SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court
by necessary implication.
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.*
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
Labor Law; Judicial Review; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice;
The Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to
reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability
of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still
follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.Before
proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels
that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it
has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the
NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way
to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years
into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor
Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and
warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
Jurisdiction; Statutes; The excepting clause provided for in
paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7902, contradicts what has been ruled and said all along
that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.It will,
however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now
grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over
all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-
judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except,
among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all
along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet,
under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
There are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other
court for that matter.The same exceptive clause further
confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified
cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of
course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly
excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical
and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that
procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for
that matter.
Statutory Construction; A review of the legislative records
on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades the Court
that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein.A review of the legislative records on
the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have
been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act
or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress
did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the
NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an
inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has
been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of
Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings;
Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose,
aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and
Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The Court is of the
that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action
considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC
on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to
to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
labor. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No.
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
decisions of the NLRC; Appeals by certiorari and the original
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
addressed to the appellate courts.The Court is, therefore, of
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was
that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have
noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important Isagani M. Jungco for petitioner.
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is Sebastinian Office of Legal Aid for private respondent.
particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption
REGALADO, J.:
that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would
not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration
Hierarchy of Courts; All references in the amended Section
Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent
9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January
in the Court of Appeals.While we do not wish to intrude into the
22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
score we add the further observations that there is a growing
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being
Revenue (BIR).1
a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not
its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the
business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter
took over the management of the business. She then discovered
that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported to show that the
same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner
had illegally terminated his employment.2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996
declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to
the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving
credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he
worked as a volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin
Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a
period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the
Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial
review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions
of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their
way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the
years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The
Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call
for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October
14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be
appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the
President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation.8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC
which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment
for program and policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of
appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but
P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished
such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no
provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC.10 The present
Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715,
instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases
within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that
this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC,
and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless
rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute;
that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of
the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions
of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy,12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65,13 for which said Rule has now
fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the
decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
period under Rule 65.14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P.
No. 129 originally provided as follows:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction.The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was
amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction.The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of
Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name
of the lower appellate court,16 the following amendments of the
original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A.
No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor
Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the
Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in
cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was
transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original
exclusionary clause therein now provides except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. (Italics supplied)
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among
the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in
point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of
judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now
been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited
to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us,
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No.
129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and
the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been
ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of
the NLRC.17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed,
the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by
declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly
excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by
transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could
not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in
the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein
are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any
other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No.
7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the
course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for
judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for
the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly
on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Conference Committee Report on S.
No. 1495/H. No. 10452.18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered
his sponsorship speech19 from which we reproduce the following
excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits
that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its
coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks
to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court
of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated
to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the
privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief
Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme
Court:
x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and
the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote
its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated
task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the
peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to
mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the
reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following
Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the
following proceedings transpired:
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that
it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor
Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)
xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill
No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill,
its unanimous approval on third reading followed.21 The
Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House
Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on
February 20, 1995,22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on
appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of
the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in
the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari
are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however, and with which
the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
this Court and the Court of Appeals;23 whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are
allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No.
1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters
were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of
Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be
circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as
he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure
would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage
to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed
after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of
the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on
the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is
procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased
number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired. Apropos to this directive
that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with
their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al.25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein
set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
Petition remanded, records ordered forwarded to Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
Notes.It is generally understood that as to administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right
of review is given by statute. (San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary
of Labor, 64 SCRA 56 [1975])
The fact that P.D. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial
review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does
not necessarily preclude judicial review. The extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or quo warranto (Rules 65 and 66)
are always available in proper cases where there is no appeal or
other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The power of the Supreme Court to strike down acts which
infringe on constitutional protections or to nullify administrative
decisions contrary to constitutional mandates cannot be reduced or
circumscribed by any statute or decree. No statute is needed to
bring arbitrary acts or decisions within our jurisdiction. (Tropical
Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987])
o0o
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494, G.R. No.
130866 September 16, 1998

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alcazaren vs. Univet Agricultural Products, Inc.
G.R. No. 149628. November 22, 2005.*
EDGARDO B. ALCAZAREN, petitioner, vs. UNIVET
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC., respondent.
Appeals; Certiorari; Jurisdictions; The Court of Appeals, pursuant to
the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petition for certiorari,
was specifically given power to pass upon the evidence, if and when
necessary, to resolve factual issues.On the first issue, this Court
has ruled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA, pursuant to the
exercise of its original jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari,
was specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and
when necessary, to resolve factual issues. When factual findings of
the NLRC are contrary to those of the Labor Arbiter, the appellate
court may review the evidentiary facts. In this case, the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter were reversed by the NLRC. Hence, the
CA had to review the evidence of the parties and determine for
itself the evidentiary facts.
Administrative Law; The general rule is that the factual findings of
administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are
accorded respect and finality, except where it is clear that a
palpable and demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has
been committed by the quasi-administrative tribunal.The general
rule is that the factual findings of administrative tribunals, if
supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even
finality. However, such general rule admits of an exception, such as
where it is clear that a palpable and demonstrable mistake that
needs rectification has been committed by the quasi-administrative
tribunal. In the case at bench, the CA found that the NLRC had
misappreciated the evidence presented and had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
setting aside the Labor Arbiters decision.
Labor Law; Dismissals; Loss of Trust and Confidence; Sales
Representatives; Loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for
dismissing an employee, provided that the loss of confidence
arises from particular proven facts.Loss of trust and confidence
is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, provided that the
loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts. Termination
of employment on this ground does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employees misconduct. It is sufficient that
there is some basis for the loss of trust or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position. It bears stressing that the
petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was a sales
representative, reposed with managerial duties in overseeing the
respondents business in his assigned area. As a managerial
employee, the petitioner was tasked to perform key and sensitive
functions, and thus bound by more exacting work ethics. He
should have realized that such sensitive position required the full
trust and confidence of his employer in every exercise of
managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of the latters business
is concerned.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Filomeno B. Tan, Jr. for petitioner.
Ma. Leah Jose-Sebastian for respondent Univet Agricultural
Products.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51311 which set aside the
Decision2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC Case No. V-0261-97.
Sometime in 1982, Univet Agricultural Products, Inc. (Univet)
employed Edgardo B. Alcazaren as a casual employee performing
the work of a sales representative in Capiz and Aklan. Over time, he
was promoted to different positions. In November 1994, he was
promoted as sales supervisor in the West Visayas Area.3
On July 3, 1996, Alcazaren was transferred as sales supervisor from
West Visayas to East Visayas via an inter-office Memorandum of
Operations Manager Romeo Savella.4 However, despite attempts to
serve the memorandum on Alcazaren, he refused to receive the
same.5 On July 10, 1996, Savella ordered Alcazaren to participate in
the mid-year meeting of sales supervisors of the West Visayas Area
at the Amigo Hotel, Iloilo City scheduled on July 15, 19966 and in a
meeting set on July 16, 1996 at the Montebello Hotel, Cebu City.
Alcazaren failed to attend the meetings.
On July 16, 1996, Savella ordered Alcazaren to report to his
supervisor, OVP General Manager Conrado S. Baylon, at the
Montebello Hotel, Cebu City either that day or the following day,
July 17, 1996.7 Alcazaren read the directive but refused to receive
it.
On July 20, 1996, Savella issued a Memorandum8 requiring
Alcazaren to explain, in writing, within 48 hours from notice thereof
why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed on him for his
failure to attend the conference despite notice. On July 27, 1996,
the Personnel Committee issued a Memorandum9 requiring
Alcazaren to explain within 48 hours why he should not be meted
disciplinary actions for his failure to comply with the July 16 and 20,
1996 Memoranda of Savella.
On August 5, 1996, Alcazaren submitted his written explanation.10
He claimed that his grandmother Ecspectacion Bacero died on July
7, 1996 and he had to attend her burial in President Roxas, Capiz on
July 15, 1996. He alleged that he received notice of the July 15,
1996 meeting in Iloilo City only on July 11, 1996; he immediately
contacted Baylon by long distance, who advised him to just try and
catch up and attend the meeting even after the burial. He narrated
that he arrived in Iloilo City on July 15, 1996 at around 7:30 p.m.
and attended the meeting only to be berated by Savella. He left the
meeting to avoid further complications. He explained that he failed
to attend the July 16, 1996 meeting because the burial of his
grandmother was reset to July 17, 1996. He informed
Ernie Poral that he needed to attend the burial of his grandmother.
He averred that he should not be faulted for his failure to submit his
explanation to the July 20, 1996 Memorandum of Savella because
he received it only on July 29, 1996 in Bacolod City when it was
given to him by his housemaid.11
On August 12, 1996, Alcazaren was directed to report to Univet at
Mandaluyong City on August 13, 1996 and to turn over to Ernie
Poral or Rolly12 Banson all accountable forms in his possession and
the service vehicle assigned to him13 described as Toyota Corolla,
Model 1990 with Plate No. PRX-856 to Dr. Rey Labaco. However,
Alcazaren failed to turn over the vehicle to Dr. Labaco.
The Personnel Committee issued a Memorandum14 to Alca-zaren,
on August 14, 1996, requiring him to explain why he should not be
disciplined for his unauthorized absences in his area from July 15-
20, 22-27, 29-31, 1996, and August 1-3, 5-10, 1996, and for his
failure to turn over the company vehicle to Dr. Rey Labaco.
The Committee pointed out that under Page 1, Article A, Paragraph
1, subparagraph (b) of the Company House Rules, absence without
leave (AWOL) for six consecutive working days is meted with the
penalty of dismissal; and that under Article 282(b) of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties is also punishable by dismissal. The Committee also
pointed out that Page 6, Paragraph G, Article 4 of the Company
House Rules provides a 15-day suspension with warning of
dismissal as a penalty for insubordination or willful disobedience in
carrying out reasonable requests or instructions of superior, or acts
of grave misconduct/disrespect towards superior. On the same
date, August 14, 1996, Alcazaren submitted his explanation to the
Memorandum of the Personnel Committee.16 He also submitted a
separate explanation to the charge of his being AWOL.17 He
reiterated his explanation contained in his August 5, 1996 letter to
the Committee.
The Personnel Committee conducted an investigation of the matter
and, on August 16, 1996, ruled that Alcazaren was guilty of an
infraction. He was suspended for 15 days effective August 19-24, On September 10, 1996, the Personnel Committee reiterated its
26-30, 1996 and September 2-5, 1996, and warned that a more directive for Alcazaren to turn over the service vehicle for shipment
severe penalty would be meted against him for future violations.18 to Iloilo City and all sample stocks in his possession intended for
West Visayas.25 Finally, Alcazaren relented and turned over all
However, Alcazaren still refused to turn over the company vehicle
accountables in his possession to Mario Dueas and released the
to Dr. Labaco or to Univet. On September 3, 1996, Alcazaren
key of the service vehicle to David Pinor.26
informed Univet that he would be reporting to the East Visayas Area
on September 6, 1996 after the expiration of his suspension, but On September 19, 1996, Alcazaren submitted to the Personnel
that he will bring with him the service vehicle. He claimed that he Committee his explanation. He claimed that he had not received
had already acquired certain rights over the said car pursuant to the August 21, 1996 Order directing him to turn over the service
existing company rules regarding his option to buy the same.19 vehicle because he was already suspended at the time. He claimed
that when Mr. Winston Young went to Iloilo, he, together with Poral,
On September 4, 1996, Alcazaren received a Memorandum from
forcibly entered his (Alcazarens) residence. He also claimed that he
the Personnel Committee of Univet directing him to claim his plane
advised Univet about his reporting to East Visayas Area after the
ticket at the Iloilo Depot and to report at Univets office in
expiration of his suspension on September 5, 1996 and that he held
Mandaluyong City on September 6, 1996. Univet also reiterated its
the service vehicle in his possession because he was under the
directive for him to turn over the service vehicle to Ernie Poral or
impression that he had already acquired certain rights over it; when
Rolly Banson, including the sample stocks and accountable forms in
the service vehicle he shipped arrived in Cebu, he immediately
his possession.20 Alcazaren still refused to turn over the vehicle to
placed the same in the possession of the security guard on duty at
Dr. Labaco; worse, Alcazaren had the vehicle shipped to Cebu City.
the Unilab Depot. He claimed that he was already in Cebu when
In a Memorandum21 dated September 6, 1996, the Personnel
Univets instructions dated September 4, 1996 arrived in Bacolod,
Committee ordered Alcazaren to appear before the Committee the
thus, it was impossible for him to comply with the said directives.
following day to answer violations of the Company House Rules,
He also requested Baylon of Univet if he could report on September
particularly insubordination and continuous noncompliance with
9 instead of September 7, 1996, which was apparently granted. He
home office directives. When he received the directive on
pointed out that he had already complied with the memorandum
September 7, 1996, Alcazaren had the service vehicle parked at the
directing him to turn over the service vehicle and other
Unilab Depot compound in Mandaue City.22
accountables in his possession.
In a Memorandum23 dated September 9, 1996, the Personnel
Alcazaren asserted that his previous 15-day suspension and the
Committee informed Alcazaren that Univet had already lost its trust
current 30-day preventive suspension imposed upon him were
and confidence in him as a result of his continuous and repeated
devoid of factual and legal bases and that he had not been afforded
violations of company rules and regulations, and deliberate
due process. He also claimed that despite the expiration of his 15-
defiance of legitimate orders from superiors. He was required to
day suspension, Univet had not given him any work assignment,
explain in writing within 5 days from receipt of said Memorandum
thus he felt that he had been placed in a freezer. He was
why his services should not be terminated. In the meantime, he was
convinced that he was being harassed, threatened and intimidated
further placed under preventive suspension effective September 16,
by management for acts which did not constitute valid causes or
1996 to October 15, 1996.24
grounds for severance of his employment.
On September 23, 1996, Alcazaren filed his complaint27 against
Univet and its officers before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
No. VI in Bacolod City. It was docketed as RAB Case No. 06-09-
10506-96. Alcazaren alleged, inter alia, that he had been illegally
suspended, that he was illegally dismissed (constructive dismissal),
that his salaries were not paid, and that he would like to exercise
his option to buy the service vehicle assigned to him. He prayed for
his reinstatement with full backwages from date of dismissal until
reinstatement, payment of unpaid salaries/wages, moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On October 5, 1996, Poral submitted his Answer to the above letter-
explanation of Alcazaren, and alleged that he and Young had not
broken into Alcazarens house but were allowed entry by the latters
cousin.
Although he had already filed his complaint with the NLRC,
Alcazaren requested Univet home office, on October 2, 1996, to
send him P10,000.00 as traveling allowance so that he could attend
the meeting on October 3, 1996 at the Univet Office in
Mandaluyong City.30 Still unaware of the complaint of Alcazaren,
Univet advised Alcazaren, on October 4, 1996, that his plane ticket
had already been delivered at his residence in Bacolod on October
2, 1996 as reflected on LBC air cargo records. Enclosed in the letter
was a check amounting to P10,000.00. Univet informed Alcazaren
that the meeting was reset to October 8, 1996.31
On October 5, 1996, Alcazaren notified Univet that he had already
filed a complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal against it before
the NLRC.32
On October 15, 1996, the Personnel Committee issued its
Memorandum33 terminating Alcazarens employment due to
violations of company house rules and the Labor Code.
Univet, in its position paper,34 asserted, inter alia, that there was
no constructive discharge or illegal dismissal of Alcazaren. As a
sales supervisor, he was vested with the unqualified trust and
confidence of the higher management, and was entrusted with the
custody and care of various company properties. It pointed out that
he had not only breached the trust and confidence reposed on him,
but continuously and habitually broke the rules. Univet further
averred that Alcazarens acts constituted serious misconduct, and
can be described as willful disobedience to lawful orders in
connection with his work. Moreover, his explanations were flimsy
he could always attend the scheduled meetings since Iloilo was only
about 3 hours away from Capiz. Univet further claimed that it had
been accommodating to Alcazaren as it considered his availability
on scheduled conferences. However, he went AWOL from July 15 to
August 10, 1996.
On June 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision35 ordering
the dismissal of the complaint. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) DISMISSING the complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal
dismissal for lack of merit;
b) DISMISSING the complaint for moral and exemplary damages for
lack of merit;
c) DISMISSING all other claims for lack of merit;
d) As a measure of social and compassionate justice, ORDERING
respondent Univet Agricultural Products, Inc. to pay separation pay
as form of financial assistance to the complainant Edgardo
Alcazaren the sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED TWO PESOS & 22/100 (P287,402.22) and
attorneys fee in the amount of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY PESOS & 22/100 (P28,740.22) or in the total sum
of THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-
TWO PESOS & 44/100 (P316,142.44) to be deposited with this Office
within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision; and
e) DISMISSING all claims and causes of action against respondents b)
Unilab Inc., Winston Young, Conrado S. Baylon, Wan Lian Tan and Dr.
Allowance/per diem:
Delfin Samson for lack of merit.
(P6,620.00 + 11,700.00 =18,320.00)
SO ORDERED.
P18,320.00/month x 15 months = 274,800.00
Alcazaren appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered
judgment granting the appeal and reversing the decision of the c) Commission/Incentive:
Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that the refusal of Alcazaren to
turn over his service vehicle cannot be considered as willful P5,000.00/month x 15 months = 75,000.00
disobedience since the said vehicle is retirable after a year, and Total backwages P701,593.95
that Alcazaren had ample grounds to initially hold on to said
vehicle under Univets Revised Motor Vehicle Replacement Policy. Add: Attorneys Fees 70,159.39
Further, the NLRC stated that although Alcazaren committed an
Grand Total P771,753.34
infraction relative to said turn over, considering that he had been
an employee of Univet for 14 years, the penalty of dismissal was SO ORDERED.37
too harsh and highly disproportionate to the offense committed.
Alcazaren felt that he was being harassed and that he had not been Univet elevated the case to the CA, alleging that:
given any work assignment after the expiration of his 15-day
suspension. Thus, the NLRC found that Alcazaren was illegally and
constructively dismissed entitling him to be reinstated with I
backwages. The fallo of its decision reads:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
Arbiter is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED and a new one entered THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY
declaring complainant to have been illegally and constructively DISMISSED, ERRONEOUSLY AND ARBITRARILY REVERSING THE
dismissed. Respondent Univet Agricultural Products is hereby FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO.
ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss
II
of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay him the following:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
1. Backwages (Sept. 6/96 to Dec. 31/97) 1 year, 3 months & 25
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
days
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DISMISS PRIVATE
a)Basic Salary: RESPONDENT, A SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE, FOR LOSS OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE.
P22,048.73/mo. x 15 mos. = P330,730.95
III
842.52/day x 25 days = 21,063.00
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
P351,793.95 AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS IN GOOD FAITH IN INITIALLY
HOLDING ON TO HIS SERVICE VEHICLE.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO
REINSTATEMENT, PAYMENT OF BACK-WAGES, ALLOWANCES, AND
COMMISSIONS.38
On December 26, 2000, the CA rendered a decision granting the
petition. It found that Alcazaren was not constructively dismissed
since he was still employed with Univet at the time he filed his
complaint for constructive and illegal dismissal although under
suspension; he had not been demoted, nor his pay decreased, as he
was only transferred to a different area which had the same sales
potential as his previous assignment; he had the same position,
privileges and pay. The CA declared that the transfer of an
employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management
prerogatives, and that Alcazaren defied his reassignment by
reporting for work at his old post in West Visayas. Moreover, he was
given sufficient opportunity to explain and comply with Univets
orders and memoranda but repeatedly refused to turn over the
service vehicle despite clear orders of his employer; in fact, he
shipped said vehicle to Cebu. According to the CA, his acts were
tantamount to an appropriation of company asset for personal
use.
The CA further held that no evidence was adduced to show that the
subject service vehicle was scheduled for disposition. It found that
Alcazarens termination from employment was justified under
Article 282(a) and (c) of the Labor Code. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
decision and resolution of respondent NLRC dated January 6, 1998
and April 27, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by private respondent against petitioner is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.39
Alcazaren filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which
the appellate court denied.40
Alcazaren, now the petitioner, avers in his petition that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE
AND GRANTING RESPONDENTS PATENTLY DEFECTIVE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI. IN DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE NLRC AND IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT ILLEGALLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.
IN DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.41
On the first ground, the petitioner avers that the CA erred in
granting the respondents petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. He avers that in a petition for certiorari, only a
question of law or lack of jurisdiction may be raised. The appellate
court is not to reexamine the evidence before the Labor Arbiter and
reevaluate the probative weight of the evidence of the parties. The
petitioner maintains that the issues raised by the respondent as the
petitioner in the CA are factual, and the laws ascribed to the NLRC
were factual and not error of jurisdiction. He insists that the CA
should have dismissed the petition for certiorari.
The petitioner asserts that there is no factual basis for his dismissal
from his employment based on serious misconduct or willful
disobedience. He reiterated that as borne by his explanations
submitted to respondent Univet and the Personnel Committee, his
absences at the conferences in Iloilo City and Cebu City were
justified.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, this Court has ruled that under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA,
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari, was specifically given the power to pass upon the
evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.42 When
factual findings of the NLRC are contrary to those of the Labor
Arbiter, the appel-late court may review the evidentiary facts.43 In
this case, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter were reversed by
the NLRC. Hence, the CA had to review the evidence of the parties
and determine for itself the evidentiary facts.
The general rule is that the factual findings of administrative
tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded
respect and even finality. However, such general rule admits of an
exception, such as where it is clear that a palpable and
demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed
by the quasi-administrative tribunal.44 In the case at bench, the CA
found that the NLRC had misappreciated the evidence presented
and had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the Labor Arbiters decision.
On the petitioners suspension for being AWOL, the records show
that the petitioner had agreed thereto. Indeed, he informed the
respondent that he was reporting to his new station after serving
his suspension.
The respondent could not be faulted for suspending the petitioner
anew for 30 days pending resolution of the charges against him
because he insisted on keeping the service vehicle and accountable
forms despite the respondents repeated orders. The respondent
had to spend for the reshipment of the vehicle from Cebu City to
Iloilo City where it was needed for the companys operational use.
The petitioner gave up the possession of the vehicle only on
September 7, 1996 after he received the Personnel Committee
Memorandum dated September 6, 1996, requiring him to appear
before the Committee for insubordination. He even had the vehicle
kept in Mandaue City.
The petitioners claim, that he did not return the vehicle despite the
directives of the management because he had acquired certain
rights over the said service vehicle under the Companys Revised
Motor Vehicle Replacement Policy or Revised Motor Vehicle Option-
to-Buy Policy, is merely an afterthought. The petitioner had been
ordered as early as August 12, 1996 to turn over the vehicle to
Poral or Banson or to Dr. Labaco for his operational use. He refused
to do so. In his Explanations dated August 5 and 14, 1996, the
petitioner did not claim that he had such option to acquire the
vehicle. He invoked for the first time that he had certain rights
over the vehicle only on September 3, 1996. In the meantime,
instead of complying with the directive of the management, the
petitioner even had the vehicle shipped to Cebu City.
Even a cursory reading of the corporate guidelines45 will readily
show that the option of an officer of the company to purchase a
second vehicle occurs only when the car is retired. Even then, the
officer has to accomplish the requisite form and submit the same to
the company for processing and approval. However, the service
vehicle still had one more year before it will be retired. Indeed, the
respondent had the vehicle assigned to Dr. Labaco for his
operational use. The petitioner never accomplished the requisite
form. He simply refused to return the vehicle and opted to defy the
directives of the respondent.
It was only after he was meted a 30-day suspension did the
petitioner finally turn over the vehicle to the respondent. He
intentionally did not turn over the vehicle to hold on to his non-
existent option to buy it. The disobedience of the petitioner was
clearly willful, and as a result, the respondent lost its trust and
confidence in him.46
The petitioner had not yet been dismissed from his employment
when he filed his complaint against the respondent with the NLRC.
He was expected to report to his new assignment after serving his
30-day suspension, but instead of requesting reconsideration
thereof, or reporting for work after such period, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent for illegal dismissal.
The eventual termination of the petitioners employment is justified
under the respondents Company House Rules and under Article
282(a) and (c) of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 282. Termination by employer.An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust re-posed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative.
Thus, loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for dismissing
an employee, provided that the loss of confidence arises from
particular proven facts. Termination of employment on this ground
does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employees
misconduct. It is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss of
trust or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that
the employee is responsible for the misconduct which renders him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.47
It bears stressing that the petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. He was a sales representative, reposed with managerial
duties in overseeing the respondents business in his assigned area.
As a managerial employee, the petitioner was tasked to perform
key and sensitive functions, and thus bound by more exacting
work ethics.48 He should have realized that such sensitive position
required the full trust and confidence of his employer in every
exercise of managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of the
latters business is concerned.
In fact, the petitioners dealings with the respondent during his
preventive suspension were attended by bad faith. He had already
filed his complaint with the Labor Arbiter on September 23, 1996,
and yet, on October 2, 1996, he had the gall to ask the respondent
to send him P10,000.00 traveling allowance and a plane ticket to
attend a scheduled meeting on October 8, 1996, per letter
memorandum in the respondents office in Mandaluyong City.49
Upon receipt of the P10,000.00 check and the plane ticket, the
petitioner notified the respondent that he could no longer attend
the scheduled meeting as he had already filed a complaint for
illegal/constructive dismissal.50
The validity of the petitioners dismissal hinges on the satisfaction
of the two substantive requirements for a lawful termination of an
employees services, to wit: (1) the employee was accorded due
process, basic of which are opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the causes
provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.51
In this case, the respondent complied with the twin procedural
requirement of written notices to effect a valid dismissal, viz.: (a) a
notice of preventive suspension was given to the petitioner
apprising him of the acts and omissions for which his dismissal was
sought,52 and (b) a subsequent notice after investigation informing
the petitioner of the respondents decision to dismiss him.53 The
petitioner preempted a formal investigation and opted to file his
complaint against the respondent thereby rendering a formal
investigation moot and academic.
In fine, the respondent had sufficiently discharged its burden of
proving that the dismissal of the petitioner was for just cause, that
it was made within the parameters of the law and pursuant to the
basic tenets of equity, justice and fair play.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. Alcazaren vs. Univet Agricultural Products, Inc., 475 SCRA 636, G.R.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51311 is No. 149628 November 22, 2005
AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.As regards cashiers, managers, supervisors, salesmen, or
other personnel occupying positions of responsibility, the
requirement that an employee should enjoy the trust and
confidence of his employer may justify their termination. In the
business of manufacturing and marketing pharmaceutical products,
selling is a highly sensitive and important activity because the
companys profitability and survival as a going concern depend on
it. (Tan vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 299 SCRA 169
[1998])
Salesmen are highly individualistic personnel who have to be
trusted and left essentially on their owna high degree of
confidence is reposed in them when they are entrusted with funds
or properties of their employer. (Sanchez vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 312 SCRA 727 [1999])
o0o