Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
3-21
Adrienne Asch
Columbia University
This article critiques the assumptions about the nature and meaning of disability
advanced in social-psychological writing, suggests the origins of these assump-
tions, and proposes a return to a Lewinianlminority-group analysis of the situa-
tion of people with disabilities. It concludes by placing the articles in this issue of
the Journal of Social Issues in context and by presenting questions in need of
further exploration.
*Between 1981 and 1984, the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Dis-
abled in Action of New York City, and other organizations of people with
disabilities fought a court battle with the New York City Metropolitan Transit
Authority to gain architectural access to the citys mass transit system. The MTA
opposed modifying the system, claiming that the expense would never be made
up by rider fares of those mobility-impaired people then denied transit access.
The New York Times (Editorial, 1983; The $2,000 Subway Token, 1984),
along with most other sectors of the community, generally favoring progressive
social change, supported the Transit Authority in the fight it eventually lost
(Katzmann, 1986).
*In 1982 and 1983, the national media described two cases where the
parents and doctors of infants with disabilities denied the infants medical treat-
The authors wish to note their equal contributions both to this article and to the editorship of the
entire issue.
Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Michelle Fine, Graduate School of
Education, University of Pennsylvania, 3700 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.
3
0022~537/88/0300Mx)3506.00/1 0 1988 The Sociely for the Psychological SNdy of Social Issuer
4 Fine and Asch
ment based on their impairments. In the first case, an infant with Down syn-
drome died of starvation six days after birth; in the second case, the parents
finally consented to the surgery. The impairments of the infants were used as the
basis for denying them treatment that could have alleviated certain of their
medical problems but left them with permanent disabilities that no treatment
would cure. Virtually the only supporters of the infants right to treatment over
parental objections were those commonly associated with the right-wing and
right-to-life sectors of society, and perhaps also people with disabilities them-
selves (Disability Rag, 1984). (For a discussion of these cases and their meaning
for notions of community, see Sarason, 1986; and for a civil libertarian
supporter of Baby Doe, see Hentoff, 1987).
*In 1983 and 1984, and again in 1986, Elizabeth Bouvia, a young woman
whose cerebral palsy made it impossible for her to control any of her limbs save
some functions of one hand, sought to get California hospitals to allow her to die
by starvation. The America1 Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), generally regarded
as championing the progress of many social causes, wrote a brief in her behalf
describing her disability as causing her pitiful existence, refemng to her
affliction as incurable and . . . intolerable, and commenting on the in-
dignity and humiliation of requiring someone to attend to her every bodily need
(ACLU Foundation of Southern California, 1983, pp. 14, 17, 35). The entire
tone of the brief implied that it was not at all surprising that someone with her
level of disability would wish to end her life. The ACLU was not dissuaded from
its line of argument by testimony of the Disability Rights Coordinating Council
(DRCC), including a psychologist who was also a quadriplegic, suggesting that
Ms. Bouvias situation was complicated by a host of stresses apart from her
disability: death of a sibling, marriage, pregnancy, multiple changes in resi-
dence, financial hardship, miscarriage, increased physical pain, terminal illness
of a parent, and dissolution of marriage (DRCC, 1983, p. 3). The DRCC did
not dispute that people had the right to take their own lives. It disputed the
unquestioned assumption that disability was a reason to end life.
The Superior Court of California, unmoved by those who sought to disen-
tangle Ms. Bouvias request from the situation of people with disabilities gener-
ally, endorsed her request saying, among other things: She, as the patient,
lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence
meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding. Later, in describing her,
it stated: Her mind and spirit may be free to take great flights, but she herself is
imprisoned, and must lie physically helpless, subject to the ignominy, embar-
rassment, humiliation, and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness
(Bouvia v. Superior Court of California, 1986, pp. 19, 21).
this f i s t article, we review the ways that disability has been viewed by social
psychology .over the past decades, trying to do for the study of disability what
Sampson (1983) has done for the view of justice: namely, to offer some chal-
lenges to the assumptions that have guided theory and research, to speculate on
the bases for these assumptions, and to suggest how alternative assumptions
would alter the study of disability. We conclude by previewing the remaining
articles in this issue as they reflect theory and research grounded in both old and
new assumptions about the social nature of physical and mental disabilities.
Although other articles in this issue elaborate upon the problem of accu-
rately defining and describing the current situation of people with disabilities in
1987, it is essential to specify briefly whom this issue is about. In 1980 Bowe
estimated the total population of people with disabilities in the United States to
be 36 million, or perhaps 15% of the nations people. In 1986 (Census
Study), the New York Times reported some 37 million people over 15 years of
age with disabling conditions. As Asch (1984) has discussed elsewhere, the mere
attempt to define and enumerate the population shows that disability is a social
construct. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1978, defines a handi-
capped individual as any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such persons major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment (Section 7B).
We can say the following with assurance: The nations population includes
some 10% of school-aged children classified as handicapped for the purposes of
receipt of special educational services (Biklen, this issue); somewhere between 9
and 17% of those between 16 and 64 years of age report disabilities that influence
their employment situation (Haber & McNeil, 1983); nearly half of those over 65
indicate having one or more disabilities that interfere with their life activities or
are regarded by others as doing so (DeJong & Lifchez, 1983).
Laws governing the provision of educational and rehabilitation services,
and prohibiting discrimination in education, employment, and access to public
programs, all stress the similarities in needs and in problems of people with a
wide variety of physical, psychological, and intellectual impairments. (Scotch,
this issue, discusses the benefits to the disability rights movement of such a
legislative approach.) In this space, however, it is important to acknowledge the
digerences among disabling conditions and their varied impact on the lives of
people in this group.
First, different conditions cause different types of functional impairment.
Deafness, mental retardation, paralysis, blindness, congenital limb deficiencies,
and epilepsy (all taken up in greater detail in this issue) may pose common social
6 Fine and Asch
problems of stigma, marginality, and discrimination, but they also produce quite
different functional difficulties. Several of these disabilities obviously interfere
with functions of daily life, but the last, epilepsy, may not. Some persons with
epilepsy have no inherent limitations whatever. Nevertheless, they are likely to
be regarded as having an impairment.
Furthermore, people with disabilities have different degrees of impairment:
Amounts of hearing and visual loss differ; some people with impairment of
mobility can walk in some situations while others cannot. Mental retardation
ranges from profound to mild-so mild that many out of school never get the
label. In addition, some disabilities are static, while others are progressive.
Multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, cystic fibrosis, some vision and hearing
impairments, some types of cancer and heart conditions represent progressive
disabilities that cause ever-changing health and life situations. Some conditions
are congenital, others are acquired. All of these factors that distinguish the
origin, experience, and effects of disability must be kept in mind in social
science research on disability.
Researchers (Davis, 1961; Goffman, 1963; Ladieu, Adler, & Dembo,
1948) have long been aware that the degree of visibility of the impairment or the
age at which it was acquired (Barker, 1948; von Hentig, 1948) may influence the
psychological consequences and the social situation of people with disabilities.
More recently, scholars have addressed the impact of ethnicity, class, and gender
upon the experience of disability (Fine & Asch, 1981, 1988). In this issue,
Schneider focuses on the social-psychological situation of people with a rela-
tively invisible condition (epilepsy), and Mest analyzes the ways in which living
and work contexts affect persons with retardation. Most of the other authors
discuss the situations of people whose conditions are manifested by appearance
or behavior. Ainlay and Frank (both in this issue) consider the different social-
psychological impact of age of onset, and their conclusions contrast with the
prevailing clinical and social-psychological views that acquiring a disability later
is less damaging to the self and to social interaction than is growing up with an
impairment. (See Asch and Rousso, 1985, for a review of psychoanalytic liter-
ature on disability.)
to the prominence and the awkwardness of disability has not been recognized as
an intervening variable. In these experiments, disability is viewed as an indepen-
dent variable, much as gender had been considered prior to the early 1970s
(Unger & Denmark, 1975). Disability is portrayed as the variable that predicts
the outcome of social interaction when, in fact, social contexts shape the mean-
ing of a disability in a persons life.
Most social-psychological work using disability to examine the concept of
stigma takes the experience as equivalent regardless of such factors as the dis-
abled persons race, culture, class, and gender. Scheer and Groce (this issue),
Becker and Arnold (1986), and Solomon (1986) provide valuable correctives by
viewing the situation of disabled people through the disciplines of anthropology
and history.
2. When a disabled person faces problems, it is assumed that the impair-
ment causes them. In their very thoughtful expansion of Goffmans notion of
stigma, Jones et al. (1984) elaborate on the consequences for the marked
person of being singled out by others. Throughout their discussion of marking
and its social-psychological consequences for disabled and nondisabled alike,
however, these authors never question the extent to which disability per se poses
difficulties in social participation, as contrasted with difficulties caused by the
environment-architectural, social, economic, legal, and cultural. For example,
in their discussion of changes in the life situations of people who became dis-
abled, the authors never question that the disability keeps the person from con-
tinuing in employment or from going to restaurants or other recreational facili-
ties. The entire discussion of stigma and marked relationships assumes as
natural what Hahn aptly terms a disabling environment; it views obstacles as
being solely the persons biological limitations rather than the human-made
barriers of architecture or discriminatory work practices.
Even Barkers (1948) early work went only part way to indicting the en-
vironment as an obstacle to the disabled persons participation. Far ahead of his
time, he called for antidiscrimination laws in education and employment, al-
though he failed to challenge the architecture, the transportation, and the com-
munication methods that confronted people with disabilities and hampered full
participation. Barkers concluding comments took social arrangements as given,
urging counseling and psychotherapy for people with disabilities, so that they
could come to accept the fact that the world in which [they live] presents
serious restrictions and frustrations. He went on to say that education and
antidiscrimination laws cannot remove all restrictions on the physically deviant
in a world constructed for the physically normal. The ultimate adjustment must
involve changes in the values of the physically disabled person (p. 37).
Barkers (1948) view is understandable 25 years before the passage of
federal legislation to modify public-sector physical environments. Jones and his
colleagues (1984) obliviousness to environmental issues is not. Their otherwise
10 Fine and Asch
situation. The work of Schulz and Decker (1985), and Ainlay (this issue), correct
this prevailing assumption and enrich our understanding of disability by demon-
strating that responses at a specific time may not be the ones people retain after
living with a disability for several years.
There are two more problems with the interpretations of disabled-person-as-
victim put forward by Bulman and Wortman (1977), Janoff-Bulman and Frieze
(1983), Lerner (1980), and Taylor et al. (1983). First, in contrast to Ladieu et
al.s (1948) report on the reactions of disabled veterans after World War 11, these
later researchers seem to discount the experiences described by the people they
interviewed. Taylor et al., for example, view their respondents as having strat-
egies for managing or camouflaging what must be truly tragic. To the out-
sider, the researcher, the objective situation is that a diagnosis of cancer is
primarily a tragedy. That insiders, those with cancer, overwhelmingly state
that they had fared better than they would have expected is not used self-
reflectively by the researchers to reframe their notions about how people think
about traumatic life events (cf. Frank, this issue). Rather, the statement is in-
terpreted to illustrate psychological defenses that disabled people mobilize in
order to manage what researchers feel is not really manageable. What needs to be
stated is that disability-while never wished for-may simply not be as wholly
disastrous as imagined.
Second, these authors presume that the disability itself constitutes the vic-
timizing experience. None of them emphasize the subsequent reactions or depri-
vations that people experience because of social responses to their disability or
environmentally imposed constraints. While Janoff-Bulman and Frieze ( 1983)
recognize discrimination based on sex or gender to be a societal injustice, dis-
ability is assumed a biological injustice and the injustices that lie in its social
treatment are ignored.
4. It is assumed that disability is central to the disabled persons self-
concept, self-definition, social comparisons, and reference groups. Taylor and
her colleagues (1983) describe their respondents as having to make downward
social comparisons, lest they come face to face with how bad their situations
really are. Jones et al. (1984), in their discussion of stigma, assume that the
recently disabled paraplegic compares herself to others who are also paralyzed.
She may, but perhaps only when it comes to assessing her capacity to perform
certain activities from a wheelchair. Gibbons (1986) claims that while such
severely stigmatized people as those labeled retarded must make only downward
social comparisons to preserve self-esteem, more mildly stigmatized people
such as those using wheelchairs seek out similarly disabled people with whom to
compare themselves, and avoid social interactions and social comparisons with
nondisabled people. Because disability is clearly salient for the nondisabled, it is
assumed that the marked person incorporates the mark as central to a self-
definition.
12 Fine and Asch
The above authors forget that the woman who is paralyzed may be as likely
to compare herself with other women her age, others of her occupation, others of
her family, class, race, or a host of other people and groups who function as
reference groups and social comparison groups for her. Disability may be more
salient to the researchers studying it than to the people being studied, who may
define themselves as similar to or worthy of comparison with people without
disabilities. Gurin (1984) reminds researchers in social comparison and relative
deprivation to pay more attention to the conditions under which people choose
particular groups with whom to compare themselves, and she stresses that social
comparison may have nothing to do with gender, race, or disability.
Clearly contrasting with the above discussions of social comparison, Mest
(this issue) demonstrates that their mark or stigma may be irrelevant to how
mentally retarded persons define themselves and each other, particularly if they
work and live in supportive contexts.
5. It is assumed that having a disability is synonymous with needing help
and social support. People with disabilities are perceived to be examples of those
ever in need of help and social support (Brickman et al., 1982; Deutsch, 1985;
Dunkel-Schetter, 1984; Jones et al., 1984; Katz, 1981; Krebs, 1970; Sarason,
1986). Such an assumption is sustained both by what researchers study and write
about those with disabilities and by their omission of disabled people in their
discussions as providers of support.
The assumption that disability is synonymous with helplessness is not sur-
prising when we remember that the handicapped role in the United States has
been seen as one of helplessness, dependence, and passivity (Gliedman & Roth,
1980; Goffman, 1963). Brickman et al. (1982), in their excellent discussion of
different models of helping and coping, review the essence of the medical model:
The person is responsible for neither the problem encountered nor the solution
required. The handicapped role, like the sick role of which it is an extension,
compels the occupant to suspend other activities until recovered, to concentrate
on getting expert therapy, to follow instructions, to get well, and only then to
resume normal life. The nonhandicapped person equates having a disability with
a bad and eternal flu, toothache, or broken leg. When such conditions are
temporary, it may be acceptable to entrust oneself to helpers and to forgo deci-
sion making briefly; but when forced to confront a moment of weakness, un-
steadiness, or limitations in the capacity to see, hear, or move, people experience
grave difficulty in adjusting. However, it is erroneous to conclude that their
difficulties mirror those of the person who has a long-term disability and who has
learned to use alternative methods to accomplish tasks of daily living and working.
That disability is assumed tantamount to incompetence and helplessness has
been investigated, and supported, in laboratory research. Unfortunately, the
writing that has been generated accepts rather than challenges this stereotype.
Katz (198 l), who found that whites gave more help to competent blacks than to
Disability Beyond Stigma 13
ones they perceived to be less competent and enterprising, expected that the same
help-giving pattern would be true for nondisabled subjects when confronting a
person with a disability. Contrary to his hypothesis, however, he found that
nondisabled people gave less help to disabled persons perceived as competent
and friendly than to those perceived as incompetent and unfriendly. They also
gave less help to the disabled persons (simulated) than to nondisabled per-
sons. To explain this, Katz relied on Goffman (1963) and Gliedman and Roth
(1980) in asserting that nondisabled persons are relatively offended or uncom-
fortable when confronting a person with an impairment who manages life compe-
tently! As Jones and his colleagues (1984) remind us, the able-bodied deny the
reality of successful adaptation by the disabled person. They perceive it as the
disabled person making the best of a bad job, and this view supports their
conviction that their own health and capacities are as important, and infallible, as
they think (p. 87).
Even while we wonder whether Katz would have gotten the same finding
had he used a person who actually had a disability rather than one who had
simulated an impairment, it is valuable to have this experimental support for
what Goffman, Gliedman and Roth, and untold numbers of people with dis-
abilities have described. Unfortunately, Jones et al. (1984) fall prey to their own
unchallenged assumptions in thinking about ongoing relationships between peo-
ple with and without disabilities: Throughout their book, and especially in the
chapter by French (1984), it is assumed that the person with the disability is in
constant need of help and support, rather than being a victim of nondisabled
persons projections or fantasies. Thereby, three problems arise: First, that the
person with a disability may need assistance with certain acts is generalized to all
aspects of the relationship between a person with a disability and one without.
Second, if the person does need assistance, it is assumed that a previous re-
ciprocal relationship will change, rather than that new methods or relationships
will develop to provide it. Concurrently, it is assumed that the biological condi-
tion rather than the environment and social context makes one-way assistance
inevitable. Third, it perpetuates the idea that the impaired person is forever the
recipient, rather than ever the provider, of help and support. If disabled people
are mentioned, they are mentioned as only on the receiving end of a helping
transaction.
In Frenchs (1984) chapter on marriages between disabled and nondisabled
people, the assumptions are never challenged that the disability causes marital
roles to change fundamentally, that blindness or quadraplegia per se will make
resuming a work role difficult or impossible, that recreation will have to be
curtailed. The spouse who performs certain amounts of physical caretaking is
seen not only as a physical caretaker but as a generous intellectual and emotional
caretaker as well. Physical incapacities are perceived as leading inevitably to
incapacities in other spheres of life. Wrights (1983) notion that disability
14 Fine and Asch
The Role of These Assumptions for Society and for Social Science
one can think of a person with a disability as needy, in contrast, one can view
those without impairments as strong and as not having needs. By thinking of the
disabled person as dependent in a given situation, and the one without disabilities
as independent and autonomous, one can avoid considering how extensively
people without disabilities too are dependent and out of control. As members
of a social group, we are all sometimes dependent and sometimes not. Rather
than the world being divided into givers and receivers of help, we are all actually
interdependent. Attributing neediness and lack of control to people with dis-
abilities permits those who are not disabled to view themselves as having more
control and more strength in their lives than may be the case.
Last, perceiving a person with a disability as a suffering victim, as a stim-
ulus object, as in need, or as different and strange, all reinforce what Goffman
(1963) describes as perception of the stigmatized as not quite human (p. 6). In
discussing the scope of justice, Deutsch (1985) comments, Justice is not in-
volved in relations with others . . . who are perceived to be outside ones poten-
tial moral community or opposed to it. . . . The narrower ones concept of
community, the narrower will be the scope of situations in which ones actions
will be governed by considerations of justice (pp. 36-37). Deutsch goes on to
contend that it has been a
too-common assumption of victimizers, even those of good will, as well as of many social
scientists, that the social pathology has been in the ghetto rather than in those who have
built the walls to surround it, that the disadvantaged are the ones who need to be changed
rather than the people and institutions who have kept the disadvantaged in a submerged
position. . . . It is more important to change educational institutions and economic and
political systems so that they will permit those groups who are now largely excluded from
important positions of decision-making to share power than to try to inculcate new
attitudes and skills in those who are excluded (p. 61).
We conclude by discussing what research might look like without the five
assumptions described above and by posing questions for future study.
Although we do not see the influence of the 1948 JSI issue on disability in
much of contemporary research, we believe it has influenced social policy in the
intervening decades and has informed much of the research found in the present
volume. Many of the 1948 policy recommendations have been realized: Children
with disabilities are now entitled to a free, appropriate public education alongside
their nondisabled counterparts (Cain, 1948). Many state civil rights laws now
provide people with disabilities the same protection against discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations as is afforded to other minor-
ity groups. Federal law now mandates that disabled people have equal access to
employment and services in all programs that receive federal money (Barker,
1948; Meyerson, 1948b,c). As laws, institutional arrangements, and social rela-
tionships begin to change, so too must the social psychology of disability change
to reflect the altered experience of people with disabilities-and of persons
without disabilities-as members of a common moral community.
Having been critical of the picture of disability portrayed in much of the
social-psychological research previously discussed, we must ask what has kept
so much research locked into the narrow assumptions about people with dis-
abilities. As Asch (1984) has described, the focus of much social-psychological
research on disability has been to determine the impact of contact with disability
upon people without impairments. Such a question, particularly when framed by
a researcher outside the disability experience, makes the person with the dis-
ability the object, not the subject, of study and distances the research from the
disabled persons life experience. Furthermore, much of this research was under-
taken primarily to bolster particular theoretical notions about stigma, victimiza-
tion, social comparison processes, justice, altruism, or social support. Not sur-
prisingly, but regrettably, the authors have used notions of disability as a
metaphor to advance social theories rather than to advance our knowledge of the
experience of disability.
We wonder what keeps researchers from imagining a context in which
disability would not be handicapping. Major reasons may be that most research
has not focused on the lives and experiences of people with disabilities, and it has
often been conducted without substantial contact with people with disabilities.
By contrast, the research presented in the following pages, like that of the 1948
JSI, stems from the authors interest in people with disabilities. The articles
adopt varying disciplinary perspectives, and they demonstrate that disability
often functions as an independent variable, but that reactions to and conse-
quences of disability are dependent upon multiple variables in the social and
psychological contexts of disabled and nondisabled persons. (Similarly, several
18 Fine and Asch
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