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The United States and Bolivia
The Tamingof a
Revolution, 1952-1957
by
Stephen Zunes
33
34 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
contractforBoliviantinandfromaccedingto thesubrogation
to theBolivian
Government's MiningBankof certaincontractsforthepurchaseof tungsten
betweentheGSAandthethreecompanieswhichhavebeennationalized.
By buildingtheTexasCitysmelterandbuyingBoliviantinformanyyears,we
havediscouraged the Boliviansor anyothercountryfromconstructing a tin
smeltertousetheBolivianconcentrates. By preventing privatepurchasein the
UnitedStatesandremaining outof themarketforso long,we haveprevented
competitionfromdetermining the priceof tin. We have,in effect,usedour
stockpiletoforcethepricedown,sinceintheabsenceof thestockpilewe could
neverhaveheldoutas longas we did.
denied them any kind of aid thatwould raise the cost of importedcommodi-
ties (Wilkie, 1969: 92).
Jose Nufiez Rosales, as vice presidentof a government-runmining com-
pany, stated that Bolivia agreed to compensate U.S. stockholders "only
because Bolivia hadto eat."The leadingBolivian left-wing partydenounced
the agreementas "Yankeeimperialism,"an attemptto "starveBolivia into
submission" (NA 724.00 [W]/4-3053). The MNR ideologue Carlos
Montenegroaccusedthe United Statesof attemptingto "fosterthe oligarchy
and the enslavementof the popularclasses for the benefit of Wall Street"
(Weston, 1968: 97). The revolutionaryleadershipwas forced to rely on aid
thatrequireddepletingits resources(Eckstein, 1976: 45). The U.S. govern-
ment forced Bolivia to use its scarcecapitalnot for its own developmentbut
to compensatethe formermine owners and repay its foreign debts.
has sustaineda governmentin Bolivia which has now become strongly anti-
Communist.... The existing governmentin Bolivia originallyacceptedCom-
munistcollaborationwhen it took office in 1952. Since thattime it has aban-
donedthatCommunistsupport,andit demonstrated,in myjudgementbeyond
all shadowof a doubt ... thatit is now stronglyanti-Communist.
Thebolivianowasdevalued,andexport/import controlswereremoved.Price
controlsandgovernment subsidieson consumergoodswereremoved,while
wagesandsalarieswerefrozen.Toreducegovernment spending,educational
outlayswereslashed,theprogram of colonizingthelowlandswasstopped,and
werehalted.Practicallyall socialwelfare
diversification
effortsat industrial
allocationswereterminated.
Zunes/ THEUNITEDSTATES
ANDBOLIVIA 45
The effect was not only to redirectthe economic prioritiesof the revolu-
tion but to alterthe revolution'spolitical structureby effectively curbingthe
power of the trade unions and displacing socialist-leaning leaders of the
MNR. This was importantbecause it had become clearto Americanofficials
thattherehadto be some changesin the internalstructureof Bolivianpolitics.
46 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
U.S. diplomats and technicians were "quite free to give them political
advice" (Alexander,1982: 93). Even the more conservativeelements of the
party had serious reservations about this level of dependency, but they
believed they had no alternative(Dunkerley,1984: 85). Accordingto Wood
(1969: 24-25),
CONCLUSION
Blasier (1985: 53) has arguedthat "the Bolivian Revolution is the only
genuine social revolutionto which the United Statesprovidedearly and sus-
tained support"and that "theUnited States was deeply involved for a dozen
yearsin makingthe Bolivian Revolution'work."'Whathe does not addressis
for whom it was made to work, other than to acknowledgethat the United
Stateshada goal "of moderatingorderadicalizingthe revolution."Thoughhe
persuasivelyarguesthatthe MNR governmentduringthis period did repre-
sent an authenticrevolution,he also acknowledgesthat "fromthe beginning
U.S. influence has tended to check the natureand extent of revolutionary
change"(1985: 101).
In the end, the United Stateswas able to overthrowthe revolutionwithout
having to overthrowthe government.The reality of a high level of depen-
dency made it possible for the United Statesto steerthe course of the revolu-
tion in a directionmore favorableto its interests-a move facilitatedby the
MNR's predominantmiddle-class orientationand the inability of its more
radicalfactionsto dominateit. While the revolutionsucceededin undermin-
ing muchof the old orderby breakingup the haciendasystem andnationaliz-
ing the tin mines, it never succeeded in developing a new orderto take its
place. This made it possible, in the words of AnthonyFreemanof the State
Department'sBolivia desk, for the UnitedStates"tochannelthe revolutionin
constructivedirections"(Scott, 1972: 53).
48 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
The United States chose to influence the directionof the MNR through
large-scale financial supportto the revolutionarygovernment.Indeed, its
influence over the Bolivian governmentwas greaterthanit had been priorto
the revolution,since the old rulingclass-tied to the tin barons-had been in
conflict with the United States over the price of tin (Whitehead,1969). The
NationalSecurityCouncil saw the successful handlingof the Bolivian situa-
tion as a model (OCB CentralFile 091.4 LatinAmerica [File #3] [3], Febru-
ary 3, 1955, 8), and it was one thatwould be exploited to the fullest in Latin
America and elsewhere.
Scott (1972: 53) andothershavearguedthatthe UnitedStatescould toler-
ate the Bolivian revolutionbecause of the lack of large-scale direct private
investment in the country.However, the lack of large-scale direct private
investmentin Iranduringthe same perioddid not preventit from intervening
to help overthrowthe government,nordid the relativelysmall amountof U.S.
investmentin Nicaraguaminimizethe hostilitytowardthe Sandinistaregime
duringthe 1980s. In part, there was great concern over the precedentthat
nationalizationand other radical initiatives might set elsewhere in Latin
Americaandbeyond.U.S. perceptionsof the willingnessof the Boliviangov-
ernmentto addressthe nationalizationissue in what was consideredto be a
responsible manner,one in large part dictatedby the United States, made
such economic nationalismtolerable.
In many respects,U.S. policy towardBolivia provedto be a harbingerof
contemporaryU.S. policy towardLatinAmericain this age of globalization,
in which the so-called Washingtonconsensus, backed by U.S.-supported
internationalfinancial institutions,has institutionalizedeconomic leverage
to the pointthatmoreovertformsof interventionto advancestrategicor eco-
nomic interestsare no longer necessary.Thoughthe outcome of this policy
was not as dramaticas whattranspiredin Guatemaladuringthe same period,
the impact on the people of Bolivia in terms of the human costs of living
within a system in which once-promised social, economic, and political
rightswere subsequentlydeniedto the majorityof the populationwas no less
severe. With the globalizationof the economy, most Latin Americancoun-
tries now have as few choices in choosing their economic policies as did
Bolivia in the 1950s.
REFERENCES
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Zunes / THE UNITED STATESAND BOLIVIA 49
Andrade,Victor
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