J Bus Ethics (2014) 120:291311
DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1665-7
Culture Corrupts! A Qualitative Study of Organizational Culture
in Corrupt Organizations
Jamie-Lee Campbell Anja S. Goritz
Received: 27 September 2012 / Accepted: 1 March 2013 / Published online: 16 March 2013
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract Although theory refers to organizational culture
as an important variable in corrupt organizations, only little
empirical research has addressed the characteristics of a
corrupt organizational culture. Besides some characteristics
that go hand in hand with unethical behavior and other
features of corrupt organizations, we are still not able to
describe a corrupt organizational culture in terms of its
underlying assumptions, values, and norms. With a quali-
tative approach, we studied similarities of organizational
culture across different corrupt organizations. In this study,
we performed content analysis on interviews of 14 inde-
pendent experts about their experience with corrupt orga-
nizations. With this approach, we gained insights about
different corrupt organizations spanning different branches
(e.g., government, foreign trade, pharmacy, sports, building
industry). We found that corrupt organizations perceive
themselves to fight in a war, which leads to their taken-for-
granted assumption that the end justifies the means. This
assumption inspires many values and norms of the orga-
nizational culture. An important value in a corrupt orga-
nization is security, and an important norm is
punishment of deviant (i.e., non-corrupt) behavior. Fur-
thermore, managers and employees differ in their percep-
tion of organizational culture. While the management
J.-L. Campbell (&)
A. S. Goritz
Institut fur Psychologie, Abteilung Wirtschaftspsychologie,
Engelberger Strae 41, 79085 Freiburg, Germany
e-mail: jamie-lee.campbell@uni-wuerzburg.de
A. S. Goritz
e-mail: goeritz@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de
J.-L. Campbell
Psychologisches Institut Arbeits-, Betriebs- und
Organisationspsychologie, Roentgenring 10, 97070 Wuerzburg,
Germany
endorses values, such as success, results, and performance,
and implements these values in their norms of goal setting,
employees make use of rationalization strategies and
endorse values of security and team spirit.
Keywords Corruption
Corrupt organization
Employee
and manager values, norms, underlying assumptions

Organizational culture
Introduction
When looking at grand corruption scandals, we ask our-
selves: How could this happen? Why do employees support
corruption on behalf of their organization? As corruption
has become common practice in many business transac-
tions, it has become more and more important to answer
these questions (Transparency International 2011).
Employees who facilitate corruption on behalf of their
organization harm other companies for the advantage of
their own organization. As a result of corruption, the share
of companies that work inefficiently increases, which
harms the market. Market harm in turn damages the
national economy. Corruption undermines standards of a
healthy economy, transferring costs to everyone through
payment of taxes for inefficient firms and currency bail-
outs. To reduce these calamities, we need to increase our
knowledge of the factors that promote employee corruption
on behalf of their organization.
In this article, we take a perspective on corruption as a
customary group behavior in corrupt organizations instead
of an individual counter-productive work behavior in a
non-corrupt organization. We need this conceptual shift
because in corrupt organizations, employees regard cor-
ruption as useful and regular behavior, rather than as a
123
 292
crime or wrongdoing. By contrast, the research field of
counter-productive work behavior takes a perspective of
corruption as a crime or wrongdoing (Robinson and Ben-
nett 1995). In the perspective of corruption as a counter-
productive work behavior, employees enrich themselves
Dois nveis de
corrupo personally or their small immediate group at the cost of
nas their organization. Here, employees behave in a criminal
organizaes
way even though a more or less non-corrupt environment
surrounds them. In general, such organizations do not tol-
erate corrupt behavior and punish employees corruption
(Pinto et al. 2008). In corrupt organizations, by contrast,
employees do not enrich themselves; instead, corrupt
organizations expect their employees to facilitate criminal
behavior to attain organizational goals (Pinto et al. 2008).
Here, employees see corruption as a customary behavior,
and employees actually behave criminally in a more or less
corrupt environment. Moreover, employees facilitate cor-
ruption in collaboration with their colleagues for the benefit
of the organization as a whole (Palmer and Maher 2006;
Pinto et al. 2008).
O que so Corrupt organizations are organizations that systemati-
organizae
s corruptas cally receive illegitimate or illicit benefits such as advan-
tages in competitions or relaxations of political regulations.
Often such organizations are able to secure themselves
these advantages in both their own country and abroad,
because their employees act corruptly on a regular, col-
lective, and systematic basis (Pinto et al. 2008). These
employees plan and implement corrupt transactions,
uphold corrupt relationships and cover traces to protect
their organization. Although the corrupt organizations
themselves encourage their employees to engage in cor-
ruption, ultimately these employees achieve advantages for
their organization in an illicit manner (Pinto et al. 2008).
A corrupo The engagement in corruption of any particular corruption (MacLean 2008). According to expectancy
facilitada pelo
cargo que a employee depends on several factors such as his or her
pessoa department, latitude, and position. For example, employees
ocupa.
who work in the purchasing department may have more
opportunities to support corruption than employees who
work in the warehouse. In addition, employees often are
engaged in only a small part of a corrupt transaction
because the division of labor forks corruption into different
tracts (Sims and Brinkmann 2003). Because of the differ-
ences in department, latitude, position, and organizational
structure, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive over-
view of all possible work constellations of employees.
Similarly, it is difficult to identify all types of possible
corrupt practices. We therefore focus on different behav-
ioral patterns to explain a general influence of organiza-
tional culture on corrupt behavior, fully aware that our
picture is still incomplete.
2 tipos de Depending on department, latitude, and position,
envolvimento
do indivduo
employees engagement in corruption can be described to
em corrupo range between two poles of involvement. We call these
dependendo
do cargo
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
poles: active corrupt behavior and passive corrupt behav-
ior. Active corrupt behavior means that employees engage
actively in the corruption as perpetrators or accomplices.
This includes behavior such as negotiating insider deals on
behalf of their organization, doing bank transfers for
bribes, or shredding incriminating documents. Passive
corrupt behavior means that although employees are not
actively engaged in corruption, they tolerate the corruption
as silent observers. This includes behavior such as
abstaining from blowing the whistle when witnessing
corruption. We refer to all manifestations of active and
passive corrupt behaviors as corrupt behavior. In the
context of a corrupt organization, we refer to fighting
against corruption such as whistle blowing as anti-corrupt
behavior. In general, it is rare that employees in corrupt
organizations show anti-corrupt behavior.
In corrupt organizations, an employees corrupt behav-
O envolvimento
ior is affected not only by his or her characteristics but also na corrupo no
s
by his or her situation. Because so many employees comportamental,
mas
facilitate corruption in corrupt organizations, we doubt that SITUACIONAL.
all employees share the same personal traits that might
explain their corruption. Instead, we expect that corrupt
employees share some situational aspects in their daily Comear os
work conditions that are conducive to corruption. Research slides com a
premissa de que
refers to organizational culture as one major situational a CO um
aspecto
aspect that affects employees corrupt behavior (Ashforth situacional que
leva ao
et al. 2008; Beenen and Pinto 2009; Dahling et al. 2012; comportamento
corrupto.
Kaptein 2011a; Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; Levine 2005;
MacLean 2008; Pinto et al. 2008; Sims and Brinkmann
2003). Although we know about this influence of organi-
zational culture, we still do not know if there are specific
characteristics of organizational culture in corrupt organi-
zations that may explain how it influences employees
theory, employees behavior depends on employees sub-
jective perception that their behavior will attain specific
results. Furthermore, employees also look at the conse-
quences that follow these results (see Andre 2008).
Accordingly, employees show the behavior that has the
highest likelihood of attaining desired results and conse-
quences (e.g., rewards alter employees outcome expec-
tancy of ethical decision making; see Trevino and
Youngblood 1990). Organizational culture impacts
employees perception of results and consequences and
thus influences employees to behave in a particular manner.
In corrupt organizations, employees might perceive posi-
tive results and consequences such as receiving a bonus or
promotion if they behave corruptly. Furthermore,
employees might perceive negative consequences for an-
ticorrupt behavior such as social exclusion, retaliation, or
mobbing (Henik 2008; Rehg et al. 2008; Rothschild and
Miethe 1999). Therefore, organizational culture is likely to
affect employees corrupt and anti-corrupt behavior.
Culture Corrupts!
Although managers and employees share some of their
organizations culture in their daily work, they also face
unique aspects through their position and work conditions
such as work group influence and latitude that may dif-
ferentially impact their behavior (Trice and Beyer 1993).
Research has shown that managers and employees differ in
both their perception of and influence on organizational
culture (Schein 1992; Trice and Beyer 1993) and their role
in corruption in corrupt organizations (Collins et al. 2009;
Palmer and Maher 2006). Therefore, we assume that
managers and employees share some aspects, but differ in
other aspects of organizational culture.
To understand how corruption works, it is necessary first
to understand the characteristics of corrupt organizational
cultures and second to understand how organizational
culture shapes employees corrupt behavior. In this article,
we tackle these two issues by addressing three research
gaps:
(1) Several researchers have called for the study of how
organizations become bad and also of how organi-
zations get good again (Ashforth et al. 2008; Johnson
et al. 2011; Misangyi et al. 2008; Pfarrer et al. 2008).
As a prelude to answering these calls for research, we
think it is necessary to understand the situation in
corrupt organizations in more detail. In other words,
we need to know more about how corrupt organiza-
tions actually look like. To draw a more complete
picture, we need to study organizational conditions in
corrupt organizations on several levels. Once it is
known how corrupt organizations work, research is
able to focus on the organizational changes that take
place.
(2) Luo (2005) referred to organizational culture as the
moral tone [] [of] an organization (p. 145).
Research has described the moral and ethical charac-
teristics of organizational culture and climate needed
to prevent unethical behavior (Berry 2004; Kaptein
2011b). However, we know few characteristics of an
immoral culture. Organizational culture bridges the
process of normalization in corrupt organizations and
employees behavior. The process of normalization of
corruption refers to mechanisms that reshape and
reframe employees environment so that employees
perceive corruption as decent behavior and facilitate
it (Anand et al. 2005). Research on organizational
identification and commitment has identified immoral
organizational culture as an antecedent of criminal
behavior (Ashforth et al. 2008; Umphress et al. 2010).
Thus, organizational culture matters, but we still do
not know many systematic characteristics of organi-
zational culture that promote corruption.
(3) Considering organizational culture might give us
insights beyond existing models about employees
293
engagement in pro-social rule breaking to support
corruption. In other words: Why do employees
actively engage in corruption, or why do they not
blow the whistle (Beenen and Pinto 2009; Dahling
et al. 2012)? Within corrupt organizations, employees
view corruption in a positive light (Ashforth and
Anand 2003). Existing models such as goal setting
theory, management by objectives, charismatic lead-
ership, and the pressure and opportunity models do
not address the question of how employees perceive
their environment, and why these perceptions lead to
a positive evaluation of corruption. In addition, we do
not know how employees perception affects the
mechanisms postulated in these models. Organiza-
tional culture can fill this gap in showing what
assumptions, values, and norms are conducive to
corruption.
Objetivo 1:
With the current study, we focus on organizational compreender
como as
culture in corrupt organizations to figure out what charac- caractersticas
teristics promote employees corrupt behavior. We study da CO em
organizaes
characteristics of corrupt organizational culture both in corruptas
promovem o
general and separately for managers and employees. Our comportamento
corrupto do
purpose is to achieve insights into this new and difficult-to- empregado.
study topic and to describe organizational culture charac-
teristics of corrupt organizations. Therefore, we chose a
qualitative approach and interviewed 14 independent metodologia
experts in different positions about their perspectives on
the culture in different corrupt organizations. These experts
include former CEOs of corrupt organizations, ombuds-
men, police officers, and investigative journalists. Most
experts had first-hand contacts with many employees on
the management and employee level of corrupt organiza-
tions. Furthermore, most experts saw behind the curtain in
different corrupt organizations of a diverse range of bran-
ches. Most experts also had been in touch with corrupt
organizations of different cultures and organizations that
work in international markets. We analyzed these semi-
structured interviews across cases. With our analysis, we
addressed both general characteristics of the organizational
culture of corrupt organizations and specific characteristics
of the organizational culture for managers and employees.
Theoretical Background
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture consists of a set of shared meanings,
assumptions, values, and norms that guide employees
behavior within an organization via explicit structures and
implicit conventions (Schein 1992). Organizational culture
explains why certain behavior occurs (Trice and Beyer
123
 294
1993). Scheins (1992) model of organizational culture
De onde
partem os consists of three layers: underlying assumptions, values,
autores:
Modelo de CO and norms of behavior. Employees share taken-for-granted
do Schein
(1992) / Teoria beliefs that address the self-concept of an organization and
da Identidade
Social its relations to the environment; these are called underlying
assumptions. The underlying assumptions guide and direct
employees thoughts and behavior on a fundamental basis
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961). Values refer to
employees shared ideals concerning work outcomes and
work behavior. These values guide how employees act on a
daily basis through standards (Stackman et al. 2000). The
manifestations of these values in implicit and explicit rules
of accepted behavior are called norms of behavior.
Employees share these norms at their workplace. We
address all three layers of organizational culture because
underlying assumptions constitute the basis of the values,
and the values in turn affect employees behavior through
norms.
According to Social Identity Theory, to create a col-
lective identity organizational culture affects employees in
a way that links their self-image to their work group (Andre
2008; Trice and Beyer 1993). Employees share success and
failure with their work group and feel a sense of belonging.
Furthermore, the fact that organizations are both person-
alized through and associated with work groups entails a
sense of belonging and identification with their organiza-
tion on the part of the employees (Ashforth and Mael 1989;
Moreland and Levine 2001). Employees identification
increases their commitment to their organization, which
increases their support of organizational goals and visions
in their daily work (e.g., performance increases; see Chang
and Lai 2002; criminal behavior on behalf of their orga-
nization increases; see Umphress et al. 2010). Employees
develop expectations about the role of employees, social
order, group membership, social relations, and work
coordination. Within each work group, employees establish
unanimity according to their expectations (Schein 1992;
Trice and Beyer 1993). Work group unanimity in turn
promotes the assimilation of new employees with their
work group and organization. Because employees identify
with their organization, the organization can shape
employees behavior through underlying assumptions,
values, and norms (Alvesson 2011).
Corrupt Organizations
In corrupt organizations, employees perceive corrupt
behavior as appropriate through three mechanisms: Ratio-
nalization, socialization, and institutionalization (Anand
et al. 2005; Ashforth and Anand 2003; Spicer 2009).
Ashforth and Anand (2003) described these three mecha-
nisms in their model of the process of normalization of
corruption. In rationalization, to act corruptly, employees
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
use arguments to reshape their perception about their sit-
uation. For example, employees might appeal to higher
goals such as the profit of the organization as a reason for
corruption (cf. Maruna and Copes 2004). These modes of
refora
justification for corrupt employee behavior buttress an
employees sense of righteousness. In socialization, work
groups use social influence strategies to introduce and
reinforce colleagues to facilitate corruption, such as with
gradual introduction to corruption (Chang and Lai 2002).
In institutionalization, organizations use work structures
that enable employees to act corruptly in their daily busi-
ness, such as work routines that involve corruption (Ash-
forth and Anand 2003). These work routines ease some
employees into facilitating corruption without always
becoming aware that they are doing something illegal.
Working individually and collectively, these three
mechanisms shape employees feelings, thinking, and
behavior to facilitate corruption at their workplace.
Because of their interwoven character, the three mecha-
casulo social
nisms form a social cocoon (Anand et al. 2005; Ashforth
and Anand 2003). The social cocoon consists of managers
and employees who share positive attitudes and behavior
toward corruption that differ from the negative perspective
that society holds toward corruption. Employees in the
social cocoon facilitate corruption, expect their colleagues
to act corruptly, and punish colleagues who refuse to
engage in corruption (Chang and Lai 2002; Greenberger
et al. 1987).
The Social Cocoon is Organizational Culture
The social cocoon is part of organizational culture because
it forms assumptions, values, and norms of employees to
support corruption (e.g., focus on particular values, norms,
and a special language to make corruption appear harmless;
see Anand et al. 2005). We refer to the organizational CO da corrupo
culture perspective of the social cocoon as corrupt orga-
nizational culture. This corrupt organizational culture has
the purpose to ensure employees support of corruption.
Therefore, corrupt organizational culture needs to address
work-related values and norms of work groups, and it
includes organizations expectation of employees corrup-
tion. Sometimes corrupt organizations install and commu-
nicate ethical values to their employees by means of a code
of conduct (e.g., Siemens). In defiance of this code of
conduct, corrupt organizations expect their employees to
actually support corruption. Thus, corrupt organizations
provide contradictory information to their employees along
the lines of We follow ethical values, but in fact, we do
not care. When employees work in this ambiguity, they
need guidelines that change their perception to support
corrupt behavior. Therefore, a corrupt organizational cul-
ture reinforces the weight of the message we do not care
 Culture Corrupts!
and builds a frame that covers the ambiguity. Accordingly,
research has revealed mixed effects of a code of conduct or
code of ethics on perceptions, intentions, and ethical
behavior (cf. Craft 2012; Kaptein and Schwartz 2008;
Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; OFallon and Butterfield 2005) as
well as on corruption (Rabl 2011). In addition, researchers
call for a strong organizational culture to reduce unethical
behavior implies that corrupt organizational culture actu-
ally emphasizes different values. This is-ought-discrepancy
becomes more tangible if we consider the following: (1)
The degree of ethical distance affects employees corrup-
tion (Zyglidopoulos and Fleming 2008). (2) Rewards,
sanction systems and actual work conditions (e.g., behavior
of colleagues, communication about ethics, group influ-
ence) promote unethical decision making (Tenbrunsel and
Messick 1999; Trevino et al. 2006). (3) Employees are
often not aware of any wrongdoing and behave in a
thoughtless and careless way (see Ethical blindness;
cegueira tica Palazzo et al. 2012). Ethical blindness means that
employees are not aware that what they do is criminal
(Palazzo et al. 2012). Organizational norms, language, and
o que leva
cegueira tica collective sense-making can foster employees ethical
blindness. The mixed effects of a code of conduct or code
of ethics on perceptions, intentions, and ethical behavior
become explainable if we take into account that the culture
in some organizations actually supports corruption.
Because different corrupt organizations establish and
maintain the social cocoon with similar rationalization,
socialization, and institutionalization mechanisms
(Ashforth and Anand 2003), we suggest that the cultures in
corrupt organizations resemble each other in underlying
assumptions, values, and norms. We consider these possi-
ble similarities among corrupt organizations as general
characteristics of corrupt organizational culture. In our first
research question, we address characteristics of the corrupt
organizational culture.
Research question I What are the characteristics of the
culture in corrupt organizations?
Two Levels of Organizational Culture
Two systems of behavioral control affect ethical and
unethical behaviors (Trevino et al. 2001): a formal system
and an informal system of control. Managers and employees
implement these two systems of control. The formal system
of control includes all top-down processes in organizations
such as a code of conduct, leadership, and reward systems
(Trevino et al. 2001). The informal system of control
includes all bottom-up processes in organizations such as the
work group influence and the ethical climate within organi-
zations (Trevino et al. 2001). Both systems of control shape
employees perception of appropriate behavior through
295
incentives and sanctions. In the formal system, managers
papel do lder na
form and maintain the social cocoon through their top-down corrupo
control and incentive mechanisms to guide employees
behavior. Leaders establish an environment that facilitates
corruption by inhibiting decent behavior through rewards
and punishment (Pinto et al. 2008). In the informal system,
employees face corruption directly in their daily routines, for
example, by faking bills or dissuading colleagues from
whistle-blowing. Colleagues and work groups support indi-
vidual employees to facilitate corruption through rein-
forcement and punishment.
Because management primarily implements the formal
behavioral control system, we refer to this as the manager
level of corrupt organizational culture. Managers reinforce
corruption and extend their values and norms to employees
through their focus of attention, through how they react and
behave, and through whom they reward (Schein 1992;
Shover and Hochstetler 2002). We define the manager level
of corrupt organizational culture as all top-down processes
that affect employees behavior to facilitate corruption
within organizations. We refer to this perspective through
the three levels of organizational culture, namely, (1)
managers underlying assumptions, (2) managers values,
and (3) managers norms. We include all levels of man-
agers (i.e., top, middle, and low-level managers) as well as
all managerial behavior influencing corruption, such as
reinforcing and punishing behavior.
Because employees are the key component of the
informal behavioral control system, we refer to this as the
employee level of corrupt organizational culture. Employ-
ees reinforce and control underlying assumptions, values,
and norms to tolerate and facilitate corruption within the
organization (Cohen 1995; Lok and Crawford 1999; Spicer
2009). Within the work group, employees reshape and
reframe manager values and expectations through collec-
tive sense-making about their daily behavior (Trevino et al.
2001; Trice and Beyer 1993). We refer to this perspective
through the three levels of organizational culture, namely,
sustentar
(1) employees underlying assumptions, (2) employees
values, and (3) employees norms. The norms prescribe
employee behavior to reinforce and punish colleagues on
the same hierarchical level. The employee level includes
all employees in corrupt organizations except managers.
Managers and Employees Perception of Organizational
Culture
Managers and employees not only differ in their position
and latitude, but also in their work tasks, work processes,
and contact with corruption. While managers carry out
abstract tasks of control and regulation, employees carry
out concrete work tasks in their projects (Payne 2000).
These differences in work-related aspects entail differences
123
296
in managers and employees perception of the corrupt
organizational culture. Managers need to provide an envi-
ronment in which their employees identify with their
organization (Payne 2000) and support the organization.
Therefore, managers define and communicate goals and
create visions to ensure employees commitment to their
working tasks. In corrupt organizations, managers need to
communicate values that allow their employees to attain
corrupt goals. Moreover, managers need to create a pro-
corruption environment that makes corruption appear as
decent and customary behavior. Furthermore, incentive
systems and sanction structures need to be in line with
these values to guide employees behavior. Due to their
special position, managers may actively create a corrupt
organizational culture in terms of assumptions, values, and
norms that support the social cocoon.
Employees, by contrast, implement corruptive tasks in
their work routines. Through collective sense-making,
employees develop underlying assumptions, values, and
norms that promote employees engagement in corruption.
In collective sense-making, employees reflect on their
leaders expectations, their work routines, and their work
experiences to formulate rules and goals for their own work
(Trice and Beyer 1993). In corrupt organizations, while
realizing the necessity and importance of corruption,
employees need to ensure their own moral self-image and
at the same time continue supporting corruption. Individual
employees may need to assimilate to group norms, so that
all employees can overcome the feeling of doing something
criminal. Because of their special position, employees
perceive a corrupt organizational culture in terms of
assumptions, values, and norms that help them to overcome
a possible image of being criminal. Employees may
therefore rely on rationalization and coping strategies. In
the second research question, we address the issue of how
managers and employees perceive corrupt organizational
culture.
Research question II What are managers and employees
perceptions of a corrupt organiza-
tional culture?
Method
We collected qualitative data with semi-structured inter-
views. We opted for the qualitative approach for three rea-
sons: First, we deemed it necessary to gain a deep
understanding about this largely unexplored topic. The
qualitative approach helped us study the difficult field of
organizational culture in corrupt organizations. Through our
interviewees, we gained insight into different corrupt orga-
nizations and were able to analyze and compare their views.
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
Furthermore, only the qualitative approach allowed us to
stick to the original data as closely as possible and to gain
unexpected insights (Russel 2000). Second, our goal was to
generalize results beyond a single case study. A single case
analysis provides information about one or several particular
cases that depend on the particular conditions of those cases.
Because of these specific conditions, single cases are difficult
to generalize. We aimed at gaining knowledge of more
general situational conditions that are largely independent of
specific organizational conditions. Third, in the course of importante
collecting the data, we realized the difficulty of securing
cooperation from organizations to do quantitative studies
about this sensitive topic. We faced the problem that orga-
nizations are reluctant to potentially harm their image by
admitting to corruption. This reluctance might introduce two
problems: (1) A bias in the sample to be studied, as less
corrupt organizations and organizations that want to stop
their corruption might be more likely to participate in the
research. This could lead to an underrepresentation of highly
corrupt organizations and of organizations that want to
continue their corruption. (2) To protect themselves, par-
ticipating organizations might provide restricted or embel-
lished information about their processes and organizational
culture. For example, participating organizations might
assign an atypically loyal employee to the interview.
Moreover, participating organizations might control the
information divulged. To circumvent these dangers to
validity when interviewing the organizations directly, we
conducted interviews with independent experts about cor-
ruption. Independent experts have insight into different
corrupt organizations and can compare these organizations
without any conflict of interest. By means of this cross-case
approach and our wide array of interviewees, we were able to
analyze similarities among different corrupt organizations
(Miles and Huberman 1994).
We chose a deductive approach to analyze organiza-
tional culture in different contexts. We transferred theo-
retical knowledge about corruption into codes and looked if
these codes emerged in the interviews (Anand et al. 2005;
Ashforth and Anand 2003; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
1961; Pinto et al. 2008). We focused on the use of different
rationalization strategies, as well as every possible under-
lying assumption, value, and norm in corrupt organizations.
importante
We analyzed underlying assumptions, values, and norms
according to their occurrence in the interviews.
Interviews
We designed our interviewee acquisition to obtain a wide
range of views into corrupt organizations and corruption. In
our opinion, similarities across different organizations point
to general mechanisms in corrupt organizations. We inter-
viewed 14 independent experts from Germany, Austria, and
Culture Corrupts!
the USA about their experiences with corruption in organi-
zations. Our interviewees were on average 53 years old
(range: 3267 years) and had on average contact with cor-
ruption for 12 years (range: 128 years). Eleven intervie-
wees were men, and three interviewees were women. Two
interviewees had had only indirect contact with corruption
(i.e., they dealt with corruption in reading literature or doing
research). Four interviewees had had only direct contact with
corruption (i.e., they dealt with corruption in working with
corrupt organizations, having contact with corrupt employ-
ees). Eight interviewees had had both indirect and direct
contact with corruption. Several interviewees had contact
with employees (7 interviewees) and lower, middle, and
upper level managers (11 interviewees) of corrupt organi-
zations. Beyond this, eight interviewees had had additional
contact with freelancers or consultants, and four intervie-
wees had had contact with corrupt business associates, sup-
pliers, entrepreneurs, politicians or others. Our interviewees
had contact with corrupt individuals in the following bran-
ches: civil service (13 interviewees), private business in
different branches for example sports, media, electronics,
and production (13 interviewees). Furthermore, most inter-
viewees had knowledge about corruption in Germany and at
least in one other country. These countries were countries in
Europe, for example, Greece and Italy (3 interviewees),
countries in Asia such as China, India, and Thailand (6 in-
terviewees), countries in the Americas such as USA, Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico (4 interviewees), Balkan countries
and former GUS states such as the Ukraine, Kosovo, and
Rumania (4 interviewees) and other countries such as Afri-
can countries and countries in the Middle East (6 intervie-
wees). We conducted the interviews between January and
June 2011 face-to-face or via Skype. We selected our inter-
viewees to obtain comprehensive insight into corrupt orga-
nizations. We chose experts with heterogeneous professions
whereby each one had witnessed different forms of corrup-
tion in several corrupt organizations (see Table 1). More-
over, to determine the reliability of each professions view on
corruption we interviewed two experts of the same profes-
sion. Through this wide array of professions, we were able to
elicit information about corrupt organizations that were
involved in different kinds of corruption (i.e., bribery, fraud,
insider dealing, nepotism).
Each semi-structured interview lasted between 45 min
and 2.5 h and covered the following topics: characteristics
and similarities of corrupt organizations as well as underly-
ing assumptions, values, and norms on the managerial and
employee level (see Appendix A for interview questions).
Data Analysis
We designed the interview with the intention of addressing
the two levels of organizational culture and their three
297
different layers separately. The interview questions were
discussed in a plenum consisting of professors, doctoral importante
candidates, and master students in the field of psychology.
All interviews were recorded on a voice recorder and after-
ward transcribed. We formulated six theory-driven coding
categories. The six code categories (see Table 2) consist of
the three organizational culture layers: underlying assump- importante
tions, values, and norms (Schein 1992) broken down by two
levels: manager and employee levels (Trevino et al. 2001).
Within the six categories, we not only formulated theo-
retically informed codes, but also used some open coding to a posteriori
remain responsive to emerging themes. This mixture
allowed us to analyze the interviews in a systematic manner
and to discover new issues (Miles and Hubermann 1994;
Namey et al. 2008). Students tested the established codes as
well as the newly developed codes as part of a university
course. Teams of two students coded the interviews using the
single word or word phrases as the code unit. For transpar-
ency, Table 3 reports all codes with their description and the
number of references made to these codes. Please keep in
mind that the mere number of references provides limited
information on the importance or validity of a code as we (1)
interviewed heterogeneous experts from different fields with
different insights to get an overview of different organiza-
tions. We selected experts that complement each other rather
than whose views could be added up. (2) Across particular
codes, interviewees had insights of different depths. For
example, only a few interviewees referred to codes of
underlying assumptions. Because underlying assumptions
are taken-for-granted entities, it is difficult to verbalize them
or to perceive them in the first place. Reasons (1) and (2)
explain why not all interviewees referred to all codes. In a
final step, we used the program MAXQDAplus Version 10 to
compare the codes obtained in the university course with the
codes independently obtained by one researcher.
In our analysis, we focused on both code occurrence and
code connection. We differentiated between the coding and
the analysis of code connections. To reduce researcher
bias, we decided to stick to the original data as close as
possible. First, we chose single words and word phrases as
code unit for all codes (see Table 3). Second, to analyze
how these codes are connected, we analyzed how our in-
terviewees connected the codes in their own words. We
defined code connection on the semantic level in the
interviews according to the following pattern:
(1) If experts combined two codes with an and, then we
considered them as related.
(2) If experts combined two codes with if,then, or
because, then we considered them as directionally
related.
(3) If experts combined two codes with an or, then we
considered them as two distinct constructs.
123
298 J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz

Table 1 Interviewee characteristics

Current profession n Country Former profession(s)a

Consultant 2 Germany State attorney, judge

Investigative journalist 2 Germany
Judge 1 Germany State attorney
b
Member of TI 1 Germany
Ombudsman 2 Germany State attorney, president of the police
Police officer 1 Germany
Scientist (from different fields of science, namely 3 Germany
management, sociology and economics)
Unknown 2 Austria, USA CEOs of a corrupt organizationc
The different former and current professions of our interviewees. Empty cells refer to the incident that we lack information about former or
current job positions
a
Refers to professions that one or both interviewees had in the past. In each of these professions, they had contact with corrupt organizations
b
Transparency International, German chapter
c
To ensure anonymity, we do not share the name of any organization

Table 2 Code categories according to the level and layer of organizational culture
Underlying assumptions Values Norms

Manager level Underlying assumption held by managers Value of managers Behavioral norm of managers
Employee level Underlying assumption held by employees Value of employees Behavioral norm of employees

For example, we had the following sentence: [the Underlying Assumptions

organization] put executives under extreme pressure to observar se vai aparecer a cultura do silncio, a negao. Sim, no Employees level.

meet earnings targets and its almost like the fog of war.
In a first step, we coded the words earnings targets as the
code goals and the phrase fog of war as the code We
are fighting in a war. In a second step, after we coded all
interviews, we analyzed all codes according to how our
interviewees connected these. In our example, the inter-
viewee connected both codes with an and; therefore, we
considered both codes as related. Any code connection
could be established within one sentence or within two or
more contiguous sentences. The resulting code connections
are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
Findings
We address the two research questions in two steps: First,
we describe the underlying assumptions of corrupt orga-
nizations. Second, as underlying assumptions inspire val-
ues, and norms, we focus on values, and norms separately
for managers and employees.1
1
We translated all quotations (except our English interview) into the
English language. Furthermore, to ensure anonymity, we removed all
names of organizations.
Corrupt organizations perceive themselves to fight in a
kind of war. We came to this conclusion because of two
recurring themes in the interviews: First, we were surprised
that half of our interviewees (7 out of 14) quoted war
metaphors to describe work circumstances in corrupt
organizations. These war metaphors implied that corrupt
organizations perceive themselves as a military force rather
than as an ordinary company. According to our intervie-
sobrevivncia
wees, employees perceive their organizations as fighting
about contracts. Employees see competing organizations as
enemies that need to be defeated to secure the continuity of
their own company. The use of such metaphors on a daily
basis impacts employees perceptions of their circum-
stances and subsequently their work attitudes. In times of
war, everything is allowed as long as it serves ones own
survival. In line with this, individuals in corrupt organi-
zations change their preferences for and the importance of
values. While values such as success and security rise
in importance, values such as ethical judgment and
morality decrease in importance. The perception of war
might be a result of the known market conditions of corrupt
branches because high-pressure markets with low levels of
control put a great deal of pressure on organizations to
receive contracts (Cohen 1995). The following sample
quotations of our interviewees refer to war metaphors:

123
 Table 3 Codes of organizational culture (excerpt)
Underlying assumptions

Code name Code description Code unit Number

of codesa
Culture Corrupts!

Appeal to higher loyalties
(low level of) Awareness that
corruption is unlawful
Corruption is a matter of course
Human nature is evil
Humans have a submissive relationship
to their environment
Social weighting
The end justifies the means
We always were corrupt
We are a team and compete against
others
We are fighting in a war
b
Employees and managers argue that norm violation fulfills the purpose of realizing a higher-order value 40/7
(Ashforth and Anand 2003)
b
Employees and managers have a low level of awareness that corruption is unlawful. They do not feel guilty 26/6
(Maruna and Copes 2004)
b
Employees and managers take corruption as a matter of course. They see corruption as usual business 38/10
practice (Anand et al. 2005)
b
Employees and managers refer to the circumstances that the human being is evil and behaves evil 16/4
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961)
b
Employees and managers describe circumstances in which, employees and managers do not have any 7/3
control about their environment (e.g., markets, within their own organization). Employees and managers
feel that they need to tolerate their environment because forces within this environment have higher
power than they do (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961)
b
Employees and managers compare themselves with other corrupt organizations to reduce the focus of 22/7
unmoral behavior. This comparison can emerge in two forms: Condemn the condemner or selective
social comparisons (Anand et al. 2005). Condemn the condemner means that employees and managers
condemn other individuals who tell them that corruption is wrong. Selective social comparison means
that employees and managers compare themselves with individuals and organizations who are worse than
they are, so that they do not need to change anything
b
Employees and managers argue or mention that results are more important than the path to attain the 14/9
results. Statements that goals justify the means
b
Employees and managers refer to a tradition of corruption in their organization. They claim they have 18/6
always worked this way
b
Arguments and statements that employees and managers of the 19/9
organizations need to stick together in a team to compete against other organizations
b
Employees and managers use war metaphors to describe the 30/7
working conditions in their organization

Codes of the manager level of organizational culture

Values

Code name Code description Code unit Number

of codesa
c
Performance Managers expect their employees to accomplish high standards and goals 20/7
c
Results orientation Managers focus on the results of behavior, tasks, and projects. They do not focus on how employees attain 13/5
these results. Managers refer to the importance to attain results
c
Security Managers refer to security needs of the organization. Security addresses the continuity of the organization 14/8
and of employees jobs
c
Success Managers refer to success as employees goal attainment. This success is associated with profit, expansion, 41/9
and victory
299

123
 Table 3 continued
300

Norms

Code name Code description Code unit Number

123
of codesa
d
Goal setting Manager norms of goal setting. This includes goal setting for employees on all levels of the organization. We 42/13
coded the naming and description of goal characteristics as well as the reference to goal setting on a more
abstract level
d
Punishment Managers punish employees who do not facilitate corruption 19/8
d
Rewards Managers reward employees to act corruptly by means of material and immaterial incentives (e.g., bonuses, 37/9
promotions)

Codes of the employee level of organizational culture

Values

Code name Code description Code unit Number

of codesa
d
Security Employees security need includes their job security, the security of the jobs of other employees, and the 16/9
continuity of the organization as a whole
d
Team spirit Employees rate team spirit for their own work group or organization as important 16/7

Norms

Code name Code description Code unit Number

of codesa
d
Separation Employees separate their in-group (corrupt employees) from the out-group (noncorrupt employees). In-group 57/10
employees avoid sharing information about corruption with the out-group
d
Open secret Most of the employees note corruption within the organization but they treat it as a secret. Employees avoid 27/7
talking about corruption and support the secrecy of corruption through language and behavior
d
Organizational silence Employees avoid talking about certain things. They do not want to receive feedback on certain results or 24/9
discuss topics-related to corruption. A code of silence within the organization leads employees to cease
speaking about lots of things (Wolfe Morrison and Milliken 2000)
d
Coercion Employees force their colleagues to act corruptly or to support corruption in one of two ways: 8/6
-(1) Employees force colleagues not to question the corruption or similar themes.
-(2) Colleagues are replaced if they are whistle blowers. This is brought about by job quitting, relocation,
etc.,

The most frequent codes according to organizational culture level and layer in alphabetical order. To separate both levels of organizational culture, we used key words found in the interviews. If the interviewees referred to
top-down, leaders, leadership, CEO, management, manager, etc., then we regard this as an indicator of the manager level. If the interviewees referred to bottom-up processes, employees, work groups, colleagues, etc., then
we regard this as an indicator of the employee level. We categorized every sentence about its organizational culture level within the university course
a
In this column, we refer to (a) the sum of all references to the single codes, and (b) the number of interviewees who referred to this code. The total number of interviewees is 14. The numbers are presented in the following
order: sum of all code references/number of all interviewees referring to the code
b
Code unit was the single word. If the interviewees named or described the codes or used example of the codes, then we coded them. We categorized the codes according to the level of organization culture in managers
and employees
c
We coded single words or word phrases if they referred to any manager level keyword such as top-down, middle management, upper management, management, etc
d
We coded single words if they referred to any employee level keyword such as bottom-up, work group, colleagues, and employees
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
Culture Corrupts!
My people at [name of organization] are soldiers underlying assumption emphasizes not only the importance
We have to kill to eat. [][the organization] puts
executives under extreme pressure to meet earnings
targets and it is almost like the fog of war. When you
are in the middle of the battle, you are trying to defeat
the enemy
Second, almost half of our interviewees (6 out of 14)
described how corrupt organizations provide a win
win situation, because they connect the organizations
survival to the continuous employment of their employ-
ees. Through linking employees success to organizational
success, a corrupt organization takes advantage of corrupt
employees winning contracts just as employees assure
themselves of a secure workplace. If every contract and
advantage support the survival of the organization and its
employees, then it becomes necessary to secure as many
contracts and advantages as possible. In turn, every fail-
ure jeopardizes both the organizations existence and
employees jobs. This puts pressure on all employees to
attain their targets. Former research has shown that these
are typical working conditions in corrupt organizations
(Beenen and Pinto 2009; Cohen 1995). The continuous
threat of job loss combined with the perception of fight-
ing in a war combined with loose market regulations may
reshape employees perceptions of corruption. We refer to
this reshaping as employees perception shift. Perception
shift means that employees moral and ethical concerns
become less important than the concern to survive, with
the consequence that employees begin to perceive cor-
ruption as a positive behavior. The threat of fighting in a
war boosts an organizations performance expectations to
border on the unrealistic to ensure that the organization
wins the war. The perception of war is an external
pressure that allows employees to keep their positive
image of their organization because the organization
apparently needs to win the war to ensure employees
jobs. This positive image might increase employees
identification and commitment with their organization,
which in turn makes it more likely that employees sup-
port corruption.
Corruption is a good thing [] because it supports
the organization. And the rules prevailing on the
outside [outside the organization, for example, in the
market] are against the organization and are directed
to harm the organization. In addition, a feeling is
generated that confers to employees a sense of doing-
the-right-thing for their organization instead of con-
sidering their actions as morally wrong.
Based on the interviews, we found an underlying
assumption shared by corrupt organizations called the end
justifies the means (Beenen and Pinto 2009). This
301
of results, but also the non-importance of the process of
obtaining them. The end justifies the means has two
consequences: First, in the process of rationalization
employees fail to question organizational goals or work
goals (Ashforth and Anand 2003). Second, employees seek
the most effective way to attain their goals (Merton 1938).
This focus on outcomes undermines employees moral
standards and enables them to engage in corruption without
feeling guilty. Moreover, it permits every possible behavior
as far as it serves organizational goals because only
employees success counts (Cohen 1995; Merton 1938):
Well, I have to reach these results and nobody is
interested in how I do it; it is just important that I
reach them.
Because the focus on goals impacts employees, we
decided to analyze this underlying assumptions more dee-
ply. We analyzed the perceptions of our interviewees
according to the cultural dimensions by Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck (1961). Two cultural dimensions describe the
main perceptions of employees in corrupt organizations:
(1) human nature, and (2) human relations to the natural
environment. First, the human nature dimension pertains to
the goodness of human beings. According to our inter-
views, employees in corrupt organizations perceive human
beings as evil. That is, all individuals play unfair. This
belief may explain why employees expect everyone to
behave corruptly. Kluckhohn and Strodtbecks (1961)
second dimension pertains to how humans relate to the
environment in terms of control and power. We took the
original dimension, and transferred it to the organizational
setting. Thus, in our study, we focused on how organiza-
tions perceive their own relation to their market in terms of
control and power. Most interviewees (9 out of 14) indi-
cated a submissive relationship of corrupt organizations to
their market. Our interviewees referred to employees who
felt dependent on and trapped by the power of competitors,
market conditions, and corruption. Employees felt helpless
to fight corruption and did not see any chance of changing
the system.
[] I cannot change [the market conditions]. And if
we would change them, we would [] cease to
exist
If we did not join in [corruption], we could
announce our bankruptcy straight away.
The perception of an evil human nature and a submis-
sive relationship to market conditions may rouse the fear
that competitors will snatch away important contracts or
other advantages. Almost all our interviewees (9 out of 14)
stated that employees do not see any alternative to
123
302
corruption to attain their goals to help their organization.
The existential fear of employees may be a reason why
values such as fairness remain out of consideration. A final
point is the so-called community of fate. Our interviewees
described how employees of corrupt organizations see
themselves as a community of fate. This community shares
the same environmental conditions and need for its mem-
bers to rely on each other to secure its own continuity. This
interdependence of the group increases (1) commitment to
the group and its values and norms, and (2) pressure to
support the group (Turner and Haslam 2001). Taking the
assumption of fighting in a war into account, the perception
of employees as a community of fate is obvious. This
community pressures all employees to tolerate corruption;
any intolerance of corruption is taken as an indication of
being against the community. Employees punish others
who are intolerant of corruption, as seen in whistle-blowing
research (Rothschild and Miethe 1999).
Manager Level
We analyzed underlying assumptions, values, and norms
on the managerial level in corrupt organizations. One
finding was a decoupling between the code of conduct and
organizational reality. Behavior and values of managers are
largely detached from ethical values. Because managers do
not enforce and reinforce virtuous values, their employees
may not take the values serious because the lip-serviced
values do not have any consequences. Our interviewees
referred to this disconnect directly:
[] usually, these organizational values [] are not
linked to reward and motivation programs. [Through
reward and motivation programs] the company reg-
ulates direction and performance of their employees
[]
Therefore, to live up to the competition in the market
and to support corruption indirectly through a supportive
environment managers do not guide their employees to
follow virtuous values in their work (Brief et al. 2001;
Cohen 1995). This non-guiding might be a result of the
great pressure managers perceive. In agreement with the
literature, our interviewees described a huge pressure and a
focus on the value of performance (Beenen and Pinto 2009;
Pinto et al. 2008). Performance seems important because it
is necessary to attain goals. This pressure to perform
increases through the organizational system of bonuses,
whereby bonuses are granted to only a few managers, as
well as punishment if managers fail to meet their targets.
Furthermore, the underlying assumption the end justifies
the means informs managers norms of punishment. layers at the managerial level (see Table 3 for code
This means that managers punish employees if they do not
attain goals with any means they can use (Chang and Lai
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
2002, p. 28, named this hope for reward and fear of
punishment; Conger and Kanungo 1998). Through the
management bonus system, managers encounter competi-
tion among managers at the same level, and their own
promotion largely depends on their results. Therefore, they
use rewards and punishment to support their own results.
This huge pressure to perform combined with a focus on
results are antecedents of corruption and wrongdoing (e.g.,
Pinto et al. 2008, Schweitzer et al. 2004)
[] the bonuses [] [of management] are made
dependent on goal attainment. And [] executives
[] pass this on to their employees, since without
their employees they cannot gain their bonuses []
This focus leads managers to emphasize the value
results orientation more than anything else. We regard
results orientation as a central value because first, in-
terviewees emphasized its importance and second, we
interpret it as a manifestation of the underlying assumption
the end justifies the means. Both concepts focus only on
outcomes, are disconnected from ethical values, and enable
employees to facilitate corruption. Furthermore, our inter-
views revealed that the value results orientation con-
nects to other important values such as success and
need for security (see Fig. 1).
Managers pass on their pressure as well as their values
of results orientation, success, performance, and
security to their subordinates through goal setting,
rewarding, and punishing. According to our interviewees
and the literature, managers set their goals in a way that
these goals are only attainable through corruption, and they
distribute rewards in a supportive way (Pinto et al. 2008). If
results are crucial and only attainable through corrupt
behavior, then corruption becomes more instrumental to
employees. Two interviewees mentioned that organizations
pay a low basic salary and that employees therefore depend
on bonuses. Such combinations increase the pressure on
employees to support corruption. Furthermore, all manag-
ers are interested in employees results. Managers do not
show interest in how their employees attain these results,
and they punish employees if they are unsuccessful.
[] the connection of goals and corruption [is] a
subtle one, namely they [employees] have a very low
base income and based on that, very high wages,
depending on success. And since they [employees]
are on minimum subsistence or below without being
successful, in terms of their wage, then through their
own initiative, they will try to increase their sales.
Figure 1 illustrates connections among organizational
descriptions). According to the interviews, the connections
among underlying assumptions, values, and norms are
Culture Corrupts!
Fig. 1 Manager level of organizational culture. The figure shows the
manager level of organizational culture with our codes and their
connections. The left hand side shows the layers of organizational
bidirectional rather than unidirectional. This was expected
because of our focus on corrupt organizations. In corrupt
organizations, corruption is a matter of course. Within
these organizations, the mechanisms of rationalization,
socialization, and institutionalization are quite common.
We evaluated the end justifies the means, results ori-
entation, and goal setting as the main underlying
assumptions, values, and norms, because they had the
closest connections with other norms and values. Our key
findings for managers corrupt organizational culture are
the absence of ethical values combined with huge pressure,
outcome-focused rewards, and punishment norms.
Employee Level
We analyzed underlying assumptions, values, and norms of
employees in corrupt organizations. Our main findings are
the huge pressure employees face to attain their goals and
their use of rationalization strategies. Some interviewees
described how employees are not allowed to fail or turn
down unattainable goals lest they lose their jobs or harm
their career. These interviewees referred to different kinds
of pressures coercing employees such as time, goal, and
group pressures. Group pressure affects employees (e.g.,
mobbing) as well as coercion to facilitate corruption,
303
culture, the right hand side illustrates the codes of the underlying
assumptions, values, and norms (for code descriptions see Table 3).
The gray boxes designate important codes
because a corrupt organization connects employees goals
to the jobs of their colleagues. Furthermore, employees
intensity in attending to their tasks increased if we take the
background assumption of fighting in a war as well as the
community of fate into account. If employees goals are
only attainable through corruption, then employees require
much rationalization to reduce the cognitive and moral
dissonance of their behavior.
Strategies of justification among the employees are
quite common. For example, the assumption that
corruption supports the companys interests and
serves market laws [][the perception] that
employment is ensured by corrupt behavior and
similar excuses.
The most frequently named rationalization strategies
were: Social weighting, appeal to higher loyalties, and
corruption is a matter of course (see Table 3 for descrip-
tions). These three rationalization strategies foster the
normalization of corruption in organizations and the mar-
ket. We interpreted the rationalization strategies as addi-
tional underlying assumptions because rationalization
strategies address more or less taken-for-granted assump-
tions about basic circumstances. The underlying assump-
tion of the end justifies the means constitutes a guiding
123
304
principle connected with the social weighting rationaliza-
tion strategy, which in turn has multiple connections to the
other underlying assumptions (see Fig. 2). We concluded
that the underlying assumptions frame a reality in which
employees see corruption as useful and which supports
employees to interpret their own behavior in a positive way
(Brief et al. 2001). Because seemingly everyone is engaged
in corruption, corruption is not only a common phenome-
non but is important to secure advantages for an employ-
ees own organization compared to other organizations.
These relations are expressed in three underlying assump-
tions, namely: We are a team and fight against the others,
appeal to higher loyalties, and we always were corrupt.
The high amount of rationalization might explain why
employees have a low level of awareness that corruption is
unlawful.
According to our interviewees, the main values
employees share are security and team spirit (see nalization strategies influence each other, and we just
Table 3). The value of security refers to the need to keep
ones job. Employees are afraid of the insecurity of market
conditions and the risk of losing continuous employment.
The value team spirit may be affected by employees
perception of fighting in a war. Through the uncertain
conditions of war, employees need to stick together, which
increases the perception of a community of fate, which in
turn increases group coercion. Through this coercion,
employees face higher pressure to follow group norms and
to punish deviant behavior if the deviant behavior might
harm the group goal. This finding is also present in the
literature (Brucke et al. 2010), and as two interviewees
describe it:
[] It is a sense of community, a feeling of
togetherness, a confirmed fellowship, the pursuit of a
common goal, [] so that there is a communal spirit,
because these actions allow a better financial
endowment for everyone.
[] it is one for all and all for one. If you are a
military or a structured unit, you say one ought not to
do things like that [whistle blowing].
The work group seems to become so important that one
interviewee indicated that employees build up a close
shop. The employees separate themselves from non-cor-
rupt individuals and share their open secret of corruption.
Employees avoid talking about corruption-related issues
and use rationalization strategies. This might be because
employees often do not know where corruption begins and
whether they might speak about a taboo topic. Therefore,
employees avoid talking about work-related issues in
general (i.e., work processes, problem solving), which
leads to organizational silence (cf. Wolfe Morrison and
Milliken 2000). This organizational silence goes along with
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
the team spirit and the perception that employees com-
pete against each other. One interviewee described the
communication among employees about work-related
issues this way:
It is some kind of unexpressed code not to write it
[corruption] down in e-mails or things like that and
that nobody is having a closer look at. But not
because people are saying: Gee, that is criminal!-
Of course they do know that things around them are
not quite correct, but they do not want that stuff to be
talked about and to be leaked as a consequence.
Figure 2 illustrates connections among organizational
layers at the employee level (see Table 3 for code descrip-
tions). According to the interviews, the connections among
underlying assumptions, values, and norms are bidirectional
rather than unidirectional. This might be because all ratio-
focused on a cross-section of corrupt organizations. Single
interviewees indicated that the assumption of evil human
nature inspires the underlying assumption of social
weighting. This is because if every human is evil everyone in
the market supports corruption. Such a view makes it more
urgent to compete against other organizations.
Discussion
This explorative study is an attempt to study characteristics
of corrupt organizational culture. Our research topic is
difficult to address in several ways: (1) Corruption is
difficult to observe and difficult to measure because
participating individuals keep it a secret among themselves
(Collins et al. 2009, p. 90). This fact decreases possibilities
to meet corrupt employees and to conduct a field study. (2)
It is difficult to study corruption in existing organizations
because these organizations fear damage to their reputa-
tion. This fact renders it difficult to observe organizational
culture in existing corrupt organizations. Given both dif-
ficulties, we chose an interview approach to get in touch
with experts and learn from their experience with different
corrupt organizations. With our approach, we covered
different corrupt organizations and analyzed similarities in
their organizational culture. In addressing our first research
question, we found three main characteristics of a corrupt
organizational culture: the underlying assumption of the
end justifies the means, the value of security, and the
fact that employees punish deviant (i.e., non-corrupt)
behavior. In addressing our second research question, we
found that managers perceive a corrupt organizational
culture in terms of performance values, and employees
perceive it in terms of rationalization strategies. In the
remainder, we detail the main findings for both research
Culture Corrupts!
Fig. 2 Employee level of organizational culture. The figure shows
the employee level of organizational culture with our codes and their
connections. The left hand side shows the layers of organizational
questions, explain how organizational culture shapes cor-
rupt and anti-corrupt behavior, discuss limitations of this
study, and finally state the additional value of this study.
Characteristics of a Corrupt Organizational Culture
To answer our first research question of the characteristics of
the organizational culture in corrupt organizations, our
analysis provides the following characteristics: (1) Organi-
zations perceive themselves to fight in a war instead of
facing ordinary competition within their market. Due to this
war perspective, employees undergo a perception shift that
tinges corruption in a positive light. For employees, it is
important to receive contracts, relax regulations, or glean
other benefits for their organization to face the war.
Wartime degrades values such as fairness and sustainability,
and therefore corruption becomes an attractive behavioral
alternative. (2) In line with former research and backed up by
our own findings, we conclude that the underlying
assumption the end justifies the means is the key char-
acteristic of a corrupt organizational culture (see also Sims
and Brinkmann 2003). This teleological assumption merely
considers ends while disregarding means. This assumption
305
culture, the right hand side illustrates the codes of the underlying
assumptions, values, and norms (for code descriptions see Table 3).
The gray boxes designate important codes
directly and indirectly touches most rationalization strate-
gies, values, and norms. (3) Organizations value job and
organizational security and connect these values to unethical
employee behavior. Under the threat of unemployment,
corrupt organizations justify corruption to bring about a
winwin situation: If employees show corrupt behavior,
then they attain benefits for their organization, which in turn
ensures their job security. (4) Because organizational culture
does not reward or punish according to ethical values, ethical
values do not get reinforced on a daily basis. (5) Employees
perceive that they are a community of fate and that every
member who fails to support corruption harms this com-
munity and needs to be punished.
Managers and Employees Perception of Organizational
Culture
In our second research question, we asked how managers
and employees perceive a corrupt organizational culture.
We found different perspectives of managers and
employees. While managers perceive corrupt organiza-
tional culture in terms of high performance values, results
orientation and security needs, employees perceive corrupt
123
306
organizational culture in terms of rationalization strategies,
team values, and group norms. We will describe both
perspectives in more detail, and we will compare them.
The pro-corrupt environment managers create mainly
refers to the threat of fighting in a war and to the under-
lying assumption the end justifies the means. Both per-
ceptions allow managers to legitimize their unrealistic
goals including corruption and promote employees per-
ception shift. Because managers goals are a key compo-
nent in corruption, managers communicate values that
justify the unrealistic goals. These values are perfor-
mance, success, security, and results orientation. managers install an environment supportive of corruption,
Because managers communicate, reward, and punish their
subordinates in line with these values, these values impact
employees daily routine (see also Collins et al. 2009).
Furthermore, because managers do not link virtuous values
to the rewards and punishment they mete out, their
behavior supports corruption in a top-down manner. The
disconnect between ethical values and organizational
reality may also explain the mixed results in research on
the effects of codes of ethics.
Employees are able to uphold a positive moral self-
image despite their support of corruption because of the
assumption that their organization is fighting in a war.
Employees get accustomed to corruption in an environment
that includes on the one hand a threat of war and on the
other hand leaves only corrupt behavior to fight this war.
Furthermore, employees use rationalization strategies to
legitimize their engagement in corruption (Maruna and
Copes 2004) in their collective sense-making at work.
These rationalization strategies influence each other,
address aspects of the perception shift, and suppress devi-
ant opinions (i.e., that corruption is bad). Consequently,
employees consider corruption as necessary, customary,
and permissible, and therefore can commit corruption
without any sense of wrongdoing (cf. Maruna and Copes
2004). Employees emphasize two values, namely, team
spirit and security. Both values derive from the active corrupt behavior on the one hand and passive and anti-
underlying assumption that all employees are a community
of fate. This feeling of communion socializes employees
into corruption. Employees are urged to assimilate with
pro-corrupt values and norms, because they face pressure
to conform within their work group that represents the
community of fate in daily business (see Joshi et al. 2007).
This pressure on the employee level urges employees to
introduce newcomers to corruption and to reward corrupt
behavior (Anand et al. 2005). The value team spirit
influences employees organizational silence and coer-
cion. Organizational silence implies that employees do
not talk about work-related issues (e.g., they do not receive
feedback about their own work). Coercion implies pun-
ishment if employees show anti-corrupt behavior and
increases employees assimilation to organizational
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
assumptions, values, and norms. These values, and norms
make employees to support corruption or to keep quiet
when becoming suspicious of corruption. Finally,
employees perceive that the organization has always been
corrupt, and they separate employees facilitating active
corrupt behavior from others. All employees keep corrup-
tion an open secret throughout the organization and do not
feel that they support criminal behavior.
To sum up the perceptions of managers and employees,
we observe that managers and employees play different
roles in the process of normalization of corruption. While
employees implement work tasks directly in a corrupt
manner. According to the model of normalization of cor-
ruption, managers rely primarily on institutionalization and
employees on rationalization and socialization mechanisms
(cf. Anand et al. 2005). We see managers norms of goal
setting, rewarding, and punishing as a manifestation of the
institutionalization mechanism, because all of these norms
pertain to organizational daily routines and structures that
facilitate corruption (Anand et al. 2005). We further see
employees rationalization and the value team spirit and
the norms coercion and punishment as manifestations
of rationalization and socialization mechanism, because
through them, employees reduce cognitive dissonance and
increase social support. To sum up, the corrupt organiza-
tional culture is a manifestation of the three mechanisms of
normalization of corruption institutionalization, ratio-
nalization, and socialization that render employees
behavior supportive of corruption.
Organizational Culture and Employees Corrupt
Behavior
In this section, we describe how a corrupt organizational
culture affects employees corrupt behavior. We focus on
corrupt behavior on the other hand. With regard to active
corrupt behavior, organizational culture provides positive
values for perpetrators and accomplices. According to Rabl
and Kuhlmann (2008), individual corrupt behavior depends
on both subjective attitudes and norms. Managers values of
succes and performance reinforce employees to attain
their goals. In addition, employees encounter the threat of
fighting in a war. Both managers values of success and
performance as well as the threat of fighting in a war sway
employees attitude toward corruption (i.e., perception
shift). In addition, social norms of coercion and orga-
nizational silence sway employees norms to support cor-
ruption. We assume that employees norms of separation
and open secret lower employees risk perception.
According to Rabl and Kuhlmann (2008), subjective
Culture Corrupts!
attitudes and norms increase employees intention to
achieve their goals through corruption.
Moreover, rationalization supports active corrupt
behavior (Maruna and Copes 2004) and brings about eth-
ical blindness. Ethical blindness might occur because
employees sense-making does not question taken-for-
granted assumptions, values, and norms that are supportive
of corruption. Within work groups, groupthink might take
place, which allows employees to continue their active
corrupt behavior. The groupthink may include a rein-
forcement of rationalization strategies, the perception of
fighting in a war, being part of a community of fate, not
being able to change ones environment as well as
employees values and norms. All of them provide a pro-
corruption environment.
With regard to passive and anti-corrupt behavior, orga-
nizational culture provides negative values toward oppos-
ing corruption for potential silent observers and whistle
blowers. Silent observers witness corruption and remain
silent, while whistle blowers report the corruption. Vadera
et al. (2009) differentiated both forms of behavior in light
of employees identification with their organization:
Employees identification determines if employees whistle
blowing intention is enacted. Employees consider possible
consequences of their actions before they decide if they
blow the whistle (e.g., consequences for colleagues, the
organization, their own family). The perceptions of fighting
in a war and of being a community of fate shape how
employees appraise these consequences. In addition, sev-
eral other factors increase the likelihood of passive-corrupt
behavior such as unethical work group norms, punishment
meted out by the management, a climate of silence, and
low perceptions of ones own responsibility (Park and Keil
2009; Zhang et al. 2009).
If employees identification explains whether they blow
the whistle or remain silent, then we need to take organi-
zational culture into account. Through employees identi-
fication with their organization, it becomes difficult for
them to separate from and remain opposed to the system of
assumptions, values, and norms. Opposition becomes even
more difficult if employees have internalized the submis-
sive feeling that they are unable to change their environ-
ment. Research indicates that employees often feel
powerless in the face of corruption (Anand et al. 2005). To
step out of corruption, employees need to disengage from
the perception of fighting in a war and challenge their
community of fate. In addition, employees need to oppose
employees norms of team spirit, open secret, and acteristics of a corrupt organizational culture.
organizational silence. Their colleagues might evaluate
anti-corrupt behavior in terms of who is not with us is
against us because they refer to their perception of we
are fighting in a war. Through anti-corrupt behavior,
employees betray their own community, which might
307
explain the feared and actual retaliation whistle blowers
face (Avakian and Roberts 2012; Mesmer-Magnus and
Viswesvaran 2005). Anti-corrupt behavior is a threat to all
colleagues because it both damages the colleagues self-
image of decent employees, and might also cause col-
leagues unemployment. Furthermore, the socialization
process aims in the opposite direction (cf. Ashforth et al.
2003). In their description of how innocent employees
become perpetrators, Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008)
identify ethical distance and the division of labor. We
referred to this ethical distance in the disconnect between
ethical values and reward and punishment norms.
Independent of employees corrupt behavior, we need to
consider that employees are not used to talk about work
problems and issues (organizational silence). Further-
more, employees are used to their taken-for-granted per-
ceptions of their corrupt organization that provide an
unethical frame that complicates any awareness process.
Therefore, the question of employees blowing the whistle
or not might depend more on individual characteristics than
on situational aspects. According to Avakian and Roberts
(2012), employees are more likely to blow the whistle if
they compare their own values with their day-to-day-
behavior. Therefore, whistle blowing in corrupt organiza-
tions becomes the more likely the stronger an employees
personal morality, the lower his or her identification with
the organization, and the stronger their possibility of
questioning their daily routines.
Limitations
There are two main limitations of this study: First, we
interviewed primarily German experts who had contact
with not only many corrupt organizations in Germany, but
also some in other cultures. This might entail that we have
given more weight to a German-shaped view of corrupt
organizational culture. This raises the question as to whe-
ther our results primarily pertain to German perspectives of
characteristics of corrupt organizations, or if they are
transferable to other countries. Second, interviewees
answered according to their own experiences and knowl-
edge. This qualitative approach limits the generalization of
our results because organizational culture is much more
than the experiences of experts who work with corrupt
organizations. Nevertheless, our study demonstrates that it
is important to foster research about the difficult topic of
organizational culture and that there are particular char-
Added Value and Research Implications
Our study adds value to the knowledge base by having
addressed three research gaps. The first research gap
123
308
pertained to the lack of knowledge of how corruption
works in corrupt organizations as a precondition for ana-
lyzing change in organizations. Miceli et al. (2009) advo-
cated that organizations need to shift from a logic of
corruption to an anti-corrupt logic. With our study, we ronment, they might not understand why their behavior is
broadened and deepened the knowledge of what this logic
of corruption looks like. Through this study, we know that
a perception shift takes place on the part of employees. In
corrupt organizations, employees perceive themselves to
fight in a war, and they no longer perceive themselves to
work in an ordinarily competitive field. This perception
shift undermines virtuous values and norms within the
corrupt organization and might explain employees per-
ception of anomie. Anomie refers to dysfunctional cir-
cumstances that enable corruption in organizations (Martin
et al. 2009). Managers values and norms of corrupt
organizational culture are reflected in key aspects of ano-
mie theory (cf. Martin et al. 2009). Besides dysfunctional
circumstances inside an organization the authors identified
external forces (e.g., highly competitive markets) as rea-
sons why organizations change their structures, processes
and frameworks in line with anomie. Employees percep-
tion of war resounds with these external forces, at least in
the eyes of employees in the social cocoon, and therefore
this study provides new information about how employees
perceive anomie. Johnson et al. (2011) reported two stra-
tegic organizational culture dimensions that promote ano-
mie, namely strategic aggressiveness and short-term
horizon. Strategic aggressiveness means that organizations
exclusively focus on ends not on means. Short-term hori-
zon means that organizations focus primarily on short-term
goals. Values and norms of corrupt organizational culture
such as results orientation and goal setting correspond nizational culture. (2) Organizational culture links external
to the dimensions of strategic aggressiveness and short-
term horizon. The perception of war explains why
employees feel committed to these dimensions and how
they perceive anomie. Thus, in corrupt organizations that
want to turn good, managers and stakeholders need to
question and redefine their general perceptions. According
to the model of reintegration (see Pfarrer et al. 2008)
questioning and redefining general perceptions can take
place in the stage of explanation. In this stage, organiza-
tions ask themselves why corruption happened. To obtain
an adequate answer to this question, it is necessary to
question the perception the organization has of its envi-
ronment as well as the corresponding values and norms.
Only a deep reflection of underlying assumptions might be
able to spark a new ethical beginning. For this beginning, a
total overhaul of organizational identity is needed (Mis-
angyi et al. 2008). We wish to pick up an important point in
this process, according to Pfarrers et al. (2008) model. The
authors described that after sounding out the reasons of
why corruption occurred in an organization, stakeholders
123
J.-L. Campbell, A. S. Goritz
need to figure out what punishment needs to follow the
crime. We want to admit that any decision about punish-
ment needs to be taken carefully. Because employees
supported corruption in harmony with their social envi-
suddenly deemed wrong. When employees are punished
for behavior they have internalized as decent, they might
reject the punishment, and they might become even more
committed to their old values. Thus, organizations need to
establish alternative values and norms about corruption and
transition slowly from old values to new ones. In this stage,
it is important to show organizations behavioral alterna-
tives to corruption to master the pressures of their market.
As an outlook, we would like to draw attention to some
remaining open questions connected to the first research
gap that research may address in the future. The globally
relevant issue that many organizations have gone bad
shows the need to examine corruption more extensively.
Research should focus on questions such as when, why,
how much and by what mechanisms perception shifts take
place among employees in the process of an organization
turning corrupt. Another research question is how anomie
relates to the perception shift. In order that corrupt orga-
nizations become non-corrupt, research needs to look at
how change management addresses the perception shift.
Research also needs to find out the value and norm changes
that take place on bothmanager and employee levels.
The second research gap that our study answers is what
an unethical organizational culture looks like. According to
our analysis, there are four main characteristics: (1) An
external threat sparks the assumption that the end justifies
the means, which is the central tenet of a corrupt orga-
threats to basic needs of employees (e.g., security), and the
criminal behavior provides a solution to overcome the
threat and addresses these needs. By rewarding corrupt
behavior, corrupt organizational cultures determine how
employees perceive results and consequences of their
behavior. (3) The exclusive focus on financial results is an
important characteristic of unethical culture. Results ori-
entation combined with the assumption that the end jus-
tifies the means installs pressure and opportunities for
employees to support corruption. (4) In corrupt organiza-
tional cultures, there is a disconnect between ethical values
on the one hand and managers reward and punishment
behavior on the other hand. Through this disconnect,
managers do not endorse ethical values but support
unethical behavior. Future research might examine whether
the four characteristics revealed in our study are specific to
corrupt organizations or whether they are general charac-
teristics of unethical organizational culture.
The third research gap we addressed in this study refers to
the issue that taking into account organizational culture
Culture Corrupts!
might make us understand above and beyond existing
models why employees engage in corruption. We refer to
existing models in the following order: (1) goal setting and
management by objectives, (2) charismatic leadership, (3)
pressure and opportunity theory, and (4) other characteris-
tics of corrupt organizations. First, we know that leaders put
pressure on their employees via goal setting and manage-
ment by objectives to support corruption (Brief et al. 2001).
Organizational culture extends this knowledge by explain-
ing why and how employees identify with these goals and
support them despite a possible inkling that what they do is
corruption. Research showed that the identification with
goals is essential for employees commitment to these goals
(Schweitzer et al. 2004). As a result of the perception of
fighting in a war in combination with the end justifies the corrupt behavior and what kind of identification leads to
means, employees feel committed to their goals. Second,
charismatic leaders influence employees corruption (De-
Celles and Pfarrer 2004). Organizational culture explains in
what direction these charismatic leaders manipulate their
employees. To increase employees commitment to a cor-
rupt organization, charismatic leaders set up visions that
refer to war conditions, and they set goals that actualize
performance values. Third, the pressure and opportunity
model postulates that employees corruption increases if
employees face pressure and opportunity to engage in cor-
ruption (MacLean 2008). Employees weigh the costs and
benefits in their decision to support corruption. According to
MacLean (2008), organizational culture represents an
environment that impacts employees perception of costs
and benefits. Our study reveals in more detail how
employees perceive pressure and opportunities. Employees
perceive pressure from fighting in a war, coercion within
work groups, and from the community of fate. Employees
perceive opportunities to support corruption because of their
perception shift and the winwin situation corrupt organi-
zations offer. Fourth, concerning other characteristics of
corrupt organizations, we have discussed the social cocoon
and the disconnected code of ethics (Joshi et al. 2007).
According to Anand et al. (2005), the social cocoon provides
a pro-corrupt culture in organizations that allows employees
to socialize in corruption. In our study, we describe in detail
what this culture looks like. Through employees perception
shift, it becomes easier for employees to adopt values and
norms that support corruption and to work in the social
cocoon. Furthermore, we found a disconnect between ethi-
cal values and prevailing norms and values in corrupt
organizations. For example, window dressing can be ana-
lyzed through the disconnect between ethical values and
managers norms. With this study, we uncover the percep-
tion shift that explains why ethical values do not get rein-
forced in corrupt organizations. It is important that research
not only focusses on the existence of a code of conduct but
also on the connection of ethical values in the code of
309
conduct to reward and punishment norms of mangers and to
how the code of conduct fits to organizational culture.
As a general outlook on future research, when studying
active corrupt behavior researchers could examine how
employees values and norms influence subjective per-
ceptions of locus of control, risk taking, and ethical
blindness. Moreover, how does collective sense-making
include and address the perception shift? Future research
on passive and anti-corrupt behavior might examine how
employees identification with their organization influences
their decision to blow the whistle. For example, is
employees identification with their organization low
before or after they blow the whistle? In addition, studies
could make out what kind of identification leads to passive
anti-corrupt behavior. Furthermore, do some of the iden-
tified characteristics of corrupt organizational culture pro-
mote counter-productive behavior, as well? Finally, future
research should characterize concrete corrupt practices in
corrupt organizations such as bribery, fraud, insider deal-
ing, and nepotism. What are commonalities among these
practices, and how do they differ with regard to organi-
zational culture?
At the outset, we asked: How can grand corruption
happen, and why do employees support corruption on
behalf of their organization? We now know that employees
undergo a perception shift to perceive themselves as
fighting for their survival, wherein corruption provides a
decent means. Organizational culture provides a frame-
work that allows employees to uphold their moral self-
image despite being engaged in corruption. Corruption can
work because corrupt organizations implement a corrupt
organizational culture that supports employees corruption.
Appendix A
Interview Questions: (Excerpt)2
Topic: Organizational Culture in Corrupt Organizations
Are there specific values and assumptions in corrupt
branches?
Which similarities have you seen in different corrupt
organizations?
Topic: Manager Level of Organizational Culture
What are the most important values of the managers in
corrupt organizations? Why?
2
We translated all interview questions into English.
123
310
Are there differences between management values
shared within the organization and those presented to the
outside? What are the differences like?
Topic: Employee Level of Organizational Culture
Are there any recurring unusual statements of employees in
corrupt organizations, about their work conditions, their
self-concept, etc.?
Are there similar group or working norms in different
corrupt organizations? Which ones?
Are there group or work values supporting corruption at
the workplace? Which ones?
Imagine a corrupt organization. What kind of working
norms do you expect to find on the level of employees?
Which norms do you not expect?
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