the preservation of
the parties rights that do not involve any matter being litigated in the appeal pursuant to R39S2
(R42S8(a)).
R39S2(a) & S3 mean that after the perfection of the appeal and the transmittal of the records, the trial
court loses jurisdiction over the case. Henceforth, it may no longer grant a motion for, or issue a writ of
immediate execution (cases cited); to do so would be an abuse of discretion.
(2) The execution of a judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The yardstick
remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of such
urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed
judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that will outweigh injury or
damage to the adverse party (Sanz Maceda, Jr. v. DBP, GR 135128, August 25, 1999). In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to show paramount and compelling reasons of urgency and justice.
(3) DCCIs alleged financial distress, by itself, is not a compelling reason to order immediate execution. On
the other hand, mere filing by JFC of a supersedeas bond does not automatically entitle it to a stay of
execution.

R39S4 La Campana Development v Ledesma, 2010
HELD:
=> On appeal the appellate court (CA) may STAY the writ of execution issued by the RTC
should circumstances so require
even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory,
=> preliminary injunction may still be granted.

R39S6 Heirs of Miranda v Miranda, 2013
HELD: An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and distinct from
the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a decision of a court in
an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for
revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be
reversed, altered, or modified.

R39S6 RCBC v Serra, 2013
HELD: (1) A final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within 5 years from the date of its
entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. Court, however,
allows EXCEPTIONS when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of 5 years. These
exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
(2) The purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from
SLEEPING on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against
Serra in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising
issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of
justice.

R39S47 Sps Antonio v Vda de Monje (2010)
HELD:
(1) Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment (Sps Torres v Medina, GR 166730, 2010).
According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree rendered 1on the merits, and
2without fraud or collusion, 3by a court of competent jurisdiction, 4upon any matter within its jurisdiction,

=> is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
A final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit (Agustin
v Delos Santos, GR 168139, 2009)
(2) There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the
litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
(3) But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same. (Agustin v Delos Santos)
(4) Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Hacienda Bigaa v Chavez, GR 174160, 2010)
(5) The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in
privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or
order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and
issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. (Hacienda Bigaa v
Chavez)
(6) The Court has previously employed various TESTS in determining whether or not there is identity of
causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle of res judicata.
One test of identity is the ABSENCE of INCONSISTENY test where it is determined whether the judgment
sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment (Sps Torres v Medina).
If no inconsistency is shown,
=> the prior judgment shall NOT constitute a bar to subsequent actions. (Agustin v Delos Santos)

(7) The more common approach in ascertaining identity of causes of action is the SAME EVIDENCE test,
whereby the following question serves as a sufficient criterion:
would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former causes of action?
If the answer is in the affirmative, => then the prior judgment is a bar to the subsequent action;
conversely, => it is not. (Agustin v Delos Santos)

(8) Aside from (6) and (7), we have also ruled that
=> a previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent one
when it had touched on a matter already decided, or
if the parties are in effect litigating for the same thing. (Agustin v Delos Santos)

R39S47 Tumbokon v Legaspi (2010)
FACTS: Legaspi raised ownership as defense, but found guilty of qualified theft. Tumbokon later lost in
civil complaint to recover ownership and possession, appeal grounded on res judicata.
HELD: (1) Bar by prior judgment is not applicable because the causes of action in the civil and the
criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of
ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine whether the act
of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land
constituted the crime of qualified theft.
(2) Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced both
actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the
authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil
action applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action
after the CA had ruled adversely against them.
(3) Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to EXCEPTIONS, such as
1where there is a change in the applicable legal context, or
2to avoid inequitable administration of justice (Kilosbayan Inc v Morato, 1995).

Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the
respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of
ownership of the land. This action for recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of
ownership of the property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the
criminal case was only the response to the respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of
defense.

R39S47 BE San Diego Inc v CA, Matias (2010)
HELD: (1) R39S47(c) Matias can no longer question the identity of the property it seeks to recover when
she invoked res judicata as ground to dismiss the accion publiciana that is the root of the present petition.
An allegation of res judicata necessarily constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the pending
suit (the accion publiciana) is the same as that in a previous one (the ejectment case). That Matias never
raised the discrepancy in the location stated in B.E. San Diegos title and the actual location of the subject
property in the ejectment suit bars her now from raising the same. Thus, the issue of identity of the subject
matter of the case has been settled by Matias admission and negates the defenses she raised against B.E.
San Diegos complaint.
(2) R39S47(b) The judgment in the ejectment suit that B.E. San Diego previously filed against Matias is
NOT determinative of this issue and will NOT prejudice B.E. San Diegos claim.
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter, there is NO identity of cause of action between
the two cases;
An action for ejectment and accion publiciana, though both referring to the issue of possession,
differ in the following manner:
1forcible entry should be filed within 1 year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property,
while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property.
2forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real property;

in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real
property.
3an action for forcible entry is filed in the MTC and is a summary action,

while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC.



R39S47 Bondagjy v Artadi, 2008
FACTS: Muslim wife petitions Sharia court for divorce twice, but on different set of facts
HELD:
(1) The TEST of identity of causes of action lies NOT in the form of an action but on
whether the same EVIDENCE would support and establish the former and present causes of action
(Serdoncillo v Spouses Benolirao, 1998).
If the same evidence would sustain both actions,
=> they are 1considered the same and
2covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
The causes of action are based on different periods during which petitioner allegedly neglected or failed to
support his family and perform his marital obligations.

R39S47 Chavez v CA, 2005
HELD:
(1) A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. (NCC 2037)
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise,
=> the other party may either 1enforce the compromise or
2regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. (NCC 2041)

(2) A compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves.
It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if NOT judicially approved,
and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
(3) The LGC provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit:
(a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature
on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and
(b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under NCC 2041.
(4) A compromise settlement is NOT an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a
dispute and an impending litigation (Servicewide Specialists v CA, 1996) which the parties hope to prevent
by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by
the danger of losing. (Genova v De Castro, 2003)

R39S47 Lee Bun Ting v Aligaen, 1977
HELD: (1) A case that has become final and executory cannot be re-opened on account of a decision of the
Supreme Court subsequently promulgated enunciating a different doctrine regarding the effects of a sales
of lands to aliens.
(2) Posterior changes in the Supreme Courts doctrine cannot be applied retroactively to nullify a prior
final ruling.
(3) Said 1987 decision cannot be applied to the instant case where there had been already a final and
conclusive determination some twelve years earlier. While a doctrine laid down in previous cases may be
overruled, the previous cases themselves cannot thereby be reopened. The doctrine may be changed for
future cases but it cannot reach back into the past and overturn finally settled cases.

R39S48 Fujiki v Marinay (2013)
HELD:
(1) The effect of a foreign judgment is NOT automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgments in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgments is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws. (NCC Art 17). Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that [l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, RECOGNITION
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
(2) R39S48(b) => Philippine courts exercise LIMITED REVIEW on foreign judgments. Courts are NOT
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, ie, want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on limited review embodies
the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,1 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of
other states.2
1Mijares v Raada, Otherwise known as the policy of PRECLUSION, it seeks to protect party expectations

resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the
task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to
promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness.
2Mijares v. Raada, The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage

among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
(3) In the recognition of foreign judgment, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

R39S48 Asiavest Merchant Bankers v CA & PNCC, 2001
FACTS:
HELD: (1) in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
(2) A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice
in the foreign forum.
In addition, under R131S3(n), a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its
presumptive validity.
(3) The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on mmatters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori
or the internal law of the forum.
(4) It is not for the party seeking the enforcement of a foreign judgment to prove the validity of the same
but for the opposing party to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, otherwise a
contrary rule would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment.

R41 Calderon v Roxas (2013)
FACTS: Calderon challenged dismissal of her appeal re support in arrears.
HELD: (1) Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable,, an interlocutory order may NOT be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case. (Investments, Inc. v CA, G.R. No. L-60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334)15
(2) Whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is NOT dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a
party to its directive.
Petitioners theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private
respondent is therefore untenable.

R41 CDCP v Cuenca (2005)
HELD:
The plaintiff in the main action may not be regarded as a party to the third-party complaint,
nor may the third-party defendant be regarded as a party to the main action;
If only the third-party defendant files an appeal, => the decision in the main case becomes final.

Plaintiff (Main Action) Defendant
3P Plaintiff (3P Complaint) 3P Defendant

R41 GSIS v Phil Village Hotel (GR 150922, 2004)
HELD:
A partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of an action. Our pronouncements in Guevarra v CA (124 SCRA
297, August 30, 1983) and Province of Pangasinan v CA (220 SCRA 726, March 31, 1993.) were categorical: a
PARTIAL summary judgment is merely an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. What the rules contemplate is
that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered
in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. (Guevarra v
CA)

R44-0 DE LIANO v CA (2001) on Rule 44 Sec 13 CONTENTS of Appellants Brief
HELD: (1) The SUBJECT INDEX is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference,
functioning much like a table of contents the subject index makes readily available at ones fingertips the subject of
the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to locate a partys arguments, or
a particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is obviated.

(2) An ASSIGNMENT of ERRORS in appellate procedure is an enumeration by appellant or plaintiff in error of the
errors alleged to have been committed by the court below in the trial of the case upon which he seeks to obtain a
reversal of the judgment or decree it is in the nature of a pleading, and performs in the appellate court the same
office as a declaration or complaint in a court of original jurisdiction. Such an assignment is appellants complaint, or
pleading, in the appellate court, and takes the place of a declaration or bill; an appeal without an assignment of
errors => would be similar to a suit without a complaint, bill, or declaration. The assignment is appellants declaration
or complaint against the trial judge, charging harmful error, and proof vel non of assignment is within the record on
appeal. xxx The object of such pleadings is to point out the specific errors claimed to have been committed by the
court below, in order 1to enable the reviewing court and the opposing party to see on what points appellant or
plaintiff in error intends to ask a reversal of the judgment or decree, and 2to limit discussion to those points. The office
of an assignment of errors is not to point out legal contentions, but only to inform the appellate court that appellant
assigns as erroneous certain named rulings; the function of the assignment is to group and bring forward such of
the exceptions previously noted in the case on appeal as appellant desires to preserve and present to the appellant (?)
(3) A STATEMENT of the CASE gives the appellate tribunal an overview of the judicial antecedents of the case,
providing material information regarding 1the nature of the controversy, 2the proceedings before the trial court, 3the
orders and rulings elevated on appeal, and 4the judgment itself. These data enable the appellate court to have a
better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for its appraisal.
(4) The STATEMENT of FACTS comprises the very heart of the appellants brief. The facts constitute the backbone
of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the case, and consequently,
will govern the appropriate relief. Appellants should remember that the Court of Appeals is empowered to review
both questions of law and of facts. Otherwise, where only a pure question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to
this Court. An appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to present
them in a manner favorable to one party. The brief must state 1the facts admitted by the parties, as well as 2the facts
in controversy. To laymen, the distinction may appear insubstantial, but the difference is clear to the practitioner
and the student of law. 1Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas 2facts in dispute must be backed
by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that ones statement of facts should be supported by PAGE
REFERENCES to the record. Indeed, disobedience therewith has been punished by dismissal of the appeal. Page
references to the record are not an empty requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page reference
to the record, => it 1may be presumed to be without support in the record and 2may be stricken or disregarded
altogether.
(5) STATEMENT of the ISSUES - When the appellant has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is
required to state the issues to be considered by the appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be confused with
the assignment of errors: they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the rules would not require a separate
statement for each. The statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate
court. X X X As distinguished from a question of law which exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on certain state of facts there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts; or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation.
(6) Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his ARGUMENTS on each assigned error. An appellants
arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of errors, for the former provide the justification supporting his
contentions, and in so doing resolves the issues. It will not do to impute error on the part of the trial court without
substantiation. The mere elevation on appeal of a judgment does not create a presumption that it was rendered in
error. The appellant has to show that he is entitled to the reversal of the judgment appealed, and he cannot do this
unless he provides satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is therefore essential that x x x [A]s far as possible, the errors
and reasons assigned should be supported by a citation of authorities. The failure to do so has been said to be
inexcusable; and, although a point made in the brief is before the court even though no authorities are cited and may
be considered and will be where a proposition of well established law is stated, the court is not required to search out
authorities, but may presume that counsel has found no case after diligent search or that the point has been waived
or abandoned, and need not consider the unsupported errors assigned, and ordinarily will not give
consideration to such errors and reasons unless it is apparent without further research that the assignments of errors
presented are well taken.

R47-0 Sps Galura, petitioners-defendant v Math-Agro Corp, respondent-plaintiff, 2009-08-14
CODAL: R47S2 Grounds for PAJ/FO&R
ACTION: R45 petition for review on certiorari w/ prayer for issuance of WPI &/or TRO. Petition challenges the
2005-01-25 & 2005-02-28 Resolutions of the CA.
FACTS: 1. 1997-03 Sps Dante & Teresa Galura purchased broiler starters & finishers worth P426K from MAC,
paid P72.5K, but despite several demands, failed to pay P353.5K unpaid balance.
2. 2000-06-21 MAC filed Complaint w/ Malolos RTC, stated addresses of Galuras in Tarlac & Sta Mesa Heights, QC.
3. 2000-08-15 RTC Clerk issued summons
4. 2000-09-17 Process Server (P/S) went to Sta Mesa Heights, but told by Dantes father that Galuras presently
reside in Tandang Sora, QC.
5. 2000-09-22- P/S went to Tarlac, but learned property has been foreclosed & Galuras no longer reside there.
6. 2000-09-26 P/S went to Tandang Sora & served summons on Teresas sister.
7. Galuras failed to file their Answer.
8. 2001-01-23 RTC order declared Galuras in default & allowed MAC to present evidence ex parte.
9. 2001-06-27 RTC ruled in favor of MAC; ordered Galuras to pay unpaid balance, P30K atty fees, litigation
expenses, legal interest from date of 1st demand letter; RTC believes failure of defendants or their refusal to file
any answer to the complaint is a clear admission on their part of their obligation to the plaintiff. It may even be
safely presumed that by their inaction, defendants have no valid defense against the claim of the plaintiff such that
under the circumstances, RTC has no other alternative but to pass judgment on the issues based on the evidence on
record.
10. 2004-11-10 RTC issued W/X to implement 2001 decision
11. 2004-12-13 Galuras received copy of 2004-11 Order
12. 2005-01-06 Galuras filed w/ CA R47 PAJ/FO, with prayer for issuance of WPI or TRO. Grounds were (1) RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because substituted service of summons invalid & (2) there was
extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe it would not file a case vs them.
13. 2005-01-25 CA Resolution dismissed petition for lack of merit; valid SSS
14. 2005-02-14 Galuras filed MR; CA denied on 02-28; Galuras petition SC
ISSUES: (1) Extrinsic fraud? (2) Should the Galuras have availed 1st of ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal or
petition for relief?
HELD:
(1) No. SC did not address extrinsic fraud but CA held: The Galuras claim of extrinsic fraud because they had an
existing payment arrangement with their creditor, Math-Agro, that the latter would not resort to judicial action for
as long as payments are being made by them and that they had been paying their obligation until July 2004 is but a
bare and vagrant allegation without any visible means of support for nowhere in their petition, as well as in their
joint affidavit of merit, did they attach copies of the corresponding receipts of their payments.
(2) No. If R47 PAJ/FO of RTC is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the nature
or subject of the action, the petition need not allege that the ordinary remedy of NT or MR of J/FO or appeal
therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a
direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order an any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.
DECISION: Petition granted; CA Resolutions set aside; 2005-04-27 TRO made permanent; 2001-06 & 2004-11 RTC
Orders set aside.

R47-1 Islamic Dawah COUNCIL of the Phils, petitioner v CA, Heirs of Araneta, respondents (1989)
FACTS:
(1) 84-2-15 REM over TCT30461 between mortgagors Da Silvas & mortgagee Council.
1a. Council filed Q43746 Foreclosure case vs Da Silvas; 85-2-5 compromise, 2-12 RTC approved => new TCT328021
issued to Council.
(2) 8-8 Araneta filed with RD notice of lis pendens re Ejectment case Q47989 Council v Araneta (converted to
collection of rentals, later withdrawn).
2a. 8-13 Araneta filed with RD affidavit of adverse claim re Case Q43469 Da Silva v Araneta for Recovery of
Possession.
2b. Notice of lis pendens & adverse claim annotated at back of TCT328021.
(3) 10-9 Case Q46196 Council v Araneta Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Damages with PMI; praying for
cancellation of all annotations at back of TCT328021.
(4) 87-7-6 While Quieting case pending, Heirs filed with CA petition to annul judgment in Foreclosure case
a. Araneta true owner, elder Da Silva employee-trustee TCT30461 in Da Silvas name, but owners duplicate copy
kept by Araneta.
b. 63-1-31 Araneta & Da Silva terminated trust; but RD refused to register Deed of Sale because Da Silva
conjugal property.
c. 84-3-24 Case Q2772 alleging copy lost/destroyed, heirs of Da Silva obtained new copy of owners duplicate
copy to TCT30461; Araneta learned, moved to re-open proceeding; 12-7 Aranetas Motion granted: Da Silvas
ordered to return copy & to not enter into any transaction.
d. 85-11-11 Da Silvas manifested before LRC that title to property transferred to Council per Foreclosure.
e. On Heirs motion, Judge of Q2772/Q43469 consolidated with Quieting case but latters Judge refused.
4a. Heirs claim fraud by & collusion between Council & Da Silva (Council knew of Aranetas claim of ownership
because its Sec Gen is lawyer of Da Silvas in case vs Aranetas); pray to annul judgment in Foreclosure case & for TRO
to enjoin Quieting proceedings.
4b. 87-11-10 CA issued TRO enjoining trial of Quieting; parties ordered to appear for PTC.
4c. Council filed MR of TRO, later filed Supplement to MR with Motion to Dismiss on following grounds:
a. CA has no jurisdiction to hear Petition to Annul a Judgment already executed
b. lack of cause of action because Heirs not valid claimants of the property
c. Heirs not parties to Foreclosure case => no legal capacity to sue
d. litis pendencia because of pendency of Quieting case
e. abandonment, waiver & unenforceablity under Statute of Frauds
4d. 12-2 CA denied MR for lack of merit; 12-03 CA denied Supplemental Motion & Motion to Dismiss.
(5) Council files Petition for Certiorari claims that:
1. CA should not hear PAJ because fully executed already;
2. Heirs have no right to question decision because they are non-parties to the REM;
3. Heirs have another remedy in Quieting case.

ISSUES:
(1) Which court has jurisdiction? CA.
(2) Who may institute a petition for annulment of judgment? Even non-party.
(3) May judgment already executed still be annulled? Yes.

HELD:
(1) CA has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs per BP 129 Sec 9(2).
(2) A person who is not a party to the judgment => may sue for its annulment
provided
1that he can prove that the judgment was obtained through fraud and collusion, and
2that he would be adversely affected thereby.

(3) An action for annulment of judgment => may be availed of


even if the judgment sought to be annulled had been fully executed and implemented.

DECISION: Petition dismissed; CA orders affirmed.

R47-2 GR178158 Strategic Alliance Devt Corp, petitioner v Radstock Securities Ltd, PNCC, respondents, Asiavest
Merchants Bankers Berhad, intervenor, 2009
GR180428 Sison, petitioner v PNCC & Radstock, respondents
FACTS: 1. 1978-81 PNCC affiliate CDCP Mining obtained loans of 5.46B yen + $5M from Marubeni
1a. 1983 CDCP changed name to PNCC to reflect 90% Govt ownership.
1b. 2000-10/11 (Erap) PNCC Board Resoln admitting P36B liability to RP Govt & P10.7B liab to Marubeni.
1c. 2001-01 (+3 mos) Marubeni assigned its credit to Radstock for only $2M = <P100M.
2. 01-1-15 Radstock filed action for collection & damages with Manda RTC.
2a. 01-1-23 RTC issued WPA vs PNCC; ordered PNCC bank acct garnished & real prop attached
2b. 01-2-14 PNCC moved to set aside 01-01-23 order & discharge writ of attachment, & filed M2D both denied;
MRs also denied.
3. PNCC filed petition for certiorari before CA assailing RTCs denial of M2D
3a. 02-8-30 CA denied PNCC petition; 03-1-22 CA denied PNCC MR.
4. PNCC filed petition for review before SC GR156887.
1d. 01-6-19 (GMA) PNCC Board (with Sison as Chairman & President) revoked Resolution admitting liability.
2c. 02-12-10 RTC ruled in favor of Radstock, ordered PNCC to pay P13.2B.
3c. PNCC appealed RTCs decision to CA CAGR87971
4a. 03-3-19 SC in GR156887 issued TRO forbidding RTC from implementing WPA & ordering suspension of
proceedings before RTC & CA.
4b. 05-10-3 SC granted PNCC PR to set aside 2001 Order & discharge writ of attachment; SC directed
CA to proceed with PNCCs appeal.
1e. 06-8-17 PNCC-Radstock compromise, reduced P17B liability to P6.2B; COA recommended approval.
3d. 06-11-22 SC referred to CA; 07-1-25 CA approved compromise.
3e. STRADEC MRd CAs approval alleged it has a claim vs PNCC pending in Makati RTC CC05-882
3f. CA treated STRADECs MR as a Motion for Intervention & denied it.
4c. STRADEC filed Petition for Review before SC GR178158
4d. 07-7-2 SC ordered PNCC & Radstock to maintain status quo ante
3g. 07-2-20 Sison (ex-PNCC Pres & Board Chair) filed before CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment Approving
Compromise Agreement.
3h. Asiavest, PNCCs judgment creditor, moved for leave to intervene before CA
3i. 07-6-12 CA denied Sisons PAJ it has no jurisdiction to annul a F&E judgment also rendered by the CA; CA
also denied Asiavests motion. 07-11-5 CA denied Sisons MR;
4e. Asiavest moved for leave to intervene in GR178158
4f. 07-11-26 Sison filed petition for review before SC GR180428
4g. 08-2-18 SC consolidated 2 cases.
ISSUES: (1) May STRADEC & Asiavest intervene? (2) Is CA Decision annullable even if final and executory on grounds
of fraud and violation of public policy and the Constitution?
DECISION: Sisons petition granted; PNCC Resolution admitting liability void ab initio; Compromise inexistent &
void ab initio; Asiavests intervention granted; STRADEC has no legal standing.
DISSENT of J. Bersamin:
(2) CA Denial of Sisons PAJ: Stripped to its barest essential, the petition should be dismissed. The CA has no
jurisdiction to annul its own final and executory judgment. The Courts jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgment pertains only to those rendered by the RTCs.
Grande v UP: The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases,
as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of
judgments rendered by RTCs filed with the CA. It does not pertain to the nullification of decisions of the CA.
The CA did not err, because the CA could not, on its own accord, take cognizance of his petition to annul its own
judgment absent any specific directive from the Supreme Court, as in Conde v IAC.
HELD: (1) R19S2 is not absolute. Allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Interventions have been allowed even
beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered
by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the
Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.
(1a) STRADEC has no legal interest in the Compromise per R19S1, its interest is dependent on the outcome of
CC05-882, thus simply contingent & expectant.
(1b) However, Asiavest has a direct and material interest in the approval or disapproval of the Compromise
Agreement. Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in GR110263 and a court has already issued a writ of
execution in its favor. Asiavests interest is actual and material, direct and immediate characterized by either gain
or loss from the judgment that this Court may render. Considering that the Compromise Agreement involves the
disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of PNCC, Asiavest, as PNCCs judgment creditor, will be greatly
prejudiced if the Compromise Agreement is eventually upheld.
(1c) Sison has legal standing to challenge the Compromise. Although there was no allegation that Sison filed the case
as a derivative suit in the name of PNCC, it could be fairly deduced that Sison was assailing the Compromise
Agreement as a stockholder of PNCC. In such a situation, a stockholder of PNCC can sue on behalf of PNCC to annul
the Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement had already been approved by the Court of Appeals. PNCCs
assets are in danger of being dissipated in favor of a private foreign corporation. He had no recourse but to avail of an
extraordinary remedy to protect PNCCs assets. Besides, in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling
reasons, such as the nature and importance of the issues raised in this case, this Court must take cognizance of
Sisons action. This Court should exercise its prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules, because after all,
the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is well recognized.

R47-3 FRAGINAL, et al, petitioners-defendant v HEIRS of PARAAL, respondents-plaintiffs, 2007

FACTS: 1. Heirs filed with PARAD a complaint for termination of tenancy relationship, ejectment, collection of arrear
rentals & damages vs Fraginals;
2. Fraginals in Answer claimed land is public agricultural within exclusive jurisdiction of DENR
=> they are not tenants => questioned PARAD jurisdiction.
3. 98-10-8 PARAD decision ordered ejectment of Fraginals.
4. 01-4-5 (+2 yrs) Fraginals filed w/ CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment w/ Prayer for Issuance of PI &/or RO.
5. 01-4-24 CA dismissed petition; 9-3 CA denied MR.
6. Fraginals filed w/ SC a R45 Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE:
Does Rule 47 pertain only to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the RTC? Yes.

HELD:
(1) Rule 47 Section 1 clearly limits the subject matter for annulment to judgments or final orders rendered by
Regional Trial Courts in civil actions.
Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies are NOT susceptible to petitions for
annulment under Rule 47.

(2) Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a DIRECT recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment
if other appropriate remedies are available such as
1a petition for new trial and 2a petition for relief from judgment or 3an appeal. (See Note 5)

DARAB Rules of Procedures provide for an appeal to DARAB from decision of PARAD. Fraginals did not avail of this
remedy. Nothing in DARAB Rules allow for a petition for annulment of a final PARAD decision.)

DECISION: Petition denied.

NOTES:
(1) Doctrine of Finality of Judgments No doctrine is more sacrosanct than that judgments of courts or awards of
quasi-judicial bodies, even if erroneous, must become final at a definite time appointed by law. This doctrineis the
bedrock of every stable judicial system. However, the doctrinepermits certain equitable remedies*; and one of them
is a petition for annulment under Rule 47.
*The other remedies are 1petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, 2a direct action such as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and 3a collateral attack against a judgment that is void on its face.
(2) The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character and will not so easily and readily lend itself
to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Secs 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it.

(3) Rule 47 is a new provision (1997) albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur by the courts.
*first recognized in Banco Espaol-Filipino v Palanca (1918),
(4) Macalalag v Ombudsman. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be resorted to as an
instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards to be put in place in order to avoid an
abuse of the rule. Thus, 1the annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, and 2the remedy may NOT be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself
of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.
(5) The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege.There must then be a law expressly granting such right.
Thisis even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of
judgments. Macalalag v Ombudsman.
(6) Fraginals excuse for failing to avail of Rule 65 time constraint & lack of counsel.

R57 Traders Royal Bank v IAC 1984
FACTS: It is further argued that since private respondent La Tondea, Inc., had voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court by filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 9894-P, the
denial or dismissal thereof constitutes a bar to the present action filed before the Bulacan Court.
HELD: We cannot sustain the petitioners view.
Intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants right in an attachment proceeding is not
exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal
of a third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate to bar a subsequent independent action by
the claimant to establish his right to the property even if he failed to appeal from the order denying his
original third-party claim.

R58 La Campana Development v Ledesma, 2010
HELD:
=> On appeal the appellate court (CA) may STAY the writ of execution issued by the RTC
should circumstances so require
even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory,
=> preliminary injunction may still be granted.
R59 Talag v CA, 1990
HELD: As it is now, the question of title and possession to the fishponds cannot be determined nor is
there any clear indication one way or the other.
Hence, the appointment of a receiver is improper and has no basis. The power to appoint a receiver
should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights, or
when it will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the
court as the movant. Before the remedy is granted, the consequences or effects thereof should be
considered or established in order to avoid causing irreparable injustice or injury to others who are
entitled to as much consideration as those seeking it. (Lanson v. Araneta, 64 Phil. 549 (1937);

R60 Sapugay v CA, 1990
HELD: A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer
by being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the action.
He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment entered for
the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the judgment for damages rendered
against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by
the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendants deprivation of possession by the plaintiff.
Indeed, even where the judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the property, but no order was
made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing damages in default of a return, it was declared that
until judgment was entered that the property should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of
the sureties.