Josephat Mua's Petition in Supreme Court

No.
16-7278
================================================================
In The
Supreme Court of the United States

------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPHAT MUA AND

FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS,
Petitioners,
v.
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE,
Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Circuit Court For
Montgomery County, Maryland
------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPHAT MUA Pro se

FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS Pro se
2332 London Bridge Dr.
Silver Spring, MD 20906
(301) 919-4939
Joseph.mua@gmail.com
================================================================
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the continuous violation of Title VI and

Title VII after the Appellees joined forces with oth-
ers including the state of Maryland to advance re-
taliation and discrimination is relevant in this
case.
2. Whether the Petitioner must establish venue by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the trial
courts decision is reviewed by this court de novo.
United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337, 338 (4th
Cir.1993).
3. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law
in which contracts containing several promises by
Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
could not be enforced.
4. Whether the Maryland and state personnel work-
ing under color of law can assist unlicensed debt
collector to garnish wages and confiscate personal
property of an employee in an organized scheme
and stay out of the case, which violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it deprives owners of their property without
affording constitutionally adequate notice.
5. Whether the lower court erred by dismissing peti-
tioners counterclaim and that judgement ob-
tained in the District Court of Maryland, against
petitioners, where the party seeking the judge-
ments did not have the legal right or standing to
do so in addition to committing fraud is void.
ii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued
6. Whether Marsden & Seledee LLCs lacking the

Mandatory License Required by Law in Maryland,
Lacked Standing to Pursue the Debt Collection by
Litigation.
7. What test should courts use to determine whether
an employees opposition to particular actions con-
stitutes protected conduct such that retaliation
against the employee for his opposition would vio-
late title VII?
8. The District Courts Decision undermines the title
VII requirement that Employees report harass-
ment at the first opportunity.
9. Whether it was proper for the lower court to dis-
miss the action after significant misconduct by the
Appellees working with the state agencies under
color of law to violate rights guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution?
10. Whether the Federal court can ignore the law and
the evidence and issue a flawed opinion without
considering all the facts surrounding the case
which is prejudicial to the Petitioners?
11. Whether third party retaliation was a motivating
factor by the appellee CCIE after Petitioner Mr.
Mua sued the unions and the state agencies in
Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The
Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al
(Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503)?
iii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Petitioners Josephat Mua and Francoise

Vandenplas were the Defendants in the Mar-
yland District State Court and they were the
Appellants in the Maryland Court of Appeals
below.
Respondents, California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange (CCIE) was the Plaintiff and a
party to the appeal below as the Appellee. The
plaintiff was represented by unlicensed Debt
Collector Marsden & Seledee LLC.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. ix
OPINIONS BELOW............................................. 1
JURISDICTION ................................................... 2
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................. 4
A. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
change of contract while the case is in lit-
igation in Federal Court for Fourth Circuit
is in Bad faith ............................................ 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT............ 12
Issue I. Continuous Violation Of Title Vi And
Title Vii After The Appellees Joined Forces
With Others Including The State Of Maryland
To Advance The Discrimination ....................... 12
A. Causes and Operating Facts Court Over-
looked ......................................................... 12
B. Creating Change in Maryland................... 13
C. Federal Cases and various conflicts .......... 14
II. Proceedings In The District Court and vi-
olation of law ............................................. 17
1. Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-03810-PJM
Mua et al v. California Casualty In-
demnity Exchange et al........................ 17
California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change v. Mua et al. ............................. 19
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

Page
III. U.S. Attorney Department of Education
conflict ....................................................... 21
Issue two: The Plaintiff must establish venue by
a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial
courts decision is reviewed by this court de
novo. United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337 (4th
Cir. 1993) .......................................................... 24
IV. Proceedings In The District Court ............ 24
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................... 25
I. Standard of Review for lawyer sanctions ... 25
A. The district court abused its discretion
in dismissing the Petitioners claims ..... 26
ARGUMENT ONE ............................... 26
The lower court erred in shielding the
appellees after they engaged in orga-
nized scheme in violation of the First
Amendment ......................................... 26
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR LAW-
YER SANCTIONS ............................... 26
LAWYER CONDUCT........................................... 27
ARGUMENT 2 ..................................................... 28
Petitioners established a prima facie case for re-
taliation ............................................................ 28
vi

Page
A. Petitioners demonstrated that the Ap-
pellees reason for ganging up to ter-
minate their car insurance was false,
and that discrimination was the real
reason .................................................. 29
ARGUMENT 3: Did the lower court
err as a matter of law in which con-
tracts containing several promises by
Appellee California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange could not enforced? ...... 30
ARGUMENT 4: Whether the Mary-
land and state personnel working un-
der color of law can assist unlicensed
debt collector to garnish wages and
confiscate personal property of an em-
ployee in an organized scheme and
stay out of the case, which violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it deprives own-
ers of their property without affording
constitutionally adequate notice due
to discrimination ................................. 32
Argument 5: The Lower Court Erred By Dis-
missing Petitioners Counterclaim And That
Judgments Obtained In The District Court Of
Maryland, Against Petitioners, Where The
Party Seeking The Judgments Did Not Have
The Legal Right Or Standing To Do So In
Addition To Fraud Is Void ................................ 36
vii

Page
A. The Public Policy Behind the Maryland
Collection Agency Licensing Act (MCALA)
Justifies an Exception to the Public Policy
Relating to Finality of Judgments ............ 36
ARGUMENT 6: Since Marsden & Seledee LLCs
lacked the Mandatory License Required by
Law, It Lacked Standing to Pursue the Debt
Collection by Litigation .................................... 39
ARGUMENT 7: What Test Should Courts Use To
Determine Whether An Employees Opposition
To Particular Actions Constitutes Protected
Conduct Such That Retaliation Against The
Employee For His Opposition Would Violate
Title VII? .......................................................... 43
ARGUMENT 8: The District Courts Decision
Undermines The Title VII Requirement That
Employees Report Harassment At The First
Opportunity ...................................................... 45
ARGUMENT 9: Whether it was proper for the
lower court to dismiss the action after signifi-
cant misconduct by the Appellees working
with the state agencies under color of law to
violate rights guaranteed by the U.S. Consti-
tution?............................................................... 47
viii

Page
ARGUMENT 10: Whether the Federal court can
ignore the law and the evidence and issue a
flawed opinion without considering all the
facts surrounding the case which is prejudicial
to the Petitioners? ............................................ 49
ARGUMENT 11: Whether third party retalia-
tion was a motivating factor by the appellee
CCIE after Petitioner Mr. Mua sued the unions
and the state agencies in Federal Case No.
8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v. The Maryland Of-
fice of the Attorney General et al (Fourth Cir-
cuit Appeal No. 16-1503)? ................................. 50
ARGUMENT 12 ................................................... 52
A. Conflict within Federal District Courts
Own Order Regarding the violations ........ 53
B. Prejudice .................................................... 54
CONCLUSION..................................................... 55
APPENDIX
Opinion of the Montgomery County Circuit
Court dated April 23rd, 2015 ........................... App. 1
Order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court
Affirming the Decision dated April 23rd,
2015 .................................................................. App. 5
Opinion of the U.S. Federal District Court ......... App. 7
Order of the U.S. Federal District Court........... App. 11
ix

Page
Order of Montgomery County District Court
Dated January 13th, 2015 denying Motion for
reconsideration ............................................... App. 13
Notice of filing Notice of Removal to Federal
Court ............................................................... App. 15
Illegal Judgement entered on December 10th,
2014 ................................................................ App. 17
Order of Montgomery County District Court
Dated December 10th, 2015 denying transfer
to Federal court .............................................. App. 20
Order Regarding postponement of dated No-
vember 18th, 2014 trial signed by Judge E.
Wolfe denied ................................................... App. 22
Order postponing trial to December 10th, 2014
dated October 6th, 2014 ................................. App. 24
Order granting Defendants Motion for leave to
file a Counterclaim dated October 21, 2014 .... App. 26
Order denying Defendant Motion to Compel an-
swers to Interrogatories and for sanctions
dated October 29th, 2014 ............................... App. 28
Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion to Compel
and for sanctions dated October 29th, 2014 .... App. 30
Order denying writ of certiorari by Maryland
Court of Appeals of Maryland dated January
29, 2016 .......................................................... App. 32
Order transferring the case to Maryland court
of Appeals from the Maryland Court of Spe-
cial Appeals dated July 18th, 2015................ App. 33
x

Page
Order Extending time to file a supplement to
the petition for writ of certiorari dated August
31st, 2015 ....................................................... App. 34
Order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court
denying Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 28th, 2015 ............................................... App. 35
Order on Motion for reconsideration denying
writ of certiorari dated May 23rd, 2016 ........ App. 36
This is the transcripts of the February 23rd,
2015 hearing in which the Appellee failed to
show up........................................................... App. 37
Order Striking a counterclaim filed on October
31st, 2014 ....................................................... App. 50
Order transferring case to Montgomery County
from Prince Georges County District Court ... App. 55
This is the letter showing Marsden & Seledee
LLC was a debt collector contrary to the opin-
ion of the U.S. District Court Judge .............. App. 58
This is an email which shows the Petitioners
tried to reach out to the Appellee .................. App. 60
This the Complaint filed in the U.S. District
Court on December 8th, 2014 ignored by the
Maryland District Court hence making the
judgement void ............................................... App. 61
This is the Appellee Motion to strike Defendants
Notice of Removal in which the Appellee mis-
led the U.S. District Court ............................. App. 87
xi

Page
This is the proof that Marsden and Seledee LLC
was not licensed in Maryland as a debt collec-
tor before filing the law suit in court ............ App. 93
This is the envelope containing the new contract
after the appellee changed the contract ........ App. 94
This is the Answer and counterclaim struck
by the court after violation of rights by the
state ................................................................ App. 95
This is the Motion to compel and immediate
sanctions for failure to provide discovery
which was ignored ........................................ App. 113
This is the letter petitioner wrote to the Chief
Judge Morrissey concerning the violations
within Montgomery county.......................... App. 121
This is the Complaint filed by the Unlicensed
Debt Collector on July 8, 2014 ..................... App. 127
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
118 Wash. 591, 204 Pac. i9o ........................................31
134 Ia. 665, 112 N. W. 181, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529 .......30
16-9. Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765
F. Supp. 2d 719 (D. Md. 2011) .................................41
184 N. Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) io42 ........30
8:11-cv-01198-PJM Mua v. Board of Education
of Prince Georges County ........................... 12, 15, 22
8:15-cv-00060-PJM California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange v. Mua et al. ............................. passim
83 Pa. Super Ct. 468 ...................................................30
871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989) .....................................25
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North
Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir.
2011) ........................................................................30
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) .......................................................................45
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44 ............................................45
AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc.,
465 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006) ....................................25
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986) .......................................................................35
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d
551, 102 S. Ct. 700 (1982) .........................................1
Boyer-Liberto, 2013 WL 1413031 ................................47
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Page
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S.
639 (2008) (quoting 1964(c)) ................................32
Bridgeport v. Scott Co., 94 Conn. 461 .........................31
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998) .......................................................................44
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006) ..........................................................28
Conkle v. Laughlin, .....................................................30
DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3rd 409 (4th
Cir. 2015) .................................................................29
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764......................................... 45, 46
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) ..............34
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998) ........................................................... 44, 45, 46
Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Inv. Co., ........................31
Fernandez v. U.S., 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991) ........ 1
Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore,
787 F. 3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015) ...................................29
Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 305 F.3d
1210 (10th Cir. 2002) ...............................................35
Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997)......... 1
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d at 1519 ......................25
Gullickson Southwest Airlines Pilots Assn, 87
F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 1996) .......................................35
xiv

Page
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652,
92 S. Ct. 594 (1972) ...................................................1
Hanley v. Donoghue, 59 Md. 239, 43 Am. Rep.
554 ...........................................................................41
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) ..... 44, 46
Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290
(1970) .......................................................................42
Helsey v. Am. Mineral Prodn. Co., .............................30
iog Atl. 162; Kalm v. Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344,
114 Atl. 165 ..............................................................31
Jeffries v. State of Kan., 147 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.
1998) ........................................................................36
Johnson v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 309 F.
Appx 675 (4th Cir. 2009) .........................................43
Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332
(4th Cir. 2006) .............................................. 43, 44, 46
Josselson v. Sonneborn, 110 Md. 546, 73 A. 650 ........41
Keen v. Keen, Md., 60 A.2d 200 ...................................41
L VNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 952 N.E.2d 1232
(II. App. 2011) ..........................................................37
Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (4th
Cir. 1995) .................................................................26
Martin v. Rose supra ...................................................24
McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560 (2011) ...........42
Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attorney General
et al. ............................................................. 15, 29, 51
xv

Page
Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
et al., 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Document 16-2
Filed 02-23-15..........................................................51
Munguia v. Unified School Dist. No. 328, 125
F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997) .......................................35
National Glass Inc. v. JC Penney Properties, Inc.,
336 Md. 606 (1994)..................................................37
Pakas v. Hollingshead, ...............................................30
Peist v. Richmond, 97 Vt. 97, 122 Atl. 420; 29
YAL4 L. J. 296 .........................................................31
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 ................41
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) ............43
Presstman v. Silljacks, 52 Md. 647 .............................41
Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2004) ............
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530
U.S. 133 (2000) ........................................................35
Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 1998) ..............26
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683,
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ...................................................
Secor v. Sturgis,..................................................... 30, 35
Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995) ............1
Staley v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Md. 56 A.2d
144 ...........................................................................41
State v. Ambrose, 191 Md. 353 (1948) ........................41
Stein v. Smith, 358 Md. 670 (Md. 2000) .....................38
xvi

Page
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..........24
Suders, 542 U.S. at 145 ......................................... 45, 46
Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.
1991) ........................................................................25
Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P. .............52
United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337 (4th Cir.
1993) ........................................................................24
United States v. Throckmorton, ..................................48
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v.
Nassar, No. 12-484 (June 24, 2013) ........................55
Williams-Abbott Electric Co. v. Model Electric
Co., ...........................................................................30
Wilmer v. Epstein, 116 Md. 140, 81 A. 379 .................41
Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873 (9th Cir.
2005) ........................................................................25
Zoning Appeals of Howard County v. Meyer, 207
Md. 389 (1955).........................................................41
RULES
Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)-(c) .......................................................2
STATUTES
15 U.S.C. 1681 ..................................................... 2, 3, 36
15 U.S.C. 1692 ......................................................... 3, 36
18 U.S.C. 1961 .................................................... 32, 33
xvii

Page
28 U.S.C. 133 ..............................................................2
42 U.S.C. 1988 ............................................................3
42 U.S.C. 2000d ...................................................... 2, 3
42 U.S.C. 2000(e) ................................................ 10, 43
1
Pro Se Litigants pleadings are to be constructed

liberally and held to less stringent standards than For-
mal Pleadings drafted by lawyers. If the Court can rea-
sonably read Pleadings to state a valid claim on which
litigation could prevail, it should do so despite failure
to cite proper legal authority, confusion, legal theories,
poor syntax and sentence construction or litigants un-
familiarity with Pleading requirements. See Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551, 102 S. Ct.
700 (1982). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30
L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972); See Green v. Bran-
son, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997); Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995); Fernandez v. U.S.,
941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991)
Now Comes Petitioner Josephat Mua and Fran-
coise Vandenplas herein, pro se, and request that this
court issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Maryland Court
of Appeals denying to review respectfully prays that a
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgement below.
------------------------------------------------------------------
OPINIONS BELOW
On February 4th, 2015, the U.S. District Court
issued an opinion finding no error. (Pet. App. 7-12).
The opinion of the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County was issued on April 23rd, 2015 and affirmed
finding no error as well. (Pet. App. 1-6). The opinions
of both courts appear on various websites on the
internet. (California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v.
2
Mua et al, No. 8:2015cv00060 Document 38 (D. Md.

2015);
------------------------------------------------------------------
JURISDICTION
The Maryland court of appeals denied petitioners
timely writ of certiorari on January 29th, 2016 (Pet.
App. 32) and denied Motion for reconsideration on May
23rd, 2016 without any written opinion. (Pet. App. 36).
On August 11, 2016 Petitioners filed an Application
(16A151) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari from August 21, 2016 to October 20, 2016.
On August 11, 2016 Application (15A1191) was
granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file
until October 20, 2016. This Petition is timely filed and
the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1254(1) and Supreme Court Rules 10(a), (b),
(c). The case is related to an appeal No. 16-5497
pending before this court. The Appeal is also related
another appeal No. 16-2263 and 16-2264 currently
pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this
cause under Title 28, United States Code, 1291,
which provides for an appeal from a final order of the
highest state court in Maryland, and asserted under
28 U.S.C. 133, as this case presents federal questions
arising under Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, et seq, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq, as
3
amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. This Court also has
supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims under 42
U.S.C. 1988.
------------------------------------------------------------------
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The National Origin Discrimination Act under Ti-
tle VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000d, et seq, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et seq, as amended; and the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
1692, et seq. is reprinted; Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) under 18 U.S.C.
1961.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without Due Process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law . . . .
The Maryland State Bar Rules of Professional
Conduct provide in pertinent part . . . . a lawyer shall
not reveal information acquired during the profes-
sional relationship with a client unless the client gives
informed consent. . . .
The Maryland State Bar Rules under PREAM-
BLE: A LAWYERS RESPONSIBILITIES states the
following [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profes-
sion, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
4
system and a public citizen having special responsibil-

ity for the quality of justice.
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer per-
forms various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides
a client with an informed understanding of the clients
legal rights and obligations and explains their practi-
cal implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously as-
serts the clients position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a re-
sult advantageous to the client but consistent with re-
quirements of honest dealing with others. As evaluator,
a lawyer acts by examining a clients legal affairs and
reporting about them to the client or to others.
[3] In addition to these representational functions,
a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a busi-
ness is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
See Rule 8.4.
------------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 10th, 2014, Maryland District Court
of Montgomery County conducted a trial without dis-
covery and ignored rules and a counter case pending in
the U.S. Federal Court Case # 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua
et al v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al.
There were other Federal cases connected to this case
pending in the U.S. District Court of Maryland in clear
violation of laid down processes. Appellee California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange via Marsden & Seledee
5
LLC (M&S) engaged in violations of fair debt collec-

tion practices, discrimination, breach of contract, con-
spiracy inter alia. On June 20th, 2014, Appellee sent
out a letter concerning an outstanding debt. (See Pet.
App. 58-59). Petitioners reached out to the appellee
and gave out a detailed rebuttal over the phone con-
cerning breach of contract. (See Pet. App. 60). However,
Appellee maliciously filed a lawsuit before the 30 days
mandated by congress under Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) on July 8th, 2014 in violation of
the statute without giving a chance to the Petitioners
to resolve the matter. (See Pet. App. 127-133). The law-
suit by the Appellee was done in bad faith and Appellee
failed to clarify the issues with the Petitioners before
filing suit. Petitioners filed a Motion to transfer venue
to Montgomery County District Court (See Pet. App.
55-57). On October 6th, 2014, the court postponed the
trial to December 10th, 2014. (See Pet. App. 24). On Oc-
tober 21st, 2014, Petitioners were given leave to file a
counterclaim (See Pet. App. 26-27). On October 29,
2014, the court granted Appellants Motion to Compel
and for sanctions. (See Pet. App. 30-31) On the same
day, the court denied the Petitioner Motion to compel
answers to interrogatories and for sanctions. (See Pet.
App. 28-29). On October 31st, 2014, and November 12,
2014 the court struck the counterclaim as untimely
(See Pet. App. 50-51, 95-112). On November 18th, 2014,
Hon. Judge Wolfe denied Motion to postpone. (See Pet.
App. 22-23). On December 10th, 2014 under duress
and without any discovery, the court held a hearing
and entered judgement ignoring parallel cases pend-
ing in the U.S. District Court. (See Pet. App. 17-19). On
6
the same day they entered an order denying transfer

to Federal court despite the case with Federal ques-
tions and other actions pending in the court of higher
jurisdiction. (See Pet. App. 20). On January 13th, 2015,
the court denied Motion for reconsideration. (See Pet.
App. 13-14). On the same day the court denied the mo-
tion of filing notice of removal after the case had been
filed in Federal court. (See Pet. App. 15-16). On Febru-
ary 4th, 2015, the U.S. District court issued a flawed
opinion and an order without considering all the fac-
tors (See Pet. App. 7-12) and remanded the case to
Montgomery county circuit court. (See Pet. App. 7-12).
On April 23rd, 2015, Montgomery county circuit court
issued flawed opinion and declined to hold a hearing
despite the Petitioners requesting one. (See Pet. App.
1-6). On May 28th, 2015, Montgomery county circuit
court denied Motion for reconsideration (See Pet. App.
35). Petitioners appealed the case to the Maryland
court of special appeals which then transferred the
case to Maryland court of Appeals. (See Pet. App. 33).
Maryland court of appeals issued an order extending
time to file a supplement to the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari on August 31st, 2015. (See Pet. App. 34).
Due to various violations of Federal law by the Ap-
pellee CCIE and the unlicensed debt collector Marsden
& Seledee, Petitioners Josephat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas filed an action in Federal Court on Decem-
ber 8th, 2014 in United States District Federal Court
in the District of Maryland which was shared with the
Montgomery County District Court the same day. (See
Pet. App. 61-86) However, the state court personnel
7
inserted another stamp later on after proceedings as

received on December 10th, 2014, which is misleading
and meant to prejudice Petitioners. Before that, Peti-
tioners filed a counterclaim with leave of court on Oc-
tober 31, 2014 in the District Court of Montgomery
County. However, the District Court of Montgomery
County struck it as untimely on November 12, 2014
due to extrinsic fraud advanced by the appellee CCIE.
(See Pet. App. 95-112 and Pet. App. 50-51). Prior to
that, On November 18th, 2014, Petitioners wrote to the
Federal court giving a status report as requested by
the court and requested the Federal court to request
Montgomery county case No. 0602-5340-2014 due to
several irregularities which were in progress violating
due process rights. (Pet. App. 121-126). There were
other improprieties within the Montgomery county
District Court. For example, on December 8th, 2014,
Petitioners filed a motion to compel discovery and the
date was changed from December 8th, 2014 to Decem-
ber 10th, 2014 without the permission of the Petition-
ers. Other illegalities involve the tampering of
transcripts for December 10th, 2014 hearing.
During the hearing, Petitioner Mr. Mua raised the
issues of fraud twice in the court during the proceed-
ings. However, those parts are missing in the tran-
scripts. Petitioners raised the issue with the court on
February 23rd, 2015 (See Pet. App. 37-49). Petitioners
also filed a letter with the chief Judge for Maryland in
Annapolis after conferring with the Maryland court of
appeals Deputy clerk. As a result of the grievances and
discrimination exhibited during the December 10th,
8
2014 hearing, another hearing was set for February 23,

2015. The Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change (CCIE) did not show up. (See Pet. App. 37-49).
Petitioners filed a timely appeal in the circuit court for
Montgomery court and removed the case to Federal
court on January 8th, 2015. (See 8:15-cv-00060-PJM
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Mua et al)
After back and forth without oral argument, the Appel-
lees misled the Federal court by saying that the coun-
terclaim was filed untimely and that the case was
struck. The case was sent to Montgomery County Cir-
cuit Court which refused to hold a hearing and af-
firmed decision of the State District Court of Maryland
and dismissed the action without oral arguments even
though Petitioners raised issues of extrinsic fraud.
(See copies of the filing of the Montgomery County Dis-
trict court which were changed (See Pet. App. 50-51) on
the right corner a new date of 11-3-2014 is inserted in-
stead of October 31st, 2014 filing made by the petition-
ers). This tampering is a clear error of law and an effort
to defeat justice by state.
In the meantime, Appellee California Casualty In-
demnity Exchange (CCIE) misled the Federal judge in
Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange v. Mua et al. The Federal
court dismissed this case on February 4, 2015 without
conducting a hearing while discrimination case was
pending in the same court. Mr. Joel Seledee of Marsden
& Seledee misled the Federal court willfully when say-
ing that Petitioners filed their counterclaim untimely.
9
(See Pet. App. 87-92). February 4th, 2015 was also the
day that the Summons were Returned Executed in this
case. (See ECF 7 Filed 02/03/15 District Court record
8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua et al v. California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange et al) Petitioners filed that action
in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland with hope to right wrongs and get justice.
In the meantime, the Marsden & Seledee LLC
which acted as a collection agency for Appellee in the
Maryland District Courts had been operating without
the required license to collect debt in Maryland. The
firm only acquired the license on October 2nd 2015 to
cover up their illegal organized scheme of collecting
debts without a license. (See Pet. App. 93). Before and
during the adjudication of this case, Petitioners dealt
with a number of staff members for Marsden & Seledee
LLC including the following staffers Jillian Smith,
Jackie Lynch and others who refused to give up their
names referring Petitioner Mr. Mua to voice mail dur-
ing illegal collection activity by the Firm. The Mary-
land Law stipulates that, if an agency or firm employ
staff to pursue debt collection, one must have a license
to collect. Its only after Petitioners filed an appeal in
the Fourth court and in the Maryland Court of Appeals
that Marsden & Seledee LLC got their Debt collection
license from the State of Maryland Department of La-
bor, Licensing and Regulation on October 1st, 2015
(Pet. App. 93). They did this in order to cover up their
illegal behavior over the years. Before that, when the
Firm went by Marsden, Botsaris & Seledee, they did
not have a license to collect debt in Maryland as well
10
which is against Federal and state laws in the United

States of America.
A. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange

change of contract while the case is in liti-
gation in Federal Court for Fourth Circuit
is in Bad faith.
On or around September 19th, 2015, The Appellee
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange changed Pe-
titioners homeowners insurance in the middle of this
litigation to cover their tracks without warning from
the Appellee. Petitioners received a new contract on or
around September 25th, 2015 with new clauses in a
mailing envelope without a date when it was mailed
(See Pet. App. 94 in order to cover up.). Appellees have
been engaged in interference of mail together with
other conspirators including failure to forward critical
mail. The court should find that, the Appellee is trying
to cover their illegal activity cited in the complaint in
an organized manner. CCIE also then added new
clauses in the new contract. Petitioners cancelled the
policy immediately and enrolled with a new insurance
company much cheaper than what CCIE has been
charging the Petitioners. Appellees who have a con-
tract with Petitioners unions engaged in organized
scheme in furtherance of violation of Title VII and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352) (Title
VII), as amended, as it appears in volume 42 of the
United States Code, beginning at section 2000e. Title
VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex and national origin. The Civil
11
Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) (CRA) and the Lily

Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-2) amend
several sections of Title VII. In addition, section 102 of
the CRA amends the Revised Statutes by adding a new
section following section 1977 (42 U.S.C. 1981), to pro-
vide for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in cases of intentional violations of Title VII,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and sec-
tion 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Additionally, this case involves abuse of process,
fraud, and misconduct, organized scheme in violation
of The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. 19611968 inter
alia by the Appellees in an effort to defeat justice. The
case involves public interest issues after Mr. Mua re-
ported widespread public corruption within the Prince
Georges County System. (A]buse of process (is) the in-
tentional use of legal process for an improper purpose
incompatible with the lawful function of the process by
one with an ulterior motive in doing so, and with re-
sulting damages. Respondent Counsel Mr. Joel
Seledee engaged in abuse of process in conspiracy to
defraud while working closely with the office of the At-
torney general, Defendant Prince Georges County, and
other coconspirators in Maryland. The Appellees in
this case worked closely with the Petitioners Mr. Muas
unions which had contract to provide insurance cover-
age for its members. Appellee initiated a case in state
court in conspiracy to defeat justice while cases ad-
dressing the same issues was in progress in Federal
12
Court. Petitioner Mr. Mua had a contract with Califor-

nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange to be reimbursed for
car rental expenses. Thus in order to advance the con-
spiracy to defeat justice, Respondents and other con-
spirator engaged in a deceit, deception, artifice, or
trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of the Pe-
titioners.
------------------------------------------------------------------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ISSUE I. CONTINOUS VIOLATION OF TITLE
VI AND TITLE VII AFTER THE APPELLEES
JOINED FORCES WITH OTHERS INCLUDING
THE STATE OF MARYLAND TO ADVANCE
THE DISCRIMINATION
A. CAUSES AND OPERATING FACTS COURT
OVERLOOKED.
Petitioner Mr. Mua engaged in a protected activity
in good faith and worked closely with National Endow-
ment for democracy (NED) in downtown Washington
DC to bring about positive change around the world.
Petitioner Mr. Mua led a social media following of more
than 100,000 followers to bring about social justice. Pe-
titioner Mr. Mua had other cases which were pending
before the Federal court when he removed this case to
the venue after his rights were violated by the state
agency in retaliation. The reason for suing in federal
court was due to violations of Title VII and Title VI in
the first case filed on May 5th, 2011. (See 8:11-cv-
01198-PJM Mua v. Board of Education of Prince
13
Georges County) Since that time, there has been a con-

tinuing discrimination and retaliation involving the
Appellees and State personnel in both state and Fed-
eral court. The appellee in this case has a relationship
with appellants Unions and his employer. The Federal
court ignored evidence of organized scheme despite
overwhelming evidence involving two states with an-
other case pending in the Washington DC Superior
court after it was transferred to Federal court in Mar-
yland (See THE ONEAL FIRM, LLP, et al. Vs.
MUA, JOSEPHAT Case No. 2013 SC3 004261:
Washington DC). The decision to appeal this case is
not taken lightly, especially concerning misconduct in-
volving highly connected individuals within Maryland
and it involves a Federal Judge Peter Messitte whom
Petitioners have requested him to recuse himself.
There appears to be a conflict of interest on several lev-
els involving the federal court and Petitioner Mr. Mua
and his family should not be retaliated against because
Petitioner Mr. Mua was engaged in protected activity
on behalf of American citizens.
B. Creating Change in Maryland

During His tenure in Prince Georges County, Pe-
titioner Mr. Mua was engaged in a protected activity
on behalf of the union members. Petitioner Mr. Mua
wrote widely and engaged with the lawmakers to make
the county a better place. Petitioner Mr. Mua wrote ar-
ticles based on information forwarded to him by the
union members and collaborated with the media. As a
result of the advocacy, Prince Georges County went
14
through a transformation which is ongoing. The only

problem now has been the retaliation part which has
caused damages to him and his family by the Appellees
in the cases Petitioners filed in the U.S. District Court
on December 8th, 2014. Petitioner Mr. Mua won his ad-
ministrative on November 26th, 2012 and due to retal-
iation and corruption in Maryland system, his
classification was changed and his documents con-
cealed with the appeal court in Prince Georges County.
This is against the state and federal law. On May 25th,
2016, the County lawyer has changed the facts and is
now misleading the court of special appeals for Mary-
land. In this case on May 23rd 2016, the appellees re-
taliated after Petitioner Mr. Mua wrote an opinion. At
the same time Federal Judge Peter Messitte dismissed
this case while other cases tied to this case were pend-
ing at the same time which overwhelmed us. The dis-
missal of this case in particular was done with the view
to shield the misconduct of the Union officials and at-
torneys who engaged in discrimination, failed to repre-
sent and engaged in organized scheme which is an
ongoing illegal activity and a threat to public life in
Maryland. This case and the cases listed below are
tied.
C. Federal Cases and various conflicts:

1. Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM Cal-
ifornia Casualty Indemnity Exchange v.
Mua et al
15

Mua et al v. California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange et al
Mua v. The Maryland Office of the Attor-
ney General et al
Mua v. Board of Education of Prince
Georges County/Prince Georges County
Public Schools et al
Mua v. Board of Education of Prince
Georges County
The above cases are tied and they all involve vio-
lations of title VII and title VI because of the intercon-
nection with the employer. There are clear acts of
retaliation in each one of them with the state of Mary-
land engaging in undermining of justice after Peti-
tioner Mr. Mua filed several grievances. The Federal
court failed to intervene and consolidate the actions
due to ongoing bias and retaliation. The opinion issued
by the U.S. District Federal court was misleading and
shields the Appellees in a clear case of unfairness and
discrimination.
On February 22nd, 2016, the California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange under Marsden & Seledee filed a
Motion to garnish wages of my wife Francoise Vanden-
plas and it was granted ex-parte. The Montgomery
County order to garnish wages of Petitioner Ms.
Vandenplas happened a week before Court of Appeals
16
for the Fourth Circuit issued their order on February

29th, 2016. How did the Appellees in this case know
the outcome of the case in advance to garnish wages of
Petitioner Ms. Vandenplas? They must have known
this in advance to harass Petitioner Ms. Vandenplas
who had nothing to do with the check in question be-
cause the contract to rent a car was done with Peti-
tioner Mr. Mua with appellee California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange.
The garnishment is unjustly because the insur-
ance company engaged in discrimination and breach of
contract inter alia. Because the opinion issued by U.S.
District Federal court affected this case filed on De-
cember 8th, 2014. Petitioners moved to reopen this
case on March 15th, 2016 since the case had been dis-
missed without prejudice and the cases in state court
where not final and there have been ongoing viola-
tions. The Motion to reopen was denied and documents
which we had filed responding to the Appellee Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange opposition Motion
were mailed back without logging them into ECF sys-
tem on April 8th, 2016.
Below are the events leading to dismissal of this
case (Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-03810-PJM) and the re-
lationship with Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM
and the manner they were both dismissed.
17
II. Proceedings In The District Court and vio-

lation of law
Mua et al v. California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange et al
a.) On February 3, 2015, Summons where
Returned Executed in Federal case No.
8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua et al v. Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al
b.) On February 4, 2015, the same day, Hon.
Judge Messitte dismissed Federal Case
No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM and sent the case
to Montgomery county Circuit Court.
c.) On February 13, 2015 Appellees filed Mo-
tion to dismiss without mailing a copy to
the Petitioners.
d.) On February 18, 2015, Petitioners filed a
line notifying the court of the violations.
e.) On February 24, 2015, instead of U.S. Dis-
trict Federal court admonishing the other
side for their illegal activity. The issue
was ignored and bias was directed to-
wards the Petitioners despite being the
victims.
f.) On 04/08/15 U.S. Federal District Court
GRANTED Petitioners Motion for Leave
to File and clarify the issues and then
later ignored the same order and issued a
flawed opinion and dismissed the case
stating it was based on res judicata de-
spite significant fraud and misconduct by
18
the state of Maryland which had been

brought to his attention through a status
update.
g.) 05/01/15 Federal court changed the rules
and stated that Petitioners could no
longer attach evidence and Motion more
than 50 pages despite the nature of the
case with interrelated issues.
h.) On 08/17/15 U.S. Federal District Court
dismissed the case based on res judicata
and other misleading theories to shield
the Appellees unjustly. There is no reason
for this when there was serious miscon-
duct by the Appellees in this case.
i.) On April 12, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court sent back documents filed in re-
sponse to the Motion filed by the Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange on
April 8th, 2016 without docketing the ev-
idence to our detriment.
j.) On May 9th, 2016, Petitioners filed Mo-
tion to enlarge time due to medical rea-
son.
k.) On May 10th, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court instead issued an order and made
false allegations that Petitioners had not
filed a timely response after the court
sent the documents back to Petitioners
detriment. Instead of mailing the order of
the court in a timely manner, he delayed
mailing the said order until May 18th,
2016.
19
l.) On May 23, 2016, Petitioners issued a no-

tice of a related case. But U.S. Federal
District Court will not give the other case
a chance to be heard.
m.) On May 26, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court issued another order and failed to
mail it until May 31, 2016. Petitioners re-
ceived the order on June 8th, 2016.

California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
v. Mua et al
(a.) Friday, January 23, 2015 Petitioners
wrote to the U.S. Federal District Court
requesting 15 days Extension of time due
to medical reasons and before the Motion
could be ruled upon, the U.S. Federal Dis-
trict Court issued an order dismissing the
case.
(b.) On February 3, 2015, Summons where
Returned Executed in Federal case No.
8:14-cv-03810-PJM Mua et al v. Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange et al
(c.) On February 4, 2015 The Summons
where Returned Executed in Federal case
No. 8:14-cv-03810-PJM were docketed by
the Deputy clerk of the court.
(d.) On February 4, 2015, the same day, U.S.
Federal District Court dismissed Federal
Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM and sent the
case to Montgomery county Circuit Court.
20
(e.) On February 4, 2015, U.S. Federal Dis-

trict Court also issued a flawed opinion.
(f.) On February 5, 2015, Petitioners filed a
response in opposition to strike. The Fed-
eral court docketed 1 page and sent the
rest of the documents back to us on Feb-
ruary 9th, 2015 which is prejudicial.
The reason for these irregular activities is due to
a conflict involving U.S. Federal District Court Federal
Judge who is a faculty member at American University
law school with attorney Michael Artz of the union in
the Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-02249-PJM. The unions
and the California Casualty Indemnity Exchange (in-
surance company) with ties to the unions engaged in
discrimination against Mr. Mua and his wife.
(g.) On April 8, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court sent back documents filed in re-
sponse to the Motion filed by the Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange
without docketing the evidence to the Pe-
titioners detriment.
(h.) On May 9th, 2016, Petitioners filed Mo-
tion to enlarge time due to medical rea-
son.
(i.) On May 10th, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court instead issued an order and made
false allegations that Petitioners had not
filed a timely response after U.S. Federal
District Court sent the documents back to
our detriment. Instead of mailing the or-
der of the court in a timely manner, U.S.
21
Federal District Court delayed mailing

the said order until May 18th, 2016.
(j.) On May 26, 2016, U.S. Federal District
Court issued another order and failed to
mail it until May 31, 2016. Petitioners re-
ceived the order on June 8th, 2016.
Other cases dismissed by U.S. Federal District
Court in suspicious manner now on Appeal in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit include the follow-
ing, Federal Appeal Case 16-1509 Josephat Mua v.
Board of Education of PG Co.; Federal Appeal Case 16-
1506 Josephat Mua v. The ONeal Law Firm, LLP; Fed-
eral Appeal Case 16-1503 Josephat Mua v. Attorney
General, Maryland; Federal Appeal Case 15-2363 Jo-
sephat Mua v. Board of Education of PG Co. The briefs
in court of Appeals are due almost at the same time.
U.S. Federal District Court appears to be interfering
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit and
has been interfering with some of the Motions which
we have filed in that court which has led to Bureau-
cratic incompetence. DISTRICT COURT UPDATE.PA-
PERLESS ORDER DENYING [32] Plaintiff s Motion
for a Stay of Memorandum and Order Filed on March
31, 2016. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on
4/13/2016. [15-2363] (JB)
III. U.S. Attorney Department of Education

conflict.
During the winter of 2010, Petitioner Mr. Mua
provided critical information to the Department of
22
Education office of the inspector General concerning

widespread corruption in prince George s County Pub-
lic schools. At the time, Petitioner Mr. Mua made the
reports, Mr. James Fisher worked as an attorney for
the U.S. Department of Education in Washington DC.
Due to undue influence, Mr. James Fisher resigned
from the U.S. Department of Education and joined the
Thatcher Law firm as an attorney for Prince Georges
County Public Schools. He engaged in serious miscon-
duct within the state court system including tamper-
ing with U.S. mail and concealment of evidence. Mr.
James Fisher now works with the Federal government
as a union lawyer but remains an attorney in my Fed-
eral case (8:11-cv-01198-PJM Mua v. Board of Educa-
tion of Prince Georges County) at which point he has
been a major influence to defeat justice using his ex-
tensive networks. The Thatcher law firm received mil-
lions of dollars in no bid contract by the local board.
The money which we suspect has been used over the
years to buy off lawyers to the detriment of the com-
munity and employees who sued the county system.
Petitioners humbly requests this court use its su-
pervisory power to get justice in this situation. What is
happening to the Petitioners is unconstitutional and a
violation of rights. To cover up their illegal schemes
and violation of rights, the Appellees in this case en-
gaged in malicious scheme to derail justice. This way,
their illegal activities continues. There should be no
two sets of laws.
Petitioners request this case be reversed and cases
in federal court be transferred to a neutral judge who
23
does not have close ties to Montgomery County, Prince

Georges County and Court of Special Appeals of Mar-
yland. In other words, a Judge who has never worked
in the courts in those jurisdictions because of various
conflicts of interest in progress. The dispute involving
significant violation of Petitioners rights arose from
the Maryland state courts in those areas. As Supreme
Court, can imagine, Petitioners expected that U.S. Dis-
trict Federal court would recognize the meaningful
value and importance of full discussion in resolving
discrimination complaints and preserving good rela-
tions. Petitioners also understand that from time to
time there may be misunderstandings and questions
concerning rules, policies, and personnel issues. But
clearly this is not the issue here, the issue is policy,
laws and procedures are being ignored and the court
which is supposed to cure these wrongs is now turning
against the Petitioners in a suspicious manner. Federal
law is supposed to be the law of the land which gives
employees a way to have complaints addressed rapidly,
fairly, and without fear of reprisal but not in Petition-
ers cases because of discrimination and retaliation
fueled by organized scheme in Maryland which is on-
going.
24
Issue two: The Plaintiff must establish venue

by a preponderance of the evidence, and the
trial courts decision is reviewed by this court
de novo. United States v. Newsom, 9 F.3d 337,
338 (4th Cir. 1993).
VI. Proceedings In The District Court
The Federal District Court erred in its findings
that there was no bad faith, breach of contract, viola-
tion of rights, fraud committed by the Appellee and the
state actors working under color of law in California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Mua et al, No.
8:2015cv00060 Document 38 (D. Md. 2015); and not
only does their finding conflict with established prece-
dent case law, but it also conflicts with itself from one
Judgement to the next. It is clear from the record that
the Appellee counsel Marsden and Seledees conduct
clearly falls outside of prevailing professional norms
and standards (Martin v. Rose supra). The Petitioners
contends that the errors are so prejudicial as to meet
the requirements under U.S. v. Cronic supra as Per Se
Error. Failing this, one may still use it to meet the first
prong on the Strickland Test (Strickland v. Washington
supra). In failing to address this matter the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County and the Federal court
clearly abused its discretion involving unreasonable
application of Federal Law as established by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Black Law Diction-
ary (7th Edition) defines wrong-doing as a violation
of the law i.e. crime. When appellee CCIE engaged in
violating the rights of the Petitioners by using the
court system to collect debt using in violation of
25
Federal law, they made the judgement which they got

to be void.
------------------------------------------------------------------
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

IV. Standard of Review
The court of appeals reviews de novo the district
courts evaluation of judicial concerns, such as the in-
terrelationship of certified claims and remaining
claims, and the possibility of piecemeal review. See
Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Cir.
1989) (mixed question of law and fact); see also Amer-
isourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946,
949 (9th Cir. 2006) (The district courts Rule 54(b) cer-
tification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to deter-
mine if it will lead to piecemeal appeals and for clear
unreasonableness on the issue of equities.); Wood v.
GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that judicial concerns are reviewed de novo).
The court of appeals reviews for abuse of discretion the
district courts assessment of equitable factors, such as
prejudice and delay. See Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1519;
cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Gregorian for the single proposition that
the court reviews a Rule 54(b) certification for abuse of
discretion).
26
A. The district court abused its discretion

in dismissing the Petitioners claims.
On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
sole obligation of the party who did not prevailed at
trial is to show that there is substantial evidence that
supports the verdict. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48
F.3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) Circumstantial evi-
dence can defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 777-789 (4th Cir.
1998). In this case, Petitioners Mr. Mua and Mrs.
Vandenplas has enough direct and circumstantial evi-
dence to prevail on trial.
ARGUMENT ONE
The lower court erred in shielding the appel-
lees after they engaged in organized scheme in
violation of the First Amendment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
FOR LAWYER SANCTIONS
The American Bar Association Standards for Im-
posing Lawyer Sanctions (the ABA Standards) that
the proper standard of proof for violations of the rele-
vant rules of professional conduct is clear and con-
vincing evidence. See ABA Standards 1.3. The
panoply of available sanctions for attorney misconduct
includes disbarment, suspension, fine, public repri-
mand, and private reprimand. Id. 2.2 2.10. When
such misconduct has been proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, the court is obliged in formulating the ap-
propriate discipline to consider both aggravating and
27
mitigating factors, as well as the potential or actual

injury resulting from the misconduct. Id. 3.0.
Turning to the merits of the claims against each
Defendant in this case, the court should examine them
in ascending order of seriousness. First, starting with
the conduct of Appellee Marsden & Seledee LLC in
misleading the court that Petitioners filed their coun-
ter claim untimely. Petitioners Lawyers in this case
mislead the Federal court that Petitioners did not file
their counterclaim timely. The debt collector Marsden
& Seledee did not have a license to collect debt in Mar-
yland. The Appellee worked in organized manner with
the state of Maryland and other conspirators to por-
tray Petitioners in bad light through discrimination,
breached contracts, confiscated their personal property
and garnishment of wages in retaliation.
------------------------------------------------------------------
LAWYER CONDUCT
That a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involv-
ing fraud and misrepresentation[s]. Marsden &
Seledee LLC via Mr. Joel Seledee who acted as unli-
censed Debt collector was hired by the Appellee Cali-
fornia casualty Indemnity Exchange. Mr. Seledee
engaged in misrepresentations in the Petitioners case.
Appellee misled the court to get a favorable opinion
to the detriment of the Petitioners. The breach of con-
tracts, the change of contract after the case was dis-
missed, was designed in a way by the appellee to
escape justice. This court has power to review the
28
issues and reverse the judgement of the Montgomery

County District Court because it was fraudulent.
ARGUMENT 2
Petitioners established a prima facie case for
retaliation.
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of retali-
ation in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53 (2006) (a plaintiff must show that a rea-
sonable employee would have found the challenged ac-
tion materially adverse, which in this context means it
well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination. ).
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, a
plaintiff must show:
1) they engaged in protected activity;
2) the defendant took action that would be
materially adverse to a reasonable em-
ployee or job applicant; and,
3) there is a causal connection between the
protected activity and the asserted ad-
verse action.
Petitioner Mr. Mua and Ms. Vandenplas estab-
lished a prima facie claim for retaliation and discrimi-
nation.
First, Mr. Mua engaged in protected activity by fil-
ing union grievances long before filing a lawsuit
against California Casualty Indemnity Exchange. The
29
Fourth Circuit has adopted an expansive view of what

constitutes oppositional conduct. DeMasters v. Carilion
Clinic, 796 F.3rd 409, 417 (4th Cir. 2015). Listed below
are some of the National Origin discrimination com-
plaints Mr. Mua filed with the Board and the state of
Maryland: See status report Federal Case Mua v. Mar-
yland Office of the Attorney General el al. 8:14-cv-
02070-PJM ECF #3 Filed 11/18/14 and Exhibits; See
also Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attorney General el
al Federal Case 8:14-cv-02070-PJM ECF #32-1 Filed
04/20/15 Page, See Mua v. Maryland Office of the Attor-
ney General el al Federal Case 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Doc-
ument 32 Filed 04/20/15 Page 1 of 1; See Exhibits
attached to District court record ECF#28.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the but for cau-
sation standard has been met because this is a McDon-
nell Douglas retaliation claim. Foster v. University of
Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F. 3d 243, 246 (4th Cir.
2015) (Nasser does not alter the legal standard for ad-
judicating a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim.)
A. Petitioners demonstrated that the Ap-

pellees reason for ganging up to termi-
nate their car insurance was false, and
that discrimination was the real rea-
son.
Mr. Mua and Ms. Vandenplas demonstrated that
the Appellee California casualty nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating their car insurance was false,
30
and that retaliation was the real reason after Peti-

tioner Mr. Mua published an opinion touching on the
union officials who were engaged in discrimination.
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-
Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011). There
was never any discovery in this case and the Appellee
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange took ad-
vantage of the situation to cover up their own miscon-
duct which was uncovered after Petitioners found the
Marsden & Seledee LLC did not have a license to col-
lect debt in Maryland which is a violation of law.
ARGUMENT 3:
Did the lower court err as a matter of law in
which contracts containing several promises
by Appellee California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change could not enforced?
Appellee California casualty Indemnity Exchange
promised to reimburse rental car expenses but later
refused to do so and changed the contract in the middle
of the case in conspiracy to cover up their illegal
agenda. The question seems to turn upon the character
of the breach viewed in the light of the intent of the
parties in making the contract. Separate actions can-
not be instituted on the various promises; where divisi-
ble they may be sued on separately. (See Secor v.
Sturgis, note i1O supra; Williams-Abbott Electric Co. v.
Model Electric Co., 134 Ia. 665, 112 N. W. 181, 13 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 529 with note; Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N.
Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) io42; Conkle v.
Laughlin, 83 Pa. Super Ct. 468; Helsey v. Am. Mineral
31
Prodn. Co., 118 Wash. 591, 204 Pac. i9o; Felt City Town-
site Co. v. Felt Inv. Co., 50 Utah 364, x67 Pac. 835.)
The test is the intent of the parties and how they
regarded the promises. A method of determining such
intention, where, as is usually the case, it is not defi-
nitely expressed, is to determine the apportionability
of the consideration, i.e. whether the consideration
seems to have been given as a whole for all the prom-
ises, and hence they are indivisible, or whether a part
of the consideration applies to each separate promise
so that they were viewed separately by the parties.
(See Bridgeport v. Scott Co. 94 Conn. 461, iog Atl. 162;
Kalm v. Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 Atl. 165; Peist
v. Richmond, 97 Vt. 97, 122 Atl. 420; 29 YAL4 L. J. 296.).
In this case, Petitioner Mr. Mua was authorized to rent
a car by the appellee California casualty Indemnity
Exchange working closely with Enterprise rental car.
The check in question was only addressed to Petitioner
Mr. Mua. The appellee engaged in bad faith by failing
to verify the issue before filing a lawsuit. This honora-
ble court should reverse and remand so that discovery
could occur.
32
ARGUMENT 4.
Whether the Maryland and state personnel
working under color of law can assist unli-
censed debt collector to garnish wages and
confiscate personal property of an employee in
an organized scheme and stay out of the case,
which violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives
owners of their property without affording
constitutionally adequate notice due to dis-
crimination.
(1.) Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 42(a) provides for consoli-
dation of cases involving common questions of law or
fact:
When actions involving common questions of
law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions; it may or-
der all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning the proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO or Act), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, provides a
private right of action for treble damages to [a]ny per-
son injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of the Acts criminal prohibitions. Bridge
v.Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 641 (2008)
(quoting 1964(c)). Specifically, 1964 provides, in
part:
33
(c) Any person injured in his business or

property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a rea-
sonable attorneys fee . . .
18 U.S.C. 1961 specifically provides:
As used in this chapter
(1) racketeering activity means (A) any act
or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extor-
tion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in a controlled substance or listed chemi-
cal (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act), which is
chargeable under State law and punisha-
ble by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable un-
der any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code: Section 201 (re-
lating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473
(relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate ship-
ment) if the act indictable under section
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), sections 891-894 (relating to ex-
tortionate credit transactions), section
1028 (relating to fraud and related activ-
ity in connection with identification docu-
ments), section 1029 (relating to fraud
34
and related activity in connection with

access devices), section 1084 (relating to
the transmission of gambling infor-
mation), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial
institution fraud), section 1425 (relating
to the procurement of citizenship or na-
tionalization unlawfully), section 1426
(relating to the reproduction of naturali-
zation or citizenship papers), section 1427
(relating to the sale of naturalization or
citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465
(relating to obscene matter), section 1503
(relating to obstruction of justice), section
1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (relating to
the obstruction of State or local law en-
forcement), section 1512 (relating to tam-
pering with a witness, victim, or an
informant), section 1513. (Citation omit-
ted). . . . (Footnote and punctuation in
original).
The Hobbs Act defines extortion, in relevant part, as
the obtaining of property from another, with his con-
sent, . . . under color of official right. 18 U.S.C.
1951(b)(2). This Court has held that a public official
violates that statute when he obtain[s] a payment to
which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment
was made in return for official acts. Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
Rather than dismiss the Petitioners case, this
court can order consolidation as Petitioners had
35
requested and let the case proceed. (See quotation from

Secor v. Sturges, given above, shows, if the plaintiff
avoids the rule against splitting and is held to have two
distinct causes of action, it is in general entirely at his
option whether to join them or not. The only exception
seems to be one coming from the common law, that the
court on motion of the defendant may at its discretion
order two or more suits consolidated in one, as sepa-
rate counts therein in order to avoid undue hardship
upon the defendant.
This court reviews a state and U.S. District courts
grant of dismissal de novo to determine whether there
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 305 F.3d
1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002). In considering whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact, the
court does not weigh the evidence but instead inquires
whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence pre-
sented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. (See Gullickson Southwest Airlines Pilots
Assn, 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 1996), citing Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
See also Munguia v. Unified School Dist. No. 328, 125
F.3d 1353, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997). In analyzing a sum-
mary judgment motion, the court may not make cred-
ibility determinations or weigh the evidence, and
must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving
party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). The nonmoving party must be given wide
36
berth to prove a factual controversy exists. Jeffries v.

State of Kan., 147 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998).
In the instant case, both the U.S. district court and
the State court erroneously ignored the evidence and
failed to weighed the evidence and the record in the
light most favorable to the Petitioners. As discussed in
detail below, a reasonable jury, when faced with the ev-
idence presented here, could return a verdict for Peti-
tioners on their discrimination claims, violation of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, et
seq, as amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Prac-
tices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq., violation of
title VII and new theories.
ARGUMENT 5:
The Lower Court Erred By Dismissing Peti-
tioners Counterclaim And That Judgments
Obtained In The District Court Of Maryland,
Against Petitioners, Where The Party Seeking
The Judgments Did Not Have The Legal Right
Or Standing To Do So In Addition To Fraud Is
Void.
A. The Public Policy Behind the Maryland Col-
lection Agency Licensing Act (MCALA) Jus-
tifies an Exception to the Public Policy
Relating to Finality of Judgments.
There is no doubt that the legislatures enactment
of MCALA set forth the public policy of this State
relating to the activities of debt collectors. Any person
37
who wanted to act as a debt collector had to be licensed.

In this case, the M&S regularly engaged in debt col-
lection activities on behalf of Appellee and others over
the years, primarily by invoking the judiciary by filing
lawsuits, when it was not licensed. The Court of Ap-
peals for Maryland has previously held that public pol-
icy considerations can alter judicial principles. In
National Glass Inc. v. JC Penney Properties, Inc., 336
Md. 606 (1994) the court held that a lien waiver provi-
sion that applied through a contractual choice of law
would not be enforced in Maryland. The decision was
based on the existence of Marylands strong public pol-
icy favoring liens.
There is a Maryland case on point with the facts
of this case. See Larry FINCH, et al. v. LVNV FUND-
ING LLC in this case, Maryland Courts resolved simi-
lar issues. In addition, the Appellate Court of Illinois
in L VNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 952 N.E.2d 1232 (II.
App. 2011) addressed the identical issue before. LVNV
had obtained judgments in Illinois state courts in vio-
lation of a licensing statute. The licensing statute in-
cluded criminal penalties. The Trice court held that the
judgments obtained by LVNV were void based on leg-
islative intent. Id. at 1234. The court viewed it as a sub-
ject matter jurisdiction issue. Id. at 1235. The same
thing is applicable in this case. The Debt collector
Marsden & Seledee LLC was not licensed at the time
appellee sought the debt and the statue the appellee
violated carries criminal penalties.
Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act
(MCALA) includes a provision for criminal penalties
38
for violations. 7-401 (b), Business Regulations Arti-

cle. Appellee CCIE hired a debt collection agency
which did not have a license to collect debt in Mary-
land. As such, judgments are void as a matter of law
based on the violation of the statute. This court should
vacate the judgement obtained by unlicensed collec-
tion agency in the interest of justice. Further, the evi-
dence shows that, Montgomery County District court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case or par-
ties due to violation of Federal law. This might explain
the reasons why the appellee has kept tampering with
the date stamps of the filings done within the court.
These actions constitute misconduct by the attorney
and is alleged with clear and convincing evidence. If
the lower court had allowed the case to move forward
to discovery or allowed for an investigation to occur,
the court would have discovered these violations and
issues could have been addressed by now.
In Stein v. Smith, 358 Md. 670, 674, (Md. 2000) the
Court of Appeals held that a complaint filed by a de-
funct corporate entity was a nullity. Therefore, there
was nothing to subsequently amend. Petitioners sub-
mit that a collection action filed by an unlicensed col-
lection agency should also be held to be a nullity. At a
minimum, the alternative relief sought by Petitioners,
that the courts should not aid in enforcing the void
judgments, should have been granted by the Montgom-
ery County Circuit Court and the United States Dis-
trict Court in Greenbelt Maryland. In the absence of
such remedy, this court should review, vacate and re-
mand in the interest of justice. Moreover, allowing the
39
judgments obtained in violation of the law, including

one that provides for criminal penalties, may only en-
courage others to violate the law if they can retain
rights that they were never entitled to assert.
ARGUMENT 6.
Since Marsden & Seledee LLCs lacked the
Mandatory License Required by Law, It Lacked
Standing to Pursue the Debt Collection by Lit-
igation.
In a past ruling before the Maryland Courts,
Judge Richard D. Bennett has aptly summarized col-
lection agencys duty to have a license to act as a col-
lection agency in Maryland: The Maryland Collection
Agency Licensing Act, Md.Code Ann., Bus. Reg., 7-
101 et seq. (MCALA) requires that a person must
have a license whenever the person does business as a
collection agency in the State. Id. at 7-301(a). For the
purposes of this lawsuit, Maryland law defines a col-
lection agency as a person who engages directly or
indirectly in the business of: (ii) Collecting a consumer
claim the person owns, if the claim was in default when
the person acquired it. Id. at 7-101(c). . . . MCALA is
clear on its face it requires that any person who di-
rectly or indirectly engages in collecting debts or credit
must be licensed. Id. at 7-101(c), 7-301(a). Moreover,
if there were any confusion, there is ample legislative
history confirming the Maryland General Assemblys
intention to require companies that acquire defaulted
consumer debt, such as Hilco, to be licensed. For exam-
ple: House Bill 1324 extends the purview of the State
40
Collection Agency Licensing Board to include persons

who collect consumer claims acquired when claims
were in default. These persons are known as debt pur-
chasers since they purchase delinquent consumer
debt resulting from credit card transactions and other
bills; these persons then own the debt and seek to col-
lect from consumers like other collection agencies who
act on behalf of original creditors. H.B. 1324, 2007 Leg.
Sess., S. Fin. Comm. (Md. 2007), ECF No. 16-9.
The law does not require licensing for businesses
that only collect their own consumer debts. . . . How-
ever, the evolution of the debt collection industry has
created a loophole used by some entities as a means
to circumvent current State collection agency laws. En-
tities such as debt purchasers or collection agencies
such Marsden & Seledee who enter into agreements
with insurance companies like Appellee California
Casualty Indemnity exchange to collect delinquent
consumer debt which is falsified rather than acting as
an agent for the original creditor, currently collect con-
sumer debt in the State without complying with any
licensing or bonding requirement. The federal govern-
ment has recognized and defined debt purchasers or
debt collection agencies, and requires that these enti-
ties fully comply with the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. This legislation would include debt pur-
chasers or collection agencies such as Marsden &
Seledee within the definition of a collection agency,
and require them to be licensed by the Board before
they may collect consumer claims in the State of Mar-
yland. Testimony in Support of HB 1324 by Charles W.
41
Turnbaugh, Commr Fin. Reg. (emphasis removed),

ECF No. 16-9. Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765
F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (D. Md. 2011).
The Court of Appeals has explained that instances
such as this one, A judgment by a court without juris-
diction over the parties is not merely erroneous, but is
absolutely void and may be assailed at all times, and
in all proceedings by which it is sought to be enforced.
Hanley v. Donoghue, 59 Md. 239, 243, 244, 43 Am.Rep.
554; Wilmer v. Epstein, 116 Md. 140, 145, 81 A. 379.
In other words, a void judgment is subject to attack
either directly by appeal or collaterally. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565; Staley v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., Md. 56 A.2d 144, 148; Keen v. Keen, Md.,
60 A.2d 200, 203-205. It does not constitute res judi-
cata. Presstman v. Silljacks, 52 Md. 647; Josselson v.
Sonneborn, 110 Md. 546, 552, 73 A. 650. State v. Am-
brose, 191 Md. 353, 369, (1948). See also Bd. of Zoning
Appeals of Howard County v. Meyer, 207 Md. 389, 394,
(1955) (It is obvious that the Courts order of Novem-
ber 20, 1953, affirming the decision of the Zoning Com-
missioner was void, and consequently it was not res
judicata of the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals
on the new application. State v. Ambrose, 191 Md. 353,
369, 62 A.2d 359, 365; Restatement, Judgments, le,
7).
Recently in a similar context the Court of Appeals
explained that a party seeking to use summary land-
lord-tenant proceedings in jurisdictions requiring
landlords to have a license, had no right to do so unless
it had the required license and the District Court was
42
without jurisdiction to hear the dispute. McDaniel v.

Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 586-87 (2011). Previously,
the Court of Appeals for Maryland also held: That if a
statute requiring a license for conducting a trade, busi-
ness or profession is regulatory in nature for the pro-
tection of the public, rather than merely to raise
revenue, an unlicensed person will not be given the as-
sistance of the courts in enforcing contracts within the
provisions of the regulatory statute because such en-
forcement is against public policy. Harry Berenter, Inc.
v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 293 (1970).
Since Marsden & Seledee LLC (M&S) acting on
behalf of Appellee in this case did not have the manda-
tory license required for collection agencies under
MCALA, at the time it initiated the Josephat Mua and
Francoise Vandenplas Collection Action, it lacked
standing to pursue judgments and was not entitled to
the judgments it obtained from the District Court of
Montgomery County Maryland and United States Dis-
trict Court in Greenbelt Maryland against the Peti-
tioners. This is because the District Court of
Montgomery county did not have jurisdiction and the
collection agency Marsden & Seledee violated the state
and Federal law. Therefore, those judgments are void.
43
ARGUMENT 7
What Test Should Courts Use To Determine
Whether An Employees Opposition To Particular
Actions Constitutes Protected Conduct Such That
Retaliation Against The Employee For His Oppo-
sition Would Violate Title VII?
It is well established courts apply the objectively
reasonable test to determine whether an employees
opposition to actions constitutes protected conduct
such that retaliation against the employee for his op-
position would violate 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) (Title VII).
Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338-39
(4th Cir. 2006) (citing EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,
424 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th Cir.2005)) (The plain mean-
ing of [Title VII] provides protection of an employees
opposition activity when the employee responds to an
actual unlawful employment practice. Reading the lan-
guage generously to give effect to its purpose, however,
we have also held that opposition activity is protected
when it responds to an employment practice that the
employee reasonably believes is unlawful.); Peters v.
Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2003). Under the
test, opposition will be protected if it targets actions
the employee objectively, reasonably believes are un-
lawful, even if they are not actually unlawful. Johnson
v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 309 F. Appx 675, 685
(4th Cir. 2009) (The retaliation claimant does not have
to show that the underlying discrimination claim was
meritorious to prevail on a related retaliation claim).
Applying the objectively reasonable test to com-
plaints about perceived workplace harassment has
44
been problematic. Under the totality of circum-

stances test, workplace harassment is not actionable
unless and until it becomes severe or pervasive,
considered in light of the totality of the circum-
stances. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
However, the Supreme Court has long encouraged em-
ployees to complain of harassing conduct before it be-
comes severe or pervasive, and an employee who
defers complaining about harassing conduct until after
that conduct has become severe or pervasive for-
feits the right to seek legal redress. Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Jordan 458 F.3d at
354 (dissenting opinion) (The Ellerth/Faragher de-
fense thus stands for the proposition that an employee
who unreasonably fails to report racially hostile con-
duct cannot pursue a hostile work environment claim
because, by his silence, he was complicit in the con-
duct.). Inflexible application of these principles to
workplace harassment cases puts at risk an employee
who heeds the Supreme Courts call to complain of har-
assing conduct before it becomes severe or perva-
sive. Some courts, such as the district court in this
case, conclude such proactive opposition is unprotected
because the court below dismissed the case, Mua v.
Board of Education of Prince Georges County/Prince
Georges County Public Schools et al, prematurely
without issuing summons or review evidence concern-
ing each Defendant in this case. Petitioner Mr. Mua
filed numerous grievances with the union, the admin-
istration and Maryland state agents. The Federal court
was made aware of the harassing activities which
45
continued until the filing of this suit against the

Appellees. While it may be objectively reasonable to be-
lieve the harassing acts, if continued, will become se-
vere or pervasive or both, it may not be objectively
reasonable to believe they are already severe or per-
vasive. In this case, appellee used pretext to pursue
fake debt and then then the Federal court covered up
the illegal activity instead of rectifying the issues.
ARGUMENT 8:
The District Courts Decision Undermines The
Title Vii Requirement That Employees Report
Harassment At The First Opportunity
The Supreme Court has many times observed that
the primary objective of Title VII is a prophylactic
one. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975). Title VII is intended to promote [c]ooperation
and voluntary compliance. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44.
With regard to workplace harassment, [f ]or example,
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mecha-
nisms. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. In hostile work envi-
ronment cases, Title VII t[ies] the liability standard to
an employers effort to install effective grievance pro-
cedures. Suders, 542 U.S. at 145.
Accordingly, in Faragher and Ellerth the Supreme
Court established, and in Suders the Court applied, an
affirmative defense permitting an employer to avoid
strict liability for one employees harassment of
46
another. The two necessary elements of the defense

are (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior
and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807. The objective of the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense is to incentivize prompt com-
plaints about (and responses to) workplace harass-
ment. Consequently, although a hostile work
environment is characterized only by harassment that
is severe or pervasive, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Faragher/Ellerth defense is in-
tended to prevent and correct any . . . harassing be-
havior. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has stated explicitly and repeat-
edly that the affirmative defenses linkage of liability
limitation to effective preventive and corrective
measures was intended to serve Title VIIs deterrent
purpose by encourag[ing] employees to report harass-
ing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive.
Suders, 542 U.S. at 145 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
764) (emphasis added).
The district courts decision and the Jordan stand-
ard that it applies conflict with Faragher, Ellerth, and
Suders. According to the courts decision, an employer
may retaliate against an employee if the employee
complains of harassment not yet sufficiently severe or
pervasive to sustain an objectively reasonable belief
that the employer committed an unlawful employment
47
practice. Boyer-Liberto, 2013 WL 1413031. In this

case, Appellee used the unlicensed collection agency to
harass the Petitioners after Petitioner brought a case
for wrongful termination against the unions which had
ties with the appellee. This case was a pretext to un-
dermine justice by the Appellee CCIE who was work-
ing in conspiracy with his employer and the unions
which have ties to the apple CCIE.
ARGUMENT 9
Whether it was proper for the lower court to
dismiss the action after significant misconduct
by the Appellees working with the state agen-
cies under color of law to violate rights guar-
anteed by the U.S. Constitution?
In dismissing this case, the U.S. District court at
Greenbelt Maryland cited Res judicata based on De-
cember 10th, 2014 hearing which was fraudulent after
various violations including denial of discovery. Peti-
tioners raised the issue of fraud in the state court pro-
ceedings to seeking to set aside the state court
judgement but were denied. As shown by the record,
there was significant fraud involving the trial in the
Montgomery county District state court and the lower
Federal Courts failed to set aside the judgements. Ac-
cording to Duke law journal, FINAL JUDGMENTS
frequently are not accorded the finality the term sug-
gests, and their binding effect may be eviscerated in a
number of ways. In appropriate circumstances these
judgments may be nullified either directly or collater-
ally, and occasionally may be attacked via a hybrid
48
proceeding. The final state court judgment, valid on its

face, is attacked in a federal court on the ground of
fraud as Petitioners presented in this case. The pur-
pose of this comment is to identify the fraudulent con-
duct for which a federal court will grant relief from a
final state court judgment and to ascertain the scope
of the relief which may be granted.
In United States v. Throckmorton the Supreme
Court laid down the general rule for granting relief
from prior final judgments on the ground of fraud. The
Court there was concerned with an attempt to avoid
the effect of a final judgment on the ground that the
judgment had been based in part on a forged document
which had been admitted as evidence. In denying re-
lief, the Court acknowledged that extrinsic or collat-
eral fraud which prevented a losing party from fully
presenting his case so that no real contest occurred
would be sufficient to set aside a prior judgment, but
held that fraud as to any matter which was actually
presented and considered in the judgment assailed
would be insufficient to support the attacking action.
On various forums both in state and federal court,
Petitioners have been unable to present their case due
to extrinsic or collateral fraud which has prevented the
Petitioners in this case from fully presenting their case
due to the Appellees misconduct backed up by agents
of the state working under color of law. In this case, an
application of the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction is very
clear. The court should find that, the fraud charged has
prevented the Petitioners in this case from making a
full and fair defense of their claims in the lower courts.
49
The U.S. Federal District court, Montgomery county

District court, Montgomery County Circuit Court re-
lied on fraudulent conduct of Appellees. That, fraudu-
lent conduct of Appellee California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange and Appellee Marsden & Seledee
prevented the Petitioners from fairly and fully present-
ing their claims or defenses is extrinsic fraud. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, must show its utter
impartiality and hold that false evidence, tampering of
transcripts, change of official stamped documents to
insert a different date while prejudicing the Petition-
ers is a ground for reversal. This court should vacate
the judgement of the lower court in the interest of jus-
tice.
ARGUMENT 10.
Whether the Federal court can ignore the law
and the evidence and issue a flawed opinion
without considering all the facts surrounding
the case which is prejudicial to the Petition-
ers?
The U.S. Federal District court was presented with
overwhelming evidence concerning the misconduct of
the Appellee including evidence on how the state
assisted the appellee after they changed official
stamps. The opinion of the U.S. District court (Pet. App.
7-12) is silent on fraud allegations and other violations
of other law committed by the appellee CCIE. And
presented to the Federal court. After the state court
engaged in denial of due process rights, discrimination
and interference of documents presented in court,
50
petitioners removed this case to Federal court on or

around January 8, 2015 in the interest of justice be-
cause the Federal court was already handling violation
of title VII in cases already in Federal court tied to this
one. Instead of the Federal court adjudicating the
claims, the Federal denied the removal and sent the
case back to the state court. The Supreme court has
held that a state court could not properly deny removal
of a proceeding from a state court to a federal court if
the general nature of the proceeding for which removal
was sought was one of which the federal courts could
rightfully take cognizance. The Court regarded an ac-
tion to set aside a judgment in which the losing party
had been fraudulently prevented from asserting a
valid defense as being in the general nature of a pro-
ceeding of which a federal court could rightfully take
cognizance under its equity power. Due to these viola-
tions, this court should vacate the judgement of the
lower courts in the interest of justice and remand the
case for trial under a different Federal judge in the in-
terest of justice.
ARGUMENT 11.
Whether third party retaliation was a motivat-
ing factor by the appellee CCIE after Petitioner
Mr. Mua sued the unions and the state agencies
in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua v.
The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et
al (Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503)?
Petitioner Mr. Mua sued his employer and the un-
ions with ties to the Appellee in this case for lack of fair
51
representation. Since May 5th, 2011, Petitioner Mr.

Mua brought claims for lack of fair representation.
Since filing a case against the office of the attorney
general, in Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-02070-PJM Mua
v. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General et al
(Fourth Circuit Appeal No. 16-1503), the Appellees in
this case retaliated shortly thereafter by initiating the
original suit. Petitioner Mrs. Vandenplas who is Cau-
casian and of European origin had nothing to do with
the check issued to Petitioner Mr. Mua and her name
was not in it. (See Case 8:14-cv-03810-PJM Document
16-2 Filed 02-23-15). She is a very disciplined admin-
istrator who has been dragged in this litigation by the
Appellees on purpose. The garnishment of wages was
done with malicious intention and to destroy her char-
acter. Petitioners requested the state and Federal court
to deposit supersedeas bond which is allowed in this
type of cases but was denied. Appellees without warn-
ing interfered with Petitioner Mrs.Vandenplas and
failed to put into consideration that, she was not listed
as a recipient of the check issued to Petitioner Mr. Mua
after he negotiated a contract with the appellee Cali-
fornia casualty Indemnity Exchange.
Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court expanded the
scope of retaliation liability for employers under Title
VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. In overrul-
ing precedents in a number of circuits (including the
Eighth), the Court held that an employee who has not
engaged in any protected activity has a valid cause of
action for retaliation if the employer took adverse
52
action against him because of his connection to an-

other employee who had filed a charge of discrimina-
tion with the EEOC. The future scope of this type of
third party retaliation claim is unsettled, but is con-
sistent with the Supreme Courts recent expansion of
Title VII retaliation liability. In this case, Petitioner
Mr. Mua was suing the unions which had contractual
ties with the appellee California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange. In Thompson v. North American Stainless,
L.P., both Eric Thompson and his fiance, Miriam Re-
galado, were employed by North American Stainless
(NAS). Regalado filed an EEOC charge alleging sex
discrimination against NAS. Thompson admitted that
he did not engage in any statutorily protected activity,
either on his own behalf or on behalf of his fiance. But
three weeks after Regalado filed her charge, NAS fired
Thompson. The same thing is applicable in this case
concerning the harassment currently in progress
against Petitioner Francoise Vandenplas. Due to these
violations, this court should vacate the judgement of
the lower courts in the interest of justice and remand
for trial under a new judge.
ARGUMENT 12.
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County and the
Federal District Court of Maryland erred in ignoring
the Fraud committed by Appellee California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange and the Maryland state officials
under color of law. The courts below also erred in find-
ing the counterclaim filed Petitioners was untimely
when the opposite was true. Both courts did not
53
address these issues which is a clear violation of peti-

tioners rights to a fair trial.
It is a given that for any case there are a multitude
of possible defense strategies. To attack judgement of
the court after Trial Counsel misled the courts is a
high hurdle to overcome. In this case questioning the
choice and/or quality of strategy with respect to poor
adjudication and ineffective assistance of the courts
below is the issue this court needs to review.
A. Conflict within Federal District Courts

Own Order Regarding the violations
Federal U.S. District Order dated February 4th,
2015 (Pet. App. 7-12) is not only inconsistent with the
law but confusing and directly contradicts itself in the
span of several sentences throughout including refer-
ring the Debt collector Marsden & Seledee as a creditor
and not a debt collector. In one sentence Judge Mes-
sitte states that the Defendants filed a counterclaim
on November 3, 2014, which the state court struck as
untimely. (Pet. App. 7-12). The court ignored over-
whelming evidence in which the state of Maryland was
engaged in violating the rights of Petitioners by con-
cealing documents within the state of Maryland court
system. This order violates the Petitioners rights to
Due Process and Equal Treatment under the law as
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. It is clearly an abuse of this Courts
discretion and should not be allowed to stand as it
includes an unreasonable application of clearly
54
established Federal Law as determined by the Su-

preme Court of the United States.
B. Prejudice
Having established that there was a breach of con-
tract, discrimination in termination provisions, viola-
tion of fair debt collection practices, violation of union
rules because the insurance had a contract with the
union membership to keep confidential agreements.
One must now examine the impact of this professional
error. Once the appellee Counsel placed the infor-
mation in the public domain, the bell could not be un-
rung, so what choice did the Petitioners have but to
defend their actions. Lying under oath was not an op-
tion, and neither was trying to avoid corroborating it
for fear of appearing evasive. The Petitioners have
been on trial for their lives, literally, and needed the
jury to believe their testimony. This was the crucial
pivoting point for the whole case, however the court be-
low failed to assist the petitioners. The appellee attor-
ney committed serious errors, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different if the appellee attorney had spoken
the truth. Should this fail to meet the Cronic standard
it would meet the second prong requirement under
Strickland v. Washington supra.
A divided U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that re-
taliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 must be established using a but-for causation
standard, rejecting an employees argument that the
55
lower motivating factor causation test applied. Uni-

versity of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar,
No. 12-484 (June 24, 2013).
------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
As a matter of first impression definitive guidance
is required from this Court to set the standard for the
waiver of Attorney-Union Client Privilege (S. Ct. Rule
10(c)). Furthermore, this guidance is required to re-
solve conflicts between the circuit courts and within
the Maryland Court of Appeals because and within the
Fourth Circuit itself (S. Ct. Rule 10(a), 10(b)).
Attorney-Union Client Privilege, while not a Con-
stitutional right, is still a cornerstone of American Ju-
risprudence. Without the guarantee of this protection
from outside intrusion, the judicial system cannot pos-
sibly function. Likewise, without the confidence in
their unions attorney to honor this privilege, the judi-
cial system will similarly cease to function. Recogniz-
ing that there may be specific instances where it is in
a defendants interest to allow counsel to disclose priv-
ileged information to the courts and outside parties,
this decision must remain with the defendant and not
counsel for the appellee.
Furthermore, any such agreements must not only
be transparent but specific in terms of intent, scope,
and clear and unequivocal language, such that any and
all persons, with or without legal training, would draw
the boundaries of any waiver identically each and
56
every time, regardless whether it is at point of drafting

or upon later review. As such, this Court needs to es-
tablish a Bright-Line Rule for the waiver of Attorney-
Union Client Privilege be it partial or total. As this is
a matter with the potential to affect every Attorney-
Union Client relationship in the land it is a matter
which falls squarely within the purview of this court.
Furthermore, the Federal District Courts ruling
which not only contradicted State and Federal Law
and precedent but itself as well, violated the Peti-
tioners rights to Equal Treatment and Due Process
under the law as guaranteed by the Constitution and
therefore should not be allowed to stand as it involves
an unreasonable application of clearly established Fed-
eral Law as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Maryland Court of Appeals failure
to correct these errors makes it a matter for this Court.
For the reasons discussed above, Petitioners Josephat
Mua and Mrs. Francoise Vandenplas respectfully re-
quest this honorable Court vacate the judgment and
remand the case for a new trial under a new Judge in
the interest of justice.
Respectfully Submitted,
JOSEPHAT MUA and
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS Prose
2332 London Bridge Drive
Silver Spring Md, 20906
App. 1
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
JOSEPHAT MUA, et al. : Case No. 9124D

Appellants,
v. : ENTERED
April 27, 2015
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY : Clerk of the
INDEMNITY COMPANY Circuit Court
California Casualty. : Montgomery County
OPINION
I. Factual Background
In August 2011, Josephat Mua (hereafter Mua)
and Francoise Vandenplas (hereafter Vandenplas)
(collectively hereafter Appellants) were insured un-
der an automobile insurance policy with California
Casualty Indemnity Exchanges (hereafter Califorinia
Casualty) for their 2003 Toyota RAV-4. On August 26,
2011, Vandenplas was involved in a motor vehicle acci-
dent while Operating the vehicle wherein she was
rear-ended while sitting at a stoplight.
Appellants made a claim to California Casualty,
their insurance carrier, for vehicle damages. A check
was issued by California. Casualty to Appellants in the
amount of Five Thousand, One Hundred, Twenty-
Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($5,128.83).
Since Vandenplas was not the at-fault party for the ac-
cident, California Casualty sought to recover money
from the at-fault drivers insurance company, Allstate.
Allstate accepted liability for the accident, but refused
App. 2
to reimburse California Casualty, citing to payment al-

ready issued to Appellants for property damage.
Upon learning that Appellants had twice been
compensated, California Casualty filed a claim in the
Montgomery County District Court against Appel-
lants, alleging that Appellants were liable for $5,128
recovered from California Casualty, since the Appel-
lants had already recovered for the identical claim
from Allstate.
On December 10, 2014, the District Court ruled in
favor of California Casualty, finding that Appellants
improperly recovered twice for the same property dam-
age.
II. Standard of Review

Appeal of a civil action from the District Court in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000 is on
the record. Md. Rule 7-102(b)(1). The Circuit Court is
not to set aside the judgment of the District Court un-
less clearly erroneous. Md. Rule 7-113(f). The Circuit
Court, acting as an appellate court, should not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the trial court on its find-
ings of fact but should only determine whether those
findings are clearly erroneous in light of the total evi-
dence. Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392 (1975). The
evidence produced at trial must be considered in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party and if sub-
stantial evidence was presented to support the trial
courts determination, it is not clearly erroneous and
cannot be disturbed. Id.
App. 3
III. Analysis
In their Memorandum (DE #5), Appellants do not
argue that the judgment of the District Court was
clearly erroneous, but rather argue that the District
Court abused its discretion by not considering fraud
on the court and other illegalities committed against
them. Appellants take issue with the District Courts
failure to consider their Counterclaim, and argue that
such is the result of a conspiracy between the Califor-
nia Casualty and the Clerk of the Court to change the
filing date of their Counterclaim. However, as was ex-
plained to Appellants, the filing date of their Counter-
claim was irrelevant because the amount sought in the
Counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the
District Court, and therefore was not proper. See Rule
3-331(f).
Because Appellants Counterclaim was properly
denied for jurisdictional reasons, California Casualtys
refusal to answer Appellants Interrogatories in con-
nection with their Counterclaim was proper. California
Casualty was not obligated to answer Appellants dis-
covery requests. For this reason, the District Courts
denial of Appellants Motion to Compel was proper.
Appellants further arguments in support of their
allegation of fraud on the court include tampering
with transcripts and a conspiracy to withhold the en-
tirety of the court file. Appellants provide no proof to
support these bald allegations, but assuming arguendo
the truth of such, the decision of the District Court that
App. 4
Appellants improperly re-covered twice for the same

property damage would not be changed
Appellants received and negotiated checks from
two sources for the same damage to their vehicle.
These checks were entered into evidence and were not
disputed. The District Courts determination was not
clearly erroneous and is AFFIRMED.
April 23, 2015 /s/ Joseph M. Quirk
Joseph M. Quirk, JUDGE
Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland
App. 5
IN THE CIRCUIT. COURT FOR

JOSEPHAT MUA, et al.)

)
Appellants
) CASE NO: 9124-D
v. )
(Dist. Ct. No.:
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY ) 0602-0005340-2014)
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE )
)
Appellee )
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ORDER
Upon consideration of Appellants Memorandum.
of Points and Authorities and Appellees Opposition
thereto, it is this 23rd day of April, 2015, by the Circuit
Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, hereby
ORDERED, that the appeal filed by Josephat
Mua and Francoise Vandenplas is DENIED, and it is
further;
ORDERED, that the judgment entered and the
Decision. of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
/s/ Joseph M. Quirk
Judge
App. 6
cc:
Joel D. Seledee, Esquire Francoise Vandenplas
Marsden & Seledee, LLC 2332 London Bridge Rd.
1 N. Charles Street, Silver Spring, MD 20906
Suite 2300 Defendant
Baltimore, MD 21201
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Josphat Mua ENTERED
2332 London Bridge Rd. April 27, 2015
Silver Spring, MD 20906 Clerk of the
Defendant Circuit Court
Montgomery County, MD
App. 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY *
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE *
Plaintiff, *
* Civil Action
v
* No. PJM-15-0060
JOSEPHAT MUA and *
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS, *
Defendants. *
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On January 15, 2015, Plaintiff California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange, by its counsel, filed this Motion
to Strike self-represented Defendants Josephat Mua
and Francois Vanderplas Notice of Removal. (ECF 35).
Plaintiff argues Defendants Notice of Removal is un-
timely and improperly filed. Plaintiff states the case
was fully adjudicated in the District Court of Maryland
for Montgomery County, and is on appeal in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff states this case was filed in state court on
July 8, 2014, raising a claim of unjust enrichment
based on a double payout Defendants received as a re-
sult of a car accident on August 26, 2011. (ECF 35,
Plaintiff s Ex. 1). Defendants were served with the
App. 8
Complaint on July 21, 2014. On October 3, 2014, De-

fendants moved to file a counterclaim. The District
Court for Montgomery County granted the motion, but
ordered the counterclaim filed by October 31, 2014. De-
fendants filed a counterclaim on November 3, 2014,
which the state court struck as untimely. Id. Defen-
dants thereafter filed a motion in the District Court for
Montgomery County to transfer the case to federal
court, and the motion was denied. Id.
On December 10, 2014, after a trial on the merits,
judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff. (ECF 35,
Plaintiff s Ex. 2). On December 16, 2014, Defendants
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a request for a
new trial, both of which were denied. Defendants then
noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. (ECF 35, p. 2).
DISCUSSION
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). To
effect removal, the defendant must file a notice of re-
moval in the district court within thirty (30) days of
receipt of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the
claim for relief in the action. Id. 1446(a) & (b). Be-
cause removal raises significant federalism concerns,
the removal statutes must be strictly construed, and
App. 9
all doubts must be resolved in favor of remanding the

case to state court. Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe
Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d
148, 151. (4th Cir. 1994) (stating removal jurisdiction
is strictly construed). The removing party has the bur-
den of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Id.; Johnson v. Nutrex
Research, Inc., 429 F.Supp.2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2006).
Here, Defendants have not satisfied the removal
statute by filing in a timely manner.1 Even were the
Notice timely, however, remand and striking this the
notice of removal are appropriate because Defendant
fails to set forth a valid basis for the Court to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. First,
there is no basis for removal jurisdiction based on di-
versity, where both Defendants appear to be citizens of
Maryland. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). (stating an action is
not removable if one or more defendants .is a citizen of
the state in which the action was brought.) (citing 28
1
Other courts have found substantial compliance with
1446(d) where a state court has actual notice of the removal not-
withstanding a defendants failure properly to file notice of re-
moval. See Johnson v. Citibank N.A. F. Supp. 3d. ___, 2014 WL
6865730 (D. Md. December 5, 2014). It does not appear that De-
fendants, who filed the Notice of Removal some six months after
the state case against them was filed, have substantially complied
with the requirements of the removal statute. Further, substan-
tial compliance need not be considered because Defendants have
not met their burden to show this Court has jurisdiction over this
case as will be discussed herein.
App. 10
U.S.C. 1441(b)).2 Alternatively, No remove an action

based on federal question jurisdiction, the federal
question must be an element, and an essential one of
the plaintiffs cause of action, Defendants identify no
constitutional provision or federal statute on which the
state action could been originally filed in this court. To
the extent Defendants are attempting to assert a coun-
terclaim presenting a federal question, they provide no
jurisdictional basis for removal because those claims
were not the subject matter of the state court case they
are attempting to remove.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion to Strike will be granted
and this case will be remanded to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County. In light of the above, Defendants
do not show good cause for an extension of time to re-
spond to the Motion to Strike. A separate Order grant-
ing Plaintiff s Motion to Strike (ECF 25) and denying
Defendants Motion for an Extension of Time (ECF 36)
follows.
/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 3, 2015
2
Additionally, the amount in controversy requirement for di-
versity of the parties jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 is not
met. (ECF 35, Ex. 1, Ex. 2, pp. 2-3).
App. 11

Plaintiff, *
* Civil Action
v
* No. PJM-15-0060
JOSEPHAT MUA and *
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS, *
Defendants. *
***
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memoran-
dum Opinion, it is this 3rd day of February 2015, by
the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, hereby ordered:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Notice of Removal
(ECF 35) IS GRANTED;
2. Defendants Motion for an. Extension of Time
(ECF 36) IS DENIED;
3. Defendants Motion for Reconsideration (ECF
27) IS DISMISSED without prejudice;
4. The Clerk SHALL TAKE ALL NECESSARY
ACTIONS TO REMAND this case to the Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County as may be
appropriate;
5. The Clerk SHALL SEND a copy of this Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order to Defendants,
counsel of record, the Clerk, Circuit Court for
App. 12
Montgomery County, and the Clerk, District

Circuit Court for Montgomery County; and
6. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.
/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
App. 13
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

California Casualty *
Indemnity Exchange *
P.O. Box 39700 *
Colorado Springs *
CO, 80949 *
PLAINTIFF/ * Trial by
COUNTER-DEFENDANT * Jury Demand
V. * 0602-5340-2014
*
JOSEPHAT MUA * Previously
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. CASE NUMBER
*
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 050200153352014
*
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS *
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. *
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 *
DEFENDANTS/ *
COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS *
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND RE-
QUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL OR REQUEST A HEAR-
ING IN THE ALTERNATIVE and Plaintiffs Answer
thereto, it is this 13 day of Jan 20145 by the District
Court For Montgomery County, Maryland Civil Divi-
sion hereby: Denied.
App. 14
ORDERED: That the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA-

TION AND REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL OR RE-
QUEST A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE is
granted on the ___ day of _________ 2014; or
ORDERED: That this matter is transferred to Federal
Court on the ___ day of _________ 2014; or
ORDERED: That this matter is scheduled for a hear-
ing on the ___ day of _________ 2014.
/s/ J. Cho
Judge
Copies Sent To:

Francoise Vandenplas
2332 London Bridge Road
Josephat Mua
Joel Seledee
One North Charles Street
Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 15

P.O. Box 39700 *
Colorado Springs *
CO, 80949 Trial by
* Jury Demand
PLAINTIFF/ *
COUNTER-DEFENDANT * 0602-5340-2014
V. * Previously
* CASE NUMBER
JOSEPHAT MUA * 050200153352014
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR.
* Received
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906
* JAN 7, 2015
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS * District Court #6
DEFENDANTS/ *
NOTICE OF FILING NOTICE OF REMOVAL

Dear Madam Clerk:
Please note the removal in this action by the De-
fendants Josphat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas, to
the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland.
No Authority
denied J. Cho
1/13/15
App. 16
/s/ Josephat Mua
[No Authority.] Josephat Mua
[Denied.] Francoise Vandenplas
[Illegible] Pro Se Litigants
[1/13/15] 2332 London Bridge Drive
(301) 919-4939
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Monday, Janu-
ary 7, 2015, a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS
NOTICE OF FILING NOTICE OF REMOVAL was
submitted via first-class U.S mail to the following:
Joel Seledee
Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 17
TRIAL DOCKET
DISTRICT: 06 PAGE: 1
LOCATION: 02 DATE: 12/10/2014
CASE NUM: 06-02-0005340-2014 ROOM: 401
COMPLAINT NUM: 001 TIME: 08:00 AM
FILED: 07/08/2014
INIT. CLAIM: $5,128.83
COSTS & FEES: $118.00* TORT
PLAINTIFF VS DEFENDANT
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY MUA, JOSPHAT
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE 2332 LONDON
PO BOX 39700 BRIDGE ROAD
COLORADO CO 80949 SILVER SPRING
MD 20906
SELEDEE, JOEL D
ATTORNEY FOR ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S)

AFFIDAVIT
DEFAULT
CONSENT
CONFESSED
FOREIGN
AFTER TRIAL
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
DISMISSED
JUDGMENT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF(S)
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT
AFTER TRIAL
PER RULE 3-615
App. 18
JUDGMENT PRINCIPAL ............ $ 5128.83

PRE-JUDGMENT-INTEREST ..... $
TOTAL JUDGMENT ..................... $
COSTS............................................ $ 118.00
OTHER........................................... $
ATTORNEYS FEES ..................... $
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AT
LEGAL RATE
CONTRACTUAL RATE
IN REPLEVIN, FOR POSSESSION OF

PROPERTY CLAIMED, VALUED AT
$______, IS AWARDED TO THE ______,
TOGETHER WITH DAMAGES OF $______
FOR THE DETENTION THEREOF.
IN DETINUE, FOR POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY CLAIMED, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, $______ REPRESENTING
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SUED
FOR, PLUS DAMAGES OF $______ FOR
ITS DETENTION IS AWARDED TO THE
______.
BAD FAITH INSURANCE CLAIM
INDICATOR
07/08/2014 INITIAL CASE FILING

07/21/2014 REGULAR CLAIMSERVEDON
DEFENDANT
07/24/2014 DEFENDANTFILED MOTION TO
TRANSFER TO OTHER JURISDIC
08/26/2014 MOTION TO TRANSFER TO OTHER
JURISDICGRANTEDBY JUDGE HON.
ROBIN DANA GILL BRIGH
App. 19
07/24/2014 INTENTION TO DEFEND FILED

/REASON FOR DEFENSE FOLLOWS
07/24/2014 I INTEND TO DEFEND MYSELF
AGAINST PLN CLAIM
07/28/2014 NOTICE OF FILING OF INTENTION
TO DEFEND SENT TO THE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIF
07/29/2014 NOTICE OF OUTCOME OF
ORIGINAL SERVICE SENT TO THE
PLAINTIFF
08/01/2014 COMP AFFID/MERIT TRL SET FOR
11/10/2014 AT 01:15PM, LOC 02,
ROOM 161B
App. 20
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY * IN THE

INDEMNITY EXCHANGE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff *
OF MARYLAND
v.
* FOR MONTGOMERY
JOSPHAT MUA COUNTY
-AND- * CASE NO:
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS 0602-0005340-2014
Defendants * ENTERED Dec 02, 2014
* * * * * * * * * *
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Defendants Motion to
Transfer Case to Federal Court and Plaintiff s Answer
in Opposition thereto, it is this 10 day of Dec., 2014,
hereby;
ORDERED, that Defendants Motion to Transfer
Case to Federal Court, be and hereby is DENIED.
/s/ J. Cho
Judge
Received Dec. 1, 2014
District Court #6
CC: Joel D. Seledee, Esquire

Marsden & Seledee, LLC
1 N. Charles Street, Ste. 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
Josphat Mua Dec 22, 2014
2332 London Bridge Drive cc copies to
Silver Spring, MD 20906 all listed.
App. 21
App. 22

P.O. Box 39700 *
Colorado Springs * Trial by Jury
CO, 80949 * Demand
PLAINTIFF/COUNTER- * 0602-53402014
DEFENDANT *
* Previously
V. * CASE NUMBER
* 050200153352014
JOSEPHAT MUA
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. * ENTERED
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 * Nov 18, 2014
*
AND *
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS *
*
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER- *
PLAINTIFFS *
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF
THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR
December 10, 2014 OR SCHEDULE
A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE
MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL
SCHEDULED FOR December 10, 2014 OR SCHED-
ULE A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE, it is this
App. 23
18th day of November 2014, by the District Court For

Montgomery County, Maryland Civil Division hereby:
ORDERED: That the trial in the instant matter is
postponed until the ___ day of _______ 2014; or [that
the motion for postponement is DENIED.]
ORDERED: That this matter is schedule for a
hearing on the ___ day of __________ 2014.
/s/ E. Wolfe
Judge
Copies Sent To:

Francise Vanderplas
Josephat Mua
Joel Seledee
Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 24
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR

MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MARYLAND CIVIL DIVISION
*
PLAINTIFF
* CASE NUMBER
V. * 060200053402014
FRANCISE VANDERPLAS, *
ET AL. *
*
DEFENDANTS *
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF
THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR
OCTOBER 22, 2014 OR SCHEDULE
MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL
SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 22, 2014 OR SCHED-
ULE A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE, it is this
6th day of October 2014, by the District Court For
Montgomery County, Maryland Civil Division hereby:
ORDERED: That the trial in the instant matter is
postponed until the 10th day of December 2014; or
ing on the ___ day of __________ 2014.
/s/ E. Wolfe
Judge
App. 25
Copies Sent To:

Francise Vanderplas
Josephat Mua
Joel Seledee
Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 26

MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
*
PLAINTIFF
* CASE NUMBER
V. * 060200053402014
FRANCISE VANDERPLAS, *
ET AL. *
*
DEFENDANTS *
**************************************************
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM OR
SCHEDULE A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE
UPON CONSIDERATION of
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM OR
SCHEDULE A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE, it
is this 21 day of Oct 2014,
by the District Court For Montgomery County, Mary-
land Civil Division hereby:
ORDERED: That Defendants are granted leave to file
a counterclaim in the instant matter; or
ORDERED: That xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [counterclaim is
to be filed by] 31 day of October 2014.
/s/ J. Cho
Judge
App. 27
Copies Sent To:

Josephat Mua
Joel Seledee, Esq.
One Charles Street Suit 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
[Any Discovery regarding the
counter claim shall be filed
and served by Nov 10 2014.
Responses to discovery shall be
due and served by Nov 28, 2014.
JCM
10/21/14]
App. 28

MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
* ENTERED
PLAINTIFF
* OCT 20, 2014
V. *
FRANCISE VANDERPLAS, * CASE NUMBER
ET AL. * 060200053402014
*
DEFENDANTS *
**************************************************
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS RESPONSE
TO MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES AND FOR SANCTIONS
PLUS DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER OR SCHEDULE
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES
AND FOR SANCTIONS PLUS DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OR
SCHEDULE A HEARING IN THE ALTERNATIVE, it
is this 29th day of October 2014, by the District Court
For Montgomery County, Maryland Civil Division
hereby: [is denied]
ORDERED: Plaintiff s Motion to Compel answers to
Interrogatories and sanctions is denied.
App. 29
ORDERED: That Defendants Motion for Protective or-

der is granted in the instant matter; or
ing on the __ day of _________ 2014.
/s/ J. Cho
Judge
Copies Sent To:

Josephat Mua
Joel Seledee, Esq.
One Charles Street Suit 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 30
CALIFORNIA * IN THE
CASUALTY DISTRICT COURT
INDEMNITY
* OF MARYLAND
EXCHANGE
Plaintiff FOR
*
v. MONTGOMERY
* COUNTY
JOSPHAT MUA
CASE NO:
Defendant
* 0602-0005340-2014
ENTERED OCT 14, 2014
* * * * * * * * * * *
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS

MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS
After consideration of Plaintiff s Motion for Sanc-
tions, and for good cause shown, it is this day of 29th
of October 2014, by the District Court of Maryland for
Montgomery County;
ORDERED, that Defendant shall answer Plain-
tiff s Interrogatories within 15 days of [from service]
the date of this Order, and it is further;
ORDERED, that if said Interrogatory Answers are
not filed within the time specified in this Order, that
judgment shall be entered against the Defendant, Jo-
sephat Mua, in the amount of $5,128.83; plus the costs
of this action and post-judgment interest at the legal
rate per annum, upon the request of the Plaintiff with-
out further hearing.
Received October 7, 2014 /s/ [Illegible]
District Court Judge
App. 31
CC: Joel D. Seledee, Esquire

1 N. Charles Street, Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
Josphat Mua
*This is a communication from a debt collector, and
an attempt to called a debt. Any information obtained
as a result hereof will be used for that purpose.
App. 32
JOSEPHAT MUA et al. * IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS
*
OF MARYLAND
v. * Petition Docket
No. 246
September Term, 2015
*
(No. 9124D
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY Circuit Court for
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE * Montgomery County)
ORDER
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
the supplements and the answers filed thereto, in the
above entitled ease, it is
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
that the petition and the supplements be, and they are
hereby, denied as there has been no showing that re-
view by certiorari is desirable and in the public inter-
est.
/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera
Chief Judge
DATE: January 29, 2016
App. 33
Josephat Mua et al. * In the

Appellants Court of Special Appeals
*
vs. No. 769
California Casualty * September Term, 2015
Indemnity Exchange
* (CC # 9124D)
Appellee (DC # 0602-0005340-2014)
* [No. 246 2015 TERM]
ORDER
It appears from the docket entries that the cap-
tioned appeal was noted to this Court from a judgment
of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the deci-
sion of the District Court. Courts Article, Section 12-
302(a). It is, therefore, this 8th day of July, 2015, by the
Court of Special Appeals, on its own motion,
ORDERED, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132,
that the captioned appeal be, and it is hereby, trans-
ferred to the Court of Appeals.
/s/ Peter B. Krauser
Peter B. Krauser
Chief Judge
[SEAL]
App. 34

Petitioner COURT OF APPEALS
v. *
OF MARYLAND
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY * Petition Docket
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE No. 246
Respondent * September Term, 2015
ORDER
Upon consideration of the appellants motion to ex-
tend the time for filing supplement to their pending
petition for writ of certiorari or schedule a hearing in
the alternative filed in the above entitled case, it is this
31st day of August, 2015
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.,
that the motion to extend the time for filing supple-
ment to the petition for writ of certiorari be, and it is
hereby, granted, and the supplement shall be filed on
or before October 30, 2015.
Chief Judge
App. 35
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

JOSEPHAT MUA, et al. :

Appellants,
:
v. Case No. 9124D
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY :
INDEMNITY COMPANY
:
Appellee.
ORDER
Upon consideration of Appellants Amended Mo-
tion For Reconsideration To Oppose Affirmance Of The
District Court Judgment (DE #13), it is this 28th day
of May, 2015, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland,
ORDERED, that Appellants Motion is DENIED.
/s/ Joseph M. Quirk
Joseph M. Quirk, JUDGE
Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland
ENTERED
May 29, 2015
App. 36

COURT OF APPEALS
*
OF MARYLAND
v. * Petition Docket
No. 246
* September Term, 2015
* (No. 9124D
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY Circuit Court for
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE * Montgomery County)
ORDER
The Court having considered the Motion for Re-
consideration and Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Petitioners Emer-
gency Motion to Stay the Judgment as Affirmed by the
circuit court on April 27, 2015 and the Order entered
on May 29, 2015 that denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration or Schedule a Hearing in the Alterna-
tive and the answers filed thereto, in the above enti-
tled case, it is
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
that the above pleadings be, and they are hereby, denied.
Chief Judge
DATE: May 23, 2016
App. 37

CALIFORNIA CASUALTY
INDEMNITY EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff,
vs. Case Number:
0602-005340-2014
JOSEPHAT MUA and
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS,
Defendants. /
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(Hearing)
Silver Spring, Maryland
Monday, February 23, 2015
BEFORE:
HONORABLE EUGENE WOLFE, JUDGE
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
JOEL D. SELEDEE, ESQUIRE
For the Defendants:
JOSEPHAT MUA, PRO SE
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS, PRO SE
Electronic Proceedings Transcribed by: Tracey Williams
HUNT REPORTING COMPANY
Court Reporting and Litigation Support
Serving Maryland, Washington, and Virginia
410-766-HUNT (4868)
1-800-950-DEPO (3376)
App. 38
CONTENTS
Page
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS H-3
-o0o-
[H-3] PROCEEDINGS
(8:47 a.m.)
THE COURT: California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange v. Josephat Mua and Francoise Vanden-
plas.
MR. MUA: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Youre all over here;
is the attorney, Mr. Seledee?
THE CLERK: I have (indiscernible).
THE COURT: Do you all see Mr. Seledee
outside?
MR. MUA: No. No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
THE CLERK: Mr. Seledee?
THE COURT: Yes. Hes supposed to be here
too.
(Pause.)
THE COURT: This is really here more for
explanation than anything else, this is really not a
merits hearing. This case, I called it because there
seems to be a lot of confusion as to whats going on with
App. 39
this case and why its happening. And I saw some of

the correspondence thats in here. And so I wanted to
just kind of straighten all of this out, so we can figure
out not figure out, but just tell you what the case is
and to we can everybody can move-on and not keep
filing stuff, because you keep filing stuff and its not
productive to anybodys time.
The first thing I want to note is that this [H-4]
something started going haywire when there was a re-
quest by you all to file a counterclaim and Judge
Moffett allowed you to file a counterclaim. The coun-
terclaim was filed and, based on everything that I
could see, the counterclaim was filed in a timely man-
ner, but for some reason somebody in probably in the
Clerks Office, somebody struck through the date it was
filed and put the date that it was actually rung at the
cash register.
So when the motion was filed, Judge Everngam
looked at the date that it was rung, not the date it was
filed, because the date it was filed was struck through.
So he then denied the counterclaim. But he also denied
the counterclaim on a second basis and the second ba-
sis was, your counterclaim was for one and a half mil-
lion dollars, we do not have jurisdiction over anything
over $30,000. So even if he was in error because of the
date, he was correct because of the amount. So we have
absolutely no jurisdiction on that counterclaim. So it
was properly denied, because we dont have any basis
for it.
App. 40
So everything else kind of started going after that.

So, if we dont have any jurisdiction over it, we dont
have any basis to transfer it. In other words, the case
technically never comes to us because we dont have
any basis to even consider it for any reason. So it was
gone.
So when so all of the other things that we had
[H-5] happening here, asking us to transfer it to a fed-
eral court, we have no basis to transfer it. One, if we
dont have it, but, two, even if we did have it, there has
to be a basis for us to transfer it. There was no basis
whatsoever for us to transfer this case. So we had ab-
solutely no basis to handle it, no basis to do anything
with it, it was properly denied.
Yes, sir?
MR. MUA: Could I explain? Yes, Your Honor,
thank you for inviting us to clarify. When I found
when I was told by a court to file a counterclaim in
Washington, D.C. small claims court, the court told
us
THE COURT: In where, in Washington,
D.C.?
MR. MUA: Yes. They told us that there was
no limit in small claims on the counterclaim.
THE COURT: That may be D.C., but thats
not true in D.C. either. There is there is a limit.
MR. MUA: Yes, I have a copy of it.
THE COURT: But thats D.C.
App. 41
MR. MUA: Yeah, the reason why I did that,

we were having similar claims in federal court touch-
ing on the insurance company and that was the basis
for (indiscernible).
THE COURT: Sir, we have absolutely no au-
thority to consider anything over our jurisdictional
amount, [H-6] counterclaim or otherwise. And this was
not a small claims case, it was a large claims case, be-
cause the amount being-sued for was over $5,000,
$6100. So it was a large claims case, you could file a
counterclaim for up to $30,000. Anything over $30,000
takes it out of District Court.
MR. MUA: Yeah. And we had asked the
court to transfer the case to either Circuit Court or fed-
eral court.
THE COURT: Okay. Listen to me again. We
dont have any authority to even consider your claim,
it cant even be filed here.
MR. MUA: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay? So, therefore, we cant
transfer anything. All right? Theres nothing to trans-
fer.
MR. MUA: I understand. We had filed a com-
plaint in federal court and the complaint in federal
court was pending. The summons were issued shortly
after the hearing was conducted, but they were noticed
that we entered a complaint there against them. But
that complaint was separate from, you know, every-
thing which is happening here. And we made the court
App. 42
aware that the complaint was in federal court, which

we had filed which we had filed against the insurance
company based on the things they had done.
THE COURT: Yeah, but that still doesnt do
anything for us.
[H-7] MR. MUA: Yeah. The problem was, the
main issue and why even the federal court was
THE COURT: Sir, I dont care why you filed
in Circuit Court, I really dont care. Okay? Listen to me
again.
MR. MUA: Yes
THE COURT: The question is, do we have
authority, do we have jurisdiction to consider your
counterclaim? The answer is no. And if we dont have
the basis to consider your counterclaim, we cant trans-
fer something that for all intents and purposes doesnt
exist in this court. Thats why it was denied. It was de-
nied because we dont have any basis to even consider
it.
MR. MUA: I understand.
THE COURT: Okay? So, therefore, theres
nothing for us to transfer.
MR. MUA: Yeah.
THE COURT: Even if you filed a counter-
claim, the counterclaim does not dictate that we have
to even if you had filed and it was $30,000, if for some
reason or if it was more than 30, not over you know,
App. 43
lets say it was something else the Circuit Court can

consider, that still doesnt mean that we have to handle
that in this claim. So your claim in federal court, wher-
ever it is, is a separate claim all together that does not
influence this claim.
[H-8] MR. MUA: Yes.
THE COURT: Completely different suit. So
your case was properly dismissed because of the
amount.
MR. MUA: Yeah. The judge the court say
that they denied us because of the time, we filed it un-
timely.
THE COURT: No, he denied it on two bases.
MR. MUA: Yeah.
THE COURT: One was timeliness. We went
back and corrected that and determined it was timely.
But the second basis was, it was too much. So thats the
basis its gone.
MR. MUA: Oh, I see.
THE COURT: Okay? Thats the basis its
gone. We went back, we looked at the date and deter-
mined it was timely filed. Once we determined that, we
then said, but, even though it was timely filed, we cant
consider it because we cant consider a million and a
half dollars.
MR. MUA: Yeah.
App. 44
THE COURT: Thats why its gone.

MR. MUA: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay?
MR. MUA: Yeah, we understand.
THE COURT: So my understanding is that
it has you came back and you paid the fees, it is now
in Circuit Court.
MR. MUA: Yeah, but the trial has been
done [H-9] conducted, that is going to is that going
to affect the claim? Its in Circuit Court.
THE COURT: What do you mean?
MR. MUA: The trial has been the plaintiff
is using the fact that the case has been concluded, its
basing theyre basing their argument on (indiscerni-
ble) collateral estoppel.
THE COURT: Well, theyre going to decide
on that in Circuit Court.
MR. MUA: Oh, in Circuit Court, okay.
THE COURT: All thats going to be this
case, for District Court purposes, this case is over in
District Court
MR. MUA: Yeah.
THE COURT: its over. What Judge Cho
held a trial, she made a decision, she denied your re-
quest to reconsider. She all of your issues are over in
App. 45
Circuit in District Court. So whatever you do now is

going to be in Circuit Court. Theres nothing else in
this court pending in this case.
MR. MUA: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay?
MR. MUA: Yeah.
THE COURT: So whenever you file any-
thing now, its going to be in Circuit Court, theyre go-
ing to tell you [H-10] whats going to happen over there
and how its going to go.
MR. MUA: No problem. And the other thing
which we had was also the transcripts. The some of
the issues we raised in the lower court are not part of
the proceedings even though we raised issues of irreg-
ularities and its not part of the transcript.
THE COURT: Well, if it was part of what-
ever it is that you asked for, thats the transcript they
would prepare. You asked for the transcript of the trial.
MR. MUA: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay? So thats what they
provide you, a transcript of the trial.
MR. MUA: Oh, I see. So if there are problems
with the transcripts, is that something this Court can
address on
App. 46
THE COURT: Then you can go back and ask

for them. If when you say problems with the tran-
script
MR. MUA: Parts of what we communicated
to the court are not part of the proceedings in the tran-
script.
THE COURT: Yeah, but is that a different
hearing?
MR. MUA: Same hearing.
THE COURT: If its the same hearing, it
should be a part of the transcript.
MR. MUA: Yeah. So its not part
THE COURT: If you think theres some-
thing not [H-11] there, then you should raise that with
the Clerk, tell them that you dont think all of the hear-
ing is there.
MR. MUA: Yeah, I do. With the Clerk down-
stairs?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MUA: Okay.
THE COURT: Go downstairs and tell them
that you dont think that the whole thing is there. But
if you gave them if you told them what the date is
and the dates are in this case and thats what you
want, then thats what they made a transcript of.
App. 47
MR. MUA: No problem. I will raise it with

them and
THE COURT: Yeah. But as far as but this
case otherwise, this case in District Court is over.
Theres nothing else in this case to be done in District
Court.
MR. MUA: Yeah. The only thing which we
wanted to with the Court clarifying and we appreci-
ate you clarifying that, was that we filed the claim
timely and it was because that was the major thing.
Even in federal court when we went there, they start
with the correct dates, which is November the
THE COURT: Yeah, but, see, that wasnt
that doesnt influence you in this case. The only reason
that the date in this case was important is that- Judge
Moffett gave you a date certain to file the counter-
claim.
[H-12] MR. MUA: Yes.
THE COURT: That does not deny you the
ability to go anyplace else and file a new claim. So what
you filed in federal court was a new claim. As long as
you filed it within the statute of limitations, you can
file it in Circuit Court in the federal court. So thats
not impacted by what you did in this case.
MR. MUA: Oh.
THE COURT: So its completely different.
MS. VANDENPLAS: Okay.
App. 48
THE COURT: All right? Because Judge Mof-

fetts ruling doesnt have any impact on federal court
and what happens there. Thats a completely new ac-
tion, something we have no control over, we have no
influence over whatsoever. All right?
MR. MUA: Yes.
MS. VANDENPLAS: Thank you.
MR. MUA: Thank you so much.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very
much.
(At 8:59 a.m., proceeding concluded.)
-o0o-
TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE
I, Geoffrey Hunt, an Official Court Reporter of the
District of Maryland, do hereby certify that the pro-
ceedings in the matter of California Casualty v. Jo-
sephat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas, Case Number
0602-005340-2014, held on February 23, 2015, were
duly recorded by means of digital recording.
I further certify that the page numbers 1 through
12 constitute the official transcript of the proceedings
as transcribed by me or under my direction from the
digital recording to the within typewritten matter in a
complete and accurate manner.
App. 49
In Witness Whereof, I have affixed my signature

this 26 day of February , 2014.
/s/ Geoffrey L. Hunt [Illegible]
Geoffrey Hunt CVR-CM
App. 50
[LOGO]
DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND
District Six
GARY EVERNGAM 191 E. Jefferson Street

Judge Rockville, MD 20850
11-12-14
The counterclaim and jury demand are stricken be-
cause:
1. Not filed 10/31/14 per J. Moffets order of 10-
21-14
2. Counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of this
court. See Rule 3-331(f ) and DJ. 4-401(1)
/s/ [Illegible]
cc 11-12-14
App. 51

FOR COUNTER COMPLAINT
Received
10/31/2014
Small counter
11/03/14
[LOGO]
LOCATED AT (COURT ADDRESS)
12-10
CASE NO. CV 0602-5340-2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPLAINT/APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF JUDGMENT
$5,000 or under over $5,000
over $10, 000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clerk: Please docket this case in an action of
contract tort replevin detinue
bad faith insurance claim
The particulars of this case are:
SEE ATTACHED
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
(See Continuation Sheet)

App. 52
PARTIES
Plaintiff JOSEPHAT MUA
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS
VS.
Defendant(s): [/COUNTER PLAINTIFF]
1. CALIFORNIA CASUALTY
EXCHANGE
Serve by: Certified Mail Private Process
Constable Sheriff
2. EXHIBIT 1
Constable Sheriff
3.
Constable Sheriff
4.
Constable Sheriff
ATTORNEYS
For Plaintiff
Name, Address, Telephone Number & Code
The Plaintiff claims $1,503,789 plus interest of

$______, Interest at the legal rate contractual rate
calculated at ______%, from ______ to ______ (___ days
x $______ per day) and attorneys fees of $______ plus
court costs.
App. 53
Return of the property and damages of $_____ for

its detention in an action of replevin.
Return of the property, or its value, plus damages
of $______ for its detention in action of detinue.
Other (see attached) and demands judgment for
relief.
/s/ [Illegible]
Signature of Plaintiff/Attorney/Attorney Code
Printed name: JOSEPHAT MUA

Address: 2332 LONDON BRIDGE DRIVE
Telephone Number: 301 919 4939
Fax:
E-mail: JOSEPHAT MUA
MILITARY SERVICE AFFIDAVIT

Defendant(s) ____________ (Name) is/are in the mil-
itary service.
No Defendant is in the military service. The facts
supporting this statement are: ____________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
(Specific facts must be given for the Court to conclude
that each Defendant who is a natural person is not in
the military.)
I am unable to determine whether or not any De-
fendant is in military service.
I hereby declare or affirm under the penalties of per-
jury that the facts and matters set forth in the afore-
going Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.
10/31/2014 /s/ [Illegible]
Date Signature of Affiant
App. 54
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
Attached hereto are the indicated documents which
contain sufficient detail as to liability and damage to
apprise the Defendant clearly of the claim against the
Defendant, including the amount of any interest
claimed.
Properly authenticated copy of any note, security
agreement upon which claim is based Itemized
statement of account Interest worksheet Vouch-
ers Check Other written document ANSWER
& COUNTERCLAIM Verified itemized repair bill or
estimate
I HEREBY CERTIFY: That I am the Plaintiff
COMPLAINT & ANSWER of the Plaintiff herein
and am competent to testify to the matters stated in
this complaint, which are made on my personal
knowledge; that there is justly due and owing by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff the sum set forth in the
Complaint.
I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury and
upon personal knowledge that the contents of the
above Complaint are true and I am competent to tes-
tify to these matters.
10/31/2014 /s/ [Illegible]
DC-CV-001 (front) (Rev. 09/2014)

Print Date (09/2014)
App. 55
[LOGO]
DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR
PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY (City/County)
Located at 14735 MAIN STREET, UPPER MARL-
BORO MD 20772 (Court Address)
Case No. 050200153352014
STATE OF MARYLAND
OR
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE
Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor
P.O. BOX 39700
Address
COLORADO SPRING CO 80949
City, State, Zip
JOSEPHAT MUA ET AL
Defendant/Judgment Debtor
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DRIVE
Address
SLIVER SPRING MD 20906
City, State, Zip
MOTION
We would like to file this motion to TRANSFER
ACTION TO MONTGOMERY COUNTY MARYLAND
ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS ________________
1.) The Accident happened in MONTGOMERY
COUNTY MARYLAND ____________________
2.) We as defendants live in Montgomery County
3.) We work in Montgomery County Maryland
App. 56
& ALL WITNESS ARE IN MONTGOMERY

COUNTY_________________________________
__________________________________________
I am the Attorney for Plaintiff Defendant

Other Specify: ________________________________
Request Hearing on Motion
2332 LONDON BRIDGE /s/ [Illegible] 7/24/2014

Address Signature Date
JOSEPHAT MUA
SILVER SPRING MD PRO SE
City State Zip Name Printed
7/24/2014 301 919 4939
Date Telephone No.
Signers Facsimile Signers E-mail

Number, if any Address, if any
I certify that I served a copy of this Motion upon
the following party or parties by mailing first class
mail, postage prepaid hand delivery, on 7/24/2014
(Date) to:
CALIFORNIA P.O. BOX 39700
CASUALTY INDEMNITY COLORADO SPRING
EXCHANGE CO 80949
Name Address
Name Address
App. 57
1 N. CHARLES STREET,
JOEL D. SELEDEE, SUITE 2300
ESQUIRE BALTIMORE MD 21201
Name Address
7/24/2014 /s/ [Illegible]
Date Signature of Party Serving
ORDER
It is ordered that: [No opposition filed. Case trans-
ferred to Monty County]
the relief requested by granted
the hearing on Motion be set for ______________
denied
8/26/14 /s/ [Illegible]
Date Judge
DC 2 (Rev. 12/2012) Print Date 08/2013

App. 58
MARSDEN & SELEDEE, LLC

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
ONE NORTH CHARLES STREET, SUITE 2300
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201-3740
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(410) 783-2700
(410) 783-4130
FAX
EMAIL: MSLAW@MARSDEN
SELEDEE.COM
ELLIOTT JAY MARSDEN (DC.VA) OFFICES:
JOEL D. SELEDEE (DC) BALTIMORE, MD
__________________________ WASHINGTON, DC
MICHAEL D. JOHNSON (DC) FAIRFAX, VA
SHIRLIEN DABAWI (DC)
June 20, 2014

Josphat Mua
RE: California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
Balance due: $5,128.83
Our file no.: 21400477C
Dear Josphat Mua:
Our office is in receipt of an Outstanding debt
claimed owed by you in the above referenced amount.
Unless you notify this office within thirty days after
receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of
the debt, or any portion thereof, this office will assume
this debt is valid. If you notify this office, in writing,
within thirty (30) days from receiving this notice, this
office will obtain verification of the debt, or obtain a
App. 59
copy of any Judgment and mail you a copy of such writ-

ing. Within thirty (30) days after receiving such notice,
this office will provide you with the name and address
of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor California Casualty indemnity Exchange. This
letter is an attempt to collect a debt and any infor-
mation obtained as a result hereof will be used for that
purpose.
If this amount is correct, please remit this sum to
our office or Contact the below signed attorney to make
arrangements to satisfy this debt. Your timely atten-
tion to-this matter may enable us to help you resolve
this claim amicably.
Sincerely yours,
MARSDEN & SELEDEE, LLC
/s/ [Illegible]
Joel D. Seledee, Esq.
JDS:jls
This is a communication from a debt collector, and
an attempt to collect a debt. Any information ob-
tained as a result hereof will be used for that pur-
pose.
App. 60
[LOGO] Joseph Mua <joseph.mua@gmail.com>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Writ of summons case # 0502200153352014
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Mua <joseph.mua@gmail.com>
Thu, Jul 24.2014 at 3:47 AM
To: jds@marsdenseledee.com
Cc: Joseph Mua <joseph.mua@gmail.com>
Dear Mr. Seledee,
I have called you several times without getting a re-
sponse from you. We received your summons concern-
ing the small claims matter filed in the District court
of Maryland on Monday July 21st, 2014.
This email is notify you that we dispute the bill be-
cause our claim with the insurance company was never
fully resolved and the insurance owes us money.
I will be filing a counter claim involving both of you
and the manner in which this dispute has been han-
dled. This is a good faith effort in trying to resolve this
before engaging the courts.
I can be reached at 301 919 4939 or by email:
joseph.mua@gmail.com
Sincerely,
Josephat Mua
App. 61
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND
Southern Division
JOSEPHAT MUA *
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. * US District Court
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 * Dec-8-2014
Clerks Office
FRANCOISE VANDENPLAS *
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. * Case No
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 * PJM14 CV 3810
*
PLAINTIFFS * ENTERED
V. * December 8, 2014
* Montgomery
California Casualty * County
Indemnity Exchange * District Court
P.O. Box 39700 * Received
Colorado Springs * December 10, 2014
CO, 80949 * District Court
DEFENDANT *
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

NOW COMES Plaintiffs Josephat Mua and Fran-
coise Vandenplas (hereinafter referred to as Plain-
tiffs), pro se, and hereby files his complaint against
the defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change (hereinafter referred to as the Defendant) and
alleges the following complaint.
App. 62
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the above-
captioned matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a),
because the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and there is complete diversity of citizen-
ship.
2. This Court is the proper venue for this matter pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b), because this is the ju-
risdiction in which a substantial proportion, if not
all, of the events giving rise to plaintiff s claims
occurred, given that the contract at issue herein
was executed in Maryland, and California Casu-
alty indemnity Exchanges obligations under that
contract were to have been performed in Mary-
land.
3. This is an action for declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, damages and to secure protection of and to
redress deprivation of rights secured by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e
et seq.
4. This Honorable Court therefore has Subject Mat-
ter Jurisdiction of this action based on the di-
versity of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1322(a)(1)-(c)(1).
5. This Court also has Personal Jurisdiction of the
Defendant because it conducts Business in Mary-
land (including Montgomery County), the busi-
ness of selling insurance, and because the alleged
breach of contract inter alia complained of oc-
curred in Montgomery County, Maryland, in the
App. 63
course of the Defendants regular business as an

insurance company.
6. Venue is also therefore proper in the Southern Di-
vision of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, at Greenbelt, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 109(2)3, 1391(a)(1)-(2), because the in-
surance agreement at issue is administered in this
District, the breach complained of occurred in this
District, and the Defendant is found District.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
7. This matter arises out of a motor vehicle incident
that occurred on August 26th, 2011, Plaintiff
Francoise Vandenplas was involved in a car acci-
dent in the District of Maryland.
8. That, Plaintiff Francoise Vandenplas is very lucky
to be alive. She was the third car stopped at a red
light. Another driver rear-ended her at a high
speed.
9. That, the impact was so strong, it pushed her car
into the 2nd car and the 2nd car was pushed into
the 1st car, which were all stopped in the red light.
10. Plaintiff Francoise Vandenplas was driving the
3rd car which hit the 2nd car as a result of the im-
pact
11. The responsible driver insured by Allstate insur-
ance company who caused this accident told the
Plaintiff Francoise Vandenplas that it was not his
only accident.
App. 64
12. That, this incident caused a substantial financial

loss for the Plaintiffs.
13. That, at first the Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange said it would fix the car.
14. That, the Defendant later retracted and said the
car was totaled.
15. That, at that point Plaintiffs had not been looking
for another car, in reliance upon California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchanges communication that it
would fix Plaintiff s car.
16. That, Plaintiffs needed to do research and bargain
for a better price in the midst of sudden change by
the Defendant.
17. That, Defendant California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange promised to reimburse car rental or as-
sist with reimbursement but upon a later date re-
fused to communicate to plaintiff, thereby not
fulfilling reimbursement requirement.
18. That, Defendant agents were rude on the phone
and refused to return calls when needed for con-
sultation while plaintiffs were negotiating with
Allstate insurance company concerning the claim.
19. That, Plaintiffs wanted the same make of the car
they had (Toyota RAV4) but the car was not easily
available due to 2011 Thoku earthquake and tsu-
nami in Japan which affected production of vehi-
cles in that country.
Exchange chose not to assist the Plaintiffs despite
the obligations to do so according to Maryland law.
App. 65
21. That, Plaintiffs were not at fault. Plaintiff Fran-

coise Vandenplas was stopped at a red light.
Exchange issued the Plaintiffs a check for $5,000
without an explanation. Due the ambiguous pur-
pose of the check, the Plaintiffs retained the check
for 3 months, causing it to expire. Upon seeking
counsel with an attorney, the attorney instructed
Plaintiffs to cash the check.
23. That, Plaintiff Josephat Mua contacted the De-
fendant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
concerning the uncashed check and reimburse-
ment of rental car expenses which totaled more
than $1,000 and the Plaintiff s was issued a new
check for $5,000 without any explanations and as-
sumed it was towards the rental car and other as-
sociated costs connected to the problem.
24. That, Plaintiffs did in fact incur expenses which
were not covered by Allstate insurance.
Exchange agent slammed the phone down saying
it was not their issue.
26. That, Defendant failed to notify the Plaintiffs of
insurance termination which was done mali-
ciously and without warning to the Plaintiffs in
the middle of difficult economic times.
Exchange ignored or refused to perform services
or assist the plaintiffs for which the Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange was con-
tractually obligated.
App. 66
28. That, Plaintiffs made inquiries of what actions to

take and were advised by an attorney that, insur-
ance companies operating in Maryland have a
very strong lobby and protection from the politi-
cians and that suing them for damages is hard.
29. That, Plaintiffs incurred damages as a result of
the tortious acts by the Defendant California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchange.
30. That, Plaintiff Josephat Mua was stopped by po-
lice and fined ~ $800 for not having insurance.
This caused Plaintiff Mr. Mua to immediately pre-
caution, so that he would be in total compliance
with the law. The insurance that Mr. Mua was
forced to purchased was substantially higher than
his original monthly payments from Defendant.
But for the irresponsible and unethical actions
Plaintiff Mr. Mua would not have purchased the
significantly more expensive insurance.
31. That, after more than two years of breach of con-
tract by the Defendant, and after Plaintiffs signed
up with another insurance company, Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange con-
tacted the plaintiffs for reimbursement of $5,000
check which led to this lawsuit based on the tor-
tious acts of the Defendant
PARTIES:
32. That, Plaintiff Francoise Vandenplas is an individ-
ual residing in Montgomery County, Maryland,
and has been married to Plaintiff Josephat Mua at
all times relevant to this litigation, up to the pre-
sent and continuing.
App. 67
33. That, Plaintiff Josephat Mua is an individual re-

siding in Montgomery County, Maryland, and has
been married to Plaintiff Francoise Vandenplas at
all times relevant to this litigation, up to the pre-
sent and continuing.
34. That, Defendant California Casualty Indemnity.
Exchange is a corporation registered in the State
of Maryland. It is engaged in the business of
providing insurance coverage throughout the
state of Maryland. Defendant does substantial
business in this judicial District by selling and is-
suing insurance to Maryland residents, and may
be found in this District.
COUNT I: BREACH OF CONTRACT

35. The Plaintiffs incorporates by reference and reas-
serts herein the matters contained in paragraphs
1 through 34 into this claim for Relief, as if set
forth fully.
36. That, Plaintiffs Josephat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas resided at 2332 London Bridge Dr, Sil-
ver Spring, Maryland 20906 at all times relevant
to this complaint, including August 26th, 2011.
37. That, Plaintiffs Josephat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas also owned two automobile vehicles
and operated from personal property at 2332 Lon-
don Bridge Dr, Silver Spring, Maryland 20906, at
all limes relevant to this complaint, including Au-
gust 26th, 2011.
38. That, At all times relevant to this complaint,
Plaintiffs had an Automobile insurance agreement
App. 68
with Defendant California Casualty Indemnity

Exchange.
39. That, a valid Contract existed between the plain-
tiffs and Defendant California Casualty. Indem-
nity Exchange, which set forth all of the
agreements, conditions, understandings, prom-
ises, warranties, and representations of the par-
ties.
40. That, under the terms of the policy, in considera-
tion for a monthly premium, the Plaintiffs auto-
mobiles were protected from any accident or
destruction by the Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange policy.
41. That, Plaintiffs had met all its obligations under
the policy and had paid their premiums in a timely
manner pursuant to the agreement.
42. That, on various dates including September 06,
2011, Plaintiffs presented an automobile claim to
the Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change for assistance.
43. That, Defendant did not assist the plaintiffs
properly with their claim and disregarded the
plaintiff without properly investigating all poten-
tial causes of the accident, but instead by conclud-
ing that Plaintiff Josephat Mua (one of the
insureds) caused the accident, despite substantial
evidence to the contrary.
44. That, Plaintiff Josephat Mua did not cause the ac-
cident in question.
45. That, Defendant, California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange, did not properly assist the plaintiffs
App. 69
when they needed help within the prescribed pe-

riod after the accident occurred. The Plaintiffs
submitted the appeal timely for assistance with
the damaged car to the Defendant on or around
August 27, 2011 and again on September 06, 2011
by email requesting the next steps.
Exchange, abruptly canceled the Plaintiffs insur-
ance in the absence of any notice, whether that be
written or oral. The Defendant, California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange had an obligation pursu-
ant to Code of Maryland Regulation 31.08.03.04 to
provide the Plaintiffs notice of their intent to can-
cel Plaintiffs insurance;
47. Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change had an obligation, whether by statute or
the policy that governed their issuance and
maintenance of insurance, to provide the Plaintiffs
notice prior to the cancellation of Plaintiffs insur-
ance;
48. As a direct result of the Defendant California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchanges abrupt cancellation of
Plaintiffs automobile insurance, the Plaintiffs
were forced to acquire new automobile insurance.,
The Plaintiffs premium rate with the Defendant,
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange was ap-
proximately $101.00. After the Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange cancelled the
Plaintiffs automobile insurance, the Plaintiffs
purchased insurance with Progressive insurance
company, which caused the Plaintiffs to incur
premium rate in the amount of $241.00. Thus, the
App. 70
Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-

changes conduct exposed the Plaintiffs to an addi-
tional monthly payment of $140;
Exchange breached its contract with the Plaintiffs
by failing to pay them the benefits due under the
provisions of the policy,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request
that this Court award judgment against Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange on the count
of Breach of Contract and seek compensatory damages
in the amount of $500,000 for the Plaintiffs pain and
suffering that was brought on directly and proximately
by Defendants misconduct Plaintiff s further seek at-
torneys fees for consultations, costs and for any such
other relief as the Court deems equitable, just, fair and
proper. In addition, Plaintiffs also seek $140 and addi-
tional civil penalties for every month from September
2012 until the resolution of this matter. Defendants ir-
responsible actions caused the Plaintiffs harm and
discernible injury.
COUNT II. BREACH OF DUTY

forth fully.
51. That, a breach of duty occurred between the De-
fendant and Plaintiffs.
App. 71
52. A duty is an obligation to conform to a particular

standard of conduct toward another. Remsburg v.
Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 831 A.2d 18 (2003).
53. A duty may arise from a contract or out of the cir-
cumstances attending the contract transaction;
but it must be independent of any breach of the
conduct. Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md.
App. 151, 552 2d 947, cert denied, 316 Md. 364, 558
A.2d 1206 (1989).
54. That, a special relationship existed between De-
fendant and Plaintiffs.
55. A special relationship may be established by: 1)
statue or rule; 2) contractual or other relationship;
or inadvertently or implied by virtue of the rela-
tionship between the tortfeasor. and a third party,
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29,
782 A.2d 807 (2001).
56. A valid Contact existed between the plaintiffs and
change, which set forth all of the agreements, con-
ditions, understandings, promises, warranties,
and representations of the parties.
Exchange, breached their duty to Plaintiffs by not
providing reasonable accommodations soon after
the traffic incident, by not acting reasonably in
light of the contractual agreement between Plain-
tiff and Defendant, and by not acting reasonably
as required by Maryland state statute. Plaintiffs
requested assistance with the rental car and help
ha resolving the dispute with the personalities
who caused the accident Defendant, California
App. 72
Casualty Indemnity Exchange refused to return

calls and the customer service was below expecta-
tion.
Exchange, abruptly canceled the Plaintiffs insur-
written or oral. The Defendant had an obligation
pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulation
31.08.03.04 to provide the Plaintiffs notice of their
intent to cancel Plaintiffs insurance;
Exchange had an obligation, whether by statute or
the policy that governed their issuance and
maintenance of insurance to provide the Plaintiffs
notice prior to the cancellation. of Plaintiffs insur-
ance.
Exchange cancelling of automobile insurance was
intentional act and was negligent.
Plaintiffs insurance, the Plaintiffs were forced to
acquire new insurance. The Plaintiffs premium
rate with the Defendant California Casualty In-
demnity Exchange was approximately $101.00.
After the Defendant California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange cancelled the Plaintiffs insurance,
the Plaintiffs, in order to be immediately compli-
ant with the law, purchased insurance with Pro-
gressive, which caused the Plaintiffs to incur
premium rate in the amount of $241.00. Thus, the
App. 73

changes conduct exposed the Plaintiffs to an addi-
tional monthly payment of $140.00
by Defendants misconduct Plaintiffs further seek at-
proper, In addition, Plaintiffs also seek $140 and addi-
discernible injury.
COUNT III. NEGLIGENCE

1 through 61 into this claim for Relief; as if set
forth fully.
63. That, a valid Contract existed between the plain-
tiffs and Defendant Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change, which set forth all of the agreements,
conditions, understandings, promises, warranties,
64. That as Plaintiffs insurer, the Defendant had an
ongoing duty to provide insurance coverage and to
both comply with the policy and governing statues
App. 74
of the State of Maryland with regards to affording

notice to the Plaintiffs prior to the cancellation of
any and all insurance. Despite that duty, the De-
fendant executed cancellation of the Plaintiffs au-
tomobile insurance in the absence of any notice.
65. The Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
changes conduct amounted to negligence that was
the proximate and/or direct cause of the Plaintiffs
retention of alternative automobile insurance,
which subjected the Plaintiffs to an additional
monthly payment of $140.00, which commenced in
September of 2012 to the present.
66. That, Negligence is doing something that a person
using reasonable care would not do, or not doing
something that a person using reasonable care
would do. Reasonable care means that caution,
attention or skill a reasonable person would use
under similar circumstances. Additionally, the
elements for proving actionable negligence are:
1) Duty or obligation, recognized by law, requiring
conformance to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable
risks; 2) Failure to conform to that standard
(breach of duty); 3) Reasonably close casual con-
nection and resulting injury; 4) Actual damage or
loss by others.
67. Further; the Defendant California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchanges abrupt cancellation of Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs automobile insurance was the
proximate cause of considerable agony, medical
problems and frustration on the part of the Plain-
tiffs. Such actions are represented as gross negli-
gence.
App. 75
68. Gross negligence is the omission of care that even

in attentive and thoughtless persons never, fail, to
take. The actions are so indifferent to the rights of
others as if such rights do not exist. Liscombe v.
Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838
(1985); Boucher v. loner, 68 Md. App. 539, 514 A.2d
485 (1986).
69. That, while absence of intent is usually essential,
a party creating intentional injury does not pre-
clude a finding of negligence. McCance v. Lindau;
63 Md. App. 504, 492 A.2d 1352 (1985); Ghassem-
ieh v. Schafer, 52 Md. App. 31, 447 A.2d 84 (1982).
Even though the direct nature of the Defendants
acts implies intent, the pretense of intent does not
preclude a Ending of negligence.
by Defendants misconduct. Plaintiffs further seek at-
other relief as the Court deems equitable, just, fair
and proper. In addition, Plaintiff s also seek $140 and
additional civil penalties for every month from Sep-
tember 2012 until the resolution of this matter. De-
fendants irresponsible actions caused the Plaintiffs
harm and discernible injury.
App. 76
COUNT IV. DISCRIMINATION AND

UNFAIR TERMINATION PROVISIONS
1 through 69 into this claim for Relief; as if set
forth fully.
71. That Defendant violated the Maryland Insurance
Administration Market Conduct Examination Re-
port of the Property and Casualty Business of In-
terstate Auto Insurance Company (NAIC # 40720)
(Report No. 10875).
72. The focus of the examination was the review of
the Companys business practices as they relate to
the private passenger automobile line of business
to determine if the Companys producer licensing,
underwriting, rating and claims practices comply
with the Marylands insurance laws and regula-
tions (Maryland Insurance Administration, p, 1).
73. Defendant violated the following standards pro-
duced by the Maryland Insurance Administration:
1) COMAR. 31.08.03.04&.05 and Marylands In-
surance Article 27-605(c)(3)(vi) stating that 30
day notice should be provided to protest insurance
cancelation; Marylands Insurance Article 27-
605(c)(1)- stating that insurance company did not
send written notice of proposed action to insured
at last known address; Marylands Insurance Ar-
ticle 27-605(c)(3)(ii)- stating that insurance com-
pany failed to provide insured with the correct
effective date of its action;
App. 77
74. Being that a valid Contract existed between the

plaintiffs and Defendant California Casualty In-
demnity Exchange, which set forth all of the agree-
ments, conditions, understandings, promises,
warranties, and representations of the parties.
And that Defendant, California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange, abruptly canceled the Plaintiffs
insurance in the absence of any notice, whether
that be written or oral, possibly due to Plaintiff Jo-
sephat Muas National origin, the honorable. court
should find that the Defendant unjustly and un-
lawfully canceled Plaintiffs insurance.
change had an obligation, by statute and policy
that governed their issuance and maintenance of
insurance, and to provide the Plaintiffs notice
prior to the cancellation of Plaintiffs insurance;
change cancelling of automobile insurance was in-
tentional act and was negligent because Plaintiff
was of a different national origin (Kenyan). This
occurred shortly after uncomfortable conversa-
tions with an agent of Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange concerning the $5,000
check. The Discrimination is evidenced by the
agent asking Plaintiff Josephat Mua about his
background which had nothing to do with the ac-
cident. The plaintiff was not the driver at the time
of the accident but the Defendant switch things
around.
Exchange violated section 5 of The National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).
App. 78
78. That, NAIC is the U.S. standard-setting and regu-

latory support organization created and governed
by the chief insurance regulators from the 50
states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. ter-
ritories.
79. That, Section 5 of NAIC as well as Maryland law
states the following An insurance shall not ter-
minate a policy because of the insureds races
color, creed, national origin, ancestry, gender, sex-
ual orientation or marital status.
Exchange cancelled insurance without any notice
whatsoever and with malice based on Plaintiff
Josephat Muas national origin. Section 8 of NAIC
states a notice must be given before cancellation
of insurance policy can ensue.
the Plaintiffs insurance, the Plaintiff were forced
to acquire new insurance.
82. That, Plaintiffs premium rate with the Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange. was ap-
proximately $101.00. After the Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange cancelled the
Plaintiffs insurance, the Plaintiffs purchased in-
surance with Progressive insurance company,
which caused the Plaintiffs to incur premium rate
in the amount of $241.00. Thus, the Defendant
California. Casualty Indemnity Exchanges con-
duct exposed the Plaintiffs to an additional
monthly payment of $140;
App. 79

discernible injury.
COUNT V. IMPROPER
TERMINATION PRACTICE
forth fully.
84. That, Defendant violated the Maryland Insurance
Administrations Market Conduct Examination
Report of the Property and Casualty Business of
Interstate Auto Insurance Company (NAIC #
40720) (Report No. 10875).
85. The focus of the examination was the review of
the Companys business practices as they relate to
the private passenger automobile line of business
to determine if the Companys producer licensing,
underwriting, rating and claims practices comply
App. 80
with the Marylands insurance laws and regula-

tions (Maryland Insurance Administration, p. 1).
86. Defendant violated the following standards pro-
duced by the Maryland Insurance Administration:
1) COMAR 31.08.03.04&05 and Marylands Insur-
ance Article 27-605(c)(3)(vi) stating that 30 day
notice should be provided to protest insurance
cancelation; Marylands Insurance Article 27-
605(c)(1) stating that insurance company did not
send written notice of proposed action to insured
at last known address; Marylands Insurance Ar-
ticle 27-605(c)(3)(ii)- stating that insurance com-
pany failed to provide insured with the correct
effective date of its action;
87. That, a valid Contract existed between the Plain-
tiffs and Defendant California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange, which set forth all of the agreements,
conditions, understandings, promises, warranties,
Exchange, cancelled the automobile insurance and
violated Code of Maryland Regulation 31.15.09.02
which is part of Title 31 MARYLAND INSUR-
ANCE ADMINISTRATION Subtitle 15 UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES.
Exchange engaged in an improper termination
practice willfully.
Exchange abruptly canceled the Plaintiffs insur-
written or oral.
App. 81

Exchange had an obligation pursuant to Code of
Maryland Regulation 31.08.03.04 to provide the
Plaintiffs notice of their intent to cancel Plaintiffs
insurance;
92. That as a direct result of the Defendants abrupt
cancellation of the Plaintiffs insurance, the Plain-
tiffs were forced to immediately acquire new in-
surance and they suffered significant financial
damages.
93. That, there was a causal connection between the
Defendant misconduct and Plaintiff s emotional
distress. The emotional stress that Plaintiffs suf-
fered is severe and ongoing. They suffered physical
and emotional harm. The Plaintiffs premium rate
with the Defendant was approximately $101.00.
After the Defendant cancelled the Plaintiffs insur-
ance, the Plaintiffs purchased insurance with Pro-
gressive insurance company, which caused the
Plaintiffs to incur premium rate in the amount of
$241.00. Thus, the Defendants conduct exposed
the Plaintiff s to an additional monthly payment
of $140.00;
App. 82

201.2 until the resolution of this matter: Defendants
irresponsible actions caused the Plaintiffs harm and
discernible injury.
COUNT VI. UNJUST ENRICHMENT

1 through 93 into this claim for Relief as if set
forth fully.
95. Under Maryland law, unjust enrichment is estab-
lished when:. 1) A party confers a benefit upon
another, 2) The benefiting party knows or appreci-
ates the benefit; and 3) The benefiting partys ac-
ceptance or retention of the benefit under the
circumstances is such that it would be inequitable
to allow him or her to retain the benefit without
paying the value in return. Benson v. State, 389
Md. 615, 651-52 (2005).
96. Defendant has attempted to unjustly enrich them-
selves by three means: 1) Requesting for the $5000
that was paid to the Plaintiffs in response to the
auto incident; 2) By not paying full and reasonable
amount to Plaintiff after the traffic incident, as
provided in the insurance agreement; 3) By the
cancellation of Plaintiffs insurance forcing them to
select an insurance carrier with significantly
higher (more Than double) rates.
97. That Plaintiff invested at least $101/monthly for
automobile services since retaining Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange. Despite
App. 83
such, the Defendant California Casualty Indem-

nity Exchange has ignored their obligations under
the governing contract.
98. In light of such, the Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange has been accruing the
benefit of the payments disbursed by the Plaintiffs
in the absence of affording the Plaintiffs the cov-
erage as contemplated by the contract.
Exchange ongoing, unjust retention of Plaintiffs
excesses serves to benefit the Defendant at Plain-
tiff s detriment, and violates fundamental princi-
ples of justice, equity and conscience.
of unjust enrichment and seeks compensatory dam-
ages in the amount of and seek compensatory damages
other relief as the Court deems equitable, fair, just and
proper. Defendants action was cause of the Plaintiffs
harm and discernible injury. In addition, Plaintiffs also
seek $140 and additional civil penalties for every
month from September 2012 until the resolution of
this matter. Plaintiffs respectfully seek a full return of
any and all payments disbursed by the Plaintiffs to the
Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
App. 84
because of the willful nature of the Defendants mis-

conduct.
CONCLUSION
As asserted above, the Defendant California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchange has engaged in egregious
behavior that has proved unduly detrimental to the
Plaintiffs in the midst difficulty unemployment and re-
cession Period involving discrimination conduct. As
such the Plaintiffs seek judgments against the Defen-
dant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange as
plead in the separate counts and request damages as
plead in the separate counts and in the prayer for Re-
lief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray this Honora-
ble Court for the following relief:
I. The Plaintiffs seeks judgment, in all counts;
against the Defendant California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange in the full amount of his damages
in an amount to be proven at trial, and for the
amounts as sought out in this Complaint, plus pre
and post judgment interest, costs. Plaintiffs seeks
each damage as sought in the counts, whether
compensatory or punitive, to be awarded sepa-
rately and distinctly;
II. A preliminary and permanent injunction against
the Defendant California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange and their directors, officers, owners,
App. 85
agents, successors, employees and representa-

tives, and any all persons acting in concert with
them, from engaging in each of the unlawful
practices, improper activities and practices, poli-
cies, customs and usages set forth herein;
III. An order awarding declaratory relief as re-
quested herein and as the Court deems appropri-
ate;
IV. An order awarding restitution and/or disgorge-
ment of profits;
V. Judgment against Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange in the amount of economic
damages, compensatory damages, liquidated dam-
ages, and punitive damages to be determined at
trial;
VI. Interest due on all payments disbursed;
VII. Reasonable attorneys fee and costs of this action
incurred while consulting on these matters;
VIII. Any other relief this Honorable Court deems just
and proper to award.
IX. And all such further relief as the court deems just
and proper.
App. 86
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury
as to each issue herein.
Josephat Mua
/s/
Josephat Mua, Pro se Litigant
2332 London Bridge Dr
Silver Spring Md 20906
Tel: 301-919-4939
App. 87

CALIFORNIA CASUALTY )
)
Plaintiff
) CASE NO.:
v. ) 8:15-CV-00060-PJM
JOSPHAT MUA, et al. )
)
Defendants )
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF REMOVAL
The Plaintiff, California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change (hereinafter California Casualty), by and
through its undersigned counsel Marsden & Seledee,
L.L.C. and Joel D. Seledee, Esquire, hereby files this
Motion to Strike Defendants Notice of Removal, and
for reasons therefore states as follows:
1. The Defendants Notice of Removal is untimely
and improperly filed. The instant case should not
be removed to the Federal Court as the case has
already been tried, and judgment entered. The
case has been fully adjudicated in the District
Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, and
there is now an appeal pending in the Circuit
Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. The
Defendants are solely seeking to remove this case
to Federal Court because they received an unfa-
vorable decision in the Maryland District Court.
App. 88
2. The instant case is a simple unjust enrichment

claim regarding a double payout from car insur-
ance companies that the Defendants received as
the result of a car accident that occurred on Au-
gust 26, 2011.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. 1446 (West) provides that a notice of
removal must be filed within 30 days after the re-
ceipt by the defendant a copy of the initial plead-
ing setting forth the claim for relief upon which
such action or proceeding is based. The Plaintiff
filed the initial case on July 8, 2014. The Defend-
ants were served with the Complaint on July 21,
2014. (See the Maryland District Course case
docket attached hereto as Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 ver-
ifying the filing and service date).
4. On October 3, the Defendants filed a motion to al-
low the Defendants to file a counterclaim. The
Court granted the Defendants motion, but held
that the counterclaimed had to be filed with the
Court by October 31. The Defendants filed a coun-
terclaim on November 3. Therefore, the Court
struck the counterclaim as untimely. As a result of
the Courts ruling, the Defendants filed a motion
to transfer the case to Federal Court. The State
Court denied the Defendants motion.
5. On December 10, after holding a merit trial, the
Court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
(Copy of Judgment Notice attached hereto as
Plaintiff s Exhibit 2). The Defendants Mua and
Vandenplas both testified and presented evidence,
as did the Plaintiff. Following trial, on December
16, the Defendants filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion and request for a new trial. The Court also
App. 89
denied the Defendants motion for reconsidera-

tion. Thereafter, on January 7, 2015, the De-
fendants filed an appeal to the Circuit Court
of Maryland for Montgomery County, which is cur-
rently pending.
6. It was not until after the full litigation process
resulting in an unfavorable judgment to the De-
fendants that the Defendants decided to file a no-
tice of removal in the Federal Courts. The notice of
the removal filed by the Defendants violates both
the 30 day rule established in 28 U.S.C.A. 1446
(West) and the legal principle of res judicata.
Wherefore, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that
this Court strike the Defendants Notice of Removal
and dismiss the above captioned action from this
Court.
Dated: January 15, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ J
Joel D. Seledee, Esquire (08070)
Baltimore, MD 21201
(410) 783-2700 (telephone)
(410) 783-4130 (fax)
JDS@marsdenseledee.com
App. 90
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of Jan,
2015, a copy of PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANTS NOTICE OF REMOVAL was mailed
first class, postage prepaid to: Josephat Mua, 2332
London Bridge Road, Silver Spring, Maryland 20906,
Defendant; and, to Francoise Vandenplas, 2332 London
Bridge Road, Silver Spring, Maryland 20906, Defen-
dant.
/s/ J
Joel D. Seledee, Esquire
App. 91

CALIFORNIA CASUALTY )
)
Plaintiff
) CASE NO.:
v. ) 8:15-CV-00060-PJM
JOSPHAT MUA, et al. )
)
Defendants )
ORDER
Upon consideration of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike
Defendants Notice of Removal and any response by
the Defendant in opposition thereto, it is this ___ day
of ______, 2015, by the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, hereby
ORDERED, that Defendants Notice of Removal
be and is hereby STRICKEN, and it is further;
ORDERED, that the above captioned mattered be
and is hereby DISMISSED.
Judge
cc:
Joel D. Seledee, Esquire
Baltimore, MD 21201
App. 92
2332 London Bridge Rd.
Defendant
Josphat Mua
2332 London Bridge Rd.
Defendant
App. 93
10/20/2015
Financial Regulation Public Query
STATE OF MARYLAND
[LOGO] DLLR
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION
Financial Regulation Public Query
Business Information
Legal Name: MARSDEN & SELEDEE, LLC
Trade Name:
Business Type: Limited Liability Company (LLC)
Street Address: 1 NORTH CHARLES ST.
SUITE 2300
BALTIMORE, MD 21201-0000
License Information
Category: Collection Agency
License Number: 7227
Expiration Date: 12-31-2015
Original Issue Date: 10-01-2015
Status: ACTIVE
Select one of the following links to perform another
search:
Search by Location
Search Company Name
Search by Individual(s) Name
[Home] [Whats New] [General Info]
[DLLR Divisions] [Forms & Applications]
[Search The Site]
App. 94
[LOGO] California Casualty

P.O. BOX 39700
COLORADO SPRINGS CO 50949-9700
Important Insurance Documents Enclosed
201 7126553
IRMD0
Forwarding service Requested
8.1.723 3 MB 1.215 88849F11.ps 576638 1-11 2
[Bar Code Omitted In Printing]
VANDENSPLAS, FRANCOISE AND MUA
JOSPHAT
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR
SILVER SPRING MD 20906-5764
You could view this document online. Visit www.
calcas.com today, and Go Paperless!
* Receive email alerts when you have new insur-
ance documents
* Review policy transaction history online any-
time, anywhere
* View or print current and past insurance docu-
ments when you need them
INSURANCE CHECKLIST
Verify the information and coverages listed in the
Policy Declarations and be sure the coverages meet
your current needs.
Retain the enclosed documents for your records.
App. 95

P.O. Box 39700 *
Colorado Springs Trial by
*
CO, 80949 Jury Demand
* [Stricken 11/12/14
PLAINTIFF/ * 9RG6]
COUNTER-DEFENDANT *
* 0602-5340-2014
V.
* Previously
JOSEPHAT MUA * CASE NUMBER
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. 050200153352014
*
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906
* Received
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS * October 31, 2014
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. * 3:55
DEFENDANTS/ *
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

[Stricken 11-12-14 9R6]
NOW COMES Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
Josephat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas (hereinafter
referred to as Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs), pro se,
and respectfully, pursuant to MD Rule 3-331, responds
to Plaintiff California Casualty Indemnity Exchanges
(hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff/Counter-
Defendant) Complaint with the following:
App. 96
1. That Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs denies owing

any debt to the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Plain-
tiff California Casualty Indemnity Exchange with
regards to any services alleged to have been exe-
cuted by the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange; and
2. That Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs did in fact in-
cur expenses which were not covered by Allstate
insurance.
3. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Plaintiff California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange failed to notify the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs of insurance termi-
nation which was done maliciously and without
warning to the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs in
the middle of difficult economic times.
4. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange ignored or refused to perform
services or assist the defendants/counter-plaintiffs
for which the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange was contractu-
ally obligated.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On August 26th, 2011, Defendant Francoise Vanden-
plas was involved in a car accident. Defendant is very
lucky to be alive. She was the third car stopped at a red
light. Another driver rear ended her, without breaking
at all at a high speed. The impact was so strong, it
pushed her car into the 2nd car and the 2nd car was
pushed into the 1st car which were all stopped in the
red light. It could have been tragic if 1st car had been
App. 97
pushed into incoming traffic. The responsible driver

who caused this accident told the Defendant Francoise
that it was not his only accident. Defendants had not
been planning this car accident. This was a huge finan-
cial loss for the defendants. At first the Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change said it would fix the car. Later retracted and
said the car was totaled. At that point Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs had not been looking for another
car. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs needed to do re-
search and bargain for a better price in the midst of
sudden change. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange promised to reim-
burse car rental or assist with reimbursement but
later refused to return calls. Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs wanted the same make of the car they had
(Toyota RAV4) but the car was not easily available due
to 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan
which affected production. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange chose not to
assist the Defendants despite the obligations to do so
according to Maryland law. Defendants were not at
fault. Defendant Francoise Vandenplas was stopped
at a red light. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange issued the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs a check for $5,000 without an ex-
planation. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs retained the
check for 3 months which expired and worked with a
lawyer who told them to cash the check. Defendant Jo-
sephat Mua contacted the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange concerning
the uncashed check and reimbursement of rental car
App. 98
expenses which totaled more than $1,000 and the

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs was issued a new check
for $5,000 without any explanations.
PARTIES:
5. That, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchange is a corporation regis-
tered in the State of Maryland. It is engaged in the
business of providing insurance coverage through-
out the state of Maryland.
6. That, Defendants Josephat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas are residents of Montgomery County
in the state of Maryland.
COUNT ONE:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
7. The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs incorporates
by reference and reasserts and religious herein the
matters contained in paragraphs 1 through 6, as if set
forth fully.
8. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange, did not properly assist the De-
fendants when they needed help within the prescribed
period after the accident occurred. The Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs submitted the appeal timely for as-
sistance with the damaged car.
Indemnity Exchange, abruptly canceled the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs insurance in the absence of any
App. 99
notice, whether that be written or oral. The Plaintiff/

Counter-Defendant, California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange had an obligation pursuant to Code of Mary-
land Regulation 31.08.03.04 to provide the Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant notice of their intent to cancel De-
fendant/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance;
Indemnity Exchange had an obligation, whether by
statute or the policy that governed their issuance and
maintenance of insurance, to provide the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs notice prior to the cancellation of
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance;
11. As a direct result of the Plaintiff/Counter-
Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Exchanges
abrupt cancellation of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
automobile insurance, the Defendants/Counter-Plain-
tiffs were forced to acquire new automobile insurance.
The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs premium rate with
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange was approximately $101.00. Af-
ter the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange cancelled the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs automobile insurance, the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs purchased insurance with Progres-
sive, which caused the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
to incur premium rate in the amount of $241.00. Thus,
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty In-
demnity Exchanges conduct exposed the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs to an additional monthly payment
of $140;
App. 100
WHEREFORE, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs re-

spectfully request that this Court award judgment
against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange on the count of Breach of
Contract and seek compensatory damages in the
amount of $250,000 for the Defendants/Counter-Plain-
tiffs pain and suffering that was brought on directly
and proximately by Plaintiff s misconduct. Plaintiff s
action was cause of the Defendants harm and discern-
ible injury. In addition, Defendants also seek $140 and
additional civil penalties for every month from Sep-
tember 2012 until the resolution of this matter.
COUNT TWO
BREACH OF DUTY
The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs incorporates by ref-
erence and reasserts and religious herein the matters
contained in paragraphs 1 through 11, as if set forth
fully.
Indemnity Exchange, did not act in the best interest of
his/her clients (Defendants Josephat Mua and Fran-
coise Vandenplas). Defendants requested assistance
with the rental car and help in resolving the dispute
with the personalities who caused the accident. Plain-
tiff/Counter-Defendant, California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange refused to return calls and the customer
service was below expectation.
Indemnity Exchange, abruptly canceled the Defendants/
App. 101
Counter-Plaintiffs insurance in the absence of any

notice, whether that be written or oral. The Plain-
tiff/Counter-Defendant had an obligation pursuant to
Code of Maryland Regulation 31.08.03.04 to provide
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant notice of their intent
to cancel Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance;
Indemnity Exchange had an obligation, whether by
statute or the policy that governed their issuance and
maintenance of insurance, to provide the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs notice prior to the cancellation of
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance;
Indemnity Exchange cancelling of automobile insur-
ance was intentional act and was negligent.
16. As a direct result of the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchanges abrupt can-
cellation of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance,
the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs were forced to acquire
new insurance. The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs pre-
mium rate with the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Cali-
fornia Casualty Indemnity Exchange was approximately
$101.00. After the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Cali-
fornia Casualty Indemnity Exchange cancelled the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance, the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs purchased insurance with Progres-
sive, which caused the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
to incur premium rate in the amount of $241.00. Thus,
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
App. 102
Indemnity Exchanges conduct exposed the Defend-

ants/Counter-Plaintiffs to an additional monthly pay-
ment of $140.00
against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange on the count of Breach of
Duty and seek compensatory damages in the amount
of $250,000 for the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
pain and suffering that was brought on directly and
proximately by Plaintiffs misconduct.
In addition, Defendants also seek $140 and additional
civil penalties for every month from September 2012
until the resolution of this matter.
COUNT THREE
NEGLIGENCE
by reference and reasserts and religious herein
the matters contained in paragraphs 1 through 16,
as if set forth fully
18. That as Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurer,
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant had an ongoing
duty to both comply with the policy and governing
statutes of the State of Maryland with regards
to affording notice to the Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs prior to the cancellation of any and
all insurance. Despite that duty, the Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant executed cancellation of the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs automobile insurance
App. 103
in the absence of any notice. The Plaintiff/Counter-

conduct amounted to a breach that was the proxi-
mate and/or direct cause of the Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs retention of alternative automobile in-
surance, which subjected the Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs to an additional monthly payment of
$140.00, which commenced in September of 2012
to the present. Further, the Plaintiff/Counter-
automobile insurance was the proximate cause of
considerable agony and frustration on the part of
the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs respect-
fully request that this Court award judgment against
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty In-
demnity Exchange on the count of negligence and seek
compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000 for
the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs pain and suffering
that was brought on directly and proximately by Plain-
tiff s misconduct. Plaintiff s action was cause of the
Defendants harm and discernible injury. Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs further seeks additional damages in
the amount of $140.00 and additional civil penalties
for every month from September 2012 until the resolu-
tion of this matter brought on directly and proximately
by Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchanges misconduct.
App. 104
COUNT IV
UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION
IN TERMINATION PROVISIONS
The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs incorporates by
reference and reasserts and religious herein the mat-
ters contained in paragraphs 1 through 18, as if set
forth fully.
Indemnity Exchange, did not act in the best inter-
est of his/her clients (Defendants Josephat Mua
and Francoise Vandenplas).
20. That, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange violated 2010 Maryland
Code INSURANCE TITLE 27 UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND OTHER PROHIBITED PRAC-
TICES.
Indemnity Exchange, abruptly canceled the De-
fendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance in the ab-
sence of any notice, whether that be written or oral
because of Defendant Josephat Muas National
origin. The Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Califor-
nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange had an obliga-
tion pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulation
31.08.03.04 to provide the Plaintiff/Counter-
Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
notice of their intent to cancel Defendant/Counter-
Plaintiffs automobile insurance;
Indemnity Exchange had an obligation, whether
by statute or the policy that governed their issu-
ance and maintenance of insurance, to provide the
App. 105
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs notice prior to the

cancellation of Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs in-
surance;
Indemnity Exchange cancelling of automobile in-
surance was intentional act and was negligent
because Defendants/Counter-Plaintiff was of a dif-
ferent National origin (Kenyan). This occurred
shortly after uncomfortable conversation with an
agent of Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange concerning the
$5,000 check.
ualty Indemnity Exchange violated section 5 of
The National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC).
25. That, NAIC is the U.S. standard-setting and regu-
latory support organization created and governed
by the chief insurance regulators from the 50
states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. terri-
tories.
26. That, Section 5 of NAIC as well as Maryland law
states the following An insurance shall not termi-
nate a policy because of the insureds race, color,
creed, national origin, ancestry, gender, sexual ori-
entation or marital status.
ualty Indemnity Exchange cancelled insurance
without any notice whatsoever and with malice
based on his national origin. Section 8 of NAIC
states a notice must be given.
App. 106
28. As a direct result of the Plaintiff/Counter-

insurance, the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs were
forced to acquire new insurance. The Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs premium rate with the Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant California Casualty Indem-
nity Exchange was approximately $101.00. After
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casu-
alty Indemnity Exchange cancelled the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs insurance, the Defendants/
Counter-Plaintiffs purchased insurance with Pro-
gressive, which caused the Defendants/Counter-
$241.00. Thus, the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchanges con-
duct exposed the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs to
an additional monthly payment of $140;
against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange on the count of unfair Discrimi-
nation in termination provisions and seek compen-
satory damages in the amount of $250,000 for the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs pain and suffering that
was brought on directly and proximately by Plaintiffs
misconduct.
App. 107
COUNT V
IMPROPER TERMINATION PRACTICE
by reference and reasserts and religious herein the
matters contained in paragraphs 1 through 28, as if set
forth fully.
Indemnity Exchange, cancelled the automobile insur-
ance and violated Code of Maryland Regulation
31.15.09.02 which is part of Title 31 MARYLAND IN-
SURANCE ADMINISTRATION Subtitle 15 UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES.
Indemnity Exchange engaged in an improper termina-
tion practice., abruptly canceled the Defendants/Coun-
ter-Plaintiffs insurance in the absence of any notice,
whether that be written or oral. The Plaintiff/Counter-
Defendant had an obligation pursuant to Code of Mary-
land Regulation 31.08.03.04 to provide the Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant notice of their intent to cancel
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance;
32. As a direct result of the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants
insurance, the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs were forced
to acquire new insurance and they suffered damages.
The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs premium rate with
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant was approximately
$101.00. After the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant can-
celled the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs insurance,
the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs purchased insurance
App. 108
with Progressive, which caused the Defendants/Counter-

$241.00. Thus, the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants con-
duct exposed the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs to an
additional monthly payment of $140.00;
WHEREFORE, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
respectfully request that this Court award judgment
against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant on the count of
Improper termination practice and seek compensatory
damages in the amount of $250, 000 for the Defend-
ants/Counter-Plaintiffs pain and suffering that was
brought on directly and proximately by Plaintiff s mis-
conduct.
COUNT VI
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. That Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs incorporates
by reference and reasserts and religious herein
the matters contained in paragraphs 1 through 32,
as if set forth fully
34. That Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs invested at
least $101/monthly for automobile services since
retaining Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, California
Casualty Indemnity Exchange. Despite such, the
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange has ignored their obligations
under the governing contract.
App. 109
35. In light of such, the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

California Casualty Indemnity Exchange has been
accruing the benefit of the payments disbursed by
the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs in the absence
of affording the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs the
coverage as contemplated by the contract.
WHEREFORE, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
respectfully request that this Court award judgment
against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant on the count of Un-
just Enrichment and seek compensatory damages in
the amount of $250, 000 for the Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs pain and suffering that was brought on
directly and proximately by Plaintiffs misconduct.
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs respectfully seeks a
full return of any and all payments disbursed by the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs to the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
As asserted above, the Plaintiff/Counter-Defend-
ant California Casualty Indemnity Exchange has en-
gaged in egregious behavior that has proved unduly
detrimental to the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs in
the midst difficulty unemployment and recession pe-
riod involving discrimination conduct. As such, the
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs seek judgments against
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange as plead in the separate counts
and award the damages as plead in the separate
counts and in the prayer for Relief.
App. 110
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
prays this Honorable Court for the following relief:
I. The Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs seeks judg-
ment, in all counts, against the Plaintiff/Counter-
change in the full amount of his damages in an
amount to be proven at trial, and for the amounts
as sought out in this Complaint, plus pre and post
judgment interest, costs. Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs seeks each damage as sought in the
counts, whether compensatory or punitive, to be
awarded separately and distinctly;
II. A preliminary and permanent injunction against
the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchange and their directors, of-
ficers, owners, agents, successors, employees and
representatives, and any all persons acting in
concert with them, from engaging in each of the
unlawful practices, improper activities and prac-
tices, policies, customs and usages set forth
herein;
III. An order awarding declaratory relief as re-
quested herein and as the Court deems appropri-
ate;
IV. An order awarding restitution and/or disgorge-
ment of profits;
V. Judgment against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange in the
amount of economic damages, compensatory dam-
ages, liquidated damages, and punitive damages
to be determined at trial;
App. 111
VI. Interest due on all payments disbursed;

VII. Reasonable attorneys fee and costs of this action
incurred while consulting on these matters;
VIII. Any other relief this Honorable Court deems just
and proper to award.
IX. And all such further relief as the court deems just
and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Requests a Trial by
Jury on all Issues.
/s/ Josephat Mua
Josephat Mua,
Pro se Litigant
Silver Spring Md 20906
Tel: 301-919-4939
App. 112
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANTS ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
was submitted via Electronic Mail, Registered U.S
mail and by process server on Friday, October 31, 2014
and served to the following:
Joel Seledee, Esq.
One Charles Street
Suit 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
/s/ Josephat Mua
Josephat Mua,
Pro se Litigant
App. 113

P.O. Box 39700 * ENTERED
Colorado Springs December 12, 2014
*
CO, 80949 * Trial by
PLAINTIFF/ * Jury Demand
COUNTER-DEFENDANT * 0602-5340-2014
V. *
Previously
*
JOSEPHAT MUA CASE NUMBER
* 050200153352014
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR.
*
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 Received
*
FRANCOISE VANDERPLAS * December 10, 2014
2332 LONDON BRIDGE DR. * Received
SILVER SPRING, MD 20906 * December 8, 2014
DEFENDANTS/ *
MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR

IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE
TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY OR SCHEDULE
NOW COMES Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Fran-
coise Vandenplas and Josephat Mua, pro se and re-
spectfully requests that this Court issue an order to
compel and for immediate sanctions for failure to pro-
vide discovery per the order of the court issued on Oc-
tober 21, 2014. The trial in this action is set For
December 10, 2014. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs
App. 114
files this Motion pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-433 or

any other law or precedent or schedule a hearing in the
alternative for the following reasons:
FACTS
1. That, this matter is scheduled for trial on Decem-
ber 10, 2014.
2. That, this matter was previously scheduled for
trial on October 22, 2014;
3. That, on October 21st, 2014, the District court of
Maryland granted leave to file a counter claim by
October 31st, 2014. (See Exhibit 1)
4. That, the same order directed the parties that, any
discovery regarding the counter claim shall be
filed and served by November 10, 2014. Responses
to discovery shall be due and served by November
28, 2014. (See Exhibit 1).
5. That, on October 31st, 2014, the Defendants filed
a counterclaim with the District court of Maryland
and served the plaintiff.
6. That, the District court of Maryland further di-
rected that, Discovery regarding the counter claim
shall be filed and served by November 10th, 2014
and responses to discovery shall be due and served
by November 28th, 2014.
7. That, on October 29th 2014, the District court of
Maryland denied the Motion for Protective order
filed by the Defendant on October 16th, 2014.
8. That, on October 29th, 2014, the District court of
Maryland denied a Motion to Sanction filed by the
App. 115
attorney for plaintiff California Casualty Indem-

nity Exchange on October 7th, 2014.
9. That, on October 29th, 2014, the District court of
Maryland granted the Motion to Compel Answers
to interrogatories filed by the attorney for plaintiff
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange on Octo-
ber 7th, 2014.
10. That, on November 10, 2014, Defendants served
the plaintiff/counter Defendant with the 1st Set of
Interrogatories to Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange.
11. That, On Wednesday, November 19, 2014, Defendants/
Counter Plaintiffs filed responses to plaintiff/
Counter Defendants interrogatories to Defendant.
12. That, on November 28th, 2014, the Plaintiff/
Counter Plaintiff California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange never responded to the discovery re-
quest in violation of the order of the court.
13. That, Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs filed a MO-
TION TO TRANSFER CASE TO FEDERAL
COURT IN GREENBELT MARYLAND and the
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange filed a response to the Mo-
tion without any signatures.
14. That, the Defendants Motion to postpone case due
to conflicts was denied.
15. That, On December 8, 2014, Defendants/Counter
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Federal Court against
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant California Casualty
Indemnity Exchange. (See Exhibit 2)
App. 116
AUTHORITY
When a party fails: (1) to attend a deposition; (2) to
provide Answers to Interrogatories and/or Responses
to a Request for Production of Documents as required
by the Maryland Rules; the opposing party may file for
immediate sanctions Motion without first filing a Mo-
tion to Compel Discovery pursuant to Maryland Rule
2-432.
Maryland Rule 2-433 provides:
Rule 2-433. Sanctions
(a) For certain failures of discovery. Upon a motion
filed under Rule 2-432(a), the court, if it finds a failure
of discovery, may enter such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, including one or more of the follow-
ing:
(1) An order that the matters sought to be discovered,
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be es-
tablished for the purpose of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(2) An order refusing to allow the failing party to sup-
port or oppose designated claims or defenses, or pro-
hibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence; or
(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,
or staying further proceeding until the discovery is
provided, or dismissing the action or any part thereof,
or entering a judgment by default that includes a de-
termination as to liability and all relief sought by the
App. 117
moving party against the failing party if the court is

satisfied that it has personal jurisdiction over that
party. If, in order to enable the court to enter default
judgment, it is necessary to take an account or to de-
termine the amount of damages or to establish the
truth of any averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any matter, the court may rely on affi-
davits, conduct hearings or order references as appro-
priate, and, if requested, shall preserve to the plaintiff
the right of trial by jury.
Instead of any order or in addition thereto, the court,
after opportunity for hearing, shall require the failing
party or the attorney advising the failure to act or both
of them to pay the reasonable expenses, including at-
torneys fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(b) For loss of electronically stored information. Ab-
sent exceptional circumstances, a court may not im-
pose sanctions under these Rules on a party for failing
to provide electronically stored information that is no
longer available as a result of the routine, good-faith
operations of an electronic information system.
(c) For failure to comply with order compelling dis-
covery. If a person fails to obey an order compelling dis-
covery, the court, upon motion of a party and
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons af-
fected, may enter such orders in regard to the failure
as are just, including one or more of the orders set forth
App. 118
in section (a) of this Rule. If justice cannot otherwise

be achieved, the court may enter an order in compli-
ance with Rule 15-206 treating the failure to obey the
order as a contempt.
(d) Award of expenses. If a motion filed under Rule 2-
432 or under Rule 2-403 is granted, the court, after op-
portunity for hearing, shall require the party or depo-
nent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the
party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of
them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attor-
neys fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to
the motion was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court, after opportunity for
hearing, shall require the moving party or the attorney
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party
or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including
attorneys fees, unless the court finds that the making
of the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred
in relation to the motion among the parties and per-
sons in a just manner.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants/Counter Plain-
tiffs Josephat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas respect-
fully requests this honorable Court to compel and for
immediate sanctions due to the failure by the Plaintiff/
App. 119
Counter-Defendant California Casualty Indemnity Ex-

change to provide Discovery to the Defendants. The
Defendants further request the court to issue an order
granting transfer of the case to Federal Court in the
District of Maryland because of the diversity of issues
and Federal Question.
The Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs further re-
quests that this Court grant any other relief that it
deems just and/or proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Josephat Mua
Josephat Mua
Pro Se Litigant
(301) 9194939
AFFIDAVIT
We, Defendant Josephat Mua and Francoise Vanden-
plas, are over eighteen years of age, have personal
knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and are compe-
tent to testify to the facts as asserted in MOTION TO
COMPEL AND FOR IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR
FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY of Trial sched-
uled for December 10, 2014.
App. 120
We do solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury

and upon personal knowledge that the Facts as as-
serted in Motion to extend time are true and correct.
Josephat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant/Counter Plaintiff
/s/ Josephat Mua and Francoise Vandenplas
/s/ [Illegible]
Signature and Title of Person Filing this motion
Date: Monday, December 08, 2014
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Monday, Decem-
ber 08, 2014, a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR IMMEDIATE
SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOV-
ERY OF THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR DECEM-
BER 10, 2014 OR SCHEDULE A HEARING IN THE
ALTERNATIVE was submitted via first-class U.S. mail
to the following:
Joel Seledee
Suite 2300
Baltimore, MD 21201
/s/ Josephat Mua
Josephat Mua and Francise Vandenplas
Pro-se
App. 121
Via Priority Mail.

Silver Spring Md, 20906
January 15th, 2015
Hon. John P. Morrissey
Chief Judge
District Court of Maryland
Maryland Judicial Center, A-3
580 Taylor Ave, Annapolis, MD 21401-2395
Dear Judge Morrissey,
Re: Illegalities involving court
documents for case No. 0602-5340-2014
I am writing to you on our own behalf (Josephat Mua
and Francoise Vandenplas) concerning illegalities and
mishandling of our above captioned case which hap-
pened recently leading to denial of adjudication of our
claims. As a result of these illegalities, our case was not
considered by the District Court of Montgomery county
Maryland. The judge stated in open court on December
le, 2014 that, our counter claim was untimely filed. As
a result, the court found us liable and struck our com-
plaint.
To appraise you, the following has been happening
leading to the denial of our case.
1. We filed a timely counterclaim on October 31st,
2014, contrary to the stamp of 11/3/2014 shown on
the first page of the counterclaim. (See Exhibit 1)
2. That, on November 19th, 2014, Defendant/Coun-
ter Plaintiff Mr. Mua spoke with the supervisors
App. 122
in the office of clerk for the District Court in

Rockville Maryland to help fix an incorrectly
dated stamp added by the Accounting Department
of the court on October 31, 2014.
3. That, the original stamp for October 31st 2014
placed on the first page of the counterclaim by the
court was intentionally and obviously scratched
out with a pen, leaving a new date of November
3rd, 2014 by the staff of the court.
4. That, as a result of the clerical error, the court
struck the counterclaim and jury demand filed by
the Defendants Josephat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas stating that, the counterclaim was not
filed on 10/31/2014, which is an irregularity. (See
Exhibit 2)
5. That, page two of the counterclaim shows a stamp
for 10/31/2014 contrary to a new stamp placed on
the first page of the counter claim. (See Exhibit 3)
6. That, the original copy of the counterclaim was
placed on the file by the clerk of the civil Division
on 10/31/2014 with stamp showing the same date.
7. That, on November 13, 2014, Defendants/Counter
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to transfer venue to Fed-
eral Court.
8. That, on November 17, 2014, Defendants/Counter
Plaintiffs received the package from the court with
a counterclaim stricken. (See Exhibit 2)
9. That, on November 19, 2014, the staff acknowl-
edged mistakes and took a copy of the order and
counterclaim back to the judge for the corrections.
App. 123
10. That, the Maryland District Court supervisors in

Rockville told Defendant/counter Plaintiff Mr.
Mua that, there was no need to file a motion and
that everything will be taken care of.
11. That, on November 20, 2014, at 2:01pm the Assis-
tant District clerk Sandy called. to say that the
counterclaim was not good because it exceeded the
threshold allowed by the court. (Defendant/coun-
ter plaintiff kept the voicemail)
12. That, Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs filed a Mo-
tion to compel the plaintiff on December 8th, 2014
assuming the correction of the wrong date on the
counterclaim had been fixed and the Motion to
transfer venue would be granted in the interest of
substantial justice.
13. That, Motion to compel and for immediate sanc-
tions due to the failure by the Plaintiff/Counter-
change to provide Discovery to the Defendants
filed by the Defendants on December 8, 2014 was
also tampered with and a new date for December
10, 2014 was placed. After Defendant/Counter
Plaintiff Mr. Mua voiced his concerns, the assis-
tant clerk of the court crossed the wrong date in
the presence of the Defendant/counter plaintiff
Mr. Mua.
14. On December 10, 2014, Defendants went to the
court and the Judge stated that the counterclaim
on file was not filed timely, resulting in an irregu-
larity.
15. That, the Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs objected
but were over ruled.
App. 124
16. That, on December 10, 2014 during the short

break before the trial commenced, Defendant/
Counter plaintiff Mr. Mua attempted to reach out
to the Assistant clerk of the court in Rockville
through the Silver Spring office to verify the is-
sues to the court. However, Defendant/Counter
plaintiff Mr. Mua was unsuccessful.
17. That, on December 10th, 2014, the Judge denied
the Motion to transfer venue to Federal court and
conducted a trial even though we raised issues
concerning fraud after the tampering of the court
documents. (See Exhibit 4)
18. That, on December 11th, 2014, the Federal Court
issued summons for the claim filed by the Defend-
ants. (See order of the Federal Court Exhibit 5)
19. That, Defendants are afraid the Complaint filed in
Federal court against the plaintiff California Cas-
ualty Indemnity Exchange, might become barred
due to the principle of res judicata, which holds
that a case cannot be argued if it covers the same
people and arguments as a previous case.
20. That, the clerk of the District court made a clerical
error and the Defendants would like the court to
exercise revisory power due to the above men-
tioned illegarities and allow the case be removed
to Federal Court in the interest of justice.
21. On December 12th, 2014, Josephat Mua spoke
with Ms. Chase Supervisor Second in com-
mand. She indicated that Ms. Bell was the Divi-
sion chief.
22. Josephat Mua also spoke with Ms. Lide Supervi-
sor who indicated that she was going to write a
App. 125
note explaining what happened concerning the

situation concerning change of Date and that she
was going to call back by Wednesday December
17th, 2014.
23. That on the same day December 12th, 2014, Ms.
Chase (Second in command) said that she was
willing to refund the money paid for the counter-
claim which we paid for filing the complaint.
24. In addition, Ms. Chase also said that, because we
requested a jury demand, she had spoken to a
judge and they couldnt accept it because time had
passed for jury demand since its been many
months since the complaint was filed. She indi-
cated that the complaint was not good.
25. Ms. Chase also stated that she had called and spo-
ken to me (Josephat Mua) and discussed it at
which time I (Josephat Mua) told her I had never
spoken to her before December 12, 2014.
26. One of the supervisors said that they will take the
file back to the judge and will be in touch by
Wednesday December 17th, 2014 (the following
week).
27. However, since writing a letter to the clerk of the
court in Montgomery County documenting the
events of what transferred on December 16th,
2014, part of the staff in the clerk of court for
Montgomery county office led by Ms. Chase and
Ms. Sandy begun a campaign of retaliation.
We would like your good offices to review these mis-
steps and illegalities involved in the handling of this
case. Its possible there might be other victims with
App. 126
similar issues. Tampering with court documents is a

serious issue. Nevertheless, we are not interested in
filing a lawsuit against the courts or the court person-
nel involved without a state or Federal agency to look
into these questionable and illegal activities. At this
point, we recommend the court to take its own initia-
tive to deal with the personnel involved. We will be
happy to cooperate with any investigations. All we are
interested in is the truth and the due process of the law
to be allowed to take its own course.
Our motion for reconsideration has been denied in a
very suspicious manner after we have already filed a
removal action to Federal court We hope that you con-
sider this information throughout the case. If you need
any more information, we can be reached at 301-919-
4939.
We didnt deserve what happened to us, and neither
does anyone else.
Sincerely,
/s/ Josephat Mua
Josephat Mua on behalf of
Francoise vandenplas and I.
App. 127

FOR Prince Georges County
[LOGO]
LOCATED AT (COURT ADDRESS)
14735 Main Street, Bourne Wing
Upper Marlboro MD 20772
CASE NO.
CV
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPLAINT/APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
$5,000 or under over $5,000
over $10, 000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clerk: Please docket this case in an action of
contract tort replevin detinue
bad faith insurance claim
The particulars of this case are:
SEE ATTACHED
This is a communication from a debt collector and
an Attempt to collect a debt. Any information
obtained as a result hereof will be used for that
purpose.
(See Continuation Sheet)

Legal Contractual ______%
App. 128
PARTIES
Plaintiff California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
P O Box 39700
Colorado Springs CO 80949
21400477C
VS.
Defendant(s):
1. Josphat Mua
2332 London Bridge
Silver Spring MD 20906
Constable Sheriff
2. Francise Vandenplus
2332 London Bridge
Silver Spring MD 20906
Constable Sheriff
3.
Constable Sheriff
4.
Constable Sheriff
App. 129
ATTORNEYS
For Plaintiff
Name, Address, Telephone Number & Code
Joel D. Seledee, Esquire 2726
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-3740
Telephone: (410) 783-2700
The Plaintiff claims:

$5128.83 plus interest of $0.00 and attorneys fees
of $0.00 plus court costs.
Return of the property and damages of $0.00 for
its detention in an action of replevin.
Return of the property, or its value, plus damages
of $0.00 for its detention in action of detinue.
Other Other Line and demands judgment for re-
lief.
/s/ [Illegible]
Signature of Plaintiff/Attorney/Attorney Code
Signers Address:
Signers Telephone Number: 410-783-2700

Signers Facsimile, if any:
Signers E-mail Address,
if any: JDS@MarsdenSeledee.com
App. 130
MILITARY SERVICE AFFIDAVIT

Defendant(s) ____________ (Name) is/are in the mil-
itary service.
No Defendant is in the military service. The facts
supporting this statement are: ____________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
(Specific facts must be given for the Court to conclude
that each Defendant who is a natural person is not in
the military.)
I am unable to determine whether or not any De-
fendant is in military service.
I hereby declare or affirm under the penalties of per-
jury that the facts and matters set forth in the afore-
going Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.
/s/
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT
Attached hereto are the indicated documents which
contain sufficient detail as to liability and damage to
apprise the Defendant clearly of the claim against the
Defendant, including the amount of any interest
claimed.
Properly authenticated copy of any note, security
agreement upon which claim is based Itemized
statement of account Interest worksheet
Vouchers Check Other written document
________________ Verified itemized repair bill
or estimate
App. 131
I HEREBY CERTIFY: That I am the Plaintiff

_________________ of the Plaintiff herein and am
competent to testify to the matters stated in this com-
plaint, which are made on my personal knowledge;
that there is justly due and owing by the Defendant to
the Plaintiff the sum set forth in the Complaint.
I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury and
upon personal knowledge that the contents of the
above Complaint are true and I am competent to tes-
tify to these matters.
July 1, 2014 /s/ See Attached Affidavit
DC/CV 1 (front) (Rev. 11/2012)
App. 132
COMPLAINT
Unjust Enrichment
1. That Plaintiff California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange (hereinafter CalCas) is a corporation
registered in the State of Maryland. It is engaged
in the business of providing insurance coverage
throughout the State of Maryland
2. That Defendants Josphat Mua and Francoise
Vandenplas (hereinafter Mua and Vandenplas)
are residents of the State of Maryland.
3. That Defendant Mua entered into an insurance
agreement, whereby CalCas agreed to provide
auto-insurance coverage to Defendant in exchange
for and in consideration of the Defendants pay-
ment of all policy premiums required under the
contract between the parties.
4. That on August 26, 2011, Defendant Vandenplas
was Involved in a vehicular accident where she
was rear-ended while stopped at a red light at the
intersection of Gorman Ave. and Washington Blvd.
in Laurel, Prince Georges County, Maryland, by a
vehicle driven by Robert Serpa. Serpa was insured
by Allstate Insurance Company.
5. That on or about March 1, 2012, Allstate Insur-
ance Co. accepted liability and Defendants, Mua
and Vandenplas, agreed to a settlement with All-
state Insurance Group for a total of $8,813.66 as a
result off Allstates Insured, Robert Serpa, being
the cause of the initial accident.
6. That Defendants Mus. and Vandenplas continued
to pursue a claim for property damages with Cal-
Cas, despite having already been paid for those
App. 133
same property damages by Allstate and that on or

about October 10, 2012, CalCas issued a check
totaling $5,128,93 to Defendants Mutt and Van-
denplas for property loss as a result of the August
26, 2011 accident.
7. That the instant Defendants have now recovered
twice for the same property damage arising from
the August 26, 2011 accident. Plaintiff is pre-
cluded from exercising its right of subrogation
against Serpa (through his insurance carrier All-
state) due to the Defendants having already ac-
cepted payment for the subject property damages
from Allstate. The Defendants have refused to re-
turn the funds paid to them by CalCas, despite de-
mand for same.
8. That Defendants acceptance and retention of Cal-
Cass payment to Defendant after Defendants
have already been paid for the same property
damages by Allstate, makes it inequitable for De-
fendant to retain such benefit.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Calms prays this Court
for Damages in the amount of $5,128.83 from
Defendant.

Josephat Mua&#39;s Petition in Supreme Court

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Josephat Mua&#39;s Petition in Supreme Court

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

No.

Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPHAT MUA AND

CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE,

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOSEPHAT MUA Pro se

1. Whether the continuous violation of Title VI and

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued

6. Whether Marsden & Seledee LLCs lacking the

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioners Josephat Mua and Francoise

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued

Pro Se Litigants pleadings are to be constructed

Mua et al, No. 8:2015cv00060 Document 38 (D. Md.

amended; and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

system and a public citizen having special responsibil-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

LLC (M&S) engaged in violations of fair debt collec-

the same day they entered an order denying transfer

inserted another stamp later on after proceedings as

2014 hearing, another hearing was set for February 23,

which is against Federal and state laws in the United

A. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange

Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) (CRA) and the Lily

Court. Petitioner Mr. Mua had a contract with Califor-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Georges County) Since that time, there has been a con-

B. Creating Change in Maryland

through a transformation which is ongoing. The only

C. Federal Cases and various conflicts:

2. Federal Case No. 8:14-cv-03810-PJM

for the Fourth Circuit issued their order on February

II. Proceedings In The District Court and vio-

the state of Maryland which had been

l.) On May 23, 2016, Petitioners issued a no-

2. Federal Case No. 8:15-cv-00060-PJM

(e.) On February 4, 2015, U.S. Federal Dis-

Federal District Court delayed mailing

III. U.S. Attorney Department of Education

Education office of the inspector General concerning

does not have close ties to Montgomery County, Prince

Issue two: The Plaintiff must establish venue

Federal law, they made the judgement which they got

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. The district court abused its discretion

mitigating factors, as well as the potential or actual

issues and reverse the judgement of the Montgomery

Fourth Circuit has adopted an expansive view of what

A. Petitioners demonstrated that the Ap-

and that retaliation was the real reason after Peti-

(c) Any person injured in his business or

Josephat Mua's Petition in Supreme Court

Josephat Mua's Petition in Supreme Court