Sociologizing Metaphysics and Mind: A Pragmatist Point of View on the Methodology of the

Social Sciences
Author(s): Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen
Source: Human Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 97-114
Published by: Springer
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Hum Stud (2007) 30:97-114
DOI 10.1007/sl0746-007-9049-6

Sociologizing metaphysics and mind: A pragmatist

point of view on the methodology of the social sciences

Osmo Kivinen Tero Piiroinen

Published online: 30 May 2007

? Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract There are realist philosophers and social scientists who believe in the
of social However, argue we that certain outlines
indispensability ontology. pragmatist
for inquiry open more fruitful roads to empirical research than such ontologizing per

spectives. The pragmatist conceptual tools in a Darwinian vein?concepts like action,

habit, coping and community?are in a particularly stark contrast with, for instance, the

Searlean and Chomskian of human In particular, we bring Searle's

metaphysics being.
realist philosophy of society and mind under critical survey in this paper and contrast it
with a approach. Drawing from Dewey, James, and recent
pragmatist, sociologizing
we propose for research work a relationalism
antirepresentationalism, methodological
of its own kind, altogether detached from the ontologies of society and mind.

Keywords Methodological relationalism Ontology Pragmatism

Realism Sociology of mind

In his article "Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society," John Searle (2001)
' ''
makes 'a plea for a branch of philosophy that... does not yet exist. This new branch, the

"philosophy of society," Searle (p. 15) says, would be a subject "centering essentially
''
around of ontology. We wish to ask in the present paper if there is any use for
questions
such an ontology in attempting to improve empirical research in the social sciences.1

1
Ontology is understood here as either a synonym for metaphysics or one of its branches?a discipline
'
that concerns itself with what exists, studying 'questions about reality that are beyond and behind those
capable of being tackled by the methods of science" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 240;
see also Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1999, p. 563).

O. Kivinen (El) T. Piiroinen

Research Unit for the Sociology of Education, RUSE, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland
e-mail: oskivi@utu.fi

T. Piiroinen
e-mail: terpii@utu.fi

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 98 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

question is intertwined with a host of other questions,

The like what is the
relationship between philosophy and sociology, and how social life is most
conveniently described. The conceptualizations involved in realist ontologies are
here compared with certain key concepts from our toolset (see Kivinen and
pragmatist
Piiroinen 2004, 2006a, 2006b). A central theme in this article is the differences
between Searlean realist and Deweyan ideas as regards how to interpret the
pragmatist
Darwinian implications to the methodologies of social scientific inquiry. Contrary to
what is being implied by, for example, Chomskian linguistics, or by the now
fashionable neuroscience, we argue that the to understanding human
key being,
language and mind cannot lie inside the skulls, where one finds brains; instead,
only
the great secret of being human?if there is any?is open to explanations.
sociological

To ontologize or not

Searle is by no means the as a foundation for

only philosopher proposing ontology
social scientific research; Mario Bunge (1996) is well known, and others include, for
example, Roy Bhaskar (1997b), Rom Harr? (1997) and Theodore Schatzki (2003).
Dozens of books on social have been Cruickshank
ontology published recently (e.g.,
2003; M?ki 2001; Schmitt 2003; Weissman 2000), and social scientists like
Margaret Archer (1996), Mustafa Emirbayer (1997), Geoffrey Hodgson (2002) and
Charles Tilly (1995) have embraced the idea that social scientific work needs to be
grounded on ontological theories. Even in the field of economics, where it is
commonplace to solve definite, operationalizable, problems, there are
practical
researchers claiming that the discipline "is not ...healthy," and needs to be cured by
a philosophical, realist ontology (Lawson 1997, pp. 3, 15 ff.; Hodgson 2002,
pp. 277-278).
Critical realists (e.g. Archer 1995; Archer et al. 1998; Lawson 1997; L?pez and
Potter 2001; Patom?ki 2002), for instance, are convinced that a certain type of
philosophical ontology is necessary for there to be social scientific inquiry in the
first place. Their is of a sort: There are many entities
ontology multilayered
interacting with each other within and among distinct levels of reality, and so the
world is equipped with heavy ontological furniture. Critical realists suppose in a
Bhaskarian vein that it is the scientist's to reveal ever levels or strata of
job "deeper
reality," whereas the philosopher's job is to lay the philosophical foundations for
the scientific work by highlighting how the intransitive, conception-independent
world must be for the transitive, human-dependent knowledge to be possible
(Bhaskar 1975/1997a, pp. 21-62, 1979, pp. 5-22; see Archer, 1995, pp. 136 ff.;
Cruickshank 2003, pp. 95 ff.; Lawson 1997, pp. xvi, 25).2

2
Critical realist level-ontologies like Margaret Archer's (1995) morphogenetic theory have faced the
criticism that they, for instance, embrace philosophically ontological dualisms due to reifying the past
actions of people into autonomous entities (Bates 2006, pp. 150-151; King 1999a, pp. 207, 211; Kivinen
and Piiroinen 2006a, pp. 226-227). It has also been argued that these dualisms are already inbuilt into the
critical realists' underlying Bhaskarian philosophy (King 1999b, p. 274; Kivinen and Piiroinen 2004,
pp. 234-235; Pleasants 1999, pp. 62, 112-113), but these arguments will not be repeated here.

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 Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 99

Searle is one of the most renowned advocates of ontology in the social sciences.

Having started his career with philosophy of language and speech acts (Searle 1969,
1979), he then concentrated on the philosophy of mind (Searle 1983, 1992, 1997)
and social ontology (Searle 1995, 2001, 2003). Searle's ultimate aim is to draw a
of "to the general structure of ...mind,
comprehensive picture reality, explain
language, and society?and then explain how they fit together" (Searle 1999a,

p. 111).
According to Searle (1992, pp.18 ff., 1995, pp. 154-155, 1997, pp. 113-114,
2004, p. 278), epistemology is to be kept separate from ontology; and ontology is the
main thing: One must not "confuse how you know with what is it that you know
when you know," because "the whole of the is to get at an
point epistemology
(Searle 1999b, p. 45, see also 1992, p. 23). Searle's
independently existing ontology"
(1993, pp. 57, 60-61) not somodest opinion is that his kind of realist ontology lies at
the core of "the Western Rationalistic Tradition," which "underlies the Western

conception of science." Science is vitally interconnected with philosophy: "Science

is systematic knowledge; philosophy is in part an attempt to reach the point where we
can have systematic (Searle 2002, p. 20). to Searle, many
knowledge" According
areas of science are desperately in need of philosophical clarification; for instance,
the and brain sciences are such areas, and one "field ...open for
cognitive
philosophical activity is the foundations of the social sciences" (Searle 1999b, p. 59).
Searle finds the present philosophies of society unsatisfying, and detects prospects
for better political and social theories specifically through an improved understand
of social Therefore he suggests a new, of
ing ontology. ontological philosophy
which, unlike the present of social sciences, would no be
society, philosophy longer
about questions of methodology in the social sciences. (Searle 2001, pp. 15-16, 37,
cf. 1995, pp. 4-7, 2003, pp. 195-196.)
We would not complain if Searle were right and the philosophy of social sciences
did primarily concern questions of methodology, but we are afraid that that is not
what is actually on. In any case, our and Searle's intentions are the
going quite
of each others: Whereas Searle wants more of we want to
opposite ontology society,
rid social sciences of ontology altogether?of all philosophized metaphysics of how
the social world is independently of how anyone finds it appropriate to describe it.
As pragmatists from William James onward have known, Charles Peirce's (1878/
1986) insight that a belief is a habit of action implies, among other things, that all
anyone can have is one's actor's of view on
point anything?a living, positioned,
interested point of view, here and now. is no exception; most
right Inquiry notably,
all causes are causes seen from one or another actor's point of view. (James 1880/

1979, pp. 165-166.) In John Dewey's (1938/1991, p. 116) treatise on the scientific
methodology, the point is made in terms that all facts, including all scientific facts,
are operational in the sense that are selected and described for some
they always
human purpose. No event comes to us labeled as cause or effect. "An event has to
be deliberately taken to be cause or effect. Such taking would be purely arbitrary if
there were not a and differential to be solved." 1938/
particular problem (Dewey,
1991, p. 453.)
a tool of communicating and actions?"the tool of
Language, coordinating
tools"?makes the difference between us and other animals us into
by turning

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 100 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

thinking and knowing creatures (Dewey 1925/1988c, pp. 132-134, 146). With
we inform others (and ourselves) about our actions: what we have done,
language
what we are about to do or want to do, and how. This involves how to use a
knowing
concept in relation to other concepts so that, for the concept
example, understanding
of chair, to know what a chair is, involves how the concept is related to
knowing
other concepts like sitting, legs, or furniture in different contexts (Coulter 1979, p. 2;
Dewey 1925/1988c, pp. 240-241; Rorty 1999, pp. 52-66), and this is all intertwined
with our embodied how to use chairs, not to mention with our shared
knowing
cultural practices involving chairs. Thus, words gain meanings relationally within
networks of words, in language-using with respect to the ways they are
practices,
used and for what purposes. As Dewey (1925/1988c, p. 145) noted: A sound or
'
written mark itself 'is not a word, and it does not become a word a
by by declaring
mental existence; it becomes a word ...when its use establishes
by gaining meaning
a of action." We then come to the idea of what we call
genuine community key
relationalism: "In science, since meanings are determined on the
methodological
of their relation as to one another, relations become the objects of
ground meanings
inquiry" (Dewey 1938/1991, p. 119; see Kivinen and Piiroinen 2004, 2006b).
Words, and purposes involved in social scientific games are
practices, language
different from the ones involved in philosophical language games.3 A social
scientist can describe an in many different ways for various social scientific
object
purposes, but there is nothing to be gained by adding that some of those descriptions
are more correct" or "in closer correspondence to reality" than
"ontologically
others. their conceptualizations as but more or less
Conceiving appropriate descrip
tions, social scientists can avoid unnecessary philosophizing about the Ultimate
Referents of terms and about the Metaphysical Essences of those referents. As

concepts are
just tools, it is no more interesting to investigate the
ontology any of

social scientific concept than it is to study the

ontology of, say, forks and spoons.
You will soon enough find out that a spoon works better than a fork in eating soup,
and need no metaphysical about the between a spoon
you arguments relationship
and the soup to ground your choice. (Menand 2001, p. 361.)

Sociologizing the philosophy of the social sciences

The philosophical ideology behind ontological theorizing is, roughly speaking, a

Platonist one, where the is obliged to try to reach the Ultimate Reality.
inquirer
Even the present-day being well aware that knowledge must be
though ontologizers,
tied to historical contexts, have toned this message down with a number of
nevertheless hold that however contextualized, claims to
qualifications, they
social scientific models?need to "rest on
knowledge?including plausible
on accounts of "the nature of that to be known" (e.g., Tilly 1995,
ontologies,"
pp. 1594, 1602). A number of philosophers have explicated their stance as a
3
As language is a tool of action, language games are tied to action?to people doing things on the
strength of their shared knowing how to do things (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006b, pp. 312 ff.; see also
Coulter 1999, pp. 166, 172-174; Dewey 1938/1991, p. 68; Medina 2004, pp. 343 ff.; Wittgenstein 1968,
?? 7, 23).

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 Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 101

combination of epistemological relativism and realism Bhaskar

ontological (e.g.,
1986, pp. 5-6, 1975/1997a, pp. 21 ff.; Harr? 1970, p. 78, 1997, pp. 173-174;
Rescher 1997, pp. 97 ff., 2006; Searle 1993, pp. 57-58, 1995, pp.153 ff.). Such
combinations, however, while allegedly aware of that is
knowledge produced
socially and needs to be understood as dependent on its historical and cultural
context, miss the important point. to "find out about (i.e. discover ...the
Trying
nature and of) structures and causal laws" as are out
properties things, they really
there, "in the intransitive dimension" (Bhaskar 1991, p. 10), can by definition be
nothing but armchair philosophizing, since metaphysical ontology just is all about
hypostatizing objects "beyond and behind those capable of being tackled by the
methods of science" (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 1996, p. 240).
Indeed, when the metaphysicians start the ultimate furniture of
cataloguing
reality, they could not care less about human actors' points of view?rather, they
portray themselves as somewhere above all and tell us how
standpoints, everything
looks "from outside the world" (cf. Searle 1995, pp. 11-12). For instance, Searle

(2004, pp. 278-279) seems to think that to confine oneself to some specific point of
view when describing the world as it really is would be to confuse the epistemic
with the ontological. Although most of the "Basic Facts" that Searle (e.g., 2004)
lists in his ontology come from the latest theories in physics, everything being in the
end just "physical particles in fields of force," he denies that his ontological
is confined even to a physicist's point of view:
understanding

the way, this has whatever to do with as an area of

By nothing 'physics'
is the name of an academic I am not talking
investigation. 'Physics' discipline.
about academic but about the basic structure of how the world is in
disciplines
fact. (p. 279)

And when his critics, like John Hund (1998, p. 126), point out that it is only people
who think that consists fields of Searle "So what? ...
reality of, say, force, responds:
[I]t does not matter what 'people.... think.' The Basic Facts remain the same."

(Searle 2004, p. 278.)

We are afraid that too many social scientists accept, or not, such a
consciously
Platonist / Searlean kind of ideology, where the ultimate goal of inquiry is to reveal
the intrinsic nature of reality. For the social scientists stuck with the ontological
Basic Facts, we suggest sociologizing philosophy, converting metaphysical presup

positions into decidable problems (Fuchs 2001, p. 6; see Kivinen and Piiroinen
2004, pp. 238-240, 2006a, pp. 226-228).
The key idea of sociologizing philosophy is simply to tie all human phenomena
to their historical context, and all human knowing to its evolutionary and communal
context (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006b). This is a sort of a well as a
pragmatist?as
Darwinian?theory of action. A sociologizing pragmatist understands human beings
as social animals who, leading their social lives, coordinate their actions through
with their fellow actors in terms of some Then, as
communicating language.
are also understood this way, and theories are tied to
philosophers philosophical
their social and historical context, the understanding of the relationship between

philosophy and sociology is turned upside down: We no longer need to look for
or of research work, but can
philosophical groundings justification sociological

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 102 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

remain satisfied with a sociological understanding of philosophers in their historical

context.4 Dewey (1920/1988a, p. 93) already insisted on the need to "connect the
story of philosophy with a study of anthropology, primitive life, the history of
literature and social institutions," and in a vein later
religion, emphasized,
associated with
Wittgenstein, interpretation that always takes place in a community;
neither nor objectivity
truth can escape the conventions of use in one's
language
are concepts that gain once understood
community?they intelligible meaning only
in the context of a community and issues and reaching
discussing debating
agreements on some of them (see Rorty 1980, pp. 6-9; Medina
intersubjective
2004).
However, by denying the need for philosophically ontological theories in social
sciences, we do not wish to the of social sciences
reject philosophy altogether.
Rather, a useful role for itwould be the promotion of methodological work, helping
social scientists to refine their conceptual tools. We suggest a relationalist

methodology, which combines Dewey's classic pragmatism with certain insights

of the recent antirepresentationalists.
Our starting point is that the decisive concept for understanding social practices
is simply action; the intertwined actions of people are the social life they lead.
and concepts also are intertwined with the shared of
Language practices?with ways
saying and doing things. Some realists' rhetorical claims (cf.
notwithstanding
Bhaskar 1991, pp. 7-10; Searle 1999b, pp. 42^4), this does not mean that
pragmatists doubt that there is a real world or that concepts are in touch with that
world. As Richard Rorty (1999) puts it, the point is just that this concepts' being in
touch with the world is not to be of in terms of reference relations between
thought
language and In their actions face causal
language-independent reality. people
pressures, which make it more appropriate for them to use their concepts one way
rather than another, and these pressures can be known
only through descriptions.
The ways that the pressures are described over time, on context,
change depending
on circumstances and the describers' This is an
purposes. (Rorty 1999, p. 33.)
antirepresentationalist approach of Davidsonian origin (see Davidson 1990), in stark
contrast with the idea that is a matter of of the 'real'
cognition '"representation'
world within the brain" (p. 304). Pragmatists appreciate the importance of language
'
as a crucial tool with which handle causal the 'environmental
people pressures?or
perturbations," the accommodation of which constitutes is an
cognition. Language
important tool for people to coordinate actions with one another, and also the tool
with which they can know of the
anything, "distinguish aspects environment,
distinguish their own distinctions and those of others and then further distinguish
'distinctions of distinctions' etc." (Goldspink and Kay 2004, pp. 602-604.)

Sociologizing the mind (1): the strength of habits

As Dewey (1929/1988e, p. Ill) says, "ideas are statements not of what is or has
been but of acts to be beliefs are instruments for
performed"; coping, just like, say,

4
An example of such a work is Randall Collins's (1998) The Sociology of Philosophies.

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Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 103

hands are (see Menand 2001, p. 361). A convenient tool for describing human
activities is the concept of habit. on Darwin, describe human
Leaning pragmatists
as that act on the of their habits,
beings living organisms incessantly strength
with their environment for as as live,
thereby transacting long they adapting, forming
new habits (see Kivinen and Ristel? 2002, pp. 421-422, 2003, pp. 365-366). On the
strength of their habits, people manage most everyday activities without thinking
consciously about what they are doing (see James 1890/1950, pp. 114 ff.). To
rephrase Michael Polanyi's famous aphorism, let us say that people know how to do
a lot more than they can explicate?and that they need neither conscious and

explicit, nor tacit and unconscious "rule for that (see Pleasants 1996;
following"
Harr? 1997, pp.184-185; also Searle 1995, pp. 141-145).5 In fact, making use of the
pragmatist concept of habit helps us appreciate the way thatWittgenstein showed
that the whole "problem" of rule following is illusory (see Sharrock and Button
1999).
Most of the time any given habit is what might be called a standby disposition,
ready to actualize when the right kind of cues are received; and when a habit does
actualize, it often intertwines with other habits actualized in other people's actions.
This sets the for a of the social sciences. "What is
stage pragmatist methodology
needed to direct and make fruitful social inquiry is a method which proceeds on the
basis of the interrelations of observable acts and their results," Dewey (1925-7/
1988d, p. 258) insisted.6
As the habit-based interactions between people institutionalize in time and

acquire established communal forms, customs and cultures come about. Human
are social animals forming all sorts of communities and associations, for
beings
whatever purposes; and communities can be described as sets of
joint simply
institutionalized customs, as ways of that people inherit from others.
acting together
'
Dewey taught us that we should not think of human social life as 'one thing which

may be called society" (Dewey 1925-7/1988d, pp. 278-279); that "individual

habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity" (Dewey 1922/1988b,
5
Of course, Searle also knows that most of what people do goes on quite "automatically," so to speak.
In fact, he makes some commendable points in this connection, especially as he discusses what he calls
"Background Abilities." These abilities, it seems, could be conceived of as just embodied knowing how
that enables people to behave according to the institutionalized customs of their communities without rule
following (see Searle 1995, pp. 127-147, cf. 1983, pp. 141-159, 1992, pp. 175-196). Indeed, in one
passage, Searle (1995, p. 132) compares his conception of the Background toWittgenstein's later work,
and to Bourdieu's habitus. There are also differences, however, between Searle's Background and
Bourdieu's habitus (see Marcoulatos 2003), just as there are differences between habitus and our
pragmatist understanding of habits (see Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006b). As to the most important
differences between our way of talking about habits and Searle's way of talking about the Background, it
seems that Searle (cf. 1995, pp. 137-147) is concerned that the Background would not be quite real
enough were it seen as simply a way of describing human behavior?simply as a conceptual tool; he
therefore vigorously defends the idea that Background Abilities must be something ontologically real and
causally powerful.
6
In social sciences, the relevant questions are about social mechanisms, that is, the constellations of
interlinked activities that regularly bring about particular type of?intended and unintended?social
outcomes. The methods for analyzing these mechanisms are very much in dispute. Some interesting
remarks about the nature of the social mechanisms are made by, for instance, Peter Hedstr?m (2005),
albeit we would like to replace his Parsons-originated analytical realism with an analytical pragmatism of
a methodological relationalist kind?a topic we will discuss thoroughly elsewhere.

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 104 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

p. 19; also James 1890/1950, p. 121). Thus the society that social scientific inquiries
investigate is just social life in a customs and
community?human practices,
routines carried forth on the strength of habitual knowing how (Kivinen and
Piiroinen 2004, 2006a; see Dewey 1922/1988b, pp. 43 ff., 1925-7/1988d, pp. 238
372; Veblen 1919/1990).
The pragmatist conceptualizations for describing social life as but simply
organisms acting on the strength of their embodied habits are in keeping with a
"Darwinian story" (see Kivinen and Piiroinen 2007). Of course, few serious
scientists today wish to be known as "non-Darwinian" thinkers, and realist

philosophers definitely want to avoid stigmatization of this kind. Thus, for instance,
Bhaskar (1986, p. 113) claims that the critical realism of his bent embraces just the
right kind of "metaphysically Darwinian" mindset; Geoffrey Hodgson (2004) has
tried to combine pragmatism and realism in the name of Darwinian
specifically
social scientific thinking; and Searle also avows himself a Darwinian,
emphasizing
how Darwin drove teleology out of biological explanation, so that we can now draw

only on the blind and brute causal forces of nature when explaining biological
or their features (Searle 1992, pp. 51-52, 1995, pp. 16, 143 ff.,
species particular
2002, p. 128).
However, for Searle (1995, 6), unlike for us, the evolutionary theory of biology is
not just one more useful description of the world, but a fundamental part of ontology
'
(indeed, one of the 'two features of our conception of reality [that] are not up for
grabs," the other one the atomic of matter). Moreover, with a
being theory
distinction quite foreign to the pragmatist ways of thinking, Searle (1995, pp. 9-23)
elaborates his ontology by separating functions?which he admits are tied to human

points of view?from the intrinsic facts of nature that he claims to be totally

independent of how anyone ever describes the world. This is then translated into the

founding idea of Searle's of society, that is, into a metaphysics where

philosophy
the brute facts of nature are to institutional facts and
ontologically prior underpin
them.7 The bulk of Searle's philosophy of society is an attempt to offer (a rather
we must as an answer to the question, How
complicated, say) conceptual machinery
exactly are the institutional facts formed upon the brute ones? (See Turner 1999,
pp. 218-219, 223-224.) It seems that the machinery runs into "the problem of the
mysterious origin of collective normativity," and offers "not so much a solution to
this problem ...as another way of the One of course
stating problem" (p. 224). may
wonder whether any philosophical theory is needed to solve this "problem" in the
first place, and thus whether the discussion of the metaphysics of the collective
actually only serves the purpose of the discussion of the metaphysics of
keeping
the collective alive.
What we find significant, however, is that Searle (1995) indeed thinks that there
are such "natural" as mountain and molecule that need to be
concepts distinguished
from "social" concepts: can be a mountain even if no one believes it is
"Something
a mountain; can be a molecule even if no one thinks at all about
something anything
7
The origins of this distinction can be traced back to Searle's (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Language (see pp. 50 ff.). For a critical analysis of the development of this and a number of
other crucial ideas in Searle's social philosophy over the years, especially as regards how they are related
to the issue of normativity, see Turner (1999).

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Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 105

it" As his critics out, he thus assumes "an ontological dualism of

(p. 33). point
'social' versus 'natural' that is as difficult to sustain as the 17th century
phenomena
between and he assumes a position
dichotomy 'primary' 'secondary' qualities";
that is dependent on the representationalist view of knowledge and thus on
that as soon as the?however brute and natural?features of the world
neglecting
are conceived of as it makes no sense to say are 'independent of
"facts they
since like other facts they are constituted by concepts"
representations,' any
(Francis 2005, p. 282; see also Turner 1999, pp. 229-231). Although Searle is
we "create" mountains
absolutely right in that it would be an odd thing to say that
and molecules about them, all the facts about mountains and molecules
by talking
(and hence all our knowledge concerning them) nevertheless depend upon using
concepts. It is intelligible to talk about mountains within a language game that
the word mountain and related terms, but the word mountain behaves quite
employs
within different games. Laymen think of mountains as
differently language
that has always been there, but in the language games of, say,
geologists,
something
mountains have a life-span of their own; come and go due to the movement of
they
tectonic plates and the effect of erosion. (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2004, p. 241.)
of is at the core of Searle's an
As the representationalist way thinking philosophy,
of the Searlean is that some organisms in
important part evolutionary story
the course of their struggle for surviving developed minds in order to represent the
world around in order to achieve more and more "mind-to-world fit" (see
them,
Searle 2002, pp. 68-73). Moreover, for Searle (2002, pp. 27-31), it is plain that in
an in the for the mind has to be a
order to give advantage struggle surviving,
feature; thus, after brains caused minds, the minds
causally powerful higher-level
in causal interactions with the rest of the world, to happen.
engaged causing things

Curiously, then, Searle (1984, p. 17, also 1983, pp. 135-136, 2002, pp. 27, 84) is
such commonsensical lessons as: "I decide, for example, to raise
fond of repeating
arm and?lo and arm goes up."
my behold?my
But why should such simplified commonsense be philosophized as an essential
feature of mental ontology? In this metaphysical vein human beings are portrayed as
for a "motive" that would set them to actions.
"passive" by nature, always waiting
This kind of thinking is familiar to the mind-first philosophers and rational-choice
economists, and already has been criticized by pragmatists like Dewey (1922/
127 and Veblen (1919/1990, pp. 73-74) a century ago. For the
1988b, pp. ff.)
"a stimulus does not the ensuing concrete action
pragmatists, psychological trigger
on its way.... The stimulus rather is explained the action, it is something that
by

happens to an already ongoing process of activity." (Kilpinen 2004, p. 423.) Habits

are for that constitute the human self and volition: "In any
demands activity

intelligible sense of the word will, they are will" (Dewey 1922/1988b, p. 21).
of making discrete decisions about actions and then acting as a result
Instead only
act the time. The action runs in front of one's nose, so to
of them, all just
people
no effort to keep on and from ever being
speak, needing conscious going, escaping
describable "in the act," right here and now. And this is precisely what we
should natural selection to have favored. There will always be
Darwinians expect
an acting organism could have done just
literally thousands of little things that
slightly differently at any instant, so that itwould be impractical for the organism to

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 106 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

preconceive and contemplate the vast majority of those things as choices calling for
and no more sensible would it be to invest nervous resources to producing
decisions;
real-time descriptions of behavior.
when it occurs to us to intervene in the events consciously, it means that
Usually
there is something doubtful, a problem we face that our habits are unable to
present
cope with immediately, a problem calling for a decision (Peirce 1878/1986, pp. 261
ff.; James 1890/1950, p. 142). So when we in retrospect say that we decided to do
it is usually not about an arm, but rather about some issue,
something, raising bigger
for which we really needed to pause and think things over (to use some linguistic
formulations in order to cognitively consider what is involved and what kind of
consequences our actions tend to bring about). It is only after such pauses and

cognitive considerations that it is apt to use a phrase like / decided to in connection

with whatever it was that we did after the pause. To be sure, there are some

occasions when it is good to do some before one's arm, at an

thinking raising
auction for instance, but most of the time we do not have to stop and decide whether
to raise our hand; we raise it, unthinkingly, in the midst of our actions?be it
just
tennis, one's head, with a friend, or whatever.
playing scratching conversing
The key words are, then, action and coping, not deciding and representing, and
this important shift in terminology makes it redundant to think of mental entities as
something that interact with the physical world. The representationalist image of
mind and does not mesh at all with the Darwinian story. At what we
language point,
may ask, were the mere nervous controls replaced by emerging representations?
(Rorty 1998, pp. 20, 295-296, 1999, pp. xxiii, 64-65, 68.) Even the simplest
nervous systems are of supplying with for
capableperfectly organisms capabilities
coping with the environment, and pace Searle (2002, pp. 72-73), there is no

particular moment in the series of more and more complex nervous systems to claim
that an organism no
longer merely copes like the simpler ones, but in addition forms

representations of the world.

Sociologizing the mind (2): the strength of language

Whereas an as
pragmatists manage just fine with understanding of human beings
organisms that transact with their environment, cope, and ever new
adapt, forming
habits in the process, Searle completes his realist vision of the world by claiming
that mental states are among the ontological furniture of Whereas we say
reality.
that people understand and predict their own and others' actions an
by taking
intentional stance toward their doings (Dennett 1987), and that talking about what
goes on in someone's mind is thus to be understood as a way of
simply rationalizing
behavior through descriptions, implying no use of metaphysical language game by
it, for a metaphysician like Searle, who is looking for the intrinsic intentionality?
"the real as to the mere appearance of the (Searle 1992,
thing opposed thing"
p. 80)?the concept of intentional stance is "empty" (Searle 1995, p. 146). For
Searle (2002, pp. 80-81), then, the mind has to have an intrinsic mental status; and
as he conceives mental terms "as for actual in the world," are
standing things they
not a manner of nor just a way to cope with the environment.
"just speaking,"

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 Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 107

We understand as a tool of action, of actions and

language coordinating coping
with enabling people to predict
the environment, the behavior of their fellow actors
through communicating who is doing what. Now, for Searle (1969), too, language is
all about communication, but mostly in the sense of a medium for commu
being
about contents that concern the
nicating something specifiable propositional
world?and it is in respect of whether the asserted correspond to the
propositions
world that the Searlean realists decide whether claims are "true" and represent
the "facts." Whereas some of the propositions are so complicated that they require
to be formulated, some others name representations simple enough to
language just
be formed in animal minds. True and false are most "funda
non-linguistic ally
...metaintentional that are "used to assess success and failure
mentally predicates"
of representations to achieve fit in the mind-to-world direction of fit, of which
statements and sentences are a special case." (Searle 2002, pp. 68-70.) First there

is the mind with its of the world, and then can come
representations only
communication of these Indeed, it seems that
representations through language.
Searle thinks of the philosophy of mind as the foundation for understanding
language; he has long emphasized that "we will not get an adequate theory of
reference until we can show how such a is part of a theory
linguistic theory general
'
of Intentionality, a theory of how the mind is related to objects in the world' (Searle
1979, p. xi). '
'
In contrast, all we need to say about how 'relates to' the
pragmatists language
world is that like other tools of action, are entangled in causal
concepts, any

relationships with the rest of the world. So there is no need to mystify the
like Searle (e.g., 1993, pp. 57-66, 1999b, pp. 34 ff.) does, as a relation
relationship,
of that have to language
correspondence linguistic propositions supposedly
truth conditions. For us, the of correspondence, any more
independent concept
than that of mind nature?is of no use (see Davidson
representation?of mirroring
1999; Rorty 1980; cf. James 1878/1978).
Besides Searle's theories, our is in stark contrast with Noam
viewpoint
(1968, 1984, 2000, 2002) Cartesian, internalist and "modular"
Chomsky's
of mind and to which there are mental organs
understanding language, according
or modules in the brain and a sort of a language organ or as one of them.
faculty

Chomsky (2002) even refuses the basic pragmatist insight that language is crucially
a tool of communication:

is not as a of communication. It is a
[L]anguage properly regarded system
for It can of course be used for communication....
system expressing thought....
But in any useful sense of the term, communication is not the function of

and may even be of no for understanding the

language, unique significance
functions and nature of language, (p. 76)

Like Searle, Chomsky seems to be suggesting that, already long before language
came along, thoughts existed in the privacy of animal minds, just dying to be
some outlet. In this as a
expressed through picture, language '"expresses' thought
conducts water," ironized such erroneously "naturalis
pipe Dewey (1925/1988c)
tic" where is confined "to some peculiarity of brain
explanations, language
structure, or to some ... 'outer of 'inner' states" (p. 134). Indeed,
expression'

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108 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

the importance of scientific work on the problem of

Chomsky emphasizes
is defined him as a sort of a "one-to-one relation"
representation?which by
between the of the environment and an animal's mind/brain processes
aspects
(Chomsky 2002, p. 86). Furthermore, Chomsky (1984, pp. 37-38, 2002, pp. 83-91),
the
again like Searle (1992, pp. 24, 73-74, 89-90, 2002, pp. 67-73), explains both
evolution of the thinking mind and the later development of languages in terms of
the in complexity and sheer size of the brain.
growth
Chomsky and his collaborators try to specify the ultimate nature and origins of
"the evolution and function of the language faculty,"
language through considering
which they think is "an internal component of the mind/brain" (Hauser et al. 2002,
p. 1570). In the Chomskian model the internal nature of the language faculty is
emphasized up to the point where the rules of grammar and the logic of language are
claimed to be inborn, genetically set (Chomsky 2002, pp. 46 ff., 61 ff.). As Terrence
Deacon (1997) puts it, the Chomskians "have placed the cart (brain evolution)
before the horse (language evolution)" (pp. 44, 102 ff.); let us rather look for
for the development of language from outside the head,
sociological explanations
from the functions a developing language may have had in human communities.
Like language, the rise and development of the conscious mind, inseparably
intertwined as it is with language, is best explained from the outside in. Instead of
internalist ideology, which remains stuck with the metaphysics of inborn mental
entities to express themselves our is that
trying through language, starting point
can have any concept of mental after have a language
people phenomena only they
with which to talk about them. According to Dewey (1925/1988c), "psychic events,
such as are more than reactions of a creature to pain and
anything susceptible
diffuse comfort, have language for one of their conditions"; for what made thoughts
"identifiable events with a perceptible character, was their concretion in
objects,
discourse" (pp. 134-135). This is consistent with Wilfrid Sellars's (1956/1997, ?
29) key insight that "all awareness ...is a linguistic affair"?that conscious thought
is a matter of language. Dewey (1925/1988c) also knew that the "world of inner
'
experience is dependent upon an extension of which is a social
language product'
(p. 139), and thus needs to be explained sociologically (also Collins 1989; Coulter
1979; Mead 1913/2005). Likewise, according to G. H. Mead (1934), mind is a social
phenomenon, which it would be absurd to view in terms of some particular
individual, because "even its biological functions are social" (p. 133).
primarily
Therefore, pragmatists think highly of such a social psychology that concerns
questions like "how different customs, established interacting arrangements, form
and nurture different minds" (Dewey 1922/1988b, p. 46, 1925-7/1988d, pp. 250
251, 357). They firmly reject the internalist psychology suggested by Chomsky and
Searle:

When the introspectionist thinks he has withdrawn into a wholly private realm
of events disparate in kind from other events, made out of mental stuff, he is

only turning his attention to his own soliloquy. And soliloquy is the product
and reflex of converse with others; social communication is not an effect of

soliloquy. If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never
talk to and with ourselves.... Through speech a person identifies
dramatically

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Sociologizing metaphysics and mind 109

himself with potential acts and deeds; he many roles, not in successive
plays
stages of life but in contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges.
(Dewey 1925/1988c, p. 135.)

Sociologizing the mind in the pragmatist vein suggested here thus embraces the
ethnomethodological insight that there is nothing interesting to be found under the
skull?only brains (Coulter 1999, p. 176). The mind is not to be explained by physical
sciences; the brain is, but themind should not be identified with the brain (Rorty 2004,
p. 219). intentions as "embedded ...in human customs and institutions"
Understanding
(Wittgenstein 1968, ? 337), we can replace the Cartesian dualism of subject and object
with a to mind, which will us avoid errors such as the Searlean
sociological approach help
reification of consciousness (see Coulter 1979, p. 1, 1989, pp. 121-124, 1994, p. 293).
This approach has other benefits as well. Whereas the
sociologizing important
Chomskian and Searlean internalists deny that mind is more a social skill than
representations in the brain, and thereby confine their investigations to the ancient
structures of the brain?more to "what our children share with chimpanzees ...than
...what share with Plato" (Rorty 2004, pp. 220-221, 233)?we can better
they
understand the rapid evolution of minds by explaining it in terms of changes in
human customs and language games. Whereas the whole evolutionary history of the

hominid brain goes back millions of years, with even the slightest of changes taking
hundreds of thousands of years, the history of language is much shorter; languages
become different from each other within a few thousand
quite unrecognizably only
years (Deacon 1997, p. 110). As Deacon (1997) says, "Languages have adapted to
human brains and human brains have adapted to languages ...but languages have

done most of the adapting" (p. 122). It should not be a big surprise that language,
a tool, has evolved much more than the brain; after all, it is easier to
being recently
tools like or hammer handles, so that they fit better to
shape languages, keyboards,
human brains and hands, than it is to wait until human brains and hands evolve to fit

better to the existing languages, keyboards and hammer handles.

Final words

No one can outside of one's own action; is what it is from an actor's

step everything
of view, as a goal of action, as a problem that the action involves, or as a tool
point
for action. For action is not to be
explained with volitions of the mind,
pragmatists,
the contrary: Action explains all social life (see, e.g., Joas and Kilpinen 2006,
quite
What we think, see, feel and smell upon what we are doing, not the
p. 324). depends
other way round (Kilpinen 2004, p. 424). This idea was developed by Mead (2001)
in his social psychology, and was echoed by Dewey (1925-7/ 1988d) in his inquiries
into public policy, as well as by Veblen (1919/1990) in economics. Action is also
the starting point of all inquiry. It is only when people face problems in their
actions, and when the present habits do
well, notthat they need
work so as
inquiry
to remove the problems. We make an object of inquiry and knowledge by
something
relating?it to other objects of knowledge in
linguistically describing?and thereby
terms of the relevant game. The of a description is
language appropriateness
measured in action: by trying to use it and evaluating the consequences.

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 110 O. Kivinen, T. Piiroinen

Beliefs (as habits of action) are also something that can only be weighed in action
and considered from some particular actor's of view; all scientific research,
point
too, is carried out in an action-related framework, which is not to be drawn from the
work of philosophers, but mainly from the previous research work in the field of
research itself. The framework offers the technical concepts, as well as the bulk of
relevant questions, for the problem-driven case studies to be conducted. And here lie
the distinctive features between different social sciences, for their differences
are due mainly to differences in the setting and phrasing of research questions in the
respective fields (say, economists setting themselves with economic questions,
political scientists with political questions, and so forth)?not, that is, to some

hypostatized metaphysical differences between the objects of inquiries of different

disciplines. Then, as all the same way from the phase of
inquiry proceeds basically
setting and phrasing the questions onward, there are also congruent methodological
guidelines to be set for all social sciences. Herein we have some
developed aspects
of a pragmatist and relationalist which the research stresses that
methodology,
problems need to be conceptualized as and as possible so that
accurately strictly
can be into actions?into research activities to
they unambiguously operationalized
be carried out in solving the research the case
problem driving study.
As tools of action determined in their use in the field, social scientific
conceptualizations have no and behind the methods of science.
ontology beyond
What ontology might hammers or spoons or have? tool of action
stethoscopes Any
and all the operations it suggests are to be weighed simply in the light of their
consequences. The realists' claim that the concepts that social scientists find useful
also refer to some real entities out there, and that these entities are
ontologically
some way or another independently of how it is found useful to describe them, adds
nothing useful to the social scientific Instead of then, social
explanations. ontology,
scientists need just agreement on what the case is, what is to be done about
enough
it, and how the problems involved in it can be legitimately operationalized into
empirical research activities?for instance, collectives
by analytically decomposing
to interactions and further to actions of participants.
Pragmatists, being action-oriented inside out, have a lot to offer for the

methodology of research in any field of inquiry. Dewey in particular has more to

offer for the social sciences than the conventional wisdom credits him for?content
wise, too. For us (also Kilpinen 2000, pp. 163-164) it seems that Dewey had even
more of the full-blooded sociological imagination than the traditional paradigm
example of a social scientist, G. H. Mead. One lesson for those
pragmatist pragmatist
considering the evolution of human mind and is that the of the
being, language, study
history of social life is more illuminating than the study of the history of the brain.

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