3/30/2017 ConcepcionvsCA:123450:August31,2005:J.

Corona:ThirdDivision:Decision

THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.123450.August31,2005]

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.

THERESAALMONTE,respondents.

DECISION
CORONA,J.:

The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care,
[1]
includingappropriatelegalprotectionbeforeaswellasafterbirth. Incaseofassaultonhisrightsby
thosewhotakeadvantageofhisinnocenceandvulnerability,thelawwillriseinhisdefensewiththe
singlemindedpurposeofupholdingonlyhisbestinterests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa
Almonte,andachildnamedJoseGerardo.GerardoandMa.TheresaweremarriedonDecember29,
[2] [3]
1989. Aftertheirmarriage,theylivedwithMa.TheresasparentsinFairview,QuezonCity. Almosta
[4]
yearlater,onDecember8,1990,Ma.TheresagavebirthtoJoseGerardo.
GerardoandMa.Theresasrelationshipturnedouttobeshortlived,however.OnDecember19,
1991,GerardofiledapetitiontohavehismarriagetoMa.Theresaannulledonthegroundofbigamy.
[5]
HeallegedthatnineyearsbeforehemarriedMa.TheresaonDecember10,1980,shehadmarried
[6]
oneMarioGopiao,whichmarriagewasneverannulled. GerardoalsofoundoutthatMariowasstill
[7]
aliveandwasresidinginLoyolaHeights,QuezonCity.
Ma.TheresadidnotdenymarryingMariowhenshewastwentyyearsold.She,however,averred
[8]
thatthemarriagewasashamandthatsheneverlivedwithMarioatall.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
marriedGerardoandannulledhermarriagetothelatterforbeingbigamous.ItdeclaredJoseGerardo
to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
[9]
Gerardowasgrantedvisitationrights.
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held
him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above
decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner socalled
[10]
visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. She argued
that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
[11]
illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from
Concepcion toAlmonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
motherssurname.
Gerardoopposedthemotion.HeinsistedonhisvisitationrightsandtheretentionofConcepcion
asJoseGerardossurname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and
madethefollowingobservations:

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Itisapitythatthepartieshereinseemtobeusingtheirsontogetatortohurttheother,somethingtheyshould
neverdoiftheywanttoassurethenormaldevelopmentandwellbeingoftheboy.

TheCourtallowedvisitorialrightstothefatherknowingthattheminorneedsafather,especiallyasheisaboy,
whomusthaveafatherfiguretorecognizesomethingthatthemotheralonecannotgive.Moreover,theCourt
believesthattheemotionalandpsychologicalwellbeingoftheboywouldbebetterservedifhewereallowedto
maintainrelationshipswithhisfather.

TherebeingnolawwhichcompelstheCourttoactonewayortheotheronthismatter,theCourtinvokesthe
provisionofArt.8,PD603asamended,otherwiseknownastheChildandYouthWelfareCode,towit:

Inallquestionsregardingthecare,custody,educationandpropertyofthechild,hiswelfareshallbethe
paramountconsideration.
[12]
WHEREFORE,therespondentsMotionforReconsiderationhastobe,asitisherebyDENIED.

Ma.TheresaelevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals,assigningaserrortherulingofthetrial
court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos
surname(Concepcion)despitethefactthatJoseGerardohadalreadybeendeclaredillegitimateand
shouldthereforeusehersurname(Almonte).Theappellatecourtdeniedthepetitionandaffirmedin
[13]
totothedecisionofthetrialcourt.
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative
father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of the
childpolicyinvokedbythecourtaquo.Itruledthat[a]tbottom,it(was)thechildswelfareandnotthe
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
[14]
hoursonceaweek.
Theappellatecourtlikewiseheldthatanillegitimatechildcannotusethemotherssurnamemotu
proprio.Thechild,representedbythemother,shouldfileaseparateproceedingforachangeofname
[15]
underRule103oftheRulesofCourttoeffectthecorrectioninthecivilregistry.
Undaunted,Ma.Theresamovedforthereconsiderationoftheadversedecisionoftheappellate
court.Shealsofiledamotiontosetthecasefororalargumentssothatshecouldbetterventilatethe
issuesinvolvedinthecontroversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court
resolvedthemotionforreconsideration.ItreverseditsearlierrulingandheldthatJoseGerardowas
notthesonofMa.TheresabyGerardobutbyMarioduringherfirstmarriage:

Itis,therefore,undeniableestablishedbytheevidenceinthiscasethattheappellant[Ma.Theresa]wasmarried
toMarioGopiao,andthatshehadneverenteredintoalawfulmarriagewiththeappellee[Gerardo]sincetheso
calledmarriagewiththelatterwasvoidabinitio.Itwas[Gerardo]himselfwhohadestablishedthesefacts.In
otherwords,[Ma.Theresa]waslegitimatelymarriedtoMarioGopiaowhenthechildJoseGerardowasbornon
December8,1990.Therefore,thechildJoseGerardounderthelawisthelegitimatechildofthelegaland
subsistingmarriagebetween[Ma.Theresa]andMarioGopiaohecannotbedeemedtobetheillegitimatechild
ofthevoidandnonexistentmarriagebetween[Ma.Theresa]and[Gerardo],butissaidbythelawtobethe
childofthelegitimateandexistingmarriagebetween[Ma.Theresa]andMarioGopiao(Art.164,FamilyCode).
Consequently,[she]isrightinfirmlysayingthat[Gerardo]canclaimneithercustodynorvisitorialrightsover
thechildJoseGerardo.Further,[Gerardo]cannotimposehisnameuponthechild.Notonlyisitwithoutlegal
basis(evensupposingthechildtobehisillegitimatechild[Art.146,TheFamilyCode])itwouldtendto
destroytheexistingmarriagebetween[Ma.Theresa]andGopiao,wouldpreventanypossiblerapproachment
[16]
betweenthemarriedcouple,andwouldmeanajudicialsealuponanillegitimaterelationship.

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TheappellatecourtbrushedasidethecommonadmissionofGerardoandMa.TheresathatJose
Gerardowastheirson.ItgavelittleweighttoJoseGerardosbirthcertificateshowingthathewasborn
alittlelessthanayearafterGerardoandMa.Theresaweremarried:

Wearenotunawareofthemovantsargumentthatvariousevidenceexistthatappelleeandtheappellanthave
judiciallyadmittedthattheminoristheirnaturalchild.But,inthesamevein,Wecannotoverlookthefactthat
Article167oftheFamilyCodemandates:

Thechildshallbeconsideredlegitimatealthoughthemothermayhavedeclaredagainstitslegitimacyormay
havebeensentencedasanadulteress.(underscoringours)

Thus,implicitfromtheaboveprovisionisthefactthataminorcannotbedeprivedofhis/herlegitimatestatuson
thebaredeclarationofthemotherand/orevenmuchless,thesupposedfather.Infine,thelawandonlythelaw
determineswhoarethelegitimateorillegitimatechildrenforoneslegitimacyorillegitimacycannotever
becompromised.Noteventhebirthcertificateoftheminorcanchangehisstatusfortheinformationcontained
thereinaremerelysuppliedbythemotherand/orthesupposedfather.Itshouldbewhatthelawsaysandnot
[17]
whataparentsaysitis. (Emphasissupplied)

Shockedandstunned,Gerardomovedforareconsiderationoftheabovedecisionbutthesame
[18]
wasdenied. Hence,thisappeal.
[19]
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
[20]
clear.Achildwhoisconceivedorbornduringthemarriageofhisparentsislegitimate.
[21]
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
FamilyCodeprovides:

Article167.Thechildshallbeconsideredlegitimatealthoughthemothermayhavedeclaredagainstits
legitimacyormayhavebeensentencedasanadulteress.
[22]
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
[23]
explainedtherationaleofthisruleintherecentcaseofCabataniav.CourtofAppeals :

Thepresumptionoflegitimacydoesnotonlyflowoutofadeclarationinthestatutebutisbasedonthebroad
principlesofnaturaljusticeandthesupposedvirtueofthemother.Itisgroundedonthepolicytoprotectthe
innocentoffspringfromtheodiumofillegitimacy.
[24]
GerardoinvokesArticle166(1)(b) oftheFamilyCode.Hecannot.Hehasnostandinginlawto
[25]
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his
[26]
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the
[27]
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
SincethemarriageofGerardoandMa.Theresawasvoidfromtheverybeginning,heneverbecame
herhusbandandthusneveracquiredanyrighttoimpugnthelegitimacyofherchild.
Thepresumptionoflegitimacyproceedsfromthesexualunioninmarriage,particularlyduringthe
[28]
periodofconception. TooverthrowthispresumptiononthebasisofArticle166(1)(b)oftheFamily
Code,itmustbeshownbeyondreasonabledoubtthattherewasnoaccessthatcouldhaveenabled
[29]
thehusbandtofatherthechild. Sexualintercourseistobepresumedwherepersonalaccessisnot
[30]
disproved,unlesssuchpresumptionisrebuttedbyevidencetothecontrary.
The presumption is quasiconclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
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[31]
immediatelyprecededthebirthofthechild.
Torebutthepresumption,theseparationbetweenthespousesmustbesuchastomakemarital
[32]
intimacyimpossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
[33]
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
[34]
violationofprisonregulations.
Here,duringtheperiodthatGerardoandMa.TheresawerelivingtogetherinFairview,Quezon
City,MariowaslivinginLoyolaHeightswhichisalsoinQuezonCity.FairviewandLoyolaHeightsare
onlyascantfourkilometersapart.
NotonlydidbothMa.TheresaandMarioresideinthesamecitybutalsothatnoevidenceatall
was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the
separationbetweenMa.Theresaandherlawfulhusband,Mario,wascertainlynotsuchastomakeit
physicallyimpossibleforthemtoengageinthemaritalact.
Sexualunionbetweenspousesisassumed.Evidencesufficienttodefeattheassumptionshould
bepresentedbyhimwhoassertsthecontrary.Thereisnosuchevidencehere.Thus,thepresumption
oflegitimacyinfavorofJoseGerardo,astheissueofthemarriagebetweenMa.TheresaandMario,
stands.
[35]
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of
[36]
marriage thatsheneverlivedwithMario.Heclaimsthiswasanadmissionthattherewasneverany
sexualrelationbetweenherandMario,anadmissionthatwasbindingonher.
Gerardosargumentiswithoutmerit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with
MariobutherillegitimatesonwithGerardo.Thisdeclarationanavowalbythemotherthatherchild
isillegitimateistheverydeclarationthatisproscribedbyArticle167oftheFamilyCode.
Thelanguageofthelawisunmistakable.Anassertionbythemotheragainstthelegitimacyofher
childcannotaffectthelegitimacyofachildbornorconceivedwithinavalidmarriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instancewhereMa.TheresacouldhavebeentogetherwithMarioorthatthereoccurredabsolutelyno
intercoursebetweenthem.AllshesaidwasthatsheneverlivedwithMario.Sheneverclaimedthat
nothingeverhappenedbetweenthem.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardosconceptionandbirth.Farfromforeclosingthepossibilityofmaritalintimacy,theirproximity
toeachotheronlyservestoreinforcesuchpossibility.Thus,theimpossibilityofphysicalaccesswas
neverestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Third,togivecredencetoMa.Theresasstatementistoallowhertoarrogateuntoherselfaright
[37]
exclusivelylodgedinthehusband,orinapropercase,hisheirs. Amotherhasnorighttodisavowa
[38]
childbecausematernityisneveruncertain. Hence,Ma.Theresaisnotpermittedbylawtoquestion
JoseGerardoslegitimacy.
Finally,forreasonsofpublicdecencyandmorality,amarriedwomancannotsaythatshehadno
[39]
intercoursewithherhusbandandthatheroffspringisillegitimate. Theproscriptionisinconsonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
[40]
towardthelegitimacyofchildren.
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court
andintheappellatecourtdoesnotholdwater.ThefactthatbothMa.TheresaandGerardoadmitted
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andagreedthatJoseGerardowasborntothemwasimmaterial.Thatwas,ineffect,anagreement
thatthechildwasillegitimate.IftheCourtweretovalidatethatstipulation,thenitwouldbetantamount
toallowingthemothertomakeadeclarationagainstthelegitimacyofherchildandconsentingtothe
denialoffiliationofthechildbypersonsotherthanherhusband.Thesearetheveryactsfromwhich
thelawseekstoshieldthechild.
[41]
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary
value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the
[42]
courtshallnotconsideranyevidencewhichhasnotbeenformallyoffered.
[43]
Moreover,thelawitselfestablishesthestatusofachildfromthemomentofhisbirth. Although
[44]
arecordofbirthorbirthcertificatemaybeusedasprimaryevidenceofthefiliationofachild, asthe
statusofachildisdeterminedbythelawitself,proofoffiliationisnecessaryonlywhenthelegitimacy
of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
[45]
terminationofmarriageissoughttobeestablished.
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be
contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence,thepresentationofproofoflegitimacyinthiscasewasimproperanduncalledfor.
[46]
Inaddition,arecordofbirthismerelyprimafacie evidence of the facts contained therein. As
prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant
evidence.Itisnotconclusiveevidencewithrespecttothetruthfulnessofthestatementsmadetherein
[47]
by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasiconclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonabledoubt)ofhislegitimacy,thelattershallprevail.Notonlydoesitbearmoreweight,itisalso
moreconducivetothebestinterestsofthechildandinconsonancewiththepurposeofthelaw.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
commonsensedictatethatalegitimatestatusismorefavorabletothechild.Intheeyesofthelaw,
thelegitimatechildenjoysapreferredandsuperiorstatus.Heisentitledtobearthesurnamesofboth
[48]
his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is
bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim
support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
[49]
counterpart. Moreover(withoutunwittinglyexacerbatingthediscriminationagainsthim),intheeyes
ofsociety,abastardisusuallyregardedasbearingastigmaormarkofdishonor.Needlesstostate,
thelegitimacypresumptivelyvestedbylawuponJoseGerardofavorshisinterest.
ItisunfortunatethatJoseGerardowasusedasapawninthebittersquabblebetweenthevery
personswhowerepassionatelydeclaringtheirconcernforhim.Theparadoxwasthathewasmade
tosuffersupposedlyforhisownsake.Thismadnessshouldend.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an
innocentchildisinvolved.JoseGerardowasbarelyayearoldwhentheseproceedingsbegan.Heis
nowalmostfifteenandallthistimehehasbeenavictimofincessantbickering.Thelawnowcomesto
hisaidtowritefinistothecontroversywhichhasunfairlyhoundedhimsincehisinfancy.
Havingonlyhisbestinterestsinmind,weupholdthepresumptionofhislegitimacy.

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Asalegitimatechild,JoseGerardoshallhavetherighttobearthesurnamesofhisfatherMario
[50]
and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
[51]
parenttochild. Hence,GerardocannotimposehissurnameonJoseGerardowhois,intheeyesof
thelaw,notrelatedtohiminanyway.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the
civilregisterregardinghispaternityandfiliationshouldbethreshedoutinaseparateproceeding.
Incaseofannulmentordeclarationofabsolutenullityofmarriage,Article49oftheFamilyCode
grantsvisitationrightstoaparentwhoisdeprivedofcustodyofhischildren.Suchvisitationrightsflow
fromthenaturalrightofbothparentandchildtoeachotherscompany.Therebeingnosuchparent
childrelationshipbetweenthem,GerardohasnolegallydemandablerighttovisitJoseGerardo.
Ourlawsseektopromotethewelfareofthechild.Article8ofPD603,otherwiseknownasthe
ChildandYouthWelfareCode,isclearandunequivocal:

Article8.ChildsWelfareParamount.Inallquestionsregardingthecare,custody,educationandpropertyofthe
child,hiswelfareshallbetheparamountconsideration.

Article3(1)oftheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsofaChildofwhichthePhilippinesisa
signatoryissimilarlyemphatic:

Article3

1.Inallactionsconcerningchildren,whetherundertakenbypublicorprivatesocialwelfare
institutions,courtsoflaw,administrativeauthoritiesorlegislativebodies,thebestinterestsofthe
childshallbeaprimaryconsideration.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of
[52]
tenderyears. Throughitslaws,theStatesafeguardsthemfromeveryone,eventheirownparents,
totheendthattheireventualdevelopmentasresponsiblecitizensandmembersofsocietyshallnot
beimpeded,distractedorimpairedbyfamilyacrimony.Thisisespeciallysignificantwhere,asinthis
case,theissueconcernstheirfiliationasitstrikesattheirveryidentityandlineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.40651areherebyAFFIRMED.
Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,(Chairman),SandovalGutierrez,andGarcia,JJ.,concur.
CarpioMorales,J.,nopart.

[1]
UniversalDeclarationoftheRightsoftheChild.
[2]
MarriageContract,AnnexA,Rollo,p.41.
[3]
Decision,AnnexE,Rollo,pp.4648.
[4]
CertificateofLiveBirth,AnnexM,Rollo,p.127.
[5]
Petition,AnnexC,Rollo,pp.3840.
[6]
MarriageCertificate,AnnexB1,Rollo,p.43.
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[7]
Supraatnote5.
[8]
Answer,AnnexD,Rollo,pp.4445.
[9]
Penned by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Delilah VidallonMagtolis, CC No. 9110935, Regional Trial Court,
NationalCapitalJudicialRegion,Branch107,QuezonCity,AnnexE,Rollo,p.46.
[10]
MotionforReconsideration,AnnexF,Rollo,p.49.
[11]
Id.,p.61.
[12]
Order,AnnexG,Rollo,pp.5354.
[13]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (a retired
AssociateJusticeoftheSupremeCourt)andSerafinV.C.Guingona.DecisiondatedSeptember29,1994,CAG.R.
CVNo.40651,CourtofAppeals,ThirdDivisionCARollo,pp.5564.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Arturo M. Buena and
ConchitaCarpioMorales(nowanAssociateJusticeoftheSupremeCourt).ResolutiondatedSeptember14,1995,
CAG.R.CVNo.40651,CourtofAppeals,FormerThirdDivisionRollo,AnnexA,pp.2932.
[17]
Id.
[18]
ResolutiondatedJanuary10,1996,CAG.R.CVNo.40651,CourtofAppeals,FormerThirdDivisionRollo,AnnexB,
pp.3437.
[19]
Article2035(1),CivilCodeBaluyutv.Baluyut,G.R.No.33659,14June1990,186SCRA506.
[20]
Further,underArticle54oftheFamilyCode,achildwhowasconceivedorbornbeforethejudgmentofannulmentorof
absolutenullityofthemarriageonthegroundofpsychologicalincapacityhasbecomefinalandexecutoryshallbe
consideredlegitimate.Italsoprovidesthatachildwhowasbornfromasubsequentvoidmarriageasaresultofthe
failureofthecontractingpartiestocomplywiththemandatoryprovisionsofArticles52and53oftheFamilyCode
shalllikewisebeconsideredlegitimate.
[21]
Tolentino, Arturo, Civil Code of the Philippines with the Family Code, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, vol. I, 1990
edition,p.528.
[22]
Bowersv.Bailey,237Iowa295,21N.W.2d773.
[23]
G.R.No.124814,October21,2004.
[24]
Inparticular,Article166(1)(b)provides:
Article166.Legitimacyofachildmaybeimpugnedonlyonthefollowinggrounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
daysofthe300dayswhichimmediatelyprecededthebirthofthechildbecauseof:
xxxxxxxxx
(b)thefactthatthehusbandandwifewerelivingseparatelyinsuchawaythatsexualintercoursewasnot
possibleor
xxxxxxxxx
[25]
Article171providesfortheinstanceswheretheheirsofthehusbandmayimpugnthefiliationofthechild.Thus:
Article 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
precedingarticleonlyinthefollowingcases:
(1)Ifthehusbandshoulddiebeforetheexpirationoftheperiodfixedforbringinghisaction
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(2)Ifheshoulddieafterthefilingofthecomplaintwithouthavingdesistedtherefromor
(3)Ifthechildwasbornafterthedeathofthehusband.
[26]
Macadangdangv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L49542,12September1980,100SCRA73Article170,FamilyCode.
[27]
Liyao,Jr.v.Liyao,428Phil.628(2002).
[28]
Supraatnote21citingPeoplev.Giberson,197Phil.509(1982).
[29]
Supraatnote26.
[30]
Id.citingTolentinosupra.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.citingEstateofBenitoMarcelo,60Phil.442(1934).
[34]
Id.citing1Manresa492500.
[35]
Supraatnote8.
[36]
Supraatnote5.
[37]
Supraatnote26.SeealsoArticles170and171,FamilyCode.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Peopleexrel.Gonzalesv.Monroe,43Ill.App2d1,192N.E.2d691.
[40]
Cf.Article220oftheCivilCode.Itprovides:
Art.220.Incaseofdoubt,allpresumptionsfavorthesolidarityofthefamily.Thus,everyintendmentoflaworfact
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
communityofpropertyduringmarriage,theauthorityofparentsoverthechildren,andthevalidityofdefenseforany
memberoffamilyincaseofunlawfulaggression.
While this provision of the Civil Code may have been omitted in the Family Code, the principles they contain are
valid norms in family relations and in cases involving family members. They are even already embodied in
jurisprudence.(Tolentino,supra,p.506)
[41]
Supraatnote19.
[42]
Section34,Rule132,RulesofCourt.
[43]
Tolentino,supra,p.539SempioDiy,Alicia,HandbookontheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,1995edition,p.275.
[44]
Articles172and175,FamilyCode.Article172states:
Article172.Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyanyofthefollowing:
(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgmentor
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parentconcerned.
Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliationshallbeprovedby:
(1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofalegitimatechildor
(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.
Ontheotherhand,Article175provides:

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Article175.Illegitimatechildrenmayestablishtheirillegitimatefiliationinthesamewayandonthesameevidence
aslegitimatechildren.
xxxxxxxxx
[45]
Cf.Article169,FamilyCode.
[46]
Article410,CivilCode.

[47]
Dupilasv.Cabacungan,36Phil.254(1917).
[48]
Article174,FamilyCodeprovides:
Article174.Legitimatechildrenshallhavetheright:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
conformitywiththeprovisionsofthisCodeonSupportand
(3)TobeentitledtothelegitimeandothersuccessionalrightsgrantedtothembytheCivilCode.
[49]
Article176,FamilyCodestates:
Article176.Illegitimatechildrenshallusethesurnameandshallbeundertheparentalauthorityoftheirmother,and
shallbeentitledtosupportinconformitywiththisCode.Thelegitimeofeachillegitimatechildshallconsistofone
halfofthelegitimeofalegitimatechild.Exceptforthismodification,allotherprovisionsintheCivilCodegoverning
successionalrightsshallremaininforce.
[50]
Id.
[51]
IntheMatteroftheAdoptionofStephanieNathyAstorgaGarcia,G.R.No.148311,31March2005.
[52]
Peoplev.Dolores,G.R.No.76468,20August1990,188SCRA660.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/123450.htm 9/9