FEDERALISM1

Antonio Rivera Garca

Universidad Complutense de Madrid
antonio.rivera@pdi.ucm.es

Philosophical and Political Foundations

Federalism is as polysemous a concept as democracy. Despite its various types and

meanings, it is possible to identify philosophical and political foundations that are
common to all kinds of federalism. Once we understand these foundations, we can analyze
the past, the present and the future of federalism in Latin America. In principle, the
concept is hard to reconcile with modern political philosophy that began with Thomas
Hobbes (Duso 2010). Federal theory allows for a high degree of complexity, which
enables it to regulate and explicate the diversity and multiplicity of the world. Modern
political philosophy, on the contrary, tends to simplify and construct a political order that
relies on the homogenous concept of the people, whose components are equal
individuals rather than a plurality of heterogeneous groups or associations.
Federalism unites two terms, ratio and natura, that refer to two different and
irreconcilable world-views. Without establishing hierarchies, federalism unites the
dominion of reason, which concerns equality and homogeneity of federated parties, and
the world of nature and phenomena, which refers to real differences that exist among
federated entities. The first aspect concerns the formal or universal side of political
concepts, whereas the second refers to their real or sociological side.
The political concept of federalism relates to concepts that emerged in order to criticize
the excesses of modern reason. An example of this criticism could be Schiller's aesthetic
state (1875), which was directed against defective revolutionary education that sacrificed
the natural character (the sensuous impulse) for the sake of the moral character (the formal
impulse). Similarly to the Schillerian idea of the aesthetic state, but unlike modern
1
In R. Sangeeta, H. Schwarz, J.L. Villacaas, A. Moreiras, A. Shemak (eds.), The
Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies, Vol. II (H-R), Blackwell Publishing, 2016 . ISBN:
978-1-4443-3498-2.
political philosophy, the concept of federalism cannot be accused of being too abstract.
Moreover, in contrast with counter-revolutionary and conservative opposition to the
revolutionary metaphysics of the philosophes, federalism does not rely on the principle of
hierarchy.
Contrary to what Hobbes thought, although rational association of those who are
different facilitates the praxis of all the federated parties, a simultaneous natural or
sociological recognition of the particularities of the associates prevents federalism from
definitively eradicating all kinds of conflict. Federal policy remains characterized by its
contingent and provisional nature because it does not reduce to sameness the differences
that exist among its parts. In a similar manner as the Schillerian aesthetic state, a federal
unit cannot be condensed into a set of laws, rules or generic formulas that would allow us
to decide how to resolve conflicts a priori, by simply passing a federal constitution.
Moving from philosophical to political foundations, we may observe that federalism is
always linked to two basic political concepts: contract (foedus) and division of power.
Federal unity is formed by free consent and pact of those affected, from the bottom to the
top, following the gradual scale of familial, local, provincial, national, continental and
human interests. The federal conception is thus a universal or rational principle that can be
applied to any group or social sphere, as well as to all forms of government. In the
political sphere, however, the federal pact or contract should not be confused with social
contract. From a rational point of view, the latter contract precedes the federal contract that
takes place among already established societies. The confusion between the two contracts
the social and the federalwould lead to the assumption that a dissolution of a
federation would result in a return to the state of nature rather than in the disintegration of
the federal state into smaller republics, which is what happens in reality. We should stress
at least two major differences between the social contract and the federal one. The social
contract is above all hypothetical or ideal; that is, it is a form of juridical fiction, whereas
the federal contract is real and effectiveit has been really proposed, discussed, voted for
and accepted, and it may be modified if contracted parties agree. Moreover, the federal
contract, unlike the unlimited contract of Rousseau, is essentially restricted. The
contractors always maintain a considerable number of faculties and rights.
The second concept that characterizes federalism is the division of power, which is
undoubtedly the best way to combat despotism. The distribution of power among many
political leaders and various territorial institutions stimulates public liberty. Contrary to
this, Unitarianisma principle that opposes the division of power and that allows for a
concentration of power in the hands of a sole political organprevents the sustenance of
political autonomy.
Federalism opposes such concepts as empire, Unitarian state, national state or indeed
any other form of centralist politics. Nevertheless, modern federalism has not been as
complex as pre-modern federalism, and modern federations increasingly resemble
centralist states. This phenomenon may be exemplified by the history of federalism in
Latin America.

Liberal, Republican and Anarchist Federalism

Modern federalism is predominantly liberal. Its purest expression is North-American

liberalism, which has served as a model for federalism in a number of Latin-American
countries. The best literary formulation of this type of federalism may be found in the
work of the federalist writers Hamilton, Jay and Madison (1980). Dual federalism is a
theory according to which power is divided and balanced out between member states and
the federal state; that is, it is a theory that allows for the existence of two mutually exclusive
spheres of power which reciprocally limit each other. The separation between member states
and the nation frequently turns into a horizontal controlling mechanism or a constitutional
defense that facilitates the maintenance of liberties. Despite this theoretical duality and
balance, the history of US federalismas anti-federalists predictedis marked by a gradual
increment of central or federal power and by a slow approach toward the juridical and
political reality of a Unitarian state. Latin-American state federalism has been historically
confused with this liberal federalism.
Liberal federalism, which ultimately yields to the simplifying tendencies of modernity,
may be fruitfully contrasted with a republican form of federalism. The latter type draws
upon pre-modern federalism (the last great expression of which may be found in the work
of the German philosopher Johannes Althusius, Poltica [1990]), and even upon
Proudhons anarchist version of federalism (1863). In his Du prncipe fdratif, the French
philosopher aimed to establish a firm basis for authentic republicanism that would respect
differences among federated parties without relying on the hierarchical principles that
were characteristic of the Ancient Regime.
Because of the heterogeneity of the members who participate in the republican political
entity, it is necessary to avoid the disintegration of the people into an indefinite set of
individual singularities as well as to guarantee the formation of a plurality of associations
in which each particularity would have a relevant role within the whole. What matters is
not the infinite number of differences among individuals, as liberal thought presupposes.
Those differences lead to the recognition of universal and abstract laws or individual
liberties, which the state considers as its limits. Republican federalism, in opposite to this,
adopts a positive perspective, and focuses on multiple forms that serve to unite
communities or associations within which individuals live and act. Political activities of
the citizens are possible only within these groupswhich, however, modern political
philosophy has tended to treat as expressions of the apolitical civil society.
Plural unity, which is typical of federalism, is associated with a type of authority that is
foreign to the modern model of legitimate power or power authorized by the people. In
contrast to the liberal conception, the objective of the political government is not to
represent an abstract and absent entityhomogeneous people, endowed with a
unequivocal and united general willbut rather to coordinate and facilitate the
cooperation of various real human communities. The very differences among associations
and assemblies require coordination; a guide or a government. This federal authority
fulfills its mission when it reaches agreement among diverse forces that manifest
themselves in society and that constitute a political entity. However, the most relevant
element is not the government, which is responsible for the aforementioned coordination
and which is formed through an explicit agreement of the heterogeneous members of the
community, but rather the effective presence and public action of the governors of those
federal associations and assemblies. In this way, representation turns into a form of
political activity that is practiced by a multitude of components of the state; the objective
is no longer to represent the totality but within the totality. In short, the aim is not to give
shape to what is by nature absenti.e. the collective and indivisible corpus of the people
but rather to promote the political expression of multiple forces, necessities and
interests.
Republican federalism, which allows for a greater complexity of institutions than
liberal federalism, cannot coincide with populism, which has become so prevalent in Latin
America. Populist forms of politics simplify the political space with dichotomist
distinctions (Laclau 2005), whereas genuine federalismwhether in its pre-modern,
republican or anarchist versionthinks in terms of multiplicity. Contemporary populism,
as Laclau observes, criticizes liberal representation because it conceives of a government
that limits itself to the transmission of an already established will, but it continues to
understand representation as action that takes place on behalf of an absent being. Contrary
to republican federalism, the Argentinean philosopher goes on, populism creates an
enormous gap between heterogeneous and particular groups that form a community, and
the community itself, when this community is considered as a whole, composed of a set of
equal citizens (such as the people or the nation). From this populist perspective, such a
gap may only be bridged in a hegemonic way, through a particularity that assumes to
represent an incommensurable totality. For this to happen, the hegemonic force needs to
present its own particularity as an incarnation of an empty, absent or transcendent
universalitythe people. Bearing in mind for instance the Bolivarian movement led by
Chvez, it may be observed that due to its triumph in the hegemonic struggle, the
victorious particularity has the legitimate right to occupy the significant emptiness that lies
at the bottom of the people, understood as a homogeneous whole. The populist reason
therefore does not share the aspiration of federalism to create a set of heterogeneous
groups or associations that would appear as such in the public scene.
The final type of federalism worth mentioning is anarchist federalism. It originates in
the philosophy of Proudhon and is characterized by extending federal principles to all
areas, not merely political or territorial ones. In this way, it attempts to resolve the social
problem of the proletariat. Latin-American anarchism reached its splendor at the end of
the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century (Rama, Cappelletti
1990). Anarchist thought, including anti-political anarcho-syndicalism, in fact arrived to
Latin America in the 1860s, and it became significant in Argentina and Uruguay, where it
stimulated the establishment of Federacin obrera regional argentina (FORA,
Argentinean Regional Workers Federation) and its Uruguayan version, FORU. In Latin-
American agricultural environment, anarchist ideas about collective self-management
were fused with the old systems of organization and life of the indigenous peoples of
Mexico and Peru. Although initially, anarchist ideology spread more extensively and
profoundly than Marxism, in the 1930s, its power started to decline. This weakening of the
anarchist movement was caused by a general repression of the workers movement as well
as by the establishment of communist and populist parties that absorbed many libertarian
currents. This period also witnessed a confrontation of the authoritarians (the Marxists)
and the anti-authoritarians (the anarchists), and especially in Argentina, the confrontation
ended with the triumph of the former. Ever since the downfall of anarchism, only
communist or populist socialism has had the power to conquer Latin-American
institutions.
From Latin-American State Federalism to Bolivarism

In the context of the revolution that took place in Spain in 1808, and in the context
American emancipation, certain representatives of peninsular liberalism (such as Flrez
Estrada with his project of Constitution for the Spanish Nation Presented to the Supreme
Junta of Spain and the Indies (1809) and Blanco White, who published articles in El
Espaol) were conscious of the fact that the only way to keep the American provinces
within the Hispanic monarchy was to satisfy their demands for equal representation,
economic freedom and federalism (Rieu-Millan 1990). According to these liberal thinkers,
the only solution of the territorial problems of Hispanic America was to let the American
provinces elect their own and autonomous representative assemblies. However, the
majority of the peninsular members of the Courts of Cdiz believed in a centralist
monarchic government that satisfied neither the insurgents nor the Creole delegates who
were present in Cdiz; moreover, these members of the Courts of Cdiz did not even
recognize provincial committees or congresses proposed by the liberals who were more
favorably inclined towards America.
After the Wars of Independence, the most durable federal systems in Latin America
were established in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (Frondizi 1972, Carpizo
1973). The primary reason why federalism succeeded in these particular countries was the
complex territorial structure of municipios, cabildos, intendencias, diputaciones
provinciales, etc. that Spain established in its American colonies. Dual federalism of the
United States was also greatly influential and the first Latin-American states, especially
Brazil, followed this model at least formally (Fernndez Segado 2003, 15). They even
copied The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. constitution when they provided federal
communities with powers that are not expressly granted to the federation.
Federalism in the Argentinean republic also emerged as a result of the past colonial
regimes reliance on the foundation of cities which, due to their being separated by
enormous distances, gained a high degree of autonomy. Argentinean federalism emerged
in an orthodox way, from the bottom to the top. From the very beginning, starting with the
revolution of May 1810, it recognized the peculiarities of the provinces. Although the
constitutions of 1819 and 1826 were Unitarian, from the 1920s, the provinces developed a
pactist policy that culminated in the 1831 establishment of the federal pact. It was initially
signed by Buenos Aires, Entre Ros and Santa Fe, but other provinces gradually accepted
the contract as well. After the end of the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas, in May
1852, San Nicols Agreement recognized the Federal Pact of January 4, 1831. In the
following year, in 1853, the Argentinean Constitution was finally sanctioned. Its first
article declared Argentina as a federal republic.
During the colonial period, Brazil was divided into decentralized captaincies. In the era
of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves (1815-1822); that is, when
Brazil was united with Portugal, the sixteen existing captaincies were recognized as
provinces. Nevertheless, the first Brazilian constitution, which was valid until the
revolution in 1889, was markedly centralist. The outcome of the revolution, however, was
a new constitution that was sanctioned in 1891 and that adopted the federal system, with
the objective of realistically answering the needs of a country that was large and composed
of very different provinces. The constitutions adopted in 1932 and 1937 represented a
Unitarian regression, as they augmented the economic power of the federation at the
expense of the power of the federated entities. Finally, with the 1948 constitution, Brazil
returned to federalism, which it has maintained until the present day.
In nineteenth-century Mexico, federalism was advocated by the liberal party, whereas
the conservatives defended centralism. After the emancipation, the federal idea practically
served to unite provinces that were initially separated, such as Oaxaca, Guadalajara and
Zacatecas. These provinces united on condition that their autonomy be recognized.
Starting with the early federal theories of Ramos de Arispe, Mexican federalism was
primarily inspired by the dual federalism of the United States. Nevertheless, this model
had several stark opponents, such as Servando Teresa de Mier, who refused to immediately
adopt the U.S. system, arguing (in a manner that appeared realistic) that federal
institutions should be implemented when Mexico reaches the same level of civic and
technical education as its northern neighbor. The Mexican constitution from 1824 in fact
recognized the federal government, until it was substituted in 1836 with the Constitution
of the Seven Laws. Ten years later, the Ciudadela pronouncement restored the federal
constitution of 1824. Ever since, with the exception of the years 1853-55 (during the reign
of the Emperor Maximiliano), Mexico has maintained a federal regime.
From the aforementioned four Latin-American countries, Venezuela has historically
been the most centralized. In 1811, the insurgents prepared a federal constitution that was
valid until 1818. Subsequent constitutions from 1819 and 1821 were Unitarian. Only the
1830 constitution recognized certain federal elements and the so-called central-federal
regime came into existence. Admittedly, the 1864 constitution provided the provinces with
more autonomy and they were eventually denominated as states, but this constitution
was never enforced. In reality, the numerous fundamental laws that have been adopted in
Venezuela since 1864 have in their general lines followed the central-federal doctrine,
which has called for administrative decentralization rather than for authentic state
federalism. The abolition of the North-American principle of division of power (The Tenth
Amendment) in 1953 was a part of this tendency to centralize. From that year, all the
powers that have not been expressly delegated to the member states by the fundamental
law have been reserved to the national power. Finally, although the 1999 constitution of
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela claimed in its Fourth Article that Venezuela was a
decentralized federal state, the Venezuelan presidential rule continues to support the
Unitarian and centripetal historical tendencies of this country.
All the above Latin-American federal states share the following characteristics
(Fernndez Segado 2003): a rigid constitution whose reform requires the participation of
the federated entities; the recognition of the autonomy of the member states, which means
that the constitution guarantees the distribution of power between the federation and the
federated parts; the participation of the member states in the formation of the federal will
through the observing eye of the Senate; and the primacy of the federal constitution over
the constitution of autonomous regions, which is demonstrated, among other things, on the
increasing loss of tributary faculties of the member states and the frequent use of the
technique of federal intervention (Fernndez Segado 2003).
Moving away from its U.S. model of dual federalism, federalism in Latin America has
progressed towards centralization in such a manner that over the course of time, federated
states have been losing a part of their autonomy at the benefit of the organs of the entire
federation. This centralist tendency may be partly explained by excessive presidential rule,
or the traditional concentration of power in the hands of the president of the republic.
Another explanation is the fact that the federal government operates with a growing
amount of economic and tributary power, and the fact that it has at its disposal the federal
capital gives it an extraordinary strength. Therefore Latin-American federal states are
closer to centralized or Unitarian states than to dual federalism. At the same time, the
1980s witnessed the emergence of instances of cooperative federalism (the Brazilian
constitution from 1988 stands out among these instances). In these cases, the federal
government and the federated entities have cooperated in one area, for example
environmental protection, artistic heritage, social integration, etc.
Yet state federalism is not the only type of federalism in Latin America. Since the era of
emancipation, inter-state federalism has acquired a special importance. Its goal is to unite
all Latin-American states. The aspiration in fact goes back to Simn Bolvar (2007), who
in his Letter from Jamaica envisioned the creation of a general federation of Bolivia,
Peru and Colombia (which at that time included also Venezuela and Ecuador). At the
Anfictionic Congress in Panama, he went even further, proposing a perpetual
confederation among the republic of Columbia, Central America, Peru and the Mexican
states. Bolvars project was not genuinely federalist, as he was concerned with unification
and homogenization rather than with the recognition of the diversity of the parts. In
opposition to the United States, he thought that the members of the Hispanic federation
should be indivisible and centralist republics.
One of the constant issues in the history of Latin America is this longing for unity,
which Vasconcelos (1937) called Bolivarianism, opposing it to North-American
Monroism. The first two generations of twentieth-century Latin-American intellectuals
defended this ideal, in an open opposition to decimononic liberalism, which adopted the
French and the Anglo-Saxon cultures as its model. A wonderful expression of this
Bolivarian ideal was the proposition of the congress of Latin-American intellectuals
(Vasconcelos, Chocano, Elmore 1926), which the Peruvian writer Edwin Elmore
formulated in 1924 on the occasion of the centenary of the Battle of Ayacucho. The
objective of this fraternal congress of Hispano-American thinkers was to take the first step
on the long and important way towards fulfilling Bolvars project of creating the general
federation of Hispanic-American States. In 1924, Elmore claimed that the Latin-American
Union could be formed neither under the tutelage of the Pan-American Union, which was
at the time presided by Leo S. Rowe, nor under the auspices of the League of Nations,
whose committee for intellectual cooperation proved highly inefficient. In Elmores
opinion, the Pan-American Union drove Latin America to a subaltern position in relation
to the United States. For that reason, Bolivarianism has beenand continues to bean
exclusively Ibero-American or Latin-American project.

Cultural Federalism and Indigenism

In recent years, a new kind of federalism has emerged. It comes to terms with the
challenge of multiculturalism and particularly with the problem of integrating indigenous
communities into modern nation states. Cultural federalism (Velasco Gmez 2004) is a
political form which recognizes the particularities of indigenous Latin-American cultures,
and which, in opposition to nationalism, highlights the points where those who are
different converge, thus enabling the creation of a federal union. Once more, the objective
is to unite two heterogeneous principlesa natural one and a rational one. The former
leads to the recognition of diversity, whereas the latter finds reasons for equality and unity.
Federalism, it its cultural form, attempts to establish a dialogue between multi-cultural and
liberal thought. Only in this way is it possible to overcome the contradiction between the
latter ideology, whose ethnocentrism posits universal rights of the individual above the
rights of indigenous communities, and of multiculturalism, which in its more extreme
version results in profound cultural relativism as it denies the existence of any universal or
common criteria for evaluating the forms of life of every community.
A paradigmatic liberal approach to multiculturalism has been developed by Will
Kymlicka (1996). This philosopher allows for the existence of special protective rights for
certain cultural or ethnic groups, but only as long as these rights do not restrict political or
civil liberties. This means that fundamental universal and individual rights are
hierarchically superior to those of the community. From this perspective, the demands of
Latin-American indigenous groups would be framed by internal restrictions that Kymlicka
considers incompatible with democracy.
Cultural federalism coincides neither with territorial federalism that is modeled on the
United States nor with multinational federalism, which has been adopted in Canada or in
Spain, where the system of autonomous communities (comunidades autnomas)
recognizes the particularity and autonomy of the nations that are integrated into the state.
For cultural, or better said, multicultural federalism, this concession of autonomy to
indigenous communities and municipalities does not entail the risk of Balcanization, so
typical of multinational federalism, because indigenous communities do not demand being
recognized as different nations within the federal state (Velasco Gmez 2004). Cultural
federalism is ultimately related to pre-modern and republican federalism rather than to
liberal federalism, because the former two represent historical types of federalism that
keep in mind the plurality of association and communities within which people really live
and act. The rational basis of any kind of federalism nevertheless prevents it from falling
into relativism. This means that heterogeneity among groups and communities cannot be
absolute; that we should always recognize common bases which, despite their movability
and flexibility, should always allow the parts to cooperate. Without the confluence of this
double logic, federalism is not possible.

REFERENCES
 Altusio, Juan. 1990. Poltica. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
Bolvar, Simn 2007. Obra poltica y constitucional. Madrid: Tecnos.
Carpizo, Jorge. 1973. Federalismo en Latinoamrica. Mxico: UNAM.
Duso, Giuseppe, Scalone, Antonino (eds.). 2010. Come pensare il federalismo?
Nuovecategorie e trasformazionicostituzionali. Monza: Polimetrica.
Fernndez Segado, Francisco. 2003. El federalismo en Amrica Latina. Mxico:
UNAM/Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala.
Frondizi, Silvio (ed.). 1972. Los sistemas federales del continente americano. Mxico:
UNAM/FCE.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, Madison, James. 1980. The Political Theory of the
Federalist. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kymlicka, Will. 1996. Multicultural Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press.
Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. La razn populista. Buenos Aires: FCE.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1863. Du principe fdratif et de la ncessit de reconstituer
le Parti de la Rvolution. Paris: E. Dentu.
Rama, Carlos M. and Cappelletti, ngel J. (ed.). 1990. El anarquismo en Amrica
latina. Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho.
Rieu-Millan, Marie Laure. 1990. Los diputados americanos en las Cortes de Cdiz
(igualdad o independencia). Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas.
Schiller, J. C. F. 1875. Schillers Briefeber die sthetischeErziehung des Menschen.
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
Vasconcelos, Jos. 1937. Bolivarismo y Monrosmo. Temas iberoamericanos. Santiago
de Chile: Editorial Ercilla.
Vasconcelos, Jos, Chocano, Jos Santos, Elmore, Edwin, al. 1926. Poetas y bufones.
Polmica Vasconcelos-Chocano. El asesinato de Edwin Elmore. Madrid: Imprenta
Helnica.
Velasco Gmez, Ambrosio. 2004. Multiculturalismo, nacin y federalismo. Revista
Mexicana de Ciencias Polticas y Sociales, vol. XLVII, n 191: 68-83.