. wr.

j,FTH ARMY CROUP

BA7T bE EXPERIENCES
No. 61 9 OCT 1944
'Battle m e r i e n o e e * are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o anable
unlts i n t r a i n i n g t o p m f i t f r o m the l a t e s t combst emeriencea of our t m o p e nor
f i g h t i n g t h e G e m i n Burope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r looation are not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o l u .
t h e item8 published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experienoe and are reoormmtnded
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may e n m u t e r s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary elperiencas a r e p a r t i o u l a r l y desired i n oraer t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

By cnmannd of Lieutanant General ERADLtSY:

c.$,U
C* M. LAAIDON
Colonel, A6D
Adjutant General

bbte: 'I'he following m a t e r i a l , extracted f r o m a mfmorandum of the 2d Inf Div concern-

iq t h e experiencee of t h a t unit i n l a r g e aoale s t r e e t f i g h t i n g i n Brest, is w r t h y
of mte a s i n d i c a t i v e of conditions l i k e l y t o be encountered by u n i t s f i g h t i n g in
German c i t i e s . A discussion of this subject by t h e d i v condr ras published i n B a t t l e
&&pexriencere No. 50.

1. Bnanw deie~benmthods. a. - S t r e e t a were covered normally by s a z i n g f i r e of

automatic rpns loaated i n pillboxes and i n basgneats. Pillboxes were located fie-
quently a t street interaectionn.
b. mRiPlemenwere placed both i n upper s t o r i e s and i n basements ta c o r e r the
autcnaatic rpns positions. Hiflemen were located alao in m y gutted building^^ anal1
holes haring been made in t h e remaining w l l l s t o enable f i r e t o be placed in t h e cen-
t e n of blooks.
c. 'Buildings within the i n t e r i o r of a block nornvsily were m t occupied as they
did not a f f o r d f i e l d s of f i r e and were e a s i l y sumunded.
d. " u i r e c t f i r e upad were kept a t some distance and were used mainly to f i r e a t
upper s t o r i e s , i n many cases denying t h e use of upper s t o r i e s t o arty obsrs.
e. *A Large number of tunnels and undergmmd i n s f d l a t i o n a mere asea 8s pro-
t e c t i v e s h e l t e r s , atoreroome, o r repair shopa. Entrances t o these shelters often were
defended.
f. *Buildings were s e t afire f r e q u e n t l y i n order t o b h c k the advance of attacking
ienits. After the buildings had burned out t h e a d d i t i s m i ?pen space gave t h e defenders
fmpmved f i e l d s of f i r e .

2. Zones of action--F'onaations. a,, aWidths of wrnse c;f a c t i o n were reduced b e

t o the height and depth of t h e area to 'be ~ e u t r & l a e d -.?zi-ic&;l.tkrad, ! A zones varied
between. one and t w o block fronts with each p l a t - s i g n e d .% rox or b b c k of b u i i d i w a ,
4 d e f r d t e s t r e e t or building was mrsl@& i;s c a s c ~A%S:W.;G dad m d plat*
 b, .It was found d e s i r a b l e t o a t t a c k two cos a b r e a s t , with t h e r e s e r v e co held
much c l o s e r t o t h e a s s a u l t u n i t s t h a n i n open t e r r a i n . The r e s e r v e co could d e a l with
l o c a l c o u n t e r a t t a c k s r a p i d l y and could prevent s u c c e s s f u l i n f i l t r a t i o n i n r e a r of t h e
assault units,
c. *To insure maintaining a continuous f r o n t , each sqd and p l a t coordinated r i t h
t h e next higher u n i t a f t e r securing an objective.

3. Bgethod of advance. a. .Because t h e s t r e e t s were s o heavily defended, t h e

b u i l d i n g s provided t h e r o u t e s of advance. mtry was gained by b l a s t i n g holes through
covered s i d e s of walls. I n some casee, demolition team with prepared charges were
a t t a c h e d t o each a s s a u l t p l a t ; i n o t h e r c a s e s , engre prepared and f u r n i s h e d t h e charges
and t h e i n f executed t h e demolitions.
b. *After a h o l e had been b l a s t e d , a r l f l e sqd, o r half-sqd made an a s e a u l t through
t h e hole before t h e en- aould recover from t h e shock. Once a b u i l d i n g was e n t e r e d ,
each f l o o r had t o be c l e a r e d i n turn.
c. *Experience proved i t w a s o f t e n b e s t t o e n t e r a building from t h e roof o r t o p
f l o o r and work down. S c a l i n g l a d d e r s were invaluable i n providing e n t r a n c e s through
windows and c e i l i n g s .
d. B W k e grenades were used t o cover t h e u n i t e c r o s s i n g s t r e e t s and gap8 between
i s o l a t e d bujldings. Enemy A 1 sametimes could be l o c a t e d when they f i r e d a t t h e arnoke.

4. Time of operations, a. fiExperience showed t h a t advances could be i n i t i a t e d

any time a f t e r d a y l i g h t , t h e hours of darkness 'being u t i l i z e d t o b l a s t h o l e s i n i n i -
t i a l o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e following day.
b. .Three o r f o u r hours sometimes were necessary f o r consolidation of p o s i t i o n s
f o r t h e night. T h i s w a s found d e s i r a b l e t o enable u n i t s t o prepare p o s i t i o m t o cover
every enemy approach. Without t h i s coordinated defenee f o r t h e n i g h t , t h e enemy in-
f i l t r a t e d riflemen behind advance elements and s e r i o u s l y hampered o p e r a t i o n s on t h e
following morning.

5. supporting a r t i l l e r y . a. *Close a r t y support from organic hows was of l i t t l e

value due t o t h e varying h e i g h t s of b u i l d i n g s and t o t h e very c l o s e contact with t h e
emuxry
b. u u t y rendered invaluable support i n engaging t a r g e t s some d i s t a n c e ahead of
f r o n t l i n e units and i n p l a c i n g an i n t e n s e 24 hour program of h a r a s s i n g and i n t e r -
d i c t i o n f i r e s on s e l e c t e d a r e a s and t a r g e t a i n t h e enemy's r e a r .
c. aTD wpns and 155~~1 s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns proved e x t r e m l y h e l p f u l i n n e u t r a l i z i n g
o r d e s t r o y i n g heavy emplacements, p i l l b o x e s , h e a v i l y defended b u i l d i n g s and s t r o n g
points,. These q n s a180 were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n providing avenues of advance f o r u n i t s
by b l a s t i n g walle of buildings. The following p o i n t s a r e worthy of i n t e r e s t i n t h e
employment of t h e s e rrpnsr
( 1 ) A I n 0 o r NCO should remain with t h e r i f l e c o ccsndr a t a l l times t o speed
d e l i v e r y of f i r e .
(2) Guides should be furniehed t o lead t h e wpne i n t o p o s i t i o n s and t o point o u t
targets,
( 3 ) The upna m e t be given p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t enemy ff upns.
(4) Wpns should follow f r o n t l i n e u n i t e by bounds when not employed.
( 5 Morte o r a r t y f i r e should be used t o conceal t h e noise of lrljns moving t o
positions,
( 6 ) Normally one e e c t i o n of TDa was a t t a c h e d t o each a e a a u l t co. Subordinate
and adjacent u n i t a should be i n f o m d when these wpns a r e t o f i r e .
 6s Chet14oal mrtars. "The 4.2 cml mrt rss one of the m a t eff e c t i v a .mpporting
* m a It waa able to shoot over h i p builainga to render support withiu 100 yds
of f r o n t l i n e elenenta. Large amunts of 1P ware ased t a drive the enary out of cel-
l a r s and b u i l d i w i n t o t h e range of r i f l e 8 and a t o a r t i c wpm,

7. mantry weapow. a, *Tb. =st a f f s a t i v e t i ~ t a m t i oa r m a p l o y e d r e r e BdRs.

'1-son SIP)e, and carbine8 nmdiiied f o r autamatic f l m .
be 'H)10. ftmnishod l i t t l e aupport due t o limited f i e l d s of f i r s . They rrarw m-
Plally ueed t o corer s t r e e t s leading i n t o t h e f l a n k s , acd m ~ r poa8ibl0, e co fife down
s t r e e t s to the f m n t to prevent t h e fmm c r o s ~ i l ys t r e e t s and s h i f t l u g positions.
c, .Rocket launchers m e p m f i t a b l y snployod w *PL i t raa possible t o tdvcace with.
i n range. Thsy rere e f f e c t i v e i n c l e a r i n g out YI p o s i t i o n s i n houses and pi.,lboxe&
dm .371m Ax guns rare held near s t r e e t c o m e r s it ready porritions, f r & which
they could go i n t o f i r i n g p o s i t i o n r a p i d l y , f i r e and vithdraw.
e. 8 6 0 a mr&s=re used on close-in targets, and ram s i f e o t i r e i n baaping an-
rlflemen from mofs o r top f l o o r s of buildirga. They were of mro value i n ssskdential
d i s t r i c t s t h a n i n s o l i d b l o c h of high buildings, but Ln both caaes rsw h e l p f u l in
f i x i n g the enemy and i n preventing his movaasnt t o new f i r i n g positions.
f a '8- m r t a pmvided e x c e l l e n t support a t ranges not t o exueed 1500 yda. Ma-
placement mas normally by s e c t i o n a s e u i t a b l e are- f o r p l a t posltiona r a r e rare, WP
om was used extensively f o r screening and f o r aaoualty e f f e c t , and HK (both l i g h t and
heavy) f o r d e s t r u c t i o n of buildings.
g
. .Band grenades (fragmentation and WP) were e s s e n t i a l f o r clearrng out taae-
,
mente , bouses and p i llboms.
h. .Flame throwers were used i n several instances d e n d i r e c t f i r e upna could
not be employed and proved a g r e a t incentive t o the enemy to surrender.

8. h m u d t i o n s w ~ 1 ~'Co . sup dumps were maintained one block i n rear of' as-
s a u l t units, because f r o n t l i n e u n i t s could not nonnally c a r r y a f u l l day'n a p .

9* Ocnmntnications, a. *sCR 536 radios pmved to be of l i t t l e value, because

t r a n s m e s i o n and reception i n buildings w e r e not good.
b. *wn with p l a t s w a s maintained by sound-gowered telephones.

10. Mine c l e a r i n q , * U e d e t e c t i r y personnel from enn and pion p l a t s and from

combat engm followed t h e assrnalt c l o s e l y i n o r d e r t o c l e a r m u t e s of advance f o r
'I'D and AT rpm.

11. annineeps. 'nngr troops w e d of invaluable assistance i n the following

roles:
a. Capping walls, f l o o r s o r c e i l i n g s t o permit inf u n i t s t o advance.
b. Clearing r o u t e s ma preparing positions f o r sels-propelled rpm. This often
was accompllahed during hours of d a r b e s s with hand t o o l s t o avoid d i s c l o s i n g ~ a a i -
t iona,
c. ~ i l l i n gc r a t e r s , which were numerous, w i t h rubble from destroyed bizildjngsn
d. r i l l i n g nueteroua AT ditchea by placing explosives i n s i d e walls of adjacent
buildings i n such a manner t h a t the debris was blown i n t o t h e ditches. This w a s
found t o be much f a s t e r than blowing i n the shoulders o f . d i t c h e s , due t o i%zx and
hard surfaced roads.
e. Checking a t r e e t a f o r mines. Some mines were found under r e g u l a r l y spaced
removable concrete squares. These concrete b l c ~ ~ kwere a not camouflaged =d mama:Py
would be presune~d t o cover s l o t s f o r holding s t e e l roadblocks.
f . Cutting s t e e l roadblocks w i t h TMI'. This was found to be the ~ u ckest j .?.z:i!
s a f e s t method.
- 3 -
 12. Conclusions. nThe following conclusions have been reached a s a r e s u l t of
t h e operation:
a. Greatly increased i n i t i a t i v e is r e q u i r e d of sqd and p l a t l d r s , because t h e
c a p t u r e of each c i t y block and group of buildings i s a d i s t i n c t o p e r a t i o n i n i t s e l f .
be N a r r o w zones of a c t i o n a r e imperative.
a. I n t e r i o r s of c i t y blocka, r a t h e r than defended s t r e e t s , provide best avenues
of advance.
d. Consolidation of p o s i t i o n 8 p r i o r t o darkness i s necessary t o prevent enemy
i n f i l t r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e night.
e. Close a r t y how support is normally impractioable.
f , Direct f i r e a r t y , AT wpns, morta, g r e l ~ a d e s , flame throwers, and l i g h t auto-
m a t i c apne a r e mst e f f e c t i v e .
g. SCR 536 r a d i o s are u n s a t i s f a c t o r y when used i n buildings.
h. l&gr t r o o p s a r e i n v a l u a b l e i n c l e a r i n g r o u t e s and accomplishing demolitions,n

-4- .Pepmdocedby ,'he Eng~neer4eproducf~onDef, /Zfh Army Group

 TWELFTH ARMY c~OUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

n m t t P e U p e r i e n c e s ~are pibUshed reguParBy by t h i s headqmrtere t o enable

unite in t r a i n i n g t o p m f i t fmm the l a t e a t combat e q e r i e n c e s of our troop8 now
f i g h t i n g the Germane i n m p e . Although the ezperiemea of c e r t a i n unite a t a
p a r t i c u l a r Slouation are not necessarily applieable t o all units in ab% s i t u a t i o m ~
t h e items publiehed vill b e t b a e based on practical. experience and a r e recormended
f o r careful consideration by unite which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary experiences are g&icularly desired i n order that t h e
v a l i d i t y of the indiaated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.

C. R. IommN
Colonelo fiD
Adgutant General
0-----0_----_-_------------------------------------a--------------------------a--a---

1 DIGGING IN P A D QFF

Metet The value of pmperly organized and p r e p r e d defensive positions is emphaeized

i n this acaount of a German counterattaok againat p o s i t i o n s of a 1st Inf Div u n i t i n
the Siegfried l i n e zone*

1. A r t i l l e r y and mdar preparation. Wn t h e night of 2 Qct U, t h e Oennans

counterattacked positions of our r e g t i n an e f f o r t t o aeize an important mad and
ridge. The counterattack was preceded by the heaviest arty and mrt preparation to
which we had ever been subjeoted. The preparation began a t 2300 hours and laeted
u n t i l 0130 hours, an estimated 2808 t o 3000 m u d 8 f a l l i n g during t h a t period.

2. I p w carrualty rate. The area covered by the barrage was approximately 15QO
yda i n width and 1000 yds i n depth and vaa occupied by approximately 200 men, Only
eight men were k i l l e d o r wounded during t h e barsage and the m u t e r a t t a c k t h a t f o l -
lowed* The low caeualbty r a t e is a t t r i b u t e d t o thoroughly prepared defensive p ~ a i t i o n e
including deep and w e l l covered foxholes, W e e positions had been continually im-
proved during the few days we had occupied the defensive area,

3. 'I'he Germane aounterattauk, mFolitovillgt h e preparation t h e Germana attacked

i n two ravea, mgrs and F n f i n the f i r s t were t o eel- the pilPbores and inf in t h e
secopd was t o occupy theme SoIthe of the f i r s t wave managed t o maah our positions but
the second wave uas c u t off and dlepersed by our planned arty and m o r t f i r e s , Of f o u r
9P assault guns t h a t atteaqpted t o penetrate our positions, three were knocked out when
they h i t our mine f i e l d s and o m was abandoned because of = t o r trouble.

4 e R e s t o r i w our linea. m ~ 4 nt hge e n t i r e operation about f o r t y Germans r e r e

able t o penetrate the p o s i t i o n and s e i z e one pillbox. A l l of these had been killed,
aaptured or driven out rhen our f i n s 6 were restored a t 0500 hours. Trip f l a r e 8 and
6- n k x t f 1-00 w e r e used e f f e c t i v e l y i n t h i s act l o b
 Y3eme hrnran pfllbogea have been 00 well aaraoufla&ed that deteetion is moat diff.i-
~ I l l t a In a few instancss we sprayed awpected are- with BdS f i r e and located the p i l l -
boxes by the riaoahetse We then used 7% and 10- Hrs t o clear off t h e ae~eouilagoand
AP s h e l l s t o penetrate the d0ors.~--S-3, 16th Inf Regte

mtei PJc;Oe and pvts of Go PC, 11th Inf' made the following mmrmntsa

n ~ h ebest mental conditioning f o r offensive iigbtillg l a a gradual introduction t o

combat. Ten dam of &kg in defensive combat a t the beginning gave our o u t f i t a chance
t o l e a r n w h s t it meant t o be under f i r e o the value of our own f i r e powero how %o t e l l
t h e differenas between Jerry wpna end our o m , how t o keep out of s i g b t , an8 mham w
could depm 2 as our r e e l 1&aa It took away the f i r s t tenseneas of b a t t l e and gave
UB ~ ~ I l f i d e n o e .Alsoe very important, it w v e us a good idea of t h e toughness and a b i l i -
t y on the enemy, :1 aras t h e best way t o get experienceam

Mte: nztracted f m a. s h Inf M v mamrandm on combat in P O O ~the

~ fol%or8ne; de-
~scribeaone technique of close t e s r a i n fighting.

le OrWzation. r ~woods ~ r% i & t i n g specdil task u n i t s are %owed c o n s i a t i ~ l gof

a s s a u l t o support and reserve gmugsp The aeseult groups are srganized f o r shere wm-
Ira$- w i t h t h e enemy end the suppork g r o ~ ~ s p r o d d i n g them d t h suppsrtfng fires and
?OF
d t i h protection f o r t h e i r f lankso The resespea a r e maneuver forces t o exploit the
are- where maxfmum g w g r e a s is b e i n g mde.

2. _Assault a d supporn groupss &&ch r i f l e c% i s Uvided i n t o tam a s s a u l t and two

support units, The assault groups rn asnaed with grenades$ BARS and r i f l e s andl fneILLBe
a number sf e x p e r t scouts capable sf maintaining direction when advancing through dense
mods. Within t h e eo t h e y move on parallel azimuths and ars mutually suppr%ingo The
suppsr& gmupe have L W k , 60im L.*F%St?9d ~ . f f i b i e n trifle8 $OF t h e i r Fmnediate l o c a l
protection. 'a'hsy follow the a ~ s s u l tgroupa by % o a d s always ready t o give c b a e aup-
port and flank pmtactfsn*

Concrete fort iff cation^^ *Wba a concrete fartificsLPon i e encountered an as-

sault group determines i t s type and size, dmps off t h e midam number of men to eon-
tain i t , and a f t e r reporting this information t o its next superior, continue8 on its
missions A s p e c i a l l y organized and equipped t a s k force then comss up and seduces the
concrete f o r t i f i c a t i o n .

4. meraiw from woods, sBefore a r r i v i n g a t t h e far edge s f the mods timely

arrangements are made f o r resuming normal combat formations upon breaking i n t o the
open,

hhse muaced a %CR 438 i n my jeep and have corn ahtb everybody j8nclud.t~n y
erty b ~ l a E l i k e i t b e t t e r than the SCF4 284,B--C89 9th h f Re&,
rn
 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

BATTLE EXPERENCES

" a t t l e lXperiences@are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable

units i n tsainirg t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e q e r i e n c e s of our troops nor
f i g h t i n g the Germam i n m m p e , Uthaugh t h e exgeriences of c e r t a i n u n i t s at a
particular l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applioable t o all u n i t s i n a l l situatiolU3e
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l e ~ e r i e n c eand are reoarmended
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s wnicn m y encounter similar problams. Reports
of corroborative o r contrary q e r i e n c e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y OI t n e indicaeea b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By canmand of L i e u t e n a t General

C-R*'J%Kdid
WLgy:

We UNION
C e
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General
s P - m _ - ~ - - - - _ - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I ~ ~ n Y - T ACTION
~ - ICN THE
~ SWFRPKD
~ . IJ?&
P. Source, %ginning om 17 Sep the 3rd Armd Croup, composed of the 74nst and
747th t k b m , w?s attached t o t h e 28th Inf Div which used it a s part or a t e s k f a r c e
having t h e mission of widening a gap which had been made ir the S i e g f k i e d Line. 'rhe
comments below are e x t r a c t e d f r m a m p s r t s f t h e t k group comdr t o t h e CG F i r s t kmy.

2, ~ m o s i t i o n ,stzen,g-ch and oraanization, *.l'he b u l k of t h e r'orce rae composed

of the t b with one i n f co a% g r s ~ t l yreduced s t r e n g t h eupportixig each t k bn. U c h
tk bn had about 33 mdiun t k s . sech bn was organized i n t o tao somposite coe. Tk
dozers were attached t o t h e a s e a u l t cos and rill a v a i l a b l e a s s a u l t guns were placed i n
positions gemaittiag &ire& f i r e supportp

3. Plaa and operation, "The general plan s f a t t s e k was f o r the Z i c s t o a s d t a

p o s i t i o n , gain f i r e s u p e r i o r i t y an5 f o r t h e inf then t o move i n and occupy the p o s i t i o n
utii a t k 5ozer had covered t h e embrasures and entranaes to the pillbox. I n f o u r days
of o p e r a t i o n 49 p i l P b o ~ swere b=ied and an a d d i t i o n a l e i g h t were captured by t h e t a s k
f o r c e m a destmyed by engineers,

Hostile counter neasuresp -~.I+%r3r the secood day of o p e r a t i s a s , the enemy m d i -

fie h i s tac",ic t o mest CGP methods w f t k increasing e f f ' e c t i ~ e n e s s ~He mined the ground
i n fron",of e n b r m u e s and entrances and stationed bazooka m n in foxholes around the
p i l b b o x e s and i? seme cases on t o p sf t h e piLPborss,

k c b m e our t a c t i ~
5. Vlms ~ were then drawn up f o r a coordinated a t t a c k by
tm i d C O ~ Ofr reinforced tk co and o n g r s working i n teams on a group of p i l l b o x e s
abut 2060 meters from t h e l o c a t i o o sf t h e previoua a t t a e k ,
 6 , glmnina, and operation. "he teams were w e f u l l y briefed and rebriefed as
to a i s s i o n s , routes, s i g n a l e , e t a . on large-acale maps, a e r i a l pRoto8 and a c t c a l l y on
t h e ground. b r i e f in@ rere all a t joint meetin@ which were held over a period
af t h e e days.

7, Deception. 'During t h e b r i e f i n g and planning period, d a i l y davsrsion attacks

worn made by th i n t h e area of p r i n c i p a l operation. On the day the main attach wa.9
launched, another strong diversion was c a r r i e d out by t k s not Included i n the main
a t t a c k and reinforced by nwrts and a s s a u l t gun80 This a t t a c k l a s t e d fmm 0730 t o 1130
and drew extremely heavy arty and mrt f i r e .

8. The main attack. 'The main a t t a c k jumped off a t 0930 and i n the beginning
drew alrJlost m f i r e a s a r e s u l t , i t i s believed, of t h e deceptive methods employed.
he a s s a u l t teams were composed of a sqd of inf supported by two tka and s u f f i c i e n t
engrs t o destroy t h e pillboxes when taken. In s i x hour8 eleven pillboxes were cap-
tured and 31 p r l a o w r s taken i n a s t r o q l y defended area.

9* Con.. on. Where t h e enamy i s r e l a t i v e l y disorganized, a t t a c k by t k s alone

o r a t t a c k s witk a minimum of inf support, w i l l accomplish r e s u l t s even against con-
c r e t e emplacementsb but when his defeme begins t o take on form and coordination, prof-
i t a b l e r e s u l t s can be obtalned only through c s r e f u l i y planned a t t a c k s of inf-tk-engr
t e ~ e

10, Miscellaneous observations. a, 'On f a i r l y l e v e l p u n d , a t k dozer can ef-

f e c t i v e l y bury a p i l l b o x i n about 15 minutes.
b. 'Covering up pillboxes s t i l l occupied by t h e enemy has a psychological effect.
A number of PWs s t a t e d t h a t they s u r e m l e r e d because they preferred t h a t t o being
buried a l i v e ,
c. ? ~ k scan blow openings i n drsgons t e e t h with d i r e c t f i r e from t h e i r cannon.
About 3 0 rounds are required t o blow an opening l a r g e enough t o p e m i t pasaage of a
tkoe

% system of area AA defense uas i n s t i t a t e d i n t h e -

Div area, by ai AAA AW Bn,
t o e l i m i n a t e attaching AA el em^:^ 9 t r r F A Bnsa The purpose was t o prevent the high
c o ~ c e n t r a t ~ oofn BA which r e s d 5-1 f'mm k b-mching of F A units. AA guns were placed
two i n each 1000 metep g r i d aquare. 'Ihis result,&. i n b e t t e r positions being selected
and permitted a higher percentage of fire u n i t s t o s m i n i n position a t one tima, It
siap1FTied coms and AAAIS, and also gave r e l i e f f r o m counterbattery f i r e as the rear
g u always leap-frogged t o t h e f m n t of t h e s e c t o r on a T f ~ a u - 4 ABn After Action
Hcport.
 TWELFTH ARMY CRQUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

-
No. 6 4 13 OCT 1946

%a t t l e m p e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q w t e r s t o e n a b l e
m i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r u n t h e l a t e s t cambat e x p e r i e n c e s of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Xurope. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n blnits a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c w n e n d e d
Por c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which , m y e n c o u n t e r sinilar problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b c r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s ake p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n a r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n rnay be d e t e r m i n e d ,

By command of L i e u t a n a n t General i 3 W L E Y :

c.W*
C. R. U i O h
C o l o n e l , AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
-------------------------------------------------------------------------.------------
I !EWGPOHTING AIV UdTANFRY H E ; G I i E i t T .

Note t The f o l l o w i n g s o l u t i o n t o t r a n s p o r t i n g en i n f r
2 u s i n g o n l y t h e T of a t e h d cam-
b a t u n i t 8 was worked o u t by t h e 1 8 t h Ia% Regt,

1. S i t u a t i o n . W t e r t h e break-through ae were f a c e d w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y of moving

forward mare r a p i d l y t h a n f o o t t r o o p s c o u l d walk i f we were t o keep pressilre on a d i s -
organized enemy. There was no c o r p s o r army T a v a i l a b l e . A f t e r c r o s s i n g t h e s i n e
,River we succeeded i n u k i n g arrangements by which we c o u l d move between 30 and 35
m i l e s p e r day and s t i l l keep t h e men i n c o r d i t i o n t o f i g h t . P r i o r t o t h i s time w e had
used a s many a s 108 Q! t r k s t o d o t h e same job.

2. B i e t h ~ dof transport in^ t r o o p s . counted t h e T of our a t c h d TD co, 15+

how bn, and 2 p l a t s of med t k a and s e t up t h e f o l l o w i n g p l a n :
a. k a d i w b a t t a l i o n (adv gd),
( 1 ) Riflamen rode t h e 15 ki trks ( k i l o a d s and r o l l s d u p e d ) and t h e t r b a &
v e h i c l e s of 2 t k p l a t s and %. TD p l a t .
( 2 ) Hv wpns c o men r o d e t h e i r own T.
b. Second b a t t a l i o n .
( 1 ) Riflemen r o d e t h e wpes and T of t h e FA bn of t h e CT.
( 2 ) Hv wpns c o men rode t h e i r o m T.
c. T h i r d b a t t a l i o n ,
The cn c o , AT co, 2 p l a t s of t h e a t c h d TD (s), and a 15% how bc moved w i t h
this bn. These orgns were a b l e t o c a r r y a l l of t h e r i f l e m e n of t h e t h i r d bn.

3. A d v a n t u e s . *This method of m o t o r i z i n g t h e r e g t depends, of c o u r s e , on using

T of a t c h d u n i t s . I n t h i s d i v , i t i s normal procedure t o a t t a c h t h e 9 u n i t , 15%
how a r t y , and tka t o t h e CT and t o always a t t a c h t h e same u n i t s . Having t h e a t c h d
u n i t s c a r r y t h e f o o t s o l d i e r s f u r t h e r s mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r e l i a n c e on each o t h e r .
An a d d i t i o n a l advantage i a i n h a v i n g i n f r i f l e orgns always p r e s e n t t o defend the a r t y
u n i t s when caught by s u r p r i s e a t t a c k ~ . ~ - - s - 3 ,1 8 t h I n f Regt i n m Board Report.
I1 DESTROYXI.JG CAST STEEL PILLBCM TLTRKETS .
*Experience i n t h e B r e a t o p e r a t i o n s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e only e f f e c t i v e method of
s e d u c i n g c a s t s t e e l t u r r e t s on p i l l b o x e s is t o use a C-2 e x p l o s i v e charge of 18 159
ar mare p l a c e d i n the embrasure. None of t h e d i r e c t f i r e wpns (3. .guns and 15%
hows) used were a b l e t o p e n e t r a t e t h e s e t u r r e t s and t h e r m i t e grenades were i n e f f e c -
t i v e because of t h e high percentage of s l a g i n t h e c a s t 8teel.m--25th I n f D ~ TReport,

T o r e d ~ c et h e number of guides and r o u t e markings an mmd PA bra i n I t a l y used

the f o l l o w i n g SOP: 'Except when markers i n d i c a t e atherwise the a mi& a t a y s on t h e sssd,
A t a @ Y qj u n c ~ k o nw i t h e q u a l s c a d c o n d i t i o n s i t takeb= the right-hszi f w k , Upon m -
r i v a l a t a c r o s s r o a d i t c o n t i n u e s s t r a i g h t ahe.96, pbr r-,x$zc?ordinar,5ri.nt--r-r-n,t;tio~.,q.g
.
main t r a f f i c c r o s s r o a d s , o r any p l a c e s where dor.:'::~L ruiy ~ r i s .: ~5un~::c
,
"
i c l dxop.prd,@--
AGF Board R e p o r t .

IV HEPAIR OF 5i-I U - F O U R CABLE .

*The f o l l o w i n g method of s p l i c i n g s p i r a l - i b cc.::ble was c i e v i ~ e d~ . E ^ c F . : :~. . ~i P$Le
' I ~ c k
of equipment fae x e c u t i n g reg%fm- f a c t c r y splices : 'OD eseh s . i i 2 ~ 04 .-'ria- tzreek p-;
Sack t h e r u b b e r i n s t i l a t i o r ; &bout s i x inehe;s, a t %be ~ 7 3 ~ 6 ti;..<.;
: bta:-pj.r~>t b r > % i e f i .$ a -
t a c t . Then p e l back t h e s h i e l d over the r u b b e r iasu.l.e,&ion, exposing f h ~ ;c ~ l r d u c & m r ; ~
S p l i c e t h e conductors a t staggered i n t r - r r a l s of . F d 2 ;:si Z f l xG. 1; l P ) ; L ; . ~ s & a ; aobd.trer!
iic-5 t e r n Uni or, methcxi. Corer t h e exposed d - e a of' 'i."e z o n c d c t c r s ; l % h sne .L-g;er of
f r i c t i o n ta5ee mis pre7eat.a t k e 8hi+?g.< f'rc=- cu$-&izg,.@t=th.+ : ~ h t ~ = l i, a x t x sai;
ose side of t h e z h i e l d back s v 2 r rhe I r ~ u l t t i o n.?zr tP& e 2 ; i . r ~ l:n!?t$ , ~ fthe ;;jlice
& a . s e e w e ii; by wrapping a i t h 2 s i z b i j g %ire, The o$her &id.,, sf " , .,i-L,e& .,a-
. :?CAAGG
b3,..

s l i p p e d orer t h e s p l i c e d area i n t h e saxe m . n n e r , :has .$vi~~igi t 5 d o u b l j s h i e l d ,

S o l d e r t c g e t h e r t h e t v l~a y e r s ~f s $ i e k Z a . i?r,2p t k l~a y e r r ni' b l a c k rabber , ~ u b c ; a ~ -
izirig t a p over t h e s p l i c e and v i l l e e ~ i z ef ~ rstrout L h : r z ; y ~ u i a u L + : ~ ~ ' ~ ~ -6-,sXIjL i g Gorya.

V FROhT LINE CCNbiUhICATIOK3 FQR C U P S L;IAIYOIi U'FFICEI-iS,

Y'o g i v e t h e c a r p s I n 0s c a m f r a n f r o n t l i n e p o s i t i o m a. system of red:1 o care

w i n g SCR 1938 and SCR 506s has been set up by s i g bn, The use of simple r e n o t e
c o n t r o l systems which t h e bn has developed mk5s B t p o s s i b l e t o o p e r a t e the a e t a even
f r u n f m hole6.a--Sig 0 , XIX Corps.

AIR BURS15 ON C-L, PIUGXZ5.

immediately upon t h e d e m o l i t i o n of a c a p t u r e d p i l l b o x by our e-s t h e enemy

i n v a r i a b l y c o v e r s i t w i t h a r t y f i r e f u z e d f o r a i r b u r s t s . The q u i c k s e s s and accuracy
of t h e s e f i r e s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e f i r e d a t a has been g r e v i o u e l y prepared.n--C0, 47th
I n f Regt.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 65 14 OCT 1944

* B a t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n t h e l a t e s t c a s b a t e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
particular location are not necessarily applicable t o a l l units i n a l l situations,
the i t e m s published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by wits which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. R e p a r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By canruand of L i e u t e n a n t General B W I E Y I
0.8-
C. H a W ~ N
C o l o n e l r Am
Adjutant General

Note; N e u t r a l i z a t i o n of a s t r o n g p i l l b o x , by a p a t r o l of t h e 5 t h Ranger Bn, was e f f e c t e d

through use of e x p l o s i = end g a s o l i n e and o i l . Considerable d i f f i c u l t y was experienced
a s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t $ran a r e p a r t of t h e Bn Comds.

1. C o n s t r u c t i o n . a m e p i l l b o x c o n s i s t e d of a 1 2 @s t e e l dane s e t on a c o n c r e t e em-
placement approximately 3 0 D i n diameter. The s t e e l extended 6 ' below ground t o t h e roof
of t h e c o n c r e t e emplacement. There were 6 f i r i n g embrasure8 each w i t h a 12' s t e e l door.
The p i l l b o x was on a k n o l l and had a r e a r e n t r a n c e with s t e e l doors.

2. S u n f i r e i n e f f e c t i v e . * P i r e f r m lXlO yda with l55mmSP guns and f r a n 3 0 0 yds w i t h

3* guns was i n e f f e c t i v a . Sane rounds f r a n 300 yds s t u c k i n t h e t u r r e t b u t d i d noti pene-
t r at e .
3. F i r s t a s a a u l t . " A p l a t of 22 men made a d i r e c t a s s a u l t on t h e box on 17 S e p t ,
r e a c h i n g the o b j e c t i v e a t l 5 O O hours. Sup2orting p i l l b o x e s were engaged by 3 r guns.
The enemy r e f u s e d t o s u r r e n d e r and a 40 l b charge of C2 was placed i n t h e v i s i o n embra-
s u r e a d j a c e n t t o t h e e n t r a n c e and f i r e d a t . 1500 hours. ,in extreruely heavy =art b a r r a g e
caused t h e p l a t t o r e t i r e and t h e damage frcm t h e b l a s t could n o t be a s c e r t a i n e d .

4- Second a s s a u l t . * A t 2140 hours t h e same day a n 11 man p a t r o l , covered by a n a r t y

barrage , moved up t o t h e p i l l b o x again. The p a t r o l c o n s i s t e d of 2 s c o u t s w i t h Tamny guns
the p a t r o l l e a d e r , 4 men w i t h p i s t o l s each c a r r y i n g 5 g a l l o n cans of an o i l and g a s o l i n e
mixture, 2 men armed w i t h p i s t o l s each c a r r y i n g a 40 l b c 2 d e m o l i t i o n c h a r g e , one m a n
c a r r y i n g a 50 l b beehive c h a r g e , and one man with a Tommy gun a s r e a r guard. Each 52
charge waa p l a c e d i n a f i r i n g embrasure, t h e beehive charge was p l a c e d on the s i d e of
the p i l l b o x , and t h e o i l and gas p@med around and over t h e box and i n t h e e n t r a n c e .
The b l a s t was s e t off with a n 1 8 second f u s e , and t h e box burned f a r 40 minutes. dl1
men r e t u r n e d s a f e l y .
- 1 -
 5. R e s u l t s . "The e n t i r e a r e a surrendered the following day and t h e f o l l o w i n g r e -
s u l t s of t h e a s s a u l t s were d i s c l o s e d ; a. The 40 l b charge a e t i n t h e afternoon blew
a 3-foot hole through t h e s h e l t e r w a l l , causing heavy damage t o the c m c r e t e box and
I d l l i n g 1 2 men i n s i d e .
b. The charges s e t i n the embrasures a t n i g h t , together with t h e g a s o l i n e , destroyed
t h e i n t e r i o r of the t u r r e t , c m p l e t e l y n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e p o s i t i o n and k i l l i n g 3 more men.
c. The 50 l b beehive charge had no e f f e c t on t h e t u r r e t .
d. P r i s o n e r s taken frcm adjacent i n s t a l l a t i o n s s t a t e d the e f f e c t s of the r a i d were
t e r r i f y i n g and t h a t t h e y believed a f l a w thrower and o i l bomb8 had been used. They
a l s o s t a t e d t h a t aa a r e s u l t of t h e r a i d s a l l personnel remained a l e r t e d on the outside
of o t h e r p i l l b o x e s t o prevent similar action."

I1 P a = ASSST A I R AmY Cli3jE;HVL.W.

* I t i s d i f f i c u l t f a r our a r t y a i r QPs t o s e e our infantrymen when they move c r o s s

country o r i n s p l i t columns a l o n g roads. I n a r d e r t o a s s i s t t h e obsrs we have adopted
s u c c e s s f u l l y t h e p r a c t i c e of having a panel c a r r i e d by t h e f i r s t sqd i n each p l a t . On
one occasion one f o o t of panel held up f r a n a dugout was s u f f i c i e n t t o enable t h e obsr
t o s p o t OUT t r ~ ~ p ~ . ' - - L 229th t, FA Bn.

1. Hand menades on t r e e s . *A PW s t a t e d t h a t i n his a r e a hand grenades were atchd

t o t r e e s . The p i n s were atchd t o ropes l e a d i n g t o fox holee s o t h a t t h e grenades could
be d e t o n a t e d f r a n a covered p o s i t i 0 n . ~ - - 2 9 t h M v 6-2 Report.

2. C i v i l i a n a i d . .Trio l o s t D i of a c a r p s unit r e c e n t l y accepted an o f f e r f r a n a

c i v i l i a n t o guide them. He l e d them s t r a i g h t t o a German CP where they = r e i n t e r r o g a t e d
and i n t e r n e d . They l a t e r managed t o escape and r e t u r n t o our own l i n e s . The i n c i d e n t
i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t a c m p l e t e l a c k of f a i t h i n c i v i l i a n s i s necessary f o r adequate ssecur-
ity.0--30th Div C-2 Report.

3. bJ-'3 Howitzers (10%~). "To c m e c t a tendency of the M-3 how t o e l e v a t e i t s e l f

a f t e r a round ha8 been f i r e d , we have made a -11 brake drum, approximately f o u r inches
i n d i a m e t e r , with self-snubbing a c t i o n that w i l l loosen i t s e l f and i s a d j u s t a b l e . T h i s
device ha8 proved q u i t e s a t i s f a ~ t o r y . ~ - - 0 r d0, 9 t h In.Div.

IV NO CIVILIAN IX515TUCE.
S e c t i o n 11 of B a t t l e Experiences KO. 49, dated 26 Sept 44, s t a t e d t h a t the 3d
Armd Div had r e p o r t e d s t u b b a r n r e s i s t a n c e frau enemy c i v i l i a n s and s o l d i e r s on 17 j e p t
44. A l e t t e r j u s t r e c e i v e d frcm t h e d i v c a n d r s t a t e s t h a t no c i v i l i a n r e s i s t a n c e was
observed by o r r e p o r t e d t o him and he considers t h e r e p o r t e r r o n e o w .
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 66 19 OCT 1944
~Frittlc:mperienoaam a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i w t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t g s t combat e q , e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p 3 now
f i g h t l n r t h e r s r m a n s i n m r o p e . Although t h e ex;leriences o f c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a ~ p l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l he t h o s e b a s e d on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n ~ c e and a r e recommended
f o r c s r s f u ? c c n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r p r o b l e m s , Rerlorts
of c o r r o b o r a t i v s o r c o n t r a r y e q e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be d e t e r m i n e d .

Ry command of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l BRil9Z.EY:

C . R. IAKDON
C o l o n e l , AGD
~d j u t a n t G e n e r a l

v C u r d i v , i n I t s y r e ; : a r a t i o n f o r t h e a s s a u l t on S i e g f r i e d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , h a s made
? f ' e c t i v ? u s e o f t h e Maginot Une.. R i f l e p l a t s have been p u t t h r o u g h l r o b l e m s i n t h e
a t t n c k of f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s u s i n g t h e a r e a s w i t h w i r e and p i l l b o x e s ns t h e t r a i n i n g
grcund. 1'Ve have found t h e t r a i n i n g v a l u a b l e as i t & e m i t s d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g . and p r a c -
tice f ~ r n ~ , ; a u l t t e r n s a 3 w e l l as e x e r c i s e s i r l v o l v i n p c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a l l arenu.*--
:$, 82d Div.

nm and r e q t l s u r g s w i l l manage e v a c u a t i o n ~ ~ r o b l e mmore s i n x e l l i g e n t l y and a l e r t l y

i f t h e y o r e kept a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n . The i n d u l g e n t d o l i n g o u t of n e c e s s a r y
i n f o r m a t i o n upon r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s f r o m t h e a u r g d i s c o u r a g e s him a n d c a u s e s him t o 10%
i n c e n t i v e and i n i t i a t i v e . n - - R e g t l S u r g e o n , 1 1 5 t h I n f .

"Yihen > i l l b o x e s h ~ v ebeen covered w i t h d i r t by t k d o z e r s Jerry h a s o f t e n r e - r n t e r e d

by d i p y i n q h c l e s j u s t l a r g e ennugh f o r a man t c g e t t h r o u g h . The man i s armed w i t h a n
autr)m-.tic y n . Aa he u s u a l l y h a s a good f i e l d o f f i r e i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o get, him o u t .
T" e n u w e r osems t c b e t o p i l e more u i r t o v e r t h e o;ening. The enemy a l s o w i l l r e o c c u p y
r c r t i a l l y a n d c'7rnl l e t e l y blown boxes and man thnm w l t h c r e w - s e r v e d wpns. n - - E x t r o c t f r o m
r e t o r t of 2 8 t h Jnf 3 I v .

TV =?>iCTIEJG 'I'HE SIEX;FFtIPD LINE

. Trainix.
d a t s v , h i c h h:;d beer,
we came t o a t t a c k t h e S i e g f r i e d l i n e we f o u n d t h a t cur s s s a u l t
~r',';h?r;
tr.!%ncd i n D.,lend had becor.e c a s u s l t i e s . T h i s t i m e we t r z i n e d a l l
?ruonr,e? a.11 w.,rit.. T h a t 1 r o v e d v a l u ~ b l eon t h e dey o f t h e a s s a u l t f o r whenever t h e
?"-as~r.,; c-l.:ncr.tu \ * e r e c u t down t h e n e a r e s t m a n c o u l d p i c k u ~ t h e wgn a n d do t h e job.
 2. ! o r3 "'The a r t y snd 8lm rncrts were v e r y e f f e c t i v e i n r e d u c i n g rccvement
of ;ers.:r.:~ol o c t . s i d c . 2f p i l l b o x e s b u t i t vias t h e 4.2 cml mcjrts, f i r i n g 150 y d s ahead of
t h e a s s a u l t c c s , which n o s t e f f e c t i v e l y r e d u c e d t h e eneng' f i r e d u r i n g o u r a s s a u l t . It
w ~ ns d t r l e c e s s ~ . ~ rtyo uue b a n g a l o r e t o r r e d o e s o r w i r e c u t t e r s f c r t h e ivire had been ~ r e t t y
w a l l torr, u l by t h e L.2 mort b a r r a g e . rp--Bn C O * 1 1 7 t h I n f .

i. 3 c ~ t r 1 1 c t i o nof c l i n e s * "When mines o r e t o be, d e s t r o y e d near t h e f r o n t l i n e s t n e y

r h c u l d b? c 5 l l e c ' e d i n one s p o t and blown a l l a t once and n o t blown i n d i v i d u e l l y o r i n
s m r l l ;;il.es. We have found t h ~ t3 s e r i e s of e x p l o s i o n s w i t h t h e r e s u l t i n g b l a c k snoke
i n - ~t el s e n m y a r t y f i r e . .

2. S e c u r i t y f o r mine c l e a r i n f i p a r t i e s . "t h e s been found n e c e s s a r y t o have s c o u t s

i n xi7rclr.ce and t o t h e f l u n k of mine c l e a r i n g p a r t i e s f o r s e c u r i t y . The enerqy f r e q u e r i t l y
a t t e n i t s t c ambush mine c l e s r b n c e p a r t i e s o p e r a t i n g away from i n f e1ements.m--Re~ort of
1 2 1 9 t V ~ g rC I%..

I . .mtenna r e p a i r . "Used l e n g t h s of open c i r c u i t t e l e p h o n e w i r e have been f o u n d

v n l u z b l e f o r r e j a i r i n g daniaged a n t e n n a on t h e SCR 3 d 0 and SCR 536 r a d i o s .

2. Map read in^, m a p r e n d i n g i n s t r u c t i o n , emphasized i n t h e com p l a t w h i l e i n

! 3 - i e l ~ n d ,h a s been i n v a l u a b l e . Our men now have c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o r e e d maps
and can g e t t o t h e r i g h t p l s c a s e a s i l y when u s i n g them.

3 . s i g n e l 8 u p y : l ~ . "In o u r d i v w e have f o u n d i t b e s t dur.ing c m b a t t o h a n d l e s i g n a l

s u & , p l i 6 st h r c u g h corn c h a n n e l s . Bi con! 0 s submit r e q u e s t s t o t h e r e g t l corn 0 , who i n
t u r n p a s s e s them on t o t h e d i v s i g n a l s u p p l y 0. The s u p p l i e s a r e p i c k e d up from t h e
h i ~ h e ru n i t by t h e lower u s i n g t h e same c h a n n e l s . The r e g t l S-4 d i ~ r e g a r d scorn r e -
q u i s i t i o n s s u b m i t t e d t h r o u g h S-4 c h a n n e l s and t h u s a v o i d s d u p l i c a t i o n s . Advantages a r e
t h a t s i g n a l s u p p l i e s c a n be o b t a i n e d and r e p a i r s e f f e c t e d more r a p i d l y . Critical signal
s u p p l y i t e m can b e r e g u l a t e d more e a s i l y by t h e corn 0s."--CC 4 7 t h I n f Re&.

VII SlGP!ALLTNG AIRCRrn

"r+wo p l n t s of one c o were i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy and had pushed f o r w a r d r a p i d l y .

Suddenly o u r p l a n e s upi-leared o v e r h e a d on s bombing and s t r a f i n g m i s s i o n . A h a s t y check
r e v e a l e d t h a t no p a n e l s o r smoke grenades were a v a i l a b l e . During t h i s t i m e one bomb
e x p l o d e d behind t h e u n i t and t h e s t r a f i n g was c l o s e . One p l a t withdrew one h e d g e r c r t o
t h e rear, where t h e men i m m e d i a t e l y s t r i p p e d o f f w h i t e u n d e r s h i r t s , which were used
w i t h V-mail f o r m s , e t c . , t o form a l a r g e U.S. i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e f i e l d . On t h e n e x t
r u n t h 9 u n i t r e c e i v e d R f r i e n d l y s i g n f r o m one of t h e p l a n e s aad t h e bombing and s t r a f i n g
was c o n f i n e d t o an a r e a where i t d i d t h e most good.'--Report of 2d Rn, 4 7 t h Inf.

" A e r i a l p h o t ~ . : r a p h sa r e i n t e r p r e t e d and a n n o t a t e d i n i n k , and t h e n r e p h o t o g r a p h e d

t o p r o v i d e our p l o t l e a d e r s w i t h an e a s i l y r e a d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of German d e f e n s e s i n
t h e i r areas."--c/s, 2 8 t h Div.
Ern
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 67 18 OCT 1944
* B a t t l e E x p e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r u n t h e l a t e s t ccmbat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i & t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. d t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f l i l c o n s i d e r a t i on by units which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d k e t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By c a m a n d of L i e u t e n e n t General BUilLEYt
C ,R , . X L - d
C. h. LANUQN
C 0 1 0 l E 1 , AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
.....................................................................................

1. U s e of mao brief in^ t a n k crews. *Under p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o m , f i t h

~ ~ O W U D fSo r
p l e n t y of time f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of our a t t a c k s a g a i n s t enemy f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s ,
we f i n d i t i n v a l u a b l e t o use 1/5,000 map blowups i n t h e b r i e f i n g of t k crews. The
blowups a r e made by hand and t a k e f o u r t o t e n h o u r s , but d a t a such as p i l l b o x l o c a -
t i o n s can be put on t h e n and shown t o t h e crews v e r y c l e a r l y . a--Capt, 70th Tk Bn.

2. Tank and a n t i t a n k gun s ~ o t t i bv n ~ a r t i l l e r y p l a n e s . "The a r t y I n p l a n e s s p o t

enemy tks and AT guns and canmunicate t h e e x a c t c o o r d i n a t e s of t h e i r l o c a t i o n s t o us.
Our t k c o ccm31-s keep one r e c e i v e r 0x1 t h e I n plane frequency f o r t h i s purpose,*--
Capt, 7 0 t h Tk a n .

1. Time banbs. T h e Germans have l a i d e f f e c t i v e t r a p s by s e t t i n g two time banbs

f o r d e t o n a t i o n w i t h i n a few manents of e a c h o t h e r . Cm one o c c a s i o n two such banbs,
p l a c e d under s i d e w a l k s d i r e c t l y a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t f r m each o t h e r , went off f i f t y
seconds a p a r t . The second e x p l o s i o n , a s p l a n n e d , caught s a n e p e r s o n n e l who had r u n
t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e damage and assist t h o % i n j u r e d by t h e f i r s t blast.*--WD Board Report.

2. Use of c l v i l i a n c l o t h i k . *That Germans have been s e n d i n g p a t r o l s d r e s s e d i n

civilian clothes across t h e r i v e r and i n t o our a r e a mas e s t a b l i s h e d when we c a p t u r e d
same of them i n t h e a c t of changing c l o t h e s . These s o l d i e r s pose as p o l i s h and R u s s i a n
workers. *--Ex 0 , 3d Cav Gp.

3. Dumny t r i c k . *This i s a t r i c k t h e Gerruans have used t o draw our f i r e d u r i n g

t h e day. They f i x up a dummy, f u l l y d r e s s e d and i n c l u d i n g a shiny buckle on t h e uni-
f m . Then they p u t i t , buckle showing, h a l f -exposed, i n a f a x h o l e on t h e i r s i d e of
t h e river.*--Ex 0 , 3d Cav Gp.
I11 SIEGFRIED LIhX EXPE;kIENC;ET.

Koter U n i t a of t h e 2d Armd Div r e p o r t t h e f o l l o w i n g l e a s o n s l e a r n e d d u r i n g r e d u c t i o n

of a l a r g e number of p i l l b a x e s :

1. Gr~anization. a. *One r e i n f o r c e d c o observed t h a t t h e m o r t s q d s and t h e hvy

MG s e c t i o n s s l o a ~ dt h e advance of i t s two a s s a u l t teams. I t was a l s o noted t h a t flame
throwers were n o t always needed and p r e f e r a b l y s h o u l d have been h e l d i n r e s e r v e . k c -
c o r d i n g l y , t h e conclusion waa reached t h a t t e a m of the f o l l o w i n g c a n p o s i t i o n would b e
m a s t desirable :
Assault T e W U M ~ ~ ) - U Q~
- e@g

One p l a t of med t k s ( w i t h t k d o z e r ) one p l a t of It t k a

One p l a t of i n f , l e a s m o r t aqd one p l a t of i n f , l e s s m o r t sq
An a r t y FO i n a t k One p l a t of hvy MG
One p l a t of e n g r s w i t h flame
throwers and d e m o l i t i o n s
I n f p l a t s 6omm m o r t s q d s
grouped as a b t r y w i t h
8- plat

2, T . 'A hvy h1G p l a t and t h e It t k s were used advantageously i n t h e

Qop-up*. A l l w i r e s had t o be c u t and a l l canpartmenta of p i l l b o x e s c a r e f u l l y s e a r c h e d ,
a s a telephone o p e r a t a r or a r t y obsr o f t e n a t t e m p t e d t o h i d e and r a i n behind t o d i r e c t
fire.

3. Flame throwers, "Another bn d i s c o v e r e d an u n u s u a l method of u s i n g t h e flame

thrower f o r r e d u c i n g a p i l l b o x , The p i l l b a x would be covered with f i r e i n t h e u s u a l
manner, and t h e flame thrower team brought forward t o t e s t t h e flame thrower sanewhere
behind t h e l i n e of t k s , but where t h e occupants of t h e p i l l b o x could s e e t h e flame.
Usually, t h e p i l l b o x would s u r r e n d e r s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . However* hvy a r t y f i r e o f t e n
made i t d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e flame t h r o w e r team w e l l up.

4. F l a n k i n g a c t i o n . 'Outflanking was f a d t o be t h e f a s t e s t method of r e d u c t i o n

where t h e r e was n o t a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p i l l b o x e s . One a s s a u l t p l a t c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e
p i l l b o x and w a s covered by t h e o t h e r a s s a u l t p l a t . One s e c t i o n placed hvy f i r e on t h e
embrasures while the o t h e r s e c t i o n moved around and p u t hvy f i r e i n t o t h e back of t h e
p i l l b o x . When t h e p i l l b o x s u r r e n d e r e d , i t a a s s e a l e d t e m p o r a r i l y by t h e t k d o z e r ,
Engra f o l l o w u s and weld t h e doors s h u t a s as have found t h a t dozing o r blowing t h e
handles o f f the d o a r e is insufficient..*--Hepart f r a n 2d mmd Div.

IV THE M-10 TANK B T R O Y E H

1. m u n i t i o n f o r M-10. * I n p l a n n i n g f o r woods f i g h t i n g i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e
b a s i c l o a d of 3" am f o r t h e LI-10 TD be modified t o i n c l u d e a m a j o r i t y of kP o r APC.
The use of HE i s g r e a t l y l i m i t e d by t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t r e e bursts on f r i e n d l y t r s ,

2, 5 0 c a l i b e r machine m n s mounted on M-10s. Wounting t h e .5O c a l MG on t h e r i g h ;

forward s e c t i o n of t h e t u r r e t of an M-10 TD f o r use a g a i n s t p e r s o n n e l has proved v a l -
uable. When t h i s gun w a s employed a g a i n s t i n t r e n c h e d enemy they s h o r t l y s u r r e n d e r e d t o
our a c c anpanying i nf ,

3. a ~ l o y m e n tof i n f a n t r y a n t i t a n k Runs, *The i n f 57mm AT guns s h o u l d be k e p t

w e l l forward behind t h e i n f and a s t h e a t t a c k d e v e l o p s , a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n of s e t t i n g
up f l a n k and r e a r road b l o c k s . This a l l o w s t h e TDs t o f o l l o w up g i v i n g d e p t h t o t h e
AT d e f e n s e and a t t h e same time p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r mobility,*--Cot 773d TD Bn,
END k
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 68 19 OCT 1944

*~,;ttJ.e n r g e r i e n c e s r are p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by this h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable

units i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f m m t h e l a t e s t c o d a t e ~ e r i e n c e sof our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n wl-ope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c i l l a r l o c a t l o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l units i n all s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e jtelns p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recormtended
f o s careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may e n c o u n t e r similar problems. Heports
3Y - ~ - - ~ * o b o r a t iovre c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n o r d e r t b t t h e
Y-?-, I < - - - f t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may b e determined.

By comaan6 ci' Lieutenant General aRhDIgY:

c.fl-
C. fie Lmoni
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General
---------.----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I WmHI
P EPISODE.

"Cos B and C were a t t a c k i n g a g a i n s t heavy o p p o s i t i o n * By a f t e r n o o n t h e CO and two

p l a t l d r s of Co C were c a s u a l t i e s and o n l y two p l a t s of t h e co remained. The co comdr
of Co B took command o r t h e two p l a t s and w i t h t h e s e and t h s remnants of his co t o &
t h e bn o b j e c t i v e . When the G e m n s c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d , t h e two p l a t s of Co C were i s o l a t e d
and Go B surrounded. Go B held t h e i r p o s i t i o n u n t i l ordered t o r e t r e a t . The co comdr
t h e n l e d an a t t a c k t i r e l i e v e t h e o t h e r two p l a t s , d u r i x which he p e r s o n a l l y h o c k e d
o u t two MCs. A f t e r r e a c h i n g t h e two p l a t s he r e o r g a n i z e d and fought h i s way back t o t h e
bn a r e a , m a g i r i g t2 brirg a l l t h e wounded with hibn--Re?oPt f r o 2 3 5 t h % a d Div.

n'tWile g o i n g through t h e S i e g f r i e d Line a p l a t was given t h e m i s s i o n of h o c k i n g o u t

a bunker s i t u a t e d on a s t e e ~and h e a v i l y wooded hill. The p l a t proceeded slowly i n l i n e
of sqd columns or. a 5 0 yd f r o n t w i t h s c o u t s o u t 20 yds. The p l a t idr m d p l a t sgt a c t e d
a s t h e c e n t e r s c o u t s t o f a c i l i t a t e c o n t r o l . Upon r e a c h i n g t h e edge sf t h e woods about
75 yds from t n e ~ u l l k e rthe p l a t h a l t e d . Three C e m n s were nalkirag a l o n g t h e edge of
t h e woods but t h e p l a t h e l d i t s f i r e u n t i l d i s c o v e r e d e It then s h o t t h e t h r e e Germans
and rushed t h e bunker. 'Mo Germans o u t s i d e promptly surrendered and two grenades thrown
i n t h e e n t r a n c e of t h e bunker brought about t h e immediate s u r r e n d e r of t h e g a r r i s o n of
22 men. 'r'he element of s u r p r i s e brought about t h e r e d u c t i o n o r t h e bunker without a
s h o t being f i r e d by i t s crewen--2d Bn, 4 7 t h Inf.

I11 EXTRA AMWR ?LrZTE FOH CAR Id-8.

n A r e i n f o r c i n g p l i t e ofan
m m r on t h e belttom of t h e M-8 ermd c a r , i n s t a l l e d by
o u r o r d c o , has proved of v a l u e , I n one i n s t a n c e one of t h e s e c a r s , p a r t i a l l y reio-
f o r c e d , r a n o v e r a mine with t h e r e s u l t thilt t h e two men i . ;-dnt p r o t e c t e d by t h i s
a m r were o n l y s l i g h t l y i n j u r e d , whereas t h e two t u r r e t m- w i t h no added pro-tez=
t i o n , were killed.#--C0 5 t h Hcn Tr.
R NAZI ANTITANK TACTICS.

The 7 t h A d D i r h a s r e c e n t l y encountered a t y p e of German d e l a y i n g p o s i t i o n de-

signed t o d e s t r o y t h e l e a d i n g t k s of an armd column and c a u s e c o n f u s i o n and d e l a y ,
The p a r t i c u l a r set-up h a s been encountered r e p e a t e d l y and t h e d i r has e v i d e n a e t h a t
t h e Germans have been s t u d i o u s l y ~ r a c t i c i n gand p e r f e c t i n g t h e technique. As e h o m
i n t h e diagram below, a covered and p e r f e c t l y camouflaged f o x h o l e f o r a two man ba-
zooka team is normally dug i n a s e m i - c i r c u l a r shape around t h e c o r n e r of a house o r
b u i l d l n g near (5 t o 50 y d s ) a road, A camouflaged e s c a p e t r e n c h l e a d s from t h e r e a r
of t h e bazooka e q l a c e m e n t t o any nearby c o v e r such a s woods, garden s h r u b b e r y , or ad-
d i t i o n a l b u i l d i n g s , KBa r e placed i n a V f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e open end of t h e V from
309 t o 400 yda from t h e road i n t h e d i r e c t i o n from which o u r approach i s expected,
When t h e column i s preceded by a dismounted p o i n t , f i r e i s w i t h h e l d u n t i l t h e bazooka
team is c e r t a i n of knocking o u t t h e l e a d v e h i c l e s . When t h e bazooka f i r e s , a l l
open up on t h e remainder of t h e column, n o t ~ r i n c i p a l l yt o cauae casualties, but t o
cause confusion and make i t d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n from where t h e bazooka f i r e has
come. Due t o t h e e x c e l l e n t camouflage of t h e p o s i t i o n s and e s c a p e t r e n c h and t h e con-
f u s i o n aaused by t h e c r o s s - f i r i n g M3s, it h a s been found e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r -
d n e t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e r e s i s t a n c e . A p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n c f f s r e d by a member of t h e
d i r , i s t o have f o o t p a t r o l s , p r e c e d i n g t h e armor, advance viith two coll~mnson each
s i d e of t h e r o a d , a t d i s t a n c e s of 20 yds and 70 y d a - f r o m t h e r o a d ,

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 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 69 2 0 OCT 1944
* B a t t l e Experiences. a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i e headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n the l a t e s t canbat experience8 of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. lllthough t h e experiences of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
, the item published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recaumended
f o r c a r e f u l iconsideration by u n i t s nhich may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Report8
of c m r o b a r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s a n may be determined.

By camnand of Lieutenant General BRBDUYI

C. R. LANDON
Colonel. AGD
Adjutant General

I Porn I u m F 6 H I P .
Examples of good l e a d e r s h i p have been presented i n previoue i s s u e s of B a t t l e Experiences,
The following i n c i d e n t s , i l l u s t r a t i v e of poar l e a d e r s h i p . rere r e p o r t e d by an i n f bn
car& and may be of equal value i n the f armation of a p i c t u r e of t h a t q u l i ty.

1. goor d i s c i p l i n e . a. " ~t ht e midpoint of a long f o o t march by an i n f bn the

bn a d j u t a n t passed through t h e column i n h i s r s h i c l e on a r d e r s of the bn candr. AS
he passed through t h e column one can& c a l l e d , 'Do you hare t o b r i n g t h a t
through here?.
jeep
L a t e r t h e a d j u t a n t was a g a i n c a l l e d farward t o b i l l e t t h e bn ard as
----
he paseed t h e trs the same c o caadr c a l l e d , 'I know t h a t ----
bn d r x s n ' t know what i t
i s daing. We a r e probably l o s t again." When t h e a d j u t a n t r e t u r n e d t o take t h e co
candr t o h i s area he r e f u s e d t o go, whereupon t h e a d j u t a n t took the executive and
pointed out t h e a r e a t o him.
b. during t h e CHEZBOURG campaign t h e bn dug i n on a m e e t on . h i c h t h e enemy
wae a c c u r a t e l y registered. The bn c d r decided t o move t h e cos forward t o lower ground,
The co ccmdr mentioned above believed t h i s t o be dangerous and showed marked h e s i t a -
t i o n and h i s h e s i t a t i o n continued i n t h e f a c e of a d i r e c t order. The bn candr assumed
comrpgnd of the c o and d i r e c t e d t h e second i n canmand t o move the u n i t forward. The c o
ccmdr r e t i r e d t o the r e a r . This occurred i n t h e presence of the 0s and men and was
l a r g e l y responsible f o r t h e d e c l i n e of t h e co. ?he c o ccmdr was r e l i e v e d .

2. Poor iudaement, "During t h e advance on L E S I Y , a c o was ordered t o follow the

r o u t e of a n o t h e r co t o a c e r t a i n p o i n t and t h e n s u i n g s t o t h e o b j e c t i v e . Without r c n
t h e co caPdr took another r o u t e acroee open t e r r a i n without deploying and r a n i n t o
about 100 Germans. sane 40 c a e u a l t i e s were incurred before t h e r e s i s t a n c e could be
by-passed. Upon r e a c h i n g t h e o b j e c t i m t h e c o ccmdr plaaed moat of h i s men and h i s
CP on a CR. E a r l y the next morning German a r t y f i r e f e l l on the CR and i n f l i c t e d t e n
c a s u a l t i e s among t h e massed pereonnel. Because of poor l e a d e r s h i p , l a c k of r c n , f a i l -
u r e t o use ccxunan sense and f a i l u r e t o obey o r d e r s , the co lost 50 men. The c o ccmdr
ras r e l i e v e d . "
I I mLOM6ENT OF THE 1 5 5 1 ~GUN
1 a SELF-PRaPfZLUD.

i. %e 15% gun SP ehauld be employed by d i r e c t attachment of a b t r y t o the d i v

a r t y . There ehould be c a r e f u l evaluation of requests f o r i t s f i r e and an ample allow-
ance of time f a r the b t r y candr t o s e l e c t po8itions.

2. *In deciding a s t o i t 8 employment the following f a c t o r s should be considered8

a. The noise of the wpn and the maximum r a t e of march of 20 miles per hour.
b. Its l i m i t e d r a t e of f i r e due t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of loading without e l e v a t i n g
the tube.
c. Its high s i l h o u e t t e i n f i r i n g position.
d. The absolute l a c k of protection f a r t h e crews f r a n SA f i r e . The gunner i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable due t o h i s open p o e i t i o n on top of the tk.
e. The huge muzzle bl-t which draw8 counterbattery f i r e . * - 4 0 , 196th FA Gp.

1. u t e r n a t e r a d i o l i n k t o b a t t a l i o n s . *We hare obtained YCR 610 r a d i a s f a r use

within our AT and cn cos, I n a d d i t i o n t o providing longer range can f c r these coe,
t h i s a l s o permits a possible a l t e r n a t e meam f o r the r e g t t o contact t h e bns. When
the cn c o F0 is a t t h e bn CP, the cn co channel can be used t o reach t h e bn CO.

2. Transfer of wire f r a n DW-& r e e l 8 t o DR-8 reel@. W . e improvised a means Pm

t r a n s f e r r i n g our W-130 wire f r m t h e DR-46 t o the m i a s by using a captured German
pack r e e l u n i t , eane p a r t s of a r e e l u n i t RL-39 frcm a CE-11, and a bicycle sprocket
and chain. The bn aan Os c o l l e c t the empty ~ ~ - 8 and
s send them t o the r e g t l wire aec-
tion far refill..-40, 47th Inf m g t .

.Our p a t r o l e r e p a r t t h a t i n wooded or h i l l y t e r r a i n the enemy w i l l allow the l e a d

man t o came through t h e i r l i n e s and when the other member8 of t h e p a t r o l can be ob-
served the J e r r i e a start shouting, whistling, and f i r i n g a Xew r i f l e s h o t 8 f r u n e i t h e r
flank. The p a t r o l leader inrnediately g e t 8 the impression t h a t he i s surrounded and
endeavcrs t o p u l l o u t , sanetinme leaving c a s u a l t i e s and with h i e p a t r o l disorganized.
During such a c t i o n , the enemy is c a r e f u l not t o diecloea h i e p o e i t i o n s by f i r i n g auto-
matic rpml usually he w i l l r e l y on a few r i f l e s h o t s t o c r e a t e t h i s confueion,a--2d Bn,
47th IrU.

.
1, p i e ~ l a c e m e n t .We have adapted t h e procedure of digging new gun p o s i t i o n s
before d i s p l a c i n g the gun, I n f a t mooing e i t u a t i o n s t h i s r e impractical but when
there i a time, half the sqd goes t o the new p o s i t i o n , l ~ s r i n gthe other h a l f t o man
the gun, Time f c r emplacing is thus c u t t o a minimum.

2. s i t i q g . .AT guns ehould always be placed a e r e r a l hundred yda from the road
they a r e covering t o obtain f l a n k i n g f i r e , b e t t e r camouflage, and s a f e t y fran Gennar,
a r t y f i r e which usually f a l l s along the road..--C0, AT Co. 115th I n f .

END
- 2 -
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 7 0 21 OCT 1944

' B a t t l e Bcperiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headqdarters t o enable u n i t s

i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r m p s now f i g h t i n g t h e
Cernans i n Europe, hlthough t h e experiences ~f c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a & a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n
a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a g p l i c s b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u & t i o n s , t h e items published m i l l
be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i h e s e t i o n by
u n i t s whioh may encounter sinllar ~ r o b l e m s . Reports of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y ex-
p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r that t h e v a l i d i t y sf the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e
lesson may be determined,

& cornand of Eieutenhnt General W L F Y :

Colonel, AGD
ka j u t ant General

.Leadership i e based on knowledge, First, ?very 0 and man musr; h o w h i s job

t h i s y i e l d s f a i t h i n each other, Second, every man m a t r e a l i z e t h a t h i s 0 s and NCOa
--
know t h e i r jobs -- t h i s g i v e s confidence i n command. Third,'each must h o w h i s
mission and t h e mission d t h e u n i t -- whf ch g i v e s cori6Y:nuPty sf e f f o r t r e g a r d l e s s of
l o s s e s . The f i r s t is obtained i n t r a i n i n g , t h e eecond i n lllaneuvers and cambat, and t h e
t h i r d by c a r e f u l b r i e f i n g snd o r i e n t a t i o n on t h e ground, Reaults of auch b r i e f i n g were
shorn i n a recent o p e r a t i o n i n which 200 Germans were k i l l e d and 800 captured a t a c o s t
of 16 c a s u a l t i e s . After each engagement c r i t i q u e s should be held i n each p l a t followed
by one f o r the os,*--% CC, 6 t h Armd Div,

11 mRWm OBSERVERS

1. roper use of a r t i l l e r y . 'One of t h e FO's most i m p o r t m t jobs i s t o g e t a c r o s s

t o infantrymen the types of t a r g e t s on which he can g i v e them the mxianun eugport,
A f t e r a l i t t l e conbat e x p r i e n c * t h e infantryman l e a k t h e ' t r u e value of a r t y and
doean't c a l l f o r support u n l e s s t h e t a r g e t ' m e r i t s i t . iIe then d m a n ' t want t o waste
valuable am t h a t he h o w 8 he m y need more on some o t h e r t a r g e t ,

2. #'Innocent bvatandersw a t t h e Observation Post. ' R i l l meaning infantrymen who

attempt t o crowd about t h e O p t o observe t h e r e s u l t s of t h e f i r e c r t o s t e a l a l o o k .
through t h e BC telescope must l e a r n t h a t they e r e i n v i t i n g . f i r e from t h e enemy. OP8
a r e high on t h e p r i o r i t y l i s t of e n e q t a r g e t s and the importance of t h e i r camouflage
d i s c i p l i n e can't be over-stressed.

3. A morale b u i l d e r . a w i n g heavy s h e l l i n g from enemy b t - 7 s t h e 2 7 can g i v e t h e

men a boost i f . h e can t e l l them t h e type of s h e l l s t h e enelqy i s us:ng and where t h e y ' r e
coming from. It a l s o h e l p s t o know t h a t he i s t h e r e sending i n t h e s h e l l r e h o r t s and pre-
paring t o r e t u r n t h a t f i r e many times over."--Capt, 1 1 1 t h FA bn.

1. IToblem. the problem of coordinating t h e i n f advance with t h e l i f t i n g of c l o s e -

i n a r t y f i r e hae been solved i n s e v e r a l ways but t h e r e is g e n e r a l agreement on two p o i n t s .
F i r s t , t h e method used is depe,~dent on t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n and such f a c t o r e a s t h e
type of t e r r a i n , l i g h t c o n d i t i o n s , a v a i l a b i l i t y of maps, and t h e degree of t r a i n i n g of t h e
inf i n f o l l o w i n g a r t y f i r e . Second, t h e method of c o o r d i n a t i o n must be simple and care-
f u l l y worked out by t h e a r t y and i n f c m d r s and t h e information disseminated t o all t r o o p s .

2. S o l u t i o n s . "Following a r e s o m e methods t h a t have been used:

a. ~ r t FO y informs Lnf ao comdr when l a s t v o l l e y i s on t h e way and he informs t h e
p l a t l d r by SCR 536. Thie is dependent on a l l SCR 5368 being i n good working o r d e r and
p r e s e n t s t h e important problem of quickly n o t i f y i n g each man i n t h e p l a t .
b. F i r i n g t h e l a s t one o r two v o l l e y s a s high b u r s t s (time f i r e ) . T h i s is dependent
upon time f i r e not being p a r t of t h e concen'Lration i t s e l f , upon inf oben not being a u t
off by t r e e s o r h i l l s , and upon absence of t r e e e i n t h e impact a r e a t o cause a i r b u r s t s .
c. L i f t i n g f i r e on a c l o s e l y coordinated time schedule. This is normally p r a c t i c a -
b l e only f o r p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s up t o about H p l u s 10 o r H p l u s 15.
d . The u s e of a block of schedule f i r e s modified t o f i t t h e a c t u a l r a t e of advaace
by repeating f i r e s , when necessary, on c a l l . This a g a i n p r e s e n t s t h e ;roblam of n o t i f y -
i n g a l l t r o o p s of changee i n t h e schedule.
e. Designation by a r t y FO of i n f f r o n t l l n e l o c a t i o n s during t h e advance, using
1:10,000 m p s with f i e l d s numbered. T h i s i s dependent on having a c c u r a t e maps a v a i l a b l e
m d t h e time i n which t o number them.
f . F i r i n g of c o l o r e d o r white smoke i n one of t h e l a s t two volleys. T h i s has mv-
e r a 1 dieadvantages:
( 1 ) The only e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e c o l o r e - - r e d , v i o l e t , and yellow have o t h e r im-
p o r t a n t uses. Green is not e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , and white is e a s i l y confused.
(2) The enemy can f i r e white smoke i n t o an a r t y concentration.
(3) Eslemy is warned t h a t t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s l i f t i n g .
(4) Colored smoke cannot be seen d u r i n g d a icness o r a t duek and d a m .
3.Additional a i d s . .Desirable f e a t u r e s i n any method include:
a . I f p o s s i b l e , more than one system of ramiug.
b. Xnf p l a t l d r s having t h e i r men organized well ahead of time t o permit moving
forward without delay.
c. Use of wire t o forward p l a t s when possible."--TI11 Corps' 0s.

The following c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a r e 2 o r t from t h e 628th TD Bn i n d i c a t e s t h a t even a t

extreme ranges t h e German blark V I (Tiger) t k i s vulnerable t o t h e M-10 TD. A p l a t comdr
r e p o r t s t h e following r e s u l t s , w i t h i n a 30 minute p e r i o d , of a r e c e n t a c t i o n i n Germany:
a. "No 1 gun h i t i t s f i r s t t k a t a range of 18u3 yd8. The enemy crew abandoned t h e
t k and f o u r more rounds of ATC were f i r e d a t i t , t h r e e of which could be seen t o bounce
o f f t h e f r o n t p l a t e . The f o u r t h round h i t t h e gun s h i e l d and r i c o c h e t e d down through
t h e t o p of t h e t k . Two rounds of A P C BDF were then f i r e d which exploded on t h e f r o n t of
t h e t k . A second t k a t t h e same range was h i t with two rounds of APC BDF which caused
i t t o burn. Both eneqy t k s were f a c i n g d i r e c t l y toweird t h e gun t h a t knocked them out.
Later a t h i r d t k was knocked out by a h i t on t h e s i d e from a range of 3030 yda.
b. nNo 2 gun knocked o u t one t k by g e t t i n g t h r e e h i t s with an AX i n r e a r of the
t k a t a range of over 3200 yds.
c. *No 3 gun knocked o u t one W VZ: t k w i t h t h r e e AFC h i t 8 i n t h e s i d e a t a range
of 1900 yd3.m ,. -
,. :&
 TWELFTF! ARMY CROUP

2 2 OCT 1944

' B a t t l e jsxperiencesw are p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s

i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t c o d a t e w e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g
t h e Germans i n m o p e . Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r loca-
t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e it- publish-
ed w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l consid-
e r a t i o n by u n i t s which m y encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r
c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i -
c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be d e t e m i c e d ,

6. R. ISLNWN
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a n t General

I COMPANY ADMUJISTRATION

1. Problem. 'Considerable d i f f i c u l t y has been experienced i n o b t a i n i n g c a s u a l t y

i n f o r m a t i o n and s t r e n g t h f i g u r e s because of c a s u a l t i e s among 1st s g t s . When evacuated,
t h e necessary information and r e c o r d s o f t e n went with them and time was l o s t i n g e t t i n g
t h e s e r e c o r d s back. In o t h e r c a s e s , t h e 1st sgt was used a s a p l a t l e a d e r a n d , t h e r e -
f o r e , s l i g h t e d administration.

2. S o l u t i o n . *As a remedy t h e bn sgt major and h i s c l e r k now keep complete r a s t e r s

of a l l c o s i n t h e bn. They make d u p l i c . ~ t ec o p i e s of a l l r e p o r t s and keep t h e s e r o s t e r s
up-to-date. It is then p o s s i b l e f o r t h e s g t major, when t h e 1st s g t 1s a c a s u a l t y , t o
t a k e o v e r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h a t co u n t i l a n o t h e r NW can be acquainted w i t h t h e
r o u t i n e . I n c a s e s i n which t h e co is s o s e p a r a t e d t h a t a r e p o r t i s i m p r a c t i c a b l e , t h e
s g t m j o r can gc ahead and submit oce based on t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e information. This
system has been q u i t e e f f e c t i v e , " - - 1 1 5 t h Inf Regt.

"When vfe r e c e i v e r e p o r t s of flit t r a j e c t o r y w-pns being f i r e d from any g i v e n d i r e c -

t i o n we make a contour s t u d y of t h e .map and s e l e c t p o s s i b l e l o c a t i o n s f o r t h e gun.
.Arty f i r e is t h e n placed on t h e s e l o c n t i o n s . We hsve been extremely s u c c e s s f u l i n
s i l e n c i n g such guns."-Regtl CO 7 9 t h Div,

I11 RADIO DISCIPILIG

#We need . m r e r a d i o d i s c i p l i ~ l e . hben o l d t i m e r s sli:, up on t h i s . I nsd q l ~ i t e
a c o n v e r s s t i o n w i t h a J e r r y one day u n t i l he s l i p p d u p on t h e c a l l sign.'--Capt,
11th Inf,
 " i n e n we p a t r o l toward important t e r r a i n f e a t . m e s we send e i t n e r an ST8 390 o r SC2
536 with t h e p a t r o l depending on t h e range. If' t h e p s t r o l r e s c h e s an important l o c a l i t y
we can d i r ~ c tit t o remain w h i l e We d e c i d e whether t o r e i n f o r c e it. A s a r e s u l t we have
never hl-d t o f i g h t f o r arm important p o i n t t h a t we n a - ~ eonce held.*--Regtl Ex 0 , 7'3th
Inf Div.

V ATTACE;ITG T O E S I N WOODS

#We f i n d th:..t enemy t k s i n woods g e n e r a l l y f i r e from p r e p a r e d and c a m u f l s g e d p o s i -

tions. we g e t a s c l o s e a s we can with o u r inf and r e g i s t e r o u r mrts w i t h HE s h e l l in
t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e tk. Then we c h a w e t o smoke s h e l l and b l i n d t h e t k s while w e c l o s e
i n w i t h bazookas end bayonets. We use t h e same system on h o s t i l e s t r o n g p o i n t s i n mods.'
- - R e e l CO, 7 9 t h Inf Div.

*We use a forward wire head t o a s s i s t i n s e r v i c i n g o u r wire l i n e s . It i s manned by

two men and i s placed immediately i n r e a r of t h e pact where t h e regtl l i n e d i v e r g e s
t o t h e v s r i o u s bn 1 0 c a t ~ ~ o n s .Using t h i s system we can determine m r e q u i c k l y t h e e x a c t
l o c a t i o n of a break."-- H e g t l CO, 7 9 t h Inf Div.

VII SALVAGE
We have s e t u? a r e c l a m a t i o n sqd which s e a r c h e s o u r z o of~ a c~t i o n a f t e r w e have
passed through. A s a r e s a l t we h w e reclaimed more t h a n enough m a t e r i a l of a l l c l a s s e s
t o make up f o r t h e b a t t l e l o s s e s , not i n c l u d i n g damaged m a t e r i a l , - t h s t we s u s t a i n m n - -
R e g t l r;x 0 , 7 3 t h I n f Dive

VIII W W I N G BY RrSWCBEZhT OFFIC%TE

"Replacelnent 0 s h,lve been found weak i n map r e a d i x on t h e ground. They a r e
i n c l i n e d t o pay t o o m c h ' a t t e n t i o n t o w3rks of man, p s r t i c u l ~ r l yr o a d s and t r a i l s o
and not enough t o n a t ~ m s lt e r r a i n f e a t u r e s a n - - R e g t l hx O p 4 t h Islf Div.

'Div o r d i n a r i l y a t t a c h e s a p l a t o r co of e n g r s t c t h e r e g t . From them we a t t a c h

a mine sweeper detachment t o t h e r e s e r v e co o f t h e bn t o c l e a r t h e way f o r v e h i c l e s .
This system has saved a l o t of j e e p a n d a m b u 1 a n c e s . ~ - R e g t l h% O * 4 t h I n f Dive

"In - e n e c l e - r i n g o p r a t i o ~ i sany Tres which cennot be searched due t o tern2orary

o b s t a c l e s shoxld be m r k e d . The wsrning shol.tld not be removed l m t i l t h a t a r e a has
been sc-isched. On one occasi.o:a a wrecked jee? was r e m v e d and a t r k a t ten,-ted t o
c r o s s t h e a r e a i t h.3 oecu,?iede It s t r u c k a T-mine which t h e wreck had covered."--
A f t e r Action 2.eporc. 29.5ttl mg?- Bn.
 f iYEL,TTH ARMY CROUP
~--z-

BATTLE EXPERIENCES

K B a tt1.e Experiences * a r e p u b ~shes r ra@larPy by t h i s h e a d q u w t e r s t o enable

u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t frcm $he l a t e a t e m b a t experiences of atx' t r ~ a p anow
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although "ce experiences of e e r ~ a i n~ m t sst a
g a r t i c u l a r l o e a t i o n a r e not m c e s s a r i > g a p p l i c a b l e t o e l l m-nts :n e l l ~ i t u a t i ~ m ,
t h e items published w i l l be t h w e besed m 2 r ~ c t i c a le x p r i e ~ c sa& =a secaannerdeZ
for c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y units vhiza m y encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l e m . Repan%a
of c m r o b o r a t i w QT contrary ex;&rAaLGes &s p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d in order %hat5 k
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e leaaon m y be determined.

Note: The f i r s t d e t a i l e d r e p o r t of? extensive use of a n t i p e r s o n n e l mines and booby t r a p

by American troops ccmea fran CQ A of 297th Engineer Bn ( C ) which was a t t a c h e d t o the
4 t h Cay group d u r i n g t h e p e r i d 17 Sep t o 2 Oct, 194.4. The Cav group m a occupying a
wide f r o n t and made f r e e use of booby t r a p s .

1. procedure. Mare t h a n 100 booby t r a p s of various type8 were s e t and ~ l a i n t a i n e d

under c l o s e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e two p l a t candra. Traps were checked d a i l y . Exploded ones
were replaced and changes made t o conf orvl t o changes i n t h e f r o n t l i n e or t o provide for
s p e c i a l s i t u e t i o m , I n c e r t a i n s p e c i a l l o c a t i o n s , t h e t r a p s would be i n s t a l l e d a t dusk
and removed a t dawn,

2. Location. The t r a p s = r e placed on r o a d s , t r a i l s and p a t h s l e a d i n g f r ~ n the

f r o n t * and near g a t e s and s i m i l a r t r a f f i c : b o t t l e n e c k s . On a number of occasions t r a p s
were l a i d a t s p e c i a l l o c a t i o n s a f t e r a t e e t i c a l buildup designed t o cause t h e enemy t o
send personnel t o t h e p o i n t s s e l e c t e d . For example, a p a t r o l would e s t a b l i s h e o n t a c t
with the enemy d u r i n g d a y l i g h t , They would then p l a c e a l i n e of t r a p a a t the p o i n t from
which c o n t a c t waa e s t a b l i s h e d and withdraw s l i g h t l y a t dusk. They c a p i t a l i z e d on t h e ob-
served h a b i t of t h e enemy of sending s p e c i a l p a t r o l s t o i n v e s t i g a t e p o i n t s fkcm which we
had made c o n t a c t with them. I n a number of *cases, booby t r a p s were placed i n tempormily
abandoned German l o c a t i o n s , Prequently with g o d r e s u l t s .

1, The bean can. An ordinary iuo. 2 @an was loaded with t h e e pounds of dynamite
pressed aa hard a s p o s s i b l e with 6Dd n a i l s a l o n g t h e i n s i d e edge of t h e can, The c e n t e r
of t h e c a n was kspt c l e a r of n a i l s t o permit i m e r t i n g the f i r i n g device. These were
d e t o n a t e d with a No. 8 b l a s t i n g c a p , t r i p wire and a p u l l - t y p e f w e . The t r i p wire is
i n e f f e c t i v e i f over 15 f e e t long. This same t y p e waa made w i t h C - 2 canpound which proved
m o r e , e f f e c t i v e t h a n dynamite.

2. Another was c o n s t r u c t e d f r a n a n American AT mine w i t h a half-pound b l o c k sf T l P e

equipped with p u l l - t y p e d e t o n a t a r , a t t a c h e d t o t h e s p i d e r , A v a r i a t i o n of t h i s wae t o
p l a c e a few nundred rounds of MG am cm t o p t o a c t as a d d i t i o n a l s h r a p n e l ,

1. ye i s a *duimkoof * .
R e s u l t s proved that t h e German s o l d i e r i a p o o r l y t r a i n e d
a g a i n s t mine8 and booby t r a p a and a n e a s y prey t o t h e quick-thinking and i r u a g i n a t i w
American i n a b a t t l e of wits.

2. H e i a c a r e l e s e . On 18 S e p a mine, a t t a c h e d t o a g e t e s o t h a t opening of t h e
g a t e would e e t i t o f f , was blown. The Csmaan s o l d i e r ~ sl e g was broken and s h r a p n e l p i e r c e d
h i s body. A n e w mine w a s immediately pleced i n a s l . i & t l y d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n and a s h o r t
time l a t e r two G e r m a n s t r i e d t h e sane gate. One was k i l l e d and the o t h e r s e v e r e l y wounded.

3 . He is u n h e a l t h i l y a ~ n e s s i v e . A n e n g i n e e r p a r t y , o u t l o o k i n g for l o c a t i o n s f a r
a d d i t i o n a l t r a p s , met a Cerman g a t r o l and had a f i r e f i g h t with them l a s t i n g about a n
hour. During t h e f i r i n g t h e y s e t up t h e i r mines w i t h t r i p - w i r e s and then withdrew.
About t e n minutes a f t e r t h e y had withdrawn they h e a d one of t h e i r mines explode. Upan
r e t u r n i n g they found one German dead and t h e o t h e r w i t h a broken l e g and s h r a p n e l wound8
i n l e g s and arms.

4. S u r ~ r i s e sf o r him a t h a m . a. One n i g h t one of o w p a t r o l s l o c a t e d a n emeny

bazooka p o s i t i o n w i t h wpns s t i l l i n p l a c e b u t no personnel &round. They p u t 4-lb of
TNT w i t h a No. 8 b l a s t i n g cap and a p u l l - t y p e d e h c e i n t h e loaded hazoob and a t t a c h e d
a t r i g wire t o a m a r b y t r e e . The n e x t day t h e baeoska was found wrecked wi%h a dead
German s o l d i e r lying near i t ,

An unexpected by-protluct o f t h i s a c t h v i i ; ~aea Lhs 'seqvs-nt au2pkeraeoti.q d t h e

s a t f ~ n~L.ls-l.. beefs yzxiaop and rabbitp 2 r.a.-i;.:,.-
, -
.j:? el?2ag.is ~ ~ .;.,-:.,.. i
t,lle fv2.y.
~ i n % s~ ~
 * M t t l e a p e r i e n e e s s -6 pu';'_.i s h s 2 reg:niar.by 'oy Znia h e a d q ~ a r t e r sso e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o prof P f r x ;-' ,,ie ,at.est e m b a t expet-:en~es of s u tr.oopa now
P i g h t i r g t h e Gemens in. E:ti:;~-e . !.:.;.,:::.~.xh. $ h e e x p e r i e ~ . c e scf c a r t. e l. n u n i t s a t ti
-
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i cn a r e ~ o eneces3a~IL:; a ~ g i i c a b i et o a l l a n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t l o r ~ s ,
the i t e m putflished w i l L be thoz; -':-;as;.% a;*; ; r a c t i c a l axperiecce and are r e c a m e n d o 2
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r e e i ~ sb ~l r m i t s > - ' . : :::h laay encounter sirriilar problems, Report8
of c a r r o b o r a t i v e a- contl-ary C J E ~ ~ T . : . ~ ~ ; C ~ Sp a r t i c u l a r l y d e e i r e d i n a r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b s . & t l e heasor. may be determined.

C. R e lAIuDOB
C o l o ~ L ,AGD
Ad j u t a n t General

"All Its of the bo take t h e i r turn a s FOe with t h e id i n t a c r v of 4 days d u r a t i o n .

B%ry c a n d r s can only be s p a r e d f a r two day tours. The bn candr and s t a f f v i s i t W s and
i n f bne i n t h e l i n e . Personnel of the FO p a r t i e e w e r o t a t e d s o t h a t even t h e canoneera
g e t up with t h e i n f . This c r e a t e s a h i g h u n i t s p i r i t , a profound r e s p e c t f o r t h e hard
job of t h e i n f , and m k e a each man p e r s o n a l l y r e a l i z e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a c c u r a t e s h o o t -
ing,*--Report of l i O t h FA a n ,

I1 UJE OF WHITE PHOSYHORUS SbELB.

The use of v p t o mark i n i t i a l r a i d s Par ground and a i r obars should be d i s c o . u a g e d
i n medium FA bns. 'with r e a s o n a b l y s c c u e t e i & . % i a l d a t a , and by n o t i n g t h e time of
f l i g h t f r a n t h e range t a b l e s the ze2;:m S>u-stcan u u a l l y be picked o a t . Excessive
use of IPP f u r m a r k i n g i n i t i a l r u d a s o t ~ n l yis waeteful. b u t adds t o t h e oberst d i f f i -
c u l t i e a by i n c r e a s i n g t h e b a t t l e h s z s , ".-=.,?e;j~rt of 227th FA Bn ( 1 5 5 1 3ow)
~~ .

1. O r ~ a n i z a t i o a , #Is t e r r a i n t h a t i s poop. f u r n o r m a l use o f 8 b m morta a eystem

of employing 4 m a r t s in b a t t e r y , ccnr;rrc:i:,adl i r m an , q C b has been q u i w effective; w o
FOs , with SCR J3008, operate with t h e 1:c;zwwd r i f l e c o s , %he t h i ~ ds e c t i o n of t h e p l a t
f u r n i s h e a t h e necessary FOs anii radio - ; ~ , r a t . o r s .

2.. Advantages. nusing t h i s metnod it has been p o s s i L ~ et o keep t h e mwts between

309 and 1000 yds t o the rear, where t h e y Braw very l i t t l e enemy fire. Tbia d i s t a n c e
makes i t p o s s i b l e t o cover a wise s e c t o r 02 f i r e , without mox6ng base p l a t e s and r e -
r e g i s t e r i n g fran new p o s i t i o n s . Four a o r t a have been found s u f f i c i e n t t o f i r e almost
a l l bn mi8sione.a--Cp1 Jerane 3. Metzger, 115th Inf Reg%.
 2.

+.;
*On 'one o c c a e i o n when our a r t y used r e d sruoke t o mark a t a r g e t f a r our f i g h t e r - b a n b e r s ,
t h e enemy immediately r e t u r n e d t h e f i r e w i t h mort s h e l l s of t h e same type. These s h e l l s
landed a t l e a s t 500 yds i n r e a r of our forward elernents. The f a c t t h a t t h e s e r a n d s
Tere f i r e d i n t o our l i n e s only a few seconds a f t e r o u r s had landed i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
enemy may have used r a d i o illtercept.*--G-2, 2d itl-md Div. ( ~ o t e : Scme u n i t s have r e p a r t e d
t h a t when air a i r c r a f t a r e i n c l o s e s u p p o r t t n e q u s e a n a r t y 0 P p l a n e t o watch f o r and
inunediutely r e p o r t t h i s enemy t a c t i c . )

1. Qemoli t i o n s . Where f i r i n g s l o t s and embrasures cover the d o o r and each o t h e r ,

making i t i m p r a c t i c a b l e t o p l a c e a charge a g a i n s t t h e d o o r , a n e x p l o s i v e charge p l a c e d
on t h e r o o f has proved e f f e c t i v e . The ccmciissi sn was s o s e v e r e as t o b l a c k t h e eyes of
t h e occupants .*-- Beport of 9 t h I n f Div.

2. burn in^ g a s o l i n e . "Attempts t o cause the, s u r r e n d e r of p i l l b o x g a r r i s o n s by p o w -

i n g g a s o l i n e through t h e v e n t i l a t a r s and t h e n l i g h t i n g i t , have been unsucceasful. The
v e n t i l a t i n g s y s t e r r ~a r e s o designed t h a t t h e g a s o l i n e goes through t h e v e r t i c a l s h a f t
and runs o u t t h e s i d e of the box. Air is t a k e n i n t o t h e p i l l b a x by a v e n t i l a t i n g s h a f t
t h a t is a n o f f s h o o t of t h e v e r t i c a l one. "--Re,-mt of t h e 9 t h I n f Dive (Note r The 5 t h
Ranger Bn r e c e n t l y r e p o r t e d s u c c e s s f u l n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of a p i l l b c x , u s i n g g a s o l i n e and
o i l i n a d d i t i o n t o o t h e r weapons .)

1. K e e ~.vow e a u i ~ r n e n t . 'There should be sane way, p r i o r t o g o i n g i n t o combat, of

showing men how f o o l i s h i t is t o throw away e q u i p e n t , such a s grenades and grenade
l a u n c h e r s . A f t e r a wfiile our men f m n d cut how v a l u a b l e t h e y were, but o f t e n i t was
impossible t o g e t s a n e of t h e s e abandoned a r t j 2 Los q k z n we needed them m a s t

ing. These p a n e l s e r e bulky and e a s i l y thrown away--don't l e t thsm d o i t .

Get r i d of n r i s o n e r s . V o n ' t keep p r i s o n e r s t o o long. Get t h e i n f o m a t i o n f'ran

them and s e n d them back. Above a l l , don't; let; xes! irrsul: arotind them and g i v e o t h e r Cer-
mans a good MG t a r g e t .
. W i t h aU
c l o s e a i r s u p p a r t , a f r o n t l i n e p a n e l d i s p l a y o f t e n g i v e s t h e t r o o p s a much b e t t e r f e e l -

3 . p o n g t g i v e sway p o s i t i o n s , 9 o n c ' i - 3 3 L F Z C ~ I W ~ I t g i v e s your p o s i t i o n away.

3n t h e o t h e r hand, Geman smokeless povder makes t h e i r l o c a t i o n s hard t o f i n d . Wait f o r
t h e n t o move and t h e n l e t them have i t

2.
0-Ua C d v ~ b S 1 \ s
.
4. Watch t h e n o i s e . "When advancing t o t k a t t a c k keep t h e r o i s e down. P r i s o n e r s
have t o l d u s t h a t w e l o s e s u r p r i s e e f f e c t ~y ama n d ~ s gapprcadh t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s .

5. Help t h e new men, "Work hard with iaiaxperienced men. They w i l l h e l p yau i n b a t -
t l e i f you h e l p them i n t r a i n i n g . Don't f a r g e t extrs. hours on t h e d r i l l f i e l d s s a v e l i v e s
on t h e battlefield. #--T/'~gt Benjamin Frisbmr "c

VT I .v.13CE;LWiE .
7.Y9%hI n f Re&.

1. Grenades. "Men s h o u l d be t a u g h t .t<jreicxe grenades f r a n pockets and p u t them

i n handy h o l e s when occupying defensi.ve gos+.i n?..:,; We heve had s e v e r a l exploded when
t h e men were h i t . * - S - 2 ,

T e l ~ t y p efrom -,
9 t h &rmd Bn, 6 t h

'The use of
t a k e s a p e ~ lto a d o f f our t e l e p h o
.':'. F,.?*,,:l:!

?%
. ?;.: -2s sscls.ines frim c o r p s a r t y hq t o ms
p s Arty
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 74 24 OCT 1944
battle m e r i e n c e e s a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l unite i n a l l situations,
t h e i t e m s published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recommnded
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t e which may encounter similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

gy ccamaand of Lieutenant General 8RADLEY:

C. R. J d u m N
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
............................................
I LEaDWSHIP EPISODE.

1. The following r o u t i n e r e p o r t of a cambat o p e r a t i o n submitted by a T/S& of Co E,

109th Inf Regt, p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e of aggressive l e a d e r s h i p which i s a p a r t i a l i n d i c a t i o n
of why t h a t T/S& i s now a 2d J,t .
2. a. situation. *Our understrength co was held up by German mort and K: f i r e on
a h i l l j u s t i n s i d e t h e German border. A Cennan machine gunner was covering t h e draw i n
f r o n t of u s from t h e l e f t f l a n k . There were a l s o Germans i n a p i l l b o x up t h e road i n
f r o n t of u s , from where they were a p p a r e n t l y d i r e c t i n g mort and a r t y f i r e .
b. m s s i o n . *Our a c t i n g co comdr gave o r d e r s t h a t my p l a t (we had had no p l a t l d r
f o r some time) of about 12 men, a s s i s t e d by a t k , was t o t a k e and hold t h i s p i l l b o x ,
c. p r e p a r a t i o n . R Ilooked over t h e map and t e r r a i n and saw t h e r e was a f i r e t r e n c h
d i r e c t l y behind t h e p i l l b o x . I g o t my men t o g e t h e r and a f t e r d a r k withdrew t o where w e
were t o meet t h e t k . The t k comdr and I made our p l a n s together and I c a r e f u l l y o r i e n t e d
my men.
d. The approach. n w e s t a r t e d moving a t 1030 hours c l o s e l y following t h e t k down t h e
r o a d , and s h o r t l y r a n i n t o mort and a r t y f i r e . The t k f i r e d a t t h e p i l l b o x every once i n
a while a s we advanced. When we got t o t h e a r e a where t h e t k had t o s t o p , the t k comdr
asked when he should s t o p f i r i n g a$ t h e p i l l b o x . I t o l d him, 'When we g e t so c l o s e you
have t o s t o p , then s t o p q . I s t a r t e d one of aqds toward t h e p i l l b o x about 350 yds away.
They r a n i n t o some barbed wire which they s t a r t e d t o c u t , but I f i g u r e d we couldn't waste
time a t t h a t . I found a way around t h e wire and l e d t h e sqd forward, We had been g e t t i n g
mort f i r e and a b u t t h a t time I r a n i n t o bX: f i r e and some of men had stopped following
me. s g t ~ o u l d i n ggot t h e BAR and t h r e e riflemen t o keep moving toward t h e p i l l b o x . I
y e l l e d back t o them, 'Keep coming, t h e s e Heinie b a s t a r d s c a n ' t h i t u s ' . Another s g t and
t h r e e of h i s men kept coming but we were down t o n i n e men now.
e. Attacking t h e p i l l b o x . R I got t o t h e p i l l b o x and about t h a t time the t k cut loose

again. It threw a l i t t l e d i r t on re but I f i g u r e d ana hoped i z would be h i s l a s t round,

, men were s t i l l coming and one of them had 10 l b s of TNT.
EQ Rhile I waited f o r them, 1
t o s s e d a couple of hand grenades a t t h e back door j u s t t o keep t h e Germans i n u n t i l I got
some help. When they a r r i v e d one s g t and two men covered t h e f i r e t r e n c h i n t h e r e a r ,
and our demolition men placed t h e TNT by t h e door of t h e box but it d i d n ' t go o f f . The
r e s t of our co had advanced t o w i t h i n 200 yds and t h e y s e n t up a m a n with two more 1 0 l b
charges. The second one a l s o f a i l e d t o go o f f and I was sweating. We f i n a l l y got t h e
t h i r d charge i n and a t l a s t she blew. It d i d n ' t even bother t h e box but I guess i t j a r r e d
t h e Heinies. I l e f t two men t o guard t h e box i n case they came out and t h e r e s t of u s
(now e i g h t men) pushed on t o t h e f i r e trench. It was empty a s was a Heinie s l e e p i n g quar-
t e r s i n t o which we threw a couple of grenades through an open door. bout t h a t time I
heard a shot f r m t h e p i l l b o x and r a n back t o s e e what was happening. Twenty-one Germans,
including a capt and two lts, were marching o u t with t h e i r hands over t h e i r heads. One
had t r i e d t o make a r u n f o r i t but g o t himself a ccuple of s l u g s from an I&-1 r i f l e . The
r e s t f i g u r e d i t was time t o q u i t .
f . Reorganiziq. " 1 searched t h e p r i s o n e r s and f i g u r e d we had b e t t e r t a k e a look
i n s i d e t h e p i l l b o x . I toclk one of t h e p r i s o n e r s and made him start moving s t u f f i n case
t h e r e were any booby t r a p s , but f o r t u n a t e l y t h e r e weren't any. I s e n t the p r i s o n e r s back
with t h r e e of men and set up a defense with t h e r e s t of my men who had came us by t h i s
time. There were only nine of u s but i t was a l l t h a t could be spared a t t h e time. In
t h e morning they s e n t u s sane h e l p and me held the p o s i t i o n f o r s e v e r a l days before with-
drawing t o r e o r g a n i z e ..*

If SALVAGE AND W N T E T J M C E .
1, Axma r e p a i r crew. #The grouping of r i f l e bn a r t i f i c e r s i n t h e s e r v i c e co t r a i n
under t h e supervision of t h e r e g t l munitions 0 and h i s a s s i s t a n t has proved e f f e o t i v e .
It has speeded up t h e r e t u r n of both i n d i v i d u a l and crew served wpns t o t h e l i n e and has
r e l i e v e d t h e load on t h e d i v ord co. Resulta: Since D-day w e haven't r e q u i s i t i o n e d a
s i n g l e M-1 r i f l e .

2. Salvage crew. "A salvage crew of one 0, one NCO and f o u r men w i t h t h e d u t i e s of
c l e a r i n g t h e a r e a s of a l l s a l v a g e , evacuating t h e dead, and handling t h e a f f e c t s of cas-
u a l s , has made i t p o s s i b l e t o r e c l a i m and r e i s s u e l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of o r d and i n d i v i d u a l
c l o t h i n g and equipment.

3 . Radio r e p a i r . "The r e g t l hq c o r a d i o repairman o p e r a t e s h i s r e p a i r shop on t h e

s e r v i c e co t r a i n , handling a l l r a d i o s issued i n t h e u n i t . Radios a r e now r e p a i r e d more
r a p i d l y and a considerable burden is taken o f f t h e d i v s i g co.

4. Maintenance i n s p e c t i o n , "The maint s e c t i o n has been divided i n t o i n s p e c t i o n crews

with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of making p e r i o d i c , systematic i n s p e c t i o n s of a l l organic T. They

.
have d e t e c t e d minor d e f i c i e n c i e s t h a t might soon have become m r e serious.*--S-4, 1 1 5 t h fnf
Regt

*Our armd i n f f i g h t from t h e i r v e h i c l e s j u s t a s long a s possible. T h i s permits maxi-

mum use of vehicular wpns, some p r o t e c t i o n from S A f i r e and s h r a p n e l , and t h e men a r e
f r e s h e r f o r the f i n a l asaault..~--6th Armd Div.

REMXE CONTROL OF RmIO IN RECONNAISS&'CE VEHICLE.

i t is sometimes inconvenient o r dangerous t o g e t i n t o t h e v e h i c l e when we want t o

use our r a d i o , we have worked out a s a t i s f a c t o r y system of remote c o n t r o l . W e use an
interphone box B C - ~ O ~ - Dand wire i t w i t h four-conductor c a b l e , s i m i l a r t o an interphone
hook-up. The box with t h e speaker m d headset a t c M can be kept near t h e operator i n a
dry p l a c e , and has been used s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with a s much a s 100' of e x t e n s i o n wireVn--
CO 5 t h Rcn Tr.
END
 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 75 2 5 QCT I944
" B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s m a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headqw-ters t o enable
u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f ~ c r nt h e l a t e s t cambat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ r m a n si n Europe. Blthough t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recanmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by units which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l ~ m e . Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i o a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

ccwnand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LANWN
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General

I USE Of 4 h GUNS AGAINST GROUND TARCBTS.

1. fir b u r s t s . "The & O m AAA gun, f i r i n g am w i t h t h e s u p e r s e n s i t i v e fuze is p a r t i c -
u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t emplaced upns and personnel because branches o r underbrush w i l l
cause d e t o n a t i o n and a i r b u r s t s . Care must be e x e r c i s e d t h a t t h e s h e l l s h i t no t r e e s o r
branches n e a r our own troops.

2. EPnployment. " m e n used c l o e e t o t h e enemy l i n e s , t h e 4Cbm guns should be d u g i n

deeply and a parapet b u i l t with t h r e e rows of sand bags. The parapet should be extended
around t o t h e f r o n t . l e a v i n g only a l i m i t e d s e c t o r of traverse, and t h e top covered with
l o g s t o p r o t e a t from overhead and nearby s h e l l b u r a t s . With t h i s p r e p a r a t i o n t h e r e is
no need t o change p o s i t i o n f r e q u e n t l y . Frequent changes of p o s i t i o n make obsn of enemy
gun l o c a t i o m l e s s a c c u r a t e and u n n e c e s s a r i l y expose t h e crew,

3 . F l r i n ~a t n i ~ h t . night f i r i n g i s i n a d v i s a b l e . The t r a c e r s soon bring d o n enemy

a r t y and m o r t f i r e . Also, t h e r e i s a ~ o s s i b i l i t yof h i t t i n g unseen branchea o r o t h e r
minor o b a t a c l e s , endangering our o m t r o o p s . . - - U Notes No. 8, Hq 1 2 t h asmgr Group.

11 ANI'ITANK COMPANY.

"When employed on t h e l i n e of forward r i f l e cos we have often found our AT s e c t i o n s

ao f a r away from t h e cos t h a t enemy i n f i l t r a t i o n c u t s them o f f .Bazooka teams c l o s e r t o
t h e r i f l e coe could s e r v e t h e S a m purpose and t h e AT co guns could be u s e d - f o r coordi-
m t e d p r o t e c t i o n of t h e f l a n k s and r e a r of t h e re&."--AT Co, 47th Inf Regt.

II1 STAY IN YOUR HOLE.

n I t always pay8 t o s t a y i n your hole when you're not advancing and come under mart
and a r t y f i r e . I ' v e o f t e n seen men g e t e x c i t e d and run f o r &er p l a c e s , but they always
ended u~ a s c a s u a l t i e s . J u s t remember t h e s e things: Always d i g i n , and when you c c a ~
under f i r e --
s t a y i n t h a t h o l e and 'sweat it o u t 1 . T h a t ' s what you dug i t for!^-s/*t
H.E. Carlson, 115th Inf Regt.

" m y was used t o ahoot medical s u p p l i e s t o t h e 3d Bn, 120th Inf, when it was c u t
o f f from more normal methods of supply i n t h e Mortain a r e a i n August. None of t h e plasma

.
got through i n t a c t but bandages, t a p e and some morphine were recovered."--After Action
Report 120t h Inf

TANKS I N TOWNS AT NIGHT.

"Tks should never be l e f t i n towns a t n i g h t . A town i n our hands is a good t a r g e t

f o r the enemy a t any time and t h e presence of t k s w i l l almost i n s u r e an enemy a r t y con-
centration..~--C0, 747th TD En.

BI T
- OF BN?'ITANK GUNS ON PIUBOXEZ.
"Excellent r e s u l t s have been obtained with 3* HE am with d e l a y fuze a g a i n s t small
pillboxes. P r i s o n e r s removed f r a small emplacements s o a t t a c k e d have had bloody noses,
out f a c e s , and o t h e r wounds. Inspection of aorne of t h e captured boxes i n d i c a t e s t h a t
t h e concussion caused s p l i n t e r i n g of t h e concrete i n s i d e the pillbox."--AT 0 , V Corps.

"In the planning of a s s a u l t boat r i v e r c r o s s i n g s p r o v i s i o n must be made f o r t h e r e -

placement of l o a t boats. I n a r e c e n t o p e r a t i o n a c o of engrs was t o f e r r y personnel a t
t h r e e p o i n t e and c o n s t r u c t an i n f bridge a t a f o u r t h . Boats used i n t h e a s s a u l t cross-
ings were neceeeary f o r b u i l d i n g t h e bridge. Twenty-f i v e of these boats were sunk by
t h e enemy and c o n a t r u c t i o n of t h e bridge was g r e a t l y delayed,."--Report of 9 t h Inf Div.

VIII FORGET TEIE HEDGEROW.

"The quicker we can f o r g e t t h e hedgerow s t y l e of f i g h t i n g and g e t back t o the i d e a

of using our hvy hE.8 i n s u p p o r t , the b e t t e r o f f we w i l l b e . " - - ~ / ~ g tL.A. Coleman, Co H,
lit h I n f Regt.

"We have e s t a b l i s h e d a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n c e n t e r s t a f f e d by a medical a i d man and an

NCO f o r o u r combat exhaustion cases. Such c a s e s a r e s e n t t o the c e n t e r by t h e bn a i d
s t a t i o n . They are kept t h e r e f o r a t l e a s t 48 hours undergoing marches and a t h l e t i c s .
They r e c e i v e hot food and a r e provided with r e c r e a t i o n i n t h e form of movies and books.
The s u r g examinea each man d a i l y . When t h e man i s d e c l a r e d f i t f o r combat by t h e s u r g
he is r e t u r n e d t o t h e s e r v i c e co f o r re-equipping and r e t u r n t o h i 8 orgn. In 14 days
of heavy f i g h t i n g we had 128 men pass through t h i s center. A l l were r e t u r n e d t o duty
and only 12 were again r e t u r n e d t o t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n c e n t e r . We t h u s reclaimed 90%
of our ccanbat exhauation c a s e s w i t h i n one week."--Regtl met 0 , 79th Inf Div.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 76 2 5 OCT 1944
a t t l e m e r i e n c e s * a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e ~ e r m a n si n =ope, g l t h o u g h , t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a11 s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recanrmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems, Beports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y o f t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e ieason may be determined..

By command of Lieutenant General 8118DLgY:

C. R. LBNDrn
Colonel, AGD
~ d j u t a n tGeneral
...........................................
Note: The following m a t e r i a l i s e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t of Hq E 1 1 Corps an8 i s a study
of t h e methods employed and t h e technique developed by t h r e e inf diva. Other d i s c u s s i o n s
of t h i s e u b j e a t were published i n B a t t l e Experiences No..50 and 61,

1. Boundaries. * S t r e e t s formed t h e boundaries between u n i t s . I n some cases t h e

e n t i r e s t r e e t was included within t h e zone of a u n i t ; i n other c a s e s t h e boundariee were
drawn d o m t h e middle of t h e a t r e e t . Many ' f e l t t h a t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e s t r e e t
was immaterial, s i n c e no one dared use it.

2. Zones of a c t i o n . * p l a t s and sqda must be assigned d e f i n i t e groups of buildings.

Where t h e near s i d e of a c i t y block i s h e l d , one u n i t (sqd o r p l a t ) should be assigned.
t h e group of b u i l d i n g e on each s i d e of the block while a t h i r d u n i t remain8 on t h e f r i e n d -
l y s i d e of t h e block t o g i v e support by f i r e i n t o t h e windowe of t h e b u i l d i n g s on e i t h e r
s i d e , a c h aupport i s rexy necessary. If only two u n i t s a r e a v a i l a b l e one should remain
t o m p p o r t by f i r e . The blocks u s u a l l y form roughly a hollow square of b u i l d i n g s acroas
t h e c e n t e r of which t h e s u g p o r t i n g f i r e i s de'livered.. Bazookas, BARs, tm guns and the
SlYE &3 a r e e f f e c t i v e f o r such support.

3. Routes of advance, *Routes of advance f o r p l a t s and sqds varied. Hallways,

e t a i r r a y e , r o o f t o p s and b a 8 e m n t s were u e d . Sametimes i t was only necessary t o blow
two or t h r e e w a l l s i n an e n t i r e block of buildinge. It was found beet t o c r o s s s t r e e t s
n e a r t h e a e n t a r of blocks.. To make s u r e t h a t t h e doors of buildings a o r o a s t h e a t r e e t
were open, t h e l o c k s were s h o t away o r t h e doors b l a s t e d open w i t h bazooka o r ~3 grenades.
The s t r e e t was then f i l l e d w i t h trnroke fran RP hand grenades and t h e men dashed a c r o s s
under its c o r e r ,
 4. pew f i r i r s l ; p o s i t i o n e . .Sometimes a s i n g l e b r i c k was removed t o provide a loop-
hole f o r f i r i n g f r o = a basement. M;s l o c a t e d i n t h e upger s t o r i e s of b u i l d i n g s o f t e n
were a b l e t o g e t e f f e c t i v e f i r e from r i c o c h e t s on t h e s t o n e s t r e e t s .

5 . m t r y of build.ings, @ Af r o n t l i n e p l a t $dr f e l t t h a t i t was b e t t e r t o e n t e r t h e

lower f l o o r s of b u i l d i n g s-- f o r , i f neceseary, t h e b u i l d i n g could be burned from t h e
bottom -- and t h e ~ e r m & s could do t h e 8- i f o w t r o o p s were above. The p l a t l d r a l s o
found t h a t , when t h e ground f l o o r was c a p t w d , a f e w AP s h o t s frm t h e M-1 o r BatR through
t h e f l o o r 8 would u a u a l l y b r i n g t h e Gennans down r i c h t h e i r hag& up. The German p o i n t of
view was explained by a sgd l a r . %id he, 'The German q u i t s when we e n t e r t h e b u i l d i n g
he i s i n . Of course he could hold out f o r a while but he f i g u r e s our men might not p l a y
'Kamerad' i f he did. When he f i n d s himself surrounded he give8 up, When th6 Germane
held out i n t h e basement, a well-tamped charge of TNT on t h e f l o o r above usualby was
affective.

4. pemolitions. upole and s a t c h e l chapgeo were used g e n e r a l l y and were prepared by

t h e e n g r s is almost a l l cases. Care was necessary i n determining t h e amount of t h e charge
since it wae d i f f i c u l t t o e s t i m a t e the t h i c b e s s of t h e w a l l s , which averaged about 189,
Tna a few c&sesp a tss heavy charge brought t h e e n t i r e b u i l d i n g down i n t o i t s baaemen$,
4orming .an obstacle. O u r men were not i n j u r e d i n t h e s e c a s e s , s i n c e t h e y would always be
:wc o r t h r e e b u i l d i n g s back a t t h e t i m e of t h e explosion. One s o l u t i o n t o t h i a problem
l a y i n p l a c i n g t h e charges i n f i r e p l a c e s where t h e heavier s i d e walls of t h e f i r e p l a c e
would prevent c o l l a p s e of t h e w a l l s ,

7. p m o l i t i o n teams. "A d P men were a t a premium a s advance was l i m i t e d by t h e

number of demolition teams a v a i l a b l e , The f r ~ n lt i n e t r o o p s joined with t h e men from
b e A & p p l a t s t o form demolition teemsp One uait r e p o r t e d t h a t i f the $ & P p l a t s e n t
down a four-man team, f o u r three-man teams were formed, using one A & P man i n each,

8. Burning buildin-. a m i l d i n g s were s e t a f i r e w i ~ h8 h m WP shells, but only as a

l a s t r e s o r t because t h i s l e f t e d i f f i c u l t o b s t a c l e , Such f i r e s were s e t a t n i g h t s o a s
r o t t o i n t e d e r e with d a y l i g h t combat,

9. Relief of u n i t s . none co comb- recommended t h a t t h e r e l i e f of a f o r z a r d c o , be

accomplished i n daylighb. Re p o i n t e d out t h a t r o u t e s forward l e d through basements,
around b u i l d i n g s , through h o l e s i n ' a a l b s , and over half-demolished walls. I f men were
brought t o t h e i r s t a t i o n s d u r i n g darkness, t h e y had no i d e a what they s e r e g ~ a r d i n gagainst,

10. I n t e r p r e t e r s , 'The uee of men who could speak German t o c a l l 1 upon small group8
t o surrender proved extremely valuable. One s g t s s a b i l i t y t o speak German r e s u l t e d i n
nany p r i s o n e r s being taken. A hundred and twenty men came o u t i n answer t o h i s c a l l s i n
two days and many smaller groups were s i m i l a r i y taken.

11. The 60m mortar s h e l l , "The 4 0 m rnort s h e l l was e x t e n s i v e l y used f o r d i r e c t f i r e

through wimlows, launched from r i f l e s by wiring t o t h e grenade p r o j e c t o r adapter bb-1.
(See B a t t l e Experiences No, 10)

12. A e r i a l photogr'aphe. RThere was a uniform d e s i r e f o r a e r i a l photographs i n quan-

t i t y and i t was pointed out t h a t they should be t a k e n almost d a i l y i n c i t y f i g h t i n g i f
t h e y a r e t o show a c c u r a t e l y which b u i l d i n g s remain."
 BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 77 26 OCT 1944
*Battle Experiences* a r e pvblished r ~ g u l a r l yby t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t frm the l a t e a t canbat experiences of ow: troops now
f i g h t i n g the Germins i n Europe. Although the experience^ of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are. not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i m a ,
the it- publiehed w i l l be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamnended
for c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of corroborative or contrary experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By caamend of U e u t e n a n t General BhBUUYs

c.R L
C. R . W 3 N
Colonel AGD
Adjutant General

I CALIBER 50 A N T I A I R W T FIRE OI\j GROUKD TBRGETS

.Note t The quadruple .50 c a l MG mount i n s t a l l e d i n t h e M-2 h a l f -track has b w n deeig-

m t e d the %f16~*.

1. With i n f a n t r g . U O n several occaeions rrhen there m e no a i r a c t i v i t y the ~ 1 6 ~

was teamed with the @an gun f o r auppart of i n f units, the N U ~ Ba c t i n g a e the prime
m m r ( f o r the 4Onm). The @mwould f i r e obtaining a i r burets a g a i n s t t r e e s , hedges,
building8 e t a . A t the conclusion af the f i r i n g t h e ~ 1 would 6 ~move the 4Omm out before
the enemy had tiue t o r e g i e z e r with mmt o r a r t y f i r e , covering the move with its c e l
.3O f i r e .
2. With annor. *me ~ 1 has 6 been
~ used e f f e c t i v e l y with tb t o p r o t e c t t h e i r r e a r
rhen t h e r e was a p o e e i b i l i t y t h a t the t k e might make a deep penetration and t h e i n f
would hare d i f f i u u l t y keeping up.

3. With a s t i l l e r v . *A p l a t of ~ 1 6 w~as8 providing p r o t e c t i o n for an a r t y bn on

a march when the columa w a s a t t a c b d by s a m 400 Germans. A t the end of a three-hour
battle a p g r a i m a t e l y 100 enemy were k i l l e d and 250 taken prisoner. There =re no cas-
u a l t i e e or damage t o the colulnn and the a r t y cam& gave much 3f the c r e d i t t o t h e pro-
t e c t i o n affarded by the AA unit.*--AM Notee No. 7. Twelfth Army Gp.

1. tank deatrqypr unite. .Atchd TD u n i t e are added t o our camarid chan-

n e l by a l l o c a t i n g t o them one of the three SCR 509 r a d i o s i n the mart p l a t . ~ & me a r t s
g e n e r a l l y are uaed i n b t r y , thus f r e e i n g a r a d i o far t h i s purpose.
2. F i r e contr_ol, "The channel nonnally taught aa cadmini8tratives i s use& by the
executive rho controle t h e f i n e of t h e m o r t s , a s e a u l t gune. a r t y , end of one of the
cos when i t farms p a r t of the baee of f i r e . He i s a l s o charged with e f f e c t i n g the
f o r l ~ a r dd i s p l a c e m n t of t h e s e elements a 8 necessary, and ha8 found t h i s chennel g r e a t l y
f a c i l i t a t e s h i s control.---C0, 68th hnnd Bn.

1. Use of base e l e c t i o n s h e l l . .Base e j e c t i o n smoke s h e l l s which were s e t f c r a

200 yd h e i g h t of b u r s t , were found t o burn with a b r i g h t l i g h t a l l t h e r a y t o t h e grourd
and t o continue burning f o r a period after landing. When f i r e d over German f r o n t l i n e
p o s i t i o n s simultaneously with a few s h o t s frcm a f l a r e p i s t o l * they caused t h e confused
Cermags t o f i r e t h e i r SA i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s s a p p a r e n t l y cer',ain they were being att8cked.q
--Lt , 8 4 t h FA Bn.

2 . Simultaneous missions f i r e d by an a i r obeer-. *An a r t y a i r obsr while begin-

ning an adjustment on enemy tks s a x f o u r P-47s banbing o t h e r tke. An enemy AA b t r y ma
f i r i n g on t h e P-4'7s and preventing e f f e c t i v e banbing by them. Continuing h i s adjustment
on t h e t k s , t h e obsr c a l l e d f o r the f i r e of another bn on the -4.A b t r y . Both missions
were conducted simultaneously, the obsr g i v i n g h i s eenaibgs and ccnnnands f i r s t f o r one
and th+n f o r t h e o t h e r u n t i l t h e t k s were knocked out 'and the AA b t r y neutra1imd.m--FA
Report, V I I Corps,

3. Cooperation, @A system of d e l i r e r i n g simultaneous c o u n t e r b a t t e r y f i r e f r m two

d i r e c t i o n s has been devised by t h e VII and XIX C a r p a r t y s , both usiw TCrr f i r e . In-
creased e f f i c i e n c y is a l s o obtained f r a n c o o r d i n a t i o n of 0bsn.n--EX 0 , XIX Corps Arty.

IV ' 2 U A R ~ W
TIPS
~

1. p n n e r f r a u water cans, *In t h e k i a r e a mess g e a r cleaning cans s h o l l d not be

f i l l e d and l e f t uncovered overnight, w a t e r - f i l l e d cans w i l l r e f l e c t f l a r e s dropped
d u r i n g a i r r a i d s l i k e mirrors.

2. D a t i n n f o r ueraonal e f f e c t s . *Tie uee the f i b e r c o n t e i n e r s of grenades and am

up t o 155mm t o s h i p personal belongings of evacuated personnel t o t h e E f f e c t s Quarter-
master, The o ~ l yother m a t e r i a l s needed a r e tape and address l a b e l s ,

3. Use of w r a ~ u i n g sand cans. *The waterproof wrapping of Class I1 c l o t h i n g m k e s

a n e x c e l l a n % l i n e r f a - dugouts an2 s l i t t r e n c h e s , Cardboard from the 10-in-one r a t i o n ,
makes a 8 a h i t a r y f l o o r l n t h e f i e l d Icier--29th C#d Co.

1. & e l messaaes. *The importance of t r a i n i n g i n o r a l messadeu cannpt be over-

stressed. They are used time and a g a i n i n t h e f r o n t l i n e s asld they rnust-be passed on
aacurate1y.e--0's and EM, Co K* 358th Inf Regt.

2. Cannon R e c o i l System. OA day t o day check of t h e r e c o i l systems on our cannon

i n a w e s t h e proper f u n c t i o n i n g r e g a r d l e s s of the am charges t h a t a r e usedew--C0, Cav
Co, 1 1 t h I n f Regt.

EM)
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No.78 27 OCT 1944
n g a t t l e Experiencesn a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n ~ b l e
u n j t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l t i t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Cernans i n m o p e . Although t h e e x c e r i e n c e s of c e r t t i i n u n i t s et a
p a r t i c u l a r 1oct:tion a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p ~ l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n e l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c b i c u l experience anci a r e reco=~ended
f o r c a r e f u l c ~ n s i d e r a t i o nby u n i t s ochich m y encounter similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x k e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o o may be c e t e r a i n e d .

Ey cornnand of Lie;ltenunt General E!.%2m:

C. R. M:WN:
Colonel, AGD
Ad j u t a t General

I GETI??&J PIGEOIJ dSElVICE FROM LIEmLTED AREAS.

1, General, information has been received t h a t Geman agents a r e t r a n s m i t t i n g

i n f o r n a t i o n from behind ~ l l i e dl i n e s t o %?many by means of pigeons. morn snall l o f t s
behind t h e l i n e s messages a r e c a r r i e d by t h e s e pigeons t o l a r g e r more c e n t r a l l y l o c a t e d
l o f t s from ~ h i c ht h e information is r e - t r a n s m i t t e d t o Gerrnany by w i r e l e s s . The mtijor-
i t y of t h e c&rman b i r d s c a r r y on t h e i r l e g - r i n g s t h e marking lViehnmchtl o r 'Wehrmcht
3 r i e f t a u b l e 1 b e s i d e s s e v e r a l numbers. Additional b i r d s commandeered from France,
Belgium and H o l l m d have o t h e r markings,

2. R a r n i v , . " ~ 1 1personnel a r e cautioned t o c a p t u r e o r M11 pigeons t h a t a r e sus-

pected of being c a r r i e r s of t h e s e messages.n--7th Armd Div p e r i o d i c r e p o r t .

1, P o s i t i o n s f o r towed guns, T h e r e i s a f e e l i n g i n m y towed TD u n i t s t h a t t h e y

should be f a r back behind t h e i n f l i n e t o ' s t o p a breakthrough1. I n c e r t a i n t y p e s of
t e r r a i n , defense of r e v e r s e slopes i s e s s e n t i a l . Guns t o o f & behind t h e MLR &e use-
l e s s , f o r i f a breakthrough occurs t h e enemy i s intermingled n i t h our own t r o o p s and
TDs cannot f i r e . preakthrou&hs must be prepared f o r l o c a l l y --
not i n a r e d s 1800 t o
2500 yds t o t h e rear.n--4th Armd Div LIem,

2 . h:ovement of towed guns i n t o f i r i n t i ; p o s i t i o n , nIn n a y c a s e s t h e towed 3 n gun

cannot be p u l l e d i n t o p o s i t i o n by t h e p r i m mover beczuse o f t h e d a g e r of drawing
enemy f i r e . To avoid manhandling t h e gun, we r e i n f o r c e d t h e jeep f r o n t bumper, m u t e d
a p i n t l e on t h e f r o n t of t h e jeep and pushed. t h e gun i n t o p o s i t i o n . n--CO, 644th TD i3n ( s p )

n s u b s t i t u t e s f o r BA-40 b a t t e r i e s f o r 600 s e r i e s r a d i o s ctin Se made by t a p i n g to-

g e t h e r f o u r BA-2s stacked two h i g h , two BA-23s placed alongside them, and a p l h t e
- 1 -
plug from an o l d BA-40 added t o t h e t o p of t h e stack.
and t h e BA-23s i n perallel.9--Corn 0, 1 2 t h Inf Regt . The Bh-2s a r e connected i n s e r i e s

1. German tanks v r i l l a t t a c k a t n i ~ h t . nOn one occasion t h e Germans launched a t k -

inf a t t a c k a t night over muddy p o u n d a g a i n s t our p o s i t i o n . After t a k i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e
the t k s aithdrew before d a y l i g h t l e a v i n g t h e i r inf t o hold the ground. A counterattack
r e s t o r e d our p o s i t i o n .

2. The a t t a c k . *The r.ermans sprayed t h e a r e a with f i r e and used star s h e l l s and

f l a r e s i n an attempt t o f r i g h t e n our troops. The enemy t k s were not road bound but .
maneuvered across country r a c i n g t h e i r engines and r i i l l i n g around t o cause ctinfusicn
among o u r i n f . Our i n f f i r e d ILGs a t t h e sound of the t k s and the sparks from r i c o c h e t s
l o c a t e d them s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r t h e TD8 t o f i r e . One German S? gun was knocked out i n
t h i s mnnner.n--C0, 813th TD Bn.

V DEF!iTNST OF i;IVISICIU' COMILJJD POST.

1. Organization. H A C? defense bn of e i g h t cos has been f o m d from bersonnel
of d i v hq, s p e c i a l t r o o k s , and atchd troops. Bn s t r e n g t h i s 1550 0s and EX. Snch co
has f o u r r i f l e p l a t s and one wpns h l a t . '@ns p l a t s employ .SO c a l IGs, Bofors of
u n i t s , &5ls (quadruple mount .50 c a l AA h1W) and t h e 57s of the defense p l a t . There
i s a s i g p l a t from the d i v s i g personnel i n one co; another co has a T p l a t from ?&I
co; and t h e rcn co i s made up of TD bn hq using s c c u t cnrs and 4-ton t r k s .

2. Training. nTraining was conducted d a i l y f o r t h r e e weeks and each u n i t dug i n

and organized i t s p o s i t i o n s . Now t h o t p o s i t i o n s nre organized thoroughly and per-
sonnel t r a i n e d , one a l e r t period p e r week is held."--CG, 8 t h Inf Div.

1. s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . *To reduce confusion i n FDC corn i n s t a l l a t i o n , we h w e housed

t h e s-3, HCO, VCO, and computers i n one t e n t and used a system which g i v e s u s the
f e a t u r e s of a switchboard without t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r an operator.

2. I n s t a l l a t i o n . *T+ielve phones a r e placed s i d e by s i d e i n a wooden carrying case

.--these phones a r e a s f o l l o w s , one simplexed phone t o each of the t h r e e f i r i n g b t r y s ,
one remote c o n t r o l phone t o each of t h e t h r e e b t r y r a d i o s e t s i n con with t h e FOs, one

-
remote c o n t r o l phone t o t h e sCR 608 a t bn, one phone f o r use with any s u ~ p o r t i n go r
atchd a r t y , two l i n e s t o t h e bn switchboard, one t o the d i v a r t y FX and one t o the cn
co f o r use v:hen a c t i n g a s an a r t y btry. Atchd t o the s i x phones t h a t a r e used t h e
most is a s m a l l bulb t h o t l i g h t s when t h e phone r i n g s , t h u s simplifying t h e i d e n t i f i -
c a t i o n of +he incoming c a l l . The wires from t h e 12 phones run through a 1 2 c i r c u i t
c a b l e of s h o r t length t o t h e o u t s i a e of t h e t e n t where they a r e atchd t o a terminal
s t r i p . A f i v e p a i r csble r u n s from the t e r m i n a l s t r i p t o the bn switchboard l i n k i n g
t h e t h r e e oimplexed phones and t h e two d i r e c t l i n e s . Radio o p e r a t o r s a t c h t h e i r own
remote c o n t r o l wires t o t h e t e r m i n a l s t r i p .

3. ~ o d i f i c u t i o n e . *Two a d d i t i o n a l modifications have been r e c e n t l y i n s t a l l e d

which have proved very h e l p f u l .
a. *TWO plugs from a head-and-chest s e t were connected and used t o bridge any two
phones .so t h a t m y one c a l l i n g i n may be put i n com by w i r e o r r a d i o with any obsr.
b. "A loudspeaker was atchd t o t h e SCR 608 t h u s enabling a l l FIX: ~ e r s o n n e lt o
hear c a l l s f o r f i r e missions, p a r t i c u l a r l y those o r i g i n a t i n g with l n 0s. the time
t h e m e s s w e has been 'Rogeredl by t h e FIX 0 , the HCO aria VCC have p l o t t e d the t a r g e t
and d a t a is on t h e way t o t h e computers. Also a l l personnel were a b l e t o hear the
p r g r e s s of t h e missions and the e t u on t h e targ tam"-Report of 1 1 t h FA h. -END-
- 2 -
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 7 9 31 OCT 1944

.Battle Experiences' a r e published r e g u ~ u r l yby t h i s headquarters t o enable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r m t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germam i n Europe. ALthough t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamnended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be determined.

By canmand of Lieutenant General BRADIEYs

@.
C.
R &dS-K/
He LAIiOON
Colonel e AGD
Ad j u t a n t General

I A R T I U Y EXPEXUENCES WRING THZ REDUCTION OF BHE;=;T.

1. Oruanization of = t i - l l e r v f i r e s f o r con ti nu in^ o ~ e r a t i o n si n an a r e a . a. ~ m r g e t s
i n an o p e r a t i o n of t h i s type remain r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d . S t was found advisable t o a s s i g n
a concentration number t o each t a r g e t a s soon as i t was l o c a t e d , and t o publish a l i s t
of these c o n c e n t r a t i o n s t o a l l u n i t s t o be p l o t t e d on f i r i n g c h a r t s . This e l i m i n a t e d the
d u p l i c a t i o n of c o n c e n t r a t i o n numbers on t h e same t a r g e t and f u r n i s h e d a common r e f e r e n c e
system f o r a l l u n i t s .
b a 'Additions t o the list were published d a i l y a s new t a r g e t s or c o r r e c t e d l o c a t i o n s
of o l d t a r g e t s were given. The targets i n each d i v a r e a were grouped d a i l y , a code name
assigned each group, and a f i r e plan published a s s i g n i n g t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s t o bns. The
f i r e p l a n scheduled each concentration t o be f i r e d with a one bn volley. The tj.me neces-
aary t o f i r e through the plan was i n d i c a t e d on the schedule.
c a When i n f was t o follow the f i r e * , the d i v a r t y c a l l e d f o r the a p p r o p r i a t e pre-
p a r a t i o n by code word through the corps a r t y F3C. The voluae of f i r e could be increased
a s d e s i r e d by r e q u e s t i n g double or t r i p l e t h e b a s i c r a t e on each concentration.
d. *It w a s . found t h a t b u i l d i n g s , even though f o r t i f i e d , should n o t be destroyed by
heavy a r t y u n l e s s t h e d i r e c t support a r t y could maintain n e u t r a l i z a t i o n u n t i l t h e i n f
a s s a u l t e d the a r e a . I f t h e f i r e was l i f t e d the Gernzans would move back i n a d c o n s t r u c t
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s from the r u b b l e which were o f t e n h m d e r t o reduce than the a r i g i n a l b u i l d -
i n g s would have been.

2. P a r a s s i n g f i r e s . .PW r e p a r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t i n t e r m i t t e n t h a r a s s i n g f i r e had l i t t l e
e f f e c t on t r o o p s grovided with adequate c o v e r , even when t h e f i r e pons f r a n heavy a r t y .
A s soon a s t h e t r o o p s were convinced t h a t t h e i r cover was adequate occasional rouuds d i d
not d i s t u r b t h e i r n o m l routine.

3. G i v i l i a n r e p o r t s . *Friendly c i v i l i a n s were g e n e r a l l y unabie t o give p r e c i s e

l o c a t i o n s on a map but were f r e q u e n t l y able t o pin-point l o c a t i o n s on a photograph.

4. Shellreps. 11t is not reasonable t o expect t r o o p s under f i r e t o t u r n i n camylett:

I
-.
.
"
.
-
I , -- ,w;B
s h e l l r e p s . As i n previous o p e r a t i o n s continuous pressure was required t o g e t t h i s i o f o r -
mation t o a s s i s t our c o u n t e r b a t t e r y f i r e . '--TrITI Corps u t y r e p o r t .

1. BscaDe hatch. 'The amount of TIJT needed t o blow p i l l b o x e s can be considerably

reduced i f the escape hatches can be found and plugged L'irst. These h a t c h e s , found i n

.
n e a r l y a l l p i l l b o x e s , a r e ebout two f e e t square and p l a s t e r e d over s o a s t o be s c a r c e l y
noticeable

2 * y e n t i l a t i o n p i ~ e s . apillbaxes have been blown e f f e c t i v e l y by p u t t i n g cha.rgeu

i n t h e v e n t i l a t i o n pipes which run v e r t i c a l l y through t h e s i d e walls near the p i l l b o x
e n t r a n c e . F i r s t the b o t t a n s of the pipes a r e plugged. then 30-50 l b s of IT dropped i n .
primed and tamped. I n one case the f i r i n g of t h e charge breached the wall caupletely
and s u r v i v i n g occupants were e i t h e r stunned or wounded by f l y i n g concrete.

.
3 1,Yelding embrasure openinas with therrni t e menades. *By c l o s i n g the door and
p l a c i n g t h e grenade on t h e slideway a mass i s farvled which prevents the door being opened.
The door i t s e l f i s not welded but i s j m e d by the o b s t r u c t i o n i n the slideway. m e
grenade is s u f f i c i e n t f o r smll doors but two should oe used on l a r g e doors with a r n o r
p l a t e t h i c k e r than two inches. I f the grenade cannct be placed i n t h e slideway a trough
of fr i n c h m e t a l may be used t o cause molten m i t e r i a l t o r u n i n t o the slideway. The s u r -
face on which the weld i s t o be made should be clean and dry. Doors t h a t work on h i ~ e s
cannot be welded with t h e r m i t e grenades a s t h e molten m a t e r i a l cannot be c o n t r o l l e d suf -
f i c i e n t l y t o make a s t r o n g band between the doar and the f r a m . * - - ~ s s t G-3, V Curps.

Note r The following c m n t s r e g a r d i n g replacements were made by an o who has ccm-

mended t h e same r i f l e c o through 16 months s e r v i c e i n I c e l a n d , 10 months I n Lingland and
I r e l a n d and f i v e months i n the presees r P r r r p 7 g n o

l o The old s o l d i e r s a t t i t u d e , T b s replacement is d e a l t off t o a l l orgns l i k e a

card f r a n a deck. he o l d - t i m r s look h5m u? aod d o m and go back t o t h e i r own c i r c l e .
The old-timers w i l l always ignore a r e c r u i t . This i s bad psycho log^. The new boy may
be f i g h t i n g Germans w i t h i n the next 30 nrinutes o r i n one or two days.

il* Common replacement f a u l t s :

a. UHe w i l l s a y 'yeah' i n s t e a d of "Ysc
b. Every a r t y s h e l l makes him junp,
c. He is slow t o shoot. He has been t o l d t o hold h i s f i r e and not give away h i s
position. T h i s is wrong. I f you s e e the enemy, shoot him whether you give away your
p o s i t i o n ar not.
d. His p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n i s not s o bgcde
e e He l a c h p r i d e .
f . He i s a 'buncher'.
g. H8 won't moveo
h. He won't t a k e c a r e of h i s e q u p n e n t :
i. He ha8 no knowledge of what m y be c a l l e d 'canbat s a n i t a t i o n 9 .*
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 80 31 OCT 1944
WBattle'meriencesH are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t ccabat experiences of our troops now
f i g h t i n g the Germans i n Europe. Althcugh the expsriences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

Ily comnculd of Lieutenant General BIWDLEY:

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad jut a n t General
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I s'!xEm FIGrnIEdG m UCm.

1. Reason8 f o r success. Tine CO of a r e g t which fought through Aachen a t t r i b u t e d
h i s success t o s e v e r a l f a c t o r s :
a,. a v a i l a b l e f i r e power, common sense, and normal t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s were
employed.
b. nThe operation was not unduly h u r r i e d ; it was r e a l i z e d t h a t s t r e e t f i g h t i n g is
a slow, t e d i o u s process which r e q u i r e s much physical e x e r t i o n and time i f buildings are
searched thoroughly.
c. *The eneqy was f o r c e d t o f i g h t on our terms. A t every opportunity we would
a t t a c k from the d i r e c t i o n he l e a s t expected. We would f i r s t i s o l a t e 8 small s e c t i o n ,
then leave a s m a l l holding group, and work around t o t h e r e a r .

2. Value of mppinp; up thorouffhly. " A t no time a w i n g t h e o p e r ~ z i o ndid t h e enenly

f i r e a s h o t fram behind our l i n e s . To accomplish t h i s , every room and c l o s e t of every
b u i l d i n g was searched and every sewer was blown. It p a i d dividends because f i g h t i n g
t-8 d i d n ' t have t o f e a r b e i n g sniped a t from t h e r e a r , and command and supply person-
n e l functioned more e f f i c i e n t l y .

3. s u p p o r t i w weapons. mTo avoid d e t e c t i o n we put the t k s , TDs and SP guns i n t o

p o s i t i o n j u s t before d a y l i g h t o r a t dusk. We had t h e engrs and t h e pion p l a t blow a
hole i n t h e n e a r wall of a b u i l a i n g . We then r a n t h e gun through t h i s h o l e i n t o t h e
building and f i r e d through a n o t h e r hole i n t h e opposite w a l l j u s t large enough f o r t h e
gun b a r r e l .

4. Enemy f i r e . the enemy covered a l l avenues of approach with AT guns and used
h i s t k s and Sps as roving guns i n c o n s t a n t l y changing p o s i t i o n s . Their 120mm morts
were used e f f e c t i v e l y a t 400 yds and were d i f f i c u l t t o locate.8--C0, 26th Inf Regt.
 *Valuable road and bridge information can be obtained quickly by simply changing
the c r y s t a l i n t h e SCR 510 on the rcn p l a t i - t o n so it cos conununicate with t h e a r t y
In plane.#--3rd ~ r m dInf En.

I11 TANF.ZRS USE GRENADES AND TL.Ui3 T R H C m .

'In t h e absence of id,t k s have made e f f e c t i v e use of hand grenades t o c l e a r t h e

e n e w from entrenchments and p l a c e s of conoealment. On enemy defensive p o s i t i o n s the
t k s run along the entrenchments and drop i n the grenades. fdong roads the grenades a r e
tossed i n t o foxholes or suspected positions, thus discouraging the enemy use of bazooka
and AT grenades. Each t k c a r r i e s t e n o r more grenades f o r t h i s purpose. W e have a l s o
found flame t h r o a e r s on t k s e f f e c t i v e against enemy bazookas and personnel placed along
s i d e the road.*--C0, 70th Tk %,

1. Use of l o c a l materials, 'Supply rcn by our 5-14 has f a c i l i t a t e d g e t t i n g consider-

able q u a n t i t i e s of v i t a l engr materials. With c i v i l i a n cooperd t i o n , our group now oper-
a t e s four eawnills and a r o l l i n g m i l l , which cut lumber and provide I-beams t o our spec-
i f i c a t i o n s . we haul the loge t o the m i l l f o r cutting.

2. Standard bridges. "A 400 f t , two-way c l a s s 40 (one-way c l a s s 70) bridge using

I-beam s t r i n g e r s , has proved t o be a standard type f o r most purposes. Each bn has
s h i f t e d i t s basic loads t o permit carrying s u f f i c i e n t m a t e r i a l f o r one of these bridges.
Additional m a t e r i a l f o r t h e i r maintenance i s c a r r i e d i n t h e group dump.*--S-4, 1137th
lmgr moup.

V INFANTRY-TANK COOPW;rTION.

N I B i n s u r e coordinhtion between inf and t k s by requiring our NCOs and p l a t ldrs t o

get together with the t k NCOs and p l a t l d r s and t a l k over t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s . Each man
is allowed t o express h i s o:)inion and a s a r e s u l t we g e t b e t t e r cooperation betreen
units..*--Capt, 41st A n d I d ,

VI SOW LEADER 'S mcEt

q a c h man should be a l e r t t o pick up a r t y t a r g e t s and t o send the information back
t o the a r t y FO s o f i r e can be brought down on them. This a l s o holds true when enemy
a r t y is f i r i n g . It is f o o l i s h t o take a r t y f i r e and not t r y t o locate t h e guns s o the
f i r e can be returned."--Sqd Ldr, CO I, Ust Armd Inf.

VII IMPROPEFl EWLOY?@Nl' OF TANYS.

"fnstances of improper employment of t k s with inf u n i t s have been observed r e c e n t l y

a8 a r e s u l t of the following practices:
a. *Specifying SOP assignrnants f o r mpyorting t k s which break down t k u n i t s t o the
extent t h a t t h e employment of t k s i n mass and depth is not possible.
b. r m l o y i n g t k s under conditions b r a t k crewa did not have v i s i b i l i t y even a s
f a r a s enemy bazooka range.

amp loyment of ~ p n s
d,
.
c. "Using tka t o draw f i r e along r o u t e s which offered no place f o r maneuver and

having t k s occupy exposed p o s i t i o n s f o r long periods of time without inf yro-

teotion.
6. moperating t k dozers with ewa.
f , 'Bqloying t k s a s f i x e d p long periods of time, thus
v i o l e t ing t h e p r i n c i p l e of f i r e excessive f i r e s upon nearby
inf,'--xx corps Memo. - - m - 2 -
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 81 31 OCT 1944

" B t t l e m e r i e n c e s * a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s heedquarters cc enable

u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e lctest cocbat ex&erler;ces s f our troo;ls n,,m
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n m o p e . Although t h e experience3 cT c e r t a i n u l t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o all u n i t s i n a l l Y i t u E i t i c ~ ~ l a .
the items published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e r ~ e r i e n c ew d are reccmcended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encoun'er a i d lar ~ r o b l e m s Re; o r t s .
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t n a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s ? o n rnay be determined.

By command of W e u t e n a n t General BRADLEY:

C. R . L A h W J
Colorlel, S L j
Adjutant General
...........................................
I DESTRUCTION OF P U q Y I S BY 1551vE GUN S T , M-12.

-
1. Method of a t t a c k . #Our bn a t t a c k e d 43 p i l l b o x r s by s h o r t range NU2 f i r e . 'Se
a d j u s t e d v l t h d e l a y f u z e s chancing t o f u z e T105 on obtaininc; a h i t , Evidence of Iene-
t r a t i o n was obtained on a l l t a r g e t s .

2. Conclusions* a. "EPfective d e s t r u c t i o n of a p o i n t t a r g e t debenus 611 range tlnd

not whether t h e nethod of f i r e i s d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t . When it is posvible t o use s h u r t
range i n d i r e c t f i r e by t h e exi;enaituz.e of two o r t h r e e rounds for a d j u s t n e s t , t h i s
should be done* n o gun8 were l o s t occupying p o s i t i o n s f o r d i r e c t f i r e ; none was h i t
employing i n d i r e c t f i r e .
b, *HE s h e l l with fuze T l @ does not o b t a i n i t s m i r m a c e f f c c t l v e n e s s a t ranges
under 2000 yds i f supercharge i s used,. m i d a n c e e x i s t s t h t rihen the teruunhl v e l o c i t y
is excessive the s h e l l begins t o b h a t t e r s l i g h t l y before :he delay f u z e c~j.erates. Thla
w a s e l h i a a t e d ~y f i r i n g normal :barge i ~ a c e a dof s u ~ e r c k a r g ea t s h o r t ran,ea, t$ith
very l i t t l e i n s t n c t i o n the gunner can be t a w h t t o employ the a i r e c t L a y i x s i g h t ,
graduated f o r suy;ercharge, m i t h normal chnrge .*--258th FA I3n.

I1 b a M YOUR W W O M COUNT.
* w i n g 'rest p e r i o d s ' wpns & r e rnzeroed and a l - pervonnel nse t r a i n e d with the
bazooka if p o s s i b l e . ~t 200 yds with a r i f l e and 75 yds with a bazooka our boys c a n
handle anything Terry can o f f e r . Longer ranges t o s often a r e a t t e n ~ t e i iwhen p a t i e n c e
would mean a c e r t a i n ' k f l l ' ,a--53d A r m d Inf 31,4 t h krmd Div,

Cmssee of v i t a l ord c a t e r i n 1 can be reylticed i n 75% less tirce i f the loasez are
r e p o r t e d t o t h e d i v ord 0 by t h e f a s t e s t means a v a i l a b l e . We u s e r a d i o when wire i s
'
not a v a i l ~ b l e . we a l e 0 f i n d t h a t Sup s g t s can keep b e t t e r infonosd on ',he sup st:?tus
- 1 -
by t r a v e l i n g with t h e i r u n i t e r a t h e r than with t h e trainor--53d &rPd 1n.f Bn, 4 t h drmd D~V.

TV TANK DBSPROYW IBbPLOYMIWl'.

mote: The following c m e n t s were made i n an a f t e r combat d i s c u s s i o n conducted f o r p l a t
ldrs and TD coadrs of t h e 703d TD a. Theae men had used t h e M-10 TD8s w i t h considerable
auccssa, d e s t r o y i n g 34 t k s , 12 SP guns and numerous t r k s . p i l l h j x e e , e t c , wMle l o s i n g
only t h r e e TDs. It i s noteworthy t h a t comnsnts of t h e s e battle-experienced men p r i n -
c i p a l l y re-emphasized e x i s t i n g t a c t i c a l doctrine.

1. Tar~ets. a. *On en- i n f u s e HE, fuze delay, and aim s l i g h t l y s h o r t . Rico-

c h e t s w i l l o f t e n cause low a i r bursts over t h e enemy.
b. "Use t h e .5O c a l MG on thin-skinned v e h i c l e s up t o 300 yds. rjver t h a t d i s t a n c e
use t h r e e inch HE.
c. "Range cards a r e s t i l l necessary. G e t exact r a n g e s f r c u ~th. xa; i n d a y l i g h t ,
and i f p o s s i b l e , z e r o i n on c r i t i o a l p o i n t s and record t h e d a t a ,

2. Movement. rMove i n t o p o s i t i o n slowly. 'The v e h i c l e can be b e t t e r c o n t r o l l e d

.
and b e t t e r prepared t o f i r e . F a ~ tmovement a t t r a c t s a t t e n t i o n and eauses considerable
noim

3. Ordere. r 0 r d e r s must be complete and p r e c i s e , and givsn with an a i r of confi-

dence. Too o f t e n t h e y l a c k t h e informetion necessary f o r even a simple operation.

4. Personnel, a. # A w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d o u t f i t goes f a r t h e r with fewer l o s s e s . Even

a t t h e f r o n t the d i s c i p l i n e d o u t f i t i s marked by i t s morale, pride of u n i t , s a l u t i n g ,
appearance and wearing of the uniform.
b. #New men should be thoroughly o r i e n t e d and put a t ease as soon a s they join an
o u t f i t . The3 mst be made t o f e e l t h a t they are an important p a r t of t h e crew.
c. *The best p l a c e t o g e t away from mort and a r t y f i r e is i n t h e M-10:TD. A long
s l i t t r e n c h under t h e h u l l w i l l a l s o make e x c e l l e n t p r o t e c t i o n f q t h e whole crew.

5. B l u i ~ m e n t . a. *Keep your equipment on t h e v e h i c l e s o you can move quickly.

b. * F i e l d g l a s s e s can be used e f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e moonlight.
2. .Always completely d e s t r o y an enemy v e h i c l e before you leave i t .

6. S e c u r i t y . a. he s e c u r i t y o u t p o s t s f o r m a d blocks should have wire cam t o

t h e guns.
b. "When MGs a r e d i s m - u t e d f o r s e c u r i t y work, d i g them in. The tendency is t o
throw t h e gun on t h e ground and f o r g e t about it.
c. OLearn more about booby t r a p s and inines, and f o r g e t about t h e souvenirs, '

d. *If you have no i n f support a t n i g h t , pick a p o a i t i o n with open f i e l d s t o t h e

f r o n t . Then put your outpost out q u i t e a ways and g e t t h e a r t y t o p r e p a r e a f i r e p l a n
f o r the frcnt.r

1. Planning a r t i l l e r y f i r e s . r I n planning a t t a c k s our i n f and a r t y comdrs g e t to-

g e t h e r and p l a n f i r e s f o r t h e a t t a c k , and defensive f i r e s a f t e r t h e o b j e c t i v e i s reached.
a f t e r t a k i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e i t pays dividends t o mass a r t y f i r e on a l l sounds and observed
movement, a s t h i s w l l l prevent r e o r g a n i z a t i o n by t h e enemy. On one occasion we broke up
a c o u n t e r a t t a c k by f i r i n g a t sounds coming from t h e woods.

2. A r t i l l e r y s u p ~ o r tof n i ~ h tr i v e r c r o s s i n ~ s . *We p l a n only defensive f i r e s f o r

a n i g h t r i v e r c r o s s i n g f o r i f the c r o s s i n g i s not discovered there is no need f o r f i r e .
Pie have been extremely s u c c e s s f u l with t h i s procedure."--COO 46th FA Bn, 5 t h Inf ~ i v .
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 82 2 NOV 1944
* B a t t l e Brperiencesm a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o e n a b l s
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops now
f l g h t l n g t h e Germane i n Europe. Although t n e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a ~ p l i c a b l et o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n e ,
t n e items published K i l l be tnose based on 1 , r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended
f o r c a r e f u l considerat i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e ~ o r t s
of corroborative o r c o n t r a r y e m e r i e n c e s a r e p%rticularly d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y o r t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may tie determined.

By conmand of Lieutenant General BRAI)LFY:

C. C. R. LhNDON
Colonel, AGD
Ad jutant General
.....................................................................................
I U S ? OF TfiX DESTROYERS.

1. Aggressiveness. 'The p r a c t i c e of holding TDs back --

t h e i n f going forward,
tnen the t k s , followed by t h e TDa --tends t o f o s t e r t i m i d i t y and lack of a g g r e s s i v e
a c t i o n . F l a t l e n d e r s and M-10 comdrs snould go forward with t h e i n f , l o c a t e e f f e c t i v e
f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s , and then have t h e i r v e h i c l e s brought forward.

2. E3nploymer:r; by j u i o r i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r s . l S e n i o r i n f 0 s g e n e r a l l y understand
t n e c o r r e c t use of TD but j u n i o r 0 s sometimes do not r e a l i z e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s and
l i m i t a t i o n s . For example, a s e c t i o n of T3s atchd t o an ~ n fp l a t was oruered i n t o im-
p o s s i b l e t e r r a i n where the- v e h i c l e s became hopelessly bogged d o ~ n . ~ - - C O ,b34th TD En.

3. ~ n f i i n t r y - t a n k d e s t r o y e r c o ~ i c a t i o n s . 'Inf cos and TD p l a t s must be t i e d i n

by wire, and by r a d i o i f i o s u i b l e , t o i n s u r e mutual support and coordination.

4. conceal in^ noise of a p ~ r o a c h . 'Arty f i r e placed on t n r e e enemy t k s caused

tnem t o buttcn up and prevented the enemy from hearing o u r TDs moving up. The TDs
knocked out a l l t h r e e t k s without 10ss.~--S-2. 813th TD Bn.

I1 USE GF KOOUED ; L R M JP; THE S I E G F R I E D LINE.

'Dense woods u s u a l l y were l e s s heavily defended than roads and more open t e r r a i n .
Frequently t a e en- has f a i l e d t o continue t h e l i n e of dragon's t e e t h tnrough woods
which appeared too dense f o r t k movement. I n most such c a s e s , t k s , w i t h i n f s u ~ p o r t ,
have been a b l e t o move through t h e woods. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of' t k HE f i r e i s increased
by the number of t r e e b u r s t s 0bta:ned.l--Report of 1st Div.
I I1 TANKS I N VILLAGE FLGHTINC.

Note r Oe and Dl of t h e 7 0 t h TSi Bn, which h a s fought its w a y f r m t h e beaches i n t o G e r -

many, make t h e f o l l o w i n g cannents on t k p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n v i l l a g e f i g h t i n g .

1. J k F i n ~t h e a ~ w ' o a c h . a. ahlain r o a d s ar ms n e a r s m a l l v i l l a g e s should be avoided

as t h e y a r e o f t e n mined and g e n e r a l l y have one o r mare r o a d blocks.
b. T h e enemy's f i r s t l i n e of defense has u s u a l l y been o u t s i d e t h e v i l l a g e . These
d e f e n s e s must n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o s e p a r a t e t h e t k s and i n f . I f t h e t b p a s s them ahead
of t h e i n f , t h e y became s u b j e c t t o . s h o r t - r a n g e AT f i r e , and cannot f i r e a t t h e by-passed
enemy w i t h o u t endangering our o m t r o o p s .
c. .A baee of f i r e should be f m e d wi.th t k s and other- d i r e c t f i r e wpns, while ad-
d i t i o n a l t k s e n c i r c l e t h e v i l l a g e and a t t a c k f r a n t h e f l a n k s .
d , Wken i n f are c a r r i e d on t k s , they should dismoimt b e f o r e e n t e r i n g a v i l l a g e .
.Yovrever, i n one n i g h t a t t a c k , t h e i n f remained on t h e t k s and f i r e d a t enemy ,on roof t o p s
and i n upper s t o r i e s of b u i l d i n g s .

2. Within t h e v i l l a g e . a. # I t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r i n f t o 'precede t h e t k a i n t o
small villages, b u t t h e y s h o r ~ l dremain a b r e a s t of or c l o s e behind them t o provide AT
protection.
b e * I f more t h a n one s t r e e t is a v a i l a b l e , p a r a l l e l a t t a c k 3 should be made. Narrow
s t r e e t s s h o u l d be a v o i d e d , as only t h e f i r e power of t h e l e a d i r g t k can be employed i n
them.
c. *Hand grenades were f m n d t o be of g r e a t value a s t k c a n d r s could throw them
through windows without l e a v i n g t h e t k , and scmeti~nescause t h e enemy t o e v a c u a t e b u i l d -
in8s. This t k am and i s l e s s dangerous t o our i n f t h a n use of t h e t k arpns.
d. *';P can be of g r e a t value i n v i l l a g e f i g h t i n g but a d e f i n i t e p l a n f o r i t s use
must be made before t h e a t t a c k b e g i n s , and e x p l a i n e d t o a l l elements. i'vF rounds should
h i t i n o r behind b u i l d i n g s . I f t h e y h i t i n f r a t t h e enemy can escape i n t h e smoke

t h e bui l d i ng .
without b e i n g seen. A round of 'NP w i l l u s u a l l y cause t h e enemy t o s u r r e n d e r o r l e a v e

e. %'here r e s i s t a n c e is s t u b b o r n , a l l b u i l d i n g s should be f i r e d upon and e i t h e r

burned o r d e s t r o y e d . Enem,)' s o l d i e r s o f t e n s e e k c w e r i n b u i l d i n g 8 , but a few rounds of
H 3 u s u a l l y w i l l b r i n g t h e s u r v i v o r s out.

3. G f t e r t h e a t t a c k . Both i n f and t k s should move out of a v i l l a g e as soon a s i t

h a s been t a k e n , t o avoid m a r t and a r t y f i r e .

IV MARKING TARGETS FOFi AIRCRAET.

"%'hen we use c o l o r e d smoke t o mark enemy t a r g e t s f o r a i r sugport , ollr a i r s u p p o r t

0 c o n t a c t s t h e p l a n e s and t h e a r t y t h a t is t o mark t h e t a r g e t . He g i v e s t h e ccmruand
t o f i r e when t h e planes r e a c h t h e t e r g e t a r e a and when t h e a r t y announces Ion t h e way'
t h e a i r s u p p o r t 0 r e p e a t s t h i s t o t h e p l a n e s s o t h a t t h e p i l o t s can watch f o r t h e b u r s t .
I n l e s s t h a n a minute f r m t h e time Ion t h e way' i s g i v e n t o the p l a n e s t h e t a r g e t i s
s a r k e d and t h e p l a n e s sweep i n f o r banbing o r s t r a f i n g o r hoth. *--G-3, 5 t h Div.

V USE Or" CAPTURED MTlLLEnY AMMUNIT1 ON.

"The p r o j e c t i l e of c a p t u r e d 10- am w i l l . f i t our s h e l l c s s e s and guns h u t t h e case

w i l l n o t . To u s e t h e c a p t u r e d am we have modified sane of our s h e l l c a s e s s o t h a t they
can be used over and over. The c a s e i s c u t down t o t h e s i z e of t h e C;eIznan c a s e and t h e
primer franl t h e G e r m c a s e i s renloved and screwed i n t o t h e American s h e l l c a s e . I t
r e q u i r e s a b o u t t h r e e hours t o c m p l e t e t h i s u i o d i f i c a t i o n . L - a r d 0 , >X Corps.
 BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No 83 5 NOV 1944
" B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s w a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t cambat e x p e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p s n o r
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n e ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and are r e c a n m e d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may e n c o u n t e r similar problems. Reporte
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d ' i n o r d e r that t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

By cammand of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l BRADLEY:

@. R. U a D O N
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant G e n e r a l
- - _ - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

NOTES OH WOODS FIGHl'ING

NmE: The m a t e r i a l i n p a r a g r a p h s one t o seven was e x t r a c t e d from an o p e r a t i o n s memo-

.
randum of 4 t h I d Div. P a r a g r a p h s e i g h t , n i n e and t e n were t a k e n Pram a r e p o r t of t h e
3 1 4 t h Inf Regt

1. O r g a n i z a t i o n . nEach a s s a u l t r i f l e c o may be o r g a n i z e d i n t o two assault groups

and two s u p p o r t groups. The a s s a u l t groups a r e mned oriy w i t h hand wpns m d grenades.
They normally advance i n column preceded by s c o u t s . The s u p p o r t group folZows i t s
a s s a u l t g r o u p w i t h i n t h e l i m i t of v i s i b i l i t y , p r o v i d e s f l a n k p r o t e c t i o n , and g i v e 8
s u p p o r t w i t h bOmm m o r t s and l i g h t ms. Reserve g r o u p s s h o u l d be h e l d far enough t o
t h e r e a r t o i n s u r e agannst t h e i r becoming i o v o l v e d i n t h e f i g h t of t h e a s s a u l t cos.
They a r e employed i n l o c a l i t i e s where t h e advance is s u c c e s s f u b . When employed, t h e y
s h o u l d be f u r n i s h e d g u i d e s and moved r a p i d l y o v e r p r e v i o u s l y r e c o n n o i t e r e d r o u t e s .

2, C o n t r o l . 6, n I n a i v i d u a l s are d e s i g n a t e d i n each a s e a u i t group t o m a i n t a i n

d i r e c t i o n by compass.
b. -Each a s s a u l t group keeps i n eom w i t h t h e co comdP by l a y i n g a piire l i n e a s it
advances. T h i s t i e s the a s s a u l t g r o u p t o g e t h e r and p r o v i a e s a r o u t e f o r m i e r s , am
c a r r i e r s m a l i t t e r b e a r e r s , The d i s t a n c e advanced can be determined e a s i l y i f t h e
w i r e l i n e is t a g g e d every 100 yda p r i o r t o startiq.
c. *Phase l i n e s are d e s i r a b l e t o p e r m i t t h e advance t o be made by bounds, t o pro-
v i d e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p e r i o d i c l a t e r a l c o n t a c t , and t o f a c i l i t a t e s u p p o r t i n g a r t y and
mort f i r e .

-
3. s e c u r i t y measures. a. #Roads, trails, c l e a r i n g s and b u i l d i n g s must & avoided
as t h e y u s u a l l y are included i n t h e enemy's p r e p a r e d f i r e p l a n ,
b. *Overhead c o v e r should be p r o v i d e d whenever p o s s i b l e . When h o l t i a g t e m p o r a r i l y
eagh man s h o u l d g e t c l o s e t o a large t r e e as t n i a a f f o r d s some g r o t e c t i o n from t r e e
b u r s t s , The d a n g e r from t r e e b u r s t s is somewhat l e s s e n e d by t h e enemy's l a c k of obsn.
 4. Antitank guns. nEnemy c o u t e r a t t a c k s can be expected a l o n g t h e r o u t e s t h o u g h
i ~ h i c hh i s r e s e r v e m r can be employed. AT guns should be leap-frogged forward t o
cover t h e s e probable r o u t e s of approach and n o t held i n r e s e m coupled t o t h e i r prime
movers. AT guns snould be emplaced s o a s t o ~ e r m i tf i r i n g w h i l e under m t y o r mrt
f i r e themselves.

5 Light tanks. n a & t t k s can be used e f f e c t i v e l y to s u p p o r t an a s s a u l t group

af%er c o n t a c t has been made, Time must be allowed f o r o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e t k p l a t l e s d -
e r s , and r c n and marking of t h e t k r o u t e t o t h e a r e a Psorn which t h e s s e a u l z i s to b e
made. The t k s lend t h e a s s a u l t , c l o s e l y followed by t h e a s s a u l t group. A l l t k wpns
a r e f i r e d and t h e accompanying i n f u s e a s s a u l t f i r e , advancine, r a p i d l y and making a s
much n s l s e a s p o s s i b l e . Each t k p l a t has atchd t o i t one i n f sqd, one e n g r mine removal
s q d , and a bazooka t e r n . A t e l e p h o n e is a f f i x e d t o t h e r e a r of e a c h t k and connected
w ~ t hthe t k i n t e r c o m u n i c a t i o n system, The sqd l e a d e r can r a k e c o n t a c t with t h e tk
comdr over t h e t e l e p h o n e and p o i n t o u t t a r g e t s w i t h t r a c e r r i f l e f i r e , Prearranged
p y r o t e c h n i c and smoke s i g n a l s o r h a d and arm s i g n a l s a l s o may be used.

6 , Enemy p o s i t i o n s . a. aConcrete f o r t i f i c a t i o n s encountered by e s s a u l t groups

should be c o n t a n e d by minimum p e r s o n n e l and a s p e c i a l t a s k f o r c e ~ i t thh e means f o r
reduction s e n t forward,
be WCletu'ings and f i r e b r e a k s a r e u s u a l l y s t r o n g l y o r g a n i z e d and should be g i v e n
s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t ion.

7. m e r g i n g from woods. prior t o debouchment s u p p o r t i n g wpns must be brought ups

a s u i t a b l e formation adopted, m d arrangements made f o r a r t y f i r e . These s t e p s should
be taken before reap,hiw~ t h e edge of t h e woods. The e x i t from t h e woods nay b e made
r a p i d l y o r by i n f i l t r a t i o n , depending upoe t h e amount of f i r e encountered. S c o u t s
should precede t h e debouchment by a t l e a s t 5 0 0 yds o r a s f a r as t h e next t e r r a i n mask.n

8. Tasks and t a n k d e s t r o y e p s , a W e have e f f e c t i v e l y used t k a and TDs i n woods,

both on and o f f r o a d s , They need sane t e r r a i n f e a t u r e t o g u i d e on nnd r e a s o n a b l y f i r m
and drgr ground. The sound of our t k s h a s a demoralizing e f f e c t on t h e Gelman s o l d i e r .

9. -horns. " m P smoke i s very e f f e c t i v e i n woods and t h e employment of

4.2 cml morts would be OF g r e a t value.
10. S t o ~ p i n j qc o u n t e r a t t a c k s , a. m&orts and SA F i r e a r e most effective i n s t o p p i n g
en- i n f c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . Morts, due t c t h e i r high t r a j e c t o r y , a r e not s u b j e c t t o the
d i f f i c u l ~ i e sof t h e a r t y and a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h e woods. Troops m a t coa-
c e n t r n t e SA f i r e s on s u s p e c t e d enemy l o c a l i t i e s when a c o u n t e r a t t a c k t h r e a t e n s because
observed t a r g e t s a r o seldom found. P r i s o n e r s s t a t e d t h a t o u r morta and 3 caused the
most c a s u a l t i e s i n t h e i r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ,
b. ",%en t n e enemy i s known o r suspected t o be p r e p a r i n g a c o u n s e r a t t a c k , concerted
f i r e t o t h e f r o n t by d 1 q n s a t proarranged i n t e r v a l s w i l l break up h i s p l a n s , T h i s
e n t a i l s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of g i v i n g away our l o c a t i o n s , but t h e e n w i s u s u a l l y w e l l 1
awnre of o u r a g p r o x i m a ~ el o c a t i o n a f t e r he h a s made one o r two counr;erattacks,w
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 84 6 NOV 1944
" B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s n a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t canbat experiences of our t r o o p s nor
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s e a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e item publisned w i l l be t h o s e bamd on p r a c t i o a l experience and a r e recamreended
f o r c e m f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r probleas. Repcrts
of c o r r o b o r a t i m o r c o n t r a r y experiences are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a d i n order t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined,

By uamtaand of Lieutenant General ~ L E Y :

C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
- L _ Q - - - - O - P - - s - - - - - _ _ O O - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I C O U N T E R S =MY TANK T A C T I C S IN WOODS.

1, ).ttackinpr. m em y t k s i n woods u s u a l l y f i r e from well camouflaged, dug i n
p o s i ~ i o n s ,where our t k s and TDs can not g e t a t them. W e f i r e smoke f r a n our Ulmm
mrts cn t h e t ks and at t h e same t ~ m smaneuver our t k s t o t h e enemy f l a n k s o r r e a r .
The enePry t k s mve t o avoid being screened and t n i e p e r m i t s our TDs and bazooka8 t o
@drawa beade on thean,

2, Avoiding harassment. "

i n emmy t k 8 i n woods remain c a q p a r a t i v e l y q u i e t
duriry: t h e daytune, but d u r i n g t h e n i g h t they move around and ehoot j u s t enough t o
keep our t r o o p s d i s t u r b e d . Keeping TDa and t k s w e l l up toward t h e f r o n t counters
t h i s t h r e a t and greatby i n c r e a s e s t h e morale of the men.

3. perending. *@xmani n f and tke eattacklng a t n i g h t s e e n t o move i n a l t e r n a t e

bounds, t h e i n f advancing f i r s t about 25 t o 30 yds and then h i t t i n g t h e ground u n t i l
t h e t k s come up. We f i r e bOmm mort i l l u m i n a t i n g e h e l l s up t o a r q e of 600 yds,
shoot hand f l a r e s close i n , t h e n open up r i t h everything we h a r e , ineluding TDs and
t k s , we shoot l i k e h e l l when t h e id i s advancing beoaum i f you atop t h e i n f you
s t o p t h e tics.r--0s of 314th Inf Regt.

~ W r ec a b l e has been found s t r e t c h e d a c r o s s roads at a proper height t o d e c a p i t a t e

i n d i v i d u a l s r i d i n g i n a v e h i c l e . Two t r a p s of this type have been found r e c e n t l y , one
w e l l behind our l i n e s and probably s t r u n g by c i v i l i a n s . Attachments t o v e h i c l e s pre-
vented i n j u r y t o t h e occupants i n both c a ~ e s . ~ - - X l XCorpa P e r i o d i c Report,
III IJSE OF FLAblES THROWER IN A T T L K ON SIEGFRIED LINE.

@An i n f r e g t equipped w i t h 75 flame throwers r e p o r t e d only one s u c c e s s f u l use of

t h e wpn i n t h r e e weekso f i g h t i n g i n t h e S i e g f r i e d Pine. I n t h a t c a s e t h e flame throrc
was used from a c a p t u r e d p i l l b o x and f i r e d through an embrasure i n t o an a d j o i n i n g f i r <
trench. When p i l l b o x e s were o u t f l a n k e d , they u s u a l l y surrendered o r were knocked o u t
by p o l e charges, and flame throwers were n o t required."-Cml O p 3 0 t h I n f Div.

TV ARTILIEFR OBSERVW WITH INFAIFRY PATROIS.

f l I n c l u s i o n of an a r t y o b s r i n l a r g e p a t r o l s h a s proved v a l u a b l e . Arty support
obtained through h i s r a d i o o f t e n h a s been t h e d e c i d i n g f a c t o r i n d r i v i n g back enemy
p a t r o l s and accamplishing t h e m i s s i o n of t h e p a t r o l . # - - V Corps Obsr.

V AFTER ACTION REPORTS BY PLATOON LEAD=.

* I n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e s f o r f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s is
f a c i l i t a t e d i n t h e 7 0 t h Tk En, by r e q u i r i n g p l a t l e a d e r s t o make simple a f t e r a c t i o n
r e p o r t s a s soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r a n engagement w i t h t h e enerqy, These r e p o r t s ,
u s u a l l y accompanied by a rough s k e t c h , a r e turned i n t o t h e S-3, and used during
a f t e r a c t i o n d i s c u s s i o n s . * - - 0 s of 7 0 t h Tk En.

VI TIPS FOR TANl;ERS.

1. I n d i r e c t f i r e by tanks. a . *Tks c u s t o m a r i l y u s e t h e c e n t e r t k a s t h e base

gun. When t h i s i s done t h e a r t y u n i t t o which t h e t k s a r e a t c h d should be n o t i f i e d
a s t h e a r t y p r a c t i c e i s t o u s e No. 1 gun a s t h e base p i e c e .
b. *Greater a c c u r a c y i s o b t a i n e d by p l a c i n g t h e t k broadside t o t h e d i r e c t i o n
of f i r e and on l e v e l ground.
6. aTks a r e a b l e t o confuse enemy c o u n t e r b a t t e r y f i r s by b u t t o n i n g up and con-
t i n u i n g t o f i r e . The e n e w a p p a r e n t l y decided t h a t t h e y were f i r i n g i n t h e wrong
p l a c e s a s t h e f i r e u s u a l l y ceased o r s h i f t e d t o a n o t h e r l o c a t i o n .
d. v e put a c a p t u r e d Geman t e l e p h o n e i n each t k t 6 permit t h e gunners t o h e a r
f i r e o r d e r s while buttoned up.*--CO, Co C , 709th Tk Bn.

2 . Tank escape h a t c h e s . *We have removed t h e backs of s e a t s t o f a c i l i t a t e hana-

l i n g of am and a c c e a s t o escape h a t c h e s . The escape h a t c h l e v e r s have been removed
a s t h e y f r e q u e n t l y s t i c k . The h a t c h e s a r e then f a s t e n e d w i t h wire.*--Plat Leader,
Co C , 709th Tk En.

wI LINE ROUTE MAPS.

V e have speeded w i r e r e p a i r by making i t SOP f o r a l l u n i t s t o send n l i n e r o u t e

map w l t h t h e wire crew t o t h e wire c h i e f of t h e u n i t t o which t h e l i n e i s being l a i d .
I f such a map is n o t a v a i l a b l e , o r s e c u r i t y makes i t s use i n a d v i s a b l e , t h e wire crew
makes c o n t a c t w i t h t h e wire c h i e f r e c e i v i n g t h e l i n e and mwk8 t h e r o u t e on h i s map.
T h i s f a c i l i t a t e s t h e work of r e p a i r crews.*--Corn 0 , l W t h FA Group.

q e p r o d u c e d by E n p r R e p r o Det 12 A G O
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 85 6 NOV 1944
" B t t l e Exi;eriencesW a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o t ' i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of o u r t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n m o p e . - d l t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n units a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c u t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on practical e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recanmended
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s whlch may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i t i l t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n m y be determined.

9 y comnnd of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l B W L W :

C. R . LCLUDON
C o l o n e l , AGD
A d ~ u t a n t General

NOTE: n r e s u l t e d i n i n c r e a s e d emphasis on
The r e c e n t c a n p a r a t l v e i y s t a t i c s i ~ u a ~ l oheis
c o u n t e r m o r t a r measures. Following a r e e x t r a c t s f r o n a r e p o r t decaling with t h e 4 t h Inf
Div a c t i v i t i e s a l o n g t h i s l i n e . S i m i l a r proceuures i n t h e k d i t e r r a n e a n Theater a r e
d i s c u s s e d i n p a r a g r a p h 6.

1. O r ~ w ~ i z a t l o n ."Rre a r e t r a i n i n g o b s r and s u r v e y teams of one 0 and f o u r rn f o r

e a c h r i r l e co and heavy q j n s co i n e a c h re&. They forward mort r e p o r t s s i m i l a r t o
s h e l l r e p s , through normal com!iwd c h a n n e l s . Ebch kiq t a k e s such a c t i o n a s i s i u d i c a t e d
t o brln;; f i r e on t h e mort. The r e p o r t s i in ally g e t t o t h e d i v G 2 s e c t i o n where t h e
d a t a i s p l o t t e d o n t h e d i v mort r e p o r t board. :Ye a l s o have ti s e c t i o n of t h e sound and
f l a s h bn, and one b t r y of FA working on t h i s p r o j e c t .

2. Mthod. a. n D i r e c t l o n of h o s t i l e l m t s may be determined by l i s t e n i n g p o s t s

manned by specially t r a i n e d men i n forward co a r e a s . The d i r e c t i o n o f t h e sound of
t h e mart prop ell en^ must be d e t e r n i n e d p r i o r t o t h e a r r i v a l of t h e s h e l l . As t h e enemy
w i l l c r o s s - f i r e m o r t s , i t is n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e azimuth oi" t h e sound of r;he rnort pro-
p e l l e n t and tlme of f i r e be r e p o r t e d by adjacenr; u n i t s b l s o ,
b. *The snape of t n e c r a t e r 1 s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e d i r e c t i o n of f l i g h t and t h e a n g l e
of d e s c e q s of t h e mort s n e l l . A s h e l l f a l l i n g v e r t i c a l l y w i l l cause s round c r a t e r .
The g r e a t e r t h e range f r o m ' r h e rnort, t h e s m a l l e r w i l l be t h e an81e of d e s c e n t i n r e l a -
t i o n t o t h e ground; m a , a s t h e q ; l e o f d e s c e n t d e c r e a s e s , t h e snape of t n e c r a t e r
g i v e s a n increasingly c l e a r e r i n d i i c a t i o n of t h 6 d i r e c t i o n of f l l g h t .
c. *The g e n e r a l a r e a of t h e enemy mort p o s i t i o n s nay be determined by p l o t t i n g on
a map t h e c r a t e r and l i n e s of f l i g h t a s determined from t h e c r a t e r ana from azimuths
r e p o r t e d by l i s t e n i n g p o s t s . A s t h e enemy d o c t r i n e of mort employment corresponds t o
o u r ovm, c a r e f u l examination of a l a r g e s c a l e zap o f t e n w i l l permit t y i n g down t h e
probable m a r t p o s i t i o n s t~ a c m r a l l area.

3. Bamining t h e c r a t e r f a r olues, a. #The s o u n d around a o r a t e r i r a a r r a t e d

by grooves which form a d e f i n i t e pattern. The groove8 extending furtheart o b r ~ from d
t h e point of impact sun perpendicular t o t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e m&.
be #The mt f i n and f u z e s p l i n t e r e w i l l b k y themsebvee along the l i n e of t h e
t r a j e c t m y a t t h e bottcnn of t h e inner w a t e r end i n f r o n t of t h e point of detonation.
They cnn be found by g e n t l e probing and a c l u e t o t h e d i r e c t i o n t o t h e nmrt obtained
by extending a l i n e d o n g t h e tunnel made by t h e f i n t o t h e point of detonation*
a. When t h e c r a t e r is q u i t e dieti.net, t h e l i n e a f f l i g h t can be determined mare
e a e i l y , aa t h e edge of t h e c r a t e r f a r t h e s t from t h e mort w i l l have under-out t u r f but
t h e nearest edge rill be h o r n of g m t h and much s e r r a t e d .

4. Qeterminin~ eizo of t h e martar. amamination of t h e fins permits detmminet ion

of t h e type of m&, ~ i n ad? the 1 2 h mrt have a diameter of 4-314' while tho- af
t h e 8Onm m a % have a diameter of 3-1/4@.

5. Reedlte, @Wea r e using % h i 8 eyetern and a l l echelons bars been e n t h u s i a s t i c

about it. There i s no question a 8 t o i t 8 effectiveneea i n s t a t i e s i t u a t i o n s b The r e a l
t e s t w i l l be i n a f a s t moving a t t a c k a i t u a t i o n e '

6. W i t s r r a n e a n Theatero A nmwrandum of t h e M i t e m a n e a n Theater i n d i o a t e e

t h e use cB a a i m l k eyatean in t h a t t h e a t m e Pointe of i n t e r e s t includeg
as. @Appointmentof a 'Div c o u n t e m o r t a r 01 in each d l v a r t y hq. The a s s i s t a n t
3-2 of t h e d i v a r t y i s considered a l o g i c a l eppointmentc
be @Deeigmtionof a 'Em c o u n t a m a r t m 08 w i t h i n each l i g h t a r t y and TD bn t o
operate i n t h e FIX.
C* 'Tying af 6nf heavy wpn COB and cn (30t3r a d 8 t ~ h d4.@2mort bet o tb PIX
whenever possible,
d* #Use by t h e d i v eountes~llartar 0 of a e r i a l photographs, IW i n t e r r o g a t i o n , and
r e p o r t 8 of a i r aP survefllance of euapested a r e a s , t o determine probable mmt Pocationa,
We a l e o a n t i c i p a t e s period8 of marFrrrrrm enenyr AO& a c t i v i t y and d i r e c t 8 a p p r o p i a t e
o o u n t e m m a r a ~ n c e r n t r a t i o n ejust p r i m t o these periodsQ bie maintain8 t h e came type
of reccrrds as thoee kept by the div c o m t e r b a t % e r y O o g

@A b t r y s f t m l m .5O ca9 IGs was organized f o r one s p e r a t f a n by taking gum f r a n

hq, eervice A3, and cn aos. The CQ heavy r p n s co s f the r e e e r v e bn l o s a t e d p o s i t i o n 8
Par t h e guns, assambled t h e mews and supervieed preparation of t h e p o s i t ion& The
b t r y gave d i r e c t suppart t o the bn making t h e main e f f o r t by m u t r a l i z i a g h a m enemy
~ o s i t i o a s T~h i s f i r e rao e f f e c t i v e and permitted t h e r a p i d adlvanc8 t h e l e a d i n g coeo
The f i r e w a s then l i f t e d t o a high r i d g e which waa t h e r e g t P objective. When t h e r i d g e
had been captured, fourOj'. c a l E s rare placed on the MIR of each be The f i r e f r a n
these gune helped t o b e a k up two enemy counterattacke.@-- 08 of 313th Inf Regt,

111 SECURITY.

@Gar@areleesneeein c&rT,ying ~ P a s a i ife d d a t a r e c e n t l y r e a u l t e d in vsPuabPe i n f o m a -

t i o n f a t h e enemy when a bna cu10 and p a s t of h i s s t a f f r a s e c a p t u e d with documents
and nmsmoranda containing much infosmation a s t o our d i ~ p o s i t i o n e ~In a a o t h m igstance,
two a t d f 08 carrying important d 0 ~ ~ ~ a e rrent n t 8 on r c n and b a r e l y e ~ o i d e daaptureor--
V Corps Obsr,

-Em-2 R e p r o d u c e d by E n p r R e p r o G e l 12 D G D
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
Na 86 7 NOV 1944

*Battle lhgarienae8* are p ~ b l i o h e dregulmrly by t h i 8 h e a d q w t o r a t o e m b l e

u n i t 8 i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t fkcm the l a t e a t a d a t experiencoa of our troop8 now
f i g h t i n g the G e r ~ u n oi n Europe. Although tbs experiences of a e r t a i n units a t a
partiaPlsl- l o a a t i o n a r e not mae8r.rily appliaable t o a l l unit8 i n a l l aituatione,
tgd item# published dlb be those baaed a, p r a c t i c a l experience and a m recunme-d
f o r careful conaideration by units rhich may enoclater 8;iPrilar proble~ure Reports
of carroborative a contrary experiences a r e p a r t i a u l a r l y desired i n order that the
r a b i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e b ~ c m may be b e t e d m d e

By crrarnrt of Lieutexmnt General t

-
B
c .&A-
~

1, @ wood.. .Ehy8icel acmtaat i s the ideal. While m o v i n g through the thiak

underbrush i n %he F o r r e t de EuToy t h e CO of the co ai lay r i g h t and I Qpeed t o hepl
our flanks i n 8 i g h t of eaah other. By t h i s mean8 we nsre able t o search every f o o t
of naunb and not one enamy mas by-pa8sed.040, Co F. 9 3 t h Inf.

2* Uaina 596. oSCR 536s furnished t o adjacent p l a t e of a d j oiuing coe

f a c i l i t a t a s lateral a o n t a ~ t e Them radio8 wcrk on a frequency d i f f e r e n t fran those
employed by e i t h e r co camnnd neto@-eErec0, 314th Infs

3* V.jnq the SCR 90Q. .TIMI SCR 300 provides adequate l a t e r a l a m t a c t i f the
country i 8 not t o o wooded, but ns like t o kmep i t off the sir as much as poeaiblo,,
6- of adjoining bne or r e g t a maintain IateraP contact daring an a t t a a k by obtaining
the f h q w n ~ yof the adjacent bn, and making cantact thraugb the bn ca&dreb rho often
have an additionab SCa( 300 r a d i o far thb p \ t r p o ~ ~ ~ = - C
313th
O , Inf and R e c Q, 314th
Infe

4e BY m t r o 1 a o .Contact patrols should be SIX with a l l COB. This prorides the

r u r e a t meaha of con%act p.rticuParly i f phase l i n e s rue designated an whloh c o n h a t
m u ~ tbe m d e befare resuming faward mmment. Th. a t t a c k is elorad earnerhat by this
method, But p a r t i c u l a r l y close aontact reaulto.@-40, 313th Inf and Exec 0, 314th Inf.
 "An excellent example of the value of e h e l l r e p and of cloee cooperation among
eorga a r t y eectioae involving a c t i a n and can acrose oorpa and .rmy boundariee occurred
as follows:
a* A t 0638 hours the emmy began t o s b l l a town i n V Gorpe one of a o t i o n *
be V C a r p counterbattery s e n t the r h e l h e p t o VII Corpa coun%erbattarye
c, Aa o h bn of VII Cmpe reparted s sarod l o o a t i o n frcm the XLX Garpa s e c t o r
that f i t t e d the ahellrep.
d. V I Z Corps FDC requneted XBE Corps FIX t o f i r e the misaioa.
ea XIX Corpa f i r e d a t 0715 houm and the a h e l l i w an the torn ceamdefl--Arty 0.
VII Gorp.
HIE m w
We laam adapted the p r a c t i a e of assigning not mare than two replacementa t o a
spd a t aps t h , This enable6 eqd and pLat l e a d e r s t o know t h e i r m n and make8 i t ia-
p m s i b l s f o r a aqd t o be made up e n t i r e l y of green meno It has bean found unrriee t o
regard &he YE! numbers appeariag on replaoement u n i t s p e c i a l orders as alwaye o m e c t ~
Often t h i s i n d i c a t e s thQ laet job a evln held i n h i s lprsrious orgn, even though he had
b l d other jobs f m longer periadcl, Speci a l i s t a are o f t e n diecovered by checking the
F m 2 0 ' ~ e ' ~ - - A d J e313th h f R.egt.

The SolSbawing l a e t h d s of c ~ n l z o l b i n g8- m o r t f i r e a ham been w e d by Go Y , 313th

Ird w i t h the indicated edvanta&ecrl
1, * B o n t r d of f i r e 8 i s bmed upon urn of a map divided i n t o
n u a b r s d tBotaaslld. mster g r i d eq\aarese FQe using SCR 380 c a l l %af i r e in a p a r t i c u l a r
aection of w given aquare. The m o r t p l a t l e a d e r canputes the d a t a and f i r e s cn the
are@* By wing tMe ayst%m obare can place f i r e s accurately m i t h a t knowing the exact
l o c a t i o n of the morts,

. I n tb advancgo .A continuotu band of ntllabered t a r g e t aream is planned across

2
the enti- f r o n t and an overlay &ven t o each r i f l e co o d e I h e morta a m l a i d So
ae t o permit at Pea& one piece t o f i r e an each area d thout moving the biped. Aa a
r e e u l t , aocurata f i r e cen be placed n i t h i n a few sscomls a f t e r the call i s received.
By m e ef t h i s a r e t h d , amkr have been eucaseeiully .ued t o d r i v e off h o e t i l e night
p a t r o l s s thereby e l i d n a t i n g the aeceaeity of d i s c l o s i n g t h e p o e i t i a n of a u t a n a t i c
vm.*

T h e e m m y r e o a n t l y e f f e o t i v e l y defended a building by otsinglng ooncertina a r e

throughout a l l r o a m on th8 ground f l o c r and hooking t o i t booby t r a p 8 d i c h c a d
be controlPed from the hsament by other wires. -en a mslarber af the a t t a c k i n g force
entered a rcbcna ar cut the concertina a booby t r a p i n the roan would be a e t off by a
man i n the baaemento Three attaclm am . t h i s bullding -re repulsedp and the building
w e s taken oely a r P t e ~i t had baen demolished by a r t y fireo*--CC, 9 t h Mve

*A m o b generator co p r o f e d . ~ b bID a d a y l i a t rinr croeeinge m e amoh

mcrsemd thdt b r i d s i t e during the construction geriod and m e u e d t o cover the
area a. ~ c m gaa tE
enemy had &an of i t m a - a p o r t of 11th I& negt.
!am I)

R e c r o d u c e C by E n p r H e p r o D c f 12 A G p
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 87 8 NOV 1944
" B a t t l e EXperiencesl a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r ~ e r st o enable
u n i t s i n t r a i n l n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l e t e s t combat e x k e r i e n c e s of our t r c o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Gernans i n Europe. Although tile experiences of c e r t a l n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s a t u a t i o n s ,
t h e ir;ems p u b l i s n e d w l l l be those based on, p r a c t i c h l ex;,erience and a r e recommended
f o r e m e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may e n c a u n t e r similar problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r conbrary e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be uetermined.

Ejy command of L i e u t e n a n t General BRBDLEY:

C. R e M r n N
C o l o u e l , ;LCJ)
A d j u t a n t General
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I COORDIEA'L'El3 ATTACK OM A PILLBOX m.
NCl-E: The f o l l o w i n g description of a coordinated a t t d c k by an l n f r i f l e co relnfo-rced
by one m d i u m t k p l a t , e p l a t of TDs a ~ i da p l a t of e x g r s , tlnd supported by a r t y , is
e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t by t h e CO 634th TD Bn t o t h e CG, 1st Dlv.

1. Zr~emyp o s i t i o n . *The o b j e c t i v e was a group of t h r e e c o n c r e t e p i l l b o x e s locdted

on t h e f a r s i d e of a dense woods wnich t h e Germans a p p a r e n t l y depended on t o s t o p armd
vehicles. The p i l l b o x e s had a f i e l d of f i r e of l e s s t h a n 100 yds and were not covered
by AT f i r e .

2. m o r e d reconnaissance. "A r o u t e f o r each armd v e h i c l e was r e c o n n o i t e r e d com-

p l e t e l y through t h e woods a f t e r t h e a t t a c k o r d e r was i s s u e d .

3. Covering n o i s e of niovment. "The t k s and TDs c r a s h e d t h e i r way through t h e wood:

under cover of t h e n o i s e of t h e a r t y p r e p a r a t i o n .

4. c o v e r l n g the uebouchment. "The debouchment from t h e woods was cove;*ed by a r o l l -

i n g b a r r a g e . AS t h e a s s a u l t g o u p s a d v a z e d , every v e h i c l e and man kept up a continuous
f i r e . These f i r e s kept t h e enemy buttoned u& i n che p i l l b o x e s u n t i l he i n f and e n g r s
were p r a c t i c a l l y i n p o s i c i o n t o reduce them.

5. s e c u r i t y f o r r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . #While t n e individual p i l l b o x e s were being reduced

and t h e ground was being o r g a n i z e d , t h e armd v e h i c l e s deployed s o the r i g h t and l e f t and
t o the front. '#hen tne reorganization was complete, t h e armor was witharewn t o r e p l e n i s t
,ts s u p p l i e s .
II E Y A C I ~ A T C Nm I r 9 G A RIVER CROSSING,
The f o l l o ~ r i n gm a t e r i a l , e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t of t h e Surg, 1 0 t h f n f Regt, p i c t u r e :
t h e problems of e v a c u a t i o n occasioned by a r i v e r c r o s s i n g , and t h e s u b s e q u e n ~b r i a g e
construction.

1, P l a n of o p e r a t i o n , *The p l a n was f o r two bns of t h e lOtn I n f Regt t o c r o s s i n

a s s a u l t b o a t s , one behind t h e o ~ h e r ,under t h e supporting f i r e s of t n e t h i r d bn, e s t a b -
l i s h a bridgehead and cover t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of an a d e q u a t e b r i d g e f o r t h e d i v . Evacua-
t i o n was t o be by a s s a u l t bouts u n t i l r a f t s o r b r i d g e s were completed. Two outboard
m t o r s were t o be f u r n i s h e d f o r t h e medical b o a t s , Orders were i s s u e d by t h e r e g t l
comdr a t 1400 h o u r s , 9 S e p t , and t h e c r o s s l n g was t > begin a t 0055 h o u r s , 10 Sept.

2. Crossings. T h e f i r s t bn t o c r o s s s y r p r l s e d t h e enemy and s e c u e a a f o o t n o l d

but encountered heavy o p p o s i t i o n a s h o r t d i s t a n c e from t h e r i v e r . G o s u & l t i e s were heavy
I n i t l n l l y t h e bn evacuated i t s c a s u a l t i e s by m e u s of a s s a u l r ; b o a t s r e t u r n i n g f o r new
l o a d s . AS soon a s s p a r e a s s a u l t b o a t s became a v a i l a b l e t h e r e g t l s u g began evacuation
by b o u t s u s i n g ouzboard rimtoss. T h i s system aorked well.. The second bn completed i t s
c r o s s i n g d u r i n g t h e e a r l y h o u r s of d a y l i g h t a a by W00 h o u r s both bns were on t h e i r
o b j e c t i v e s . Repeated eneqv c o u n t e r a t t a c k s conzlnued u n t i l about 1330 h o u r s , however,
inflicting many more c a s u a l ~ i e s . The t h i r d h c r o s s e d by boat i n t h e a f t e r n o o n , secured
and mopped up a town bypassed by t h e two l e a d i n g bns, and, a f t e r n i g h t f a l l , assembled
i n a reserve p o s i ~ i o n .

3 . F i r s t d a y q 8 evacuation. A B midnight
~ 10-11 S e p t , 120 c a s e s had been e v a c u a t e d .
Evacuation was by l i t t e r t o t h e r i v e r , b y boat a c r o s s t h e r i v e r , t h e n a g a i n by l i t t e r
from t h e n e a r s h o r e , Ecross a m a l l c a n a l by f o o t b r i d g e t o t h e ambulances. Same l i t t e r
h a u l s were a s m c h a s 2000 yds. It was not u n t i l dawn 11 .%pt that t h e f i r s t l i t t e r
jeep was f e r r i e d a c r o s s .

4., Second d a y ' s c r o s s i n g s . nThe second morning a bn of t h e 1 1 t h I n f Regt c r o s s e d

a t t h e s a n e p o i n t t o a s s i s t i n e n l a r g i n -g t h e bridgehead. T h i s b n 1 8 c a s u t i l t i e s a l s o had
-

t o be evacuated by t h e 1 0 t h Inf' f e r r y . . t h i s t i m e t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s o f t h e f i r s t bn
t o c r o s s were n e a r l y exhausted and i t became n e c e s s a r y t o send them a l l remaining l i t t e r
bearers. B.J t h e end of' t h e morning a l l l i t t e r j e e p s of t h e f i r s t two bns had been
f e r r i e d a c r o s s , e a s l n g t h e problem somewhat. On t h e n e a r s h o r e t h e c o n d i t i o n was a l s o
r e l i e v e d by w i n g j e e p s frm t h e s h o r e t o t h e ambulance.

5. Heavy enemy f i r e . *The e v a c u a t i o n conzinuecl through heavy e n e w m c r t and a r t y

f i r e u n t i l 0130 h o u r s , 1 2 S e y t , when e v a c u a t i o n was t e m p o r a r i l y 3t0pped. By t h a t t i m e
one f e r r y had been s u k , a11 t h e a s s a u l t b o a t s had been sunk o r f i l l e d w i t h n o l e s , and
a l l work on t h e b r i d g e had ceased.. It was not u n t i l d a m , t h a t a meuical sgt found one
u n s h a t t e r e d a s s a u l t boat on t h e f a r s h o r e , and t h e e v a c u a t i o n c o n t i n u e d , E'rm t h e n
u n t i l . completion of t h e b r i d g e , e v a c u a t i o n by f e r r i e s and a s s a u l z b o a t s c o n t i n u e d d e s h i t
heavy m o r t and a r t y f i r e . In t h e meantime additional l i z t e r b e a r e r s had t o be s e c u r e d
from c o q s u n i t s and f e r r i e d o v e r t o a s s i s t t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s on t h e f a r s h o r e . By
midnight 12-13 s e p t a l l a i d men and l i t t e r b e a r e r s showed s i g n s of f a t i g u e .

6, leti ion of briQe. W F ~ l a l l y ,on 13 :;ept t h e b r i a g e was completed and c a s -

u a l t i e s could be evacuated a c r o s s t h e r i v e r i n l i t t e r jeeps t o a p o i n t where ambulhnces
p i c k e d them up, T h e e l i c t e r j e e p s , h o w e ~ e r , were knocked o u t by enemy f i r e . The n e x t
p r o b l e n was t h e d i s p e r s l o a of t h e a i d stations whlch had s e t up t o g e t h e r on the f a r
Skoz+e. The engm4s c o n s t r u c t e d a bn a i d s t a t i o n f a r t h e r up t h e h i l l m d one bn w a s moved
t o t h a t p o i n t . The expansion of t h e bridgehead c o n t i n u e d w i t h heavy c a s u a l t i e s . On
18 Sopt t h e r s g t l CP and aad s t a t i o n moved t o t h e f a r s h o r e ,
D
- 2 - - ) e ~ ' 3 5 u r e d oy E n a f R e p r s Del 2 AGO
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 88
w m t t l e m ~ e r i e n c e s *a r e p u u l l u h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
U n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r t r i t f r o m t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f l g h t i w t n e German2 I n Euro1,e. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a l n u n l t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p 3 l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e ir;ems p u b l i s n e d w i l l be t h v s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e nrd a r e r e c a m e n d e d
f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which nay encounber s i m i l a r problems, R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e u i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i u i t j r of' t h e indicclted b a 5 t l e l e s s o n m y be a e t e r m i n e d .

Ry command. o f E i e u ~ e n a n tGeneral BRkDLFY:

C. 2. h ? \ W N
C o l o n e l , ASD
Adjutant General
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I MRTA!! FIRE.
1. Eighteen-mortar b a t t e r y . nWe f i r e 81nn m o r t s a s bn b t r y s , m l p l o y i r g c o n t r o l
s i m i l a r t o t h a t u s e d by a r t y . T h i s h a s made p o s s i b l e t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s u s e of t h e
m o r t s of a l l t h r e e brls on r e g t l t a r g e t s .

2. W e s o r f i r e . "The t y p e s of f i r e employed a r e 6 s f o l l o w s :
a , n l b r t r r t i m e on t a r g e t ( h ~ ~ v p )i ,n n h i s h a l l rounds s t r i k e a s e l e c t e d t a r g e t a t
t h e same time.
b. nmrtar time on l i n e (MToE)~ i n which a l l rounds s t r i k e a l o n g t h e same l i n e
simultaneously.
c . "P'lortar t l n e on area (hTO!,), I n which e a c h bn b t r y f i r e s on a bn l i n e , e a c h bn
a t a d i f f e r e n t r a n g e , g l v i n g s i n u l t o n e o u s a r e a coverage.
d. r g o l l i n g b a r r a g e , which e n p l o y s e l t ' h e r LFOL o r W O A f i r e , increasing t h e r a n g e
f o r e a c h s u c c e e d i n g round.

j. Time of f l i g h t . RKo t i m e of flight t a b l e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r morts. I n c r d e r

t o p l a c e s i m u l t a n e o u s f i r e on r e g t l m i s s i o n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r e a c h b t r y t o r e g i s t e r
on t n e p r e s c r i b e d t a r g e t ana r e c o r d time of f l i g h t .

4. Method o f firint;, #When u s i n g t h i s tyke of b m r a g e on known t a r g e t s , i t has

been found most effective t o f i r e crle round p e r rnort , r e p e a t i n g t n e f i r e m y number of
t i m e s a t odd i n t e r v a l s . The enemy u s u a l l y f i n d s cover b e f o r e a second round s t r i k e s .

5. R e s u l ~ s . wmemy 2';s s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i r e was very e f f e c t i v e c h i e f l y because

t h e y never knew when i t was g o i n g t o s t r i k e next. I n one c a s e t h e y were even a f r a i d
t o e e t out of f o x h o l e s t o f e e d i n t h e i r s o u r e a , S m a l l d e t a i l s bad t o be s e n t around
fro;; h o l e t o h o l e v.ith t h e food, We a l s o developed e t e c h n i q u e of s n i p i n g a t t h e s e
d e t a i l s v,-lth 60mm m d tilmn mortu.fl--CC, 117th I n f Re&,
J : Tne follovring wlesvons l e a r n e d w e e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t of t h e 9 0 t h I n f Div
ccvering t h e r e r i o d of t h e a t t a c k on Fort D r i a n t .

1. E n ~ i n e e ra c t i v i t i e s . a. RDlgrs must determine t h e amount and type of e x p l o s i v e s

needed t o breach t h e casemates.
b. nonce a casemete i s breached, g a s o l i n e and o i l should be poured i n t o i t and
i g n i t e d , ; # r e f e r a b l y m i ~ ha 'W grenade. Flnrrle t n r o ~ e r scan be used but a r e 01' l i m i t e d
ef l'ectiveness.
c. *Suncbags must be provided a f t e r e a c h casemate is capeur'ed t o s e a l t u n n e l s
running t o t h e next casemate.
d. noxygen masks should be m s u e a v a i l a b l e f o r underground o p e r a t i o n s .

2. Use of t a n k s . a. "Tks a r e u s e f u l i n r e d u c i n g p i l l b o x e s , but u e nos e f f e c t i ~ e

hgslnst cese~lates.
b. TTks must be withdrawn a t n i g h t and p r o t e c t e d from enemy i n f i l t r a t i o n . Tankers
must a s s l s t i n t h e i r own l o c a l protection. They must not a l l g e t i n t h e i r t k s and
' b u t t o n up ,.

3. A r t i l l e r y and 4.2 m o r t a r s . a. n m t y was g e n e r a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e on casemates,

but some casemcites were lalocked o u t by SP 155m guns et a range of 800 yds.
b. nm1 morts were not e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t casemates, but were u s e f u l f o r smoking
enepy obsn,

4. A i r support. a the 1000 l b HE and jell ' bombs dropped on t h e f o r t were

not e f f e c t i v e .
F&
b.
dmoge
c.
. *Tt
nThe 2000 l b bon~bsdro2ped on Verdun, s i m i l a r t o F t m i a n t , d i d some

i s b e l i e v e d t h z t 4000 l b PEE bombs would eeuse t h e d e s i r e d d e s t r u c t i o n . Air

p r e p a r a t i o n s u s i n g t h e s e bombs should be made t h e day p r e c e d i n g t h e a t t a c k e n

"Pinpoint accuracy by s u p p o r t i n g heavy a r t y was r e p o r t e d by t h e 90th Inf Div i n a

%?cent a c t i o n . A l a r g e b u i l d i n g , s t r o w l y h e l d by t h e enemy, was holding up t h e c l e a r -
once of a ton'il. Inf troops were on t h r e e s i d e s of t h e b u i l d i n g and within l o 0 yds of
i t i n soce p l a c e s when t h e t a s k was t u n e d over t o a 24Om how and one B R b t r y . The
guns vrere fired from a range of 9000 yds and controlled from an OP 1000 yds from t h e
t a r g e t . m e t o t h e proximity of f r i e n d l y t r o o p s , t h e a r t y r e g i s t e r e d 300 yds beyond
t h e t a r g e t an5 c r e p t back t o i t . k t o t a l of t h i r t y - s e v e n 0"hells ma seventeen 240mm
s h e l l s were f i r e d , completely d e s t r o y i n g t h e b u i l d i n g and k i l l i n g a l l of t h e d e f e n d i n g
enemy p l a t except one 0 a d f i v e men. h ' i e n d l y t r o o p s w i t h i n 100 yds of t h e f i r e were
untouched..tt--Report of CG, 9 0 t h Pnf Div,

IV DE3TFiUCTION OF C!BhP$1N RAILWAY SUN.

WMstruction of a German heavy c a l (probably 280rrrm) r a i l w a y gusl i n t h e b k t z area,

is c l o i n e a by XX Corps Arty. The gun was r e p o r t e d a s hidden i n a shed on a t r a c k i n
t h e r a i l r o a d yard. The corps a r t y i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n , w l c h t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of French
r a i l r o a d o f f i c i a l s t ~ a c e dt h e gun t o a p a r t i c u l a r 100 yd area w i t h i n f o u r hours, A
b t r y of 15%~ guns, a d j u s t e d by a h i g h pesfoarmmce g l a n e f i r e d 11;O sounds. A s a r e s u l t
t h e gun was demolished and 22 c a s u a l z i e s were r e p o r t e d . A few R.P rounds caused f i r e s
l a s t i n g s s v e r s l hours.*--Report of XX Corps Arty Hq.

- 2 - Q e p - o d u c e d by Enpr R e c r o Del 12 A G p
 T W ~ L F T H ARMY CR~UP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 89 10 NOV 1944

'Battle Experiencesm are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable

u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r a n the l a t e s t canbat experience8 of aur troop8 now
f i g h t i n g the Germane i n Europe. Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n ape not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l e i t u a t f o w ,
the i t e m s published dl1 be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recommended
for careful. conaideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problem, R e g a t a
of carroborative or c o n t r a r y experience6 a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n arder t h a t the
v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e a a m be determinedo

B2 cnnnnenrl of Lieutenant General B R A L U Y t

c.R.X m A U
C o R. W D O N
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
- - - O I I I I I - - e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - ~ - - - ~ - ~ m - - - m -

I A D I I T I O W .70 CALZBiER MAC- GUN FOB TANS

Substituticm of a .30 c a l MG f o r the .5a c a l MG on the t k U mount has been r e -

p a r t e d a s d e s i r a b l e by t k OB i n the Mediterranean Theater. They f e e l t h a t A l l i e d a i r
e u p e r i m i t y makes the .50 c a l MG unnecessary aad t h a t the a d d i t i a n a l -30 i e d e s i r a b l e
f o r use a g a i n s t peraannel. Other advantages m n t i o n e d a r e t h a t am sup i a s i m p l i f i e d
and t h a t more am can be c a r r i e d i n the eame space. Units which have t r i e d the m d i f i -
c a t i o n f i n d the gun "very h a n d y s , - a p o r t of Armd Group t o WD Board,

XI C I T Y FIGtI'l'ING

1. F i r e a m r . n I learned t o u e the f i r e power of every a v a i l a b l e wpn i n the

Aachen f i g h t i n g . % took ons a t r o n g l y held p o s i t i o n without a s i n g l e caeualty by l a y -
i n g an a r t y barrage. a cl-r-in sort barrage, and having every man i n the a s a a u l t wave
t h r o w a grenade a s the f i r e L i f t e d and the a a s a u l t s t a r t e d .

2. Infantry-tank c o a ~ d i n a e i o n . kept the t k s and TDe we11 forward, usually

and o t h e r AT wpm ,a -a CO, 26th Inf .

one t o a s t r e e t . Four infantrynmn w e r e aaeigned t o p r o t e c t each vehicle frcrn beuxsh

I11 SUPF'LY AND WAIR QF QRI3NBNC;E I--.

*Ord sup and r e p a i r has been speeded by p l a c i n g t h e m a p a n e i b i l i t y f a the r e q u i -

s i t i o n , issue, and r e p a i r of a l l rgns on t&e r e g t l section. The mun 0 has given one
of h i s sgts the 8 p e c i f i c . d u t y of c o l l e c t i n g itenrs f a r r e p a i r and of r e c e i r i n g them f r a n
the d i v ord co f a r reis~ue.~---Eiepart of 11th Inf Regt.
IV ATTACK A W N S T REVERS SLOPE IEFEEE (Extracted fram memo of 83d I n f MI)

1. J e r r y 'a r h w t r a m maDon. QW r e p o r t s v e r i f i e d by a c t u a l coatact with canbat

p a t r o l 8 i n d i c a t e the enomy i e prpping u n i t e of co s i e e with a 194.4 model a u t a m t i c r i f l e .
T h i s rpn is e f f i c i e n t only a t shcgt ranges and i a no match far the Ml r i f l e , a t medium
and l a a g rangpr,

2, Bie defense. 'One method used by t h e Germans f o r obtaining close contact han
been the m e of reverae slope t a c t i c s i n defense. Only a few of the defending f a r c e
are placed oa tho f o r r a r d slope near the creet. Ihe bulk of the f o r c e w i t h 8uppqrtiag
upns is r r s l l dug i n on t h e reverse slope. Any f a r c e a t t a c h n g such a p o s i t i o n f i n d s
l i t t l e trouble reaching t h e c r e e t of the h i l l , but once i t start8 a c r o s s the c r e e t i t
c a m s under heavy f i r e a t short ranges $ran a mass of automatic wpm, including M G s *

3. How t o crack i t . "The proper method s f a t t a c k i n g euch a poeitiori i e t o quickly

d r i v e the defenders fkcra the forward elopes, and c r o s s the c r e e t only a f t e r the rover-
elope has been thoroughly r w p t and p l a r t e r e d n t h W and HE m a t and a r t y f i r e . Once
t h e reverse n l o p i r thoroughly covered by f i r e the a t t a c k e r s m u s t move quickly aver
the c r e s t and a t t a c k m i t h marching f i r e , h a d grenades and the bayonet,

4
. Founterinu the counterattack. "The German caunterattack is almost ~~~~tic
and uaually hits a f l a n k j u s t aa the a t t a c k approaches i t s climax ar immediately a f t e r
i t succeeds and before r e a r g a n i z a t i o n can be effected. TBe beet pssthod of countering
the counterattack i a by a r e e e r r e canposed of tkm and inf s o disposed aa t o permit h i t -
t i n g the counterattacking force i n i t s flank. Defensirs ax=@fims t o m s i e t i n breaking
the c m t e r a t t a c k should be planned before tihe a c t i o n startss

5. Action a f t e r euccesatul a t t a c k , g ~ d i a t e l ayf t e r the goaftion is taken, e c t i m

is necessary t o prevent heavy loss %sma r t y and mort f i r e s which are a b o e t c e r t a i n t o
follow c l o r a l y , If the a t t a c k is t o proceed, the a t t a c k i n g f okcea slhould more fasward
gram the p o s i t i o n q u i e k l y ~i f n o t s a emall holding or observing f o r c e should be l e f t and
a p o e i t i o n a r m z e d f a r the bulk of the force on the m v e r a e 81-eu

1. h t i ~ e r e o n n s ~a h~c r e a s i n g numbers of a n t i p e r e o m e l mines have been e n c u t -

ered--scum n ~ t a l l i c and . -
not a m c e p t i b l e t o l o c a t i o n with the mine d e t e c t o r o Anti
personnel mines a r e n o r m e ~ i yplaced i n groups. In one i ~ t a n c ethe lead reen sf a
p a t r o l atepped on a S a h u d n e . Three other men, including the p a e o l l e a d e r kcam@
casualties froln other mines h e n they attempted t o a s s i s t him,

2. M t i t a n k . "'Enemy AT nines nor a r e being more c a r e f u l l y cemouflaged. f i n e s

on hard surface roads a r e e r e n being covered with a l i @ t l a y e r of tar t o give the
appearance of a repaired h o l e o Sane s f our units l ~ c a t eGerman mines and then ring
t h e m with minea and booby t r a p s t o catch Cgnnan i n s p e c t i o n parties-but the Germam
sanetimes do the eama t o oursen-&port s f V C o q o Oblsr.
 TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 9 0 I I NOV 1944
' B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s * a r e p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s i n t ~ a i n i n gt o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Euroge. s l t h o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u ~ t i o n s ,
t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recarnrcended
f o r c t l r e f u l consideration by u n l t s which may e n c o u n t e r s i m i l a r problems. Reports
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

Ely commmd of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

C. R. LfLFaDON
Colonel, AGD
~d j u t a n t General

NOTICE: T h i s i n d e x of p r e v i o u s * B a t t l e Experiences@is t h e l a s t i s s u e of t h i s publi-

c a t i o n by Twelfth ~ r m yGroup. Succeeding i s s u e s w i l l be from Hq, m o p e a n Theater of
Cperations, U . S d . P o l i c i e s governing t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e p u b l i -
c a t i o n of nE?attle E x p e r i e n c e s " m a t e r i a l w i l l c o n t i n u e unchangea, The a d d r e s s of t h i s
a c t i v i t y i s now: Commanding General, European Theatre o f O p e r a t i o n s , U S Army, a t
tention 6 3 Combat Leasons Branch, APO 8&7, U S Army.
" BA?TLE EXF&IENCES* INDEX
( I s s u e s 1 through 8 9 )

-
NO.
A d m i n i s t r ~ ~ t i o (See
n S t d f Procedure)
A e r i a l Photography . 3 2 , 66.
A n t i a i r c r a f t mt i l l e r y
Against Ground T a r g e t s 159 23, 419 75* 77.
General 33, 63.
~ i Supgort
r
m o r 22, 3 6 , 38, 42, 45.
Infantry 6 , 13, 14, 3 1 9 34, 35, 73, 82, U 8 .
~nt it ank Weapons ( I n f ) 3 0 , 409 69, 75, 83.
Artillery (Field)
A i r OPS 20, 22, 29, 31, 3 2 , 34,
389 44* 45, 4 6 , 66, 679 77.
CQmfdunicoti o n s 21, 329 84.
Forward Observers 5, 17, 31, 40, 45* 46, 7 0 , 73, 77, 84.
Inf-Tank-~rty '/* 57.
Medium A r t i l l e r y 18, 81, 88,
She1l r e p s 5, 22, 79, 86.
 -
NO.

k t i a l e r y ( ~ i e l d ) ( c a t 'deB
Tac ti crs

Techni que

Fraining
~ ~ U l l i t as d
Air Suaport
Attack
f i g h t i n g in Toma
C%neral

Inf - T m k T e a m

2~&'?e~&-Arty Tea;-&
hec a u a i 3saocs
_?&vex Cr(msi@gs
&oke, L7ae of
3:-ec$ ( C i t y ) Fighting
S a r ; r i s ~ , E l e m e n t sf
-&
1 ~ c ; Eof
$j &$ti E,g
3 0 ~ 8
A i t r z t i c F i P l o (aAm)
B&) ~ a e %aEl%adt
7-
~ S Z O ~ ~
Booby Traps
Ci :y (Straet) fighting*
Civilians
Csslnsn (Lacantry)
-
Problem

Ccamar;d Post Loeationa

Samu.icatians
Artillery
G e sera1
Fanels
Radio

l?ai mi ng
3 i r e and Te%apBom
SUBJZCT %+ -
NO* ,

Enemy, I n f o r m a t i o n Concerning
A t t a c k Methods
Usf erne Methods

Organization ( I n f Cos)
Snipers
T a c t i c s , General
Tricks

We apona
Engineer Operations
Equipment, I n d i v i d u a l
F o r t i f i e d P a s i t i o n s , A t t a c k of

F i r e D i a t r i b u t i o n and D i s c i p l i n e
F i r e and Movement
Feeding
G e r m a n Army (see Enemy, Information
of
Grenades
Hedgerows
A t t a c k With Tanks
A t t a c k Without Tanka
German Defense of
House, V i l l a g e and S t r e e t F i g h t i n g
(See C i t y F i g h t i n g )
Infantry
Air Support of

Anti -Tank Weapons

Bayonet A s s a u l t
Cannon Cmpany
F i r e and Movement
F i r e D i s t r i b u t i o n and D i s c i p l i n e
I n f -Tank Teams

Inf-Tank-Arty Teams
Reconnaissance
S c o u t i n g and Pa t r o l l i n g

T r a i ni ng

Weapons (See Weapons)

I n d i v i d u a l Equipment
Intelligence
Dissemination of I n f o r m a t i a ~
General
Securit y
T r a i ni ng
 =90
SUBJECT

Liaison Planes

Leadership

Machine CUM
Maintenana
Ordnance
Miscellaneous
Medical O p e r a t i o m

hIilitary Polico
Mines
Mortars

Chemical (4.2)
C o u n t e m o r t a r ffiissions
Motor Movement and T r a f f i c Control
k d e r a , Issuence sf
Panels
Personnel
Reconditioning
Replacement8
P r i s o n e r s of W a r
Radio (See ~ o m r u ~ m i c a t i o n s )
Reconditioning (personnel)
R e c onnai a s a c e
Raplacemerits ( P e r s a n n e l )
Rifle, M-l
R i v e r Crossings
S c o u t i n g and P a t r o l l i n g

Security
S i e g f r i e d Lines Attack of

Smoke
White Wospharoua
-.
Snipers -
~ h f Ef k o c s d u n and Administref i o n
C a s u a l t y and Strength R e p o r t s
CP Locatione
Evacuation
InP-tio~~ D i s s e d m t l o n of
Oraers, Ieauance of
Periodic Reports
Personal E f f e c t s
P r i s o n e r s of War
S t r e e t (City) Fighting
Submachnne Gun
Supply
C l a s s e s d'
Discipline
SUBJXCT -
NO.

Supply (Cont ' d )

Feeding
I n d i v i d u a l Equipnent
Maintenance
Qr dunce
M i scellanem e
&placement (Equipment)
Salwige
Truckheade
S u r p r i s e Elements of
Tanks (See Armored Unite)
Tank Destroyers

Task Forces
Telephone (See ( ; m u i c a t i o n s j
T r a f f i c Control and Motor Moveinent
Trai n i ng
Artillery
Canmunicationa
Infantry

Intelligence
Reconditioning PersonmP
Replacements
Truckheads
V i l l a g e F i g h t i n g (See C i t y F i g h t i n g )
Weapons
Anti-Tank ( I n f ) 30, 40, 69, 75s a3m
BAR 13.
Bazooka 1 2 s 35s 5 1 s 52. 56, 81.
Cannon (Xnf) 54. 58. 45, 411.
G r e nade s 12, 35.
Machina Guns 14, 27s 5 4 , 58, 59s 85s 890
M o r t a r s (Inf) 69 no, 1 2 , ' a s 23, 250 T I , 280 34,
37s 46, 5 2 s 54. 58, 7 3 s 86, 88.
Mortars (4.2 chemical) 2s 19, 24, 3 3 , 40, 51, 66s 88.
R i f l e 16-1 6.
Sub-Machim Gun 27.
Use of 56, 85, 89
White Phospharoua Sin& 3, 20. 35s 73s 83.
Wire and Telephone ( h e C a n m u n i -
catione)
Woods F i g h t i n g

END

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