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(In philosophy, naturalism is the "idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to
supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world."[1] Adherents of
naturalism (i.e., naturalists) assert that natural laws are the rules that govern the
structure and behavior of the natural universe, that the changing universe at every
stage is a product of these laws.[2] wiki)

(Positivism is a philosophical theory stating that positive knowledge is based on natural

phenomena and their properties and relations. Thus, information derived from sensory
experience, interpreted through reason and logic, forms the exclusive source of all authoritative
knowledge.[1] Positivism holds that valid knowledge (certitude or truth) is found only in this
derived knowledge.[2]

Verified data (positive facts) received from the senses are known as empirical evidence; thus
positivism is based on empiricism.[1)

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Whilst empiricism, and positivism more generally, locate causal relationships at the
level of events, Critical Realism locates them at the level of the generative
mechanism, arguing that causal relationships are irreducible to empirical constant
conjunctions of David Hume's doctrine; in other words, a constant conjunctive
relationship between events is neither sufficient nor even necessary to establish a
causal relationship.
The implication of this is that science should be understood as an ongoing process
in which scientists improve the concepts they use to understand the mechanisms
that they study. It should not, in contrast to the claim of empiricists, be about the
identification of a coincidence between a postulated independent variable and
dependent variable. Positivism/Falsificationism are also rejected due to the
observation that it is highly plausible that a mechanism will exist but either a) go
unactivated, b) be activated, but not perceived, or c) be activated, but counteracted
by other mechanisms, which results in its having unpredictable effects. Thus, non-
realisation of a posited mechanism cannot (in contrast to the claim of positivists) be
taken to signify its non-existence.)
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