New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134

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New Ideas in Psychology

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Positive psychology on character strengths and virtues. A

disquieting suggestionq
Konrad Banicki
Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Ul. ojasiewicz 4, 30-348 Krakw, Poland

a b s t r a c t

Keywords: The Values in Action (VIA) classication of character strengths and virtues has been
Values in Action recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin
Character strenghts Seligman as the social science equivalent of virtue ethics. The very possibility of devel-
Peterson
oping this kind of an equivalent, however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent
Seligman
criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as
Unity of virtue
Fact/value distinction the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its ofcial normative
neutrality, is pervaded by specically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order
to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue
ethical tradition, the classication was assessed against two fundamental features of the
classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues,
as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the
relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above
features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the
latters: (10 ) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent vari-
ables and (20 ) ofcial endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments
for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential
responses available to the VIAs proponents are discussed.
2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. From MacIntyres disquieting suggestion to
Peterson and Seligmans classication of character
strengths and virtues
At the beginning of Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue
(MacIntyre, 2007; cf. MacIntyre, 1984), arguably one of the
most inuential books in 20th century analytic philosophy,
the reader is asked to imagine that humanity has suffered a
great catastrophe after which civilization has reverted to
the Dark Ages. All natural sciences and technology have
virtually vanished. Some time after this great disaster,
q Christopher M. Peterson, one of the authors of the VIA classication
investigated in this paper, sadly passed away on 9 October 2012. The
obituaries of this great contributor to psychological studies of the good
life and virtuous character can be found in Park, Oates, and Schwarzer
(2013).
E-mail address: konrad.banicki@uj.edu.pl.
however, the situation changes for better and some
enlightened people undertake the mission of reviving
scientic knowledge.1
Their noble endeavor, however, is very deeply, if not
thoroughly, undermined by the fact that they have only
scarce remains of a once sophisticated system of thought
and practice. In fact, they have largely forgotten what it
was (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 1, emphasis added): both the real
nature and the meaning of their predecessors achieve-
ments is obscure to them. The revived science turns out to
be nothing more than a knowledge of experiments de-
tached from any knowledge of the theoretical context
which gave them signicance; parts of theories unrelated
1
MacIntyres somewhat science-ctional piece of imagery is based on
the post-apocalyptic novel written by Walter Miller (1960): A Canticle for
Leibowitz.

0732-118X/$ see front matter 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.12.001
22 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
either to the other bits and pieces of theory . or to
experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten;
half-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not
always fully legible because torn and charred.
These ambitious restorers, importantly, are not only
ignorant of the real character science in the past but also
mostly unaware of their own ignorance. Working under the
illusion that they are rebuilding real science they advertise
the return of physics, chemistry, and biology. They are
deeply wrong, however, because what they are doing is
not natural science in any proper sense at all. The context
that once used to provide meaning to their practice,
including scientic standards of consistency and coher-
ence, has been lost, perhaps irretrievably.
The analysis of this imagined situation is only an
introduction to a deep and sophisticated investigation into
the condition of modernity. The striking and very inuen-
tial thesis that comes to be founded on this investigation is
that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of
morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the lan-
guage of natural science in the imaginary world (p. 2)
described above. Modern so-called moral philosophy, ac-
cording to this disquieting suggestion, is not moral phi-
losophy in any proper sense at all.
The post-apocalyptic project of a scientic renaissance
foundered because of its lack of proper theoretical and
meta-theoretical context including forgotten genuinely
scientic practices. Modern moral philosophy, analogously,
is inevitably entangled in endless and irresolvable disputes
because it has been torn from the context that used to
supply it with meaning and rational rules. This context
included the shared conception of human good, as char-
acteristic of pre-modern societies as it has been unchar-
acteristic of modern ones, as well as common beliefs,
thoughts, feelings, and actions connected with the latter.
All of these have been to a large degree fragmented and
then in part destroyed (p. 5). This loss, however, is barely
recognized by the majority of moral philosophers who
continue to use the language of morality, even though it
currently lacks any external foundation or criteria and,
thus, can be justiably considered as subjective. Genuine
morality, for MacIntyre at least, can be roughly identied
with the tradition of virtue ethics. In the contemporary
world, however, we possess only simulacra (p. 2) or
meagre substitutes (p. 243) for any moral system that
could be justiably placed within this tradition. Our theo-
retical and practical understanding of its nature seems to
have been irretrievably lost.
The aim of this paper is to apply the MacIntyrean vision
as a metatheoretical perspective from which a recent
attempt at reintroducing the notion of virtuous character
into scientic psychology will be investigated.2 More spe-
cically, it is the Values in Action (VIA) classication of
character strengths and virtues developed by two leading
positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin
Seligman (2004, p. 89) and proclaimed as the social sci-
ence equivalent of virtue ethics that will be subjected to
scrutiny.
2
For a history of this notions banishment see Nicholson (1998).
Before conducting this particular analysis, however,
some preparation will be needed. (1) First, recent criticism
of positive psychology will be briey summarized. Even
though this criticism is usually directed at the program
understood globally, rather than at the project of Peterson
and Seligman in particular, it still substantially shares
philosophical and theoretical perspectives with this paper
and is applicable to the VIA classication as highly repre-
sentative, for better or worse, of positive psychology. (2)
Second, the particular classication of character strengths
and virtues will be briey delineated with a special focus on
its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings. This
preparation will enable us to assess whether the VIA clas-
sication has really provided the social science equivalent
of virtue ethics by evaluating this classication against
two typical features of the classical virtue ethical perspec-
tive: (3) the interconnectedness of individual virtues, as
embodied in the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (4) the
constitutive relationship between virtue and happiness. What
will be investigated, importantly, is not just the faithful-
ness of the psychological classication to its philosophical
counterpart but also the validity of any ways in which it
may deviate. (5) Finally, there will be some concluding
remarks concerning potential responses available to the
VIA classications proponents.3
2. Positive psychology under re
The classication of character strengths and virtues
proposed by Peterson and Seligman was developed as an
integral part of the positive psychology movement, if not a
trademark feature. In Authentic Happiness Seligman (2002),
till then known mainly for his theory of learned helpless-
ness (Seligman, 1975), elaborated the project of a new
psychological movement that would attempt to do justice
to positive aspects of human functioning, which he
importantly believed had been neglected by psychological
science hitherto. Seligmans call to develop a new positive
psychology drew a broad range of responses, leading to the
creation of a new and very popular sub-eld (Seligman &
Csikszentmihlyi, 2000; Snyder & Lopez, 2002).
At the same time positive psychology was subjected to
extensive criticism, not only from mainstream psycholo-
gists such as Lazarus (2003) but also from philosophers,
including Annas (2004) and Nussbaum (2008). The diverse
sources of this criticism included insights taken from phi-
losophy, history, psychological anthropology, cross-
cultural, and cultural psychology (Christopher &
Hickinbottom, 2008; cf. Christopher, 1999) as well as the
ones offered by critical psychologists like Becker and
Marecek (2008). In the context of this paper, however, it
is the criticism rooted in virtue ethics, especially of its
Aristotelian and Neo-Aristotelian brand, as well as that
founded on philosophical hermeneutics that are crucial.
3
An argument formally parallel to the one proposed in this paper has
been recently made by Sugarman (2007) who claims that positive psy-
chology, as embedded in the modern ideology of technical and instru-
mental rationality, fails in its attempt to advance the neo-Aristotelian
notion of human fulllment. The theses put forward by Sugarman,
however, are never explicitly related to MacIntyres diagnosis.
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
A good sampling of such virtue ethics- and
hermeneutics-based criticism can be found in special issues
of Theory & Psychology (Christopher, Richardson, & Slife,
2008) and The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy-
chology (Fowers, 2012a). Some other sources that offer not
only a critical account of positive psychology but also well-
argued proposals for alternatives include Virtue and Psy-
chology by Fowers (2005) and Practical Wisdom by
Schwartz and Sharpe (2010; cf. Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006).4
The general aim is to uncover, articulate, and critically
assess the key conceptual and moral underpinnings of
positive psychology as well as the ways in which these
underpinnings determine and narrow its theoretical po-
tential. These critics, signicantly, all consider themselves
sympathetic with many of the goals of positive psychol-
ogy (Christopher et al., 2008, p. 556) and their arguments
as ultimately constructive.
Positive psychology arose from criticism of mainstream
psychological science and was proposed as a remedy to its
focus on the negative side of human functioning. The edi-
tors of the Theory & Psychology special issue, however,
believe that this criticism turned out to be too shallow and
too unreective to let positive psychology escape some
essential shortcomings of the conventional psychology it
intends to reform. The movement inspired by Seligman and
colleagues fails to detect and unreectively perpetuates
some of the key assumptions of the very mainstream social
science they censure for being too negative (Richardson &
Guignon, 2008, p. 606). In large part these assumptions can
be subsumed under the heading of scientism with its ideal
of a disengaged and supposedly objective observer. Scien-
tism, however, is not the end of the story.
The scientic ideal of contemporary social science,
namely, can be most revealingly read not as an isolated
entity, but rather as one emerging from and pervaded by
Western culture. Positive psychology overtly and enthusi-
astically endorses this ideal, so despite its best intentions to
become a culture-free, universally applicable, and norma-
tively neutral science, turns out to be pervaded by Western
cultural values and assumptions (Christopher &
Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 565). This fact, importantly, is
usually unacknowledged and remains hidden, not only
from the general public view but also from the theoretical
self-awareness of positive psychologists. It is for this reason
that the cultural content underlying the movement is
sometimes called, employing a term borrowed from
Bernstein (1978), a disguised ideology.
The particular content assigned to the disguised ideol-
ogy of positive psychology can differ from one critic to
another. Some elements, however, are often repeated. Apart
from scientism, positive psychology is commonly accused of
being pervaded by conceptual and normative hedonism. The
hedonism is hidden in its attempts to dene the good life in
mostly emotional terms (Richardson & Guignon, 2008), with
pleasure being the prime contender . for the ultimate good
for humans (Fowers, 2005, p. 36). Among the specic goals
promoted by the movement are autonomy and efcacy, the
4
For a well-intended and thoughtful defense of positive psychology
against this criticism one may consult Kristjansson (2010).
23
goods which are distinctively valued by Western societies
(Fowers, 2012b; for the analysis of the values embedded in
the notions of subjective and psychological well-being see
Christopher, 1999). The pervasiveness of specically Western
assumptions and values, signicantly, is usually either unac-
knowledged or even ofcially denied. This, in turn, can be
seen as exemplary of the movements more general tendency
to underestimate the cultural embeddedness of all human
phenomena.
Without giving a full account of the positive psychol-
ogys disguised ideology, there are two specic aspects
that deserve some closer attention here. The rst of these
aspects is the liberal individualism characteristic of Western
societies, and especially of American society. Kristjansson
(2010) explains this individualism as a conceptual, rather
than a political, point of view. Positive psychology,
accordingly, understands the self as a unique, self-
contained, self-dening, and self-dependent unit substan-
tially separate from others and the world it inhabits
(Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 566). This notion of
the self, importantly, is far from universal. It belongs rather
to a particular and historically situated conceptual
perspective of the independent (Western/liberal/individ-
ualist) self-concept (Kristjansson, 2010, p. 299).
The individualistic bias of positive psychology, however,
cannot be explained away as a purely conceptual issue. In
fact, it entails a particular moral perspective combining
ontological claims about the nature of the self with a
normative image of the good or ideal person. The individual
self is considered metaphysically primary, whereas society
is conceived as a derivative, second-order level of reality
that is simply a collection of individuals (Christopher,
1999, p. 142). All sources of meaning and value, respec-
tively, are understood as ultimately subjective, which leads
to the belief that the specication of lifes purposes,
including the ideas of the good life and happiness, should
be ceded to individual people on one condition only: that
they wont interfere with one another (Christopher &
Hickinbottom, 2008). The very content of the default
normative system turns out to be substantially infected
with individualism. Individual goods and self-interest are
treated as opposed to shared or communal values and to
social motivation. They are believed, furthermore, to be
metaphysically and normatively primary (Fowers, 2005).
The second crucial aspect of positive psychologys
disguised ideology is instrumentalism: a viewpoint that all
human action is ultimately instrumental (Fowers, 2012b),
consisting of manipulative or instrumental efforts to gain
control over the natural or social world (Richardson &
Guignon, 2008). In positive psychology, accordingly, it is the
instrumental pursuit of external goals that constitutes the
standard model of agency. Even the best-intended efforts to
investigate more intrinsically motivated activities are driven
by this model and, for this reason, ultimately hampered.5
5
Instrumentalism of this kind is connected with a specically modern
strategy of justifying moral values by trying to show that they contribute
to some nonmoral goods such as subjective happiness, physical health, or
longer life (Guignon, 2002). Exactly this kind of strategy has been
employed in studies connecting volunteering to with subjective well-
being (see Haidt, 2006; Piliavin, 2003).
24 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
The instrumentalism and individualism hidden behind
positive psychology, though separately explicable, are two
aspects of the same ideological stance. The former indicates
a default, or even exclusive, pattern of agency as one
organized by means and ends. The latter, in turn, refers to
the way in which these ends are determined. It is the in-
dividual who subjectively denes his/her aims in order to
subsequently select the best strategies, techniques, and
skills to attain them (Fowers, 2012a, p. 2). Psychological
research pervaded by this approach neatly separates
technical prowess, or effectiveness connected with
means, from ethical considerations, which are concerned
with aims (Fowers, 2005, p. 113). Goals, in particular, are
regarded as unproblematic and beyond the scope of in-
quiry (Fowers, 2012b, p. 13). This general perspective,
notably but not surprisingly, is common not only to positive
psychology and its business-as-usual counterparts but also
to the historical and contingent ideology of the modern
West.
The reliance of positive psychology on the contemporary
ideals of individualism and instrumentalism is not in itself
surprising to the critics of the movement. Via references to
philosophical hermeneutics they insist that cultural
embeddedness of this or that kind is not only inescapable
but also necessary for us to know anything at all or partici-
pate meaningfully in human life and its struggles
(Christopher, 1999, p. 150). By itself it is not a bad thing
(Christopher, 1999, p. 150); it is simply the nature of the
beast (Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 580).
What is problematic about culturally embedded positive
psychology, however, is acting as if we are not culturally
embedded (Christopher, 1999, p. 150). Such rejection of
cultural dependence, importantly, is a direct consequence
of the mainstream philosophy of social science with its
ideals of objectivity and neutrality and its attempts to put
all normative issues beyond scrutiny. Both positive psy-
chology and the business-as-usual kind lack a conceptual
framework for assessing the paradigmatic core of their
theory, research, and practice, so they cannot explicitly
address their own ontological presumptions and normative
commitments (Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008).
Such incapacity has many non-negligible consequences.
Positive psychology, for instance, may unintentionally pro-
mote specically Western values; it can perpetuate the sta-
tus quo, when applied locally, or become culturally
disrespectful, bordering on psychological imperialism
(Richardson & Guignon, 2008, p. 608), when applied across
cultures. Most important here is that the movements un-
acknowledged adherence to particular conceptual, theoret-
ical, and normative biases seems to make it inadequate to
foster even its own best aims (Christopher et al., 2008, p.
556). It is actually in providing this worrisome diagnosis that
the criticism of positive psychology can be understood as
ultimately constructive program of providing an adequate
basis for positive psychology:a stronger foundation for
research and theory on the brighter aspects of human
functioning (Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 569).
The criticism of positive psychology summarized above,
as well as the disquieting MacIntyrean vision recalled at the
beginning, provide the framework for this article. The in-
vestigations that will follow take up these two threads and
apply them to one of the leading theoretical and empirical
contributions of positive psychology, the classication of
character strengths and virtues developed by Peterson and
Seligman. Despite its overall importance within the
movement and its employment a basis of an extensively
used inventory,6 the classication has not heretofore
attracted closer attention from positive psychologys critics.
Its aspiration to become the social science equivalent of
virtue ethics, is easily challenged from the MacIntyrean
point of view.
3. Character strengths and virtues: a handbook and
classication
The origins of the project can be found in Authentic
Happiness, in which Seligman (2002) called for the resur-
rection of character as a central concept to the scientic
study of human behavior (p. 128) and a core assumption
of Positive Psychology (p. 125). This call was responded by
Peterson and the research program initiated and directed
by these two psychologists quite soon led to the develop-
ment of the Values in Action classication of character
strengths and virtues (VIA; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; cf.
Park, 2009; Park, Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Peterson,
2006; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; Seligman, 2002).
Because of its complex and multifaceted character the
project will be introduced in a stepwise way. First, we will
consider its direct sources regarding (1) theoretical in-
spirations and (2) cross-cultural study. Then, in turn, (3) the
conceptual structure underlying the classication and (4)
the organization of its content will be presented. Finally, it
will become possible to (5) evaluate the classications
claims to be the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.
(1) The theoretical context from which the VIA project
emerges is constituted by three elements: consists of pos-
itive psychology, trait theory, and, most notably for the
purposes set in this paper, virtue ethics. (1.1) Classifying
character strengths instantiates positive psychologys effort
to counteract mainstream psychology, with its alleged
neglect of positive human functioning. The VIA classica-
tion was specically proposed as a response to the most
popular psychiatric classication of mental disorders, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM; APA, 2000), and
the latters predominance in psychology and psycholog-
ically informed culture. Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 8)
hoped to do for the domain of moral excellence (character
strengths and virtues) what the DSM does well for disor-
ders while avoiding what it does poorly.
(1.2) The second pillar is personality psychology or,
more specically, trait theory. The working assumption is
made that character is plural, which is followed by an
attempt to unpack it by specifying the separate strengths
and virtues and, then, by developing techniques that could
measure them as individual differences (Peterson et al.,
6
The Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) is devised to
measure an individuals prole of character strengths. The www.viame.
org website, where its versions for both adults and youths are available,
claims that the survey has been already taken more than 1.3 million times
(as for 18th February 2013).
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
2005, p. 94). Character, accordingly, is understood as being
a family of widely-valued traits, each of which exists in
degrees and are manifest in a range of thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors (Park, 2009, p. 137).7
(1.3) The nal theoretical component is virtue ethics.
Peterson and Seligman (2004, pp. 910) explicitly state that
their classication is grounded in a long philosophical
tradition concerned with morality explained in terms of
virtues, a tradition they connect with gures such as
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. The au-
thors make an explicit reference to the ground-breaking
paper by Anscombe (1958) and claim that virtue ethics,
for a psychologist at least, is much more interesting than
alternatives based on the concept of moral law. The explicit
rationale is unfortunately highly parsimonious; it seems to
come down to saying that virtues pertain to people and
the lives they lead (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 10). As
such, one may presume, virtues are much more susceptible
to straightforward and convincing psychological interpre-
tation than moral laws.8
(2) Apart from these theoretical roots summarized
above there was also a more empirical, even if not strictly
quantitative, source of the classication. While developing
the VIA, namely, its authors conducted a thorough cross-
cultural study focused on the most widely inuential tra-
ditions of thought in human history. including those from
China, South Asia (mostly India), and the West (p. 34). What
they chose, more concretely, was: Confucianism and
Taoism for China, Buddhism and Hinduism for South Asia
as well as ancient Greece, Judeo-Christianity, and Islam for
the West. Both primary and secondary sources concerning
each of these traditions were investigated.
The outcomes of the study conducted led the authors to
the conclusion that there wasa surprising amount of
similarity across cultures (p. 36). They claimed, in partic-
ular, to have found a historical and cross-cultural conver-
gence (p. 50) of six so-called core virtues: courage, justice,
humanity, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom. It was
due to the surprising ubiquity of these character traits that
the authors decided to treat them as ubiquitous or
endorsed across every major religious and cultural tradi-
tion (Seligman, 2002, p. 130).9
7
An attempt to dene character on the basis of trait theory presumes
that psychological structures constituting the former are more or less
consistent across time and situations. The validity of these presumptions
has been recently subjected to harsh criticism inspired by the results of
social psychologists (Doris, 1998, 2005; Harman, 1999). In many cases
these results have been understood as ultimately undermining the notion
of virtuous character as useful to empirically-oriented moral psychology.
Some more sophisticated responses, however, still seem to be possible
(see Miller, 2013).
8
A similar, though more elaborated, argument has been presented by
Becker (2004) who believes that eudaimonistic ethics is much more
useful for psychology than non-eudaimonistic ethical traditions such as
the various forms of rationalism, consequentialism, and perfectionism.
9
Both the results and the methodology of this cross-cultural study can
be are obviously a matter of for considerable dispute. Christopher and
Hickinbottom (2008, p. 578), for example, note that world traditions
were assessed against the predetermined list of virtues: But is it really so
surprising to nd commonality where one looks for it? After all, it is one
thing to look at other cultures and to try to understand them on their own
terms, it is quite another to develop a list and then check off similarities.
25
(3) The six core virtues belong to the most general
conceptual level of the VIA classication. As such they are
connected with more specic categories within so called
vertical classication scheme. This scheme distinguishes
three levels of abstraction, which are all applicable to the
issues of the good life.
(3.1) The rst or the highest conceptual level is consti-
tuted by the virtues.: the most general and broad classi-
catory notions applied.
(3.2) The second or middle level, in turn, involves
character strengths understood as psychological processes
or mechanisms dening a given virtue and constituting
distinguishable routes (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 13)
along which it can be displayed. The virtue of courage as
entailing the exercise of will to accomplish goals in the
face of opposition (p. 199), for instance, can be expressed
through the strengths of: bravery, integrity, vitality, or
persistence. The last of these strengths, to give one
example, is dened as enabling voluntary continuation of
a goal-directed action in spite of obstacles, difculties, or
discouragement (p. 229). Individual character strengths,
though considered to be ubiquitously recognized and
valued (p. 13), are not expected to universally display the
same pattern within a respective virtue. No particular
strength, furthermore, is necessary for the possession of
the virtue.
(3.3) The lowest conceptual level, nally, is constituted
by situational themes: specic habits that lead people to
manifest given character strengths in given situations (p.
14). The particular habits that build the strength of
persistence, for instance, may substantially differ between
occupational and relational contexts. The situational theme
level is crucial when responding to criticisms that
emphasize the sociocultural variability of virtuous char-
acter (cf. Footnote 8). For the present purposes, however, it
can be safely put aside.
Of the three conceptual levels it is the middle level of
character strengths that the authors consider most natu-
rally suited to categorizing and discussing the good life.
They believe, furthermore, that it can be relatively easily
lled with psychological content and assessed by means of
psychological trait theory and measurement techniques. As
such it is expected to provide an explanatory power out of
the realm and reach of philosophy (p. 13). It was for the
above reasons that the level of character strengths was
made central for the VIA project, a project of classifying the
strengths of virtuous character.
(4) In order to develop such a classication the authors
created a list of 10 criteria, most of which (p. 16) have to
be met by a positive trait in order to qualify as a character
strength. The application of these criteria to the cross-
cultural survey summarized above yielded a list of 24
characteristics, all organized under the headings of six core
virtues. It is the report of the current state of knowledge
concerning each of these character strengths that consti-
tutes the second and the biggest part of Character Strengths
and Virtues more than 500 pages. Each of this parts 24
chapters is divided into ten sections, which make the
overall outcome a well-organized and rich handbook. The
handbook will be undoubtedly very useful for any
researcher or theoretician interested in psychological
26 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
dimension of virtuous character. Is this enough to make VIA
the social science equivalent of virtue ethics, then?
(5) Certainly, there are some indications of an afrma-
tive answer Not only is the projects subject matter
explicitly identied with a life well lived (p. 12) but it is
also approached with an emphasis on the stable and gen-
eral features of psychological functioning, including
extensive employment of trait-like variables and discussion
of the relationship between virtuous character and habit
(cf. the developmental section in the description of each
character strength). All of these points the VIA classication
shares with classical approaches to virtuous character.
More particularly, one may add, some of the character
strength criteria can be read as directly conveying the
traditional insights of ancient virtue ethics. Criterion 1, for
instance, according to which the character strength con-
tributes to various fulllments that constitute the good life
(p. 17) refers explicitly to Aristotles discussion of eudai-
monia and is said to allow the possibility that some of
character strengths outcomes (fulllments) are its
inherent aspects rather than separable consequences.
Criteria 2 and 4, which make a character strength morally
valued in its own right (p. 19) and its opposite something
that cannot be phrased in a felicitous way can also be easily
related to the ancient discussion of the independent value
of virtuous life. The similarities between the VIA project
and classical virtue ethics are evident and non-accidental.
4. From the multiplicity of character strengths to the
unity of virtue
Both the most general features of the VIA classication
and its more particular content may make one believe that
its authors have revitalized an important aspect of ancient
virtue ethics, the psychological dimension of virtuous
character. The authors of the VIA classication may seem to
have contributed to contemporary virtue ethics by
providing the moral psychology of which the latter stands
in need.
But the MacIntyrean vision of the substantial difculty,
if not impossibility, of any contemporary revival of a
genuinely virtue-ethical framework and the criticism of
positive psychology as deeply pervaded by modern liberal
individualism, would suggest a more cautious approach.
The critics of positive psychology, for instance, although
generally afrmative of its references to Aristotle and other
virtue ethicists, warn that the movement overall has only a
rudimentary and fragmented understanding of the rich
theory available on virtue and the good life (Fowers,
2012a, p. 5). A common reaction of these critics is to
dismiss the alleged Aristotelian connection as lip-service
and to suggest that positive psychologists either do not
understand what Aristotle really meant . or . deliber-
ately use him as a ventriloquists dummy to air their own
philosophical and psychological preconceptions
(Kristjansson, 2010, p. 297).
In order to assess whether, or to what extent, the above
worries apply to the VIA classication and its claims to be
the social science equivalent of virtue ethics, two key
features must be accounted for and compared with Peter-
son and Seligmans project. (1) The rst is the constitutive
relationship between virtue and happiness usually formu-
lated in the form of the thesis of the unity of virtue. (2) The
second is a very specic way in which the ancients related
the issues of fact and value to each other one that has no
modern counterpart. These are not just fundamental to the
virtue ethics; they can be easily brought into the criticism
of positive psychology.
(1) The thesis of the unity of virtue, in different forms, can be
found in most ancient virtue ethical systems (see Irwin,1996;
McDowell,1998; Wolf, 2007). Its strongest version, as held for
example by Socrates and Plato, states that Virtue is One, and
that our names for all the apparently different virtues refer to
different aspects of the same single property (Wolf, 2007, p.
145). Its weaker, and apparently much more common, alter-
native, in turn, is the belief that nominally distinct virtues are
so deeply integrated with each other that none of them can
be fully possessed except by a possessor of all of them, that is,
a possessor of virtue in general (McDowell, 1998, p. 53). To
have one virtue, in Susan Wolfs (2007, p. 145) concise
phrase, is to have them all.
As central as such a thesis was for classical virtue ethics
it is absent from the VIA classication. Schwartz and Sharpe
(2006, 2010) note that both virtues and character strengths
are treated by Peterson and Seligman as logically inde-
pendent of one another. Individual virtues and strengths
may or may not be correlated. It is a purely empirical
question whether they are and, if so, to what extent. As far
as the theoretical and conceptual structure is concerned,
respectively, there is no normative suggestion that they
should be correlated . nor is there a claim that it is very
difcult to exercise one strength effectively without many
of the others (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006, p. 380). The in-
dependence of character strengths can be read as a formal
equivalent of the independence of individual human be-
ings. Individual selves, we may recall, are treated by posi-
tive psychology as metaphysically primary in relation to
family or society. Individual character strengths, similarly,
turn out to be more fundamental than moral character as a
whole. What is common to both of these viewpoints is
formal atomism.
The thesis of the unity of virtue, importantly, is not only
absent from the VIA classication but effectively contra-
dicted by it. It is explicitly stated that some individuals
may be creative and authentic but are neither brave nor
kind, or vice versa (Park, 2009, p. 139). The classications
authors, furthermore, actively encourage people to identify
their signature strengths and to cultivate them as
frequently as you can and in as many settings (Seligman,
2002, p. 161). And it is necessarily made at the expense of
cultivating some other, non-signature strengths that may
not be the aptitudes you want to deploy in work, love, play,
and parenting (p. 161). At the same time, no attempts
directed at the entire set of virtues or character as a whole
are suggested. In fact, it does not seem to be an accident
that the VIA conceptual scheme involves virtues and
character strengths but does not explicitly identify any
unied virtuous character. The only weak trace of the unity
of virtue thesis seems to be the authors speculation that all
the core virtues must be present at above-threshold values
for an individual to be deemed of good character (Peterson
& Seligman, 2004, p. 13).
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
Having admitted this, however, one may still claim that
the VIA approach, i.e. the one that species virtues and
character strengths as more or less independent, is valid,
not its ancient counterpart emphasizing their interdepen-
dence. The thesis of the unity of virtue, after all, is far from
being intuitive and, actually, it was not only usually
considered paradoxical outside the strictly virtue ethical
framework, but also gave rise to an intense debate within
it.10 Why then should this thesis or, more modestly, any
kind of non-accidental connection between individual vir-
tues, be given serious consideration?
Some relatively brief remarks on this question have
been made by Becker (2004) and Fowers (2005). Becker
claims that some of the VIAs assumptions the require-
ment of possessing all the core virtues at above-threshold
values in order to be classied as possessing good char-
acter (cf. above) and the tenet that some minimal level and
number of character strengths under each virtue-heading
are necessary to warrant a claim that the person pos-
sesses the virtue (Becker, 2004)11 cannot be properly
addressed without showing how the six core virtues relate
to each other. In turn, this question requires an additional
level of analysis for the general concept of virtue and
competing accounts of it.
Fowers (2005, pp. 1011) maintains that Peterson and
Seligmans strong focus on cataloguing specic virtues led
them to neglect development of an adequate general
concept of virtue. Virtues, as he explains, cannot be un-
derstood in a piecemeal fashion. Their full import can
become vivid only in connection with a persons life as a
whole and the unifying concept of integrated character.
What one needs, according to Fowers, is a concept of
virtuous character (singular), not of individual virtues or
strengths (plural).
Becker remakes that the lack of a unifying conceptual
level may lead to serious difculties when obvious
second-order questions arise. Two examples of such
questions are How are we to resolve conicts between the
virtues and How much character strength of a given sort
is optimal, not only in terms of the virtue it serves directly,
but in terms of how that virtue is integrated with others
(Becker, 2004). Beckers questions can be interestingly
addressed using Schwartz and Sharpes (2006, 2010)
critique of the VIA.
Schwartz and Sharpe (2006, p. 377) discuss three kinds
of second-order problems that inevitably arise whenever
character strengths must be translated into action in con-
crete situations. (1) The rst of these problems is that
virtues or strengths lack the specicity required for
translation into action (p. 381, italics added). It is much
easier to say that one should implement a just social order
than to specify how this order would look like in the
particular community with which one is concerned. (2) The
second difculty is relevance. Real life situations, namely,
do not come labeled with the needed virtues or strengths
10
It is especially evident in Stoicism and in the criticism of this school.
11
In fact, Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 13) are comfortable saying
that someone is of good character if he or she displays but 1 or 2
strengths within a virtue group.
27
attached (p. 381). In many of them it may be far from
obvious whether they require one to exhibit courage,
temperance, justice, or this or that combination of these
virtues. (3) The last of the problems is conict. Virtues tend
to be applicable simultaneously and to compete with each
other. A judge, for example, should primarily be just. A good
mate, similarly, is expected to be friendly rst of all. What
about a teacher or a parent? Should they be just even at the
cost of being friendly, or another way round? The three
kinds of problems enumerated above, importantly, are not
rare. Rather, they are pervasive in everyday experience (p.
383) and inevitably arise whenever a virtuous character is
to be expressed in a concrete situation.
The theoretical and practical stance of the VIA are both
completely unable to satisfactorily respond to the above
problems. The strategy of identifying and cultivating
signature strengths (often at the cost of non-signature
strengths) can make the problem of relevance invisible
. If one cultivates ones signature strengths, one may not
even realize that more than one strength might be called
for in a given situation (p. 382). Some cases of conict,
arising when one of the strengths called for is non-
signature, could become invisible as well. The results of
such an invisibility may be terrible: you may want, for
example, to cultivate your signature strength of honesty,
when you tell your friend how fat she looks in . [her
wedding, author] dress (p. 392) a few hours before the
very ceremony.
Schwartz and Sharpe conclude that virtues and char-
acter strengths are ineffective when displayed indepen-
dently and that they should be treated as substantially
connected to each other. With an explicit reference to
Aristotle, furthermore, they propose that the proper coor-
dination of individual virtues and strengths requires the
possession of a master virtue without which other virtues
or character strengths fail to produce effective action (p.
379). The virtue they nominate for this awarded position is
Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronesis). It is this trait,
importantly, that the authors consider as essential to
solving problems of specicity, relevance, and conict (p.
377; cf. Fowers, 2005, p. 108).
The virtue of phronesis famously depicted in Book 6 of
Nicomachean Ethics (NE, Aristotle, 1999) is an intellectual
virtue (dianoia) strictly connected with practical life and its
particularity. In opposition to theoretical wisdom (sophia),
it is not about universals only. It must also acquire
knowledge of particulars, since it is concerned with action
and action is about particulars (NE, Book VI, Chapter 7,
1141b, 1517). What is of crucial importance here is the
mutual entailment of phronesis and moral virtues or virtues
of character (ethike aretai): we cannot be fully good
without prudence, or prudent without the virtue of char-
acter (NE, Book VI, Chapter 13, 1144b, 3132). Without
practical wisdom, as it entails, none of the moral virtues can
accord with the correct reason (NE, Book VI, Chapter 1,
1138b, 25).
A practically wise person (phronimos) is exceptionally
able at exercising good judgment in individual cases and at
responding at the right times, about the right things, to-
ward the right people, for the right end, and in the right
way (NE, Book II, Chapter 6, 1106b, 2223). In order to
28 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
respond appropriately to a situation at hand, signicantly,
he/she needs to possess not only purely cognitive abilities
but also more perceptual and imaginative skills. These skills
are necessary for the essentially non-mechanical applica-
tion of every general principles or rule to a particular
context at hand.12,13
The rst thing one should do in order to refer the above
remarks to the VIA project is to admit that the virtue of
practical wisdom is to some extent present in the VIA.
Wisdom and knowledge, more particularly, are said to
include the character strengths of: creativity, curiosity,
open-mindedness, love of learning, and perspective (wis-
dom in a narrow sense). The strengths of social intelligence
(under the rubric of humanity) and prudence (under the
rubric of temperance),14 as one may add, are also connected
with the trait famously investigated by Aristotle.
But wisdom is not in any sense singled out. As a virtue it
is placed at exactly the same level as its remaining ve
counterparts. The relationships between the virtues are
fully symmetrical and no hierarchy is present. The wisdom-
related character strengths, in turn, are only items within
on the list of 24 formally analogous properties. The authors
of the VIA classication, one should admit, are fully aware
of the fact that philosophers such as Aristotle, Confucius,
Cicero, and Aquinas have not hesitated to deem some
strengths of character more important than others and
provided explicit arguments that one or another character
strength (virtue) is the master or queen that organizes
others and adjudicates conicts among them (Park et al.,
2004, p. 607). But they argue in response that no
consensus has emerged among philosophers concerning
the most fullling of the character strengths (p. 607) and
seem to consider the issue as at least partly empirical.15
The reasons hidden behind the reluctance to assign any
special status to practical wisdom, however, may be even
deeper. It seems, namely, that positive psychology as it is
usually conceived is devoid of conceptual and theoretical
means which would be sufcient to do the full justice to the
notion of phronesis. One should recall, in particular, that it is
not only the case that we cannot be fully good without
prudence but also we cannot be prudent without being
good (NE, Book VI, Chapter 13, 1144b, 3132 & 1). Any
character strength or virtue that, by the very denition, is
so overtly normative, seems to be far beyond the
12
In fact, one may argue that these are habits and skill, rather than
rules, that are central to Aristotelian ethics.
13
For more thorough and psychologically informed account of practical
wisdom see especially Fowers (2005) and Schwartz and Sharpe (2010).
These two books, importantly, argue for the universal applicability of
phronesis. The extensively provided examples and discussions refer both
to the private lives and the professional activities of such diverse groups
as: psychologists, psychotherapists, physicians, teachers, lawyers, and
even bankers.
14
The VIAs prudence, importantly, is identied with a relatively narrow
conception of practical reasoning and self-management that helps to
achieve the individuals long-term goals effectively, (Peterson &
Seligman, 2004, p. 478) rather than with a very complex phenomenon
of Aristotelian phronesis.
15
A very cautious discussion of the ways in which normative and
empirical issues are deeply, and sometimes perplexingly, entangled in the
thesis of the unity of virtue can be found in Wolf (2007).
theoretical range of the VIA project. The reasons for this
signicant fact will become clear in the next section.
5. Positive psychology and the fact/value distinction
We have shown how the thesis of the unity of virtue,
which was present and central in ancient virtue ethics, is
absent from the contemporary VIA project. The same is true
of the ancient account of the relationship between factual
and normative issues. The two most important and central
concepts in ancient ethical theory (Annas, 1998, p. 37)
were virtue (arete) and happiness (eudaimonia). The two
were usually understood to be strongly and non-
accidentally connected. Even though there were non-
negligible differences between philosophical schools in its
specication,16 all Greek philosophers agreed on an
eudaimonist constraint on virtue: a position that
virtuous people must improve their degree of happiness
by being virtuous, and that no one can improve their de-
gree of happiness as much by any other course of action
(Irwin, 1996, p. 42).
It is because of the essential character of this connection
that MacIntyre (2007, p. 148) specied virtues as precisely
those qualities the possession of which will enable an in-
dividual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will
frustrate his movement toward that telos. The author of
After Virtue emphasizes that the way in which virtues
enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia is usually not
a matter of contingent fact (p. 149). The virtues are not
means, which can be adequately described without any
reference to their goal and which are only one of many
possible routes to the latter. They are, rather, a necessary
and central component of eudaimonia and the life worth
being chosen. Within this kind of framework, importantly,
the suggestion . that there might be some means to
achieve the good for man without the exercise of the vir-
tues makes no sense (p. 149).
The relationship between virtue and happiness, espe-
cially when it is read along Aristotelian lines (see Footnote
17), can be understood as constitutive: the one existing
between a constituent and the whole (rather than between
means and an end). Its nature, accordingly, can be easily
exemplied by constitutive activities, in which there is no
separation between the means and the ends because the
activity partly constitutes the ends (Fowers, 2012b, p. 12)
and the ends of acting are intrinsic to the action, not
external rewards that might be obtainable without per-
forming this action (Guignon, 2002, p. 98). Constitutive
activities cannot be specied by reference to their behav-
ioral content only. The same overt behavior, in particular,
can belong either to the means-ends or the constituent-
whole structure. There is an important qualitative differ-
ence between these two cases, however, like the one be-
tween helping others in order to feel good, and helping
16
Virtue, respectively, could have been understood as: (1) a means to
happiness (the Cyrenaics), (2) a constitutive part (only a part) of happi-
ness (Aristotle), and (3) a property both necessary and sufcient for
eudaimonia, or even one that constitutes it (the Socratic tradition
including the Stoics) (see Annas, 1993).
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
others for the sake of being a caring, decent person
(Guignon, 2002, p. 98).17
The constitutive relationship between virtue and happi-
ness is as characteristic of classical virtue ethics as it is alien to
the VIA project. The latter classication, in particular, takes a
specically modern position directly contradictory to the
ancient perspective: it afrms the fact/value distinction
(Brinkmann, 2009; Davydova & Sharrock, 2003; Putnam,
2002). The distinction in question, originally stemming
from certain famous remarks in David Humes (1978) Treatise
of Human Nature, can be identied with the claim that no
valid argument can move from entirely factual premises to
any moral or evaluative conclusion (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 56).
An important consequence of such a claim is modern sci-
ences attempt at building a systematic account of the factual
domain, considered uniquely susceptible to objective inves-
tigation, without any reference to normative issues under-
stood as inevitably subjective and unsettlable.18
The majority of psychologists, importantly, fully identify
with this perspective. Any commitment to a particular
normative stance sounds risky to them, because they are
concerned about prescribing how individuals should live .
about bias, ideological distortion, and value imposition
(Fowers, 2008, p. 636). Any open discussion of the normative,
respectively, challenges one of the most powerful taboos in
psychology (p. 632) and some psychologists not only beware
of becoming crypto-missionaries (Meehl, 1959, as cited in:
Slife, Smith, & Burcheld, 2003) but are also averse to the
very word morality with its connotations of a holier-than-
thou attitude (Kristjansson, 2010, p. 308).
The VIA project adopts this traditional mainstream
approach. Its proponents, accordingly, unblushingly confess
that as scientists rst (Seligman & Csikszentmihlyi, 2001, as
cited in: Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 564) they are
not able to prescribe the morally good life, but . well
equipped to describe the what, how, and why of good char-
acter (Park, 2009, p. 136). Positive psychology, accordingly, is
proclaimed as descriptive and not prescriptive. It is not its
task to tell you that you should be optimistic, or spiritual, or
kind or good-humored; it is rather to describe the conse-
quences of these traits . What you do with that information
depends on your own values and goals (Seligman, 2002,
p. 129).19
17
Cf. dialectical activities in Brewer (2009), intrinsic activities in Fowers
(2005), and practices in MacIntyre (2007).
18
The fact/value distinction can be considered as providing a very
favorable environment for contemporary instrumentalism. Only when
the distinction is presupposed can one draw an apparently neat distinc-
tion between objective facts concerning the efciency of means and an
ultimately arbitrary evaluation of outcomes.
19
This ofcial position of the VIAs authors is obviously not the end of
the story. The criticisms of positive psychology summarized above, in
particular, have argued forcefully that the movement through formula-
tions that have the ring of detached objectivity (Fowers, 2012b) covertly
promotes particular human goods proper to the Western instrumental
individualism. Its proponents are often seen as visibly torn . between
their personal views on happiness and the caveats that they believe their
scientic stance forces them to enter (Kristjansson, 2010, p. 303) or as
sending conicting messages (Martin, 2007, p. 90). It does not come as a
surprise, in consequence, that Woolfolk and Wasserman (2005, pp. 88
89) ironically compare positive psychology to the culinary science that
claims it doesnt care whether people eat.
29
The avoidance of the normative as well as the strict
attachment to the fact/value distinction are readily
discernible in the empirical research that is conducted
within positive psychology. It is especially the case of the
investigation into so called virtue hypothesis that: Culti-
vating virtue will make you happy (Haidt, 2006, p. 158) or,
more precisely, that cultivating virtue tends to contribute
to our happiness . even though it does not guarantee it
(Martin, 2007, p. 92). This thesis, importantly, although
presumed by all major ancient schools, is considerably
weaker than most of its classical counterparts. The main
difference is that virtue hypothesis does not specify the
relationship between cultivating virtue and being happy. It
certainly never suggest that this will be the relationship the
one between the constituent and the whole.
The most common empirical approach applied to the
virtue hypothesis is correlational (see Haidt, 2006; Piliavin,
2003). For instance, a cross-sectional study conducted on
the Internet sample of 5299 adults (Park et al., 2004) has
shown that the VIA character strengths which are most
strongly related to life satisfaction are hope, zest, gratitude,
love, and curiosity. The strengths with the weakest con-
nections, on the other hand, turned out to be modesty,
appreciation of beauty, creativity, judgment, and the love of
learning.
Martin (2007) has undertaken a careful investigation of
the theoretical and conceptual background of this kind of
researches. Apart from the simple fact that correlational
data are insufcient to reveal any substantive or causal
relationship between virtue-related and happiness-related
variables, Martin emphasizes that they are equally inap-
propriate to support any stronger or more specic hy-
potheses such as the one that only virtue tends to
promote happiness, and that vice tends to promote un-
happiness (p. 92). Measures of virtuous conduct validated
by the reference to social consensus, furthermore, leave
undecided whether societys view of the virtues is
reasonable, how virtues do and should interact with each
other to create morally desirable conduct in specic situ-
ations, and which forms of happiness are morally desir-
able (p. 102).
Martins nal point is that any study of the virtue hy-
pothesis makes clear empirical sense only to the extent that
happiness is dened in value-neutral terms, such as those
of life satisfaction or predominantly positive affect.
Without such a neutrality i.e. whenever some normative
terms are included in the very denition of happiness the
virtue hypothesis is dangerously transformed into at least a
partial tautology: cultivating virtue brings forms of
happiness dened by exercising virtues (2007, p. 93).
Martins results are far from surprising in light of the
VIAs general attempt to take the position of empirical and
objective science. The studies of the virtue hypothesis, as a
matter of fact, are completely in accord with the dominant
psychological paradigm. A closer look at the empirical
design applied, however, yields two crucial results. (1) Such
designs cannot be validly applied to any moral psychology
substantially based on virtue ethics. (2) The second point,
in turn, is that even without any attempt at revitalizing the
ancient ethical framework the design applied is doubtful in
the light of the very latest philosophical results.
30 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
(1) The rst point is directly connected with the limi-
tations characteristic of the methodology used. Methodo-
logically, a correlational design is insufcient to establish a
causal relationship between virtue and happiness. And it is
completely inappropriate, what is more, for addressing any
non-contingent and constitutive connection. And it is
exactly this kind of a relationship which ancient virtue
ethics usually believed to exist between arete and eudai-
monia. It is, in fact, hardly conceivable how the formal
property of being a larger wholes constituent could be
detected by any quantitative paradigm. Similarly, it is hard
to imagine how the VIA project could be understood as
substantially based on the ancient virtue ethics unless it
gave up its value-neutral denition of happiness.
The constitutive character of the relationship between
virtue and happiness, as one may remember, was funda-
mental to classical virtue ethics, especially to Aristotle. The
VIAs inability to come to grips with it, consequently, is
indicative of a general and serious problem. Virtue ethics is
one of those systems which are unabashedly normative in
the sense that they evaluate the world of description rather
than merely describe the world of evaluation
(Kristjansson, 2010, p. 303). The very concept of virtue or
character strength, in particular, is dependent on the notion
of the good life (see MacIntyres denition above), making
the latter absolutely central (Fowers, 2008, p. 630) to
comprehending the former. The VIA project, with no
explicitly normative theoretical content, in result, has few
resources for understanding or applying any genuinely
virtue-ethical framework and for applying it in social sci-
ence terms.
(2) The fact that the VIA project cannot be considered as
to properly address the ancient account of virtues character
and happiness is very important in the present context.
Even if the VIA classications proponents ofcially gave up
the claim that their project is the social science equiva-
lent of the classical virtue ethics, this would not be the end
of the story, however. The approach that it has adopted,
namely, seems to be inadequate not only in ancient terms
but also in the wake of the very recent philosophical dis-
cussions. Such an inadequacy cannot be put aside without
risking the accusation of theoretical self-delusion.
The fact/value distinction, which is paradigmatic to the
VIA project in particular and scientic psychology in gen-
eral has been recently subjected to serious philosophical
critique. And not just only within a general philosophical
framework (for reviews see Brinkmann, 2009; Davydova &
Sharrock, 2003), but also with direct regard to positive
psychology (cf. Fowers, 2012a, 2012b; Richardson, 2012). Of
many different arguments that may be used to undermine
the fact/value distinction the most important here are (2.1)
Aristotles (1999) function argument as utilized by MacIn-
tyre and (2.2) the factvalue entanglement argument pro-
vided by Putnam (2002). These arguments do not merely
possess independent merits and applicability to virtue
ethics; they have been also formulated within the broadly
analytic philosophical tradition, the same tradition from
which the Humean distinction originally spring. Here the
criticisms are coming from within.
(2.1) The author of After Virtue, at rst, argues that the
fact/value distinction, which by itself may be occasionally
useful, was made absolute and changed into an inescap-
able truth or a dichotomy by the philosophers whose
culture possesses only the impoverished moral vocabulary
(MacIntyre, 2007, p. 59). The impoverishment resulted
from their rejection of the pre-modern, mostly Aristotelian,
teleological perspective, a perspective which used to pro-
vide a context in which evaluative claims functioned as a
particular kind of factual claim (p. 77).
For example, from the factual premises that This watch
is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and
that This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably,
we feel completely safe to entail awe have no trouble
accepting the normative conclusion that This is a bad
watch (pp. 5758). This transition is possible and perfectly
valid because watch is a functional concept denoting an
item which has an essential nature and an essential pur-
pose or function (p. 58). It is this kind of functionality that
allows a move from the description of a things function
being fullled (or not) to the normative conclusion that it is
a good (or bad) thing at hand.
The argument employing functional concepts to un-
dermine the absolute version of the fact/value distinction
becomes especially important as soon as one realizes that
the very concept of a human being was considered as
functional in the ancient virtue ethical tradition. In this
tradition, to be a man is to ll a set of roles each of which
has its own point and purpose: member of a family, citizen,
soldier, philosopher, servant of God (p. 59). With such a
concept of human being, it is easy to see how one can
conclude about somebody being a good or bad human
being from the a description of the extend extent to which
the person in question fullls his/her natural end. And this
very conclusion, importantly, becomes a kind of a factual
statement that can be called true or false in precisely the
way in which all other factual statements can be so called
(p. 59).
MacIntyres argument is clear and understandable. But
it dependence depends on the notion of human end or
function. Such teleological perspective could would have
been obvious for Aristotle but its obviousness has virtually
nearly vanished during all the ages that divide us from the
Philosopher. And without any easy way to bring it back, one
may add.20 Because of the fact that it would be especially
difcult to reconcile any teleological notion of human na-
ture with contemporary ideal of science, the argument of
MacIntyres argument turns out to be insufcient to deci-
sively settle the issue. With this is mind, it may be useful to
turn to the factvalue entanglement argument as proposed
by Putnam (2002).
(2.2) This American philosopher, in particular, provides
rich and convincing arguments against the extreme version
of the fact/value distinction, according to which all value
judgments are completely outside the sphere of reason
(Putnam, 2002, p. 1). A distinction that is by itself innocent
and may be useful in some particular contexts has . been
inated into a dichotomy (p. 7) or even a metaphysical
20
For an attempt to rebuild this kind of perspective within evolutionary
psychology see Foot (2001), MacIntyre (1999), and Fowers (2012b). For
some skeptical remarks see Aho (2012).
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
dualism (p. 11). The main argument of Putnam is twofold.
Putnam rst shows the fact/value dichotomy to have been
based on a narrow empiricist psychology of ideas and
impressions and a narrowly scientic notion of the fact
(p. 26), both of which are completely indefensible within
the context of contemporary philosophy of science. Then he
undermines the distinctions universality by pointing
entanglement of fact and value referring to the ways in
which factual description and valuation can and must be
entangled (p. 27).
This factvalue entanglement is instantiated by so-
called thick ethical concepts such as, for instance, the ones
of cruelty or courage (Williams, 1985, p. 129). These notions
are not purely descriptive; their application is not only
determined by what the world is like (for instance, by how
someone has behaved) but also at the same time .
usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of
persons or action. Whats more, it seems to be impossible
to sharply separate the descriptive and normative aspects
of their content. The content of courage, in other words, is
not a conjunction of a descriptive quality referring to a
particular disposition and a positive evaluation of that
disposition. Rather, it expresses a union of fact and value
(Williams, 1985, p. 129): its normative element is inextri-
cable from the description of the content of the disposition
and goes all the way down (Wolf, 2007, p. 166). It is
exactly for this reason that the proper application of the
notion of a cruel or courageous person, even when it ap-
pears to be done for purely descriptive purposes, requires
one to be able to identify imaginatively with an evaluative
point of view (Putnam, 2002, p. 39). The very existence of
this kind of fact/value entanglement, as Putnam concludes,
undermines the whole idea of an omnipresent and all-
important gulf between value judgments and so-called
statements of fact (p. 8). The fact/value distinction, in
other words, cannot be reliably inated into a sharp and
universal dichotomy. There is nothing fundamental or
metaphysical about it.
Turning back to the social sciences it should be
emphasized that they cannot dispense of thick ethical
concepts.21 And it is not only because of the normative
commitment necessarily, and rightly, guiding their theory,
research, and practice (for psychology see Fowers, 2005),
but also because of the very nature of their subject matter.
The latter point is very clearly made by Brinkmann (2009,
p. 12) who insists that the sharp distinction between facts
and values seems unduly sterile and unhelpful if we want
to understand the particulars of human action. When ac-
tions and intentions are concerned, rather than sheer
physiology of the movements, value-laden concepts are
inevitable (cf. Christopher & Campbell, 2008, on the values
inevitably embedded in all social practices).
The VIA writings are no exception to this critique.
Woolfolk and Wasserman (2005, p. 88) point out how they
are replete with thick ethical concepts. And for a good
reason, one should add! Courage, after all, is one of the
21
The examples from psychology could involve the notions of: devel-
opment, maturity, mental health, or subjective well-being (cf.
Christopher, 1999).
31
notions of virtue in the VIA. All such notions are thick,
which is implicitly conceded when the point is made that
we cannot make any full sense of a virtue or a character
strength without ultimately referring to normative con-
cepts such as eudaimonia or various fulllments that
constitute the good life (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 17;
cf. MacIntyres denition of virtue discussed above and
Fowers, 2008). It turns out, in consequence, that neither the
understanding of human action in general nor any attempt
at applying a virtue virtue-ethical conceptual framework to
this understanding cannot do without the entanglement of
fact and value embodied in the presence of substantially
value-laden notions. The merits and the prospects of the
present version of the VIA project, accordingly, turn out to
be very seriously undermined.
6. Concluding remarks
Our purpose has been to apply MacIntyres disquieting
suggestion to the VIA classication of character strengths
and virtues. The aspirational social science equivalent of
virtue ethics, in particular, was assessed against two
fundamental aspects of the classical virtue ethical frame-
work: (1) the interdependence and mutual entailment of
individual virtues, as expressed in the thesis of the unity of
virtue and (2) the constitutive relationship between
virtuous character and happiness. We have found that
these features are not only merely absent from the VIA
framework but also are explicitly contradicted by (10 ) the
latters construal of individual virtues and character
strengths as independent variables without any general
concept that unies or harmonizes them and (20 ) its ofcial
endorsement of the fact/value distinction. The VIA classi-
cation turned out to be not only alien to its ancient pre-
decessors but also, and more importantly, questionable in
the light of the most recent philosophical and theoretical
analyzes. Consequently, it becomes a central pressing
question, whether there are any ways for proponents of the
VIA classication to respond to above criticism.
The rst approach that could be adopted is in a sense
local or tactical. One could address, in particular, two
running threads of this paper, i.e. the interconnectedness of
character strengths and the entanglement of fact and value,
separately and try to solve them as independent problems.
With regard to interconnectedness, one may admit that the
problems of specicity, relevance, and conict raised by
Schwartz and Sharpe (2006) conclusively undermine any
atomistic approach to positive character traits and try to
modify the VIA vertical classication scheme by imple-
menting some interdependence between character
strengths. It doesnt, importantly, have to be the strong
thesis of the unity of virtue; some weaker and less counter-
intuitive accounts of virtuous characters unity such as the
thesis of the unity of evaluative knowledge offered by Wolf
(2007; cf. Badhwar, 1996), also address this problem.
A serious concern would necessarily arise, however,
about how such an implementation would exactly look like.
Would virtues interdependence be introduced as a theo-
retical presumption or as a conceptual convention? How
would it be reconciled with empirical data and everyday
observations seemingly inconsistent with it? And nally,
32 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
how would it be justied and explained? Some support for
addressing these problems could be provided by nomi-
nating a master virtue, such as practical wisdom, or by the
addition of a unifying conceptual level of virtuous character
or the good life (cf. Backer, 2004). But any such additions,
however promising, would make a deeper and more
fundamental issue evident.
Any careful analysis of the interconnectedness of vir-
tues, in particular, will inevitably reveal their substantially
normative character. Identifying the virtue which is rele-
vant to the situation at hand, translating this virtue into
specic action, and solving of any conicts that arise are all
issues which cannot be formulated in purely factual terms.
The standards for a virtue relevancy and for the appropri-
ateness of its expression are determined by the goods at
stake. Potential clashes between virtues, similarly, arise not
because of any particular facts about the natural world but
because of the substantial link existing between the virtues
and the heterogeneous normative domain.
As far as the VIA classication is concerned, it is the very
rst criterion of the character strength, i.e. the tenet that
any strength contributes to various fulllments that
constitute the good life (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 17),
that sufces to make the point. Not only does it illustrate
that the very subject matter of the classication cannot be
fully specied without an account of the good life but
also, and explicitly, claims that the fulllments in ques-
tion are various. The virtues and character strengths
directed at these multiple fulllments, in consequence, can
and often will clash with each other. The conicts that
emerge will obviously be normative. One will need,
accordingly, to resort to normative resources, such as the
account of the good life, not just to solve but also even to
properly specify them.
This inevitably normative fate of any serious discussion
of the relationships between individual character strengths
is not an isolated issue. Rather, it is one more expression of
all the normativity hidden beneath the surface of positive
psychology. A thoughtful proponent of the positive psy-
chology movement, in result, will necessarily have, sooner
or later, to face the dubious character of his/her ofcial
endorsement of the fact/value distinction and the ideal of
value-neutral science. Such a confrontation, in fact, seems
to have already occurred in some places, albeit not the most
conspicuous.
Park and Peterson (2009; cf. parallel remarks in
Peterson, 2006) in particular have recently undertaken a
brief examination of the relationship between descrip-
tiveness and prescriptiveness in psychology, which displays
greater subtlety than the ofcial declarations cited in the
section above. Though only a sketch, their analysis deserves
closer attention because of its considerable novelty and the
fact that it has not been noticed by the critics of positive
psychology heretofore. Park and Peterson propose that
psychology be regarded as both descriptive and prescrip-
tive (Park & Peterson, 2009, p. 423). Their justication,
interestingly, is fully in accord with the standard critiques
of positive psychology. Not only do they claim that all
sciences are infused by the beliefs and values of scientists
but also acknowledge that psychologists choose certain
topics as most deserving of study, in which they follow
either their own values or the mandate of society. The
authors, in fact, even admit that their very subject matter of
living well is an unabashedly prescriptive matter, which
involve value-laden constructs that may cause discomfort
among some psychologists.
These insights are certainly very remarkable. They still,
stop short, however, of doing complete justice to the phe-
nomenon of the fact/value entanglement and of making
sense of it. Despite declaring that we must go beyond
these old ways of thinking about psychology, in particular,
they seem to be devoid of the theoretical and conceptual
resources needed for such an attempt. The old ways of
thinking about psychology, as a matter of fact, are nothing
less than the essential part of the mainstream neo-
positivist philosophy of psychology which puts nearly
exclusive reliance on value-neutral empirical research. This
paradigm, importantly, is not only unable to place current
theory, research, and practice in historical and cross-
cultural perspective but also, and more broadly, leaves
psychology unable to engage in critical self-reection
beyond examining aws in methodology and statistics
(Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 580). What critical
self-reection of this kind as well as more positive meta-
theoretical and normative investigation would require is a
philosophy of social science that is both aware of the limits
of empirical methods and well equipped with techniques of
another kind, a philosophy which is robust enough to
handle ontological, epistemological, and ethical/moral is-
sues and move beyond both objectivism and relativism
(Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008, p. 582).
The inevitability of dependence on this kind of a broad
philosophical project marks the collapse of the any local
approach to the two central issues raised in this article. If the
proponents of the VIA, accordingly, still want to make full
sense of the above criticism and offer a convincing response
to it, they have to turn to more global or strategic solutions. In
such an effort they may be able to count on the helping hand
of positive psychologys critics. Some authors from the Theory
& Psychology special issue (Christopher & Campbell, 2008;
Fowers, 2008; Richardson & Guignon, 2008; Slife &
Richardson, 2008; Sundararajan, 2008; cf. Fowers, 2012a,
2012b; Richardson, 2012), in particular, have offered a
more adequate theoretical foundation for inquiry into the
questions positive psychologists have raised about psychol-
ogy and the good life (Christopher et al., 2008; pp. 557558).
This foundation, importantly, not only enables one to engage
in the needed task of uncovering and critiquing positive
psychologys disguised ideology and to move beyond this
necessary work in order to construct more adequate social
science equivalents of virtue ethics (for a well-conceived and
thorough proposal, see especially Fowers, 2005, 2008, 2012a,
2012b; cf. Aho, 2012; Richardson, 2012), but also provides
conceptual tools necessary for addressing the two main is-
sues of this article.
The proposal made by Slife and Richardson (2008, pp.
700701) exemplies this latter point. The vast distinction
between two large categories of ontology named as
abstractionism and relationality made by these authors, in
particular, provides a convenient conceptual framework for
elucidating the VIAs previously noted problems and sug-
gesting some promising solutions to them.
 K. Banicki / New Ideas in Psychology 33 (2014) 2134
Abstractionist ontology, to begin with, assumes that all
things, including the self, are the most real and the best
understood when they are abstracted or separated from the
situations in which they occur (p. 701). This is the ontology
behind contemporary individualism, with its conception of
the separated and self-contained self, it also underlies most
of the natural and social sciences including positive psy-
chology as an exemplar of an abstractionist approach (p.
705). Abstractionism spawns (p. 700) a myriad of
fundamental problems for positive psychology, among
them: (1) the ideal of the disinterested observer, (2)
emotional satisfaction as a major criterion of positive out-
comes, and (3) the decontextualization of human
phenomena.
Both the VIAs construal of individual virtues and char-
acter strengths as independent variables and its ofcial
endorsement of the fact/value distinction are derivable
from the abstractionist roots of the classication. Rejecting
the unity of virtues, to begin with, is as an instance of more
general contextlessness. The focus and the energies of
positive psychologists, as Slife and Richardson (2008, p.
715) claim, are largely directed toward constructs, ethical
qualities, and beliefs that are abstracted from the contexts
in which they occur. The neglected contexts are usually
external to the person and include culture, history, or even
the current physical situation. With the VIAs particular
character strengths, however, even the very intrapersonal
environment, i.e. the context of virtuous character as a
whole, seems to be have been ignored.
The VIAs version of the fact/value distinction, in turn, is
related to the ideal of the disinterested observer of a world
that is taking place quite separately from the observer and
his or her observations (p. 706). Among the ontological
claims presupposed by this ideal one nds a particular
dualism, in which the subjective and the objective realms
of being are sharply distinguished, with the subjective
realm containing values, opinions, feelings, and beliefs that
occur independently of the objective realm of all events
outside the observers skin. In the objective, natural world,
respectively, there is nothing . that is inherently more
valuable or meaningful than anything else (p. 706). What
turns out to be presumed by this epistemological image, in
result, is probably the most straightforward specication of
the fact/value distinction.
A diagnosis tracing the two central problems of the VIA
classication to the tenets of abstractionist ontology not only
reveals the deeper character of these difculties but also
suggest a general direction in which the solution may be
sought for. The maladies of abstractionism, in particular, can
be remedied by replacing this ontology with a more relational
perspective based on the claim that it is impossible to un-
derstand and describe what is real and fundamental without
taking into account the context in which the real occurs and is
used (pp. 701702). Relationalism of this kind, importantly,
would provide an appropriate framework for reliably dis-
cussing the interdependence of virtues and the entanglement
of fact and value.
The thesis of the unity of virtue, at rst, will nd a much
more friendly formal and conceptual environment within
an ontological relationality. The broad claim that all that
exists is contextually situated, in particular, can be applied
33
to the realm of virtues and character strengths, not only
making the virtuous character as a whole substantially
connected with our culture and history, but also specifying
the elements of character as essentially interdependent on
each other. Such a broadly relational construal of character
strengths and virtues, obviously, will not sufce to solve all
of the problems connected with the unity of virtue. Still,
however, it seems to be the sole general framework in
which these problems can be seriously addressed.
The interconnectedness of the virtues, in its turn, inev-
itably draw the researcher into fact/value entanglement.
Here again he/she can benet from a relational view.
Relationally, any account of the good life or the qualities
that seems to be associated with it is situated and cannot
be both abstracted and rich enough to be truly meaning-
ful (p. 718). The qualities of the good life, in particular, are
not only mutually situated with regard to each other and to
the agents subjective well-being, but are also substantially
related to the contexts of historically- and culturally-
changing social practices. For them, the subjective cannot
be divorced from objective (p. 717).
The contextual character of values and the inevitably
normative character of all social practices, importantly, have
major consequences for the VIA project and positive psy-
chology in general. They entail that the subject matter of
these scientic projects cannot be dened and reliably
addressed within the framework of the fact/value distinction
and that their proponents cannot pretend to remain disin-
terested and disengaged observers of the good life. Positive
psychology is itself nothing less than a morally imbued social
practice and, as such, is inevitably connected with the
culturally situated values . always present in all human
functioning (Christopher & Campbell, 2008, p. 691).
This hermeneutic perspective, nally, not only makes
the VIA projects unsuccessful attempt at keeping faith with
the fact/value distinction comprehensible, but also pro-
vides a framework to cope with such understanding
without giving up any of the substantial purposes and
values either of positive psychology or of social science in
general. Positive psychology and the VIA classication, for
instance, could drop their pretensions to value-neutrality
and redene themselves as an interpretive and self-
interpretive moral inquiry (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan,
Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), which would be free not only
to employ all of the resources of science, both empirical
and theoretical but also to prescribe, so long as the pre-
scriptions are identied as such and the reasons for them
are open to inspection (Christopher & Campbell, 2008, p.
692). The details of such an approach still remain to be
worked out, but the efforts needed are denitely worth-
while and potentially highly fruitful.
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