DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this
character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:

What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their
offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional
provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by
such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was
vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue
of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom
it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power
of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

249 SCRA 538October 25 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree
No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to develop and promote the iron and steel
industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of
5 years, and when ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was
extended for another 10 years. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself an entity
wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program
embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was
issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from
sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City and reserving
that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain portions of
the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-
operational chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated16 November 1982, was
issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf
of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC s present occupancy rights on
the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private
respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the
date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under
P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights
of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant
itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations between
NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for
ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.

HELD:

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded
as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory term
of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as
the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the
Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter
of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality
of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having
been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency
of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in
its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.From the foregoing premises,
it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not
by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

REBECCA A. BARBO, ELEONORA R. DE JESUS, and ANTONIO B.MAGTIBAY,

Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

(G.R. No.157542 / October 10, 2008)

FACTS: Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and
designated members of the Interim Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water
District (SFWD).On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA Board of
Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313,Series of 1995 and Board Resolution No.
39, Series of 1996 respectively. These Board Resolutions authorized the Board of
Directors of SFWD to receive reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation
and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Travel Allowance, and Extraordinary &
Miscellaneous Expense (EME); Christmas Bonus; Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance;
Medical and Dental Benefits; and Productivity Incentive Bonus. Pursuant to the said
Board Resolutions, petitioners received EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and
Productivity Bonus from SFWD during the calendar years starting 1994 until
1996.On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA Regional Office No. III at San
Fernando, Pampanga audited the financial accounts of SFWD for the period covering
January 1, 1994 to July 15, 1996. The COA Special Audit Team disallowed the
payment of the above-mentioned benefits and allowances received by petitioners
after the same were found to be excessive and contrary to Sections 228, 162 and
163 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) and to Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 954073in relation to Section 13 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Thus,
petitioners were directed to refund the benefits and allowances subject of the
disallowance. The Regional Director, affirmed the Special Audit Team's Notice of
Disallowance No. 97-004 (94, 95, 96).COA denied the petition for review and
affirmed the ruling of the COA Regional Director as contained in its First
Endorsement. The COA stressed that the Directors of local water districts (LWDs)
were prohibited from receiving compensation other than

per diems

and that LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 were contrary to the law which it
intended to implement, specifically, Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended. Citing
the case Peralta v. Mathay
, the COA declared that the subject bonuses and allowances received by petitioners
constituted additional compensation or remuneration. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent has jurisdiction to moto propio declare LWUA Board
Resolution No.313 as amended by Resolution 39 to be totally in conflict with Sec 13
of PD 198 as amended.

2. Whether or not Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended, prohibit petitioners entitlement

to RATA, EME, BONUSES and OTHER BENEFITS and ALLOWANCES.

3. Whether or not Petitioners are liable to settle / refund the disallowed allowances,
Bonuses and Other Benefits received by petitioners.

HELD:

1. Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to declare whether or not
LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 are consistent with Section 13 of PD No.
198, as amended, on matters pertaining to the compensation and "other benefits"
of the Directors of the LWD. This is allegedly the function of the courts. The Court
has already settled this issue in a myriad of cases. Particularly, in

Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan Water District] v. COA

, the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of
the disbursement of government funds by a water district and declared that such
power does not conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA.
Citing Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the1987 Constitution the Court declared
that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the
Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine whether
government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government
funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. This
independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property.

2. A water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special

charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree 198. It is
undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, EME, and bonuses to
members of the board of Water Districts. Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, reads
as follows: Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined
by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no
director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of
the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive
other compensation for services to the district. Any per diem in excess of P50shall
be subject to approval of the Administration. In Baybay Water District v.
Commission on Audit , the members of the board of Baybay Water District also
questioned the disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and
excessive per diems. The Court ruled that pursuant to PD 198, members of the
board of water districts cannot receive allowances and benefits more than those
allowed by PD 198. Construing Section 13 of PD 198, in Baybay

, the Court declared: xxx Under 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to
be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. Indeed,
words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and
commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the
words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is
entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a
month, and, in the same paragraph, providing "No director shall receive other
compensation" than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly
indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per die
authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.
Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It expressly
prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diem, thus pre-
empting the exercise of any discretion by water districts in paying other allowances
and bonuses.

3. While we sustain the disallowance of the above benefits by respondent COA,

however, we find that the SFWD affected personnel who received the above
mentioned benefits and privileges acted in good faith under the honest belief that
Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 authorized such payment. Petitioners here
received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest
belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time
petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet
decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment
was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the
allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's
arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the
country. PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the
1973Constitution?

Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant of arrest.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rulemaking It is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably
appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial
functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the
President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the black
marketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

United Residents of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on Settlement of Land

Problems, 353 SCRA 782

Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of

public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency,
albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are
not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals.

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the
alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with
an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41,
P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said
teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the
suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a
case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the
meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases
filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work
orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking
teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

US v Ang Tang Ho GR L-17122

February 27, 1922 Johns

Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions,
Section 1,authorizing the governor-General from any cause resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of
rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price
of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found
guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of
legislative powers.

Issue: Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act
authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and
regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the
legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue
the proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also failed to define
extraordinary rise that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to
prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures by the Governor-General.

US v Ang Tang Ho GR L-17122

Facts: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of
Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes
the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919,
the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The
said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang
Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for
violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering
that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged
of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order
issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as
a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in present, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (148 SCRA 659) Case Digest

Facts:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of
the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was
sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also
upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed.

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these were
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O.
due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before
an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper
exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.

Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really

presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under
Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid

controversy. In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it
would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down
a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to
every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they
be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.

There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against

arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of

contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a
passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in
addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it cant be
said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.

Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due

process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a
court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.

The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method to confiscate carabaos was oppressive.

Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his
defense and punished immediately.

This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of
powers.

The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It
seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive
orders aforementioned.

ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the
President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has
been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to.

PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569)

FACTS:

September 4 to October 29, 1964: President of the Philippines issued EO Nos. 93-
121, 124 and126- 129 which created 33 municipalities.

November 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines, instituted
a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against Auditor General, to restrain
him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities

ISSUE:

EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 are null and void upon the ground that said
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio

and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by
the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.