THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.105827.January31,2000]

J.L.BERNARDOCONSTRUCTION,representedbyattorneysinfactSantiagoR.Sugay,
EdwinA.SugayandFernandoS.A.Erana,SANTIAGOR.SUGAY,EDWINA.SUGAYand
FERNANDOS.A.ERANA,petitioners,vs.COURTOFAPPEALSandMAYORJOSEL.
SALONGA,respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGAREYES,J.:

ThispetitionforcertiorariunderRule65seekstoannulandsetasidethefollowing:

1.DecisiondatedFebruary6,1992issuedbytheEleventhDivisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.No.
26336whichnullifiedtheorderoftheRegionalTrialCourtofCabanatuanCityinCivilCaseNo.1016AF
grantingplaintiffs(petitionersherein)awritofattachmentandacontractorslienupontheSanAntonioPublic
Marketand

2.ResolutiondatedJune10,1992issuedbytheformerEleventhDivisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.
No.26336denyingthemotionsforreconsiderationfiledbybothparties.

Thefactualantecedentsofthiscase,asculledfromthepleadings,areasfollows:

Sometimein1990,themunicipalgovernmentofSanAntonio,NuevaEcijaapprovedtheconstructionoftheSan
AntonioPublicMarket.TheconstructionofthemarketwastobefundedbytheEconomicSupportFund
Secretariat(ESFS),agovernmentagencyworkingwiththeUSAID.UnderESFS"grantloanequity"financing
program,thefundingforthemarketwouldbecomposedofa(a)grantfromESFS,(b)loanextendedbyESFSto
theMunicipalityofSanAntonio,and(c)equityorcounterpartfundsfromtheMunicipality.

ItisclaimedbypetitionersSantiagoR.Sugay,EdwinA.Sugay,FernandoS.A.EranaandJ.L.Bernardo
Construction,asingleproprietorshipownedbyJuanitoL.Bernardo,thattheyenteredintoabusinessventurefor
thepurposeofparticipatinginthebiddingforthepublicmarket.ItwasagreedbypetitionersthatSantiagoSugay
wouldtaketheleadroleandberesponsibleforthepreparationandsubmissionofthebiddocuments,financing
theentireproject,providingandutilizinghisownequipment,providingthenecessarylabor,suppliesand
materialsandmakingthenecessaryrepresentationsanddoingtheliaisonworkwiththeconcernedgovernment
agencies.

OnApril20,1990,J.L.BernardoConstruction,thrupetitionerSantiagoSugay,submitteditsbidtogetherwith
otherqualifiedbidders.Afterevaluatingthebids,themunicipalprequalificationbidsandawardscommittee,
headedbyrespondentJoseL.Salonga(thenincumbentmunicipalmayorofSanAntonio)asChairman,awarded
thecontracttopetitioners.OnJune8,1990,aConstructionAgreementwasenteredintobytheMunicipalityof
SanAntoniothrurespondentSalongaandpetitionerJ.L.BernardoConstruction.

ItisclaimedbypetitionersthatunderthisConstructionAgreement,theMunicipalityagreedtoassumethe
expensesforthedemolition,clearingandsitefillingoftheconstructionsiteintheamountofP1,150,000and,in
addition,toprovidecashequityofP767,305.99toberemitteddirectlytopetitioners.

Petitionersallegethat,althoughthewholeamountofthecashequitybecamedue,theMunicipalityrefusedto
paythesame,despiterepeateddemandsandnotwithstandingthatthepublicmarketwasmorethanninetyeight
percent(98%)completeasofJuly20,1991.Furthermore,petitionersmaintainthatSalongainducedthemto
advancetheexpensesforthedemolition,clearingandsitefillingworkbymakingrepresentationsthatthe
Municipalityhadthefinancialcapabilitytoreimbursethemlateron.However,petitionersclaimthattheyhave
notbeenreimbursedfortheirexpenses.[1]

OnJuly31,1991,J.L.BernardoConstruction,SantiagoSugay,EdwinSugayandFernandoErana,withthelatter
threebringingthecaseintheirownpersonalcapacitiesandalsoinrepresentationofJ.L.BernardoConstruction,
filedacomplaintforbreachofcontract,specificperformance,andcollectionofasumofmoney,withprayerfor
preliminaryattachmentandenforcementofcontractorslienagainsttheMunicipalityofSanAntonio,Nueva
EcijaandSalonga,inhispersonalandofficialcapacityasmunicipalmayor.Afterdefendantsfiledtheiranswer,
theRegionalTrialCourtheldhearingsontheancillaryremediesprayedforbyplaintiffs.[2]

OnSeptember5,1991,theRegionalTrialCourtissuedthewritofpreliminaryattachmentprayedforby
plaintiffs.ItalsograntedJ.L.BernardoConstructiontherighttomaintainpossessionofthepublicmarketandto
operatethesame.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionprovides:

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOINGDISQUISITION,theCourtfindstheauxiliaryreliefsof
attachmentprayedforbytheplaintiffstobewelltakenandthesameisherebyGRANTED.
Conformablythereto,letawritofpreliminaryattachmentbeissueduponthefilingbythe
plaintiffsofabondintheamountofP2,653,576.84toanswerforcostsanddamageswhichthe
defendantsmaysuffershouldtheCourtfinallyadjudged(sic)thattheplaintiffsarenotentitledto
thesaidattachment,andthereafter,theDeputySheriffofthiscourtisherebyorderedtoattachthe
propertiesofthedefendantsJOSELAPUZSALONGAandtheMUNICIPALITYOFSAN
ANTONIO,NUEVAECIJAwhicharenotexemptfromexecution.

CORROLARILY,theCourtgrantstheplaintiffsJ.L.BERNARDOCONSTRUCTION,
representedbySANTIAGOR.SUGAY,EDWINA.SUGAYandFERNANDOS.A.ERANA,the
authoritytoholdontothepossessionofthepublicmarketinquestionandtoopenandoperatethe
samebasedonfairandreasonableguidelinesandothermechanicsofoperationtobesubmittedby
plaintiffswithinfifteen(15)daysfromtheirreceiptofthisOrderwhichshallbesubjecttoCourts
approvalandtodeposittheincometheymayderivetherefromtotheProvincialTreasurerof
NuevaEcijaafterdeductingthenecessaryexpensesfortheoperationandmanagementofsaid
market,subjecttofurtherordersfromthisCourt.

SOORDERED.

Thetrialcourtgavecredencetoplaintiffsclaimsthatdefendantswereguiltyoffraudinincurringtheir
contractualobligationsasevidencedbythecomplaintandtheaffidavitsofplaintiffsSantiagoSugayandErana.
Thecourtruledthatdefendantsactsof"obtainingproperty,creditorservicesbyfalserepresentationsasto
materialfactsmadebythedefendanttotheplaintiffwithintenttodeceiveconstitutesfraudwarranting
attachment"andthat"adebtisconsideredfradulentlycontractedifatthetimeofcontractingit,thedebtor
entertainedanintentionnottopay."

Withregardstothecontractorslien,thetrialcourtheldthatsinceplaintiffshavenotbeenreimbursedforthecash
equityandforthedemolition,clearingandsitefillingexpenses,theystandinthepositionofanunpaid
contractorandassuchareentitled,pursuanttoarticles2242and2243oftheCivilCode,toalienintheamount
ofP2,653,576.84(asofAugust1,1991),excludingtheotherclaimeddamages,attorneysfeesandlitigation
expenses,uponthepublicmarketwhichtheyconstructed.Itwasexplainedthat,althoughtheusualwayof
enforcingalienisbyadecreeforthesaleofthepropertyandtheapplicationoftheproceedstothepaymentof
thedebtsecuredbyit,itismorepracticalandreasonabletopermitplaintiffstooperatethepublicmarketandto
applytotheirclaimstheincomederivedtherefrom,intheformofrentalsandgoodwillfromtheprospective
stallholdersofthemarket,asprayedforbyplaintiffs.

Thetrialcourtmadeshortshriftofdefendantsargumentthatthecasewasnotinstitutedinthenameofthereal
partiesininterest.Itexplainedthattheplaintiffinthecauseofactionformoneyclaimsforunpaidcashequity
anddemolitionandsitefillingexpensesisJ.L.BernardoConstruction,whiletheplaintiffsintheclaimfor
damagesforviolationoftheirrightsundertheCivilCodeprovisionsonhumanrelationsareplaintiffsSantiago
Sugay,EdwinSugayandErana.[3]

Thedefendantsmovedforreconsiderationofthetrialcourtsorder,towhichtheplaintiffsfiledanopposition.On
October10,1991themotionwasdenied.Thefollowingday,thetrialcourtapprovedtheguidelinesforthe
operationoftheSanAntonioPublicMarketfiledbyplaintiffs.

RespondentSalongafiledamotionfortheapprovalofhiscounterbondwhichwastreatedbythetrialcourtinits
October29,1991orderasamotiontofixcounterbondandforwhichitscheduledahearingonNovember19,
1991.

OnOctober21,1991,duringthependencyofhismotion,respondentSalongafiledwiththeCourtofAppealsa
petitionforcertiorariunderRule65withprayerforawritofpreliminaryinjunctionandtemporaryrestraining
orderwhichcasewasdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.26336.[4]Petitionersopposedthepetition,clamingthat
respondenthadinfactaplain,speedyandadequateremedyasevidencedbythefilingofamotiontoapprove
counterbondwiththetrialcourt.[5]

OnFebruary6,1992,theCourtofAppealsreversedthetrialcourtsdecisionandruledinfavorofSalonga.The
dispositiveportionofitsdecisionstates

FORALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisherebygrantedasfollows:

1.TherespondentjudgesORDERdatedSeptember5,1991fortheissuanceofa
writofattachmentandfortheenforcementofacontractorslien,ishereby
NULLIFIEDandSETASIDEthewritofattachmentissuedpursuanttheretoand
theproceedingsconductedbytheSheriffsassignedtoimplementthesameare,asa
consequence,alsoherebyNULLIFIEDandSETASIDE

2.TherespondentjudgesORDERdatedOctober11,1991furtherenforcingthe
contractorslienandapprovingtheguidelinesfortheoperationoftheSanAntonio
PublicMarketisalsoNULLIFIEDandSETASIDE.

PetitionersprayersforthedismissalofCivilCaseNo.1016(nowpendingbefore
respondentjudge)andforhisdeletionfromsaidcaseasdefendantinhisprivate
capacityare,however,DENIED.

TherespondentjudgemaynowproceedtohearingofCivilCaseNo.1016onthe
merits.

SOORDERED.

TheappellatecourtreasonedthatsincetheConstructionAgreementwasonlybetweenJuanitoBernardoandthe
MunicipalityofSanAntonio,andsincethereisnoswornstatementbyJuanitoBernardoallegingthathehad
beendeceivedormisledbyMayorSalongaortheMunicipalityofSanAntonio,itisapparentthattheapplicant
hasnotproventhatthedefendantsareguiltyofinceptivefraudincontractingthedebtorincurringtheobligation,
pursuanttoRule57oftheRulesofCourt,andtherefore,thewritofattachmentshouldbestruckdownforhaving
beenimprovidentlyandirregularlyissued.

Thefilingofamotionfortheapprovalofcounterbondbydefendantsdidnot,accordingtotheCourtofAppeals,
renderthepetitionforcertioraripremature.Theappellatecourtheldthatsuchmotioncouldnotcurethedefect
intheissuanceofthewritofattachmentandthat,moreover,thedefendantsmotionwasfiledbythem"without
prejudicetothepetitionforcertiorari."

Astothecontractorslien,theappellatecourtruledthatArticles2242oftheCivilCodefindsapplicationonlyin
thecontextofinsolvencyproceedings,asexpresslystatedinArticle2243.Evenifitisconcededthatplaintiffs
areentitledtoretainpossessionofthemarketunderitscontractorslien,theappellatecourtheldthatthesame
rightcannotbeexpandedtoincludetherighttousethebuilding.Therefore,thetrialcourtsgrantofauthorityto
plaintiffstooperatetheSanAntonioPublicMarketamountstoagraveabuseofdiscretion.

Withregardtotheallegationsofdefendantsthatplaintiffsarenottheproperparties,theCourtofAppealsruled
thatsuchissueshouldbeassignedasanerrorbydefendantslateronshouldtheoutcomeofthecasebeadverseto
thelatter.[6]

PetitionersarenowbeforethisCourtassailingtheappellatecourtsdecision.Intheirpetition,theymakethe
followingassignmentoferrors:

1.THEDECISIONISCONTRARYTOLAWINTHATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOVERLOOKED
AND/ORDISREGARDEDTHEFUNDAMENTALREQUIREMENTANDESTABLISHEDSUPREME
COURTDECISIONSINACTIONSFORCERTIORARICONSIDERINGTHATTHEFILINGOFTHE
PETITIONBYRESPONDENTSALONGAWITHTHECOURTOFAPPEALSISOBVIOUSLY
PREMATUREANDIMPROPERSINCETHEREADMITTEDLYEXISTSAPLAIN,SPEEDYAND
ADEQUATEREMEDYAVAILABLETORESPONDENTSALONGAWHICHISHISUNRESOLVED
"MOTIONTOAPPROVECOUNTERBOND"PENDINGWITHTHETRIALCOURT.

2.INCOMPLETEDISREGARDOFESTABLISHEDJURISPRUDENCE,THECOURTOFAPPEALSHAS
SKIRTEDAND/ORFAILEDTOCONSIDER/DISREGARDEDTHEEQUALLYCRUCIALISSUETHAT
THEQUESTIONEDORDERSARECLEARLYANDADMITTEDLYINTERLOCUTORYINNATUREAND
THEREFORETHEYCANNOTBETHEPROPERSUBJECTOFANACTIONFORCERTIORARIPROOF
THATTHEORDERSASSAILEDBYRESPONDENTSALONGAAREINTERLOCUTORYIN
CHARACTERISTHEDISPOSITIVEPORTIONOFTHEDECISIONWHENTHECOURTOFAPPEALS
SAID"THERESPONDENTJUDGEMAYNOWPROCEEDTOHEARINGOFSAIDCIVILCASENO.
1016ONTHEMERITS"PETITIONFILEDBYRESPONDENTSALONGAWITHTHECOURTOF
APPEALSSHOULDHAVEBEENDISMISSEDOUTRIGHTLYASSOUGHTBYHEREINPETITIONERS
INTHEIRVARIOUSUNACTEDPLEADINGS.

3.THEDECISIONISBASEDONFINDINGSOFFACTSANDCONCLUSIONSWHICHARENOTONLY
GROSSLYERRONEOUSBUTARESQUARELYCONTRADICTEDBYTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD.

4.THECOURTOFAPPEALSHASCLEARLYMISAPPRECIATED,MISREADANDDISREGARDED
HEREINPETITIONERSCAUSESOFACTIONAGAINSTRESPONDENTSALONGAANDHISCO
RESPONDENTMUNICIPALITYOFSANANTONIO,NUEVAECIJA.

5.THECOURTOFAPPEALSHASMADEERRONEOUSANDCONTRADICTORYCONCLUSIONSAND
FINDINGSONTHEISSUEOF"REALPARTYININTEREST"INCOMPLETEDISREGARDOFTHE
POWERSANDAUTHORITYGRANTEDBYJUANITOL.BERNARDOCONSTRUCTIONTOHEREIN
PETITIONERS.

6.THECOURTOFAPPEALSHASSKIRTEDTHEIMPORTANTISSUEOF"AGENCYCOUPLEDWITH
ANINTEREST."

7.THECOURTOFAPPEALSWENTBEYONDTHEISSUESOFTHECERTIORARICASEANDITS
FINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONSONISSUESNOTRELATEDTOTHECASEFORCERTIORARIARE
CONTRARYTOTHEPLEADINGSANDDONOTCONFORMTOTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD.

8.THECOURTOFAPPEALSHASLIKEWISEDISREGARDEDTHEPRECEPTTHATCONCLUSIONS
ANDFINDINGSOFFACTOFTHETRIALCOURTAREENTITLEDTOGREATWEIGHTONAPPEAL
ANDSHOULDNOTBEDISTURBEDSINCETHEREISNOSTRONGANDCOGENTREASON
WHATSOVERTOOVERCOMETHEWELLWRITTENANDDETAILEDANDESTABLISHEDFACTUAL
FINDINGSOFTHETRIALCOURT.
9.PETITIONERSHAVESTRONGREASONSTOBELIEVETHATTHEDECISIONOFTHECOURTOF
APPEALSWASISSUEDWITHSERIOUSINJUSTICEANDAGAINSTTHETENETSOFFAIRPLAY
SINCETHEDECISIONHADBEENKNOWNTOASITWASOPENLYANDPUBLICLYANNOUNCED
BYRESPONDENTSALONGALONGBEFOREITWAS"PROMULGATED"BYTHECOURTOF
APPEALS.

Thevariousissuesraisedbypetitionersmayberestatedinamoresummarymanneras

1.WhetherornottheCourtofAppealscorrectlyassumedjurisdictionoverthepetitionforcertiorarifiledby
respondentshereinassailingthetrialcourtsinterlocutoryordersgrantingthewritofattachmentandthe
contractorslien?

2.WhetherornottheCourtofAppealscommittedreversibleerrorsoflawinitsdecision?

Apetitionforcertiorarimaybefiledincaseatribunal,boardorofficerexercisingjudicialorquasijudicial
functionshasactedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdiction,andthereisnoappeal,oranyplain,speedy,andadequateremedyintheordinarycourseof
law.[7]

Theofficeofawritofcertiorariisrestrictedtotrulyextraordinarycaseswhereintheactofthelowercourtor
quasijudicialbodyiswhollyvoid.[8]Weheldinarecentcasethatcertiorarimaybeissued"onlywhereitis
clearlyshownthatthereisapatentandgrossabuseofdiscretionastoamounttoanevasionofpositivedutyorto
virtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepoweris
exercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonalhostility."[9]

Asageneralrule,aninterlocutoryorderisnotappealableuntilaftertherenditionofthejudgmentonthemerits
foracontraryrulewoulddelaytheadministrationofjusticeandundulyburdenthecourts.[10]However,wehave
heldthatcertiorariisanappropriateremedytoassailaninterlocutoryorder(1)whenthetribunalissuedsuch
orderwithoutorinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretionand(2)whentheassailed
interlocutoryorderispatentlyerroneousandtheremedyofappealwouldnotaffordadequateandexpeditious
relief.[11]

WeholdthatthepetitionforcertiorarifiledbySalongaandtheMunicipalitywiththeCourtofAppeals
questioningthewritofattachmentissuedbythetrialcourtshouldnothavebeengivenduecoursefortheystill
hadrecoursetoaplain,speedyandadequateremedythefilingofamotiontofixthecounterbond,whichthey
infactfiledwiththetrialcourt,thegrantofwhichwouldeffectivelypreventtheissuanceofthewritof
attachment.Moreover,theycouldalsohavefiledamotiontodischargetheattachmentforhavingbeen
improperlyorirregularlyissuedorenforced,orthatthebondisinsufficient,orthattheattachmentisexcessive.
[12]
WithsuchremediesstillavailabletotheMunicipalityandSalonga,thefilingofapetitionforcertiorariwith
theCourtofAppealsinsofarasitquestionstheorderofattachmentwasclearlypremature.

However,withregardstothecontractorslien,weupholdtheappellatecourtsrulingreversingthetrialcourts
grantofacontractorslieninfavorofpetitioners.

Articles2241and2242oftheCivilCodeenumeratescertaincreditswhichenjoypreferencewithrespectto
specificpersonalorrealpropertyofthedebtor.Specifically,thecontractorslienclaimedbypetitionersisgranted
underthethirdparagraphofArticle2242whichprovidesthattheclaimsofcontractorsengagedinthe
construction,reconstructionorrepairofbuildingsorotherworksshallbepreferredwithrespecttothespecific
buildingorotherimmovablepropertyconstructed.[13]

However,Article2242onlyfindsapplicationwhenthereisaconcurrenceofcredits,i.e.whenthesamespecific
propertyofthedebtorissubjectedtotheclaimsofseveralcreditorsandthevalueofsuchpropertyofthedebtor
isinsufficienttopayinfullallthecreditors.Insuchasituation,thequestionofpreferencewillarise,thatis,
therewillbeaneedtodeterminewhichofthecreditorswillbepaidaheadoftheothers.[14]Fundamentaltenets
ofdueprocesswilldictatethatthisstatutorylienshouldthenonlybeenforcedinthecontextofsomekindofa
proceedingwheretheclaimsofallthepreferredcreditorsmaybebindinglyadjudicated,suchasinsolvency
proceedings.[15]

ThisismadeexplicitbyArticle2243whichstatesthattheclaimsandliensenumeratedinarticles2241and2242
shallbeconsideredasmortgagesorpledgesofrealorpersonalproperty,orlienswithinthepurviewoflegal
provisionsgoverninginsolvency.[16]

Theactionfiledbypetitionersinthetrialcourtdoesnotpartakeofthenatureofaninsolvencyproceeding.Itis
basicallyforspecificperformanceanddamages.[17]Thus,evenifitisfinallyadjudicatedthatpetitionersherein
actuallystandinthepositionofunpaidcontractorsandareentitledtoinvokethecontractorsliengrantedunder
Article2242,suchliencannotbeenforcedinthepresentactionforthereisnowayofdeterminingwhetherornot
thereexistotherpreferredcreditorswithclaimsovertheSanAntonioPublicMarket.Therecordsdonotcontain
anyallegationthatpetitionersaretheonlycreditorswithrespecttosuchproperty.Thefactthatnothirdparty
claimshavebeenfiledinthetrialcourtwillnotbarothercreditorsfromsubsequentlybringingactionsand
claimingthattheyalsohavepreferredliensagainstthepropertyinvolved.[18]

OurdecisionhereinisconsistentwithourrulinginPhilippineSavingsBankv.Lantin,[19]whereinwealso
disallowedthecontractorfromenforcinghislienpursuanttoArticle2242oftheCivilCodeinanactionfiledby
himforthecollectionofunpaidconstructioncosts.

Itnothavingbeenallegedintheirpleadingsthattheyhaveanyrightsasamortgageeunderthecontracts,
petitionersmayonlyobtainpossessionanduseofthepublicmarketbymeansofapreliminaryattachmentupon
suchproperty,intheeventthattheyobtainafavorablejudgmentinthetrialcourt.Underourrulesofprocedure,
awritofattachmentoverregisteredrealpropertyisenforcedbythesheriffbyfilingwiththeregistryofdeedsa
copyoftheorderofattachment,togetherwithadescriptionofthepropertyattached,andanoticethatitis
attached,andbyleavingacopyofsuchorder,description,andnoticewiththeoccupantoftheproperty,ifany.[20]
Ifjudgmentberecoveredbytheattachingpartyandexecutionissuethereon,thesheriffmaycausethejudgment
tobesatisfiedbysellingsomuchofthepropertyasmaybenecessarytosatisfythejudgment.[21]Onlyinthe
eventthatpetitionersareabletopurchasethepropertywilltheythenacquirepossessionanduseofthesame.

Clearly,thetrialcourtsorderofSeptember5,1991grantingpossessionanduseofthepublicmarketto
petitionersdoesnotadheretotheprocedureforattachmentlaidoutintheRulesofCourt.Inissuingsuchan
order,thetrialcourtgravelyabuseditsdiscretionandtheappellatecourtsnullificationofthesameshouldbe
sustained.

Atthisstageofthecase,thereisnoneedtopassuponthequestionofwhetherornotpetitionershereinarethe
realpartiesininterest.IntheeventthatjudgmentisrenderedagainstSalongaandtheMunicipality,thisissue
maybeassignedasanerrorintheirappealfromsuchjudgment.

WHEREFORE,weUPHOLDtheCourtofAppealsDecisiondatedFebruary6,1992inCAG.R.SPNo.26336
insofarasitnullifiesthecontractorsliengrantedbythetrialcourtinfavorofpetitionersinitsSeptember5,1991
Order.Consequently,wealsoUPHOLDtheappellatecourtsnullificationofthetrialcourtsOctober11,1991
OrderapprovingtheguidelinesfortheoperationoftheSanAntonioPublicMarket.However,weREVERSEthe
appellatecourtsordernullifyingthewritofattachmentgrantedbythetrialcourt.

Nopronouncementastocosts.

SOORDERED.

Melo,(Chairman),Vitug,Panganiban,andPurisima,JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo,1619.
[2]Ibid.,6396.
[3]Ibid.,106126.
[4]Ibid.,128146.
[5]Ibid.,55.
[6]Ibid.,5262.
[7]Abadv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,286SCRA355(1998)RulesofCourt,Rule65,sec.1.
[8]Fortichv.Corona,289SCRA624(1998).
[9]Lalicanv.Vergara,276SCRA518(1997).
[10]Id.
[11]Pearsonv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,295SCRA27(1998)Casilv.CourtofAppeals,285SCRA264(1998).
[12]RulesofCourt,Rule57,sec.13.

[13]
Article2242.Withreferencetospecificimmovablepropertyandrealrightsofthedebtor,thefollowingclaims,mortgagesandliens
shallbepreferred,andshallconstituteanencumbranceontheimmovableorrealright

(1)Taxesdueuponthelandorbuilding

(2)Fortheunpaidpriceofrealpropertysold,upontheimmovablessold.

(3)Claimsoflaborers,masons,mechanicsandotherworkmen,aswellasofarchitects,engineersandcontractors,engagedinthe
construction,reconstructionorrepairofbuildings,canalsorotherworks,uponsaidbuildings,canalsorotherworks

(4)Claimsoffurnishersofmaterialsusedintheconstruction,reconstruction,orrepairofbuildings,canalsorotherworks,uponsaid
buildings,canalsorotherworks

(5)MortgagecreditsrecordedintheRegistryofProperty,upontherealestatemortgaged

(6)Expensesforthepreservationorimprovementofrealpropertywhenthelawauthorizesreimbursement,upontheimmovables
preservedorimproved

(7)CreditsannotatedintheRegistryofProperty,invirtueofajudicialorder,byattachmentsorexecution,uponthepropertyaffected,
andonlyastolatercredits

(8)Claimsofcoheirsforwarrantyinthepartitionofanimmovableamongthem,upontherealpropertythusdivided

(9)Claimsofdonorsofrealpropertyforpecuniarychargesorotherconditionsimposeduponthedonee,upontheimmovabledonated

(10)Creditsofinsurers,uponthepropertyinsured,fortheinsurancepremiumfortwoyears.
[14]PhilippineSavingsBankv.Lantin,124SCRA476(1983).
[15]Id.

[16]
DeBarrettov.Villanueva,6SCRA928(1962),citingtheReportoftheCodeCommission,provides:

"ThequestionastowhethertheCivilCodeandtheInsolvencyLawcanbeharmonizedissettledbythisArticle(2243).The
preferencesnamedinArticles2261and2262(now2241and2242)aretoenforcedinaccordancewiththeInsolvencyLaw."
[17]Rollo,3738.
[18]PhilippineSavingsBankv.Lantin,supra.
[19]Id.
[20]RulesofCourt,Rule57,sec.7.
[21]Id.sec.15.