U.S. History: Book 4 Name Lesson 24 Handout 24 (page 1) Date A Nation Held Hostage Part A. Read the article below and answer the questions which follow. When the yellow ribbons fade, what meaning wil the hostage episode have for Iran, for the United States and for the future? ‘Seen as an act of terrorism, which clearly it was, the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran capped a decade of growing international terrorism. In the ‘70s, taking over embassies became a common form of protest and coercion. The seizure of the American Embassy in Iran was in fact the 35th time in ten years that armed extremists, on behalf of ‘one cause or another, had taken over an embassy or a consulate, This does not include the numerous times when mobs sacked embassies or unarmed protesters occupied them. ‘without taking hostages. However, as an act of terrorism the episode in Tran was unique because of the Iranian Goverament's complicity in tt. ‘To be sure, governments before had been the accomplices of terrorists, providing them with financial support, training camps, asylum, weapons smuggled in diplomatic pouches. Idi Amin's soldiers in Uganda openly assisted the team of Palestinian and German terrorists who hijacked a French airliner to Entebbe in 1976. But the episode in Iran was the first time that a government openly embraced an act of terrorism commited within its, borders, made the terrorists’ demands its own and ultimately took charge of the negotia- tions. Turmoil: Holding the hostages brought nearly universal condemnation to Iran, but that did not seem to trouble the Iranians or cause them great hardship. If terrorism Drought them no reward. the world imposed no great cost either, nor could it, iran destroyed {ts own economy. The political turmoil was its own creation. As we discovered, it's hard to coerce a country that appears intent upon national suicide. On the balance sheet for Iran, consider titese questions: Is the iranian revolution more firmly rooted now than it was on Nev. 4, 1979? Is the Iranian Government more stable? Are Iran's frontiers more secure? Are the Iranian people more united? Are they prouder? Iran. would seem to have gained litle. Looking at it from the American side, the affair influenced an election, raised disturbing questions about our military competence and ended an era. ‘The seizure of our embassy in Iran confronted us with a form of terrorism new to our ‘experience. Prior to the event, neither the American Government nor the American people fully appreciated the extent to which a single terrorist incident could mesmerize a nation and thoroughly distract tts government. After the election, Hamitton Jordan said that frustration over the hostage crisis was the prineipal factor in Carter's defeat, ‘The post-Vietnam era came to its unofficial end during the Iranian crisis, when the Administration, many of whose members had vigorously opposed the war in Vietnam, indeed any military intervention abroad, suddenly found itself in a situation in which they considered the use of military force to be appropriate and useful. President Carter thus Joined every President in this century in ordering soldiers into action overseas. ‘The seizure of the American Embassy also altered one of the widespread attitudes of, the post-Viemam era, Since the Vietnam War, the American people have carried a heavy ‘cargo of guilt, as if our great wealth and power had made us a principal source, f not the + sole source, of evil in this worl. Brian Jenkins, “When the Yellow Ribbons Fade,” Newsweek (9 February 1981), 19. Copyright 1981 by Newsweek, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted by Permission. 1» COPYRIGHT, The Center for Learning, Used with permission. Not forsale. 155,US. History: Book 4 Name Lesson 24 Handout 24 (page 2) Date In the Iranian crisis, this attitude dissolved. Not since the early 1950s, perhaps act since World War il, have the American people been so united in their outrage and anger, so agreed on its source. True, some might argue, and did, that we brought this trouble on ourselves through our itimate relationship with the Shab. But the public mood was reflected in the cruel caricatures of the ayatollah, the graffiti scrawled on walls and the defiant bumper stickers—not in the columns of foreign-policy analysis, The folks didn’t need to be told who the villains were Although American unity was a positive result of the incident, the prospects for global unity against terrorism seem more remote than ever. Government-hacked kidnappings and assassinations are being carried out more frequently, with bolder disregard for the fragile international regime that governs relations between nations. No longer does a handful of nations make and enforce the rules: a growing number of nations no longer abide by them. Security: This raises a critical policy question: can a world so unevenly respectful of sovereignty, so economically interdependent, impose constraints on terrorist govern ments? The handwringing and finger wagging seen in international forums do not sulfice World opinion carries little weight with nations so self-righteous as to be immune to it. Economic sanctions appear unenforceable, particularly when those imposing the sanc tions depend on the target for some vital resource. Military intervention is risky, ‘Terrorists have seized embassies on eight occasions since the American Embassy in ran was taken over. Doubtless, it will happen again despite the increased security measures that are iurning embassies into fortresses. Diplomats now routinely receive hostage training—and so they should, for terrorism will not go away. What will we do next time? That question must be answered next time, There are no formulas; each episode Is unique. However, we can prepare for the next time, Right now the government's attention Is focused on terrorism. That will not last. When we are not under the gun, the problem of terrorism is considered no more than a nuisance. That itself is part of the problem. ‘Terrorism attracts everyone's attention for a brief moment, then It 1s virtually ignored. Now js the time to develop a permanent arsenal of response measures, both military and diplomatic. The incident in tran aroused the world’s wrath and compassion. Now is the time to translate that into conerete agreements among those nations that stil place a premium on human lif. 1. Jenkins says that in the 1970s, armed extremists took over embassies or consulates thirty-five times. What made the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran unique? eS “ wl e 2, What does Jenkins mean when he says, ". . . it's hard to coerce a country that appears intent upon national suicide”? 3, Explain how the hostage crisi a. influenced an election b. ended an era © COPYRIGHT, The Center for Learning, Used with permission. Nat for eal, 156U.S, History: Book 4 Name Lesson 24. Handout 24 {page 3) Date — 4, What effect does increasing economic interdependence have on attempts to impose constraints on terrorist governments? Part B, Read the following chronology of the hostage crisis and record at the end steps taken by President Carter to end the ordeal The Seizure On November 4, 1979, 400 self-described Iranian students invade the U.S. embassy in ‘Teheran and hold sixty-two Americans hostage, demanding that the United States hand over the exiled Shah, Three other Americans tale refuge in the Iranian Foreign Ministry. ‘The Iranian Prime Minister resigns and Ayatollah Ruholleh Khomeini takes full charge of the government, Jimmy Carter asks Gen. Ramsey Clark to try to mediate, but the Iranians refuse to let him into the country. The Stalemate On November 10, Carter orders deportation of Iranian students living illegally in the United Siates, cuts off direct American imports of Iranian oll, freezes Iranian assets in ‘American banks, and orders the aircraft carrier, “Kitty Hawk” and five escort ships to the ‘Arablan Sea. Khomeini releases eight blacks and five women out of his professed respect for women and “oppressed” blacks. Enter the U.N. On January 1, U.N, Secretary-General, Kurt, Waldheim arrives in Teheran to try to negotiate the release of the hostages. but is beseiged by a mob and leaves. On January 28, Boni Sadr, a moderate, is elected President of Iran. He set these conditions for the hostages’ release: that the United States must admit its “past erimes” against Iran; promise not to interfere again; and acknowledge Teheran’s right to extradite the Shah and recover his fortune. With those guidelines, a five-man U.N. Commission is appointed to investigate charges against the Shah, and, the United States hope, to arrange for the hostages’ return. However, the militants holding the hostages refuse to hand them over to the Iranian Government, touching off an internal power struggle. When Khomeini sides with the militants, the U.N. Commission leaves in failure, Getting Tough | On April 7, Khomeini announces that the fate of the hostages will not be considered until Iran's newly elected Parliament meets. Carter severs diplomatic relations with “fourteen Months of Futility” by Bob Levin. Condensed from Newsweek, (26 January 1981): 22—23. Copyright 1981 by Newsweek, Ine, all Rights Reserved. Reprinted by Permission, {© COPYRIGHT, The Center for Learning, Used with permission. Not forsale 187U.S. History: Book 4 Name — 7 Lesson 24 Handout 24 (page 4) Date ‘Teheran, bans Iranian imports, bars Americans from traveling to Iran, and sends all American military equipment ordered by Iran before the crisis back into U.S. stockpiles. Under American pressure, the nine nations of the European Economie Community and Japan agree to impose sanctions on Iran. The Rescue Fiasco On the night of April 24 an elite American commando team lifts off the deck of the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz in the Arabian Sea in an effort to rescue the hostages. But three of their helicopters are crippled and Carter calls off the mission. As the team prepares to evacuate, a helicopter collides with @ transport plane, killing eight Americans. The Lull Iran’s new Parliament finally convenes on May 28 and immediately bogs down in internal squabbling. At the end of July, the Shah dies in Cairo; most leaders shun his funeral and Teheran says the death has no bearing on the hostage situation. High Hopes On September 12, Khomeini issues his own terms for freeing the hostages. The United States must cancel its claims against Iran, return the late Shah's wealth and Iran's frozen assets and promise never to interfere in Iranian affairs. The Parliament finally appoints a special committee to study the hostage issue. On November 2, two days before both the hostages’ first anniversary in captivity and the U.S. election, the Parliament approves Khomeini's terms. But there is no deal, and bitter American disappointment is thought to be a factor in Carter's devastating defeat at the polls. The End Game A period of quiet negotiation follows. Algeria is asked to serve as intermediary. A U.S. mission led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher goes to Algiers to meet the spirit if not the letter of Iran's proposal, Eventually, Iran demands $24 billion in cash and gold. Carter offers $5.5 billion down payment in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for the hostages. The Parliament approves a bill permitting arbitration of claims against other els. On January 18, 1981, the 442nd day of their captivity, the deal is finally struck. From what you have read so far, male a list of the actions Carter took to end the crisis: (© COPYRIGHT, The Center for Learning. Used with permission, Not for sale 168U.S. History: Book 4 Name Lesson 24 Handout 24 (page 51 fae seeece eee Part C. To conclude the lesson, read reactions from the hostages during captivity and just rrtcr freedom concerning Carter's handling of the crisis, and answer the questions at the end. 1. In April 1980, upon reading a copy of "Newsweek," one hostage earned that Washington faid not expect the hostages to be free much before the Novelnber election. "If you support President Carter, you're sick,” he screamed. Ex-President Carter visited the hostages in the Weisbaden, West Germany Army tospltal as President Reagan's citizen envoy to welcome the hostages home. He gave a short speech and then listened to complaints. 2. "Why didn't the rescue mission take place sooner?” 3. Some complained that Washington's initial reaction to the fall of the U.S. embassy in ‘Teheran had been too little, too late. 4, The mecting broke up after fifty minutes. About a half-dozen hostages had stayed away, talking to relatives in the phone room. Apparently unaware of that, Carter ambled over to the phone bank himself, interrupting several calls and offering friendly, down-home greetings to wives, mothers, and children. After he left, one glowering hostage turned fo a hospital employee and snipped: “If he had stayed any longer, twas going to pop him one.” © COPYRIGHT, The Center for Learning. Used with permission. Not forsale 159S. History: Book 4 Name a - Lesson 24 Handout 24 (page 6) pate cue mission? 1. Why did Carter wait so long to attempt the re 2. Why might you expect some of the hostages to be critical of Jimmy Carter? 8. Carter and his administration strongly belteved in “moral” government. He wanted a negotiated settlement without U.S. militery invasion In Iran. He did not believe that the hostage seizure was grounds for war (popular support for an all-out war against Tran would probably not have materialized anyway.) Do you think he acted indecisively? 4, What else could he have done? 5. Write a sentence telling one lesson learned from the Hostage Crisis. © COPYRIGHT. The Center for Leaming, Used with permission. Not forsale 160