reddit.

com/r/syriancivilwar 1 March 2017 Volume 3 Issue 2

THE WEEK IN REVIEW

SAYDNAYA MILITARY PRISON

INHUMANITY ON AN INDUSTRIAL SCALE

IN DEPTH UPDATES MAPS

SAYDNAYA MILITARY PRISON
IED AND MINE PROTECTION
ENGINEERING SURVIVABILITY
ENERGY AND INNOVATION IN DEIR EZ-ZOR
SYRIA'S UNREPORTED ENERGY WAR
PART 2
2016 IN REVIEW - SYRIA THE BATTLE FOR AL-BAB
ABU JABER AND HAYAT TAHRIR AL SHAM
A RENAISSANCE FOR THE REBELLION?
INTERNATIONAL
PART 1
EU SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
/R/SYRIANCIVILWAR
THE WEEK IN REVIEW INDEX AND MAP REFERENCE
Our team We are REGION LOCATION PAGE TITLE

PUBLISHER A weekly publication written and edited by MIDDLE Page 2 Timeline

EAST
/u/oreng the moderators and contributors Map ref 1 Page 4 Saydnaya military prison

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of reddit.com/r/syriancivilwar Page 6 IED and mine protection, engineering survivability

/u/AofB, @qamaamaalamriki Map ref 2 Page 7 Energy and innovation in Deir ez-Zor

DEPUTY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Social media Page 8 2016 In Review - Syria

/u/Naenil, @Naenil Page 10 Syria's Unreported Energy War - part 2
ART DIRECTOR
Visit us on social media or scan the Page 13 Abu Jaber and Hayat Tahrir al Sham, a renaissance for the rebellion? Part 1
/u/CIA_Shill, @scw_shill QR code: Map ref 3 Page 14 The battle for al-Bab
PHOTO EDITOR EUROPE Page 16 EU Security challenges in the 21st Century
/u/Status_Gruen /ScwWeekInReview
MANAGING EDITORS
Trenton S /r/syriancivilwar
EDITORS
/u/almshouse_coffee /week_in_review/
Andy Jackson 3
/u/CIA_Shill, @scw_shill
Erik Markus Kannike Email us
hivemind-nz
Vince Beshara Contact us by email at: 2
Matt M contact.weekinreview@gmail.com
/u/samsoninbabylon
Trenton S

SOCIAL MEDIA OFFICER

Ethics Statement
/u/almshouse_coffee The editors and contributors are all members of an online community
that has managed - some might say against all odds - to preserve a cul- 1
CONTRIBUTORS ture of inclusiveness, civility and mutual dialogue between users ranging
from the staunchest supporters of Syrias government to supporters of
Chris Gentry entities as diverse as the FSA, YPG, the Islamic Front, Western states,
/u/CIA_Shill, @scw_shill Israel and indeed the Islamic State.
This coexistence is made possible by active, often heavy-handed
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Zohan Tariq

1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2 1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 1

2 February
The Islamic State (IS) set ablaze the last
wells at the Hayyan Gas Fields after
the SAA and Hezbollah liberated the
strategic Jihar Crossroad, putting them
at the outskirts of the
Hayyan Gas Fields.
(Almasdar News)
4 February
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
backed by the US, have declared a new
offensive to capture Raqqa from Isis.
(Reuters)
01/02/17
5 February
Jordan said that its warplanes bombed
positions held by the IS in southern
Syria, two years after one of its pilots
was captured and killed by the armed
group.
(Al Jazeera)
7 February
Amnesty International accuses Syria of
hanging thousands of prisoners and
dumping bodies in mass graves.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 2
9 February
Three Turkish soldiers are mistakenly
killed and 11 are injured in a Russian
airstrike near the Syrian city of al-Bab.
(Turkish Armed Forces)
10 February
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
sought to convince President Trump in
a telephone call that arming Kurdish
fighters in Syria to fight the IS would be
counterproductive to the military effort
and damaging to already strained ties
between the United States and Turkey.
(Washington Post)
SINCE THE PREVIOUS ISSUE
Four Russian servicemen are killed
12 February
President Tayyip Erdogan said the final
goal of a Turkish incursion into Syria
was not just to retake the city of al-Bab
from IS, but to cleanse a border region
including Raqqa of the jihadists.
(Reuters)
14 February
Jund al-Aqsa and Tahrir al-Sham clashed
around Kafr Zeita in the countryside
north of Hama, and near Tamaniaa,
Khan Sheikhoun and Tal Aaas in
southern Idlib Province, said the Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights, a British-
based war monitor.
(Reuters)
Turkey-backed rebels have largely
taken control of Syria's al-Bab from IS
militants, according to the Turkish Prime
Minister, but a war monitoring group
said the jihadists still control most of
the city.
(Reuters)
15 February
A cease-fire brokered by Turkey and
Russia two months ago faultered along
Syrias southern border as rebel forces
launched their largest offensive in the
area in more than a year.
(Washington Post)
Monitors, activists and an aid group said
fighting between opposition and pro-
government forces raged for a fourth
day Wednesday in the southern city of
Daraa, pushing the number of dead and
wounded past 60.
(Washington Post)
16 February
by a roadside bomb in western Syria,
according to the Russian military.
17 February
According to a report released
by Human Rights Watch, Syrian
government forces used chlorine gas
to purge rebel-held areas of Aleppo,
killing at least nine civilians and injuring
hundreds more between Nov. 18 and
Dec. 9.
IS administrators and bureaucrats have
started to flee the militant group's
Syrian stronghold of Raqqa as a U.S.-
backed alliance works to isolate the city,
a Pentagon
official says.
(Reuters)
18 February
Turkey's military said it was close to
taking the northern Syrian city of al-Bab
from IS.
(Reuters)
19 February
Syrian government forces fired rockets
at a rebel-held area on the Damascus
outskirts on Sunday, pressing an attack
that began the day before and has
killed up to 16 people, a medical worker
and war monitor said. The medical
worker and the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights said it was the biggest
attack on the Qaboun area, to the
city's northeast, in at least two years.
(Newsweek)
The Iraqi air force bombed Islamic
20 February
Syrian government forces escalated
their bombing campaign around
Damascus, raining shells down on rebel
territory and sending out a "bloody
message" just days before renewed
peace talks in Geneva.
(AFP)
21 February
The US-backed SDF alliance has crossed
into Deir ez-Zor province for the first
time as part of an offensive against IS, a
Kurdish military source said.
(Al Jazeera)
23 February
After five months of intensive fighting,
rebels backed by Turkey said they had
recaptured nearly all of al-Bab, a key
target and ISs westernmost stronghold.
(The Guardian)
The first day of Syrian peace talks at the
United Nation in Geneva have failed
to bring government and opposition
groups together in direct negotiations.
Expectations were low as they arrived
in Geneva for the first time in almost
a year. Staffan de Mistura, the UNs
special Syria envoy, met separately
with both delegations, but they did not
speak with one another.
(BBC)
28/02/17
24 February
State targets in Syria, the first time the
government of Haldar al-Abadi has
admitted to targeting the group beyond
its own borders.
(NBC)
26 February
Deadly suicide attacks in the Syrian
government-held city of Homs threaten
to derail talks in Geneva. General
Hassan Daabul, an army intelligence
chief and close confidant of President
Bashar al-Assad, was among the dozens
killed in blasts targeting two security
service bases in Homs.
(Al Jazeera)
28 February
Russia and China have vetoed a UN
resolution to impose sanctions on
Syria over the alleged use of chemical
weapons. It is the seventh time Russia
has vetoed a UN Security Council
resolution to protect the Syrian
government. China has also vetoed six
security council resolutions on Syria
since the civil war began in 2011.
(BBC)
By /u/Status_Gruen
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 3

SAYDNAYA MILITARY PRISON
INHUMANITY ON AN INDUSTRIAL SCALE
Illustration from Amnesty International showing conditions within
the prison
Saydnaya is the end of life-the
end of humanity.
Saydnaya is a military prison located 30km north of Damascus,
operated by the military police under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Defense.1 In 2004 and 2005, many Islamist fighters serving with
al-Qaida returned from Iraq. Once in Syria they began a series of
bombings and shootings that landed many of them in Syrian prisons,
one of which was Saydnaya.2
Saydnaya has two buildings, referred to as the Red and
White Buildings which together can hold about 10,000-20,000
detainees. In 2008, a prison riot began when military police officers
aggressively attempted to search the Saydnaya compound. Reports
from inside the prison say that the officers beat many of the inmates.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 4
The prisoners responded by fighting with the police, and in the
ensuing clash the police opened fire and killed at least 25 prisoners.3
In 2011, faced with the nation-wide protest movement that eventually
led to the uprising, Assad offered some reforms in an attempt to stem
the tide. Most of these reforms were cosmetic, but the relevant one
in this case gave amnesty to all members of the Muslim brotherhood
and other political detainees.4 After the amnesty decree those held in
Saydnaya were all prisoners related to the Iraq war.
On February 6, 2017 Amnesty International (AI) released
a report detailing mass executions at the Saydnaya site. From their
estimates AI claims that 5,000-13,000 prisoners have been extra-
judicially killed during the period of September 2011-December 2015.5
AI conducted interviews with 84 former prisoners, prison guards, and
judges from December 2015-December 2016. Each interview was
conducted separately and AI required that any published details had
to be corroborated independently to assure accuracy.6 From these
interviews crucial information about how Saydnaya functioned can be
ascertained.
After the release of most of the Islamist fighters in May 2011,
the function of the prison changed, ceasing to be a typical detainee
facility and was converted to house enemies of the state. Unusually,
when the first group of detainees from the civil war arrived in July
2011 every member confessed to capital crimes such as killing a
member of the Syrian Military. As a result of these confessions the
detainees would be taken to a military field court where the trials
would last between 1-3 minutes. The verdict was always guilty, the
Saydnaya military prison
Alleged burial site at
Dumayr airbase
Burial site at the Martyrs Burial site at Nahja Cemetary
Cemetary 33.4114, 36.3697 33.3844, 36.3824
sentence was always execution. From there, the prisoners would be defector. That report detailed
returned to Saydnaya where they would await their deaths.7 mass executions committed in
the Syrian prison system. The AI
Through testimony, AI ascertained that the prisoners who report is also in line with a report
were selected for execution would be rounded up and brought to from 2013 from the Violations
the White building in the early morning. Sometime between 12am Documentation Centre in Syria
and 3am the prisoners would be hanged and then their bodies would which detailed the activities
be loaded onto a truck.8 From Saydnaya the bodies would be sent of Branch 215 of the Security Illustration of prisoners
to Tishreen Hospital for registration, and then brought to their final Service, known as Raid Brigade, in Saydnaya by Amnesty
resting place in mass graves around Damascus.9 Some confirmed and their participation in International International
mass grave sites include Nahja, and some suspected mass grave sites extrajudicial killings.15,16 The
include Qatana and Qalamon.10,11,12 Syrian Government has issued a blanket denial statement calling
the report politically motivated and untrue. The government
Former prison authorities informed AI that during the has stated that the death sentence is only ever given after a lengthy
beginning of the war the death rate was slower, about 14-20 prisoners judicial process.17
executed per month. By December 2012 through to December 2015
this number ramped up. Groups of 20-50 people were executed Despite their protests it is clear that the Syrian government
one to two times per week.13 Given this rate AIs estimate seems is operating a facility to extra-judicially kill prisoners in Saydnaya, and
reasonable. Since 2015 there has been no sign that the executions there is sufficient evidence that they at least tacitly endorsed these
have stopped. Prisoners are still sentenced to Saydnaya, the trials acts. It should also be said that the oppositions hands are far from
have continued, and it is likely that several thousand more have died clean, with the Syrian Arab Army previously finding mass graves in
since the interviews concluded for AIs report. sites in east Aleppo.18 We could not independently verify the death
tolls, but this is a clear war crime and its victims deserve justice.
All of the information found in the report is consistent with
a report from 2015 from Human Rights Watch which detailed mass
death and torture in the Syrian detention system.14 Most of the By Chris Gentry
information from that report came from the Caesar photographs
taken by a Syrian military police forensic photographer turned
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 5
IED AND MINE PROTECTION
ENGINEERING SURVIVABILITY
T o date, four ACV-15 IFVs operated by the Turkish Free Syrian
Army (TFSA) near al-Bab are confirmed to have been destroyed
by Improvised explosive Devices (IEDs).1 With mines and IEDs a
persistent threat on the Syrian battlefield it is worth examining the
mine and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) protection of tracked
and wheeled vehicles, which are employed extensively by all sides
in the Syrian conflict.
3 vehicles, it takes much more energy to get them airborne due to the
1 extra weight of their metal treads, wheels and rollers. Essentially the
2
Damaged ACV-15 vehicle number 243770, near al-Bab
Let us start by taking a closer look at the wreck of ACV-15 vehicle
number 243770.2 This vehicle suffered severe damage; forced onto
its side, there is significant damage to the floor (1) and part of the
suspension has been destroyed. Focussing on the damage to the
floor we can see a number of effects caused by the explosion. First,
the port in the floor, commonly mistaken for a crew escape hatch, is
an engine service hatch that has been blown off (2). This would have
no effect on the crew since the engine and crew compartments are
separated.
More concerning is the crack in the floor near the suspension (3).
The compartment above this crack contains the torsion bars and
there are no public drawings indicating whether this compartment is
sufficiently isolated from the crew compartment. Isolating the crew
compartment from the shockwave and pressure of an explosion is
an important part of protecting against mines and IEDs. Failing to
do so can have a severe and potentially fatal impact on the crew.
In this case it appears the torsion bar compartment is partially
disconnected from the crew compartment since the floor appears
to have cracked on a connection between two plates, with the outer
plate deforming.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 6
Another part of mine/IED protection is to shield the crew against
the upwards acceleration of the vehicle due to the overpressure
under the hull. A mine made of 6 kg TNT that has been buried half
a meter under an Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV)-variant
will push that vehicle 1.5 meters upwards;3 the upward acceleration
and force of impact when the vehicle hits the ground can cause
injuries. This means that the acceleration and the maximum height
the vehicle will reach has to be minimised.
This is where tracked and wheeled vehicles differ from each other.
Since tracked vehicles are comparatively heavier than wheeled
weight protects the vehicle. Wheeled vehicles, on the other hand,
are much lighter, even when they are the same size as the tracked
vehicles.
Wheeled vehicles minimise the acceleration by employing
a V-shaped hull. Designed to allow the pressure caused by the
explosion to escape to the sides, instead of pushing the vehicle
upwards, this V-shape effectively deflects the force. Note that
there are also tracked vehicles with a V-hull, like the new Russian
Kurganets-25.4 The shallow angles on these V-hulls are not
specifically designed to redirect pressure, but to make the hull floor
stronger and prevent it from failing. This prevents the crew from
sustaining injuries from a floor that (temporarily) moves upwards, as
can be seen in the photos of destroyed ACV-15s.
Any injury sustained by an IED or mine in these vehicles would
most likely be non-life threatening, with typical injuries manifesting
as concussions and broken bones. While the crew of this ACV-15
were largely protected from the IED, many more will put their lives
in the hands of the engineers who toil to protect the operators of
their vehicles from a weapon which does not discriminate and litters
battlefields where non-state militias operate.
By /u/Usertmp
ENERGY AND INNOVATION
IN DEIR EZ-ZOR
H ow does Deir Ez Zor power its water pumps? The question
has been asked for months: how has the city retained its fuel
supplies in the midst of widespread shortages and power outages?
Maps indicate that there are two specific pump stations, one near
the water purification plant and one close to a bend in the river
east of the Air Base.1,2 Recent satellite images show traffic and the
expansion of facilities around the first of the two pumps, including
continued usage of the road along the intersection by vehicles.3
Other obtained photos show some of the step tanks in the sewage
treatment plant to be empty.4 This suggests that the plant served
by the pumps is no longer operational, and the pumps have been
diverted to drawing water from the river. Leaving waste water
untreated can be a hazard for hygiene and water quality of the city.
Given the short-term threats posed by the fighting, using river water
is understandable. It would also explain the emphasis on retaining
government control of the Heart Hospital as a way to guarantee the
pumps are protected from Islamic State (IS) control.5,6
The question remains: how does Deir ez-Zor continue to receive
fuel when the rest of Syria struggles under shortages and black
market prices? The United Nations (UN) reported that 3,300 metric
tons of food were delivered in 177 airdrops starting in April 2016.7
However, according to the UN, as late as January 2017 the lower
limit of water rationing in regime-controlled Deir ez-Zor was 12
hours per week.8
This suggests that there are generators powering pumps being
run in the area. Further, the vehicles in use by the garrison were
mobile much longer after the blockade was imposed as seen on
videos from the area. The question was answered using satellite
photo evidence dated from September 13th 2016 of the Panorama
area. The explanation can be found near the road where there are
pits that have a dark reflective surface.9 These crude pits and tanks
resemble the crude refineries used by IS in Syria and Iraq. Cross
examining them with earlier photos from 2013 shows storage tanks
were added, and pictures from May 2016 show the substance having
an oil-like texture.10,11
This explains the behaviour of the garrison and the focus on
defending the Panorama road and Tal Baruq. Government garrisons
have been reporting attacks on both of these positions since the
beginning of the recent offensive, starting the same time as the
attacks on the airport perimeter possibly in an effort to stretch the
defending pro-government forces. Attacks against the first two
locations by IS have been pushed back. As of late afternoon on the
18th of January, there is little concrete evidence that IS captured
parts of the Panorama area or completely dominates the Baruq hill.
The strategic importance of this hill is in its commanding presence
over the nearby oil field which supplies the makeshift refinery.12,13
Like much in the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) world, this
article is largely supported by circumstantial evidence and while we
cannot confirm the views here, the evidence and its implications are
robust.
Is this view credibly supported by such circumstantial evidence?
Given the importance of the diminishing supply of fuel to the survival
of the pocket, as well as a particular shortage of high grade aviation
fuel that is needed to keep the airbase operational (and which
is currently being crudely refined), it may be prudent to re-asses
the value of the air base. On the one hand, theres little remaining
ground to concede and the ordinance it houses would be difficult
and expensive to relocate. Furthermore, if the airbase can be kept
operational then it is an important strategic asset to assist in retaining
control of the triangular area between the Euphrates, the Panorama
area and Tal Baruq. This area, which forms the heart of the defensive
perimeter, houses significant resources and infrastructure such as an
oil field, a crude refinery, and of course the water pumps close to
the treatment plant. It is therefore important to retain this triangle in
order to gain support from the local population. On the other hand,
the areas defense wouldnt necessarily be compromised should
the airbase be sacrificed or lost. After all, water has already been
rationed to less than 2 hours per day. But in comparison, IS is able
to offer an abundance of water. Thirst can set in rather quickly, and
when it does it can be unrelenting.
By Stanimir Dobrev
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 7
2016 IN REVIEW
2016 marked the sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and has been one of its most signicant years.
B y far, the most prominent developments occurred in and around
Aleppo. Beginning in February, the government began operations
in Aleppo which led to its forces besieging and later taking full
control of rebel-held east Aleppo by December. The fall of east
Aleppo decisively ended a grueling five-year battle, despite a briefly
successful relief offensive by Jaysh al-Fatah (JaF) in August. The Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) also made major gains in northern Aleppo,
taking Menagh, Tall Rifaat and surrounding areas from rebel groups.
On the other side of the governate, the SDF also captured Manbij
city and the surrounding countryside from ISIL. Yet another critical
development was the entry of Turkey into Syria in August; supported
by Turkish troops, artillery and airpower, Free Syrian Army (FSA)
forces captured the entirety of Islamic State (IS)-held territory near
the Turkish border in the north Aleppo countryside before advancing
south, reaching the city of Al Bab by December.
Latakia experienced a seismic shift from 2015 when government
forces went on the offensive, reversing a streak of defeats and costly
yet indecisive offensives. In the first three months, government troops
captured over fifty villages, including the major rebel strongholds of
Salma, Rabia and Kinsibba; the lost territory represented roughly
two-thirds of rebel holdings in Latakia. Rebel counterattacks in April
and the Autumn retook some ground, but each was reversed and
followed by further government advances.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 8
In Damascus, government forces continued to make progress
around east Ghouta, taking the Al Marj area in the south of the pocket
and capturing multiple areas on its eastern axis, including Tal Kurdi,
Maydaa and Midaani. These operations were significantly aided by
infighting among the major rebel factions in the area, including Jaysh
al Islam and Al Rahman Corps. Elsewhere in the Damascus countryside,
several besieged rebel pockets conditionally surrendered following
years of staunch resistance in the face of overwhelming bombing
by government forces. Surrendering rebel forces were granted safe
passage to Idlib with some light arms and their families. These areas
were referred to as reconciled and included Darayya, Moadamiyah
and much of the West Ghouta area. Meanwhile, inconclusive fighting
occurred between rebel groups, government forces and ISIL in the
east Qalamoun, east of Dumayr.
In Homs, the government succeeded in retaking Palmyra and
Qaryatayn early in the year following a months-long offensive and
made slow progress against IS in the countryside. Embarrassingly
for the government, a major and comparatively brief IS offensive in
December retook Palmyra and the nearby gas fields, forcing pro-
government forces back to the heavily fortified T4 Airbase.
In Hama, the government was able to recapture a few rebel-held
villages near Hama city at the beginning of the year. A major rebel
offensive later in the year in northern Hama succeeded in capturing the
major towns of Halfaya, Souran and Taibat al Imam amongst others,
nearly reaching Hama city, with these gains only partially reversed by
the end of December. Also, government forces attempted an advance
from Ithriyah towards Taqba with the goal of reaching Raqqa. While
the advance initially saw success, government forces fell back in a
chaotic retreat to Ithriyah following an IS counterattack.
government completed the capture of Sheikh Miskeen town and
Hasakah and Raqqa both saw large-scale advances by the SDF.
In an offensive in February, the SDF captured the town of Shadadi
and its vicinity, nearly expelling IS from Hasakah governate. In Raqqa,
the end of 2016 saw a large SDF offensive north and west of Raqqa,
continuing into 2017 and resulting in the capture of 3000 square
kilometres from IS. Hasakah and Qamishli also experienced brief but
intense fighting between NDF and Kurdish Asayish, leading to the
SDF taking control of virtually all of the former.
Deir ez-Zor was one of the few highlights of the year for IS. In
January, they breached government defenses in the northern suburbs,
capturing Ayyash, Baghiliyah and the Ayyash Weapons Depot. IS
managed to make another crucial gain in September, capturing Jabal
Thurdah after a coalition airstrike mistakenly attacked government
positions. Control of Jabal Thurdah provides IS with fire control
over Deir ez-Zor airbase, preventing government aircraft from safely
landing.
Southern Syria remained relatively quiet in 2016. In January, the
Atman village, north of Daraa city. In March, intense fighting broke
out in southern Daraa between IS-linked Liwa Shuhada Yarmouk (LSY)
and other rebel groups, with inconclusive results. Additionally, rebel
forces captured Tal Hamriya, near the village of Hader in Quneitra
during an offensive in September.
In 2016, the centre of gravity of the conflict lay in northern Syria,
with the south and west playing a peripheral role in the years events.
In 2017, the north will likely remain a key battleground but in light of
continued IS losses in Iraq, a resurgent government push eastwards
in Homs and Aleppo, and the SDFs proximity to Deir ez-Zor and
Raqqa, eastern Syria will become increasingly important with its prize
of energy and mineral resources.
By Zohan Tariq
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 9
SYRIA'S UNREPORTED
ENERGY WAR PART 2
A s part of the previous issue, reductions in fuel and electricity
supplies in Syria were described as reaching a breaking point.
Shortly after the last issue came out, the situation hit that breaking
point.1 For over a week, the country was paralyzed as a bout of cold
weather hit while supplies of diesel and gasoline started running out.
Black market prices soared, factories stopped working and images
from Syria's major cities of lines of cars kilometers long waiting for
gasoline went viral on social media. The immediate situation was
relieved by February 13 as new shipments of fuel started to arrive,2
but the underlying problems still exist.
Shortages and rationing had already been a problem in Syria
before the Islamic State (IS) overran the gas fields in Homs this past
December.3 Domestic fuel supply issues became more acute after the
fall of Palmyra, increasing electricity rationing up to 20 hours a day
in some areas and forcing black market prices of gasoline and diesel
to increase.4 While electricity rationing had seen a marked increase
in December and January, gasoline and diesel rationing mostly
held steady until late January. Difficulties in the supply of gasoline
and diesel received little attention, though the warning signs where
present.
In early 2017, reports emerged that operations at the major
port of Tartus were nearly stopped due to diesel shortages5 and by
late mid-January some news sources claimed only 10% of industrial
diesel needs were being met.6 On January 21st, the Ministry of Oil cut
diesel supplies to Hama by 27%.7 Then on the 26th, the governor of
Hama cut family diesel allowances by 60%.8 On January 28th, reports
came out that "hundreds" of factories in the Damascus area had
stopped work due to diesel shortages and the price of diesel jumped
by 15% in a few days to 400 Syrian Pounds (SYP) a litre.9 The situation
became so concerning that on January 31 the Syrian Government
approved an extraordinary measure to allow private industrialists to
import diesel themselves directly from Lebanon, though this wouldn't
be finalized for several weeks.10
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 10
This measure would later be
extended to cover the agricultural
sector as well.11 The measure
was a watermark signaling
the severity of the crisis, as Syria
has clamped down on imports
to avoid the leakage of much
needed foreign currency, which
would flow out of Syria to finance
imports.12 Syrian misfortune was
compounded when unusually
Damascus, 2017. The message
late cold weather hit the country,
reads: My love, I brought you
forcing the government to
a gallon of fuel.
reprioritize electricity and diesel
supplies to rural areas to protect crops, while competing demand for
diesel to provide heating shot up.13
Over the following week this perfect storm manifested itself in a
rise of domestic fuel costs and extreme shortages. Prices for gasoline
and diesel exploded, with reports that the black market price of
gasoline hit 1000 SYP a litre in some places,14 a hefty sum in a country
where the estimated average monthly wage is only 28,000 SYP.15
For comparison, official prices are 225 SYP for a litre of gasoline and
180 SYP for diesel.16 Images and video of lines of cars waiting for
gasoline, some allegedly three kilometers long, emerged on social
media. Surprisingly these images and videos showed that shortages
were present even in the coastal provinces of Syria, which have
historically been bastions of support for the government and enjoyed
less rationing.17 Transport was largely shut down18 and drivers strikes
such as those in Suweida only worsened the situation.19 On February
11, Prime Minister Imad Khamis issued a proclamation ordering
government bodies to reduce fuel consumption by 50%, excluding
hospitals, bakeries and the Ministry of Defense.20 Shortly thereafter,
the first shipments of fuel from 200 billion SYP in new fuel contracts
began to arrive, and shortages started to ease up.21
Key ndings
In comments to Parliament, Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources
Ali Ghanem finally gave updated numbers for energy demand and
production in Syria as follows:22
Domestic Production:
Oil- 3,000 barrels a day
Liquefied Petroleum Gas(LPG- propane/butane)- 40 tons a day
Natural Gas- 6.6 million cubic meters a day (prospectively)
Demand:
Gasoline, diesel and other petroleum derivatives- 9.5-10
million liters a day (or, 57-60,000 barrels)
Heavy Fuel Oil- 6,500 tons a day (47,600 barrels)
Natural Gas- 1,300 tons a day (14.8 million cubic meters)
This meant that to meet current demand, Syria needs around
101-104,000 barrels of oil and 8.2 million cubic meters of gas a day
in imports. Given the language used in his statement, and previous
statements over the past few months which put gas production lower
and demand higher, the need for gas is likely higher than currently
stated.23 Statements by Prime Minister Khamis to Parliament - in which
he blamed Iran for not sending fuel for three months - also revealed
the prices paid by Syria for fuel imports, allegedly $550 USD a ton or
an around 20% markup due to issues with sanctions.24 In January,
Iran provided Syria with a new $500 million loan to finance fuel
imports.25 Taken alongside the prices stated by Khamis and estimated
domestic consumption, supplies will likely last two and a half months
assuming no gas is imported. In total, minister Ghanem recently said
Syria will need more than $3.4 billion to cover oil product needs.26
Economic Fallout and What Might Come Next
Economic repercussions are likely to extend far into 2017 as a result
of the crisis. More immediately, the disruption caused by shutting
down hundreds of factories and the country's transport network will
be costly. The combination of late frost and lack of fuel caused billions
of SYP in losses to crops in the northwest of the country, destroying
90% of some fields.27 The crisis has been worsened by reports of
farmers cutting down fruit trees to provide firewood for heat and
difficulties securing diesel to run irrigation pumps.28 These losses will
impact food prices this spring and summer. On a more granular level,
fear of future shortages coupled with the shock from the crisis and
the sudden influx of fuel is likely to incentivize people to hoard fuel
supplies while they can, which will distort the market.
The Iranian loan discussed above provides Syria with funds to
import enough oil for two and a half months. After that, Syria will
need a new injection of funds to stave off further shortages. In light
of this, Syria may take several measures to extend energy stockpiles;
for instance, shifting electricity generation to fuel oil as opposed to
natural gas. This is because Syria lacks the means to import liquid
natural gas (LNG), which is used for electricity generation, in large
quantities. Syria may also attempt to shift some remaining domestic
gas production to fill cooking gas needs as importing LPG for cooking
gas would be costly and inefficient. This would be an attempt to
reduce and stabilize prices which have impacted the civilian populace.
While this will increase fuel oil demands, the government may try
to lower oil demand and push down import costs to private actors. To
lower demand, ration levels are unlikely to reach the levels they were
at in the Autumn, however a new normal will be established between
current ration levels and the Autumn levels. This is most likely to occur
with diesel and gasoline rations, which could allow the government to
stretch out the funds to import fuel.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 11

Syrians buy petrol on a street in the northwestern city of Idlib
The recent government decision to let industrialists, and later
the agriculture industry, import diesel directly from Lebanon and
push much of Syria's diesel importation costs down was significant.
While this is arguably a prudent move by the government, it is one
that should have been taken sooner. Due to this measure, future
fuel supply issues are unlikely to be as severe as the February
crisis because private actors with means will be able to provide for
themselves. However, this wont solve all of Syrias diesel needs if
government imports dry up, nor will it solve fuel demands. This will
also cause foreign currency to bleed out of Syria at a faster pace,
which will increase pressure on the already poorly-performing SYP.
Comments, primarily from Prime Minister Khamis and Minister
Ali Ghanem, have repeatedly mentioned plans to increase domestic
production of oil and gas.29 They have commented on plans to
revitalize and restart production in the Homs fields once they
are liberated from IS, stating that this would happen soon. While
bringing any more domestic production online will be important,
and effort should be put toward doing so, Syrians should not be
expecting large production increases from the Homs fields. Besides
destroying the Hayyan gas processing plant, IS has been destroying
remaining infrastructure in anticipation of future government
advances.30 The full extent of the destruction is not yet known,
but repairs and development are likely to take a long time even
in the best of circumstances. Further, the tightness of the current
situation makes remaining domestic energy assets crucial. This
was highlighted when IS shelling of the Ebla gas processing plant,
which was noted in the last issue to be "dangerously close to the
front lines", temporarily cut off 65% of Syria's electricity generation
capacity.31
While the above measures will allow Syria to move forward, Syria
will eventually need further aid from its allies to finance its basic
needs. Perhaps more importantly, Syria needs a larger economic
intervention to prevent the continuing deterioration of the economy.
Wars are not only fought on the battlefield; Syria's allies should start
paying deeper attention to the needs of the home front as well.
By Vince Beshara
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 12
ABU JABER AND HAYAT TAHRIR AL SHAM
A RENAISSANCE FOR THE REBELLION? PART 1
O n January 28, 2016, a new rebel faction under the leadership
of Hashem al Sheikh was
announced in Syria.1 Hayat
Tahrir al Sham (HTS) initially
unified five large Islamist
factions the al Qaeda-linked
Jabhat Fatah al Sham, Harakat
Nur al Din al Zenki, Liwa al
Haqq, Ansar al Din, and Jaysh al
Sunna but with an open call to
others, it has quickly swallowed
Abu Jaber, also known as
scores of smaller groups.
Hashem al Sheikh
Not all of these factions have
joined in full, however, with up
to 30% of al Zenki fighters defecting to Faylaq al Sham, another
major rebel faction in Idlib, immediately following the January 28th
announcement.2
It is difficult to confirm exactly who has joined HTS, although an
Ahrar al Sham tweet on February 15 claimed that 955 of its fighters,
including three Shura members, defected to HTS.3 This supports
Charles Listers January 29th assessment that Saraya al Aqsa, Suqour
al Izz, Liwa al Abbas, and parts of Liwa al Tamkin have all left Ahrar al
Sham.4 None of these groups are listed as fighting with Ahrar in its
current Daraa offensive.5
Social media posts have listed 21 additional unit defections from
Ahrar al Sham, 4 from Faylaq al Sham, and 4 from Jund al Sham.6
In total, it appears that 67 units have joined HTS.7 Most of these
are very small local militias, making it impossible to know the full
strength of HTS. Yet assuming only an average of 75 men per unit
means that HTS has already grown by 5,000 fighters since the end
of January, supporting reports that the new faction fields more than
30,000 fighters.8
This mass consolidation of Syrian rebels represents a milestone in
the nearly six-year war. HTS is more than a coalition; it is a complete
merger of five factions that will [henceforth] cease to exist and
instead will operate under one name, one flag, and one leader.9 HTS
will represent one fighting force in future coalitions, such as in the
current Daraa offensive where units are already flying the Tahrir al
Sham flag.10
HTSs choice in leadership also represents an attempt at unity,
rather than a coalition under the rule of Jabhat Fatah al Sham.
While there is much debate as to whether or not Abu Mohammed al
Jolani truly stepped down from his role as head of the now defunct
JFS, there is some evidence to support this notion. According to
Charles Lister, al Jolani offered to cede leadership during merger
negotiations in both February and August 2016.11 If true, this would
set a strong precedent for the current merger. Furthermore, Hashem
al Sheikh is not an untested leader, and makes a good fit as head
of HTS.
Hashim al Sheikh, a.k.a Abu Jaber, is a native of Aleppo who was
imprisoned in Saydnaya in 2005, possibly due to his work facilitating
jihad in Iraq.12 According to a biography released by the Islamic
Front, Abu Jaber first entered the war by fighting alongside the
al Fajr Islamic Movement (part of which would later split and form
Harakat Nur al Din al Zenki) before leading the Musab Ibn Omayr
Battalion.13 Al Fajr fought alongside al Nusra in 2012.14 He was a
member of Ahrar al Shams Shura Council since its foundation
until he was promoted to lead Ahrar al Sham after the death of
Hassan Aboud and the entirety of Ahrar al Shams top leadership in
September 2014.15
At a time when many analysts predicted Ahrar would disintegrate,
Abu Jaber successfully kept his faction a major player in the war. In
mid-February, 2015, Abu Jaber announced the formation of a new
coalition of nine rebel groups in Aleppo. The short lived Thuwar
Halab consisted of Ahrar al Sham, Harakat Nur al Din al Zenki,
and the FSA groups Fastaqem Union, Sultan Murad Division, 101
Division, 16 Division, Liwa Suqur Jabal, 1st Mountain Regiment, and
the Muntasir Brigade.16
Where exactly Abu Jabers political and religious beliefs fall is
difficult to say. In an April 17, 2015 interview with Al Jazeera, he
called for cooperation with the FSA, a Syrian constitution based
on Islam, and the protection of Syrian minorities.17 However,
following the merger, the Salafi jihadi Sheikh Tariq Abd al Haleem
tweeted in support of Abu Jaber, countering criticism by Sheikh
Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi.18 Sheikh abd al Hakeem once spoke
in favor of ISIS and has theological beliefs that parallel al Qaeda's.
Sheikh al Maqdisi, the most influential contemporary Salafi Jihadist
scholar, also has close ties to al Qaeda and has long advocated for
negotiations between Ahrar al Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, and IS. This
division between two hard line, al Qaeda-linked scholars hints at the
complexity of HTSs ideology.
Yet Abu Jabers longstanding relations with rebel groups
spanning the ideological spectrum and his history of coalition
building makes him a smart choice for the leader of Hayat Tahrir al
Sham. Tahrir al Shams creation is in part a response to the rebels
defeat at Aleppo and the internal conflicts that plagued them
throughout the Autumn of 2016.19 It is an attempt to create a united
front against the Assad regime and its allies, as well as forcing the
international community to acknowledge its legitimacy as a voice for
the people. As HTS grows, its absence from the Astana talks will be
increasingly more meaningful as the opposition representatives lose
negotiating power. This will effectively give HTS the power to start
or end negotiations on its own terms.
But if this new consolidation effort is to have any impact, more
factions will need to join under the HTS banner, and a neutral
leader like Abu Jaber may offer the best chance of success.
By Gregory Waters
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 13
By By

1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 15

EUROPEAN UNION
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
How a fragmenting West, a rising right and disunity within the union may spell the end of the EU
O n Tuesday 17th January,
Theresa May, prime minister
of the United Kingdom (UK)
made a controversial yet largely
expected announcement, the
UK would leave the single
market" as part of a hard Brexit.1,2
While predictions of Brexits
economic severity have been
highly publicised, the security
situation arising from the UK
leaving the European Union (EU)
has so far received little attention.
Brexit has come at a time when British Prime Minister Theresa
major concerns such as the May following talks at the
new paradigm of international Chancellery on July 20, 2016
terrorism from Islamic State in Berlin
(IS), industrial scale Russian
subversion, growing support for the far right and disenchantment
with the European dream are growing together in a perfect and
symbiotic storm that may well overturn the traditional order in Europe
and indeed the greater Western world. It is in this environment that
questions of European unity and security must come in to focus, as
the likely ramifications have the potential to affect Europes regional
security and the course of its political development.
Within Europe the UKs intelligence agencies play a leading
role fighting terrorism and serious crime in cooperation with their
European partners.3,4 Following requests from its intelligence and
policing agencies on retaining inter-agency contacts and information
sharing, the government has stated its intent to preserve security
ties between the UK and Europe.5 The UKs recent declaration that
it intends to opt in to Europol Regulation 2016/7396,7 provided a
strong indicator that this promise would be kept, even while other
ties between the UK and EU would be allowed to expire.8 The
regulation in question is notable as it sets forth the mechanisms for
international cooperation of Europol and information sharing in line
with EU personal rights and safeguards. These repeated statements
of cooperation signal the resolve of the UK government towards
mutually beneficial cooperation with Europe and its intent to retain
strong connections in the area of security.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 16
With the UK apparently committed to cooperation with Europol,
Europes stressed security services might breathe a temporary sigh
of relief, as recent failings have shown the need for experienced and
well-funded state security to play a leading role. In the wake of the
devastating attacks in Belgium and France, security services were
lambasted for their failings in both prevention and detection of the
attacks.9,10 Belgian officials had failed to follow up on information
from Turkish officials that the Belgian national and subsequent airport
bomber Ibrahim El Bakraoui,
had been arrested attempting to
cross in to Syria from the Turkish
city of Gaziantep. Following
an initial request for further
information from Belgian police, Ibrahim El Bakraoui pictured
the consular officer charged right with his brother Khalid
with securing this information
simply forgot.11 Failures such as this cost lives and may encourage
subsequent attacks, particularly against weaker targets such as
Belgium. This substantial failing in the processes used by an EU-based
security structure highlights the pressing need for cooperation and
local restructuring of systems to prevent reoccurrences.
In the immediate term making up for shortcomings like these
places a burden on the larger, more experienced, intelligence
agencies. These agencies must play an important role in leveraging
their experience and resources to shore-up others considered
weak links amongst European intelligence agencies. Failing to do
so not only risks destabilising countries within the EUs local zone of
interest but also risks strengthening Europes strategic enemies, thus
weakening its influence, prestige and allies.
Burdens or not, the UKs involvement in European security looks
set to continue as Theresa May outlined her 12 step plan for the
Brexit process, with her 11th step stating, Co-operation in the fight
against crime and terrorism. We will continue to work closely with our
European allies in foreign and defence policy even as we leave the
EU itself.12 Such a public declaration essentially locks the UK in to
security cooperation with Europol, acknowledging that the stability
and security of Britains closest neighbours is vital to its own domestic
and international security.
When speaking of Europe, one must understand that after its
violent and divisive history, European nations still harbour reservations
about deeper ties. Varying levels of prejudice are common amongst
neighbours, not to mention the cultural and social differences between
countries. This is an unfortunate reality, considering the decentralised
nature of Europes myriad intelligence agencies where cooperation
is limited by legitimate concerns such as the retention of national
sovereignty and protection of sensitive information. Intelligence
agencies, particularly those in former Soviet block and Russian-aligned
nations, are a major consideration here, where corruption, leaks to
and penetration by nations hostile to Western interests and major
organised crime syndicates pose particular threats.13 Unfortunately,
despite trends towards pro-EU mentalities amongst their citizenry and
leadership there still exists a substantial pro-Russian/anti-EU support
base in many Central and Eastern European countries.14 Many of
these nations, newly brought into the union, are still in the process
of adopting Western standards, particularly in law enforcement and
intelligence.15,16,17 In spite of the challenges they face, these nations
must be recognised for their key roles as the frontlines in the battle
against trafficking and securing Western regional hegemony in Europe
by serving as a bulwark against an increasingly assertive Russia.
In the wake of the Maidan
protests and subsequent
Russian annexation of Crimea,
the Western world is waking
up to a Europe where historical
tensions and divides in some
Eastern nations are coming An armed man in Russian
to the boil. Many civilians and uniform patrols Simferopol
politicians feel torn between airport in Crimea, 28/02/2014
Russia, the EU and NATO in
an area which has traditionally functioned as a buffer zone of weak
states and divided loyalties where no one side gains supremacy. The
younger generations in former Soviet bloc nations increasingly look
to the west for their economic salvation, while older citizens fondly
remember a time of plenty, prior to the hardships and deprivation
ushered in by the collapse of the USSR.
Recognising the threat to the relative neutrality in this area amid
declining pro-Russian sentiments, Russia is suspected of engaging in
various destabilising acts. For instance, an attempted coup by pro-
Russian nationalists was foiled last year in Montenegro following
government plans to join NATO.18 While there is no solid evidence
proving Russian involvement, the circumstances are suspicious,
and those involved likely had the tacit support of the Kremlin,
which has recently been emboldened by the presidency of Donald
Trump. The American president has previously declared NATO
obsolete19 and despite later backtracking,20 many Eastern European
nations are fearful for the future of Europe as a whole. The danger
of Trumps inexperience is in the unpredictable chain of events his
statements may spark. For example, a senior MP in Chancellor Angela
Merkels own party recently called for a German nuclear deterrent in
response to questions of American commitment to NATO. While this
prompted a denial from the German Chancellor,21 it shows a degree
of support to take initiative in a world where America is increasingly
turning inwards. Yet in a clear demonstration of resolve against
Russian intimidation, NATO deployments to Eastern Europe have
reached levels unseen since the Cold War.22
While the narrative that Russia only understands force dominates
Western thinking, it remains unclear whether combative stances
against them will ultimately yield success. On one hand a weak Russia
benefits Western regional hegemony. Yet the belief that Russia will
change its ways by political process or by domestic discontent is
speculative and has so far been countered by the Kremlins ability
to champion nationalist pride in Russia while deflecting blame for
economic hardships onto the West.23
Certainly Russia has legitimate grievances, such as the expansion
of NATO towards its borders, Western sanctions, the missile shield
in Romania and a steady trickle of countries looking to abandon
economic cooperation in favour of the EU. However, Russia has
responded with counter sanctions and Syrian intervention, driving
migrants and refugees in ever-greater numbers into a Europe where
integration and immigration are political buzzwords that have split
the UK from the EU and are fanning the flames of far-right support
across the region.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 17

Compounding the economic
hardships of central Europe,
Russian counter sanctions in
retaliation to EU sanctions have
limited trade between the two
parties, with weaker states such
as Albania and Montenegro
impacted disproportionately.24
With an estimated 34 billion
Russian President Vladimir
trade shortfall predicted to peak
Putin eyes the EU ag
at 92 billion, the impact on
Europes economy and employment rates is weighty.25 While larger
EU states have been able to weather this, the response from some
smaller states has been disunity with varying degrees of support for
Russian policy and the cessation of sanctions.26
Capitalising upon European discord, and in an effort to weaken
a coordinated response to its actions in Ukraine, Russia has cosied
up to many far right parties with leaders in favour of exiting the EU
such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Frances National Front
(FN) and the Netherlands Party for Freedom.27 Most concerning is
the knowledge that some, such as FN, receive direct funding from
Russia, while others are alleged to have received funding or support,
presumably under the direction of the Russian government.28
Migrants are escorted through elds by police as they are
walked from the village of Rigonce to Brezice refugee camp on
October 23, 2015 in Rigonce, Slovenia
The migrant crisis, unleashed on Europe by Turkey and Russia in
pursuit of their geopolitical goals, has provided human trafficking
networks with a windfall. By far the largest route for trafficking, the
Balkans has become the primary entry point to Europe for a major
criminal network and features prominently in concerns for tighter
border controls. While the recent migrant crises aggravated by
refugees fleeing the violence in Syria has drawn attention to this
issue, trafficking by this route long predates the Syrian conflict. A
recent report by Interpol and Europol discovered that more than
90% of the migrants coming to the EU are facilitated, mostly by
members of a criminal network. 29 This alarming figure is expected
to increase as part of a global industry with low running costs and
a turnover of USD 5-6 billion annually.30 Detection of terrorists and
criminals attempting to enter Europe is confounded by the vast
numbers of people transiting these routes, alongside the potential
for corruption from a profitable criminal enterprise. The mastermind
of the Paris attacks, which killed 130 people, is suspected of using
the migrant crisis and the associated trafficking routes into Europe
to enter France.31 The Schengen Area, which allows free movement
across borders, covers much of Europe and likely facilitated the free
transit of this man and many others.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 18
Whether symptomatic of a desire to tackle emerging threats
at the expense of privacy or simply an inevitable casualty of the
communication age, lessons have yet to be learnt on the potential
for abuse in information sharing between international agencies.
The use of legal loopholes such as those that emerged following
the revelations from the Edward Snowden leaks have exposed
a cumbersome network of dragnet surveillance with much
discrimination and little regard for privacy or the rights of the
individual. Countries have outsourced information on their citizens
to be processed by allies not subject to the laws that would prevent
their counterparts from processing this data domestically.32 A
supplemental agreement to Regulation 2016/739 is hazy on many
of the protections present for information sharing between US
intelligence agencies and Europol, as well as between agencies
within Europe.33 Not only does this raise questions of investigation
by the backdoor but lends detractors ammunition in battling against
essential information sharing and security cooperation.34
Whatever the future may hold, it appears that the enemies of
Europe beset her from within and without, employing every means
in their arsenal to fragment and subvert her grand union. The
heady days of her youth and the fires that bore her unity of pacifist
necessity have grown a distant memory. She is however, far from
alone; just recently Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau agreed
a trade deal with the EU calling for Canada and the EU to lead
the international economy.35 And while relations with Russia have
grown tense, Germany, a leading member of the EU, has spoken in
favour of cooperation against Islamist terrorism.36 Beset as she is,
this grand union is far from ended and her noble dream endures
amongst her supporters.
By /u/CIA_Shill
BIBLIO & LINKS
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8. https://www.facebook.com/Men.of.God.in.the.land.of.the.Euphrates/ https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/833646146644017152
posts/1192625670806789 https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/833444267209158656
9. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.308349&lon=40.089819&z=1 30. http://bit.ly/2lZwgWK
6&m=b http://tishreen.news.sy/?p=76103
10. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-24/syria-open- http://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/133573
backyard-refineries-as-war-reaches-oil-field
11. http://energyfuse.org/taking-stock-of-isis-oil-part-2/ ABU JABER AND HAYAT TAHRIR AL SHAM
12. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.350731&lon=40.037527&z=1 A RENAISSANCE FOR THE REBELLION? PART 1
5&m=b 1. https://twitter.com/MiddleEastEyes/status/825363671350120451/
13. http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35.335958&lon=40.079005&z=1
photo/1
6&m=b 2. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/825373172958650368
14. https://twitter.com/tobiaschneider/status/765780151036772352 3. https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/831916500856500225
15. http://kassioun.org/economy-and-society/item/19857-300 4. https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/825414353352609793
5. https://twitter.com/AhrarAl_Sham/status/832486095388434432/
Note to the reader, all wikimapia coordinates are place holders for photo/1
coordinates visible on the satellite pictures available from terraserver for 6. https://twitter.com/OmerOzkizilcik/status/830072228435865600/
the date of September 16th 2016.
1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 19
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photo/1; https://twitter.com/OmerOzkizilcik/
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7. https://twitter.com/OmerOzkizilcik/status/830072228435865600/
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long_list_of_factions_that/; https://twitter.com/sayed_ridha/
status/829039467025428480/photo/1; https://twitter.com/
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idUSKBN14Z0YO
20. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/16/donald-trumps-
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germany-planning-lead-european-nuclear-superpower/
22. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/military-build-up-
along-russias-border-no-cause-for-alarm
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propaganda_in_russia3080
24. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/
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26. www.gmfus.org/file/4250/download
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and-europe%E2%80%99s-far-right
28. http://www.france24.com/en/20170105-france-national-front-marine-
le-pen-russia-finance-election-campaign
29. (p4) https://goo.gl/uncirY
30. Ibid
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france/12004462/paris-attacks-france-belgium-security-services.html
32. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23123964
33. http://eutarn.blogactiv.eu/2016/09/13/the-future-of-europols-
cooperation-agreements-and-the-new-europol-regulation/
34. https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/supplemental_
agreement_between_europol_and_the_usa_on_exchange_of_
personal_data_and_related_information.pdf
35. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-eu-trudeau-
idUSKBN15V15Y
36. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-merkel-
idUSKBN15X06L

EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-
updates-theresa-may-article-50-speech-unity-end-division-global-
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experts-clash-Brexit-impact-UK-security.html
4. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/oct/uk-brexit-german-
bundstag-report.pdf
5. https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/home-affairs/terrorism/
news/79555/theresa-may-prepared-use-intelligence-services-brexit
6. (stated intent in summary p2)http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/77/77.pdf
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8. https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/regulation-
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intelligence-paris-attacks.html
10. https://www.ft.com/content/ba92eb42-f101-11e5-aff5-19b4e253664a
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15. https://goo.gl/Rrkm8J
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19. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato-obsolete-

1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 20 1 March 2017, The Week In Review | Page 21
 LIST OF CHARITIES RATED "B+"
(72%-74% OF FUNDS RAISED ARE USED FOR THE PURPOSES STATED)
WHO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF: