JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIETTA
NERI ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all
persons holding the subject child
ARABELA SOMBONG in their
custody, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS
CORPUS; PURPOSE. - In general, the
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or
moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. A prime specification
of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER LEGAL REMEDY.
- Although the Writ of Habeas
Corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time
and again that the said writ is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of
her own free will. It may even be said that
in custody cases involving minors, the
question of illegal and involuntary restraint
of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy;
rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of custody over a child.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHILD CUSTODY CASES;
WELFARE OF THE CHILD IS THE
SUPREME CONSIDERATION. - The
controversy does not involve the question
of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone
until he attains majority age. In passing on
the writ in a child custody case, the court
deals with a matter of an equitable nature.
Not bound by any mere legal right of
parent or guardian, the court gives his or
her claim to the custody of the child due
weight as a claim founded on human
nature and considered generally equitable
and just. Therefore, these cases are
decided, not on the legal right of the
petitioner to be relived from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the .case
of adults, but on the courts view of the
best interests of those whose welfare
requires that they be in custody of one
person or another. Hence, the court is not
bound to deliver a child into the custody of
any claimant or of any persons, but
should, in the consideration of the facts,
leave it in such custody as its welfare at
the time appears to require. In short, the
childs welfare is the supreme
consideration.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before
us seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals2 which had
reversed the decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court4 which granted the Petition for Habeas
Corpus filed by petitioner.
The following facts were developed by the
evidence presented by the opposing parties:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O.
Sombong who was born on April 23,
1987 in Signal Village, Taguig, Metro
5
Manila. Some time in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was
brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at 121
First Avenue, Kalookan City, for relief of
coughing fits and for treatment of colds.
Petitioner did not have enough money to pay
the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00.
Arabella could not be discharged, then,
because of the petitioners failure to pay the
bill.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to
the effect that she allegedly paid the private
respondents by installments in the total
amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that
the sum payable was only P300.00. Despite
such alleged payments, the owners of the
clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr.
Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over
Arabella to her. Petitioner claims that the
reason for such a refusal was that she refused
to go out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been
courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a
reason to be jealous of her, making it difficult
for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her
foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that
she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two
years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go
beyond berating the spouses Ty for their
refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years
thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again
resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas
allegedly fell on deaf ears.
Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She
alleged therein that Arabella was being
unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No.
121, First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City.
The petition was denied due course and
summarily dismissed,6without prejudice, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged
detention having been perpetrated
in Kalookan City.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal
complaint7 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Kalookan City against the
spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit,
admitted that petitioners child, Arabella, had
for some time been in her custody. Arabella
was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989,
and was, in the presence of her clinic staff,
turned over to someone who was properly
identified to be the childs guardian.
In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty
to turn over Arabella to her, she had sought
the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and
Bautista of Kalookan City, Mayor Asistio of the
same city, and even Congresswoman
Hortensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their
efforts to help availed her nothing.
On September 4, 1992, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis
of petitioners complaint, filed an
8
information against the spouses Ty for
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor
before
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City.9 On S
eptember 16, 1992, an order for the arrest of
the spouses Ty was issued in the criminal case.
Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility
that the child, Arabella, may be found at No.
23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. The agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation went to said address
and there found a female child who answered
to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite
significantly, the evidence disclosed that the
child, Cristina, had been living with respondent
Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was
just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her
parents at the Sir John Clinic. On April 18,
1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John
Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and
respondent Alviar, called the latter up to
discuss the possibility of turning over to her
care one of the several abandoned babies at
the said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that
this baby whose name was unknown had long
been abandoned by her parents and appeared
to be very small, very thin, and full of scabies.
Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and
her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided to
take care of her.
This baby was baptized at the Good
Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988. Her
Certificate of Baptism10 indicates her name to
be Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to
be April 30, 1987; her birthplace to be Quezon
City; and her foster father and foster mother
to be Cicero Neri and Maura Salacup,
respectively. Respondent Alviar was invited by
the National Bureau of Investigation for
questioning on September 22, 1992 in the
presence of Dra. Ty and petitioner. Cristina was
also brought along by said respondent. At that
confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that
Cristina was indeed petitioners child, Arabella.
Neither could petitioner with all certainty say
that Cristina was her long lost daughter.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus with the Regional Trial Court11 of
Quezon City. The trial court conducted a total
of eight (8) hearings, for the period,
from October 28, 1992 to December 11, 1992.
On January 15, 1993, it rendered a decision
granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordering respondent Alviar to immediately
deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the
petitioner, the court having found Cristina to
be the petitioners long lost child, Arabella.
The trial court, in justification of its
conclusions, discussed that:
On the issue of whether or not the minor child,
in question, is the daughter of the petitioner,
there seems to be no question, to the mind of
this Court, that the petitioner, is, indeed, the
mother of the child, registered by the name of
Arabella O. Sombong, per her Certificate of
Birth x x x and later caused to be baptized as
Cristina Grace S. Nery (sic) x x x For, this child
is the same child which was delivered by the
Sir John Clinic at Kalookan City, owned by Dra.
Carmen Ty, to Dra. Fe Mallonga and later given
to the custody of the respondents. In fact, Dra.
Carmen Ty, in her testimony admitted that the
petitioner is the mother of Arabella xxx
On the question of whether or not the
petitioner has the rightful custody of the minor
child, in question, which is being withheld by
the respondents from her, as will authorize the
granting of the petition for habeas corpus x x x
there is no question that the minor x x x is
only about five (5) years old x x x it follows
that the child must not be separated from the
mother, who is the petitioner, unless, of
course, this Court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
Heretofore, under the New Civil Code of
the Philippines, the compelling reasons which
may deprive the parents of their authority or
suspend exercise thereof are stated. It was
then provided in Article 332, supra, that:
The courts may deprive the parents of their
authority x x x if they should treat their
children with excessive harshness x x x or
abandon them. x x x (Italics supplied by the
RTC)
Unfortunately, the foregoing article, which was
under Title XI, parental authority, was
expressly repealed by Article 254 of the Family
Code of the Philippines xxx
xxx xxx xxx
It can be seen, therefore, that the words or
abandoned them mentioned in Article 332 of
the New Civil Code x x x is (sic) no longer
mentioned in the amending (of) Art. 231 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
It is clear x x x that under the law presently
controlling, abandonment is no longer
considered a compelling reason upon the basis
of which the Court may separate the child
below seven (7) years old from the mother.
Conceivably, however, in paragraph 6 of
Article 231, supra, the effects of culpable
negligence on the part of the parent may be
considered by this Court in suspending
petitioners parental authority over her
daughter, in question x x x
The question, therefore, is whether there is
culpable negligence on the part of the
petitioner so that her parental authority over
her child, in question, may at least be
suspended by this Court.
This Court is not persuaded that the petitioner
is guilty of culpable negligence vis-a-vis her
daughter, in question, upon the bases of the
facts adduced. For, there is no question that
from April, 1988 she kept on demanding from
Dra. Carmen Ty x x x the return of her child to
her but the latter refused even to see her or to
talk to her. Neither did Vicente Ty, the husband
of Dra. Carmen Ty, respond to her entreaties to
return her daughter.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, in the interim, while petitioner was
looking for her daughter, she made
representations for her recovery with
Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista, and
Mayor Asistio, all of Kalookan City, as well as
with Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke to
intervene in her behalf.
It cannot be said, therefore, no matter how
remotely, that the petitioner was negligent,
nay culpably, in her efforts for the recovery of
her daughter.
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the respondents have no right to
the parental authority of the child, superior to
that of the petitioner as they are not her
parents. They have, therefore, no right to the
custody of petitioners daughter. The Sir John
Clinic, or Dra. Carmen Ty, have (sic) no right to
deliver the child, in question, to Dra. Fe
Mallonga. Neither had the latter the right and
the authority to gave (sic) the child to the
respondents, whose custody of petitioners
daughter is, consequently, illegal.12
Herein private respondents filed an appeal
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to
the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court took
cognizance of the following issues: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-
a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the
child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed
petitioner be the mother of the child in
question, what the effect would proof of
abandonment be under the circumstances of
the case; and (3) Will the question of the childs
welfare be the paramount consideration in this
case which involves child custody.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court, ruling as it
did that:
x x x the lower court erred in sweepingly
concluding that petitioners child Arabella
Sombong and respondents foster child Cristina
Neri are one and the same person to warrant
the issuance of the writ. x x x
As clearly stated in the facts of this case, not
even petitioner herself could recognize her
own child when respondents foster child
Cristina Neri was presented to her before the
NBI and respondent court. Dr. Carmen Ty at
the NB! investigation could not also ascertain
whether or not Cristina Neri and petitioners
missing child are one and the same person.
Before the lower court, petitioner-appellee
presented two physicians from the Sir John
Clinic, namely, Dr. Carmen Ty and Dr. Angelina
Trono to identify the child in question. But both
witnesses could not positively declare that
Cristina Neri is the same missing child Arabella
Sombong of petitioner. Dr. Trono even declared
in court that there were other babies left in the
clinic and that she could not be certain which
baby was given to respondents (pp. 48-49,
tsn, Nov. 10, 1992). x x x Petitioner, herself,
could not identify her own child, prompting the
respondent court to call for child Cristina Neri
to come forward near the bench for
comparison of her physical features with that
of her alleged mother, the petitioner (p. 32,
tsn, Nov. 5, 1992). After a comparison of
petitioner and Cristina Neris physical features,
the lower court found no similarity and to
which petitioner agreed claiming that said
child looked like her sister-in-law (p.
33, id.) When the lower court instructed
petitioner to bring said sister-in-law in the next
hearing, petitioner stated they were not on
good terms (p. 34, id.) No one, therefore, up to
this time has come forward to testify as a
witness in order to positively identify
respondents child Cristina Neri to be one and
the same as petitioners missing child, Arabella
Sombong.
xxx xxx xxx
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus does
not lie in this case considering that petitioner
is not entitled to the custody of Cristina Neri
because she is not the mother of the said
child, and does not have the right to have
custody over said child.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not agree with the lower court that the
ground of abandonment of a child has been
repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for
abandonment can also be included under the
phrase cases which have resulted from
culpable negligence of the parent (par. 2, Art.
231 of the Family Code). What can be the
worst culpable negligence of a parent than
abandoning her own child. This court does not
believe petitioner-appellees explanation that
she had been negotiating for the discharge of
her child for the past five years. That was too
long a time for negotiation when she could
have filed immediately a complaint with the
authorities or the courts x x x
As to the issue of the welfare of the child,
petitioner-appellees capability to give her child
the basic needs and guidance in life appear
(sic) to be bleak. Before the lower court
petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as
pauper as she had no fixed income. She also
admitted that she had no stable job, and she
had been separated from a man previously
married to another woman. She also confessed
that she planned to go abroad and leave her
other child Johannes to the care of the nuns.
The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is
certainly does not face a bright prospect with
petitioner-appellee.13
This prompted the petitioner to file this
petition.
We do not find the petition to be
meritorious.
While we sympathize with the plight of
petitioner who has been separated from her
daughter for more than eight years, we cannot
grant her the relief she is seeking, because the
evidence in this case does not support a
finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and
in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there
sufficient evidence to support the finding that
private respondents custody of Cristina is so
illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus. In general, the purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual
and effective, and not merely nominal or
moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve
a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.14
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant
of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
This is the basic requisite under the first part
of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty.
In the second part of the same provision,
however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Thus, although the Writ of Habeas
Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is
voluntary, we have held time and again that
the said writ is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody
of a third person of her own free will.15
It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the
writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas
corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child.
The controversy does not involve the
question of personal freedom, because an
infant is presumed to be in the custody of
someone until he attains majority age. In
passing on the writ in a child custody case, the
court deals with a matter of an equitable
nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of
parent or guardian, the court gives his or her
claim to the custody of the child due weight as
a claim founded on human nature and
considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the
legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the
case of adults, but on the courts view of the
best interests of those whose welfare requires
that they be in custody of one person or
another. Hence, the court is not bound to
deliver a child into the custody of any claimant
or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such
custody as its welfare at the time appears to
require. In short, the childs welfare is the
supreme consideration.
Considering that the childs welfare is an
all-important factor in custody cases, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code16 unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the
care and custody, among others, of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount
17
consideration. In the same vein, the Family
Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of
the child so demands, deprive the parents
concerned of parental authority over the child
or adopt such measures as may be proper
under the circumstances.18
The foregoing principles considered, the
grant of the writ in the instant case will all
depend on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right
of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful
custody of the minor is being withheld from
the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that
it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner
and not that of the respondent.
Not all of these requisites exist in this
case. The dismissal of this petition is thus
warranted.
I
As to the questionof identity.
Petitioner does not have the right of
custody over the minor Cristina because, by
the evidence disclosed before the court a
quo, Cristina has not been shown to be
petitioners daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not
warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the
same person as Cristina. It will be remembered
that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the
question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including
those as to identity of person. 19 These
presumptions may yield, however, to the
evidence proffered by the parties.
Identity may be thought of as a quality of a
person or thing, - the quality of sameness with
another person or thing. The essential
assumption is that two persons or things are
first thought of as existing, and that then the
one is alleged, because of common features,
to be the same as the other.20
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to
prove that two persons, initially thought of to
be distinct and separate from each other, are
indeed one and the same. The process is both
logical and analytical.
x x x it operates by comparing common marks
found to exist in the two supposed separate
objects of thought, with reference to the
possibility of their being the same. It follows
that its force depends on the necessariness of
the association between the mark and a single
object. Where a certain circumstance, feature,
or mark, may commonly be found associated
with a large number of objects, the presence
of that feature or mark in two supposed
objects is little indication of their identity,
because x x x the other conceivable
hypotheses are so numerous, i.e., the objects
that possess that mark are numerous and
therefore any two of them possessing it may
well be different. But where the objects
possessing the mark are only one or a few,
and the mark is found in two supposed
instances, the chances of two being different
are nil or are comparatively small.
Hence, in the process of identification of
two supposed objects, by a common mark, the
force of the inference depends on the degree
of necessariness of association of that mark
with a single object.
For simplicitys sake, the evidential
circumstance may thus be spoken of as a
mark. But in practice it rarely occurs that the
evidential mark is a single circumstance. The
evidencing feature is usually a group of
circumstances, which as a whole constitute a
feature capable of being associated with a
single object. Rarely can one circumstance
alone be so inherently peculiar to a single
object. It is by adding circumstance to
circumstance that we obtain a composite
feature or mark which as a whole cannot be
supposed to be associated with more than a
single object.
The process of constructing an inference of
identity thus consists usually in adding
together a number of circumstances, each of
which by itself might be a feature of many
objects, but all of which together make it more
probable that they co-exist in a single object
only. Each additional circumstance reduces the
chances of there being more than one object
so associated.21
In the instant case, the testimonial and
circumstantial proof establishes the individual
and separate existence of petitioners child,
Arabella, from that of private respondents
foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono,
who is petitioners own witness, testified in
court that, together with Arabella, there were
several babies left in the clinic and so she
could not be certain whether it was Arabella or
some other baby that was given to private
respondents. Petitioners own evidence shows
that, after the confinement of Arabella in the
clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again
only in 1989 when she visited the clinic. This
corroborates the testimony of petitioners own
witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically
confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to
April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her
assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect
that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital
until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with
the unwavering declaration of private
respondents that they obtained custody of
Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at
the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988,
leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not
Arabella.
Significantly, Justice. Lourdes K. Tayao-
Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of
the herein assailed decision, set the case for
hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the
purpose of observing petitioners demeanor
towards the minor Cristina. She made the
following personal but relevant manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself
of four children, wanted to see how petitioner
as an alleged mother of a missing child
supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would
react on seeing again her long lost child. The
petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing
of this case late, and she walked inside the
courtroom looking for a seat without even
stopping at her alleged daughters seat;
without even casting a glance on said child,
and without even that tearful embrace which
characterizes the reunion of a loving mother
with her missing dear child. Throughout the
proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed
no signs of endearment and affection expected
of a mother who had been deprived of the NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE
embrace of her little child for many years. The VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, RTC, BRANCH 37
conclusion or finding of undersigned ponente
as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is PEREZ, J.:
not the mother of Cristina Neri has been given
support by aforestated observation x x x.22 Before this Court is a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65[1] of the Rules of
The process of constructing an inference of
identity having earlier been explained to Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008
consist of adding one circumstance to another of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
in order to obtain a composite feature or mark Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-
which as a whole cannot be supposed to be 119132 which denied the petition for Habeas
associated with more than a single object, the
Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri
reverse is also true, i.e., when one
circumstance is added to another, and the Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police
result is a fortification of the corporeality of. Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan[2] (PO1
each of the two objects the identity of which is Ampatuan).
being sought to be established, the nexus of
Petitioner alleged in her petition that
circumstances correspondingly multiply the
chances of there being more than one object her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at
so associated. This is the situation that Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14
confronts us in this case, and so the inevitable April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police
but sad conclusion that we must make is that
to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff
petitioner has no right of custody over the
Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali
minor Cristina, because Cristina is not identical
with her missing daughter, Arabella. (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan
to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial
xxxxx Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to
In the light of the aforegoing premises, we
are constrained to rule that Habeas stay at the Police Provincial Office of
Corpus does not lie to afford petitioner the Maguindanao without being informed of the
relief she seeks. cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April
2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30574 the General Santos City Airport and was made
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner. to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound
for Manila. Upon landing at
SO ORDERED.
the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan
was turned over to policemen of Manila and
brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police
Director Geary Barias and General Roberto
Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted
where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan
was arrested for the killing of two Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then
detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan
GR NO 182497
was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department
of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008,
Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional
Headquarters Support
[3]
in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.
Petitioner continues that on 21 April
2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva
ordered the release for further investigation of
PO1 Ampatuan.[4] The Order was approved by
the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior
Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief
Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release
PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 37.[5]
Private respondents had another version
of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at
around 7:08 oclock in the evening of 10
November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man,
later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head
of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed
at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil
Streets, Ermita, Manila.Investigation
conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD)
Homicide Section yielded the identity of the
male perpetrator as
Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for
proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila
Prosecutors Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior
Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report
against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause
to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave
Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that
said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
PO1 hearing.
Group On even date, a charge sheet for Grave
Misconduct was executed against PO1
Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT
hereby charges above-named respondent of
the administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of
R.A. 8551[6] in relation to NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as
follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of
November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named
respondent while being an active member of
the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this
office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause
(sic) his death.
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules
and Regulations.[7]
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18
April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I.
Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the
PO1
National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO)
to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody, thus:
1. Reference: Memo from that Office
dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1
Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing
of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee
Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.
2. This pertains to the power of the
Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA
8551, to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency Armed with the 21 April 2008
of a grave administrative case filed
against him or even after the filing of a recommendation of the Manila Citys
criminal complaint, grave in nature, Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife
against such police personnel.
of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
3. In this connection, you are hereby Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the
directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan,
RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition
suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden
Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-
COMELEC Legal Officers, under your 119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.
restrictive custody.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to
4. For strict compliance.[8] be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered
On 19 April 2008, through a
the issuance of a writ of habeas
Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008,
corpuscommanding therein respondents to
respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias
produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and
requested for the creation of the Summary
directing said respondents to show cause why
Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1
they are withholding or restraining the liberty
Ampatuan.[9]
of PO1 Ampatuan.[12]

On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the
was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua,
Petition in its Order which reads:
placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, Essentially, counsels for petitioner
effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being
illegally detained by the respondents despite
921, reads: the order of release of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21,
Restrictive Custody 2008. They further claim that as of April 23,
2008, no administrative case was filed
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan against PO1 Ampatuan.
128677, is placed under
restrictive custody of the Regional Respondents, while admitting that to
Director, NCRPO effective April date no criminal case was filed against PO1
19, 2008. (Reference: Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under
Memorandum from CPNP restrictive custody since he is facing an
dated 18 April 2008). administrative case for grave
misconduct. They submitted to this Court the
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge
GENERAL RAZON:[10] Sheet. Further, in support of their position,
respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo,
et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920
claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City
a PNP personnel under restrictive
Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the custody. They claim that this is authorized
case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place
investigation and that the latter be released the PNP personnel under restrictive custody
from custody unless he is being held for other during the pendency of administrative case
for grave misconduct.
charges/legal grounds.[11]
 Petitioner countered that the
administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear
that there was such a case filed before April
23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to
determine the legality of ones detention,
meaning, if there is sufficient cause for
deprivation or confinement and if there is
none to discharge him at once. For habeas
corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom which must be
actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the
administrative case was ante-dated, the
Court cannot simply ignore the filing of an
administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that
the PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly
pointed out by the respondents, the
Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody
pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
The filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done
by the PNP and this Court has no authority
to order the release of the subject police
officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the
petitioner that the letter resignation of
PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic,
the same could not be accepted by this
Court. It must be stressed that the
resignation has not been acted (sic) by the
appropriate police officials of the PNP, and
that the administrative case was filed
while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active
status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.[13]
Distressed, petitioner is now before
this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question the validity of the
RTC Order dated 25 April 2008.
The issues are:
I. THE RESPONDENTCOURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER
B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY
WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF
RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR.
UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE
AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED
FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE
RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE
CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.
[14]
Essentially, a writ
of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty.[15]
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets
forth the procedure to be followed in the
issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on
any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted
it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable
before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is valid
or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot
issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person's detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application.[16]
Plainly stated, the writ
immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned
sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not
be issued when the custody over the person is
by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.[17]
The most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty
is restrained via some legal process, the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.
[18]
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant
of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[19]
In general, the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine whether or
not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A
prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
be
essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. [20]
as the
In passing upon a petition for habeas
corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of
his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
obtains
proceed only where such restraint exists. If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be
without
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and
the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused. [21]
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as a
mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is
only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will
the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If
the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition
should be dismissed.[22]
Petitioner contends that when PO1
Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet
no administrative case filed against him. When
the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor
Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on
21 April 2008, there was still no administrative
case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also
argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1
Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal
because there was no warrant of arrest issued
by any judicial authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their
Comment[23] filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, argue that the trial court correctly
denied the subject petition.Respondents
maintain that while the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that
PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said
recommendation was made only insofar as the
criminal action for murder that was filed with
the prosecution office is concerned and is
without prejudice to other legal grounds for
which he may be held under custody. In the
instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing
administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v.
Calderon,[24] where this Court held that a
petition for habeas corpus will be given due
course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully,
but a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a
form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
[25]
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been
placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act
No. 6975 (also known as the Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are
subject to the administrative disciplinary
machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said
law enumerates the disciplinary
actions, including restrictive custody that may
be imposed by duly designated supervisors
and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter
of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of
Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power
to impose the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service; suspension or
forfeiture of salary; or any combination
thereof for a period not exceeding one
hundred eighty (180) days. Provided,
further, That the Chief of the PNP shall
have the authority to place police
personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or
even after the filing of a criminal
 complaint, grave in nature, against such SO ORDERED.
police personnel. [Emphasis ours].

xxxxx
G.R. No. 182855 June 5, 2013
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been
MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS,
placed under restrictive custody, such
represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA
constitutes a valid argument for his continued FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR),
through its Executive Director, MRS.
detention. This Court has held that a MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the
restrictive custody and monitoring of NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its
movements or whereabouts of police officers Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES,
JR., Petitioners,
under investigation by their superiors is not a vs.
form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO,
DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL
[26]
FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL
NORTE, Respondent.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal REYES, J.:

restraint which is beyond
of habeas corpus. It is neither
effective restraint that would call for the grant
of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans
restrictive custody is the administrative case
filed against him, his remedy is within such
the ambit This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of
actual nor Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102 of the 1997
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alexander
Adonis (Adonis), praying that the Court directs
respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro
(respondent), Director of the Davao Prisons
and Penal Farm, to have the body of the
former brought before this Court and in the
alternative, praying for the application of the
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-
2008,2 which imposes the penalty of a fine
instead of imprisonment in Criminal Case No.
48679-2001.3
Antecedent Facts

administrative process. In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was

convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge him by then Representative Prospero Nograles.
He was sentenced to an indeterminate
the burden of showing that she is entitled to sentence of five (5) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor maximum, as minimum penalty,
the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of
to four (4) years, six (6) months and one (1)
her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails day of prision correccional medium, as
maximum penalty.4 He began serving his
to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully sentence at the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and on February 20, 2007.5

enshrined in the Constitution. A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against
Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14.6
merit.
Costs against petitioner.
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons
and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the
Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in
various jails in the country, which included
Adonis. The said document was received by
the City Parole and Probation Office of Davao
on May 2, 2008.7
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
the subject of which is the "Guidelines in the
Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, on
April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a
Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of
Court),8 praying for his immediate release from
detention and for the modification of his
sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the
said Circular.
On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-
2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved
for his provisional release from detention. The
motion was granted by Presiding Judge George
Omelio in open court and he was allowed to
post bail in the amount
9
of P5,000. Subsequently on even date and
after Adonis filed a cash bond and an
undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order
directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to
release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is
being held for some other crimes or
offenses."11 On the same date, the said order
was served to the respondent, 12 but the
release of Adonis was not effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained
by the respondent for no valid reason.13
The respondent consequently filed his
Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27,
2008 an Urgent Motion to Resolve15 and on
November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and
Motion,16 reiterating all his previous prayers.
On February 11, 2009, the Court received the
letter from the respondent, informing the
Court that Adonis had been released from
confinement on December 23, 2008 after
accepting the conditions set forth in his parole
and with the advise to report to the City Parole
and Probation Officer of Davao.17
The Courts Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense
of personal freedom. It is issued only for the
lone purpose of obtaining relief for those
illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the
person is in custody because of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides when a writ must not be
allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for
libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 48679-2001.1wphi1 Since his detention
was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not
entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was
serving his sentence when the BPP granted
him parole, along with six (6) others, on
December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a
convict may be released from prison on parole
when he had served the minimum period of
his sentence; the pendency of another criminal
case, however, is a ground for the
disqualification of such convict from being
released on parole.20 Notably, at the time he
was granted the parole, the second libel case
was pending before the RTC Branch 14. 21 In
fact, even when the instant petition was filed,
Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending.
The issuance of the writ under such
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There
was basis for the respondent to deny his
immediate release at that time.
xxxx SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.