#11
Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. CA
Facts:
PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) to pass through NCLEX as the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and SapangMaragul via
Magalang, Pampanga were heavily damaged by the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that operates and maintains
NCLEX, was furnished with the copy of the request to comment on.
Thereafter, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum
Agreement wherein PNCC was also furnished with a copy. The latter
was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX provided they
abide to the terms and conditions agreed upon. At around 2:30
a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Send in, the PNCC security
supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente
Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX and saw a
pile of sugarcane in the middle portion. Sendin, Ducusin and
Pascual requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was hazardous
for the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO's
equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them
that no equipment operator was available as it was still very early.
Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned
the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived,
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked
the sugarcane at the side of the road leaving a few flattened
sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes
had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought
there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already
approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and
lane dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto,
Bulacan, and made the necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m.,
Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate
number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour.
He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend
RicardoGeneralao on their way to Baguio to attend their
grandmother's first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran overthe
scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several
times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from
the scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car
was totally wrecked.
Issue:
Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco
and PNCC and the latter be made to pay for damages.
Held:
Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable. There are three
elements of a quasi-delict:(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;(b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and(c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.[31]Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed b y the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would do.[32]It also refers to
the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that
the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury.[33]The Court declared the test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith ,[34] viz :In the case at
bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The petitioner
should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would
endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the
morning. The petitioner cannot escape liability under the
MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was
not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA:
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should
be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the
expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties.
The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a
private agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free
from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but
evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left
flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.
There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that
there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the toll way.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz's car
ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a hauler truck.
[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, the MOA refers to
accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover
damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX
who are not privies to the MOA .PASUDECO's negligence in
1
transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of
PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two
successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate
cause of Latagan's injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are
jointly and severally liable.
#12
Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.,
G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012
Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit
Hotel, invited her friend, Dr. Genevieve L.Huang, for a swim at the
hotels pool.
At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels pool attendant informed them that
the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the
shower room adjacent to the swimming
pool to take a shower anddress up. When they came out of the
bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black
and there were theonly ones there. The doors were also locked.
After some time, Huang saw a phone behind the lifeguards
counter.As she went inside, the wooden countertop fell onher head
and knocked her down almost unconscious. Delia immediately
notified the hotel phone operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance
door of the swimming pool area and gave her an icepack.Huang
demanded the services of the hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr.
Dalumpines, instead of immediately providingthe needed medical
assistance, presented a Waiver and demanded that it be signed
by Huang, otherwise, the hotelmanagement will not render her any
assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the hotel.Thereupon,
Huang consulted several doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because
she began experiencing on and off severeheadaches that negligence but not on any breach of contract.Presently, she claims
caused her three sleepless nights. They all said she had a serious
brain injury.In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material
allegations. According to them, a sufficient notice on the glass door
ofthe hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the
people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool areais
open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless, the lights thereon are
kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2)housekeeping
personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings;
and (3) people doing their exercise routineat the Slimmers World
Gym, which was open until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in
the hotels swimming pool areawere turned off, it would not render
the area completely dark as the Slimmers World Gym near it was
well- illuminated.Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse) was
informed that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She
hurriedlywent to the pool area. Although Huang looked normal as
there was no indication of any blood or bruise on her head,
Ms.Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to
which she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and shedid not
need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid
cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpinescame to check
Huangs condition. Huang insisted that she was fine and that the
hirudoid cream was enough. Dr.Dalumpines requested Huang to
execute a handwritten certification regarding the incident that
occurred that night. An X-Ray test was also suggested to Huang
but she replied that it was not necessary. She also refused further
medical attention.On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for
damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed the
Complaint for lackof merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly raises the
defense on breach of contract. She maintains that that an implied
contractexisted between them in view of the fact that the hotel
guest status extends to all those who avail of its
services its patrons and invitees. The CA
affirmed the TCs decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for
certiorari under Rule 45.She also avows that the doctrines ofres
ipsa loquitur andrespondeat superior are applicable in this case. It
was anaccident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not
present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is
normallyexpected of them because they negligently locked the
main entrance door of the hotels swimming pool area.
Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.
Held:
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their
that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and
breach of contract. A perusal of thecomplaint evidently shows that
her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict (negligence). It
is evident from thecomplaint and from her open court testimony
that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed
against her byrespondents, through their management and staff. In
quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is
incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence ofthe
defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed. In a
2
breach of contract, negligence is presumed solong as it can be
proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on
the defendant to prove that there was nonegligence in the carrying
out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed. It is now too late toraise the said argument for the first
time before the SC without causing injustice.As Huangs cause of
action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove
the presence of the followingrequisites before respondents PHI and
Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b)fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connectionof
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is
for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of heraction. The burden of proof is
upon her.Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed
to prove the alleged negligence of respondents. Other than herself-
serving testimony that all the lights in the hotels swimming pool
area were shut off and the door was locked, whichallegedly
prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury,no other evidence
was presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion
during the night of the accident insidethe hotels swimming pool
area was never presented to corroborate her allegations.On the
other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents positively
declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel
management not to put offthe lights until 10pm. to allow the
housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings, including thetoilets and counters. There is a remote
possibility that the hotels swimming pool area was in complete
darkness as theaforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the
lights radiate to the hotels swimming pool area.Ergo, she cannot
faultthe Hotel for the injury she allegedly suffered because she
herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that itwas
only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of hisinjury, she then
cannot recover damages.Even Huangs assertion of negligence on
the part of respondents in not rendering medical assistance to her
is preposterous.Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents
afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate
accidentinside the hotels swimming pool facility. Moreover, the
Hotel shouldered the expenses for the MRI services at the
MakatiMed.Res Ipsa Loquitur&RespondeatSuperior :With regard to
Huangs contention that the principles
ofresipsaloquitur andrespondeat superior are applicable in this
case, this Court holds otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
whichliterally means the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference
tothe cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case.
The doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence
or presence of negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that
respondentsstaff negligently turned off thelights and locked the
door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on Huangs
head had she not lifted the same.Records showed that she lifted
the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her
head.Doctrine ofrespondeat superior finds no application in the
absence of any showing that the employees of respondentswere
negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the CA found no
negligence on the part of the employees ofrespondents, thus, the
latter cannot also be held liable for negligence. With the foregoing,
the following were clearlyestablished, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed
in the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2)
she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head;and (3) respondents extended medical assistance to her. As
such, no negligence can be attributed either to or to their staff
and/or management.Third element:On the issue on
whetherHuangsdebilitating and permanent injuries were the result
of the accident she
suffered at the hotels swimming pool area, theCourt holds that
there is no cogent reason to depart from thelower courts findings.
(1)Huang had a past medical history which might have been the
cause of her recurring brain injury.(2)The findings of Dr. Perez
did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident
and the brain damagesuffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified
that the symptoms being experienced might have been due to
factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered.(3)Dr.
Sanchezs testimony was hearsay. (4)Medical
reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors
whom petitioner sought for examinationor treatment were neither
identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed
as hearsay, theycannot be given probative value.All told, in the
absence of negligence on the part of respondents as well as their
management and staff, they cannot bemade liable to pay for the
millions of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it
necessarily follows that FirstLepanto cannot also be made liable
under the contract of Insurance.
#13
Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 147)
3
Facts: a motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a
Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his traffic regulation. Petitioners herein failed to present satisfactory
father, co-petitioner herein. The jeep collided with the delivery evidence to overcome this legal presumption. Therefore they shall
van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while travelling on the National be liable for the loss of Reyes life.
Highway in Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake a fiera which
had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the curve and moved in
the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the
vehicle he saw the delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles
collided. The points of collision were the and the left rear portion of
the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van.
The 2 right wheels of thedelivery van were on the right shoulder of #14
the road and pieces ofdebris from the accident were found
scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of
the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact caused the
jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to
its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died
due to the gravity of his injuries.

The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from

Mallari, Jr. and Sr. and Bulletin as well. The trial court found that the
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver of
the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front
portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped the left rear portion of
the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision
of the lower court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent.
Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the
death of Reyes.

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held
that Mallari Jr. and Sr. who are responsible for the death of Reyes.
The collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the
collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook
a Fierawhich had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van
driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. This act of
overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA
4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his
proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and
not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Article 2185 of the NCC,
there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving

4
#15
PLDT v CAGR No. 57079September 29, 1989
Facts:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an
earth mound andfell in an open trench on the road resulting to
slight injuries to the husband and serious injuries to the wife. The
windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the
accident.Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of
lack of warning signs placednear the manhole dug resulting on the
earth mound on the road causing injuries to thewife. PLDT contends
the injuries were the result of the negligence of the
independentcontractor the company hired (Barte) and should be
the one held liable and not thecompany. RTC ruled in favour of the
spouses while the CA under Justice Agrava asponente reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses
Esteban
Held:
PLDT and Bartecontends that the independent contractor placed
signs on theroad and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban because
he did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly
swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting the earthmound. SC
finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original
decisionthat the accident which befell private respondents was due
to the lack of diligence ofrespondent Antonio Esteban and was not
imputable to negligent omission on the part ofpetitioner PLDT. The
findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
AntonioEsteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those
of his wife but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, andthereby precludes
their right to recover damages. The presences of warning signs
couldnot have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose
of said signs was toinform and warn the public of the presence of
excavations on the site. The privaterespondents already knew of
the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack ofknowledge
of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall
into theexcavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the
jeep from the inside lanetowards the accident mound.
#16
SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.
Facts:
Clara UY Bico and AmparoServando loaded on board the Philippine
SteamNavigation vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to
Pulupundan, Negros Occidental,cargoes of rice and colored paper
as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the
carrierUpon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of
November 18, 1963,the cargoes were discharged, complete and in
good order, unto the warehouse of theBureau of Customs.About
2:00 p.m. of the same day, said warehouse was razed by afire of
unknown origin, destroying Servandos cargoes.
Issue:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the goods.
Held:No.
1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the duty
to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are
unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee
or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice
to the provisions of Article 1738. The court a quo held that the
delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article
1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before
actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the
loss is chargeable against the appellant.
5
2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading MERCURY DRUG v. SPS. HUANG
issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the
responsibility of the carrier. The stipulation is valid not being FACTS:
contrary to law, morals or public policy.
Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of asix-
3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation does not wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641Page 20
bind them since it was printed at the back of the B/L and that they of 25(truck). It has in its employ petitioner
did not sign the same. However, as the Court held in OngYiu vs. CA, Rolando J. del Rosario asdriver. Respondent spouses Richard and Ca
while it may be true that a passenger had not signed the plane rmen Huang arethe parents of respondent
ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such Stephen Huang and own the red1991 Toyota Corolla GLI
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, Sedan with plate number PTT 775(car).These two vehicles
and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's figured in a road accident within themunicipality of Taguig,
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. Metro Manila. Respondent StephenHuang was driving the car, while
petitioner Del Rosario wasdriving the truck. Both were
4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate traversing the C-5
cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non- Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alaban
performance.In the case at bar, the burning of the customs g going toPasig City. The car was on the left
warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened innermost lane while thetruck was on the next lane to its
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have right, when the truck suddenlyswerved to its left and slammed into
foreseen the event. the front right side of thecar. The collision hurled the car over
the island where it hit alamppost, spun around and landed on the
5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier incurred opposite lane. Thetruck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car
in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that it had and zigzaggedtowards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land
not only notified UyBico and Servando of the arrival of their Church.At the time of the accident, petitioner
shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, Del Rosario only had aTraffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers
pursuant to such demand, UyBico had taken delivery of 907 cavans license had beenconfiscated because he
of rice before the burning of the warehouse. had been previously apprehended forreckless driving.The car was
a total wreck. Respondent
6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with Stephen Huangsustained massive injuries to his spinal
negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse cord, head, face, andlung.
pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and Servando was Despite a series of operations, respondent StephenHuang is
undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the paralyzed for life from his
warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it chest down and requirescontinuous medical and rehabilitation
would be unfair to impute negligence to the carrier, the latter treatment.Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for
having no control whatsoever over the same. committing grossnegligence and reckless imprudence while driving,
andpetitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence ofa
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
itsdriver.In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate andproxi
mate cause of the accident was respondent StephenHuangs
recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, hewas
#17

6
driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumpedthe and psychologicalexamination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario,
trucks front right tire. The however,Mrs. Caamic admitted that
truck then swerved to the left,smashed into an electric post, crosse he took the driving tests andpsychological examination when he
d the center island, andstopped on the other side of applied for the position ofDelivery Man, but not when he applied for
the highway. The car likewisecrossed over the center the position ofTruck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner
island and landed on the same portionof C-5. Further, DelRosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of
petitioner Mercury Drug claims that itexercised due diligence of atruck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were
a good father of a family in theselection and supervision of all its conductedon the motor skills development, perceptual speed,
employees. visualattention, depth visualization, and
eye and hand coordination andsteadiness of petitioner Del Rosario.
ISSUE: No NBI and policeclearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner
Del
Whether mercury drug failed to exercise the diligence Rosarioattended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001,Febr
required in supervising its employees despite uary 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar
the evidencespresented by the petitioners. heattended before the accident which occurred in 1996 was
heldtwelve years ago in 1984.It also appears that petitioner
HELD: Mercury Drug does not providefor a back-up driver for
long trips. At the time of the accident,petitioner Del Rosario has
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of theCivil Code is been out on the road for more thanthirteen hours, without
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned on aprior recourse against any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testifiedthat she does not know of
the negligent employee, or a priorshowing of insolvency of any company policy requiring back-up drivers for
such employee. It is also joint andsolidary long trips.Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that itexer
with the employee.To be relieved of liability, petitioner cised due diligence on the supervision and discipline overits
Mercury Drug shouldshow that it exercised the diligence of a employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
good father of a DelRosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVRfor
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incidentto his
ofthe performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of superior, but nothing was done about it. He was notsuspended or
itsprospective employees, the employer is reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoeverwas taken against
required to examinethem as to their petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore
qualifications, experience, and service records.With respect to the affirmthe finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed todischarg
supervision of its employees, the employershould formulate e its burden of proving that it exercised due diligencein the
standard operating procedures, monitor selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner DelRosario.
theirimplementation, and impose disciplinary measures
for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements,e
mployers must submit concrete
proof, including documentaryevidence.In the instant case,
petitioner Mercury Drug presentedtestimonial evidence on its #18
hiring procedure. According to Mrs.Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment
and Training Manager ofpetitioner Mercury Drug, Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas
applicants are required to taketheoretical and actual driving tests, G.R. No. 174156

7

FACTS:
Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto
Street in Manila when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon
verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the owner of the other
car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's Corporate Secretary
Atty. CandidoFlor and, at the time of the incident, was driven by
Atty. Flor's personal driver, TimoteoFloresca.
Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming
that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since
Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle
which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the damages
caused to the Espinas
HELD:
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver,
Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor
vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on this
basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for
damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or
omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the
torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is
laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify
another for damage caused by one's act or omission is imposed
upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the
negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for
exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or
omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the
tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
x xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
x xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code,
an action predicated on an employee's act or omission may be
instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent
act or omission committed by his employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes
him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle ofpater
familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of one's subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.It is well settled that in case
of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made
primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of
the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the
actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner
of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under
Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood
in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that
Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage
in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable: The
rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for
damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained
by the principle behind motor vehicle registration, viz:The main aim
of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed
on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
8
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways.Employer-employee relationship
between registered owner and driver is irrelevant. Thus, whether
there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered
owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the
registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the
operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is
the protection of innocent third persons who may have no means of
identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it
difficult if not impossible to seek redress for damages they may
sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other
damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for
the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures
that relief will always be available to them.
To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the
damages would also prevent a situation where a registered owner
of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the
blame to anther who may have no means to answer for the
damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road
accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our
roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed
drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to
pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.
Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party
The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor
vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to
and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse
is to the motor vehicle registration.Filcar cannot use the defense
that the employee acted beyond the scope of his assigned task or
that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code that the employee acts beyond the scope of his
assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the
Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered
owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the
registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it
could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the
driver and the driver himself.This does not mean, however, that
Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of
the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle
of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has
a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the
amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury
caused to another.
o Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article
2180 of the Civil Code
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on public highways, responsibility
therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
o The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a
certain extent so that the defense available thereunder cannot be
used by the registered owner
o The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and
the driver under the doctrine of unjust enrichment
#19
Professional Services, Inc. V. NatividadAnd Enrique Agana
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the
Civil Code
FACTS:
April 4, 1984: NatividadAgana was rushed to the Medical
City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement
and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to
be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.
April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it
9
 Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband,
Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy.
After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes about the excruciating pain in her anal
region. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist.
May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek
further treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer.
August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of
gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her
house and extracted by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic
General Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal
fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to
remedy the damage
February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by
her children
RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for
damages for negligence and malpractice
CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from
the PRC Board of Medicine for failure to show that he placed the
guages or concealed the fact from Natividad
ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso
loquitor
HELD:
NO. CA affirmed
Dr. Ampil as the negligent party
surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the
bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation
immediately after the operation, the nurses who
assisted in the surgery noted in their report 2 sponges lacking
2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the
body of Mrs. Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which
caused the injury" to be wanting
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter
reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room
and all personnel connected with the operation
res ipsa loquitur
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of
liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting consultant staff
control test is determining
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts
of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure
to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting
on his behalf without authority.
10
 By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients
doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital
constitutes knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the
Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors,
nurses, and interns
19/20.Professional Services, IncvsAgana
FACTS
NatividadAgana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.Ampil diagnosed
her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr.Ampil
performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that
the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent
of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes
showed his work to Dr.Ampil, who examined it and found it in order,
so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr.Ampil
was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses
made some remarks on the Record of Operation: sponge count
lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no
avail continue for closure (two pieces of gauze were missing). A
diligent search was conducted but they could not be found.
Dr.Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal
region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural
consequence of the surgery.Dr.Ampil recommended that she
consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were
not removed during the operation. After months of consultations
and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of
gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr.Ampil manually
extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away.
However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital,
where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She
underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI
(owner of Medical City), Dr.Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the
latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in
Natividads body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an administrative
complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the two
doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes
was heard since Dr.Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC
found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and
malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA
dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr.Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr.Ampils
negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American
doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit
evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re:
number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes alleged negligence,
Dr.Ampil examined his work and found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after
incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence
by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a
surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen
because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal
duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her
of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from
the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition
might permit. Whats worse in this case is that he misled her by
saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.
Medical negligence; standard of diligence
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient
must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do
something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done [or wouldnt have done], and that
the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Duty to remove all foreign objects from the body before
closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to
inform the patient about it
11
 Breach failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform
patient
Injury suffered pain that necessitated examination and
another surgery
Proximate Causation breach caused this injury; could be
traced from his act of closing the incision despite information
given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still
missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later
extracted from patients vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the
Aganas does not convince the court. Mere invocation and
application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and
management of the defendant [DR.
FUENTES] LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR.
AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those who had control or
management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation. That Dr.Ampil discharged such role is
evident from the following:
He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
He examined Dr. Fuentes work and found it in order
He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL
[NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC
2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or
negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has
weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are
taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care
to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others.
Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal
rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Courts bases for
sustaining PSIs liability:
Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship
o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of
control]
Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel
o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal
or employer in somehow misleading the public into believing
that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the
names and specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is
now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians
whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory,
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence.
o
If doctors do well, hospital profits financially,
so when negligence mars the quality of its services, the
hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its
agents acts.
Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility
o This is the judicial answer to the problem of
allocating hospitals liability for the negligent acts of health
practitioners, absent facts to support the application
of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from
hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of
exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all patients
admitted into its facility for medical treatment. PSI failed to
conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
note of the count nurse, and this established PSIs part
in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
about the gauzes.
o
PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the
matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the
fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of
various hospital staff
12
 o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to
persons who practice medicine within its walls and take an remedy the damage
active step in fixing the negligence committed February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by
PSI also liable under NCC 2180 her children
RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for
damages for negligence and malpractice
o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from
the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation the PRC Board of Medicine for failure to show that he placed the
and supervision of Dr.Ampil guages or concealed the fact from Natividad
ISSUE: W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of
res ipso loquitor
OTHER VERSION

G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006 HELD: NO. CA affirmed

Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages) Dr.Ampil as the negligent party
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the
Code
bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation
immediately after the operation, the nurses who
assisted in the surgery noted in their report 2 sponges lacking
FACTS: 2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the
April 4, 1984: NatividadAgana was rushed to the Medical
body of Mrs.Agana
City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement element 3 "control and management of the thing which
and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to
caused the injury" to be wanting
be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter
April 11, 1984: Dr.Ampil performed an anterior resection
reported and showed his work to Dr.Ampil who allowed Dr.
surgery on Natividad and found that the malignancy in her
Fuentes to leave the operating room
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating
removal of certain portions of it
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room
Dr.Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband,
and all personnel connected with the operation
Enrique Agana to perform hysterectomy.
res ipsa loquitur
After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr.Ampil
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
and Dr. Fuentes about the excruciating pain in her anal
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of
region. Dr.Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist.
liability, being a mere evidentiary rule
May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does
further treatment and was told she was FREE from cancer.
not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence
August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr.Ampil proceeded to her
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
house and extracted by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
inches in width and assuring that the pain will vanish.
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
General Hospital where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the

13
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting consultant staff
control test is determining
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts
of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure
to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting
on his behalf without authority.
By accrediting Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients
doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital
constitutes knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr.Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the
Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors,
nurses, and interns
21.Manila Doctors Hospital vs So Un Chua
Notwithstanding the provision of R.A. 9439 [antidetention law] that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic in the
country to detain patients, there are instances wherein hospitals
can legally detain a patient against his will. In the case of Manila
Doctors Hospital v. So Un Chua and Vicky Ty1, the Supreme Court
enumerated these instances, to wit, (1) the patient is a detained or
convicted prisoner, (2) the patient is suffering from a very
contagious disease where his release will be prejudicial to public
health, (3) when the patient is mentally ill such that his release will
endanger public safety, (4) in other exigent cases as may be
provided by law. Considering the total physical restraint of a
detained or convicted prisoner prior to his admission, he can no
longer complain that he is being held as a patient against his will in
the hospital. In fact, through the instrumentality of the State, it is
entirely valid to prevent him from escaping. Not all patients
afflicted with contagious diseases must be detained. However,
where his release will be prejudicial to public health, it is best to
confine him in the hospital even against his will. The hospital is
even required to report such very contagious disease to the
Department of Health wherein in the authorities, invoking the
police power of the State, can lawfully detain the patient in any
appropriate hospital facilities. Similarly, a patient who is mentally ill
should be detained if his release will endanger public safety. In
reality, detaining the mentally ill will also prevent the patient from
harming himself, not to mention avoiding professional liability for
improper discharge of the patient. The law2 states that [f]or the
purpose of preventing or suppressing dangerous communicable
diseases, any person may be inoculated, administered or injected
with prophylactic preparations of recognized efficiency and
standard and no person shall refuse to permit or receive such
inoculation, administration or injection or to hinder or obstruct in
any way such protective measures as may be deemed advisable by
the Director of Health or his authorized representative. A person or
patient cannot refuse any prophylactic preparations for
preventing or suppressing dangerous communicable diseases.
The law makes treatment compulsory due to some communicable
disease.3 If such treatment entails hospital confinement against a
patients will, such treatment, nonetheless, is a valid exercise of
police power to address public health concerns.
22. Merritt vs Government of the Pilppine Islands
14
34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State
for acts of special agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is
Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a
constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was
riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a
government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to
have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was
hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so
much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to
and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the
government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government
by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing
E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount
of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent
act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by
private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed
on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be
liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent
nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there
can be no liability from the government. The Government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest.
Merittvs Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
Facts:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an
hour, collidedwith an ambulance of the General Hospital which
turned suddenly andunexpectedly without having sounded any
whistle or horn.Merrit was severelyinjured. His condition had
undergone depreciation and his efficiency as acontractor was
affected. The inquiry at once arises whether the Government
islegally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom even if the
collision was due tothe negligence committed by an agent or
employee of the government whichis the chauffeur.
Issue:
Whether or not the Government may be held in this case.
Held:
No.That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code
and theprinciple laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th
of May, 1904,in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which itcontracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with
some definite purposewhich gives rise to the claim
, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable
to a public official charged with some administrativeor technical
office who can be held to the proper responsibility in themanner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the
trialcourt in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the
paymentof damages, caused by an official of the second class
referred to, has byerroneous interpretation infringed the provisions
of articles 1902 and 1903of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ.,146.)It is, therefore, evidence that
the State (the Government of the PhilippineIslands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the SupremeCourt of
Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
actas special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, andthat the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such anagent.
15
23. FontanillavsMaliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration
and driven officially by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's
death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against
Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses
Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the
NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but
is an agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver
Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent?
HELD:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable
for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was
not its special agent. (Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 &
61045, February 27, 1991)
RATIO:
Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency
invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section
2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that NIA also has its own assets
and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board
of Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA
may sue and be sued in court.
Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11
SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an
agency performing governmental functions; rather it performs
proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply
and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service rendered caters to the
community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of
society.
Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not
created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that
the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed
at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but
these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the
agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NOTES:
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the
tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045,
December 1, 1989)
24.FontanillavsMaliaman February 27, 1991
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law
Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government
agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the
son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or
negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is
not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not
perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental
functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused
by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government, because its community
16
services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is
irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary
functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of
their employees.
25. Aquinas School vsInton
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011, AQUINAS
SCHOOL, PETITIONER, VS.SPS.JOSE INTON AND MA. VICTORIA S.
INTON, ON THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD,
JOSE LUIS S. INTON, AND SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP,
RESPONDENTS.
Jose Luis was a grade three student at the Aquinas School, while
Sister Margarita was a religion teacher who started teaching at the
school only that year. On July 14, 1998m while Sister Margarita was
writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went
to a classmate to play a prank on the latter. Despite Sister
Margaritas instruction for him to go back to his seat, Jose Luis kept
on going back again. Unable to tolerate anymore the childs
behavior, Sister Margarita approached Jose Luis and kicked him on
the leg several times; pulled and shoved his head on his
classmates seat, and told him to stay in on the floor and finish
copying the notes on the board while seated on the floor. Because
of this, Jose Luiss parents, Jose and Ma.Victoria, filed a case for
damages against Aquinas School and Sister Margarita. They also
filed a separate criminal case for violation of Republic Act 7610
against Sister Margarita, to which she pleaded guilty. The RTC held
Sister Margarita liable for damages but absolved the school. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the RTC
judgment but found the school liable for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between it and Sister Margarita. Both parties
appealed the CA decision. On one hand, the school contended that
it cannot be held liable, insisting that it was the congregation who
selected Sister Margarita to catechise its grade three students,
pursuant to the schools agreement with the congregation for the
latter to send sisters so it can fulfil its ministry of catechising
students. On the other hand, the spouses sought to increase the
amount of damages awarded by the courts.
The Supreme Court:
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the
employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his
wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his
work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control
refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or
reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means
and methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that
it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that
chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade three
students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who
would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it
was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the
school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was
error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to
ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach
its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas
took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards
the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas
showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that
Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters
and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to
assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools
Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching
orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of
1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was
to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
classroom evaluation.Unfortunately, since she was new and it was
just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly
to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of
the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright
neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of
damages, the Court finds no justification for this since they did not
appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the
increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot
obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that
the CA already granted them in its decision.
17

AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
FACTS:This case is about the private schools liability for
theoutside catechists act of shoving a student and kicking himon
the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain inhis seat and
not move around the classroom.In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis)
was a grade threestudent at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
SisterMargarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher
whobegan teaching at that school only in June of that year,taught
Jose Luis grade three religion class.Jose Luis left his seat and went
over to a classmate to playa joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and senthim back to his seat.After a while, Jose Luis got
up again and went over to thesame classmate.Yamyamin
approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on thelegs several times.
She also pulled and shoved his head onthe classmates seat.She
also made the child copy the notes on the blackboardwhile seating
on the floor.Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed
anaction for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
againstYamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court(RTC)
of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427.The Intons also filed a criminal
action against Yamyamin forviolation of Republic Act 7610 to which
she pleaded guiltyand was sentenced accordingly.With regard to
the action for damages, the Intons soughtto recover actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as wellas attorneys fees, for the hurt that
Jose Luis and hismother Victoria suffered.The RTC dismissed
Victorias personal claims but ruled inJose Luis favour, holding
Yamyamin liable to him for moraldamages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damagesof P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of
P10,000.00 plus thecosts of suit.They elevate the case to the CA to
increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA was correct in holding
Aquinassolidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded
toJose Luis.
HELD:No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had
anagreement with a congregation of sisters under which, inorder to
fulfil its ministry, the congregation would sendreligion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to itsstudents.Aquinas insists that it
was not the school but Yamyaminsreligious congregation that
chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade three
students, much likethe way bishops designate the catechists who
would teachreligionin public schools. Aquinas did not have control
overYamyamins teaching methods.The Intons had not refuted the
school directress testimonyin this regard.Aquinas still had the
responsibility of taking steps to ensurethat only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teachits young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said thatAquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence
of improperconduct towards the students by their religion
teacher.They showed records, certificates and diploma
thatYamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question thatshe
came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. Theyprovided
Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students.They pre-approved
the content of the course she wanted toteach. They have a
classroom evaluation program for herunfortunately, she was new,
and therefore do not havesufficient opportunity to observe her.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETSASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV88106 dated August
4, 2008, and HOLDS petitionerAquinas School not liable in damages
to respondent JoseLuisInton
SISTERS ACT: How an Outside Catechist Saves A School From
Liability (Aquinas School vs Spouses Inton and Sr. Margarita
Yamyamin, OP, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011)
By Siesta-friendly
First of all, we note the long length of time to resolve this issue. The
incident subject of this case occurred in 1998. The trial court
issued its decision only in 2006. The CA decided in 2008 and the
SC only this April 2011. The award was for moral damages
of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys
fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. It took 13 years for
complainants to be paid P50,000 in damages.
Anyway, the case as Ponente Justice Abad summarizes, is about
the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of
shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed
her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the
classroom.
Based on the Supreme Courts decision below, an outside catechist
is apparently a religion teacher provided by a congregation to teach
religion in a school and whose conduct is nobodys responsibility
but himself/herself.
18

The Facts
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three
student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita
Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at
that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three
religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard,
Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play
a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis
back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went
over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the
childs behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on
the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was
on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the
blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the
Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal
action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which
she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees,
for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC
ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00,
and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA). They asked the CA to increase the award of damages and
hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an
employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and
Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA,
however, declined to increase the award of damages. Jose Luis
moved for partial reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for
its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Ruling
So is the school liable for harm brought by a teacher to a student?
Not in this case. Why not? Because, believe it or not, Aquinas
School named after St. Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of
Catholic schools of all things does not have control over its
catechists. So the school says and so the Supreme Court believes.
The SC found that
Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under
which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send
religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students.
The SC favored Aquinas insistence that it was not the school but
Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way
bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public
schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas
did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The
Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this
regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas
solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Wow, its hard enough to imagine that any school would have an
arrangement where they lose control over how their students are
educated but who would believe that a private catholic
school would even think of losing control over the religious
education of their students?
The SC refers to Sr. Margarita as an outside cathechist yet Sr.
Margarita is from the same order, O.P. or OrdoPraedicatorum, the
Dominican Order. Why then when it comes to religious teaching, is
she deemed outside? The only reason she is outside is likely
because Aquinas is an exclusive school for boys run by Dominican
fathers. Aquinas lay teachers would be more outside when it
comes to catechism as they are outside the Dominican Order.
Anyway, the SC writes it applied the four-fold test to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer
(a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has
power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these,
the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the
right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to
control the work of the employee as well as the means and
methods by which he accomplishes the same.
19
The SC does not specify, beyond finding the existence of the It seems parents must now check what kind of teaching
teaching agreement with the congregation, where the loss of arrangements their childrens schools have. As these
Aquinas control over Sr. Margarita Yamyamins work begins. arrangements may matter when a schools liability is raised once a
teacher does wrong to their children. Obviously, a Catholic school
The SC admits that [O]f course, Aquinas still had the responsibility is not beyond doing a Pontius Pilate by washing its hands of liability
of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are for a sisters act.
allowed to teach its young students. The SC enumerates the steps
Aquinas took to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards 26. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs Intermediate Appellate
the students by their religion teacher: Court

First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas

showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that
Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters
and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to
assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools
Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for
handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching
orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of
1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was
to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was
just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly
to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of
the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright
neglect.
But why does the SC limit its findings on the schools responsibility
only to the above 5 steps to justify absolving Aquinas of
neglect? In any case, arent they applicable as regards any teacher
outside or not?
What now prevents a school from having an agreement with other
congregations/groups under which the latter would provide
teachers to teach other school subjects so that the school is
absolved from any responsibility for any of said teachers
misconduct?
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC. G.R. Nos. L-66102-04 August 30,
1990. A TRANSPORTATION CASE.BY C Y.
Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.
FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune
Spouses and driven by Manalo to bring them to Carmen Rosales
Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio SinayoanTarlack,The right rear wheel of the
truck was detouch so the driver steps on the brake as a result of
which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face
the south where it come from and its rear face the north where it is
going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep
resulting in the death of the three passengers of the jeepney and
injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the
MTC of SanMiguelTarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo
and the case of Delos Reyes was dismissed and Manalo was
convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for
recovery of civil damages before the court of first instance
impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by
the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers of the jeepney?

20
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the
doctrine of last clear chance in this case because this doctrine
applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit
where passengers demand responsibility from a carries to enforce
its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI
was reinstated.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. IAC
DOCTRINE
: (1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit
between the owners anddrivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does
not arise where a passenger demands responsibility fromthe carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligentdriver and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
(2)In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured,
the carrier is presumed to havebeen at fault or to have acted
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome byevidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756of the New
Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event.
(3) The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the
carrier in case of breach of thecontract of carriage. Firstly, the
contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and
inthe event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible to the passenger, even if suchbreach be due to the
negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift
his liabilityon the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his
driver's negligence is his. Secondly, thatwould make the carrier's
liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently,
entitled torecover only the share which corresponds to the driver
contradictory to the explicit provision of Article2181 of the New
Civil Code.
FACTS:
At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua,
AdelaidaEstomo, ErlindaMeriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro
Morales and ZenaidaParejas boarded the jeepney owned byspouses
Isidro Mangune and GuillermaCarreon and driven by
TranquilinoManalo at Dau, Mabalacat,Pampanga bound for Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas with their families for P
24.00.Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right
rear wheel of the jeepneydetachedcausing it to run in an
unbalanced position. Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing
the jeepneyto make a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on
the opposite lane of the road (the jeepney'sfront faced the south
(from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it
was going)).The jeepney occupied and blocked the greater portion
of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming
from the north.Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost
immediately after the sudden U-turn the busbumped the right rear
portion of the jeep. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the
bus stoppeda few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as
a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina
Pascua, ErlindaMeriales and AdelaidaEstomo) died while the other
jeepneypassengers sustained physical injuries.A criminal complaint
was filed against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case
against delosReyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for
insufficieny of evidence. Manalo (jeepney driver),however, was
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.3 complaints for
recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan.
(1) SpousesCasiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of
Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in herbehalf Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses Manuel Millares and
FidenciaArcica sued asheirs of ErlindaMeriales. And (3) spouses
Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued as heirs of
AdelaidaEstomo. All three cases impleaded spouses Mangune and
Carreon, Manalo (jeepney owners),Rabbit and delos Reyes as
defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses
ManguneandCarreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As
against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs basedtheir suits on their
culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance
Corporation, Inc. wasalso impleaded as additional defendant in the
first case only.
27. Coca-Cola Bottlers vs CAG.R. No. 110295
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS.
LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the
CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite
21
soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH
and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a
result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she
had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She
demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which
dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of
Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the
soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of
implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes
after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in
the case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC
which prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under
article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations
in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless and
negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be
sold for public consumption."
28.Jimenez v. City of Manila
Jimenez v. City of Manila (1987)
J. ParasBy P.R. Manalo
Facts
Petitioner Bernardino Jimenez bought bagoong in the Sta. Ana
Public Market on a rainy day. It was flooded by ankle-deep and dirty
rainwater. Then petitioner turned around, he stepped on an
uncovered drainage opening, causing a 4-inch rusty nail to
penetrate his leg. Petitioner fell sick and was unable to supervise
his bus business for a long time. &e sued the City of Manila and
Asiatic Integrated Corp. as administrator of the said public market.
(he trial court sentenced the City of Manila and Asiatic solidarily
liable for damages. On appeal, the CA modified and held that only
Asiatic is liable. Hence this petition.HELD City of Manila liable
under article 2189 of the Civil Code.
Argument:
The City of Manila argues that it cannot be held liable because
under the Management and operating contract with Asiatic# the
latter assumed sole responsibility for damages which may be
suffered by third persons for anycause attributable to it.
The City of Manila also argues that under the Revised Charter of
Manila, it shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the provisions
of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance# or from negligence
of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing
or attempting to enforce said provisions.
Issue:
Whether the Cityof Manila is liable for the injuries suffered by the
petitioner despite the contract and the Revised Charter of Manila.
Held:
YES.
The Revised Charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for 2damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the failure of city officers2 to enforce the
provisions of said Act, or any other law or ordinance or from
negligence2 of the city Mayor Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. On the
other hand, Art. 2189 of the Civil Code provides that Provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision.
The said article constitutes a !articular prescription making
provinces, cities and municipalities ... liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason2 3 specifically
3 2of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or su!
er$ision.2 In other words the Revised charter of Manila refers to
liability arising from negligence# in general, regardless of the
objects thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability
due to defective streets, public buildings and other public works in
particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case
JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Jimenez boughtBagoongat the Santa Ana public market at
the time that it was flooded with ankle-deep water. As he turned
around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could
22
not be seen because of dirty rainwater. A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail,
stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth
of1 inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was
confined for 20 days, walked w/ crutches for 15 days and could not
operate his school buses. He sued City of Manila and Asiatic
Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana had been
placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract. TC found
for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved
City of Manila. ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and
solidarily liable with Asiatec
HELD: YES
RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1,
Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manila is invoking in this case,
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila
while Art 2189 NCC governs the liability due to defective streets,
public buildings and other public works in particular and is
therefore decisive in this case. It was also held that for liability
under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province, city
or municipality over the defective public building in question is
enough. It is not necessary that such belongs to such province, city
or municipality. In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta.
Ana public market remained under the control of the City as
evidenced by:
1.the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that
prior approval of the City is still
needed in the operations. 2.MayorBagatsing of Manila admitted
such control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec. Virata
(The City retains the power of supervision and control over its
public markets)
3.City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market
whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that
particular public market 4.Se
c. 30 of Tax Code
The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over public markets
It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep
the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place
for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been
taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The
drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls rather than
the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings
were covered. It was evident that the certain opening was already
uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it was still uncovered.
There were also findings that during floods, vendors would remove
the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not
prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending
danger was evident. Petitioner had the right to assume there were
no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they
were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would
not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. Asiatec and City are joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.
29. Nakpil& Sons vs CA October 3, 1986
G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986
Facts of the Case:
The private respondent (Philippine Bar Association) hired the
services of the petitioner to make the plans and specifications for
the construction of their office building. The building was
completed by the contractor but subsequently, an earthquake
struck causing its partial collapse and damage.
Issue: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?
HELD: Yes. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the
plans and specifications and failed to observe requisite
workmanship standards in the construction of the building while
their architect drew plans that contain defects and other
inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape
liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an
earthquake. Other buildings in the area withstood the tremor. The
lower court also found that the spirals in one of the columns in the
ground floor has been cut. One who creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability even if an act of God may have intervened
as in this case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein
petitioner) and the architect for the collapse of the building is
solidary.
NAKPIL & SONS v. CA
To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the
engineer/architect/contractor must not have been negligent in the
construction of the building.
23
FACTS:
Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a non-profit
organization formed under the corporation law decided to put up a
building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of
the building were Juan Nakpil& Sons, while United Construction was
hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of
Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building
was completed in 1966.
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused
the building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward,
leading the tenants to vacate the premises. United Construction
took remedial measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but
United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and
Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr.Hizon, as a court
appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the
building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition
after the building suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous
earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were deviations in
the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction
of the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from
liability parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?
HELD:
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are
liable for damages should the building collapse within 15 years
from completion.
Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be
responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be
exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the
industry to the creditor.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by
the earthquake which was an act of God, the defects in the
construction, as well as the deviations in the specifications and
plans aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive
measures that the building would otherwise have had.
30. Nakpil& Sons vs CA
Case Title: Nakpil vs. CA (April 15, 1988)GR numbers: L-47851, L-
47863, L-47896Ponente: Paras, J
FACTS:
Philippine BarAssociation (PBA) decided to construct an office
building on its 840square meters lot located at the corner of
Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intamuros, Manila.For the plans,
specifications and design, PBA contracted the services of Juan F.
Nakpil& sonsand Juan F. Nakpil (Nakpils). For the construction of the
building, PBA contracted the servicesof United Construction
24
Company (UCCI) on an administration basis. The building
wascompleted in June 1966. On Aug. 2 a strong earthquake hit
Manila and the building in questionsustained major damage. The
front columns of the building buckled causing the building to
tiltforward dangerously. As a temporary remedial measure the
building was shored up by UCCI atthe expense of 13,661.28. On
Nov. 29, 1968 PBA commenced action for recovery damagesagainst
UCCI. UCCI then filed a complaint against Nakpils alleging in
essence that the collapseof the building was due to the defects of
architect plans. Upon the investigation of theCommissioner it was
found that the damage of the buildings were caused by the defect
in theplans and specifications prepared by the Nakpils and UCCI
deviations from said plans and specifications and its failure to
observe the requisite workmanship in the construction and PBAs
failure to supervise the construction of the building. The lower court
agreed with the findings of the Commissioner and ordered UCCI to
pay. Court of Appeals modified the decision. Hence thispetition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not UCCI as wells as Nakpils are liable even if the
damage was due to an Act of God.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Civil Code provides that
when there is afortuitous event the debtor is exempt from liability
however there is an exception. If fraud,negligence, delay in the
event on the part of the party then the party liable cannot be
exemptedtherefore PBA can recover damages from UCCI. The
negligence of the defendant was shownwhen and proved that there
was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been
sostipulated among them. Therefore, therefore there should be no
question that NAKPIL andUNITED are liable for damages because of
the collapse of the building.
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape
hability for thenatural and probable consequences thereof,
although the act of a third person, or an actof God for which he is
not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, UNITED's motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED; theNAKPILS" motion for leave to file second motion
for reconsideration is also DENIED, the latters"first motion on the
same grounds having been already denied with finality in the
resolution of April 3, 1987. Needless to say, the Motion to Refer this
case to the Court En Banc is DENIED, inview of all the things stated
in this Resolution.SO ORDERED.
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