1.
LAHM v MAYOR
A.C. No. 7430; 15 February 2012
Facts:
On 5 September 2006, a certain David Edward Toze
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission against the members of the
Board of Trustees of the International School,
Manila. The case was raffled to the sala of the
respondent, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
During the proceedings, Toze filed a Verified Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, to which the
complainants, Martin Lahm III and James P.
Concepcion, opposed. Thereafter, the respondent
issued an Order directing the parties in the said case
to maintain the status quo ante, which consequently
reinstated Toze to his former position as
superintendent of the International School Manila.
Despite the complainants' motion for an early
resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case,
respondent maintained his Order. Thus, the complaint
praying for the respondent's disbarment for alleged
gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
Issue:
Is the respondent guilty for the gross misconduct and
violation of lawyers oath?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court concurred with the
conclusion of the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that respondent
guilty for the gross misconduct and violation of
lawyers oath. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of
a person concerned with the administration of justice;
i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or
to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.
Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the
labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue
writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining orders. However, the respondent, in
violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he
has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Further, the unfounded insistence of the respondent
on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, taken together with the delay in the resolution
of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly
show that the respondent deliberately intended to
cause prejudice to the complainants.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to
issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order contrary to the clear
import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Reference:
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court
on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
2. SUAREZ v PLATON
G.R. No. 46371; 7 February 1940
Facts:
In May 1935, respondent Lieutenant Vivencio Orais
of the Philippine Constabulary filed a complaint
charging petitioner Fortunato N. Suarez, and one
Tomas Ruedas, with sedition for vocally despising
the abuses made by government officers. The case
was subsequently dismissed after Lieutenant Orais
moved for its temporary dismissal in obedience to an
order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. In
turn, Suarez charged Orais and Damian Jimenez with
the crime of arbitrary detention for unlawfully
arresting and detaining him while riding a train going
to Calauag. During the course of the proceedings,
respondent Judge Serviliano Platon was appointed to
preside over the case. Judge Planton thereafter
dismissed the case after due consideration of all the
facts and proofs submitted. Thus, the petition for writ
of mandamus, compelling Judge Platon to reinstate
the criminal case.
Issue:
Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued?
Held:
No. The Court held that Judge Servillano Platon, in
granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for
arbitrary detention, did not abuse his discretion so
flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a
departure from the well settled rule that an inferior
tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within
the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be
controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a
matter involving the examination of evidence and the
decision of questions of law and fact, since such a
duty is not ministerial.
3. OLAZO VS JUDGE TINGA
FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a
sales application covering a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of
Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part
of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and
declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476, 4 issued on January 7,
1986, and Proclamation No. 172, 5 issued on
October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172,
Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating
a Committee on Awards whose duty was to
study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on
the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards
was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members,
in his official capacity as the Congressman of
Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the
respondent's district includes the areas covered
by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint, 6 the complainant claimed
that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards when he unduly interfered with the
complainant's sales application because of his
personal interest over the subject land. The
complainant alleged that the respondent exerted
undue pressure and influence over the complainant's
father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainant's sales application and claim the subject
land for himself. The complainant also alleged that
the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to
accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment
of the latter's alleged rights over the subject land. The
complainant further claimed that the respondent
brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez,
who is the nephew of the respondent's deceased
wife. IcHSC
As a result of the respondent's
abuse of his official functions, the complainant's
sales application was denied. The conveyance of
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales
application were subsequently given due course
by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another
parcel of land within the proclaimed areas
belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant's
brother. The complainant alleged that the
respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent's promptings, the rights to the land
were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that
in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel
for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of
rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The complainant claimed that the respondent
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of
Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he
was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the
respondent engaged in unlawful conduct
considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona
fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not
qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his
sales application by the Committee on Awards
amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No.
119.
The complainant also alleged that the
respondent violated Section 7 (b) (2) of the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the
practice of law, within the one-year prohibition
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.
The respondent denied violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He alleged that during his third term as
Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting
applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included
in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee
on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and
their respective supporting documents were
before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR
of the DENR. This office ruled over the
conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This
ruling became the basis of the decision of the
Secretary of the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held
liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since the provision
applies to lawyers in the government service who
are allowed by law to engage in private law
practice and to those who, though prohibited
from engaging in the practice of law, have
friends, former associates and relatives who are
in the active practice of law. 8 In this regard, the
respondent had already completed his third term
in Congress and his stint in the Committee on
Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he
cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility since he did
not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting
applications of the complainant and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were
not submitted to the Committee on Awards when
he was still a member.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent's actions constitute a breach
of the standard ethical conduct
1. while the respondent was still an elective
public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards;
2. when he was no longer a public official, but
a private lawyer who represented a client
before the office he was previously
connected with.
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of
Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, filed against retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for
lack of merit.
HELD:
Accountability of a government lawyer in public
office
The first charge involves a violation of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It imposes the following
restrictions in the conduct of a government
lawyer:
A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer
from using his or her public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere
with his or her public duties. We previously held
that the restriction extends to all government
lawyers who use their public offices to promote
their private interests. 12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, 13 we defined
promotion of private interest to include soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his or her
office, or may be affected by the functions of his
or her office. In Ali v. Bubong, 14 we recognized
that private interest is not limited to direct
interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest
interferes with public duty when the respondent
uses the office and his or her knowledge of the
intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15
In Vitriolo v. Dasig, 16 we found the act
of the respondent (an official of the Commission
on Higher Education) of extorting money from
persons with applications or requests pending
before her office to be a serious breach of Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.17 We reached the same
conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the
respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded
money from the complainant who had a pending
application for visas before his office. 18
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano 19 we
found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this
Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, after considering
the evidence showing that he demanded and
received money from the complainant who had a
pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the
facts of the case, we find the absence of any
concrete proof that the respondent abused his
position as a Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards in the manner defined
under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Private practice of law after separation from
public office
As proof that the respondent was
engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after
his separation from the government service, the
complainant presented the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and
the document entitled "Assurance" where the
respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the
foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us
to conclude that there was a violation of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing
definition should be correlated with R.A. No.
6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which impose certain restrictions
on government lawyers to engage in private
practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713
reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and
Transactions. In addition to
acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public
official and employee and are
hereby declared to be
unlawful: aDHCAE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and
other activities related
thereto. Public officials and
employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice
of their profession unless
 authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official
functions; . . .
These prohibitions shall continue
to apply for a period of one (1)
year after resignation, retirement,
or separation from public office,
except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but
the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter
before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not
allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. 29 By way
of exception, a government lawyer can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with his or her official
functions. 30 The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service
who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law
in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility echoes this restriction and
prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government
service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The
keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term
"intervene" which we previously interpreted to
include an act of a person who has the power to
influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated,
to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the respondent
must have accepted engagement or employment
in a matter which, by virtue of his public office,
he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists
showing that the respondent previously
interfered with the sales application covering
Manuel's land when the former was still a
member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish
that the respondent was engaged in the practice
of law.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful
conduct. From the above discussion, we already
struck down the complainant's allegation that
respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice
of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.
4. PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding
of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court
in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the
PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant
to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against
respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos.
The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan
et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central
Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became
Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGGs
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and
his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service.
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the adverse
interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it
is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents
et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is
still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-
interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The
key is unlocking the meaning of matter and the
metes and bounds of intervention that he made on
the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or the act
of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the
case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in the
Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds
of the intervention. The applicable meaning as the
term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that
it is an act of a person who has the power to influence
the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be
remedied by the Code do not exist where the
government lawyer does not act which can be
considered as innocuous such as drafting,
enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract
principles of law. The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role
of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the
claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of
the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office
or employ. Indeed, the restriction against a
public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests
extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which
he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes
this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who
once held public office. A plain reading shows that
the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once
served in the government and 2. relates to his
accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the service.
5. Bernardo v. Mejia
FACTS:
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr.
accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the
following administrative offenses:
1) Misappropriating and converting to his
personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00
entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00
entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in
connection with the registration of title of Bernardo
to another property in a subdivision known as Valle
Verde V;
2) Falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated
March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by
Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainants affidavit
dates October 4, 1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22,
1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly
executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor,
in Bernardos favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without
funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from
Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter,
replacing said check with others known also to be
insufficiently funded.
ISSUE: Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in
the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the
sound discretion of the Court.
HELD:
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character, a fit and proper person to practice
law. The Court will take into consideration the
applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent
to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed
between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. The Court is inclined to grant the
present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia
was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment.
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for
Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the
fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While
the age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are
not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992,
no other transgression has been attributed to him, and
he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it
also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed
not to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the continuing requirements for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.
6. Tapucar vs Tapucar A.C. No. 4148
FACTS: Complainant Remedios Tapucar and
respondent Atty. Lauro Tapucar were married with 11
children (8 in Antipolo, next 3 in Butuan City). When
respondent became a CFI judge in Butuan City, he
cohabited with Elena Pea of whom he had 2
children. A certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for
immorality. After investigation, the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six months
without pay was meted by this Court upon
respondent.
Despite this penalty, respondent still
continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct.
These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and
separation from the service. But his dismissal as a
judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways, and
even continued living with Elena. Moreover, he
completely abandoned complainant and his children.
 Respondent later contracted marriage with
Elena in Antipolo while the respondent's marriage to
complainant subsists. Upon knowing of that her
children allegedly misery because of their father's
acts, including deception and intrigues against them.
Complainant filed (her daughter as counsel) the
present petition for disbarment under the compulsion
of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her
children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own
father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents actuations
merit the penalty of disbarment?
RULING: YES. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Members of the Bar, must live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession,
by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers
must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as
well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct
both public and private fails this scrutiny
would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
In the case at bar, keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating
complainant and their children, show his disregard of
family obligations, morality and decency, the law and
the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondent's character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance
of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of
the administration of justice in peril, hence the need
for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
7. CONRADO QUE vs ATTY. ANASTACIO
REVILLA, JR.
Facts: In a complaint for disbarment Conrado Que
(complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio RevillaJr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline(IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing
the following violations of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Complainant alleged the respondents
commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject
cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own
personal gain and to defeat the right of the
complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC
and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case. In
his Answer, the respondent declared that he is a
member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative
(KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the
underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and
those marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed
to take over the cases formerly handled by other
KDC members. Investigating Commissioner ruled
that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions
for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of
judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief
were all done to prevent the execution of the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer case and
constituted prohibited forum-shopping.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum
shopping.
Held: YES. Respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
Respondent violated Rule 12.02 and Rule12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of
which are directed against the filing of multiple
actions to attain the same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes they tend to
degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on
orderly judicial procedure; and add to the congestion
of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
In the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari
to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantially erroneous)
move, the respondents subsequent petitions
involving the same property and the same parties not
only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable
ruling using different forum, but his obvious
objective as well of preventing the execution of
MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer
case against his clients. This intent is most obvious
with respect to the petitions for annulment of
judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards
preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer
decision, long after this decision had become final.
Hence, Atty. Anastacio Revilla,Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for violations of the 2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the
Lawyers Oath and Canons of Professional improper calling card of Labiano.
Responsibility and should be disbarred from the
HELD:
practice of law.
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not
steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result
8. Linsangan v. Tolentino AC 6672
or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty.
Linsangans clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an
FACTS: unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice.
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and
administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, pirated a client of Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the
Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was
affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangans allegations. connected to his law office. Through Labianos
actions, Atty. Tolentinos law practice was benefited.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
Labianos calling card which appears as follows: representation on the strength of Labianos word that
Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable
result.
FRONT Labianos calling card* is improper.
The card made it appear that the law office will
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a
LAW OFFICE lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
client.
Fe Marie L. Labiano
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers
Paralegal
independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to
BACK ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
SERVICES OFFERED: the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH consider his own recovery rather than that of his
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
ABROAD. of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
the clients cause.
In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing The phrase in the calling card which states w/
Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of financial assistance, was clearly used to entice
such calling cards. clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
ISSUES:
actions.
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
However, since there is no substantial evidence to
encroached upon the professional services of Atty.
prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct
Pedro Linsangan.
hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot
be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the
infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was
suspended by the Supreme Court for one year.
*NOTE: Professional calling cards may only contain
the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is
connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced
9. People v. Maceda, 89591-96, 24 January 2000
FACTS:
Judge Maceda issued an order giving Atty. Del
Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana
with the obligation "to hold and detain" Javellana in
Del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court. The order,
however, was not strictly complied with as Javellana
went about his normal activities, including engaging
in the practice of law.
During the pendency of G.R. No. 89591-96, private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana filed a motion
seeking permission from this Court to be allowed to
appear as counsel for accused Patino in a criminal
case. This Court denied his motion and ruled that
being a detention prisoner, he cannot be allowed to
appear as counsel for the aforesaid accused.|||
Javellana had been arrested based on the filing of
criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
deemed to be under the custody of the law. Thus,
Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as
a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. Further, the Court deemed that the perceived
threats to Javellana's life no longer exist. Hence, the
Order giving custody over Javellana to the clerk of
court was set aside and Javellana was ordered
detained at the Provincial Jail.
ISSUE: Is Javellana, having been a detention
prisoner, allowed to practice his profession?
HELD: He is not allowed to practice his profession.
DISCUSSION:
PERSON UNDER DETENTION CANNOT
PRACTICE HIS PROFESSION. As a matter of
law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested,
he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He
is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.
10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the Land Registration Authority,
petitioner, vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the construction by
respondent Kenrick Devt Corp. of a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located
behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. Respondent
justified its action with a claim of ownership by
presenting Transfer Certificate of Titles. The OSG
then filed a complaint for annulment of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
against respondent. During the pendency of the case,
the Senate conducted a hearing in aid of legislation
on the matter of land registration and titling. One of
those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent's
former counsel. He testified that he prepared
respondent's answer and transmitted an unsigned
draft to respondent's president, Mr. Victor Ong.
The signature appearing above his name was not
his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf
either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
The Republic moved to declare respondent in default,
predicated on its failure to file a valid answer arguing
that, since the person who signed the answer was
neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known
to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned
pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, it was a mere scrap of paper and produced
no legal effect.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Republic and found
respondent's answer to be sham and false and
intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.
The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals and
later concluded that when Atty. Garlitos assented to
the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead,
this supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had.
ISSUE: Is the pleading, not having been signed
personally by the counsel, an invalid one?
HELD:
The Supreme Court did not uphold the CAs decision
holding that counsel's authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate
it to just any person.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims
Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise
void. There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by
him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone,
by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of
the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do
so in favor of one who is not. The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:
Violation: Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate
to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts
to signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes.
11. Zeta v. Malinao
Facts
Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of
First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar was charged of
administrative complaints, as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR.
Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an
attorney.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being
employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land
rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal
court in this town involving himself and his men. He
incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over the judges.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information
has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in
the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the
municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time
record as present. He receives salary for those absent
days.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable
information it is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession
or business without permission from the Department
Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that
permission because he should not be allowed to
practice as he is not an attorney.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic)
for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not
engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty
and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if
true, carry the day for him, considering that in
appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified
his time record of service to conceal his absence from
his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel
under the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a
more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative
than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court
or investigative body wherein Only members of the
bar are allowed to practice.
12. Tan v. Balajadia
Facts
Petition for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio
Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
Respondent filed a criminal case against them for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation
of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from
respondent. In the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City xxx" However, certifications issued by
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has
never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence,
petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect
contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation
in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a
practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims
that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared
the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned
after Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. It appears
that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same
subject matter
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is
liable for indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
x x x x.
In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-
settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence
makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the
allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result
of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent
as to make him liable for indirect contempt.
15. PANGAN V. RAMOS
AC No. 1053
7 September 1979
FACTS:
1. Atty. Dionisio Ramos, the respondent, asked for a
postponement of the hearing of this case for the
reason that on said date he had a scheduled hearing at
Branch VII CFI Manila.
2. To know if it was true, the counsel for the
complainant went to Branch VII. He found out what
was on the record was one Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos.
Respondent admits that he used said name and that he
has a right to do so because in his birth certificate his
name is Pedro Dionisio Ramos and his parents are
Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw and that the D.D.
in Pedro D.D. Ramos is but an abbreviation of
Dionisio Dayaw, his other given name and
maternal surname.
ISSUE: May the respondent use Pedro D.D. Ramos?
HELD:
1. No. The name appearing in the Roll of Attorneys is
Dionisio D. Ramos. A lawyer is not authorized to
use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in the practice of law.
2. The official oath obliges the lawyer solemnly to
swear that he will do no falsehood. In representing
himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of
Dionisio D. Ramos, he violated his solemn oath. He,
in effect, resorted to deception. He demonstrated lack
of candor in dealing with the courts.
RULING: Respondent is severely REPRIMANDED.
16. ARTIAGA V. VILLANUEVA
AC No. 1892
19 July 1988
FACTS:
1. This complaint against Atty. Villanueva stems from
a civil case (a long-running land dispute) in which
both Artiaga and Villanueva are opposing counsels
for their respective clients.
2. Backgrounder of the civil case:
a. 3 parcels of land are being in dispute. The first
parcel is owned by the client (Estolano) of the
petitioner. The second and third parcels were
transferred to Estolano through sale by previous
owners. The clients (Aquino and Guanzon) of the
respondent filed a Revocable Permit Application over
8,000 square meters of land covering a part of both
parcels of land now owned by Estolano.
b. Bureau of Lands took cognizance of this conflict
and ruled in favour of Estolano. Private respondents
appealed the Decision of the Director of Lands but
was denied. They appealed again to the Secretary of
Agriculture and to the Office of the President but all
was denied.
c. But the clients of the respondent remained in
possession of the lands despite the order of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands.
d. Respondents clients filed a complaint of forcible
entry against Estolano but was dismissed by the
Court.
e. Again, Respondent filed a case of annulment of
Estolanos title but was dismissed by the Court.
f. And then again Respondent filed a complaint
against Estolano and the Director of Bureau of Lands
in the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CAR
dismissed the case and on appeal, was also dismissed
by the CA.
3. Artiaga then charged the respondent with the
following:
a. caused his client to perjure himself
b. lacks candor toward his adversary and the courts
c. abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.
ISSUE: Did the Respondent violate his Lawyers
Oath and the Canons?
HELD:
1. Yes, on all three charges.
2. On the first charge, the Respondent allowed his
client Aquino to perjure himself in the case of
forcible entry. In the original complaint, respondents
client alleged that he was dispossessed of his lands in
1960 but in the amended complaint, Aquino alleged
that the forcible entry happened in 1973. Clearly this
was a ploy concocted by the respondent for the court
to acquire jurisdiction of the case since a forcible
entry case must be filed 1 year from the accrual of the
cause of action. Instead of safeguarding the interest
of his client, respondent caused his client to commit a
felony. His client is now facing perjury charges in the
court. This lack of candor of the respondent towards
the court and his adversary is evident. He employed
every step to forestall petitioners clients from taking
rightful possession of said property.
3. Respondent also filed a case annulling the title of
Estolano and was dismissed. He filed an appeal to
CA. But while pending the resolution of this appeal,
he filed another case in the Court of Agrarian
Relations when he knows that there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
4. The cause of respondents client is clearly without
merit. Respondent was well aware of this fact so he
resorted to forum shopping and thereby adding to the
already clogged dockets of the courts. He clearly
abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing
multiple complaints for a cause which has been
previously rejected by the courts, thus obstructing the
administration of justice.
RULING: The Respondent is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until such
time that he can demonstrate to the Court that he has
rehabilitated himself
19. In re: Sotto
January 21, 1949
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt in
connection with his written statement of the Supreme
Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case,
which was published in Manila Times and in other
newspapers in the locality. Sotto was given ten days
more besides the five originally given him to file his
answer, and although his answer was filed after the
expiration of the period of time given him the said
answer was admitted. He does not deny the
authenticity of the statement as it has been published.
He however, contends that under section13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the
Supreme Court has no power to impose correctional
penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to
be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that
"in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the Constitution, the respondent made his
statement in the press with the utmost good faith and
with no intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in
his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but
he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty
or integrity of any one.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

HELD: The Court finds that the respondent Sotto
knowingly published false imputations against its
members.
He accused them of such depravity as to have
committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He
has maliciously branded them to be incompetent,
narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril
to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those
who were the honor and glory of the Philippines
judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be
rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing
replacement by better qualified justices. Respondent
has not presented any evidence or offered any to
support his slanderous imputations, and no single
word can be found in his answer showing that he ever
believed that the imputations are based on fact. It is
also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to be respectful in
his conduct and communication to the courts, he may
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
20. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGEOF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS
OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THESUPREME
COURT
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH 2011
FACTS: SC Justice Mariano Del Castillo rendered a
decision in Vinuya, et al v. Executive Secretary
(G.R.No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty.Bagares) for Vinuya, et al (the Malaya
Lolas), filed a supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, on the ground that, inter alia, charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision and a twisting
of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia was made to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition. Works
allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents
article A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens; (2)
Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis
article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime. Such supplemental motion for
reconsideration appeared on internet sites. Thereafter,
a statement entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was
submitted by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone to the Court
through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The
statement basically conveys that the plagiarism
committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive
Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of
the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and
professional competence expected of the Supreme
Court. The SC Ethics Committee referred this matter
to the Court en banc. The high court said the UP law
professors statement was evidently intended to
discredit its April 28 decision on the Vinuya et al. v
the Executive Secretary et al. case. It claimed that the
law faculty wanted to undermine the courts honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion
for reconsideration of 70 comfort women.
Accordingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law
faculty-signatories to show cause, within ten (10)days
from receipt why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11
and13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers, whether they are judges, court
employees, professors or private practitioners, are
officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an
oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission
to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts.
The administrative matter is decided by reminding
the Thirty-five UP professors of their duty as officers
of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone was
admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as a
member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a
Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned
that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of
his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. The Show Cause Resolution does not
interfere with respondents academic freedom. Even
if the Court was willing to accept respondents
proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their
duty to participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration
of justice under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they
have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the
demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect
to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid
conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members
of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which
canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this
indulgence, since they are expected to provide their
students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof. The Court finds that there was
indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents
knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the
Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya
decision itself, at the time of the Statements
issuance, were still both subjudice or pending final
disposition of the Court.
21. RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGABUYO,
FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
FACTS: The administrative case has its roots from
the case of People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza heard before
the sala of Judge Jose Manuel Tan, Regional trial
court of Surigao City, Branch 29. Luis Bucalon, was
found to be guilty of homicide and not murder with
the evidence as basis. Counsel of the defense
thereafter filed a motion to fix that amount of bail
bond, with which Senior state prosecutor and
deputized prosecutor of the case Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo contests stating that murder is non-
bailable. Atty. Bagabuyo thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was consequently denied.
Hence, instead of resorting to his available judicial
remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article in the August 18, 2003 issue of Mindanao
Gold Star Daily. Atty. Bagabuyo again resorted to the
media, after he was ordered arrested and put up a bail
of P100,000.00 this time at Radio Station DXKS. He
attacked once again Judge Tan and his disposition on
the proceedings of People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bagabuyo has violated
the Code of professional conduct.
HELD: Atty. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
the code of professional conduct Canon 13, Rule
13.02 which states that a lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. That instead of resorting to the available
judicial remedies before him, Atty. Bagabuyo has
degraded the dignity and authority of the court and
the presiding judge, as well as promoted distrust in
the administration of justice when he resorted to
media and declared his complaints there. Atty.
Bagabuyo is also cited for violation of Canon 11,
when he disrespected the courts and the judicial
officers and Rule 11.05 when he did not submit
grievances against a judge to proper authorities only.
22. G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995
THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA
M. TIONGCO, petitioners, vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC,
Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO
and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.
Facts:
1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He characterized the
decision of respondent Judge as having
been crafted in order to fool the winning
party; as a hypocritical judgment in
plaintiffs favour; one with perfidious for the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial
character.
2. In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11
October 1994, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar"
"thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is
because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious
and blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First
Division, however, forget, that the
undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber"
(Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a
"rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26)
and "abetter" of graft and shady deals
(Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the
other hand, if the undersigned called
anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he
is indeed cross-eyed particularly when he
sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-
word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of
Professional Responsibility and therefore
stands in dire need of amendment which
punishes lawyer who truthfully expose
incompetent and corrupt judges before this
Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore,
respectfully submitted, that for all his pains,
the undersigned does not deserve or is
entitled to the honors of being dealt with
administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
undersigned respectfully prays of this
Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear
from turning the undersigned into a martyr
to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S
RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND
UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble,
66 word).
3. Tiongco described respondent as a liar,
perjurer or blasphemer.
Ruling:
The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is
closely entwined with his vow in the lawyers oath
to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity
to the courts, his duty under Section 20(b) of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers, and his duty under the first canon to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.
 The use of unnecessary /offensive and
abusive/abrasive and offensive language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts creates or promotes
distrust in judicial administration or tends necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the
integrity of the members of the Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by the Court.
In the case at bar Tiongco had exceeded the
bounds of decency and propriety in making the false
and malicious insinuation against this Court. Such
could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was
not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only
come from one who seems to be of that frame of
mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law
and justice whatever he believes to be right in his
own opinion and as contrary to law and justice
whatever does not accord with his views. Tiongco
was fined Php 5,000 plus warning.
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que
(complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing
the following violations of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and
processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment
of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC
and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the
RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and
overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful
detainer case rendered against the respondents
clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC
and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants
and his siblings titles over the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping
by filing the subject cases in order to impede,
obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of
justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the
right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful
detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect
towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to
falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice. The
respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary
order issued by the presiding judge in open court
which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by
the respondents in the said case. The complainant
alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his
lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his
clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.[4]
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood
that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name
and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico
(Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the
respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for
annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of
whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent
appearance in the second petition for annulment of
title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines
without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No.
Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given
to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the
complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a
member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative
(KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the
underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and
those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He
agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by
other KDC members. One of these cases was the
unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty.
Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were
the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were
the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment
complaint, the respondent (revilla) professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions
complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the
interests of his clients in their property. The
respondent asserted that these petitions were all based
on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC
and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer
case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty.
Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the
complainant and his family against his clients; he
discovered that the allegedly detained property did
not really belong to the complainant and his family
but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that
his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and
a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his
legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the
petition for annulment of judgment (covered by
paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the
respondent maintained that his allegations were based
on his observations and the notes he had taken during
the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated
in open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any
unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He
claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-
48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he
immediately rectified his error by dropping them
from the case. On the petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31
out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification
constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on
forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied
having represented the Republic of the Philippines in
the second petition for annulment of title. The
respondent pointed out that there was no allegation
whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both
the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the
Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the
petition embodied a request to the Office of the
Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.
[6]
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any
illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed
that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them
and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as
a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend
the interests of his clients. The respondent
additionally claimed that the disbarment case was
filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P.
Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7]
before the IBP that the present complaint violated the
rule on forum shopping considering that the subject
cases were also the ones on which a complaint was
filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by
Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline. The respondent also posited that the
present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and
defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly,
to harass his clients who are marginalized members
of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance
on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-
48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan[8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan)
found all the charges against the respondent
meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he
stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to
defend and protect the cause and rights of his client
with all the fervor and energy within his command,
yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the
lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of
the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is
not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor.
He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of
suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]
On the first charge on abuse of court processes,
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the
unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies
to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the
MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case
against his clients.[10]
On the second charge, the Investigating
Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in
filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition
for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for
declaratory relief were all done to prevent the
execution of the final judgment in the unlawful
detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-
shopping.[11]
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing
with the court as shown in his petition for annulment
of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed
acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of
which were untrue. [12]
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating
Commissioner disregarded the respondents
explanation that he had no intention to represent
without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom
were already deceased) in the petition for annulment
of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the
Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely
glossed over the representation issue by claiming that
the authority given by a majority of the litigants
complied with the certification of non-forum
shopping requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed aside the
respondents argument regarding his
misrepresentation in the second complaint for
annulment of title since he knew very well that only
the Solicitor General can institute an action for
reversion on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent
solely signed the amended complaint for and on
behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and
recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On
reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the
respondents suspension from the practice of law to
one (1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the
respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct,
and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint
is not the only one so far filed involving the
respondent; another complaint invoking similar
grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders,
Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from
the practice of law for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in
the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a
suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency
subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6)
months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the
conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court procedures and
processes to shield his clients from the execution of
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the
unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari
(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for
the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to question the final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In
dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the
petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be
rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily
demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the
petition for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a
petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an
ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the
motion to dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil
Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the
complainants title to the property involved in the
unlawful detainer case. The records show that these
petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal
personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the
petition.[19]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for
annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a
petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and
his siblings from exercising their rights over the same
property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of
the complainants title because the property is a part
of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for
injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in
several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition
for annulment of judgment, the second petition for
annulment of complainants title and the petition for
declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence
in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in
the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated
attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of
his client. These are already uncalled for measures to
avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent
violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it
obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used
procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy
and efficient administration of justice, resulting in
prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum
shopping, both of which are directed against the
filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective.
Both violations constitute abuse of court processes;
they tend to degrade the administration of justice;
wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[22] and
add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets
of the courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question
the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally
legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the
respondents subsequent petitions involving the same
property and the same parties not only demonstrate
his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different
fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing
the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent
is most obvious with respect to the petitions for
annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both
geared towards preventing the execution of the
unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision
had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent
committed willful,
intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings
he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed
before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds
for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was
alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as
follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants
therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper
remedy then available after receipt of the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold
out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein)
by keeping them away to the Court and in complete
ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of
compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging
representing them when in truth and in fact, have
connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at
his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner
(defendants therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the
respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition
with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the
decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC
are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no
doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it
involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague, another violation
we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious
subterfuge when he filed his second petition for
annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful
attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion proceedings of
public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private
party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the
respondent and his clients requested that they be
represented by the Solicitor General in the
proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was
simply impleaded in the amended petition without its
consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed
the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel
for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the
respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate
and waste its resources on an unauthorized and
unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his
motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his
petition for annulment of judgment where he
misrepresented to the court and his clients what
actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in
this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing
(June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have
argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the
Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the
presence and within the hearing distance of all the
plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of
the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled
hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the
respondents application for temporary restraining
order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys
motion to dismiss.[28] The records also show that
RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents
application for injunctive relief pending the
resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the
adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically
the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by
the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the
allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not
true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even
without stating the factual and legal bases as
required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are
no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation
by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court
interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.
[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge
of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took
advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him
by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them
to support, through their affidavits, his false claims
on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002
hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to
observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the
court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an
artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an
attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to
remember that his duty as an officer of the court
makes him an indispensable participant in the
administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected
to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33]
His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the
truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any
manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his
clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to
his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the
court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also
failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS
CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
clients x x x
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his
client, to employ only such means as are consistent
with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute
clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the
respondent did to prevent the execution of the
judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition
for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked
(as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late
Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect,
corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for
the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to
demonstrate how he came upon his accusation
against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own
admission, only participated in the cases previously
assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the
same time, the respondents petition for annulment of
judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the
MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer
case for the reason that the respondent believed the
said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the
respondent has been less than fair in his professional
relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for
violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues. He was unfair because he
imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without
showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively
maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable
to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans
finding that the respondent twice represented parties
without proper authorization: first, in the petition for
annulment of judgment; and second, in the second
petition for annulment of title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the
respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom
gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did
not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand
explanation that he truly believed that a majority of
the litigants who signed the certification of non-
forum shopping in the petition already gave him the
necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it
highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have
been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the
respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of
law for more than 30 years and who received rigid
and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the
University of the Philippines College of Law and in
the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of
compliance with the rule on the certification of non-
forum shopping glossed over the real charge of
appearing in court without the proper authorization of
the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second
complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew
that only the Solicitor General can legally represent
the Republic of the Philippines in actions for
reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended
petition where he impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and
consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the
Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended
complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and
the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21
and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he
undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled
rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant
without authority from the latter or from the latters
representative or, in the absence thereof, without
leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized
appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case
constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants
disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for
professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking unconscientious advantage of another.
Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we
said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of law, together
with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious."[42]
Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior
purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind,
they may be deduced from the attendant
circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts
and statements of the person whose state of mind is
the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad
faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw
this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the
dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared
towards forestalling the execution of the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took
advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and
misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the
presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part
of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit
of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions,
considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting
theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he
filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and
honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot
means to achieve his objective of avoiding the
execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against
his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his
discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss
to note that this was the same defense he raised in the
first disbarment case.[44] As we explained in Plus
Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in
acting for his client can never be at the expense of
truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of his clients case
with the end in view of promoting respect for the law
and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always
remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to
the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state,
the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued
at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice, and it must be done within the bounds of
reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does
not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim
that the disbarment case was filed because the
counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to
grind against him. We reject this argument,
considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the
present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only
the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his
own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders
the underlying motives of the complainants
unimportant and with very little relevance. The
purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as
an officer of the court and a participant in the
dispensation of justice an issue where the
complainants personal motives have little relevance.
For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information
of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in
the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged
personal motivation that drove the complainant Que
and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the
exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past
record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to
disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice, we believe and
so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He
is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of
everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice,
this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is
not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and
Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating
with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We
showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly
treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did
not learn any lesson from his past experience and
since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is
time to put a finis to the respondents professional
legal career for the sake of the public, the profession
and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated
December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-
657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is
found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01
and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the
respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice
of law.