3 Future For Israel and Palestine

Three Futures for Israel and Palestine
Author(s): Bjoern Moeller

Source: Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1/2 (JUNE & DECEMBER 2000), pp.
67-95
Published by: Manju Jain
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41960889
Accessed: 30-03-2017 17:19 UTC
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Three Futures for Israel and Palestine
B]OERN Moeller
It is usually regarded as more "scientific" to write about the

past and present than about the future, if only because they provide
access to a wealth of empirical data, whereas the future is inevitably
somewhat nebulous and shrouded in uncertainty. However, it does
not follow that it is impossible to say anything meaningful about
the future, if only predictions are firmly based on available data
from the past and present, and if predictions are falsifiable, at least
in the "time will tell" sense. Indeed, present actions are nearly
always influenced by 'the shadow of the future', hence involve
prediction, which can be undertaken in a perfectly rational manner.
Hie further we attempt to glance into the future, however, and the
more complex die setting, the dimmer the picture.
The. Future is Still Open
In the 'present paper, an attempt shall be made at comparing
three different futures for the Israel-Palestine nexus. This is, indeed,
very complex, if only because it involves a large set of actors, most
of which cannot reasonably be treated as unitary. One has to look
at the different groupings within botti the Israel and Palestinian
camps, at their (likewise pluralistic) friends and foes in what is a
multipolar and open-ended region. One further needs take into
account external actors such as the United States and lhe European
Union. Including their national and sub-national component parts
68 Three Futures for Israel and Palestine
(the 'Jewish link', 'Islamic link', etc.). Only a sma

complexities will be addressed in the following.
The 'baseline future' is a simple extrapolat
trends, including the peace process - or what is le
reign of Benjamin Netanyahu which was, by the
hopefully, gradually coming to an end. Ther
reasons, no such thing as a 'status quo' in a proces
progress and momentum. It may be stalled for a
it cannot stand still for long and certainly not in
It may still be possible to salvage the peace pro

Labour Party should return to power after the el
for 17 May 1999. However, it seems, at least, equa
process will come to a halt, or even be reversed.
approaching a juncture where two divergent paths lea
futures. For some time after this juncture, it ma
to reverse course, but it will become increasingly dif
until a point of no return is reached.
Two different 'generic futures' appear conceiv
an indefinite number of variations. One is a r
conflictual relationship in several different vers
based on self-help and unilateralism. The other an
future entails a more cooperative relationship bas
respect for basic security concerns.
Even though only the latter future would be stab
conceivable that there is no path leading from
Important though this problem of implemen
sequencing) certainly is, it has been largely o
beyond the scope of the present paper. On the ot
enumeration of the basic problem seems ind
introduction to the main analysis.
Roots of the Problem
One might describe the foundations of the Israel-Palestine

conflict as an instance of the well-known security dilemma which,
according to neo-realist analysis, affects relations in any anarchic
setting, i.e. where independent actors confront each other.
Moeller 69
When two
have come t
tend to tak
inadvertentl
responds in
may manife
wars-^or in
which may
severe oppr
Even since
have een th
other actors
struggle un
1967 and 19
for most of
by enemies,
surpassing I
natural reso
need for a m
recently), f
and for und
deterrent - the so-rcalled 'bomb in the basement/2
Regardless of the underlying defensive motivation, this

offensive posture has understandably been viewed as threatening
by Israel's neighbours, who have responded by similar means, i.e.
with pre-emption (e.g. in the 1973 Yom Kippur War), offensiveness
(inter alia manifested in ballistic missile proliferation) and a quest
for (mostly chemical) weapons of mass destruction.3 The result is
an unstable stand-off, promising possible victory to whoever strikes
first and defeat to the side that is caught-off guard by a surprise
attack.
For most of the period, the Palestinians have been little more
than 'pawns' in this Arab-Israel conflict, to the interests of whom
the Arab states have paid lip-service, but little more. Occasionally,
the Arab states have even turned against the Palestinians, as when
Jordan occupied the West Bank in 1948, or when they launched the
military campaign against the PLO fedayeen in (what the PLO refer
to as) the 'Black September' of 1970.4
Even though peace agreements have bee

Israel and Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994),
remains a distinctly 'cold peace' that has, at be
eliminated the security dilemma.5 That the s
work, however, does not mean that the inter
are necessarily incompatible. Quite a strong
made that the present (almost) zero-sum conf
into a positive-sum one, where absolute g
collaboration could come to outweigh relative
hence that a mutually advantageous relationsh
infra). The security dilemma simply implies t
difficult, to get from here to there.
The situation of an Israeli settlement is a microcosmic version
of the security dilemma. It represents a piece of Israel situated on
occupied territory, i.e. an environment that is perceived as distinctly
hostile - uncomfortably similar to the situation of the Jewish ghettos
in Europe and elsewhere in the past. Hence the need for an armed
protection which is, in its turn, viewed as threatening by the
Palestinians. When the latter resort to hostile acts against settlers or
their armed guardians, this is usually viewed as an ex post facto
validation of the need for the armed presence, or even used as an
argument f oi strengthening it - whence may easily develop a vicious
circle of escalating violence.
One might even argue that the very identities of the two sides
are mutually incompatible, hence may provide sufficient grounds
for conflict, even in the absence of conflicting interests. First of all,
some would argue that 'identity' presupposes 'otherness' (i.e. that
ego is in conceivable without alter), and that this Other is
(automatically, or at least usually) seen as a hostile, rather than
merely different, Other.7
Secondly, to the extent that nationhood is based on attachment

to (and even more so when it requires possession of) a particular
piece of land, Palestinian and Israeli/ Jewish (as opposed to religiously
or culturally) the Israelis become, the less capable are they of
acknowledging another nation's right to the land which forms a
constitutive element of (this form of) national identity. And the more
the Palestinians see themselves as a nation in their own right (as
Moeller 71
opposed to o
comes to pr
Israel. That i
necessarily
however.8
The securi
predominan
with no viab
indeed, argu
is for one pa
If one party
certain to re
rule indefin
side may, h
to acquiescen
but 'dorma
while this m
in the Israel
predominanc
is thus an ac
basic securit
(vide infra).
Baseline Future: 'Back on Track'
The term 'peace process' has become increasingly misleading.

It was initiated by the Israeli Labour leaders Yitzhak Rabin and
Shimon Peres, and produced some fairly significant results in the
first couple of years.
A peace treaty was signed with Jordan in 1994 to supplement
that signed with Egypt of 1979, and negotiations were started with
the rest of the Arab community of states on a number of issues in
a complex set of interlocking bilateral and multilateral talks.9 As far
as relations between Israel and the Palestinians were concerned, the
following was accomplished.
A mutual recognition by the two sides of each other as
possible interlocutors, manifested, among other things, in
the symbolic handshake.
A gradual transfer of powers from Israel

power to the Palestine National Authori
A gradual and partial relinquishmen
occupied territory, intended as part of a
Peace' bargain.
An Israeli debate about the continuin
accelerating (illegal) settlement drive on
While it is still government policy, a gro
Israelis is quertioning it.
A time-table for further steps, pointing
Final Status Negotiations.
Since the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, h
has been (deliberately) stalled and obstructed,
back. Even the involvement of Israeli's main al
in the process has been to no avail. The 1998
thus merely a compromise that should help i
already been agreed, and in a truncated for
transfer of 13 percent of the West Bank to th
from what had been envisioned in Oslo, Washi
may be just enough to uphold the illusion of p
at the time of writing, the implementation of
even been suspended until after the Israeli el
It remains possible that the process will com
particularly if a new Labour government i
committed to the process as the Rabin/Peres g
it seems (at least) equally likely that a right-w
be formed that will formally abrogate previo
Even if the peace process does come back on
to be seen where this track actually leads. By s
extrapolation from the past, one might expec
relinquish more and more occupied territory
halt the settlement drive and perhaps even ab
all, of the existing settlements; to allow t
increasingly independent and state-like; to per
significant number of Palestinians from their dia
to devising and implementing viable agreements
halves of the Palestinian 'entity' with each oth
Moeller 73
In the fulln
statehood th
action of Pal
(vide infra)
opposed to t
to accept ea
each others'
other divisi
be a long jou
Even in the
some hope f
Alternativ
It is all too
could even tr
this may we
or developm
interlinked,
A continuation (or even worse: acceleration) of the
settlement drive on the West Bank and /or in Jerusalem11
Each new settlement spurs Palestinian protests that are
usually put down (quite brutally) by Israeli security
forces, which produces Palestinian retaliation, etc.
A halt to the progressive transfer of authority to the PNA
(or even an annulment of the agreements reached to date),
This will further erode the PNA's authority (and that of
Arafat in particular), thereby strengthening Hamas, which
will put even greater strains on the Palestinian security
forces, etc.
A major terrorist attack against Palestinians by Israeli

extremists like the 1994 Hebron massacre perpetrated by
Baruch Goldstein, which may well entice Palestinian
radicals to retaliate.
The Palestinian side might also trigger similar developments,

for instance by the following steps.:
A series of large terrorist attacks against Israeli civilian
targets. This might well produce an Israeli

borders as well as of communications between Gaza and
the West Bank; a curtailment of Arab citizens' rights in
Israel; more severe oppression of dissident Palestinian
groups such as Hamas ; or even violent 'reprisals' against
the civilian Palestinian population. This would
undoubtedly produce a backlash among the Palestinians,
leading to a renewed Intifada (probably led by Hamas)
that could well be considerably more violent than that of
the late 1980s. This would not merely produce even
harsher Israeli measures, but also strengthen the political
right (from the Likud outwards to the extremes), etc.
A unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. 'Heroic'
and even justified though this may be, it would probably
be counter-productive for the cause of the Palestinians,
and even more so if it should take place on 4 May 1999
(as had, by the time of writing, not been ruled out). It
would strengthen the Israeli right in the 17 May elections,
thereby further reducing the chances of getting the peace
process back on track.
Tempting though it might appear to try, neither side has any
realistic prospects of winning a decisive victory. The Palestinians
stand no chance of becoming preponderant in the foreseeable
future, for several reasons: They are presently dispersed in their
diaspora, hence weakened; Israel is in a position to regulate their
return; they do not have access to all the implements of power that
statehood may afford; and their prospects of international support
are very limited, except for rhetoric. None of this is likely to change
in the short or medium term, and any major chance presupposes
Israeli consent.
The Israelis might, at first glance, appear to stand a better

chance. However, they are numerically inferior and bound to
become increasingly so because of higher Arab/Palestinian birth
rates.12 The danger of becoming a minority in their own homeland
looms large in the Israeli minds, and none of the conceivable
remedies are adequate: Additional Jewish immigration will be hard
to ensure and will put greater strains on already scarce natural
Moeller 75
resources, ab
in the form
combined so
the balance a
This demo
pronounced i
and/or a ret
which would
would 'tip th
either remai
majority; or
thereby for
'European') i
Another reas
the Palestin
strategy of
Intifada) or
military prep
(Israeli Defe
damaging ef
Martin Van
By the mid-1
become plain
army steeply
materially in
repeatedly pr
of volunteer
lamentable st
prospect of t
Other mean
might be a c
during the f
also negative
no signs tha
the contrary,
including H
problem.
Alternative Future 2: Towards Stable Peace
Neither side will thus be able to defeat the other decisively.

Unfortunately, this does not mean that the conflicting sides realize
the futility of their quest for victory. As long as victory seems
achievable, if only as a dim prospect or the distant future, there will
be a temptation to fight on, if only as a way of justifying the 'sunk
costs' of previous years of (futile) struggle.
Conversely, a precondition for a resolution of a conflict may
be the recognition of the impossibility of decisive victory, which
may mark the moment of 'ripeness', i.e. the juncture when conflict
resolution comes within reach. Unfortunately, it is much easier to
. identify such a moment of ripeness retrospectively (endowed with
'20-20 hindsight') than predictively, even though prediction would
be infinitely more useful. By implication, however, the Oslo and
Washington accords would seem to imply that the moment was ripe
in the early 1990s, i.e. that the (at least some of) the conditions for
conflict resolutions were present. Some of them may have survived
the reign of Netanyahu.
A stable peace presupposes that all sides to the previous

conflict regard its resolution as satisfactory. A necessary, albeit not
sufficient, precondition is that both Israeli and Palestinian security
concerns are met, which recommends the notion of 'common
security' as an appropriate guideline. This is not tantamount to
unselfish behaviour, but is entirely compatible with a pursuit of
national interests, if only these are not 'defined in terms of power',
but rather ot security, and if a short-term perspective in discarded
in favour of a medium or long-term perspective. Whatever a state
(or other actor) gains at its respective opponent's expense is simply
unlikely to last, because the other side will react, thereby negating
short-term gains.
What Does 'Security' Mean?
Even if we reject as illusory such goals as 'absolute security',
we are still faced with a wide spectrum of goals and ambitions -
if only because 'security' is 'an essentially contested concept', as
argued by Barry Buzan. Hence, a certain matter is not one of
Moeller 77
security, b
'desecuritize
it is general
of its urgen
an uncontes
matter of p
can play a r
Different
Referent Objects Connotation Possible Threats (Examples)
Regimes Power, Privilege Opposition, Subversive

activities
States Sovereignty, Territorial Military Attack

integrity, Power
Collectives Identity, Autonomy 'Cultural Imperialism'

(e.g. Nations, ethnies) Religious Fundamentalism,
Migration
Individuals Survival, Quality of Life, Economic Reprisals

Terrorism, Property
Ecosystem(s) Sustainability Environmental threats
Moreover, it is contested to whom (or what) 'security'

refer, i.e. what the term's appropriate 'referent obje
Traditionalists want to reserve the term for the state's secu
which is often misleadingly labelled 'national security',
sometimes used as a cover for what is really 'regime security'
a particular group's political domination. Others (m
'communications' of various categories) are prepared to exten
to (some) human collectives such as ethnies or nations,
stateless ones. Still others (of a more cosmopolitan persuasion)
that the ultimate referent object is the individual, regardles
political ethnic or national affiliations. At least one author has
rejected all of the above as anthropocentric and advocat
'ecocentric' orientation. In the following, however, I shall disr
both this and 'regime security' and concentrate on the three rema
referents.
Finally, ther is a controversy over what it means tobe 'secure',
i.e. the connotation, as the term can obviousl

when applied to a strategy and a individual
sovereign and they alone have a territorial in
while only collectives have a collective identity th
be threatened.
In the following, 1 shall apply the above taxonomy to a very

tentative and sketch analysis of Israeli and Palestinian security
requirements in .order to identify a meaningful set of minimum
requirements. 1 shall relegate the question of separation or not to
the next section, presupposing in the following a certain de facto
separation between Israel and 'Palestine'.
Israeli Security Requirements
The Israelis are notoriously prone to securitization, which is
quite understandable in view of the historical Jewish experience
(above all the Holocaust). As admitted by Ben Gurion.
'I am not capable of seeing anything now other than through the
prism of security... Security is involved in all branches of life.18
Such an attitude bodes ill for reconciliation with any opposing

party that also has security requirements. It is therefore necessary
to not accept views such as the above as 'natural' or inevitable, but
to 'distil' a set of minimum security requirements, based on an
extrapolation from what other states and nations would find
acceptable.
State Security
As far as state security is concerned, Israel's minimum
requirements surely include an absence of (serious) threats to the
very survival of the Israeli state, or to its sovereignty and territorial
integrity within its internationally recognized borders. This has
largely ceased to be a problem, even though Israel has yet to
acknowledge the fact. However, because of Iraq's defeat in 1991, the
collapse of the USSR as the main supporter of Syria, the peace treaty
with Jordan, and the budding alliance with Turkey, the Arab-Israeli
balance of power has titled tremendously in Israel's favour through
the 1990s. It has especially done so along the "Eastern front', for
which Palestine is relevant Even when measured against a (highly
unlikely) maximum alliance comprising Syria, Jordan and an Iraq
Moeller 79
that has mir

better situat
some of the
probably sh
Syria's and I
have dried
According
return the G
obliged) wit
strategic dep
of some imp
up of reserv
its use as a f
Jordanese fo
infra).
Israeli state security in the 'normal' sense thus seems entirely

achievable without the continuing breach of international law that
a clinging to the occupied territories constitutes. This i clearly not
the case for the integrity of Eretz Israel, Le. the historical/mythical
'Land of Israel', which could only be had at the expense of its
neighbours, at least by holding on to what has already been
conquered as a 'first instalment7 of the 'promised land'.
Force Comparison, Israel Syria Jordan Iraq Isr/ IsrV

Israel's Eastern Front19 Syria S+J+Iraq
MILEX 1997 (US$m) 11, 143 2, 217 496 1, 250 5.03 2.81
MILEX 1985 (US$m) 7, 1% 4, 961 857 18,328 1.45 0.30
Change +55% -55% -42% -93% +247% +843%

Manpower 1997 (1000) 175 320 104 388 0.55 0.22
Manpower 1985 (1000) 142 403 70 520 0.35 0.14
Change +23% -20% +48% -25% +55% +51%
This brings us directly to the level of collectiv

is not so much territorial concept (even though
form) as it is part and parcel of certain underst
is to be an Israeli, namely to be a Jew and as su
God-given rights. Fortunately, this is not the co

or national identity to which most citizens of Is
Societal Security
Societal security, defined as an absence of thr
(e.g. national or ethnic) identity, is a complicated
above, it is, for instance, possible for the Jews
very existence of Palestinians as a threat to their je
defined), and the more so the more the two nat
are intermingled.
The only answer to this is probably to cultiva
a 'dialogue of civilisations' that would allow the
each other as a 'different Other' rather than a hostile one. This
would allow the two (or even more) cultures to coexist peacefully
(perhaps, even amicably), thereby preventing a securitisation of the
identity issue. However, as identifies are socially constructed or
deconstructed over time, this will undoubtedly be a protacted
process.
A contribution to such peaceful coexistence would be a

strengthening of the secular and political over the religious and
ethnic features of Israeli national identity. One might even argue
that the IDF makes an important contribution to this, serving as a
'melting po for the diverse (ethnic and other) strata of Israeli
society. The quickest way to build a nation may be to build an army.
David Ben-Gurion in 1952 expressed this in the following words:
We do not have hundreds of years [to build a nation], and without
the institution of die military, a compulsory, educating, unifying
institution, we will not become a nation in time. We cannot rely on
a historical process only... We must direct the historical process,
speed it up, channel it to our goals. Through the Israeli Defence Force
we can do in a short time that would otherwise require dozens of
years...
Paradoxically, this might eventually even become the IDF's

main contribution to Israeli security, as the threat of military attack
recedes to the background.20
There are, however, other ways of forging national unity that
do not to the same extent require enemy images, lead to arms races
Moeller 81
and trigger
of historica
science that
be an ideal p
dialogue with
Arab civilisa
able to live p
Individual S
Were one t
individual se
requirement
large in th
personal secu
In crude nu
though Israe
in the worl
alarming. Si
recorded a 'm
factor has t
a democracy
becomes secu
measures'.
Ihere does indeed seem to be support for such extraordinary

measures, regardless of their violation of international law and
human rights conventions. In 1993, 79 per cent thus declared
themselves in favour of the destitution of the houses of people
hiding (i.e. presumed to hid)-terroritst; and 77 per cent supported
a deportation of people (presumed to be) in contact with terrorists.
A significant minority of 27 per cent were even in favour of
deporting all residents of villages from which terror attacks (were
presumed to) originate, and 21 per cent favoured destroying the
villages. The desirable de-securitization of the terrorism issue is
thus not within sight yet
What might help would be a distinction between Israel and the
occupied territories. While it is indisputable that Israeli citizens
have the right to (a reasonable degree of) personal security in their
own country, it is less obvious that this also h

settlers. First of all, their very presence is illega
and secondly, they are heavily armed and p
security forces. Efforts to solve their problem
become parts of the problem itself rather than
solution.
Palestinian Security Requirements

The Palestinians are a nation to the same extent as the Israelis.
As such they must be acknowledged as endowed with the same
rights to state, societal and individual security.22
State Security
The so-called 'State of Palestine' that was declared in 1988 is
a complete fiction, mainly because this entity is only recognized by
a small number of states, none of which are very important. Hence
the following discussion of state security for Palestine is hypothetical,
as it deals with a potential future Palestinian state.
Statehood presupposes (de jure) sovereignty in the formal sense
of recognition as the supreme authority within a demarcated
territory. Such sovereignty may be relinquished, either completely
or in a piecemeal fashion (as EU member states do the EU), but it
cannot be achieved incrementally by a simple cumulation of powers
and prerogatives. Either one is sovereign or not, and Palestine
presently is not.
To make Palestine into a state presupposes a 'heroic leap',
where sovereignty is solemnly declared and subsequently recognized
by other states. While it is easy to envision the Palestinians making
such a heroic leap (for instance on . 4 May 1999), it strains the
imagination to envisage Israel recognizing it. In the absence of such
recognition, most Western countries, above all the United States,
would probably withhold their diplomatic recognition. This would
make the new state just s fictitious as its predecessor.
Certain constraints on the subsequent exercise of sovereign
powers may, however, help make Palestinian sovereignty more
palatable to Israel, hence more likely to be achieved. Relevant
constraints might include a Palestinian commitment neutrality
Moeller 83
along with c
her permitt
precedent fo
Treaty of 19
(i.e. sovereign
(signed 15 A
as well as fo
compromised
countries - a
well, especia
internationa
Even though
itself as a fo
prefers 'Finl
the subsequ
with the USSR
also accpeted
an attack ag
likewise com
use of the W
possible allie
shield Israel,
depth implic
provide the
sovereignty.
an Israeli re-
war as it pre
Hence, the P
and armed,
operations. T
both contribu
or an attack
Arab coalitio
safely be com
entire West
Presupposi
state, the qu
important, i.e. how to maintain Teal control ov

domain. Even though it is preferable to pos
territory, it is not an absolute sine qua non, as
several examples of states that include enclaves (
Germany during the Cold War, or Lesotho in S
and exclaves (Alaska, for instance). However, in
of recent intense hostility, it seems unlikely that
would be satisfactory to the Palestinians, imply
linking the West Bank and Gaza have to be fou
Societal Security
Palestinian societal security would seem to pr
two minimum requirements: A right for the refug
their diaspora; and equal religious, cultural, e
rights with the Israeli/ Jewish population, unless th
separated {vide infra).
Even though it is legally indisputable, the right
genuine problems that cannot be ignored. First o
diaspora Palestinians would well overtax the abs
of Palstinian society. The Gaza strip is already
and the West Bank can only accommodate a l
immigrants-even if Jewish settlers are evicted
influx of immigrants would put great strains on th
of tKe land, not least its scarce water supplies.
Thirdly, one might question (and a large porti
undoubtedly would) the ethic, if not the legally
Jewish settlers to make room for returning Pa
cases, the former may have been born in the set
latter may never have set foot there. To thus c
accompli' is, of course, part of the Israeli rationale
hence a very strong argument for putting a stop
drive. Once the settlers have been there for more t
however, they do have a moral cases to make.
What might help would be a degree of recipro
insult to injury when the Israeli government d
return for Palestinians while upholding the 'rig
immigrate to Israel, regardless of whether t
Moeller 85
personal lin
they are jus
For Israel t
demograph
psychologica
other as equ
(including r
collaborative
want to attr
vice versa. In
and Palesti
skewed in f
Mutual rec
indispensabl
and for its d
a 'victim id
However, it
measures th
the Jews.
An abolition of the 'apartheid system' that has developed for

the occupied territories is thus indispensable, but there may also be
a need for foreign assistance to accelerate the indispensable 'levelling
of the playing field', entailing an evening out of living standards,
levels of education, etc. between the two nations. By benefitting the
Palestinians, this would tend to facilitate Palestinian state-building
and further democratization - including the growth of civil society -
thereby also help allay Israeli security concerns.
Individual Security
Just as Palestinian terrorism is a threat to the individual
security of the Jews, the presence of armed settlers and security
forces in the midst of Palestinian society is a threat to the individual
security of the Palestinians - to say nothing of the threat posed by
terrorist extremists such as Baruch Goldstein, or the (illegal) reprisals
by Israeli security forces against Palestinian civilians.
A minimum security requirement is a disarming of all non-
state forces: Jewish settlers as well as Palestinian civilians and
paramilitary militias. As all other 'modern' an

Palestinian society is better off with its state
on the legitimate use of physical force' within
though the ownership of firearms may aff
certain immediate (sense of) security, the resu
guns adds to the total problem.
Can the Two be Combined?
Even though Israeli and Palestinian security concerns remain

far apart, the above analysis has, hopefully, shown that there is
some scope for compromise. For both sides to the conflict, meaningful
; minimum security requirements can be identified which are mutually
compatible. To the extent that 'securitization' of problems proceeds
beyond minimum towards the maximalist end of the scale, the two
positions soom become impossible to reconcile.
The Question of Statehood
Having already touched on the question of statehood, it seems
appropriate to conclude with a comparison of the various available
options, especially with a view to the longer-term future.
Available Options
To have two states exercising sovereign power over the same
territory is a contradictio in adjecto, as sovereignty is exclusive. This
leaves, in principle, the following as possible solutions:28
I. A continuation of the status quo, with Israeli occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza and without Palestinian
statehood.
II. Annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, i.e. their de jure
incorporation into Israel
HI. Partition, i.e. a division of the available territory, leaving
Israel with sovereign powers over one part, the Palestinian
state over the rest.
IV. Binationalization, where formal sovereignty continues to

reside in the state as such, while 'actual sovereignty' is
divided among the two nations, either in the form of
'consocialisation'/29 or of regional autonomy.
Moeller 87
V. Interna
Israel-Pales
authority
'trusteesh
Palestinian
population
VI. A blen
Integration
transforme
integration
Very little
problem bei
who would
hence facing
In some res
but it also e
the resident
of the popu
above for Is
Arab/Palest
In favour
Palestinians
entitled as most of the world's other nations. To establish this state
on the West Bank and Gaza would be the most obvious way of
achieving this. Against partition speaks the fact that it would
necessiate a choice between two rather unattractive options, because
it would inevitably leave pockets of minorities within each state; or
require a large-scale 'resident swap'. Partition would further have
to tackle the thorny question of Jerusalem. Either the city would also
have to be (re-) divided; or it would remain in the possession of
Israel - which would be just as unacceptable to the Palestinians as
it would be to the Israelis to hand it over to Palestine.
In favour of IV speaks the fact that an undivided but binational

state it would be economically viable, and that it might even draw
advantage from the various synergies between Israelis and
Palestinians - or, at the very least, make the best of the inescapable
interdependence. Against it speaks the fact that

formula would be vulnerable to the demogra
Unless fertility patterns change significantly
unlikely) Arabs would eventually come to const
of the population, which would allow them to a
democratic means, the agreement. For obvious re
then minority would not feel comfortable with
In favour of V (internationalizaton) speaks
would avoid most of the problems above. Howev
great strains on the international system, whic
(and be seen as) both more effective and more l
presently the case for the United Nations.
'Daytonization' and Neomedieavalism
The author's preferred solution is VI, i.e. a form
cwra-enlargement hat combined elements of the
undeniable resemblance to the vision of Simon Peres for "The New
Middle East'.30 One could, for instance imagine a 'Chinese boxes'
arrangement, where Palestine and Jordan establish a federation (or
confederation) which then merges with Israel into a confederation.
The resultant confederation might, in due course, become a
constituent part of an even larger political entity, including Lebanon
and/or Syria (probably presupposing a change of regime in
Damascus).
There are pretends for such an arrangement, albeit from other
parts of the world. The 'new Bosnia' created by the 1995 Dayton
Agreement is exactly such a confederation of one state (Republica
Srbska) with a Croat-Muslim federation.32 One might even regard
the European Union such a 'super-confederation', including both
unitary states and federations (e.g. Germany). This entails a certain
division of powers between confederate, federate, state, local and
perhaps regional political authorities. At which level the supreme
authority would reside would differ from one issue-area to the next,
preferably according to the principles of 'subsidiarity'. Some might
even be functional (within the total territory) as opposed to
territorially defined (religious authority over, for instance, all
Christians, Jews or Muslims), which illustrates the similarity with
medieval system, hence the term 'neo-Medievalism'.33
Moeller 89
In such a con
They would b
lines betwee
likely to pro
'softer' and
labour, goo
economies
benefits for all involved.
The suggested- scheme also offers a possible solution to the

thorny, but inescapable, question of Jerusalem. Within a larger
political framework, and with both the Israeli and Palestinian
political authorities 'demoted' from sovereign to more administrative
units, it would be less of a problem to envision the city serving as
a dual, or even triple, capital. It could be the capital, and host the
governments of, botti Israel and Palestine, just as it might be the
home of the confederal authorities - just like Brussels is both the
capital of Belgium and the centre of the European Unin. Religious
matters, such as the maintenance of, and regulation of access to, the
holy sites, could be handled by an ecumenical authority, while each
half could have its own (half-) city councils in charge of administrative
matters.
Conclusion
We have thus seen that the future is still open. Least likely
(albeit not excluded) is a continuation of present trends, i.e. of the
peace process without any major course changes. More likely, but
least desirable, is a return to open conflict that could well get very
nasty, almost to the point of a civil war.
The main point of the paper is, however, that another, and
much more appealing future, may also be within reach - been
though it requires some 'heroic' breaks with the past. Based on a
mutual recognition of each other's legitimate security interests, the
Israeli and Palestinian nations should be able to coexist peacefully
and, in the longer run, even come to benefit from each other. The
concrete steps towards this goal are based on an integrative approach,
envisioning a Dytonization' of Israel/Palestine combined with a
Tinlandiiation' of the latter.
Endnotes
1. Comparable anlayses of European futures are Buzan,

Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer
& Ole Waever: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios
for the Post-Cold War Er (London: Pinter, 1990); Hyde-
Price, Adrian: European Security Beyond the Cold War. Four
Scenarios for the Year 2010 (London: Sage, 1991).
2. Aronson, Shiomo (with Oded Brosh): The Politics and
Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. Opacity,
Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991. An Israeli Perspecive (Albany:
State University of New York, 1992); Evron, Yair: Israel's
Nuclear Dilemma (London: Routledge, 1994); Shahak, Israel:
Open Secrets. Israeli Foreign and Nuclear Policies (London:
Pluto Press, 1997); Cochran, Edwin S.: 'Deliberate
Ambiguity: An analysis of Israel's Nuclear Strategy', The
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19., no. 3 (September 1996),
pp. 321-342.
3. Navias, Martin: Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in
the Middle East (London: Brassy's, UK, 1993); Levite, Ariel:
'Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: causes
and Consequencs', in Gtz Neuneck & Otfried Ischebeck
(eds.): Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 221-227; Karp, Aaron:
'Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Realities, Omens
and Arms Control Options', in Efraim Inbar & Shmuel
Sandler (eds.): Middle East Security: Prospects for an Arms
Control Regime (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 111-129.
4. See, for instance, Sela, Avraham: The Decline of theArab-
Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional
Order (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1997), where Arab politics is described as one dominated
by the states, and where the pan-Arabist ideology that
would mandate support for the Palestinians is dismissed
as empty" rhetoric.
5. On the Israel-Egypt peace, see Quandt, William B.: Peace

Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Moeller 91
since 1967
1993), espe
475 on the
Laura Zitt
Peace. Patte
Indiana U
negotiation
6. On the
instance,
Circumstan
Cornell U
(ed.): Neorea
(New York
7. Neuman,
European J
(June 1996
8. On secur
Barry Buzan
Migration a
Pinter Pub
and the Poli
Relations,
"violizatio
Outbreak of
3, no. 1 (J
Kriesberg, L
Resolution
61.
9. A good overview is Peters, Joel: Pathways to Peace. The

Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs/European Commission, 19%); or
Steinberg, Gerald M.: 'Middle East Arms Control and
Regional Security', Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994),
pp. 126-141.
10. Hie Wye River Memorandum is available at http://
www.israel-mfa.giv.il/peace/wye.html.
11. On the settlements in Jerusalem see Aros

'Israeli Settlements in and around Jerusale
Karmi (ed.): Jerusalem Today. What Future
Process? (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), pp.
12. While Jews beget, on average, 2.6 child
Muslims (largely synonymous with Ar
children. See Central Bureau of Statistics: Is
at http://www.cbs.gov.il/israel-in-figures/
vital_stats.htm#a.
13. Beschorner, Natasha: 'W ater and Instability in the Middle

East', Adelphi Papers, no. 273 (London: IISS/Brassey's
1992/93), pp. 8-26; Gleic, Peter H.: 'Water and Conflict:
Fresh VVater Resources and International Security',
International Seecurity, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp.
79-112.
14. McDowall, David: Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and

Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Lockman, Zachary &
JopelBeinin(eds.): Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Againt
Israeli Qccupation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990)
15. Creveld Martin Van: The Sword and the Olive. A Critical
Study of the Israeli: Defence Force (New York: Public
Affairs, 1998), p. 352. See liso Liebes, Tamar & Shoshana
Blum-Kulka: 'Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers
in the Intifada', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 21, no. 1 (Fall
1994), pp. 45-68; Barzilai, Gad & Efraim Inbar: "The Use
of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options', ibid,
vol. 23, no. 1 (Fall 19%), pp. 49-80.
16. Palme Commission (Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues): Common Security. A
Blueprint for Survival With a prologue by Cyrus Vance (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). Common Security and
Nonoffensive Defence. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1992).
17. Buzan Barry; People, States and Fear. An Agenda for
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold Ward Era,
2nd Era, 2nd Ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), passim
Moeller 93
(quote fro
Security. A
Riener, 19
Desecuritiz
(New York
18. Quoted
(Bloomingt
19. Calculated on the basis of data from International Institute
for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1998/99 (London:
IISS, 1998), p. 296.
20. The quote is from Porter, Bruce: War and the Rise cf the
Stae (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 18, a work that
also theoretically illuminates the role of armies in state
and nation-building; as does Holsti, Kalevi J.: The State,
War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
21. According to the Israeli government, a total of 233 Israeli
citizens (soldiers as well as civilians) have been killed in
terrorist attacks in Israel since the accord with the PLO
in September 1993.
22. On Palestinian security concerns, see the excellent article
by Khalidi, Ahmad S.: 'Security in a Final Middle East
Settlement: Some Components of Palestinian National
Security', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1 (1995), pp. 1-
18.
23. I first used the term in 1994. The paper is published as

Moeller Bjorn, "Non Offensive Defence in the Middle
East" in Gustav Daniker, et. al, Non-Offensive Defence in
the Middle East (New York, 1998), p. 54. On the Finnish
brand of neutrality see Allison, Roy: Finland's Relations
xoith the Soviet Union, 1944-84 (New York: St. Martin's
Press, "985); Joennini, Pertti: The Underlying Assumptions
of Finnish Neutrality', in Kruzel & Haltzel (eds.): op. cit.
(note 54), pp. -133-160; Jrvenp, Pauli: 'Finland: Peace
Treaty of 1947', in Fred Tanner (ed.): "From Versailles to
Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States",
UNIDIR 92/70 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New

Nations, 1992), pp. 55-70. On the military a
policy see Ries, Tomas: Cold Will. The Defen
(London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1
24. Alpher, Joseph: 'Security Arrangements
Settlement', Survival, vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter
49-67.
25. This is elaborated upon in Moller: loc. c

further elaboration on such 'non-offensive defence' is:
Maller, Bjorn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe:
The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London:
Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1991)
26. 'Law of Return', 5710-1950, passed on 5 July 1950, granted
all Jews the right to come to Israel as 'olehs' (Jewish
immigrants). In 1970, it was amended ('Amendment no.
2', 5730-1970) to allow for the immigration with oleh status
to children and grandchildren as well as their spouses,
'Jew' being defined as anyone born by a Jewish mother
or converted to Judaism.
27. Weber, Max: 'Politics as Vocation' (1918), in H.H. Gerth
& Wright Mills (eds.): From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-128, quote from
p. 78. See also Tilly, Charles: Coercion, Capital and European
States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990),
pp. 68-70 & passim.
28. An excellent comparison of various models, with real-life
examples, is Lapidoth, Ruth: Autonomy. Flexible Solutions
to Intrastate Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1996).
29. Iijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1977).
30. Peres, Simon (with Arye Naor): The New Middle East (New
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1993), pp. 163-179 & passim.
31. An elaborate argumentation against confederation is
provided by Braizat, Musa S.: The Jordanian-Palestinian
Moeller 95
Relationship
British Ac
32. Borde
Yugoslavia:
1996, pp.
appended
33. Bull, He
World Poli
Macmillan
'Continuit
Toward a
(ed.): Neor
University
revision
Metaphors
State Impe
Victoria E
(London: S

3 Future For Israel and Palestine

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Three Futures for Israel and Palestine

Author(s): Bjoern Moeller

It is usually regarded as more "scientific" to write about the

(the 'Jewish link', 'Islamic link', etc.). Only a sma

It may still be possible to salvage the peace pro

One might describe the foundations of the Israel-Palestine

Regardless of the underlying defensive motivation, this

Even though peace agreements have bee

Secondly, to the extent that nationhood is based on attachment

Baseline Future: 'Back on Track'

The term 'peace process' has become increasingly misleading.

A gradual transfer of powers from Israel

A major terrorist attack against Palestinians by Israeli

The Palestinian side might also trigger similar developments,

targets. This might well produce an Israeli

The Israelis might, at first glance, appear to stand a better

Alternative Future 2: Towards Stable Peace

Neither side will thus be able to defeat the other decisively.

A stable peace presupposes that all sides to the previous

Referent Objects Connotation Possible Threats (Examples)

Regimes Power, Privilege Opposition, Subversive

States Sovereignty, Territorial Military Attack

Collectives Identity, Autonomy 'Cultural Imperialism'

Individuals Survival, Quality of Life, Economic Reprisals

Ecosystem(s) Sustainability Environmental threats

Moreover, it is contested to whom (or what) 'security'

Finally, ther is a controversy over what it means tobe 'secure',

i.e. the connotation, as the term can obviousl

In the following, 1 shall apply the above taxonomy to a very

Such an attitude bodes ill for reconciliation with any opposing

that has mir

Israeli state security in the 'normal' sense thus seems entirely

Force Comparison, Israel Syria Jordan Iraq Isr/ IsrV

MILEX 1985 (US$m) 7, 1% 4, 961 857 18,328 1.45 0.30

Change +55% -55% -42% -93% +247% +843%

This brings us directly to the level of collectiv

God-given rights. Fortunately, this is not the co

A contribution to such peaceful coexistence would be a

Paradoxically, this might eventually even become the IDF's

Ihere does indeed seem to be support for such extraordinary

own country, it is less obvious that this also h

Palestinian Security Requirements

important, i.e. how to maintain Teal control ov

An abolition of the 'apartheid system' that has developed for

paramilitary militias. As all other 'modern' an

Even though Israeli and Palestinian security concerns remain

IV. Binationalization, where formal sovereignty continues to

In favour of IV speaks the fact that an undivided but binational

interdependence. Against it speaks the fact that

The suggested- scheme also offers a possible solution to the

1. Comparable anlayses of European futures are Buzan,

5. On the Israel-Egypt peace, see Quandt, William B.: Peace

9. A good overview is Peters, Joel: Pathways to Peace. The

11. On the settlements in Jerusalem see Aros

13. Beschorner, Natasha: 'W ater and Instability in the Middle

14. McDowall, David: Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and

23. I first used the term in 1994. The paper is published as

UNIDIR 92/70 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New

25. This is elaborated upon in Moller: loc. c

29. Iijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven:

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