Bakshi 2011

International Studies
http://isq.sagepub.com/
Marx's Concept of Man: Alienation, Exploitation and Socialism

Om Bakshi
International Studies 2011 48: 85
DOI: 10.1177/0020881712469456
The online version of this article can be found at:

http://isq.sagepub.com/content/48/2/85
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
Additional services and information for International Studies can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://isq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://isq.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://isq.sagepub.com/content/48/2/85.refs.html
>> Version of Record - Feb 7, 2013
What is This?
Downloaded from isq.sagepub.com at NATIONAL CHUNG HSING UNIV on March 27, 2014
Article
Marxs Concept of Man: International Studies

48(2) 85111
Alienation, Exploitation 2011 JNU
SAGE Publications
and Socialism Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0020881712469456
http://isq.sagepub.com
Om Bakshi
Abstract
For long, the feeling has been that Marx views man essentially in terms of his
material interests. The publication of Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,
however, has led many to realize that he is keenly interested in developing indi-
vidual potentialities, realizing human essence and nurturing talents. What is
interesting, however, is that Marx relies on productive activity, on labour, to
give meaning to life. How work in factories, however rationally organized, can
be a source of joy and fulfilment is hard to see. It is, therefore, not surprising
that when he touches upon these issues in later writings, few though these occa-
sions are, he relies more on intellectual, literary and artistic pursuits than on
labour. No matter which activity we pursue, however, we can profitably pursue
it, says Marx, only in a communist society. Thus, he attaches great importance
to reorganizing the economic aspect of society. But strangely he does not think
that bringing about these changes, building a better society, would give meaning
to life. In any case, Marxs plea to develop potentialities, realize human essence
and foster creativity did not have much relevance for societies characterized by
poverty, privation and exploitation that existed in his time. It is, therefore, not
surprising that in his later writings he is concerned more about the problems
facing society, especially the miserable condition of workers. This leads him to
make a careful analysis of the existing reality. Those interested in the study of
politics and society today, especially in countries like India, which are facing
major problems, need to pay more attention to the approach Marx adopts in
his later writings.
Keywords
Capitalism, division of labour, free activity, happiness, human essence, liberalism,
morality, psychological traits, species power
Om Bakshi is former Professor of Political Theory at School of International Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. E-mail: bakshi.om@gmail.com
The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees, Prof. P. Sahadevan and Dr Bansidhar
Pradhan for their comments on the article.
86 Om Bakshi
The publication of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in 1930s was an

important event for scholars interested in Marxs social and political thought. It
also provided those sympathetic to him with an opportunity to challenge the way
his view of man had been traditionally understood. For long, it was widely
believed that Marx was interested mainly, if not exclusively, in the economic
activities of man, relying on them not only to explain what was going on around
him in society but also to define the very nature of man. In these Manuscripts,
however, we find him talking enthusiastically about man as a free being who
needs to develop freely, emphasizing the importance of human status and dig-
nity, referring to free activity as the spiritual aspect of man and so on. This led
many not just to see Marxs view of man, but also his social and political thought
as a whole, in new light. The enthusiasm for his early writings was, however, not
shared by everybody. There was no dearth of scholars, critics as well as those
sympathetic to him, who argued that his interest in the themes which preoccupied
him in the Manuscripts declined in his later writings. Although much has been
written on these issues, several questions remain. In particular, we need to exam-
ine the usefulness of focusing on the concept of man, whether it helped Marx in
making sense of what was going on around him and in providing a basis for inter-
vening in it. This discussion, thus, will be of interest not only to those trying to
understand the place Marxs concept of man occupies in his thought but also to
those engaged in the study of social and political life today.
Marxs Concept of Man

For long scholars had placed Marxs interpretation of history or his analysis of
capitalist economy at the heart of his thinking. The publication of Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts,1 however, led many to think that his concept of man
provides the key to understanding it. Marx is, of course, not the first thinker to
study human nature. Interest in it began when philosophers like Plato and Aristotle
turned to the study of social and political life. But Marx gives a new turn to the
whole discussion on man. The feeling over the centuries has been that what makes
us human beings is the interest we take in intellectual, artistic or literary pursuits,
in religious contemplation, or in the capacity for moral judgement and action.
There has even been a tendency to think that the pursuit of pleasures of the senses
is all that matters. In the Manuscripts, however, Marx argues that we realize
human essence through productive activity, through labour (Marx, 1977, pp.
7374)
The view that we find meaning in life by doing labour would come as a sur-
prise to many, scholars as well as people in ordinary life. In particular, those who
emphasize the need to develop individuality, realize potentialities, or give expres-
sion to creativity would rather rely on artistic, literary or intellectual activities.
They would think that we depend on labour to produce necessities of life. Those
conversant with history of ideas would also remember that thinkers like Aristotle
International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111
Marxs Concept of Man 87
had contempt for labour, which they thought rendered people incapable of leading
virtuous life. In Marxs own times, classical economists were of the view that
most of us would rather shun it. On the other hand, in his Comments on James
Mill, Marx argues that a persons individuality finds expression in what he pro-
duces. This is why he not only enjoys doing labour but also regards the product of
his labour as a source of happiness (Marx, 1844, pp. 1718).
Marx is, of course, aware that his views regarding labour would hardly be
endorsed by workers. In fact, he has no doubt that they are forced by economic
compulsions to engage in productive activity. When there is no compulsion, they
shun it like the plague. Far from being a source of joy and fulfilment, labour is
a source of misery. In his work, the worker, says Marx, does not affirm himself
but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his
physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind (Marx,
1977, p. 71).
Marx holds private ownership of means of production responsible for turning
labour, which is a source of joy, into drudgery. Our life activity, says Marx, has
become a means for making a living (Ibid., pp. 7173). Those who own the means
of production decide what to produce, how much to produce and where and how
to dispose of the product. It is necessary for us, particularly those who hold a more
traditional view of Marx, to understand what he is complaining about. He is not
saying that those who own means of production exploit workers, forcing them to
work for long hours in appalling conditions for low wages. He is complaining that
workers are unable to give expression to their individuality, to develop potentiali-
ties, and to nourish talents. It is, therefore, not surprising that some commentators
claim that Marx is not concerned about the exploitation of workers but their alien-
ation (Fromm, 1961, pp. 4849). This criticism provides the basis for his plea to
abolish private property, but Marxs aim, it should be remembered, is to create
conditions in which labour becomes a source of joy and fulfilment instead of
being regarded as drudgery. In this society, everybody will be able to produce
what they like to produce, to own what they produce and to share it with others.
Work becomes a source of joy and fulfilment, says Marx, when we are not forced
to do what we are not interested in doing (Marx, 1977, pp. 6774; Marx, 1844, pp.
1718).
While many would sympathize with Marxs desire to turn a boring, monoto-
nous and tiresome activity into a source of joy and fulfilment, they might wonder
whether this beautiful dream could be translated into reality. For the economy as
it has evolved over the last few centuries relies heavily on division of labour to
maximize production. This is why it is doubtful whether labour could ever become
the kind of activity we would look forward to engage in. Marx is, of course, well
aware that division of labour prevents it from being a source of joy. When a per-
son is assigned a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon
him and from which he cannot escape, says Marx in an oft-quoted passage in
German Ideology, labour ceases to be a free activity (Marx and Engels, 2010b, p.
53). In his discussion on division of labour, however, Marx does not rest content
88 Om Bakshi
with saying that we should be free to decide which activity to pursue. He finds
division of labour so repulsive that he emphasizes the need to keep shifting from
one activity to another. The task is, thus, to create conditions in which it is pos-
sible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, indeed to hunt in the
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, without ever becoming
a hunter, a fisherman, or a shepherd. While many would agree with Marx that we
should be free to decide which activity to pursue, they might wonder why we must
keep shifting from one activity to another. They could even argue that we develop
potentialities, nourish talents, more by focusing on one kind of activity. This view
will be endorsed particularly by those pursuing intellectual, literary, or artistic
activities. But we should remember that Marx does not rely on these activities to
find meaning in life but on labour, which could become boring, monotonous and
tiring if we engage in it for long.
The argument that division of labour stands in the way of finding joy and fulfil-
ment in life as developed in German Ideology seems to be different from that
developed in the Manuscripts, which holds private ownership of means of pro-
duction responsible for turning productive activity into alienated labour. While in
the Manuscripts he emphasizes the need to abolish private property, he now advo-
cates the need to develop a society in which nobody has one exclusive sphere of
activity, in which we freely move from one kind of activity to another. However,
Marx does not see any contradiction in his argument, since he regards division of
labour and private property as identical expressions: in the one the same thing is
affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the
product of the activity (Ibid., p. 34). His argument is that division of labour
brought about an increase in productivity, which resulted in the development of
private property. This has led some commentators to think that the abolition of
private property would result in the abolition of division of labour. This is, how-
ever, open to question. Although Marx is right in referring to the role of division
of labour in the growth of property, it is doubtful whether it would disappear when
private property is abolished. For Marx has himself shown how economic activity
was completely transformed after the rise of capitalism. In particular, division of
labour, which characterized exchange for long, entered production, changing it
once and for all. And every advance in technology helps in further increasing divi-
sion of labour. Since these changes have resulted in greatly increasing productiv-
ity, we can hardly think of undoing the transformation the process of production
has undergone in the last few centuries. It is, therefore, not surprising that, although
Marx emphasizes the need to abolish private property, he does not say that we
need to do away with industrialization. Although he is aware that advances in
technology increase division of labour, making work in factories repetitive,
monotonous and boring, he still relies on it to increase production. The material
needs of people have to be met.
The passage in which Marx attacks division of labour has been widely dis-
cussed by scholars. They have also complimented him for showing the impor-
tance of freely choosing activities we want to pursue. But what is surprising is that
Marx feels such banal activities as hunting, fishing, and rearing cattle give mean-
ing to life. This would leave many even in ordinary life puzzled. Those conversant
with the history of ideas might even find it strange. They would admit that there
are major differences among social and political thinkers over the activities which
could be profitably pursued. While some emphasize intellectual pursuits, others
attach more importance to moral behaviour. But few among them could imagine
that we develop potentialities by rearing cattle, realize individuality by fishing, or
give expression to creativity by hunting.
What is even more perplexing is that, although Marx lived in a capitalist soci-
ety which was making extensive use of machinery, he refers to hunting, fishing
and rearing cattle as examples of productive activity. It should also be remem-
bered that division of labour within a factory is not the result of workers exchang-
ing their individual products. There is a division of labour between workers, each
of whom performs a partial operation, all operations being performed simultane-
ously. What is produced is the product of their collective effort. No single worker
produces an article in which his individuality could find expression. The work of
the proletarians, Marx admits in the Communist Manifesto, has lost all individ-
ual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman (Marx and Engels,
2011, Vol. I, p. 114). It is true that he makes this observation when he discusses
the system of production as it existed in his time. But so long as we rely on it, no
matter how rationally we organize it, whether in a capitalist or socialist economy,
there is little possibility of abolishing division of labour. How labour could become
a source of joy and fulfilment is hard to see.
This is not to deny that we can rationally organize working conditions in fac-
tories, make work mentally and physically less exhausting. Advances in technol-
ogy could also help in reducing hours of work. Changes in working conditions
may not turn labour into an activity which workers would look forward to engage
in. But these changes would give them free time in which to pursue activities that
give meaning to life. In the Capital, thus, Marx draws a distinction between the
realm of necessity and the realm of freedom (Marx, 2009, Vol. III, p. 820). All
societies, including socialist societies, remain in the realm of necessity, con-
cerned with meeting the material needs of society. It is only when they are able to
produce enough for the use of all, says Marx, that the possibility of entering the
realm of freedom arises. The realm of freedom, therefore, begins only when
we leave the realm of necessity. In this way, Marx abandons the view that we
find joy and fulfilment when we engage in labour. In works like the Grundrisse
and the Capital, thus, his emphasis is on shortening of the working day, on giv-
ing workers more free time. It is not surprising that in his later writings, Marx
uses the word labour rather than the expression species power, which he uses
in the Manuscripts.
Since we cannot rely on labour to find joy and fulfilment in life, the question
regarding the kind of activities we could profitably pursue arises. Marxs discus-
sion on the alienation of that section of society which does not rely on labour to
make a living, namely, the capitalist, throws light on this issue. The talk about the
90 Om Bakshi
alienation of capitalists might come as a surprise to many, for unlike workers, they
have the means to choose freely the kind of activities they would like to pursue.
But, surprisingly, Marx does not think that the fate of capitalists is very different
from that of workers. However, the few observations he makes at the end of the
first unfinished manuscript, where he refers to their alienation, are of little help. In
his discussion on their alienation in the third manuscript, however, Marx clarifies
that their freedom to choose activities is severely limited by the code of conduct
that obtains in capitalist societies. For it enjoins everybody, capitalists as well as
workers, to practice thrift. The renunciation of life and of all human needs is the
principal tenet of this moral code. For the more you save, says Marx, the less you
think, love, theories, sing, paint, fence, etc. The more you follow this moral code,
the less you express your own life the greater is your alienated life, the greater
is the store of your estranged being (Marx, 1977, pp. 111112, emphasis in the
original). In this way Marx endorses the more traditional view that we find mean-
ing in life when we engage in intellectual or artistic pursuits, find joy and fulfil-
ment in human relationships.
For long it was widely believed that Marx regarded capitalists as exploiters, as
oppressors and workers as their victims. But now we find that capitalists, too, are
victims of the existing system, that they also lead alienated life. Marxs criticism
of capitalist society, according to Fromm, is directed against its destruction of
individuality and its enslavement of man, not by the capitalist, but the enslave-
ment of manworker and capitalist (Fromm, 1961, p. 49, emphasis in the origi-
nal). This adds a new dimension to Marxs thinking. It might even lead some to
think that when he claims that the emancipation of the working class contains
universal human emancipation (Marx, 1977, p. 78), he has in mind the emancipa-
tion of the capitalists, too.2 How this view can be reconciled with the whole thrust
of Marxs thinking that they are exploiters is hard to see. Although the language
used by Marx is not precise, it is doubtful whether, when he talks about universal
human emancipation, he has in mind not only the oppressed sections of society
but also the ruling classes (Ibid., see also Marx and Engels, 2010b, pp. 6869). We
should also not ignore that, although he talks about the alienation of the capital-
ists, he has no doubt that there is a big difference between their alienation and that
of the workers. For the working class, says Marx in the Holy Family, feels anni-
hilated in its alienation, sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an
inhuman existence. The propertied class, on the other hand, feels at ease and
strengthened in this self-estrangement it recognizes estrangement, as its own
power and has in it the semblance of a human existence (Marx and Engels, 2010a,
p. 46, emphasis in the original). This is why, while some scholars, especially those
in the West, might feel concerned about the alienation of the owners of property,
the capitalists themselves are not likely to be unduly worried about it.
The interpretations that show Marx was well disposed towards capitalists
would come as a surprise to those who accept a more traditional view of Marx.
But we can make better sense of them by grasping the implications of the concept
of man he espouses. We may well insist that he does not have the emancipation of
the capitalists in mind. We may also underline the distinction he draws between
the alienation of capitalists and that of the workers. But there is no denying that in
his early writings, thanks to the concept of man he espouses, he is concerned
about the fate of everybody, not only workers but also capitalists, whether they
find joy and fulfilment in the conditions as they obtain in the society. It is only
when Marx addresses the problems facing society rather than the philosophical
issue regarding the nature of man that he focuses entirely on the plight of the
workers, their exploitation, their misery, and their suffering, and is no longer con-
cerned about the capitalists.
Be that as it may, Marxs plea to engage in artistic, intellectual, or literary
activities is similar to the more traditional view regarding the kind of activities
which help in making life more fulfilling. Those conversant with the history of
ideas would, however, wonder why he has completely ignored the capacity for
moral judgement and action, which has often been regarded as the defining
attribute of man. This seems to be a major limitation of Marxs concept of man,
although this objection may not seem relevant to some, those who think that Marx
does not attach much importance to morality, since he regards it more as a part of
ideological superstructure. In spite of the popularity of this view, it is open to seri-
ous objections. While it is true that Marx attacks liberal values for playing an
ideological role, it is doubtful whether he also believes that socialist society is not
based on moral principles, that all we can say is that while capitalist society serves
interest of one section of society, namely, the owners of property, socialist society
serves interest of the other section of society, namely, workers. However, we can-
not go into this question at this stage. What is pertinent to note here is that Marx
strongly believes in the need to reorganize the institutional structure of society,
particularly economic institutions and exhorts workers to bring about these
changes. That is why it is surprising that he does not think that efforts to bring
about these changes would make life more meaningful. Hunting, fishing and rear-
ing animals are regarded as activities which give meaning to life, but not building
a better society.3 This limitation of Marxs thinking would appear far more serious
if he has not completely written off morality. And, the truth, as we will see below,
is that he has not.
Marxs Vision of Ideal Society

Marxs view of an ideal society is closely connected with his concept of man. To
enable workers to lead a more meaningful life, he emphasizes the need to redesign
economic institutions. In the model of economy that Marx has in mind, not only
in the Manuscripts but also in German Ideology and in his Comments on James
Mill, there is no place for private ownership of means of production. This, he
hopes, would help in creating conditions in which everybody is free to produce
what he enjoys producing, to own it, to share it with others and so on. In this
model, there is no place for division of labour. Everybody is free to decide for
92 Om Bakshi
himself the kind of work he wants to do, whether it is fishing, hunting, or rearing
animals. Also, he does not confine himself to one kind of activity, moving freely
from one kind of work to another. Although the passages in which Marx develops
these ideas have won the admiration of many, his followers as well as his critics,
translating this vision into reality in industrial societies, whether capitalist or
socialist, as noted earlier, appears to be a utopian dream. This realization seems to
have led Marx to think that we find joy and fulfilment through intellectual, literary
and artistic pursuits. We work in factories to create conditions to pursue these
activities. Every society, no matter how its economic institutions are organized,
needs to produce material goods to meet requirements of life. But Marx thinks
that only a communist society would provide conditions in which intellectual,
literary and artistic activities could be pursued meaningfully.
Although Marx may have given up the view that we rely on labour to find joy
and fulfilment in life, he has no doubt that we have to organize productive activity
rationally. There is need to improve working conditions in factories, to make
working in factories mentally and physically less exhausting. The working day
must be shortened considerably to give workers free time to pursue artistic, liter-
ary and intellectual activities. Marx was happy when Ten Hour Act was passed by
Parliament in England. But he believes that the possibility of rationally organizing
work in factories arises meaningfully only in socialist societies.
Marxs vision of an ideal society has proved attractive to many. Even a critic
like Popper admires him for emphasizing the need to pursue artistic, literary and
intellectual activities (Popper, 1963, pp. 103, 201). He disagrees with the view
that Marx was interested only in meeting the material needs of life, insisting that
in Marxs view they provide the conditions in which these activities could be
pursued. Yet, the question remains whether people turn to these pursuits when
their material needs are met. Take, for instance, societies in the West. Although
they have greatly succeeded in improving the condition of workers, they have not
moved significantly in the direction of developing individuality, realizing their
potentialities and fostering creativity. The focus of these societies remains on
maximizing utilities. However, this example may not appear apt to many, particu-
larly the followers of Marx, who would argue that the economic institutions as
they obtain in Western societies encourage people to become consumers rather
than developers of their potentialities. For the whole effort of those who direct
production in these societies is to create wants for their products. Many readers
would be familiar with this argument, which was developed by Marx in the
Manuscripts (Marx, 1977, pp. 108109).
While there is a great deal of substance in this objection, the question raised
in the preceding paragraph still remains relevant. For the societies which have
experienced socialist revolution, have not shown much enthusiasm for realizing
Marxs vision of ideal society. Those conversant with the situation as it obtains
in China, for example, have no doubt that the economic condition of ordinary
people has significantly improved in the last few decades. Many among them
would even say that in the not-so-distant future the ordinary Chinese will be able
to enjoy a lifestyle comparable to that of people in Western societies. Although

the determination with which the ruling class in China has pursued the goal of
economic prosperity has been widely acclaimed, it has not found many admirers
among those who cherish the ideals Marx defends in his early works. They have
often criticized the Chinese for abandoning these ideals. Although the tendency
to find fault with the ruling classes in societies that experienced radical changes
has been strong, we need to question the assumption that we can solve all prob-
lems for all times, make everybody happy, bring heaven on earth simply by abol-
ishing private property. This assumption has proved to be completely
unfounded.
Materialistic View of Man

The concept of man as developed by Marx in his early works has helped his fol-
lowers to critically evaluate societies as they obtain in the West today. Since the
main focus of these societies is on the pursuit of economic prosperity, they have
raised questions regarding the quality of life in Western societies. Although this
kind of exercise would seem wholly legitimate to many, others might wonder
whether this was the problem that the disadvantaged sections of society, particu-
larly workers, faced when Marx was writing. At least those conversant with his
later works would not think it was. They would rather point out that he regarded
the exploitation of workers as the main problem.
Thus, in his later works, especially the Capital, Marx gives a graphic account
of the condition of workers, their suffering, privation and misery, in his time. He
relies on such sources as the findings of factory inspectors and reports appearing
in newspapers to show the blind, unbridled passion, the werewolf hunger for
surplus labour of the owners of factories (Marx, 2009, Vol. I, Chapter X, The
Working-Day, pp. 222286). It will come as a surprise to many today that work-
ers, including women and children under thirteen, sometimes six or seven years of
age, had to work for twelve, even fifteen or sixteen hours a day. Bus drivers and
conductors in London, a daily reported, worked for l6 hours a day for the wages
of a dog. Small children worked in factories for bare subsistence from early
morning to late in the night, their limbs wearing away, their forms dwindling,
their faces whitening, and their humanity absolutely sinking into a stone-like tor-
por. Marx refers to a newspaper report about a milliner, Mary Anne Walkley,
twenty years of age, who had worked without pause for 26 1/2 hours in an over-
crowded workroom and badly ventilated bedroom and died at her workplace to
show how bad working conditions in factories were. In most factories, factory
inspectors reported, night work was usual, meal times were irregular, food being
taken in the workrooms, some of which were filled with poisonous gases. Dante,
says Marx, would have found the worst horrors of his Inferno surpassed in these
factories.
94 Om Bakshi
Working in such conditions as these had a devastating effect on the health of

workers. Marx refers to the statements of physicians made before Commissions of
Inquiry appointed by Parliament to show that those working in factories often suf-
fered from acute attacks of dyspepsia, disorders of the liver and kidney, scrofula
and rheumatism and chest diseases like asthma, bronchitis and phthisis. They
were stunted in growth, ill shaped and frequently ill-formed in the chest, they
became prematurely old and were short lived. Each successive generation of
workers was more dwarfed and less robust than the preceding generation. The
exploitation of workers, Marx points out, was not confined to certain types of
industries. Workers of all occupations, ages, and sexes were being exploited. It
is not surprising that the average expectation of life of those working in factories
was extraordinarily short, for example, fifteen in Liverpool and seventeen in
Manchester, whereas the average age of those belonging to the middle classes was
much higher (Marx, 2009, Vol. I, p. 601). Thus the problem facing society in the
nineteenth century, as described by Marx, was not the inability of workers to real-
ize human essence, to develop potentialities, to give expression to individuality
but their privation and suffering, their unmitigated slavery, the slow sacrifice
of humanity that took place in factories.
It is, therefore, not surprising that within a few years of writing Manuscripts,
Marx began to emphasize the need to pay attention to the interests of workers
(Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto 2011, Vol. I, p. 131). Instead of talking
about realizing potentialities, developing individuality and nourishing creativity,
he started talking about increasing wages, reducing hours of work and improving
conditions in factories. This led many to think that what mattered to Marx was the
material interest of workers. Lest we misunderstand their argument, the critics did
not have any objection against his concern for the economic needs of workers,
given the extremely poor condition of the disadvantaged sections of society. Their
objection was that this was not all that there was to man. Whereas social and
political thinkers had through the centuries emphasized artistic, literary and intel-
lectual pursuits, all that mattered to Marx was, they complained, filling bellies, to
use the language employed by Heraclitus long ago.
After the publication of Marxs early writings, those sympathetic to him have
not found it difficult to show that this criticism is misconceived. Although they
admit that he emphasizes the need to improve the economic conditions of work-
ers, they find fault with his liberal critics for ignoring his interest in developing
individuality, realizing potentialities and nourishing talents. They are also sur-
prised that he is criticized for focusing on the economic interest of workers, since
liberal economists too believe that man is guided essentially by economic motive.
The case for an exchange economy often rests on the ground that it is in agree-
ment with human nature. There is, no doubt, some substance in this view, although
an argument like this cannot go far. We cannot defend Marx simply by saying that
liberals also rely on the economic motive.
This kind of defence also ignores the fact that in Marxs times, the tendency to
question the view of man propounded by early liberals had started growing.
Instead of viewing man as a consumer, as a maximizer of utilities, as Bentham put

it, liberals like J.S. Mill and T.H. Green emphasized the need to realize individual
potentialities, to develop individual personality. The revision of liberal thinking
by these writers has been widely welcomed. This is not to deny that scholars like
Macpherson have argued that the acceptance of the view of man as a doer, as an
enjoyer of his powers by thinkers like Mill has rendered liberal theory internally
incoherent, since it continues to support a capitalist market economy which is
based on a view of man as a consumer (Macpherson, 1977).
While it is not possible to discuss here the issues about the internal problems
of liberal theory, many, including Macpherson, agree that liberals consider the
need to realize potentialities, develop individual personality, etc., as part of their
creed today. What has greatly increased the appeal of liberalism is, of course, the
success of Western societies in improving the economic condition of ordinary citi-
zens. The practice of socialism for almost a century has also left many, including
those sympathetic to Marxist thinking, disappointed. Since, as mentioned earlier,
these societies have not only shown little interest in developing potentialities,
realizing individuality and nourishing creativity, but have also denied civil liber-
ties, showed little respect for human rights and suppressed democratic move-
ments. It is not surprising that in spite of the enthusiasm generated by Marxs
early writings, the view has not completely disappeared that economic interest is
all that matters to Marx and his followers.
Analyzing the Capitalist Economy

Instead of resting content with defining the nature of man, speculating about
human essence or describing his psychological traits, in his later writings, as
noted earlier, Marx focuses on misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, [and]
exploitation of workers. In the Capital especially, he analyzes the economic sys-
tem of capitalism to show why it results in the exploitation of workers. Relying on
the labour theory of value, which was developed by classical economists, he
argues that a workers day is divided into two parts. In one part, he produces value
equivalent to his wages: wages which are barely enough to produce labour
power. The rest of the time he devotes to produce value which the capitalist uses,
called the surplus value. Although the worker produces surplus value, he cannot
use it. The capitalist enjoys the fruits of his labour. Thus, Marx is not complaining
that workers are unable to develop potentialities and realize individuality. His
entire focus is on how surplus labour is extracted in factories, and why workers
are paid subsistence wages, which are just above starvation level.
The owners of factories would, we might feel, like to keep wages low. But
Marx does not believe that social and political life is shaped by what goes on in
our mind. Hence, instead of depending on the propensities of the owners of facto-
ries, he relies on the existence of a large number of unemployed people in society,
96 Om Bakshi
the industrial reserve army, as Marx calls it, to explain why wages remain at
subsistence level. Those unemployed exert pressure on workers, forcing them to
accept low wages. To understand what goes on in society, thus, Marx relies on his
analysis of the situation as it obtains in society. He is, of course, aware that, as
industry expands, many of those unemployed would be absorbed in factories.
This could ease pressure on workers and wages could rise. But the very rise in
employment and increase in wages starts what Marx calls a trade cycle. His
analysis of the trade cycle shows why growing industry cannot absorb workers
for any length of time. This is why he insists that the possibility of wages rising is
little. To say that Marx gives much importance to the consequences of the exist-
ence of unemployed people in society is, however, not to say that he denies capi-
talists having any role in keeping wages low. What is interesting, however, is that
he relies on his analysis of the falling rate of profit, rather than on their propensi-
ties, to explain their actions. His argument is that competition among capitalists
forces them to make investments to increase productivity of labour. But this
increase in investment is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in their
profits. This is why, Marx argues, the rate of profit must fall. Thus, the capital-
ists face pressure, which they are forced to pass on to the workers. This they do
by extending hours of work, lowering wages, and exploiting children and
women.
Since Marx does not think that the condition of workers would improve under
capitalism, he exhorts them to work for the realization of socialist society in which
their suffering and misery alone would come to an end. Marx was, of course,
aware that workers were becoming increasingly assertive, ready to confront fac-
tory owners to get their grievances redressed. But he did not think that the situa-
tion would improve significantly as a result of local and sectional struggles. The
rise of the working class movement, however, brought about major changes in
society. The part it has played in the growth of democracy, for example, has been
widely acknowledged by historians. We might also think that the rise of a politi-
cally conscious working class would bring about changes in the role that Marx
thinks the state plays in social and political life. For when he describes the state as
the instrument of the ruling class, he is thinking of a society in which the position
of the class that owns the means of production is unchallenged. The rise of a class
that challenged its supremacy, however, created a situation which resulted in rede-
fining the role of the state. It gradually began to act independently of the economi-
cally dominant class. Although followers of Marx continue to insist that it remains
an instrument of the ruling class, they have been forced to admit that it has acquired
a measure of autonomy. That the role of the state has much to do with the class
structure of society has not escaped the attention of Marx and Engels. In fact,
Engels refers to periods in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly
that the state acquires a certain degree of independence of both (Marx and
Engels, 2011, Vol. III, p. 328). Although he does not think such situations occur
very often, the truth is that the rise of working class has brought about enduring
changes in social and political life.
It is, therefore, not surprising that, contrary to Marxs assessment, the condi-
tion of workers has considerably improved over time, owing largely to state inter-
vention in the economic aspect of society. Although many would think he was
right when he claimed that the state served the interest of the ruling classes, we
should not ignore that it has played a major role in alleviating the suffering of
workers in our times. It is, no doubt, possible to argue that Western societies are
still capitalist societies in which surplus value continues to be extracted from
workers. But it must be admitted that they can no longer be forced to work for
long hours in factories. Nor can their wages be kept at subsistence level. Working
conditions in factories have also improved over time. Child labour, too, is more a
thing of the past. While most writers tend to focus on the improvement in the
economic condition of workers, what those conversant with the condition of
workers in the nineteenth century, their suffering, privation and misery, would
find more striking is that workers can no longer be exploited with impunity.
Be that as it may, in his later writings like the Capital, Marx addresses a prob-
lem, albeit the most urgent problem, facing society in the nineteenth century. In
the Manuscripts, on the other hand, he develops a view of an ideal society on the
basis of an abstract principle, the concept of freedom. He rejects liberal concept
of freedom which he identifies with freedom to own and dispose of property and
redefines it as free activity, the freedom to engage in an activity of ones choice,
an activity that would help to develop potentialities, to give expression to creativity,
to nourish talents and so on. In his later writings, however, he does not develop a
view of society on the basis of an abstract principle, does not build a utopia, or
provide the blueprint of an ideal society. He does not regard communism as an
ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself, but the real movement which
abolishes the present state of things (Marx and Engels, 2010b, p. 57, emphasis in
the original). The task, as he visualizes it, is to minimize suffering rather than to
maximize happiness.
The usefulness of developing the concepts of man, philosophizing about what
makes us human beings, about human essence, is open to objections. For when
a large section of society lives in miserable conditions, there is little justification
for talking about developing potentialities, fostering creativity, nourishing talents,
or giving expression to individuality. When workers are being ruthlessly exploited
there is little relevance of talking about the joy of composing music, the pleasure
of writing poems, experiencing fulfillment in philosophizing and finding meaning
in painting. These activities can be pursued by those leading comfortable lives,
those who have leisure which they want to enjoy tastefully, not by those working
in factories for long hours in appalling conditions just for subsistence wages. It is
therefore surprising when some of those sympathetic to Marx admire him for
philosophizing about man, for showing what is common between workers and
capitalists, between slaves and masters (Petrovic, 1981, p. 141). The search for
what is common between the slave whose very humanity has been denied, and the
master who has denied it, or between the worker who is no better than a slave, and
the capitalist who exploits him ruthlessly, is misconceived. For what is relevant in
98 Om Bakshi
the study of social and political life is not what is common between those who
exploit and those who are exploited, those who oppress and those who are
oppressed, but what is not common between them. A prophet or a saint, concerned
about the well-being of our souls, may not be unduly worried about the difference
between the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and the exploited, the
masters and the slaves. He may think it is far more important for us to prepare
ourselves for life after death than to worry about miseries in the present life. But
social and political thinkers must be concerned about matters related to life in this
world. They cannot remain mute spectators when the ruling classes, the powerful,
and the well-to-do oppress those who are weak, poor, and helpless. If this view
sums up all that there is to Marx, then he has no relevance for those innumerable
people who live in conditions of poverty, deprivation, and suffering. But, as we
have seen earlier, there is much more to him than what it says.
Moral Basis of Communist Society

However, Marxs argument as developed in the Capital seems to be open to a
major objection. For his proposal to reorganize economic aspect of society is
based on a purely factual analysis of the existing capitalist society. While this kind
of reasoning might seem straightforward to many in ordinary life, those who
accept fact-value dichotomy would not think it legitimate to move from a factual
analysis to a moral conclusion. This would, no doubt, be a serious issue for schol-
ars interested in the social and political theory of Marx. The usefulness of discuss-
ing such a philosophical issue, however, may be questioned by others, those who
think that Marx proposes to redesign economic institutions to promote interest of
workers not to serve some highfalutin moral principles. For Marxs view, they
would argue, is that the principles widely accepted in society, far from being eter-
nal verities they are often supposed to be, serve the interest of the ruling classes.
While we might think that liberal society is based on such values as freedom and
equality, which are widely cherished, Marx argues that they have resulted in the
exploitation of a large section of society. There is a great deal of substance in this
interpretation of Marxs view of morality (Marx and Engels, 2010b, pp. 67; Marx,
2011, Vol. I, p. 118, etc.). But, this view of morality may not be acceptable to
many, scholars as well as people in ordinary life. They may concede that liberal
values served the interest of the more affluent section of society in the nineteenth
century, but would be hesitant to dismiss morality altogether.
The view that there is no place for morality in Marxs thinking can, of course
be questioned. To begin with, his criticism of the capitalist system is basically a
moral criticism, that it results in the exploitation of a large section of society, not
that it is, for example, a wasteful and inefficient system. Those conversant with
the history of socialist movements would also refer to the moral appeal of social-
ism which attracted innumerable people over the years, inspiring them to work for
the realization of socialist ideals, enduring immense hardships and making great
sacrifices. Those who espouse socialist beliefs, too, would not agree that their
beliefs cannot be defended on moral grounds. In fact, they might even argue that
in a world characterized by poverty, disease, and deprivation, any attempt to
ameliorate the condition of the disadvantaged sections of society is morally justi-
fied. They would not agree that all we can say about socialism is that it serves the
interest of one section of society, while capitalism serves that of another. For there
is a big difference between improving the condition of those who are poor and
weak, those who belong to the disadvantaged section of society and serving the
interest of those who are rich and powerful, those who are the beneficiaries of the
existing system, those who belong to the ruling classes. There is, no doubt, a great
deal of substance in this argument.
This view would be endorsed by many in ordinary life, although this does not
mean that no objection could be raised against it. In fact, those conversant with
the history of ideas would remember that objection against it was raised by Plato
when he dismissed Glaucons concept of justice as the interest of the disadvan-
taged sections of society on the ground that it was not different from
Thrasymachuss view of justice as the interest of the ruling classes, since both of
them equate justice with selfishness, even if they have selfishness of different
sections of the society in mind. Although Platos criticism of the prevailing views
of justice has found admirers like Barker, objections could be raised against it, at
least against his criticism of Glaucons view. For there is a complete asymmetry
between the interest of those who belong to the affluent section of society, the
ruling classes, those leading comfortable lives and the interest of the disadvan-
taged section of society, of those living in conditions of misery, deprivation, and
privation. Those working for fifteen to sixteen hours a day in factories, for exam-
ple, could not be accused of being selfish when they demand reduction in hours
of work. This is not to deny that we may be tempted to define our interest without
caring about how its pursuit would affect others. But this does not mean that this
is what we often do.
It is true that Marx talks about the interest of the workers. But far from saying
that interest is all that matters in social and political life, he argues in the Holy
Family that interest must be morally justified. But, surprisingly, he does not
defend interest of workers on the ground that their economic condition needs to
be improved. His defence depends rather on his own view of morality. If cor-
rectly understood, says Marx in the Holy Family, interest is the principle of all
morality (Marx and Engels, 2010a, p. 162). That he thinks morality is about our
interests would come as a surprise to many, his critics as well as those sympathetic
to him. But, what is more important, he does not think that we can define our
interest in any way we like. Our interest, says Marx, must coincide with the inter-
est of humanity. We can, thus, evaluate any set of moral principles by asking
whether the interest it upholds coincide with the interest of humanity. As is well
known, he criticizes liberal principles of freedom and equality on the ground that
they promote interest of the bourgeoisie without bothering about the grave conse-
quences the pursuit of its interest has for the working class.
100 Om Bakshi
Even those who think that interest of humanity can be defined in a variety of
ways might still agree that we should not disregard the larger interest of society.
Those conversant with the history of ideas would remember that this is how social
and political thinkers have often sought to justify moral principles. Take, for
instance, John Locke who is widely known to have defended the right to property,
setting aside even the restrictions on the acquisition of property as postulated by
scriptures and the natural law. This, he claims, would result in increase in produc-
tion, benefitting society at large. Classical economists, to take another example,
do not deny the criticism of exchange economy made by several writers including
Rousseau that the increase in production that it brings about results in the creation
of social disparities. But they defend it by claiming that increase in production
benefits society as a whole. This defence of the market economy is, of course,
challenged by Marx who argues that, far from serving the larger interest of soci-
ety, it results in the exploitation of a vast section of society. Here, we are con-
cerned with the kind of reasoning adopted by those defending the market economy
rather than with the validity or otherwise of their claim regarding the beneficial
results of increase in production.
Marxs recourse to this kind of reasoning to defend the interest of workers,
however, appears surprising. For it seems more suited to defend the interest of
a small section of beneficiaries of the system rather than the interest of a major
social group like workers, which in any case is a disadvantaged section of the
society. The reason why Marx adopts it is that although workers are the worst
victims of the system, they are not the only disadvantaged section of society
(Marx and Engels, 2011, Vol. I, p. 118). It enables him to claim that their fight
against the ruling class serves not only their interest but also the interest of all
disadvantaged sections of society. Such a claim might leave many puzzled. For
it is not clear how increasing wages of workers, for example, would benefit
other disadvantaged sections of society. Marx is, of course, not thinking of some
economic benefits which the disadvantaged sections of society may receive but
of the political consequences of the abolition of private property. What he has
in mind is that the emancipation of the workers contains universal human
emancipation. Workers fight against the ruling class brings to an end not just
their servitude but the servitude of all those oppressed in society (Marx,
1977, p. 78). We can understand what Marx is saying in the context of his
broader argument developed in German Ideology that a class which fights
against the ruling class, including the bourgeoisie when it fought against aris-
tocracy, fights not as a class but as a representative of the whole society. This
is why its interest, says Marx, really is more connected with the common
interest of all other non-ruling classes. Thus, the bourgeoisie in France, when it
fought against aristocracy, helped the disadvantaged sections of society, to
improve their lot. The victory of the bourgeoisie made it possible for many
individuals of the other classes to raise themselves into the ruling class.
Their fight against aristocracy, thus, helped many proletarians to become
bourgeois (Marx and Engels, 2010b, pp. 6869).
We might wonder whether Marxs assessment of the role bourgeoisie has

played historically can be reconciled with his position which regards it as the
oppressor. But Marx has no difficulty in showing that there is no inconsistency in
his thinking. For, he points out that the bourgeoisie, which represented the interest
of society as a whole when it fought against aristocracy, began to represent its
own interests as that of society at large when it came to power (Ibid.). This expla-
nation might clarify Marxs position regarding the changing role the bourgeoisie
plays over time. But it might give rise to the fear that workers, too, could pursue
their interest aggressively when they overthrow the bourgeois rule. Marx, how-
ever, thinks that this fear is misplaced. Since it is not a property-owning class, the
working class does not have a particular interest, which it could foist on society at
large (Ibid., p. 69). While those sympathetic to Marx would find substance in his
position, others might remain sceptical. We might think that the practice of social-
ism in societies which experienced radical transformation in our times would
throw light on the issue. But there is no certainty that it does. For many among
those familiar with the history of socialism over the last almost hundred years
believe that these societies saw the rise not of the working class to power but of
what Djilas calls the new ruling class, comprising bureaucracy. However, those
conversant with the behaviour of the poorer sections of society when they acquired
power in the past, for example, in cities like Athens in the fifth and the fourth
centuries B.C.4 may not feel particularly reassured.
Marxs concept of interest is, of course, open to objections. There is a strong
opinion among those writing on ethics that we should not dismiss interests that are
in conflict with our interest. The right approach, according to Hare (1982), for
example, is to adopt an attitude of give and take, to work for a compromise.5 Since
this is how we often resolve conflicts of interest in ordinary life, this approach will
make sense to many. But, still, it is not difficult to imagine that there will be others
who would not be ready to make any compromise regarding their interests. In
fact, Hare thinks that those strongly committed to certain ideals are not likely to
favour the approach he defends. But he argues that this is the only sane approach
to adopt. While there is some substance in this argument, we should remember
that Hare is writing in the context of societies which have succeeded in signifi-
cantly improving the economic condition of workers. The kind of issues in which
they are interested today is such as can be settled by sitting across the table
(Bakshi, 2000, p. 107). On the other hand, Marx was writing at a time when work-
ers were being exploited by owners of property who were completely uncon-
cerned about their suffering. It is not hard to understand why he thought that the
only way to realize workers interest was by fighting the ruling class, by over-
throwing it. His position was closely connected with conditions that obtained in
the nineteenth century rather than with any concept of an ideal society. Writers
like Hare need to ask whether the rules of reasoning they defend are eternal truths
or their relevance is limited to certain historical circumstances only.
This does not mean, however, that there are no problems with Marxs attempt
to justify workers interest. His argument, as mentioned earlier, is that the fight of
102 Om Bakshi
the working class against the ruling class would result not just in their emancipa-
tion but in the emancipation of the whole society. This is what, according to
Marx, lends legitimacy to their interest. This argument would come as a surprise
to many, scholars as well as people in ordinary life, who justify the efforts of those
living in poverty, privation, and misery to improve their condition. If workers
fight against the ruling class also serves the interests of other sections of society,
it would, no doubt, provide added justification to their interest. But the case of
those living in miserable conditions does not rest on how their fight results in
helping others. And workers fight is justified whether they try to secure their
interest by overthrowing the ruling class or they fight for their interest within the
existing system. In this context, it is worth noting that Marx was very happy when
the British parliament passed Ten Hour Act that benefited only the workers. It is
difficult to accept the position that workers interest is justified only when it helps
in bringing to an end the servitude of all those oppressed in society. While
Marxs concept of interest may provide moral basis for a socialist society, serious
objections can be raised against it.
Marxs concept of interest, although embroiled in difficulties, clearly shows
that he has not written off morality. He does not take a crude position that in social
and political life all that matters is interest: while capitalism serves the interest of
owners of property, socialism serves that of the working class. There is no doubt
that he believes that the basis of socialist society is truly moral. In fact, he thinks
that for the first time in the history of mankind, the possibility of developing a
society that has a truly moral basis has arisen (Marx and Engels, 2010b, p. 69).
Maximizing Happiness
The discussion in the last few paragraphs might leave some readers impatient,
especially those who feel that the view of man developed by Marx in his early
writings like the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts lies at the heart of his
thinking. In the Manuscripts, they would argue that the concept of communism is
closely connected with the view of man that emphasizes the need to develop
potentialities, realize individuality and foster talent, rather than the view that seeks
to improve economic condition of workers. An increase in workers wages, says
Marx, is nothing but better payment for the slave, which would not give him
human status and dignity (Marx, 1977, p. 78, emphasis in the original).
Communism, on the other hand, is the real appropriation of the human essence
by and for man; it is the complete return of man to himself (Ibid., p. 96, empha-
sis in the original). Those who endorse this interpretation of Marxs concept of
communism might also claim that it is not open to the kind of objections that
could be raised against the concept of communism derived from psychological
assumptions regarding man. There is a great deal of substance in this view. The
concept of man developed in the Manuscripts provides a far more satisfactory
moral basis for his concept of communist society.
However, this does not mean that there are no problems with Marxs thinking.
To begin with, as discussed earlier, there is the confusion regarding the model of
economy which he has in mind. When he claims we realize human essence
through labour, then he is thinking of a more primitive kind of economy. There
was little possibility of replicating it in the conditions as they obtained in the nine-
teenth century, let alone those that obtain today. But when he talks about the need
to pursue artistic, literary, or intellectual activities, he has industrial societies in
mind. He relies on labour to produce conditions of plenty in which these activities
could be meaningfully pursued. We might think that these conditions could be
realized in societies that undergo extensive industrialization, whether capitalist or
socialist. But Marx does not think that the mere abundance of material goods is all
that is needed. It is also necessary to improve the working conditions in factories,
particularly to reduce hours of work. This we can do meaningfully, Marx thinks,
only in societies that abolish private ownership of means of production. However,
as noted earlier, although many among his followers would be sympathetic to this
argument, it may not carry conviction with others.
However that may be, the question those sympathetic to Marxs concept of
man must address is how, given the possibility of viewing man in a variety of
ways, it could be justified. This question is not raised by Marx, who is more inter-
ested in arguing that his view of socialist society is in accordance with human
nature. But this would not come as a surprise to those conversant with history of
ideas. For over the centuries few thinkers have raised this question. They seemed
to have assumed that this is how we theorize about social and political life. In our
times, too, this view of political theory has been endorsed by many. But, since
they have taken keen interest in philosophical issues involved in the study of
social and political life, they have discussed questions regarding the justification
of our views of man. And so Berlin, for example, has argued that, depending on
our metaphysical outlooks, we can define man in a variety of ways (Berlin, 1972,
pp. 133). But the trouble, as he himself points out, is that we cannot rationally
decide which metaphysical outlook to accept. That is why he does not think that
we can rationally decide which concept of man to adopt. If we endorse this view,
we cannot regard the concept of man as developed by Marx in his early writings
as superior to the concept of man, for example, as a maximizer of utilities.
This view is, of course, not acceptable to writers like Macpherson, who feel
that we can rationally decide which view of man to accept (Macpherson, 1977).
Unlike Berlin who links our views of man with our metaphysical outlooks,
Macpherson believes that human nature is the product of social conditions. This
opens the possibility of checking the validity of our views regarding man by plac-
ing them in the context of historical conditions in which they obtain. In his view,
thus, a political theory will be adequate if it relies on a concept of human nature,
which is in accordance with historical conditions. This view would find many
sympathetic listeners among the followers of Marx. It seems to agree with his
view that consciousness is determined by social conditions. The truth is, however,
that Marxs thinking regarding man is very different from that of Macpherson.
104 Om Bakshi
While Macpherson compliments (thinkers from Locke to) Bentham for accepting
the view of man as shaped by conditions that obtained in Europe since the seven-
teenth century, Marx criticizes Bentham for focusing entirely on human nature as
modified by conditions that obtained when he was writing and for ignoring
human nature in general, which was not the product of specific historical condi-
tions (Marx, 2009, Vol. 1, p. 571). This is not surprising. Indeed this would be the
position of all those who define man in terms of artistic, literary, or intellectual
capacities. For these capacities were not the product of social conditions that
obtained in the nineteenth century. Man started painting, dancing, singing, writing
poems or stories, and philosophizing long ago. This is why he has often been
defined in terms of these capacities over the centuries. In the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle, for example, emphasizes the need to engage in intellectual activities
(1969, Book X, 1177a1179a) and in Politics, in literary and artistic activities
(1961, Book VIII, 1338a1338b). We may agree with Macpherson that advances in
technology have greatly increased productivity, creating conditions of plenty in
which the concept of man as a doer could be realized by many. But, as he him-
self admits, instead of turning man into a doer, these conditions are, in fact,
strengthening consumerist tendencies in man. Far from providing any rational
basis for claiming moral superiority of the concept of man as a doer over the
concept of man as a consumer, he simply asserts his preference for it (Bakshi,
1986, pp. 320). While many would be sympathetic to writers like Macpherson,
who think that the concept of man as a doer is morally superior to the concept of
man as a consumer, there is no way to prove it. That is why this view of man can
only serve as one perspective among other competing perspectives to evaluate
conditions as they obtain in society today. This is perhaps all those sympathetic to
the early writing of Marx may be interested in, since improvement in the condi-
tion of workers has considerably reduced the possibility of reorganizing economic
institutions of societies in the West. But we must remember that this is not the
reason why Marx theorizes about social and political life. He is deeply interested
in bringing about changes in it, not just in evaluating the quality of life it offers.
In his oft-quoted thesis on Feuerbach, Marx is emphatic that while philosophers
try to interpret the world, the task is to change it (Marx and Engels, 2011, Vol. I,
p. 15, emphasis in the original). Although we cannot be faulted for evaluating
social and political life on the basis of values we cherish, we can reorganize it only
on the basis of values which we can show are rational.
Solving Problems of Capitalist Society

Let us turn to the view that Marxs concept of socialism is closely connected with
his analysis of capitalist society. As we have noted earlier, he has shown that the
exploitation of workers is the result not of same chance factors but of the way
economic institutions are organized in a capitalist society, in particular, the private
ownership of means of production. That is why he thinks that the abolition of

private property alone would help put an end to their exploitation. His plea to
reorganize economic aspect of society is, thus, connected with his factual analy-
sis. This, however, raises the question whether, given the dichotomy between fact
and value, Marx has violated canons of reasoning when he proposes a new moral
basis of society.
The thesis regarding the logical relationship between fact and value is often
attributed to Hume. In our times, however, it has been forcefully expounded by
Moore when he discusses the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 1976, pp. 136).
Although he defines it in at least three different ways, scholars have generally
focused on his claim regarding the impropriety of deriving a moral judgement
from a statement of fact. It is widely believed that, thanks to the logical dichotomy
between fact and value, we can respond to a fact in a variety of ways. This has
resulted in the development of a relativistic view regarding values, a view which
denies the possibility of making judgements rationally.6
Although the relativistic view regarding values has been widely endorsed by
scholars since the beginning of the twentieth century, it is open to serious objec-
tions. For when we regard a person as rude, dishonest or courageous, we give
reasons for our judgement. And what we count as reasons, far from depending on
our whims and fancies, is known to everybody in society. What is more interesting
is that these reasons are often factual in nature. Whether we can logically derive
moral judgements from factual statements or not, we depend on them for making
judgements in everyday life. Writers like Foot (1978, pp. 96131), thus, rely on
the model of reasoning derived from ordinary life to question the relativistic posi-
tion. This model of reasoning is, of course, open to objections. We do not go about
collecting facts without some idea to decide which facts to look for, which facts
would count as reasons. These criteria of relevance are provided by our beliefs.
Those who do not accept our beliefs could, thus, reject our facts as irrelevant.
While Indians who accept the principle of caste, for example, would disapprove
of a persons marriage outside his caste, many in the West would regard even a
reference to caste as irrelevant. This is admitted by Foot. But she argues that we
cannot rely on any principle that catches our fancy. We must choose our principles
rationally. This we can do by asking how they are connected with human good
and harm. This argument would make sense to many. For, as Protagoras says,
man is the measure of all things. The question, however, is how to define human
good and harm, since this is not a purely factual question. Much would depend
on our metaphysical beliefs, concepts of man, or moral values. Although Foot has
clearly shown that we do not ignore facts when we make moral judgements, she
has not succeeded in showing how we can move from a factual statement to a
moral conclusion.
Let us examine how Marxs social and political thinking copes with the issues
raised by the logical thesis. The trouble is, however, that he does not discuss the
issues which arise when he moves from his analysis of the capitalist economy to
106 Om Bakshi
his proposal regarding restructuring economic institutions on a new basis. He has

no doubt, however, that we can discuss moral issues meaningfully only in the
context of problems facing society. That is why Marx says in German Ideology
that when we see a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings,
we see the necessity of a transformation of the social structure (Marx and
Engels, 2010b, p. 47). If we consider the statement regarding the starvelings as
no more than a statement of fact, then, as exponents of the relativistic view of
values claim, we would not agree with Marx that his response is the only one that
is possible. We can respond to it in a variety of ways. Those who do not accept
relativistic implications of the logical thesis would expect Marx to give reasons to
show why his response is morally more justifiable than other competing responses.
But instead of giving reasons in support of his response, Marx makes a careful
analysis of the capitalist economy. We can understand why he proceeds in this
way only if we remember that when he talks about scrofulous, overworked and
consumptive starvelings, he is not just stating a fact but drawing attention to seri-
ous problems facing society. He analyzes the capitalist economy to show why it
results in large-scale suffering of a major section of society. This analysis pro-
vides the basis for his claim that we can address the most urgent problems facing
society meaningfully only by reorganizing economic institutions, or, as the
Communist Manifesto says, only by abolishing private ownership of property
(Marx and Engels, 2011, Vol. I, p. 120). This is what socialism stands for.
Let us try to understand the approach adopted by Marx. He does not start from
the concept of the needs of ordinary people, as the writer of German Ideology
does; or from beliefs widely accepted in society, as Berlin advises us to do; or
from philosophical difficulties in the moral tradition we have inherited from the
past, as Macpherson does. He starts from the most urgent problems facing society,
as social and political thinkers have done over the centuries. His analysis shows
that these problems are the result not of some fortuitous circumstances but of the
way economic institutions of the capitalist society function. This provides the
basis for his claim that these problems can be meaningfully addressed only by
restructuring economic aspect of society. Thus, he wrote to solve problems and
not, like the writer of German Ideology, to address academic issues raised by
intellectuals; or like Berlin, to understand the behaviour of people in society; or
like Macpherson, to make the existing moral basis of society more coherent or
more morally appealing; or like Rawls, to develop a theory (of justice) which
accords better with our considered judgements; or like some moralists to pro-
vide principles for the purposes of making scholarly evaluations of existing social
and political conditions.
Thus, when Marx exhorts workers to reorganize the economic aspect of soci-
ety, he is not saying that it would serve their interest, but that it would bring about
a society in which there is no subjugation, no exploitation, no suffering, and no
misery. He was aware that workers were agitating against their exploitation in
factories. But he is of the view that their movement would acquire a new meaning
when they accept socialist principles. For then they will be able to understand why
the task is to restructure economic institutions of society rather than to rest content
with securing concessions from the owners of property. Marx may not be using
the language employed by political thinkers over the centuries, but there is no
doubt in his mind that those who accept principle of socialism are obligated to act
to bring about a socialist society.
The advantages of this approach are hard to exaggerate. It is easier to agree on
the problems facing society, the sufferings of the people, than on what makes
them happy. As we have noted earlier, our views of happiness are closely con-
nected with our concepts of man. Since man can be defined in a variety of ways,
there are bound to be differences about the nature of happiness. But we do not
depend on our values, concepts of man or metaphysical beliefs to recognize the
suffering of a large section of society (Bakshi, 2006, pp. 140141). It is, therefore,
not surprising that by the second half of the nineteenth century liberals had begun
to recognize the ill-consequences of a free market economy. Writing in the con-
text of social problems also helps us to evaluate principles more rationally, while,
as noted earlier, we do not know how to evaluate principles derived from our
concepts of man. We can examine whether the problems facing society have been
carefully analyzed and whether the analysis provides a secure basis for the solu-
tion proposed. All those interested in the study of moral issues would find Marxs
approach interesting. It could provide one way to anchor moral principles in the
empirical analysis of social and political life, thus loosening the grip of the logical
thesis which has strangled the study of moral questions for long.7 Since the prin-
ciples espoused by Marx are developed in the form of a solution to the problems
facing society, and not logically derived from factual analysis, we cannot indict
him for violating the canons of logical reasoning. It should be noted, however,
that Marx has not invented this approach; it was invented long ago by thinkers
like Aristotle. In the IV, V and VI Books of Politics, Aristotle relied on this
approach to develop the principles of justice, which could help solve the problems
that Greek cities were facing in ancient times (Aristotle, 1961, 1288b1323a; see
Bakshi, 1986, pp. 1618; Bakshi, 1987, pp. 101103). It is possible that the solu-
tion to the problems regarded as the result of the logical thesis may not prove very
exciting to many in the West. Much of the discussion on moral questions in
Western societies takes place within the framework of liberal values, on which
there is wide consensus. This is why scholars in the West are more attracted
towards the concept of moral reasoning developed by Rawls, who believes that
we should check our moral thinking against our considered judgements. But
there are a large number of societies like India, which are facing major problems,
and raising serious questions regarding the way social and economic institutions
are organized in these societies. Those living in these societies need to think about
principles that could provide the basis for solving their problems. They must give
thought to the way traditional thinkers like Aristotle and Marx have gone about
studying moral issues.
108 Om Bakshi
Development of Marxs Thought

The nature of Marxs social and political thought has been a subject of consider-
able discussion and controversy, one reason being that his thinking underwent
major changes over the years. Although today nobody would deny that he took
keen interest in such themes as human essence, individuality, finding joy and
fulfillment in life, and alienation in his early writings, many would say that he
began to espouse a materialist, determinist, and authoritarian position before long.
Those who hold this view are not very sympathetic to the tendency to interpret
Marx as a humanist. There are others who think that the difference lies in the
nature of the approaches he adopted at different stages in his writing career. In
their opinion, while Marx was deeply interested in philosophical questions regard-
ing human nature in his early phase, he concentrated more on social and economic
structures or forces shaping history in the later phase.8 According to them, we can
understand his thought much more adequately by focusing on the later phase. The
view that there is a break in Marxs thinking is, however, not shared by some of
his sympathizers. In their opinion, the main focus of Marx is on issues concerning
man and his alienation. He may have taken more interest in analyzing social real-
ity in his later writings, but he does not seem to have lost interest in these issues
at any stage. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a tendency to interpret
Marxs later writings in the philosophical perspective he developed in his early
phase.
There is no doubt some substance in all these views. But we can understand
Marx, in fact any thinker, better by paying attention to the kind of problems he is
addressing. In his early works such as the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, he is deeply interested in the philosophical issues concerning the
nature of man. His concept of man leads him to think that the main problem facing
society is alienation, the inability of a large section of society to realize their indi-
viduality, to develop their potentialities, to express their creativity, and so on. In
his later works, especially the Capital, on the other hand, he is concerned about
the exploitation of workers, their suffering, and their privation. This leads him to
make a careful analysis of social reality, particularly its economic aspect. It is true
that he does not completely lose interest in issues concerning human nature,
developing potentialities, and realizing individuality even in the later phase. And
so a commentator may insist that these are the abiding features of his thought,
emphasize the need to view Marx as a whole, and regard him essentially as a
humanist. But such an interpretation will not do justice to Marxs concern for the
suffering, privation, and exploitation of workers and his painstaking analysis of
the economic conditions in the nineteenth century.
The whole discussion on how to interpret Marx might not seem very relevant
to those who think that we should study the work of a thinker as it is rather than
give it a form which he may not even have in mind (see Bakshi, 1987, pp. 6779).
Although this argument might appear attractive to some historians of ideas, the
truth is that no matter what we think, we invariably interpret him. Since we cannot
include all that he has written, we have to decide which aspects of his thought we
should focus on and to establish interconnections among them. We might choose
our criteria openly and critically or do so unwittingly, depending on our biases or
following traditional understanding. In any case, the interpretation defended in
this article depends more on the thinking of Marx himself, who gradually lost
interest in philosophical questions regarding man and began to focus on analyzing
social reality, particularly its economic aspect. While in the more youthful phase
he believed that the main problem was why workers were unable to develop their
potentialities, to give expression to their individuality, to find joy and fulfillment
in life, in the later phase he identified the main problem with the exploitation of
workers, their privation and suffering. No doubt, philosophical issues crop up
some times in his later writings too, but they are not central to his argument in his
later phase. It is difficult to agree with writers who think Marxs concept of man
is central to his social theory (for example, Plamenatz, 1975, p. 60) or with those
who believe his concept of alienation provides the foundation of his system (for
example, Meszaros, 1978, p. 93). To interpret his later writings in the light of
themes which engaged his interest in his early, youthful phase would distort his
thought.
We should remember that the problems in response to which Marx theorized
are the kind of problems which confront several societies today. Those interested
in studying social and political life in countries like India will find it more profit-
able to pay attention to his later writings. It is possible that those concerned with
questions regarding the quality of life in the Western societies today are interested
in the philosophical issues raised by Marx in his early writings and they may take
more interest in them. But this is different from claiming that these issues are the
main concerns of social and political thought of Marx.
Notes
1. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were first published in 1932. Their English
translation became available in 1959.
2. Writers like Ollman (1977, p. 153) discuss alienation of capitalists in the context of
Marxs statement that emancipation of working class would result in the emancipation
of everybody.
3. In this context, it is interesting to note that in response to his daughter, Lauras
questionnaire, Marx says that his idea of happiness is to fight. It is obvious that
he has in mind his revolutionary activities, his efforts to bring about a better society
(quoted in Fromm, 1961, p. 257).
4. Aristotle (1961, 1279a, etc.) refers to a variety of practices that the poorer sections of
society introduced in the political system of Athens with the sole purpose of benefitting
them. They also had no hesitation in enjoying the fruits of slave labour or in milking
the Athenian empire. It is possible that Platos criticism of Glaucons view of justice
had much to do with the behaviour of the poorer sections of society when they acquired
power in Athens.
5. It is not necessary for our purposes to discuss Hares (1982) concept of universalizability,
which he places at the heart of his concept of moral reasoning.
110 Om Bakshi
6. For a discussion of the nature of ethical theory in our time, see Bakshi (2000, pp.
97113).
7. The close relationship between moral principles and empirical analysis is discussed in
Bakshi (1987, pp. 98110) and Bakshi (2000, pp. 97113).
8. This is the kind of position taken, for example, by Althusser, who believes that there is
an epistemological break in Marxs thinking that took place in 1845 (Althusser, 1979,
pp. 3234). According to him, the theoretical framework of his later writings is very
different from the more speculative framework of his early writings. While in works
like the Manuscripts, Marx is interested in philosophizing about man, he makes a much
more scientific analysis of social and political reality in his later writings, developing
in particular a materialist view of history. Although there are serious problems with
Althussers concept of science, the position defended in this article, too, holds that
Marxs thinking underwent major changes overtime. But the present article relates
evolution of his thinking more to the kind of problems he addresses. While in his early
phase, he regards alienation as the main problem, in his later phase, he is intensely
concerned about the exploitation of workers. The aspects of social life on which he
focuses in works like the Capital, thus, are those which help him to analyze the economy
that produces wealth for one section of society and poverty and misery for the other.
The philosophical framework derived from Hegel could hardly help him in analyzing
it. Although we should not ignore the fight he waged against speculative tendencies
among German scholars, we cannot understand the evolution of his thinking adequately
if we regard it only as a response to the trends which dominated scholarly writings in
Germany.
References
Althusser, Louis (1979). For Marx. Translated by Ben Brewster. London: Verso.
Aristotle (1961). Politics. Translated by John Warrington. London: Everymans Library,
J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd.
. (1969). The Nicomachean ethics. Translated with an introduction by Sir David
Ross. London: Oxford University Press.
Bakshi, Om (1986). Empirical and logical consideration in the study of values. Teaching
Politics, XII(1), 320.
. (1987). The crisis of political theory. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
. (2000). Values in the study of international politics, International Studies, 37 (2),
97113.
. (2006). Whither social science? International Studies, 43(2), 13783.
Berlin, Isaiah (1972). Does political theory still exist? In Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman
(Eds), Philosophy, politics, and society (second series). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.
133.
Foot, Philippa (1978). Virtues and vices. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fromm, Erich (1961). Marxs concept of man. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.
Hare, R.M. (1982). Freedom and reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macpherson, C.B. (1977). Democratic theory: Essays in retrieval. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Marx, Karl (1977). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress
Publishers.
Marx, Karl (2009). Capital, In Frederick Engels (Ed.), Translated by Samuel Moore and
Edward Aveling. Volumes 13. Hyderabad: Visalaandhra Vignana Smithi.
Marx, Karl & Frederick Engels. (2010a). The holy family. New Delhi: Peoples Publishing
House Pvt. Ltd.
. (2010b). The German ideology. New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.
. (2011). Selected works, Volumes 13. New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House Pvt.
Ltd.
Marx, Karl Comments on James Mill. Available at http:/www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1844/james-mill/ (accessed on 23 May 2012)
Meszaros, Istvan (1978). Marxs theory of alienation. London: Merlin Press.
Moore, G.E. (1976). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136.
Ollman, Bertell (1977). Alienation: Marxs conception of man in capitalist society.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Petrovic, Gajo (1981). Marxs concept of man. In Tom Bottomore (Ed.), Modern
interpretations of Marx. Oxford: Blackwell.
Plamenatz, John (1975). Karl Marxs philosophy of man. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Popper, Karl (1963). The open society and its enemies, Vol. 2. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
May 2012

Bakshi 2011

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Bakshi 2011

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

International Studies

Marx's Concept of Man: Alienation, Exploitation and Socialism

The online version of this article can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://isq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

>> Version of Record - Feb 7, 2013

Marxs Concept of Man: International Studies

Om Bakshi is former Professor of Political Theory at School of International Studies,

The publication of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in 1930s was an

Marxs Concept of Man

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Marxs Vision of Ideal Society

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

to enjoy a lifestyle comparable to that of people in Western societies. Although

Materialistic View of Man

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Working in such conditions as these had a devastating effect on the health of

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Instead of viewing man as a consumer, as a maximizer of utilities, as Bentham put

Analyzing the Capitalist Economy

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Moral Basis of Communist Society

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

We might wonder whether Marxs assessment of the role bourgeoisie has

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Solving Problems of Capitalist Society

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

ownership of means of production. That is why he thinks that the abolition of

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

his proposal regarding restructuring economic institutions on a new basis. He has

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Development of Marxs Thought

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

International Studies, 48, 2 (2011): 85111

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi