Economic Viability of HTC and MTC Service

Provision on a Common Network Infrastructure

Angel Sanchis-Cano1,2, Luis Guijarro1, Vicent Pla1, Jose R. Vidal1
1
Instituto Universitario de Aplicaciones de las Tecnologas de la Informacin y de las Comunicaciones Avanzadas.
Universitat Politcnica de Valncia. Camino de Vera s/n. 46022 Valencia, Spain.
2
ansanca8@itaca.upv.es
3
{lguijar, vpla, jrvidal}@dcom.upv.es

Introduction Results Conclusions

THE Internet of Things (IoT) is a growing paradigm This section compares the baseline case against We have proved that the
where most common life objects are connected. the duopoly case. To obtain the results we vary coexistence between HTC
Under this paradigm, a huge amount of devices are the sensitivity of the users to the delay in the and MTC is only feasible in
trying to transmit small size packets and may cause packets mean service time. We obtain the va- a duopolistic scenario.
network congestion. lues for the users traffic, operators prices and
profits. The entry of a second
1.
Objective: to study the economic viability of serving
0.9



x m
operator to serve MTC users
both Human Type Communications (HTC) and
x
1

x

x

is desirable not only from
0.8
1 +2
x 2

Machine Type Communications (MTC) simultaneously
x

0.7 x

x

x

the point of view of resource
x

x
0.6 x

on the same network infrastructure.

x x x x x
0.5

0.4
usage efficiency and from

0.3


Contributions: to prove that the duopoly provision 0.2

0.1

the point of view of the users,
is economically viable and allows the HTC and MTC 0.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 but also from the point of
to coexist and to use an economic (game theory- Figure 3: Equilibrium Traffic - m is the baseline traffic, view of the two operators
based) model coupled with a performance (queue 1 is the HTC traffic and 2 the MTC traffic.
if a payment mechanism
theory-based) model for the scenarios. 1.
0.9

x pm

between MTCo and HTCo
0.8
is agreed. Furthermore, the
p1

p1
p2

Q1 - priority p2
x

0.7 x

1
HTC operator profit is hardly
x

x

0.6

x

x

x
0.5
x

x x x x x x x

0.4

affected by the entry of the
Q2 - ordinary

second operator.
0.3


2
0.2




0.1

0.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Figure 1: Two-priority queue model used to study the
different traffic profiles.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Prices - pm is the baseline optimal In summary, we conclude than
price, while p1 and p2 are the optimal prices charged to
HTC users respectively MTC in the duopoly case.
the HTC-MTC coexistence
service provision is feasible
Methods
1.2

m

and economically viable,
1.1

x
1
2
1.

1 +2

and more efficient than the

0.9

Game Model:
0.8
0.7

x

baseline scenario.
x

A Two steps Game Theory model is used to
0.6

x

x

0.5

x

x

solve the problem.
x

0.4
0.3
x

x

x

x

x

x x

x x

x

0.2

0.1
0.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Operators Pricing Decision
Figure 5: Equilibrium Prices - m is the baseline
operator profit. 1 and 2 are the profits for the HTC
operatorespectively MTC in the duopoly case.
Users Flow Subscription Decision Figure 3 shows coexistence is feasible in the
duopoly case and is more efficient in terms of
Figure 2: Economic Game Theory Model used to solve
the equilibrium
usage than the baseline case.
The game is solved through backward induction.
Figure 4 shows that when a second operator
Step 2 is solved first using Wardrop Equilibrium
enters into the market to serve MTC users the
and after Step 1 is solved using Nash Equilibrium.
price charged by both operators decreases, and
it is therefore beneficial for the users. Acknowledgements
Scenarios: This work was supported by the Spanish
Baseline case: One operator serving HTC flow. Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Monopoly case: One operator serving one HTC Figure 5 shows that HTC operator suffers a through projects TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R
flow and one MTC flow. negligible decrease in its profits when a second and (co-supported by the Europen Social
Duopoly case: One operator serving an HTC flow operator enters into the market. Also the overall Fund) BES-2014-068998.

and other operator serving an MTC flow. profits in duopoly are greater than in baseline
case, so opeators can agree a payment that
In the monopoly case coexistence is not reached. makes MTC operator entry desirable for both
operators.