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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Legislative power
Initiative, referendum and Recall
- Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, GR 127325, March 19, 1997

Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997


Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval
1 set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
2 caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and
3 instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been
untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those
in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples
initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the
Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:
1 Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for Peoples Initiative to amend the constitution
specifically to lift term limits of elected officials.
2 Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.

Ratio:
Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation
is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally
defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the
petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that . . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history of
the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17
was entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom,
Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or
Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body. Beyond doubt,
Senate Bill No. 17 did not include peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In
checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.

Indirect Initiative
- SBMA v. Comelec, Sept. 26, 1996

Recall
- Garcia v. Comelec, Oct. 5, 1993

FACTS:

In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone
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(SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of
1992.
May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they
include their municipality with SSEZ.
Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission,
which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal
of said resolution.
Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Morong,
wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local
initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.
July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that
its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance
July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjaminn
Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners

ISSUE:

Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper
subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is questioned
is only a resolution and not an ordinance?)

HELD:

Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power:


1. ORIGINAL- possessed by the sovereign people
2. DERIVATIVE- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the
original power of the people.
One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make
laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of peoples initiative was thus
installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or
local legislative body.
COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no. 6735 entitled An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Which
spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of
the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be
included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives.
LOCAL INITIATIVES- legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with
the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or
purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but
also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The law should be
construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.
Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the
power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to
ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to
enact.
Resolution vs. Ordinance
RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have
only a temporary effect
ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to
persons or things in general.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence
of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their
voice on the matter via an initiative.

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Loss of confidence, a political question
- Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472

Bicameralism vs. Unicameralism

Senate (Composition; Qualifications; Term of office)

House of Representatives
Composition (District Representatives; Party-list Representatives)

Party-list Representatives
- Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC


[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that
under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system
to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented
in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent
threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very
essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation,
the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
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How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number
of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

- Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

Apportionment of Legislative Districts


- Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186

Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the
Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn
its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting
according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that
the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities,
thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-
large elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political
question and would therefore not be heard by the court.

Issues
1 Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment?
2 What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)


1 Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment.
2 The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question
are:
1 Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)?
2 Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue?
3 The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion.
4 The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government.
5 Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made?
6 Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question?
The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is
determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive
governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the
dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may
be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present
an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under
the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no
policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a
political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches.

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- Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211)


FACTS:

1. Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.
2. GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.
b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
c. Section 52:
i. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter)
violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census
ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title
iii. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,000
3. GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same
grounds as aforestated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.

HELD:

Yes. Petitions dismissed.

RATIO:

a. D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government
unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government
only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which
will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.

b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run
again, etc.)
Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue.
Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment
law.
This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makatis legislative district.

D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to
impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror,

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fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least
one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

- Montejo v. Comelec, GR 118702, Mar. 19, 1995

Gerrymandering
Doctrine of Equal Representation

Qualifications
- Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300
- Aquino v. Comelec, Sept. 18, 1995

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC


[G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN]

FACTS:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1st district of
Leyte.
Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1st district of Leyte, filed a
petition for Petitioners disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement
for residency.
Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed ____ years and seven
months.
Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood. This was not
accepted for it was filed out of time.
It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution:
1. Finding the private respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious
2. striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995
3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy
Even the MR to COMELEC was denied.
Petitioners reasons for the change:
o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos
who was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she
followed her husband throughout his political career.
o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace.
o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral
home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences.
Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes.
Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.

HELD:

1. Qualification on 1 yr residency
No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile.
In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Courts concept of domicile is to mean an individuals permanent
home.

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She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she
got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of
law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her
husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore,
on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her
domicile.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes.
To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue.

2. Qualification on 1 yr residency
The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in
accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution
Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.
Mandatory vs. Directory provision
o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law
o Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may be
thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.

AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400)

FACTS:

Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10
months)
Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking
residence qualification.
COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify
Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.
On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes.
COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as
a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.

ISSUE:

WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position


WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional

HELD:

NO to both issues.

RATIO:

Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing
for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to
the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing
instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile.
Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of
the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people.

Natural-born
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- Bengson v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal


G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith.
He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a
representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural
born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and
by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On
the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Term of office

Privileges
Freedom from Arrest
Parliamentary Immunity
- Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug. 25, 2009

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- Eastland v. US Servicemen's Fund, 421 US 491

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)


No. 73-1923
Argued January 22, 1975
Decided May 27, 1975
421 U.S. 491

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Syllabus
The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, pursuant to its authority under a Senate resolution to make a
complete study of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950, began
an inquiry into the various activities of respondent organization, to determine whether they were potentially
harmful to the morale of United States Armed Forces. In connection with such inquiry, it issued a subpoena
duces tecum to the bank where the organization had an account, ordering the bank to produce all records
involving the account. The organization and two of its members then brought an action against the
Chairman, Senator Members, Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee, and the bank to enjoin implementation of
the subpoena on First Amendment grounds. The District Court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that, although courts should hesitate to interfere with congressional actions even where
First Amendment rights are implicated, such restraint should not preclude judicial review where no alternative
avenue of relief is available, and that, if the subpoena was obeyed, respondents' First Amendment rights
would be violated.

Held: The activities of the Senate Subcommittee, the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel fall within
the "legitimate legislative sphere," and since it is determined that such is the case, those activities are
protected by the absolute prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution against being
"questioned in any other Place," and hence are immune from judicial interference. Pp. 421 U. S. 501-511.
(a) The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall
not be questioned" and the sweep of the term "in any other Place." P. 421 U. S. 503.
(b) Issuance of subpoenas such as the one in question is a legitimate use by Congress of its power to
investigate, and the subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of one of
the Houses. Pp. 421 U. S. 503-505.
(c) Inquiry into the sources of the funds used to carry on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress
to have a potential
Page 421 U. S. 492
for undermining the morale of the Armed Forces is within the legitimate legislative sphere. Pp. 421 U. S.
505-507.
(d) There is no distinction between the Subcommittee's Members and its Chief Counsel insofar as complete
immunity from the issuance of the subpoena under the Speech or Debate Clause is concerned, and since
the Members are immune because the issuance of the subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides
share that immunity. P. 421 U. S. 507.
(e) The subpoena cannot be held subject to judicial questioning on the alleged ground that it works an
invasion of respondents' privacy, since it is "essential to legislating." P. 421 U. S. 508.
(f) Nor can the subpoena be held outside the protection of speech or debate immunity on the alleged ground
that the motive of the investigation was improper, since, in determining the legitimacy of a congressional
action, the motives alleged to have prompted it are not to be considered. Pp. 421 U. S. 508-509.
(g) In view of the absolute terms of the speech or debate protection, a mere allegation that First Amendment
rights may be infringed by the subpoena does not warrant judicial interference. Pp. 421 U. S. 509-511.
159 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 488 F.2d 1252, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN
and STEWART, JJ., joined, post, p. 421 U. S. 513. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 421 U.
S. 518.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena
duces tecum that directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a First
Amendment
Page 421 U. S. 493
privilege status for those records on the ground that they are the equivalent of confidential membership lists.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with the subpoena "would
invade the constitutional rights" of the organization, and that judicial relief is available to prevent
implementation of the subpoena.

I
Page 9 of 40
In early 1970, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security was given broad authority by the Senate to
"make a complete and continuing study and investigation of . . . the administration, operation, and
enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950. . . ."
S.Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The authority encompassed discovering the "extent, nature, and
effect of subversive activities in the United States," and the resolution specifically directed inquiry concerning
"infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government. . . ." Ibid. See
also S.Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Pursuant to that mandate the Subcommittee began an inquiry
into the activities of respondent United States Servicemen's Fund, Inc. (USSF).
USSF describes itself as a nonprofit membership corporation supported by contributions. [Footnote 1] Its
stated purpose is "to further the welfare of persons who have served or are presently serving in the military."
To accomplish its declared purpose, USSF has engaged in various activities [Footnote 2] directed at United
States servicemen.
Page 421 U. S. 494
It established "coffee houses" near domestic military installations, and aided the publication of "underground"
newspapers for distribution on American military installations throughout the world. The coffeehouses were
meeting places for servicemen, and the newspapers were specialized publications which USSF claims dealt
with issues of concern to servicemen. Through these operations, USSF attempted to communicate to
servicemen its philosophy and attitudes concerning United States involvement in Southeast Asia. USSF
claims the coffee houses and newspapers became "the focus of dissent and expressions of opposition within
the military toward the war in [Southeast Asia]." [Footnote 3]
In the course of its investigation of USSF, the Subcommittee concluded that a prima facie showing had been
made of the need for further investigation, and it resolved that appropriate subpoenas, including subpoenas
duces tecum, could be issued. Petitioner Eastland, a United States Senator, is, as he was then, Chairman of
the Subcommittee. On May 28, 1970, pursuant to the above authority, he signed a subpoena duces tecum,
issued on behalf of the Subcommittee, to the bank where USSF then had an account. The subpoena
commanded the bank to produce by June 4, 1970:
"any and all records appertaining to or involving the account or accounts of [USSF]. Such records to
comprehend papers, correspondence, statements, checks, deposit slips and supporting documentation, or
microfilm thereof within [the bank's] control or custody or within [its] means to produce."
From the record, it appears the subpoena was never actually served on the bank. [Footnote 4] In any event,
before the
Page 421 U. S. 495
return date, USSF and two of its members brought this action to enjoin implementation of the subpoena
duces tecum.
The complaint named as defendants Chairman Eastland, nine other Senators, the Chief Counsel to the
Subcommittee, and the bank. [Footnote 5] The complaint charged that the authorizing resolutions and the
Subcommittee's actions implementing them were an unconstitutional abuse of the legislative power of
inquiry, that the "sole purpose" of the Subcommittee investigation was to force "public disclosure of beliefs,
opinions, expressions and associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular," and that
the "sole purpose" of the subpoena was to
"harass, chill, punish and deter [USSF and its members] in their exercise of their rights and duties under the
First Amendment, and particularly to stifle the freedom of the press and association guaranteed by that
amendment. [Footnote 6]"
The subpoena was issued to the bank, rather than to USSF and its members, the complaint claimed,
"in order to deprive [them] of their rights to protect their private records, such as the sources of their
contributions, as they would be entitled to do if the subpoenas had been issued against them directly."
The complaint further claimed that financial support to
Page 421 U. S. 496
USSF is obtained exclusively through contributions from private individuals, and, if the bank records are
disclosed, "much of that financial support will be withdrawn, and USSF will be unable to continue its
constitutionally protected activities." [Footnote 7]
For relief, USSF and its members, the respondents, sought a permanent injunction restraining the Members
of the Subcommittee and its Chief Counsel from trying to enforce the subpoena by contempt of Congress or
other means and restraining the bank from complying with the subpoena. [Footnote 8] Respondents also
sought a declaratory judgment declaring the subpoena and the Senate resolutions void under the
Constitution. No damages claim was made.
Since the return date on the subpoena was June 4, 1970, three days after the action was begun,
enforcement of the subpoena was stayed [Footnote 9] in order to avoid mootness and to prevent possible
irreparable injury. The District Court then held hearings and took testimony on the matter. That court
ultimately held [Footnote 10] that respondents
Page 421 U. S. 497
had not made a sufficient showing of irreparable injury to warrant an injunction. The court also purported to
strike a balance between the legislative interest and respondents' asserted First Amendment rights, NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). It concluded that a valid legislative purpose existed for the inquiry
because Congress was pursuing its functions, under Art. I, 8, of raising and supporting an army, and had a
Page 10 of 40
legitimate interest in "scrutiniz[ing] closely possible infiltration of subversive elements into an organization
which directly affects the armed forces of this country." [Footnote 11] Relying on Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U. S. 109 (1959), the District Court concluded that the legislative interest must prevail over respondents'
asserted rights, and denied respondents' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions. It also
dismissed as to the petitioner Senators after concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause immunizes them
from suit. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967).
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding first that, although courts should hesitate to interfere with
congressional actions even where First Amendment rights clearly are implicated, such restraint could not
preclude judicial review where no alternative avenue of relief is available other than "through the equitable
powers of the court." 159 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 359, 488 F.2d 1252, 1259 (1973). Here, the subpoena was
directed to a third party which could not be expected to refuse
Page 421 U. S. 498
compliance; unless respondents could obtain judicial relief, the bank might comply, the case would become
moot, and the asserted violation of respondents' constitutional rights would be irreparable. Because the
subpoena was not directed to respondents, the Court of Appeals noted, the traditional route for raising their
defenses by refusing compliance and testing the legal issues in a contempt proceeding was not available to
them. Ansara v. Eastland, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 442 F.2d 751 (1971).
Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that, if the subpoena were obeyed, respondents' First Amendment
rights would be violated. The court said:
"The right of voluntary associations, especially those engaged in activities which may not meet with popular
favor, to be free from having either state or federal officials expose their affiliation and membership absent a
compelling state or federal purpose has been made clear a number of times. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 (1961);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1962); Pollard v. Roberts, 393 U. S. 14 (1968),
affirming the judgment of the three-judge district court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 283 F.Supp. 248
(1968)."
159 U.S. App.D.C. at 364, 488 F.2d at 1264. In this case, that right would be violated, the Court of Appeals
held, because discovery of the identities of donors was the admitted goal of the subpoena, id. at 367, 488 F.
2d at 1267, and that information could be gained as easily from bank records as from membership lists.
Moreover, if donors' identities were revealed, or if donors reasonably feared that result, USSF's contributions
would
Page 421 U. S. 499
decrease substantially, as had already occurred merely because of the threat posed by the subpoena.
[Footnote 12]
The Court of Appeals then fashioned a remedy to deal with the supposed violation of rights. It ordered the
District Court to "consider the extent to which committee counsel should properly be required to give
evidence as to matters without the legislative sphere.'" Id. at 370, 488 F.2d at 1270. [Footnote 13] It also
ordered that the court should "be liberal in granting the right of amendment" to respondents to add other
parties if thereby "the case can better proceed to a decision on the validity of the subpoena." Ibid. Members
of Congress could be added as parties, the Court of Appeals said, if their presence is "unavoidable if a valid
order is to be entered by the court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go unredressed." Ibid. The Court
of Appeals concluded that
Page 421 U. S. 500
declaratory relief against Members is "preferable" to "any coercive order." Ibid. The clear implication is that
the District Court was authorized to enter a "coercive order" which, in context, could mean that the
Subcommittee could be prevented from pursuing its inquiry by use of a subpoena to the bank.
One judge dissented on the ground that the membership list cases were distinguishable because in none of
them was there a "showing that the lists were requested for a proper purpose." Id. at 377, 488 F.2d at 1277.
Here, on the other hand, the dissenting judge concluded, "there is a demonstrable relationship between the
information sought and the valid legislative interest of the federal Congress" in discovering whether any
money for USSF activities "came from foreign sources or subversive organizations," id. at 377, 378, 488 F.2d
at 1277, 1278; whether USSF activities may have constituted violations of 18 U.S.C. 2387(a), which
prohibits interference with the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the Armed Services; or whether the anonymity
of USSF donors might have disguised persons who had not complied with the Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq. Finally, he noted that the prime purpose of the Subcommittee's inquiry
was to investigate application of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. 781 et seq., and that, too,
provided a legitimate congressional interest.
The dissenting judge then balanced the congressional interests against private rights, Barenblatt v. United
States, supra; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 354 U. S. 198 (1957), and struck the balance in favor
of the investigative role of Congress. He reasoned that there is no right to secrecy which can frustrate a
legitimate congressional inquiry into an area where legislation may be had. 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 378-379,
382, 488 F.2d at 1278-1279,
Page 421 U. S. 501
1282. Absent a showing that the information sought could not be used in the legislative sphere, he
concluded, judicial interference was unwarranted.

Page 11 of 40
We conclude that the actions of the Senate Subcommittee, the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel
are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 6, cl. 1, and are therefore immune
from judicial interference. We reverse.

II

The question [Footnote 14] to be resolved is whether the actions of the petitioners fall within the "sphere of
legitimate legislative activity." If they do, the petitioners "shall not be questioned in any other Place" about
those activities, since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.
S. 306, 412 U. S. 312-313 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 408 U. S. 516 (1972); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 408 U. S. 623 n. 14 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 395 U. S.
502-503 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 84-85; United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S.
169, 383 U. S. 184-185 (1966); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 360 U. S. 569 (1959).
Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes.
Kilbourn
Page 421 U. S. 502
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 103 U. S. 204 (1881); United States v. Johnson, supra, at 383 U. S. 179; Powell
v. McCormack, supra, at 395 U. S. 502-503; United States v. Brewster, supra, at 408 U. S. 508-509; Gravel v.
United States, supra, at 408 U. S. 617-618; cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 341 U. S. 376-378
(1951). The purpose of the Clause is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to
Congress may be performed independently.
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the
personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by
insuring the independence of individual legislators."
United States v. Brewster, supra, at 408 U. S. 507. In our system "the clause serves the additional function of
reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." United States v. Johnson,
supra, at 383 U. S. 178.
The Clause is a product of the English experience. Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra; United States v. Johnson,
supra, at 383 U. S. 177-179. Due to that heritage, our cases make it clear that the "central role" of the Clause
is to
"prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary,
United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 383 U. S. 181 (1966),"
Gravel v. United States, supra, at 408 U. S. 617. That role is not the sole function of the Clause, however,
and English history does not totally define the reach of the Clause. Rather, it "must be interpreted in light of
the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government. . . ."
United States v. Brewster, supra, at 408 U. S. 508. Thus, we have long held that, when it applies, the Clause
provides protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals
Page 421 U. S. 503
as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch. Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra; Tenney v. Brandhove,
supra; Doe v. McMillan, supra; Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra.
The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall not
be questioned," and the sweep of the term "in any other Place." In reading the Clause broadly, we have said
that legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity "should be protected not only from the
consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden of defending themselves." Dombrowski v.
Eastland, supra, at 387 U. S. 85. Just as a criminal prosecution infringes upon the independence which the
Clause is designed to preserve, a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a
distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to
defend the litigation. Private civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function.
Moreover, whether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil action is brought by
private parties, judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence
is imperiled. We reaffirm that, once it is determined that Members are acting within the "legitimate legislative
sphere" the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 412 U.
S. 314.

III

In determining whether particular activities other than literal speech or debate fall within the "legitimate
legislative sphere," we look to see whether the activities took place "in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn v.
Page 421 U. S. 504
Thompson, 103 U.S. at 103 U. S. 204. More specifically, we must determine whether the activities are
"an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House."
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 625. See Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 412 U. S. 313.
Page 12 of 40
The power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within that definition. This
Court has often noted that the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws because
"[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change."
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 273 U. S. 175 (1927). See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 46 (1953). [Footnote 15] Issuance of subpoenas such as
the one in question here has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 188.
"[W]here the legislative body does not itself posses the requisite information -- which not infrequently is true
-- recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such
information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed."
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, at 273 U. S. 175. It also has been held that the subpoena power may be
exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of one of the Houses. Id. at 273 U. S. 158. Cf. Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 341 U. S. 377-378. Without such power, the Subcommittee may not be able to do
the task assigned to it by Congress. To conclude that the power of inquiry is other than an integral part of the
legislative process would be a miserly reading of the Speech or Debate Clause in derogation of the "integrity
of the legislative process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 524, and United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 172. We have already held that the act "of authorizing an investigation
pursuant to which . . . materials were gathered" is an integral part of the legislative process. Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 313. The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation is similarly
an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking; without it, our recognition that the act "of authorizing" is protected
would be meaningless. To hold that Members of Congress are protected for authorizing an investigation, but
not for issuing a subpoena in exercise of that authorization, would be a contradiction denigrating the power
granted to Congress in Art. I, and would indirectly impair the deliberations of Congress. Gravel, supra, at 408
U. S. 625.
The particular investigation at issue here is related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.
Page 421 U. S. 506
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 187. On this record, the pleadings show that the actions of
the Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." The
Subcommittee was acting under an unambiguous resolution from the Senate authorizing it to make a
complete study of the "administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950. . . ."
S.Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). That grant of authority is sufficient to show that the investigation
upon which the Subcommittee had embarked concerned a subject on which "legislation could be had."
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 273 U. S. 177; see Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 (1961).
The propriety of making USSF a subject of the investigation and subpoena is a subject on which the scope
of our inquiry is narrow. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U. S. 599, 369 U. S. 618-619 (1962). See Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U. S. 263, 279 U. S. 294-295 (1929). "The courts should not go beyond the narrow
confines of determining that a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province." Tenney v.
Brandhove, supra, at 341 U. S. 378. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 316 n. 10. Even the most
cursory look at the facts presented by the pleadings reveals the legitimacy of the USSF subpoena. Inquiry
into the sources of funds used to carry on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress to have a
potential for undermining the morale of the Armed Forces is within the legitimate legislative sphere. Indeed,
the complaint here tells us that USSF operated on or near military and naval bases, and that its facilities
became the "focus of dissent" to declared national policy. Whether USSF activities violated any statute is not
relevant; the inquiry was intended to inform Congress in an area where legislation may be had. USSF
asserted it
Page 421 U. S. 507
does not know the sources of its funds; in light of the Senate authorization to the Subcommittee to
investigate "infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of . . . foreign government," supra
at 421 U. S. 493, and in view of the pleaded facts, it is clear that the subpoena to discover USSF's bank
records "may fairly be deemed within [the Subcommittee's] province." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 341 U.
S. 378.
We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for issuance of
this subpoena. We draw no distinction between the Members and the Chief Counsel. In Gravel, supra, we
made it clear that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they
must be treated as [the Members'] alter egos. . . ." 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 616-617. See also id. at 408 U. S.
621. Here, the complaint alleges that the "Subcommittee members and staff caused the . . . subpoena to be
issued . . . under the authority of Senate Resolution 366. . . ." The complaint thus does not distinguish
between the activities of the Members and those of the Chief Counsel. Contrast Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 84. Since the Members are immune because the issuance of the subpoena is
"essential to legislating," their aides share that immunity. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 621;
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 317.

IV

Page 13 of 40
Respondents rely on language in Gravel v. United States, supra, at 408 U. S. 621:
"[N]o prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed an invalid resolution
by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, themselves
seized the property or invaded
Page 421 U. S. 508
the privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability or questioning in such
circumstances."
From this, respondents argue that the subpoena works an invasion of their privacy, and thus cannot be
immune from judicial questioning. The conclusion is unwarranted. The quoted language from Gravel referred
to actions which were not "essential to legislating." Ibid. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966).
For example, the arrest by the Sergeant at Arms was held unprotected in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra,
because it was not "essential to legislating." See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 243 U. S. 537 (1917).
Quite the contrary is the case with a routine subpoena intended to gather information about a subject on
which legislation may be had. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 349 U. S. 161 (1955).
Respondents also contend that the subpoena cannot be protected by the speech or debate immunity
because the "sole purpose" of the investigation is to force "public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions
and associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular." App. 16. Respondents view the
scope of the privilege too narrowly. Our cases make clear that, in determining the legitimacy of a
congressional act, we do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it. Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. at 354 U. S. 200; Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 614. In Brewster, we said that
"the Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the
legislative process and into the motivation for those acts."
408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 525 (emphasis added). And in Tenney v. Brandhove, we said that "[t]he claim of an
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." 341 U.S. at 341 U. S. 377. If the mere allegation that a
valid legislative
Page 421 U. S. 509
act was undertaken for an unworthy purpose would lift the protection of the Clause, then the Clause simply
would not provide the protection historically undergirding it. "In times of political passion, dishonest or
vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed." Id. at 341 U. S. 378.
The wisdom of congressional approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto. Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. at 412 U. S. 313. Nor is the legitimacy of a congressional inquiry to be defined by what it produces. The
very nature of the investigative function -- like any research -- is that it takes the searchers up some "blind
alleys" and into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry, there need be no predictable end
result.
Finally, respondents argue that the purpose of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter" them in
the exercise of their First Amendment rights, App. 16, and thus that the subpoena cannot be protected by the
Clause. Their theory seems to be that, once it is alleged that First Amendment rights may be infringed by
congressional action, the Judiciary may intervene to protect those rights; the Court of Appeals seems to have
subscribed to that theory. That approach, however, ignores the absolute nature of the speech or debate
protection [Footnote 16]
Page 421 U. S. 510
and our cases which have broadly construed that protection.
"Congressmen and their aides are immune from liability for their actions within the 'legislative sphere,' Gravel
v. United States, supra, at 408 U. S. 624-625, even though their conduct, if performed in other than
legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes."
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 312-313. For us to read the Clause as respondents suggest would
create an exception not warranted by the language, purposes, or history of the Clause. Respondents make
the familiar argument that the broad protection granted by the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is
correct, and in Brewster, supra, we noted that the risk of such abuse was "the conscious choice of the
Framers" buttressed and justified by history. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 516. Our consistently broad construction
of the Speech or
Page 421 U. S. 511
Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so construed to provide the independence which is its
central purpose.
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been
frustrated for nearly five years, during which the Members and their aide have been obliged to devote time to
consultation with their counsel concerning the litigation, and have been distracted from the purpose of their
inquiry. The Clause was written to prevent the need to be confronted by such "questioning" and to forbid
invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom of Congress' use of its investigative authority. [Footnote
17]

When the Senate case was in the Court of Appeals, it was consolidated with three other cases [Footnote 18]
because it was assumed that "a decision in [the Senate] case might well control the disposition of [the
others]." Those cases
Page 14 of 40
Page 421 U. S. 512
involved subpoenas from the House Internal Security Committee to banks for the bank records of certain
organizations. As in the Senate aspect of this case, the organizations whose bank records were sought
sued, alleging that, if the subpoenas were honored, their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue of
speech or debate protection for Members and aides is presented in all the cases consolidated in the Court of
Appeals. However, the complaints in the House cases are different from the complaint in the Senate case,
additional parties are involved, and, consequently, additional issues may be presented.
Progress in the House cases was suspended when they were in the pleading stage awaiting the outcome of
the Senate aspect of this case. The issues in them, therefore, have not been joined. Additionally, it appears
that the Session in which the House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the House, unlike the
Senate, is not a continuing body, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 273 U. S. 181; Gojack v. United States,
384 U. S. 702, 384 U. S. 706-707, n. 4 (1966), a question of mootness may be raised. Moreover it appears
that the Committee that issued the subpoenas has been abolished by the House, H.Res. 5, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., Jan. 14, 1975. In view of these problems, and because the House aspects of this case were not
briefed or argued here, we conclude it would be unwise to attempt to decide any issues they might present
that are not resolved in the Senate aspect of this case. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 496 n. 8;
id. at 395 U. S. 559 (STEWART, J., dissenting).
Judgment with respect to the Senate aspect of this case is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for entry of a judgment directing the District Court to dismiss the complaint. The House aspects of
this case are remanded with directions to remand to
Page 421 U. S. 513
the District Court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[Footnote 1]
USSF is, or has been, listed with the Internal Revenue Service as a tax-exempt charitable organization.
[Footnote 2]
According to the complaint filed in this action, USSF has helped provide civilian legal defense for military
personnel, and books, newspapers, and library material on request. App. 11.
[Footnote 3]
Ibid.
[Footnote 4]
The subpoena at issue here directed "Any U.S. Marshal" to serve and return, but there is no proof of service
in the record. The Subcommittee had issued two previous subpoenas duces tecum to the bank, but they had
been withdrawn because of procedural problems. Apparently, at least one of those subpoenas actually was
served on the bank. Id. at 13. The other subpoena also may have been served, because the bank informed
respondents of its existence. Id. at 14. Respondents claim all three subpoenas are substantially identical.
[Footnote 5]
Apparently, at least partially because the bank was never served, Tr. of Oral Arg. 22, 46, it has not
participated in the action. Id. at 15, 19-20, 21-22. Therefore, as the case reaches us, only the Senators and
the Chief Counsel are active participants.
[Footnote 6]
App. 16.
[Footnote 7]
Id. at 17-18.
[Footnote 8]
Id. at 18.
[Footnote 9]
On June 1, the District Court refused to enter a temporary restraining order, but, on June 4, the Court of
Appeals stayed enforcement of the subpoena pending expedited consideration of the matter by the District
Court. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the threat of irreparable injury if the subpoena were honored, and
the significance of the issues involved, necessitated "the kind of consideration and deliberation that would be
provided by . . . a hearing on an application for injunction." Id. at 22. One judge dissented.
[Footnote 10]
After the Court of Appeals stayed enforcement of the subpoena, the District Court held an expedited hearing
on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss. Afterwards, the District
Court denied both motions; however, the Court of Appeals again stayed enforcement of the subpoena
pending further order. At that time the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to proceed to final
judgment on the merits, with a view to consolidating any appeal from that judgment with the appeal on the
denial of a preliminary injunction. The District Court then took testimony on the merits and, finally, denied
respondents' motion for a permanent injunction against the subpoena. Appeal from that decision apparently
was consolidated with the appeal from the denial of the preliminary injunction.
[Footnote 11]
Id. at 31.
[Footnote 12]
It appears that the District Court finding of failure to show irreparable injury was held clearly erroneous. 159
U.S.App.D.C. 352, 367, 488 F.2d 1252, 1267 (1973). See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 52(a)
Page 15 of 40
[Footnote 13]
Respondents had made a motion in the District Court to compel petitioner Sourwine, the subcommittee
counsel, to give testimony. The Senate passed a resolution, S.Res. 478, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Oct. 13,
1970, authorizing Sourwine to testify only as to matters of public record. Respondents moved to compel
further testimony from Sourwine, but the District Court denied the motion. The court ruled Sourwine's
information
"has been received by him pursuant to his official duties as a staff employee of the Senate . . . , [and, as]
such, the information is within the privilege of the Senate . . . Senate Rule 01, Senate Manual, Senate
Document No. 1 of the 90th Congress, First Session."
App. 38. The court also ruled that the Senate made a timely and appropriate invocation of its privilege. Thus,
information held by Sourwine was not discoverable. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 26(b)(1). Respondents' appeal from
this ruling was heard by the Court of Appeals with their appeals from the denial of injunctive relief. 159
U.S.App.D.C. at 358, 488 F.2d at 1258.
[Footnote 14]
On this record, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the District Court properly entertained this action
initially. 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 359-360, 488 F.2d at 1259-1260. The Court of Appeals saw a significant
difference between a subpoena that seeks information directly from a party and one that seeks the same
information from a third person. In the former case, the party can resist, and thereby test the subpoena; in
the latter case, however, unless a court may inquire to determine whether a legitimate legislative purpose is
present, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 412 U. S. 312-313 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606,
408 U. S. 624 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 341 U. S. 376 (1951), compliance by the third
person could frustrate any judicial inquiry.
[Footnote 15]
Although the power to investigate is necessarily broad, it is not unlimited. Its boundaries are defined by its
source. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 354 U. S. 197 (1957). Thus,
"[t]he scope of the power of inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution."
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 360 U. S. 111 (1959); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 279
U. S. 291-292 (1929). We have made it dear, however, that Congress is not invested with a "general' power
to inquire into private affairs." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 273 U. S. 173 (1927). The subject of any
inquiry always must be one "on which legislation could be had." Id. at 273 U. S. 177.
[Footnote 16]
In some situations, we have balanced First Amendment rights against public interests, Watkins v. United
States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 (1959), but those cases did not
involve attempts by private parties to impede congressional action where the Speech or Debate Clause was
raised by Congress by way of defense. Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 46 (1953). The
cases were criminal prosecutions where defendants sought to justify their refusals to answer congressional
inquiries by asserting their First Amendment rights. Different problems were presented from those here. Any
interference with congressional action had already occurred when the cases reached us, and Congress was
seeking the aid of the Judiciary to enforce its will. Our task was to perform the judicial function in criminal
prosecutions, and we properly scrutinized the predicates of the criminal prosecutions. Watkins, supra, at 354
U. S. 208; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147, 358 U. S. 151 (1958); Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S.
155, 349 U. S. 162, 349 U. S. 169 (1955); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U. S. 599, 369 U. S. 630-631
(1962) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); 369 U. S. 640 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
concurring in Watkins:
"By . . . making the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for enforcing the authority that, underlies the
congressional power to punish for contempt, Congress necessarily brings into play the specific provisions of
the Constitution relating to the prosecution of offenses and those implied restrictions under which courts
function."
354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 216. Where we are presented with an attempt to interfere with an ongoing activity by
Congress, and that activity is found to be within the legitimate legislative sphere, balancing plays no part.
The speech or debate protection provides an absolute immunity from judicial interference. Collateral harm
which may occur in the course of a legitimate legislative inquiry does not allow us to force the inquiry to
"grind to a halt." Hutcheson v. United States, supra, at 369 U. S. 618.
[Footnote 17]
Although the Speech or Debate Clause has never been read so broadly that legislators are "absolved of the
responsibility of filing a motion to dismiss," Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 395 U. S. 505 n. 25 (1969);
see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 341 U. S. 376-377, the purposes which the Clause serves require that
such motions be given the most expeditious treatment by district courts because one branch of Government
is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate branch. If there is a dismissal and an appeal, courts of
appeals have a duty to see that the litigation is swiftly resolved. Enforcement of the Subcommittee's
subpoena has been restrained since June, 1970, nearly five years, while this litigation dragged through the
courts. This protracted delay has frustrated a valid congressional inquiry.
[Footnote 18]
Progressive Labor Party v. Committee on Internal Security of the U.S. House of Representatives (C. A. No.
71-1609); National Peace Action Coalition v. Committee on Internal Security of the U.S. House of
Page 16 of 40
Representatives (C. A. No. 71-1693); Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice v. Committee on Internal
Security of the U.S. House of Representatives (C.A. No. 71-1717).
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Speech or Debate Clause protects the actions of the Senate petitioners in this
case from judicial interference, and that the House aspects of this case should be reconsidered by the
District Court. As our cases have consistently held, however, the Speech or Debate Clause protects
legislators and their confidential aides from suit; it does not immunize congressional action from judicial
review. I write today only to emphasize that the Speech or Debate Clause does not entirely immunize a
congressional subpoena from challenge by a party not in a position to assert his constitutional rights by
refusing to comply with it.

When the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed the records of the bank account of
respondent USSF (hereinafter respondent), respondent brought this suit in the District of Columbia against
the Members of the Subcommittee, its counsel, and the bank to declare invalid and restrain enforcement of
the subpoena. Suit as brought in the District of Columbia because the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had held, one week before in a suit against the same Subcommittee and its counsel, that jurisdiction
and venue lay only in the District of Columbia. Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (1970).
Having sued in the District of Columbia, however, respondent found that it could not get proper service on
the New York
Page 421 U. S. 514
bank. Consequently, the only parties that it brought before the courts were the Senators and their counsel.
As the Court points out, the District Court properly entertained the action in order to provide a forum in which
respondent could assert its constitutional objections to the subpoena, since a neutral third party could not be
expected to resist the subpoena by placing itself in contempt. Ante at 421 U. S. 501 n. 14; see Perlman v.
United States, 247 U. S. 7, 12 (1918); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 756-757 (CA1), vacated sub nom.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 691
(1974). But a court's inquiry in such a setting is necessarily quite limited once defendants entitled to do so
invoke the privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause, as was done here. If the Senators' actions were within
the "legitimate legislative sphere," the matter ends there, and they are answerable no further to the court. If
their counsel's actions were in aid of that activity, then, as a confidential employee of the Members, he is
equally shielded from further judicial interference. Compare Gravel v. United States, supra, at 408 U. S.
616-622, with Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 412 U. S. 314-316 (1973). [Footnote 2/1]
Page 421 U. S. 515

The Court applies this well settled doctrine to the present case and holds that, since the issuance of the
subpoena fell within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, the proceedings against the petitioners must
come to an end. I do not read the Court to suggest, however, nor could I agree, that the constitutionality of a
congressional subpoena is always shielded from more searching judicial inquiry. For, as the very cases on
which the Court relies demonstrate, the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is personal. It extends to
Members and their counsel acting in a legislative capacity; it does not preclude judicial review of their
decisions in an appropriate case, whether they take the form of legislation or a subpoena.

II

Modern legislatures, and particularly the Congress, may legislate on a wide range of subjects. In order to
discharge this function, and their related informing function, they may genuinely need a great deal of
information in the exclusive possession of persons who would not make it available except under the
compulsion of a subpoena. When duly subpoenaed, however, such a person does not shed his constitutional
right to withhold certain classes of information. If he refuses to testify or to produce documents and invokes a
pertinent privilege, he still runs the risk that the legislature will cite him for contempt. [Footnote 2/2] At trial, he
may defend on the basis of the constitutional right to withhold information from the legislature, and his right
will be respected
Page 421 U. S. 516
along with the legitimate needs of the legislature. As the Court said in Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S.
178, 354 U. S. 188 (1957):
"The Bill of Rights is applicable to [congressional] investigations as to all forms of governmental action.
Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to
unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or
political belief and association be abridged."
Accord, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 39 (1963); see Quinn v. United
States, 349 U. S. 155, 349 U. S. 161 (1955); Reinstein & Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation
of Powers, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1113, 1173-1176 (1973).

Page 17 of 40
The Speech or Debate Clause cannot be used to avoid meaningful review of constitutional objections to a
subpoena simply because the subpoena is served on a third party. Our prior cases arising under the Speech
or Debate Clause indicate only that a Member of Congress or his aide may not be called upon to defend a
subpoena against constitutional objection, and not that the objection will not be heard at all.
The privilege of the Speech or Debate Clause extends to Members of Congress when their action is
"essential to legislating," in order to assure the independence of the legislators and their freedom from
vexatious and distracting litigation. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 383 U. S. 180-182 (1966);
United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 408 U. S. 512 (1972). Further, "a Member and his aide are to be
treated as one'" under the Clause, "insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if
performed by the Member himself." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 616, 408 U. S. 618. At the
same time, however, the Speech or Debate Clause does not insulate
Page 421 U. S. 517
legislative functionaries carrying out nonlegislative task. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 315.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881), was an action to recover damages for false imprisonment. The
Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause afforded the defendant Members of Congress a good defense,
since they had taken no part in Kilbourn's arrest other than to vote that the Sergeant at Arms accomplish it.
The Sergeant at Arms, however, was held to answer for carrying out their unconstitutional directive; and
Kilbourn later recovered $20,000 from him. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, MacArth. & M. 401, 432 (Sup.Ct.D.C.
1883). The basis for the Court's holding was not, however, as the Court seems at one point to suggest, ante
at 421 U. S. 508, that the arrest was inessential to legislating. We have already twice observed that the
"resolution authorizing Kilbourn's arrest . . . was clearly legislative in nature. But the resolution was subject to
judicial review insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as it did there. That the House could with
impunity order an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for those who made the arrest."
Gravel, supra, at 408 U. S. 618 (emphasis added); Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 412 U. S. 315 n. 9.

III

This case does not present the questions of what would be the proper procedure, and who might be the
proper parties defendant, in an effort to get before a court a constitutional challenge to a subpoena duces
tecum issued to a third party. [Footnote 2/3] As respondent's counsel conceded at oral argument, this case is
at an end if the Senate petitioners
Page 421 U. S. 518
are upheld in their claim of immunity, as they must be. [Footnote 2/4]
[Footnote 2/1]
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), was a damages action against the same Chairman and
Counsel Sourwine of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, based on allegations of a conspiracy
with state officials to violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court distinguished between the
Senator and counsel, remanding only the case involving the latter for trial because there was disputed
evidence in the record giving "more than merely colorable substance" to the claims against him, id. at 387 U.
S. 84; the record contained no evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that could give rise to
liability. The Court noted that the doctrine of immunity for acts within the legislative sphere is "less absolute,
although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a legislative body, rather than to legislators
themselves." Id. at 387 U. S. 85. In the present case, where counsel is alleged only to have joined with the
Senators in causing the subpoena to be issued, we have no occasion to distinguish between Mr. Sourwine
and the Senators.
[Footnote 2/2]
In the federal system, this is done by the appropriate chamber referring the matter to the United States
Attorney for presentation to a grand jury, indictment, and trial in the federal courts. See 2 U.S.C. 192-194.

[Footnote 2/3]
See the opinion below, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 370, 488 F.2d 1252, 1270 (1973); Liberation News Service v.
Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1384 n. 10 (CA2 1970); cf. Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365, 1369 (CA7 1969).

[Footnote 2/4]
In the House aspects of this case, where the banks to which the subpoenas were directed are within the
jurisdiction of the District Court, this would not necessarily be true if that court were to determine that the
issues are not moot.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.


I would affirm the judgment below.
The basic issues in this case were canvassed by me in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 341 U. S.
381-383 (1951) (dissenting opinion), and by the Court in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), in an
opinion which I joined. Under our federal regime that delegates, by the Constitution and Acts of Congress,
awesome powers to individuals, those powers may not be used to deprive people of their First Amendment
or other constitutional rights. It is my view that no official, no matter how high or majestic his or her office,
who is within the reach of judicial process, may invoke immunity for his actions for which wrongdoers
Page 18 of 40
normally suffer. There may be few occasions when, on the merits, it would be appropriate to invoke such a
remedy. But no regime of law that can rightfully claim that name may make trustees of these vast powers
immune from actions brought by people who have been wronged by official action. See Watkins v. United
States, 354 U. S. 178, 354 U. S. 198 (1957).

- Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 US 111

Hutchinson v. Proxmire case brief summary


443 U.S. 111 (1979)

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff research scientist appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants, a senator and his
assistant, from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an action for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, and infringement of plaintiff's rights of
privacy, peace, and tranquility.

CASE FACTS
Plaintiff was a research behavioral scientist who studied emotional behavior in monkeys. Most of his
research was funded by government grants. Respondents were a United States Senator and his legislative
assistant. Respondent senator awarded plaintiff the Golden Fleece Award for presenting an egregious
example of wasteful governmental spending. Respondents publicized the award through telephone calls,
radio and television interviews, and newsletters. Plaintiff filed his action for libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, and infringement of his rights to privacy, peace,
and tranquility.

DISCUSSION
Reversing the district court and the appeals court, the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiff
was not a "public figure," and therefore the "actual malice" standard did not apply to him.
In addition, the Court held that the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution did
not protect respondents for defamatory statements they made or might make.
That meant that the libelous remarks made by respondents in followup telephone calls to executive
agencies, and in the television and radio interview, were not protected.

CONCLUSION
The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

- Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 714

FACTS

Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang

- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not libelous since
he was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense

- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while
congress was presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.

- The open letter was an expos on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious
plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Natl Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II A
coup detat;Plan III A modification of Plan I)

- The letter also implicated that the planners have under their control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj.
Jose Reyna.......It is of course possible that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of
which they may have absolutely no knowledge.

- Lower Court dismissed - Petitioners appealed

Page 19 of 40
ISSUES

1. WON the publication is a privileged communication 2. (if not) WON it is libelous

HELD

1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the President
published by the defendant when the Congress was not in session. And in thus causing it to be published he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House Committee.

- The phrase speech or debate therein as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to
utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its function as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question.

2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise added that it was possible that
plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages.

Disqualifications and Inhibitions


Effect of Imprisonment
- People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sessions; Adjournment; Officers


- Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

FACTS

- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad
nominated to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as
majority leader.

- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the
seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.

- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek the
ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.

ISSUES

1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition


2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader

HELD

Page 20 of 40
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in
exercise of their functions and prerogatives

- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of respondents.

- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of
Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or
executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit
in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:

- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.


- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.

- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the
Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.

3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader.

- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without
color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person
suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of
the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader.

- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Page 21 of 40
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

Quorum
- Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17

RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC

FACTS

- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court
refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own president

Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Taada and Prospero Sanidad
prepared a resolution enumerating charges30 against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO
presided the session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a
hospital and another who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.31

- TAADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAADA from delivering his
privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall.
Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The
remaining senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution declaring vacant the position of the
President of the Senate and designating... Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next
day the President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President.

- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and
oust CUENCO.

ISSUE

WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

HELD

NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper
of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition
accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by
this Court in matters of similar nature.
Decision Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent]

- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session.

The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by
any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social
order.
Page 22 of 40
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu
propio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the
United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a
provision.

- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was
properly made and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The
circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his
supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed
investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of
CUENCO's group.

- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact
business. The Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business...
[cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the
majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full
membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them
cannot be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority.
Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

FERIA [concur]

- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the
beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country
of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the
members. There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the
House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS

- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return
to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them), reversed its original decision and
now assumed jurisdiction over the case

ISSUES

1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case


2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid

HELD

1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria
[and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where
CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's
pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would
result in CUENCO's election as Senate President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy
[the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but
to no avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest.

Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION FERIA [concur]

Page 23 of 40
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the amendment of the
quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not
incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through
coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in
order to constitute a quorum.

PERFECTO [concur]

- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of Congress, because they were
a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because
"majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that
is, of all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A
majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half.
The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do
not constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic
logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two
numbers combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the two
hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority presupposes the
existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the Senate.

- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12 senators was enough
quorum. The Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum..., but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner
and under such penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The
"smaller number" referred to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions
specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The collective body
constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent members," so
as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" may be
12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president,
who will have to act until normalcy is restored.

- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renounce the
position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the sessions of the Senate and insist
on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions.
AVELINOs refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.

Rules of Proceedings
- Arroyo v. De Venecia (Sin-taxes case), GR 127255, Aug. 14, 1997

Discipline of members
Suspension vs. Preventive Suspension
- Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

Enrolled Bill Theory


- Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1
- Casco Chemical v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347
Legislative Journal vs. Enrolled Bill

Electoral Tribunals
Composition
- Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792
- Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651
Powers
- Aquino v. Comelec, Sept. 18, 1995

Page 24 of 40
- Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807
Jurisdiction over Proclamation Controversy
- Caruncho v. Comelec, G.R. No. 135996, September 30, 1999

Commission on Appointments
Composition
- Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789
Powers
- Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Powers of Congress

General Legislative Power


Limitations
Substantive Limitations
Procedural Limitations
One Bill, one subject
- Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000
Sufficiency of Title
- Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, GR 105371, Nov. 11, 1993
- Chongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

Bills that must originate exclusively from the House


- Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, GR 115455, Aug. 25, 1994

FACTS

- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716. -
RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue
Code.

- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT.
These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197.

- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee
submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into
consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197

- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.
- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times,
recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved
by the conferees.

- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was
presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2
newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.

- RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of
Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income from
advertisements are still subject to VAT.

- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation
was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:

Re: Art VI Sec 24


1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/
Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified by the
word exclusively.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the
Senate of treaty-ratifying power.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate
merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630.

Page 25 of 40
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not
an unusual condition in this country.
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197.

Re: BCC acted within its power


1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these
were surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind closed doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses.

3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didnt
contain detailed and explicit statement of changes 4. It is required that the Committees report undergo
three rdgs in the two houses.

- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)

1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of
VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title.

2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the
franchise (24 of PD 1590).

- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:


Re: Art III Sec 1

1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not
only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law.

Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:


2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:


3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.

- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4

1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although
exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says theres possibility that exemption may still be removed by
mere revocation by Secretary of Finance. Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom
because of VAT on gross receipts on advertisements.

2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment.

3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is
discriminatory.

4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and
the Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom
of thought/conscience.

- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:


Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts

- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:


Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education

ISSUES

Page 26 of 40
Procedural

1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps)
2. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days)

3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power


4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON
amendment of 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein
Substantive:

5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated


6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated

7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated


8. WON Art III 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science and tech) is violated

HELD

- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also
charged w/ enforcement of Consti.

Procedural

Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled
copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the
enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than surreptitiously inserting
provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of govt.

1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24


a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill
originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the
bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with and propose
amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two houses.

b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on
executive power.
c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that its the
initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs.

Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long
as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that
legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.

2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)


a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill
on separate days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity... qualifies two stated
conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and
distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the except clause dispenses only with printing
would violate grammar rules and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified
H No 9210 then pending.

3. YES the BCC acted within its power


a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive
sessions of the BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision
to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only

Page 27 of 40
requirement that the 3rd version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include
an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be
valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographers limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize
conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting.
Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of
the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in
either house, not the BCC report.

4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)


a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by
withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title,
would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for
operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when common good
requires.

Substantive

- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should
be in Congress.

5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated


- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when property is
imperiled, lawmakers judgment prevails.

a. This is actually a policy argument. b. This is a mere allegation.


c. This is also short of evidence.

6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated


a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State.
b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by
law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not
the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not
apply to press alone but to all sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is a central feature
of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.

7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated


a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by
religious org.

8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated


a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read
into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.

9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of
higher

income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted.
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we evolve a progressive taxation
system.

10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by
religious org.
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17

a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.

Page 28 of 40
Decision Petitions are dismissed.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross selling
price

Narvasa, Separate Opinion Cruz, Separate Opinion Padilla, Separate Opinion Vitug, Separate Opinion
Regalado, Dissenting Opinion Davide, Dissenting Opinion Romero, Dissenting Opinion Bellosillo, Dissenting
Opinion Puno, Dissenting Opinion

- Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, Oct. 30, 1995

Three readings on separate days


Bicameral Conference Committee

Legislative Process
Approval of Bills
Presidential veto
Pocket veto

Item veto
- Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133

BENGZON VS. DRILON


G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of
RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was
not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that
the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President
Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there
was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to
restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that
there should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these
provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for
the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid
and subsisting.

Legislative veto; One-House Veto


- Immigration Service v. Chadha, 462 US 919, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
- Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

Facts:

Page 29 of 40
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain
items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through
the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as
reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the
Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6)
additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity
funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed
said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government
agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because
these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No.
902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Managements Procurement Service).

Page 30 of 40
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with
the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP,
the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the
issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the
Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10),
more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such
is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be
embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme
Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the
President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are
issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent


SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur and dissent]

- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's
decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the
Executive.

VITUG [concur]

- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would
have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by
law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

Power of the Purse


Implied limitations on appropriation measure
- Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3
from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as

Page 31 of 40
members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the
said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.

- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as
provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void.

- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus
oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one man-legislature, new
legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation, operating on no laws therefore,
would be unenforceable.

- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of
Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the
Constitution which stated that:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.

whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize
said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides as follows

Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated
for the debt service.

- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it
enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high
interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to
enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-
debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service
estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in
layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and nterest rate assumption's which may significantly differ
from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic
appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which
by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may
have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have
supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates. - Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and
indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the
person of Marcos."

ISSUES

1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in
violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.

The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.

2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of
the Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative by automatic appropriation.

HELD

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1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other
imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest
in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above.
The enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not
only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted
more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.

2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution
recognizes that:

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social
order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force
and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the
Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate
law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government
to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country.

- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very
nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be
disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall
become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as
shown by the books of the Treasury.

Constitutional limitations and rules


Riders
Sub rosa appropriation
Prohibition against transfer of appropriation
- Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (see case above)

Power of Taxation
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat, 316)

Power of Legislative Investigation


- Senate v. Ermita (E.O.464), G.R. No. 169777

FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of
E.O. no. 46415 issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1;
Art. XIII Sec. 16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries
concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the
Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying
reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive
report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly
and that preparations and arrangements have already been completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the
Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had not
been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant
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to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO
enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent
Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.

ISSUES

Primary Issue

1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:

a. Legal standing of petitioners:


G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)

b. Actual Case or Controversy


3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

HELD

Primary Issue

1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in
aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor.

- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right
to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of
Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to
divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid.

Reasoning

Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of
information of a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21 This is the power of the Legislature to make
investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It
gives the Congress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for
information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended to be
distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of
the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in
the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. -Sec.
2(a)ofE.O.464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is
covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government.
It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.

-Sec.2(b)ofE.O.464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official.
It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is
contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary
Page 34 of 40
power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy.
-Sec.3ofE.O.464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does
not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and certain reasons
for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given
her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry.

Secondary Issues

2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:


Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1.
the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions raised.

The Senate of the Philippines

- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public
decision- making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles
the ability of the members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and
direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy.

Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)

- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on
their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)


- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct
and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)


- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the
controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP- Laban no standing.

b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)


- A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such
results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.

- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate
hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern,
therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations deprives the people of information.

4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication.
Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was
implemented.

Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while
sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.

- Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (November 20, 1991)

Page 35 of 40
FACTS

- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the
Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.

-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their
relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the
expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:

-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings,
Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the
PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc.

8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without
PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa Sen.
Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil
degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government

-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on what they know about the sale
of the 36 Romualdez corporations

-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both
averring that such testimonies would unduly prejudice the defendants of civil case no.0035

-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose

-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in
aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec)

-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee

ISSUES

1.WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.


2.WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government.

3.WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.

HELD

1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation


- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the
Romualdez corporationsthere was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As
held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power of
inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a
legitimate task of congressno inquiry is an end in itself. 2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive
domain of another branch of government

- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would
only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress
cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.

3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process


- It has been held that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed
by the Constitution on governmental action, including...the Bill of Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant
be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private
Page 36 of 40
rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends
to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused.

Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence
before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the
principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the
Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.

SEPARATE OPINION GUTIERREZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.


-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual granteven so, it is
expressly granted by A6 S21.

Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit
the power of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to legislate on a
particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.

US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative
purpose must be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation is easier to establish here where Congress
legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every question be material to the
proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject of the inquiry.

-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may investigate for its own
purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under trial.

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-A6 S21 provides that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
However, such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations where a violation
of a basic right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be respected.

-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are posed, but the
witness may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar, no incriminating questions
had been asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is premature.

CRUZ [dissent]

Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.


Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object
if it is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the contrary.

-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the
disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the legislature

Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation ...expressly state that
the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation.

Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right against
self-incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand outright.

Power to Punish contempt


- Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29

FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista
estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the

Page 37 of 40
then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the
said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American
for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable
terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P
1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan
de Dios. There was however no other payment received from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its
original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the
resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of
First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one under the
name of Rural Progress Administration.

- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above
estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for
Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the
full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-in-
fact. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.

- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice
secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the
funds to Rural Progress.

- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8
which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.

- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:

a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal

- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently
the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the transactions.

- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in
cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he
gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on
many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that answering the question might incriminate him.
Based on this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and
subsequently found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at
arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later.
The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.

- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain
his release cited the following grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is not material to the
intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The
Senate has already approved bills related to the transactions.

b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating

- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with regard the
power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of
its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from
American precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after
largely American institutions and practices. The discussions were as follows:

a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investigate or
exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce
it, is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative
functions. In the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same
Page 38 of 40
from others who have them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given
this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information.

b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to
inquire.

ISSUES

WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted

HELD

a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution
Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the
question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired
into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme
Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not
pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a
clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to be elicited is
material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope.

- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to
answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the
Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the
power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement.

b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of the legislative
session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that
the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the
McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of Representatives which losses all its members
every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose
members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant
every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of
the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in
contempt, the remedy is with the Court.

c. Arnaults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court
must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified
in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was obviously false. He
obviously knew the name of the person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable
with contempt.

Decision Petition is denied

SEPARATE OPINION

TUASON [dissent]

- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of the
ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where disagreement occur.

- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to the
contemplated legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the question as to who
received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of getting the
money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President Quirino). The Senate is not the
proper forum for such vindication. The Senate investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to
prepare the way for court action since they could not expect the Justice department to take the initiative to
investigate and prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department
had a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.

- The Committees report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were
passed by the Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the case there is no need to extract
names. The importance of names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution.

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- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main
objection lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory of other
braches of government when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless,
impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot.

- Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358

Power to declare existence of state of war


- The Prize cases, 67 US 635, 17 L.Ed. 459
- Mora v. McNamara, 389 US 934, 19 L.Ed.2d 287

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