InPhilosophicalPapers29(2000),12153

NondescriptivistCognitivism:
FrameworkforaNewMetaethic

TerryHorganandMarkTimmons
UniversityofMemphis

Weproposetobreaksomenewgroundinmetaethicsbysketchingaviewaboutmoral

judgmentsandstatementsthatdepartsfromtraditionalwaysofthinkingaboutthem.Asthetitlesuggests,ourview

combinesanondescriptivistaccountofmoraljudgmentsandstatementstheyarenotinthebusinessofdescribingmoral

factswiththecognitivistideathatmoraljudgmentsaregenuinebeliefsandmoralstatementsaregenuineassertions.

Weclaimthatinadditiontodescriptivebeliefs,thereare(moral)evaluativebeliefswhichareneitherreducibleto,nora

speciesof,beliefsoftheformertype.Wethinkthatourkindofmetaethicalviewhasobviousadvantagesoverthe

standardmenuofoptions(versionsofrealism,rationalism,relativism,errortheory,andformsofstandard

nondescriptivism)advantagesthatwillbecomeapparentasweproceed.

Ourplanistobegin(sectionI)byquestioningadeeplyembeddedassumptionoftraditional

metaethicalthinkingwhichwethinkhasunfortunatelyandunnecessarilyblockedfromviewthemetaethicaltheorywe

favorandwhich,whenrejected,opensupsomenewmetaethicalterritoryworthexploring.Wethenproceedinsections

IIVItooutlineourpositiveviewbydevelopinganewframeworkforunderstandingbeliefandassertionwithinwhich

nondescriptivistcognitivismemergesasaconsistentandplausiblemetaethicalcontender.InsectionVIIweconsider

variouschallengestoourbrandofcognitivism,explaininghowourviewcananswersuchchallengesandalsoindicating

someofthemaintasksthatlieaheadforanyattempttodeveloptheviewfurther.

Ourcentralfocuswillbeonmoraljudgments,withmuchofwhatwesayapplyingmutatis

muntandistomoralstatements.Sometimes,butnotalways,wewillexplicitlyextendpointsmadeaboutjudgmentstothe

caseofstatementstoo.

I.TheSemanticAssumption

Inordertofocusonthesemanticassumptionthatwethinkoughttoberejected,wedistinguishthreenotionsof

semanticcontent.

First,letjudgmentswhoseoverallcontentisexpressiblebydeclarativesentencesbecalleddeclarative

judgments,andlettheoverallcontentofsuchajudgmentbecalleditsdeclarativecontent.Declarativecontent,then,is

possessedsimplyasaresultofgrammaticalform.Typicalmoraljudgmentsareexpressiblebydeclarativesentences
(e.g.,ApartheidiswrongHimmlerwasanevilman),andsoinmetaethicsallcompetingviewsdescriptivist

andnondescriptivistalikemustgrantthatmoraljudgmentshavedeclarativecontent.

Evenifallmetaethicalviewsrecognizethatmoraljudgmentshavedeclarativecontent,theydisagreeover

whethersuchjudgmentsalsohavecognitivecontent.Cognitivecontentisbeliefeligibleandassertiblecontent,andsoto

saythatajudgmenthassuchcontentistosaythatthejudgmentisagenuinebelief.Correspondingly,tosaythata

statementhascognitivecontentistosaythatitisagenuineassertion.Althoughtalkofcognitivecontentmightbea

relativelyrecentbitofphilosophicalnomenclature,talkofcognitivemeaninghasahistoryofuseinmetaethics,though

thetwoexpressionsmaybeusedtosignifythesamething.Ofcourse,therehavebeensharpdivisionswithinmetaethics

overthequestionofwhetherornotmoraljudgmentsandstatementshavecognitivecontentandifso,whethersuch

contentissemanticallyprimary.Cognitivistsinmetaethicsaffirmthattypicalmoraljudgmentshavecognitivecontent,

whiletheirnoncognitivistopponentsdenythatthedeclarativecontentofamoraljudgmentiscognitive(orprimarily
[1]
cognitive).

Butnoticethatwhathasbeentakenforgrantedinanalyticphilosophygenerally,andmetaethicsinparticular,is

theideathatforcontenttobegenuinelycognitiveitmustbeinthebusinessofpurportingtorepresenthowtheworldis.

Andthisbringsustoathirdnotionofcontentdescriptivecontent.Descriptivecontentiscontentthatpurportsto

representtheworldasbeingacertainway,andischaracteristicofordinarynonmoralbeliefsabouttheworld.The

judgmentthatClintonwasimpeachedhasasitsoverallcognitivecontentthedescriptivecontent,Clintonshavingbeen

[2]
impeached.

Now,accordingtoourview,moraljudgmentsaregenuinebeliefsandmoralstatementsaregenuineassertions.

Consequently,moraljudgmentsandstatementshavedeclarativecontentthatisgenuinelycognitivethatis,theyhave

beliefeligible,assertiblecontent.Cognitivisminethicsistheviewthatmoraljudgmentsaregenuinelycognitiveintheir

content,andsoweareethicalcognitivists.Cognitivecontenthasbeenassumed,byallpartiesinthesediscussions,tobe

thesamethingasdescriptivecontent.Thus,descriptivismandcognitivismhavebeenseenasalternativelabels

forthesamekindofmetaethicalposition.Inoppositiontothetradition,wemaintainthatthedeclarativecontentofmoral

beliefsandassertionsisnotaspeciesof,norisitreducibleto,descriptivecontentcontentthatrepresentstheworldas

beingacertainway.Wethereforerejectmetaethicaldescriptivismonourview,moralbeliefs(andthesentences

expressingthem)arenotdescriptive.

Thiscombinationofcognitivismandnondescriptivismfliesinthefaceofadeeplyembeddedassumptionthatwe

callthesemanticassumption:

SAAllgenuinelycognitivecontentisdescriptivecontenti.e.,waytheworldmightbecontent.Thus,

mentalstateslikebeliefsandlinguisticitemslikesentencesthathavecognitivecontentareinthebusinessof
 representingsome(putative)stateofaffairsorstatingsome(putative)fact.

Thisassumption,weclaim,isalargelyunquestioneddogmaofbothdescriptivistandnondescriptivistviewsin

metaethics,and(wethink)isthemainculpritthatstandsinthewayofdevelopingafullyadequatemetaethicalaccount
[3]
ofmoralthoughtanddiscourse. Letusbrieflyreviewhowitfiguresintraditionalmetaethicalthought.

Supposeoneacceptswhatwecallthethesisofsemanticunity:

SUSentenceswiththegrammaticalandlogicaltrappingsofassertionhavegenuinecognitivecontent.

Similarly,judgmentswhosecontentisexpressiblebysuchsentenceshavegenuinecognitivecontent.

Sonowconsideratypical(ifsomewhatsimplified)lineofthoughtbehindversionsofmetaethicaldescriptivism.The

descriptivistbeginswiththefollowingobservationaboutmoralthoughtanddiscourse:

MMoralthoughtanddiscoursemanifesttherelevantgrammaticalandlogicalfeaturesthatare

characteristicofgenuinebeliefandassertion.

Nowthisclaim,togetherwiththeideathatjudgmentshavingsuchgrammaticalandlogicaltrappingsreallyaregenuinely

cognitive(SU)andthatallgenuinelycognitivecontentisdescriptive(SA)entailthemaindescriptivistclaim:

DMoralthoughtanddiscoursehavedescriptivecontent,i.e.,declarativemoralcontentisdescriptive.

Bycontrast,thetraditionalnondescriptivistrejectsmetaethicaldescriptivism,recognizesthat

moraldiscoursehasallthegrammaticalandlogicaltrappingsofgenuinecognitivecontent,butthen,giventhesemantic

assumption,isforcedtorejectthethesisofsemanticunity.Thatis,thetraditionalnondescriptivistreasonsasfollows:

notDMSAthereforenotSU.Andsothenondescriptivist,rejectingthethesisofsemanticunity,mustdistinguish,for

moraldiscourse,betweensurfacefeaturesofmoralthoughtanddiscourseandthesupposedlydeepfeaturesthatrevealits

truesemanticalworkings.Hence,theprojectofthetraditionalnondescriptivistwastocharacterizethedeepsemantic

workingsofmoralthoughtanddiscourseoftenthroughreductivemeaninganalysesthatessentiallyequateddeclarative

moralcontentwithsomekindofnoncognitivecontentexpressibleinnondeclarativelanguage.Eschewingdescriptive

declarativecontentformoralthoughtanddiscourse,thetraditionalistembracedsomeformofnoncognitivism(e.g.,
[4]
emotivism).

Ourproposalistobreakawayfromallthisbyrejectingthesemanticassumptionthatweds

genuinecognitivecontenttodescriptivecontent.Thelineofthoughtweemploy,then,couldbeexpressedthisway:wedo

recognizeandtakeseriouslythefactthatmoralthoughtanddiscoursedisplaythegrammaticalandlogicaltrappingsof

cognitivecontent,andalongwiththetraditionaldescriptivists,weagreethatsuchtrappingsareindicativeofgenuine,

deep,cognitivecontentformoralthoughtanddiscoursebutsincewerejectdescriptivisminethics,wemusthold(and
[5]
thinkthereisgoodreasontohold)thatsomeformsofgenuinelycognitivethoughtanddiscoursearenotdescriptive.
Ourprojectinvolvesstakingoutametaethicalpositionaccordingtowhichthisclaim,inconnectionwithmoralthought

anddiscourse,isbothconsistentandplausible.

Here,then,isaninitialstatementofournondescriptivistcognitivism(henceforth,NDC):

(1)Declarativejudgmentswithmoralcontentaregenuinebeliefs,havinggenuinelybeliefeligible,cognitive

content.Thus,declarativestatementswithmoralcontentaregenuineassertionstheirdeclarativecontentis

cognitive.

(2)However,thecognitivecontentofsuchjudgmentsandstatementsisnotdescriptive(waythetheworld
[6]
mightbe)content.

Itwillperhapshelpifwelocateourmetaethicalpositionvisvisstandardviewsusinga

visualaid:

METAETHICALVIEWSABOUT
MORALJUDGMENTS

DESCRIPTIVISTNONDESCRIPTIVISTNONCOGNITIVISM
COGNITIVISMCOGNITIVISM

DescriptiveContentNondescriptiveContent

Cognitive
Content
NoncognitiveContent

DeclarativeContent

Noticethatonourdiagnosisofwhatiswrongwithtraditionalmetaethics,twolevelsof

contentdescriptive/nondescriptiveandcognitive/noncognitivearesimplyconflatedowingtothesemanticassumption.

Rejectingtheassumptionanddistinguishingthesetypesofcontentopensupfertilemetaethicalterritorythatweplanto
[7]
exploreandcultivate.

II.AFreshStart

Indevelopingametaethicaltheory,onewouldliketoaccommodatewhatseemtobedeeplyembeddedfeatures

ofmoralthoughtanddiscourseasplausiblyandcoherentlyaspossible.Onethingthatseemsclearisthatmoral

judgmentsandmoralstatementsexhibitmanyofthecharacteristicsdistinctiveofgenuinebelief.First,wehavealready

mentionedthatmoraljudgmentshavethelogicogrammaticaltrappingsofgenuinebeliefs:thecontentofamoralbeliefis

declarative,andcanembedasaconstituentofajudgmentthathaslogicallycomplexdeclarativecontent(e.g.,the

[8]
judgmentthateitherJeeveshasalreadymailedUncleWilloughbysparcelorBertieoughttomailit). Assuch,moral
judgmentscanfigureinlogicalinferences.Theycancombinewithotherbeliefstoyieldnewbeliefsthatarecontent

appropriategivenpriorbeliefs.Second,moraljudgmentsalsoexhibitphenomenologicalfeaturescharacteristicofbeliefs.

Theyareexperiencedaspsychologicallyinvoluntary,andasgroundedinreasons:givenonesevidence,onecannothelp

butmakecertainmoraljudgments.Andbecauseoftheirreasonbasedinvoluntariness,moraljudgmentsexertafelt
[9]
rationalauthorityuponus. Thebelieflikenatureoftypicalmoraljudgmentsiswidelyenoughrecognizedand

uncontroversialenoughthatweneednotdigresshereinordertoelaboratethecaseforthisclaim.

Moraljudgmentsalsoseemtoplayadistinctiveactionguidingroleinapersonsoverall

psychologicaleconomythatmakestheminsomewaysunlikeordinarynonmoralbeliefs.Typically,anyway,moral

judgmentsdirectlydisposeustowardappropriateaction,independentlyofourpreexistingdesireswhereasordinary

nonmoralbeliefsonlybecomeactionorientedincombinationwithsuchpriordesires.(Thus,thereasonbasedauthorityof

moralbeliefstypicallygivesthemmotivationalforce,overandabovethemotivationalforceofourpreexistingdesires

[10]
andoftencapableoftrumpingthem. )Associatedwiththisactionguidingrolearecertaindistinctive

phenomenologicalfeaturestoonotably,afeltdemandingness,aphenomenologicaltobedoneness.Theaction

orientednatureoftypicalmoraljudgments,withitsaccompanyingtypicalphenomenology,hasledmanymoral

philosopherstoembracesomeformorotherofethicalinternalism.Despitedifficultiesinformulatingaplausibleformof

internalism,wethinktheinsightbehindsuchphilosophicalviewsiscorrectdistinctiveofmoraljudgmentsistheir
[11]
actionguidingrole.

Theproblemistoplausiblycombinethesetwodominantfeaturesofmoraljudgmentstheir

beingakindofbeliefandyetmainlyinthebusinessofactionguidanceintoaplausiblemetaethicalview.Manymoral

philosophersseeatensionhere,someoptingfornondescriptivistviewsthatwoulddenythatmoraljudgmentshave

overallcognitivecontent,othersdenyinginternalism.Ofcourse,therearethosewhoattempttodefendcognitivismand

internalism,butnottoosuccessfullywethink.

Wearenondescriptivists,andweaimtodevelopastrainofthisgeneralkindofviewthat

fairlyaccommodatesbothfeaturesjustmentioned.Doingsorequiresthatwefacethreeserioustasks:

FirstTask:Articulateaconceptionofbeliefthatdoesnotrequiretheoveralldeclarativecontentof

beliefstobedescriptivecontent.

SecondTask:Makeacasefortheindependentplausibilityofthisconceptionofbelief.

ThirdTask:Arguethatnondescriptivistcognitivism,formulatedinawaythatdrawsupontheproposed

conceptionofbelief,hassignificantcomparativeadvantagesoverdescriptivistformsofcognitivism.

Thefirsttaskisthemostbasic,becauseitisnotantecedentlyclearhowthesemantic

assumption,whicheffectivelyequatescognitivecontentwithdescriptivecontent,couldpossiblybemistaken.Thistaskis
alsothemostimportant,becauseitiswhatwillopenupthenewmetaethicalterritoryweseektooccupy.Weproposeto

addressthischallengebydevelopingagenericframeworkforbeliefthatdoesnotpresupposethatallcognitivecontentis

descriptivecontent,andthereforeisconsistentwiththeclaimthatsomebeliefshaveoverallcognitivecontentthatisnot

[12]
descriptive.(Theframeworkisalsoconsistentwiththedenialofthisclaim.)ThisisthebusinessofsectionIII.

Ofcourseitisnotenoughjusttoproposeaconceptionofbeliefthatisconsistentwiththe

claimthatsomebeliefshaveoverallcontentthatisnotdescriptive.For,theproposalmightcomplicatethenotionsof

belief,assertion,andcognitivecontentinadhoc,implausibleways,and/oritmightseemtheoreticallyunmotivated(and

hence,questionbegging)fromtheperspectiveofadvocatesofthesemanticassumption.Thesecondtask,then,istoshow

thattheframeworkistheoreticallyplausibleindependentlyofthefactthatitisconsistentwiththepossibilitythatsome

beliefshaveoverallcontentthatisnotdescriptive.WetakeupthisprojectinsectionIV,wherewearguethatthe

proposedframeworkforbeliefisattractiveevenforthosewhoacceptthesemanticassumption,becauseitprovidesa

wayfordescriptivistversionsofcognitivismtoaccommodatetheinternalistic,actionguiding,aspectofmoraljudgments.

Insofarastheframeworkturnsouttobeindependentlyplausible,however,thethirdtaskthen

arises:arguingthatnondescriptivistcognitivism,assituatedwithintheframework,ismoreplausiblethan

descriptivismandinparticular,ismoreplausiblethanthekindofdescriptivistcognitivismthatissituatablewithinthe

sameframework(therebysuccessfullycombiningdescriptivismwithinternalism).Addressingthisissueisthebusinessof

sectionV.

ThediscussioninsectionsIIIVthuswillconstituteanarticulationofboththemetaethical

positionweadvocateandthereasonsforembracingit.InsectionVIwemakesomeobservationsaboutthephilosophical

methodologyemployedintheprecedingsections,inordertounderscorehowourapproachdepartsfromstandard

metaethicaldebatesnotonlyinsubstancebutalsometaphilosophically.

III.AFrameworkforBeliefandAssertion

Wewilldescribeagenericapproachtobeliefandassertionthatprovidesthebackboneofour

brandofnondescriptivistcognitivism.Webeginwithacharacterizationofthebasecaseforunderstandingbeliefsand

assertionsthatis,beliefsandassertionswhosedeclarativecontentlackstruthfunctionalorquantificationalcomplexity,

andalsolacksanyembeddeddeonticoperatorsandthenturntocasesthathavethatkindoflogicalcomplexity.

1.Thebasecase

Speakingmostgenerally,abasecasebeliefisakindofpsychologicalcommitmentstate,ofwhichtherearetwo

mainspecies:iscommitmentsandoughtcommitments.Beliefsofbothsorthavewhatwecallcoredescriptive

contentawaytheworldmightbecontent.So,forinstance,thebeliefthatBertiewillmailtheparcel,andthebelief

thatBertieoughttomailtheparcel,sharethesamecoredescriptivecontent,expressiblebythenonevaluativethat

clause,thatBertiemailtheparcel.Aparallelpointappliestoassertions,aboutwhichwesaymorebelow.
 Anordinarydescriptivebelief(purportingtorepresenthowtheworldis)isaniscommitmentwithrespecttoa

coredescriptivecontent,andsothebeliefsdeclarativecontentcoincideswithitscoredescriptivecontent.For

descriptivebasecasebeliefsandassertions,then,theiroveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptive.

Bycontrast,anevaluativebeliefisanoughtcommitmentwithrespecttoacoredescriptive

content.Evaluativebeliefsdifferessentiallyfromdescriptivebeliefsinthefollowingrespect:thecoredescriptivecontent

ofanevaluativebeliefdoesnotcoincidewithitsoveralldeclarativecontent.Forinstance,thebeliefthatBertieoughtto

mailtheparcelisanoughtcommitmentwithrespecttothecorecontent,thatBertiemailtheparcelhowever,itsoverall

declarativecontentisthatitoughttobethatBertiemailtheparcel,andsoitsoveralldeclarativecontentdoesnot

coincidewithitscoredescriptivecontent.Thus,whereasdescriptivebeliefsinvolveaniscommitment(ahowitiswith

theworldcommitment)withregardtoacoredescriptivecontent,moralbeliefsinvolveadifferenttypeofcommitment:a

[13]
howitoughttobewiththeworldcommitmentwithregardtoacoredescriptivecontent.

Someobservationsareinorder.First,wepreviouslydistinguishedthreespeciesofcontent:

declarative,cognitive,anddescriptive,wherewewerefocusingonanitemsoverallcontent.Moraljudgments

certainlyhaveoveralldeclarativecontentbecausetheiroverallcontentisexpressiblebydeclarativesentences.

Furthermore,withintheframeworkweareproposing,theiroverallcontentisalsocognitivecontentsincetheycountas

genuinebeliefs.Theframeworkisofficiallyneutral,however,aboutwhetherornottheiroverallcontentisdescriptive

content.Accordingtothemetaethicalpositionwewillbeadvocating,moralbeliefsdonothaveoveralldescriptive

content,buttheframeworkcouldbeadoptedbysomeonewhothinkstheiroverallcontentisdescriptive.(Moreonthis

below.)

Second,evenifonedeniesthattheoverallcontentofmoraljudgmentsisdescriptivecontent,

thereisstillakindofdescriptivecontentthatispossessedbothbyordinarydescriptivebeliefsandbymoralbeliefs(as

illustratedaboveinthepairofstatementsaboutBertie).Weintroducedournotionofcoredescriptivecontenttoreferto

suchcontent.Onceoneconstruesabasecasemoraljudgmentasanoughtcommitmentwithrespecttoacoredescriptive

content,conceptualspacetherebyopensupfortheclaimthatthejudgmentsoveralldeclarativecontentiscognitive

contentontheonehand(sothatthestateisagenuinebelief),butisnondescriptiveontheotherhand.Eventhoughthe

stateisagenuinebelief,byvirtueofbeinganoughtcommitmentwithrespecttoacoredescriptivecontent,itdoesnt

followthatitsoveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptivecontent.

Third,onstandardaccountsofthesematters,abeliefinvolvesarelationbetweenabeliever

(speaker)andaproposition(orsentence,orwhatever)suchthatwhatisbelievedissomethinghavingoveralldescriptive

content.Thisconceptionofbeliefpresupposesthesemanticassumptionandmakestheveryideaofnondescriptivist

cognitivismincoherent.Bycontrast,ourframeworkopensupthepossibilitythatcertaingenuinebeliefshaveoverall

declarativecontentthatisnotdescriptive.Thus,theframeworkcallsintoquestionthecommonassumptionthatabeliefis
alwaysarelationbetweenabeliever(speaker)ontheonehand,andontheotherhandapropositionconstitutingthe

beliefsoveralldeclarativecontent.

Fourth,inmaintainingthattherearetwodistinctbasecasespeciesofbeliefiscommitments

andoughtcommitmentswearemaintainingthatstatesofbothtypesexhibitcertaingenerickindsoffunctionaland

phenomenologicalfeaturesthatqualifythemasgenuinebeliefs.However,inmaintainingthatoughtcommitmentsarea

distinctkindofcommitment,tobedistinguishedfromiscommitments,wearealsomaintainingthatoughtcommitments

exhibitcertainfunctionalandphenomenologicalfeaturesthataredistinctiveofthissortofjudgment.Wehavenotedthe

actionguidingcharacteroftypicalmoraljudgments,andhereitisworthmentioningthatunderstandingbasecasemoral

beliefsasessentiallyoughtcommitmentswithregardtoacoredescriptivecontent,helpsaccommodatethewidelyshared

internalistintuitionthatthereissomeintimaterelationbetweenhavingamoralbeliefandaction.Thatis,theveryideaof

anoughtcommitmentsuggestsakindofcommitmentorientedtowardappropriateactionvisvisthespecificcore

descriptivecontentofthebelief.Thewaytounderstandthismannerofactionorientationisbywayofexaminingtherole

ofsuchbeliefsintheoverallcognitiveeconomyofagents.

Justasbeliefsarepsychologicalcommitmentstateswithacertaindistinctiveroleinpsychologicaleconomy,

assertionsarespeechactsthatplayacertaindistinctivesociolinguisticrolearoleininterpersonaldynamics.An

assertionisastancetakingspeechact,anactthroughwhich(i)oneexpressesaniscommitmentoranoughtcommitment

withrespecttoacoredescriptivecontent,andthereby(ii)onepositionsoneself,withinthecontextofsociolinguistic

dynamics,visvisthatcorecontent.Astanceisanorientationtherebyoccupied,withinaninterpersonalsituation.An

oughtstance,inparticular,isadistinctivelyactionguidingorientation.Forinstance,totakeanoughtstancewithrespect

tothecoredescriptivecontent,Bertiesmailingtheparcel,istoengageinanactionguidingspeechactwhoserole

withininterpersonaldynamicsisimportantlysimilartotheroleofthecorrespondingpsychologicaloughtcommitment(the

moralbelief)withinintrapersonalcognitiveeconomy.Thissociolinguisticroleinvolvesreasonsforaction,anda

preparednesstoprovidethem.ByassertingthatBertieoughttomailtheparcel,onenormallysignalsoneswillingness

todefendonesoughtcommitmentonthismatteroverandagainstopposingoughtcommitments,includingawillingness

togivereasonsforsuchacommitment.Normallyitisunderstoodthatthereasonsoneispreparedtogiveareofacertain

distinctivekindthat,e.g.,appealtoimpartialconsiderationsbearingontheissue.Ingeneral,oneentersthespaceof

interpersonalmoraldiscourseandreasoningboundbythesortsofconventions(oftenunstatedandpartlyinchoate)that

[14]
governinterpersonaldeliberationanddiscussionaboutmoralissues.

2.Theframeworkcontinued:logicallycomplexcases

Wenowgeneralizeourframework,byextendingittobeliefsandassertionswhoseoverall

declarativecontenthastruthfunctionaland/orquantificationallogicalcomplexity,and/orembeddeddeonticoperators.
[15]
Tobeginwith,letusrestrictthenotionofcoredescriptivecontenttoatomicdescriptivecontentthekindof

contentexpressiblebyatomicsentences.Giventhisstipulation,hereisthekeyideaforgeneralizingourapproach:

whereasabasecasebeliefisalogicallysimplecommitmentstatewithrespecttoasinglecoredescriptivecontent,a

nonbasecasebeliefisalogicallycomplexcommitmentstatewithrespecttoseveralcoredescriptivecontents.Whereas

basecasebeliefscomprisetwologicallysimplecommitmenttypes(viz.,iscommitmentandoughtcommitment),non

basecasebeliefscompriseawholerecursivehierarchyoflogicallycomplexcommitmenttypes,correspondingtothe

variouslogicalformsthatcanbeexhibitedbylogicallycomplexdeclarativesentences.Theessentialfeatureofanygiven

logicallycomplexcommitmenttypeisitsdistinctiveconstitutiveinferentialroleinanagentscognitiveeconomy

(insofarastheagentisrational),aroleinvolvingtherelevantcoredescriptivecontents.

Firstletusconsidercasesofmoralbeliefexhibitingtruthfunctionalcomplexity,i.e.,

complexityinvolvingconnectivesbutnotquantifiers.Onourview,suchabeliefistobeunderstoodasalogically

complexcommitmentstatewithrespecttoasequenceofcoredescriptivecontents.So,forexample,considerthebelief

thateitherJeevesmailedtheparcelorBertieoughttomailtheparcel.Thisbeliefisalogicallycomplexcommitment

stateofthelogicaltype[v(Ought)],withrespecttothesequenceofcoredescriptivecontents<Jeevesmailedthe

parcel,Bertiemailstheparcel>.Thekeytounderstandingthisbelief,andothersofthesamelogicaltype,involves

understandingtheirconstitutiveinferentialroleinthepsychologicaleconomyoftheagent.Inparticular,theirroleisto

combineinadistinctivewaywithotherbeliefs(othercommitmentstates)toinferentiallyyieldfurtherbeliefs(further

commitmentstates).Onewaytoputthemainideaaboutsuchlogicallycomplexcommitmentstatesisthatthesimple

constituentsofcomplexcommitmentstatesarelogicallyintheoffinginthesensethatthecomplexcommitmentstate

involvedinthedisjunctivebelief,whencombinedwithanappropriateadditionalbelief,rationallyinferentiallyyieldsan

oughtcommitmentwithdeclarativemoralcontent.Intheexampleathand,theembeddedmoralconstituent,Bertieought

tomailtheparcel,isintheoffinginthesensethatthecomplexcommitmentstateinquestion,togetherwiththebelief

thatJeevesdidnotmailtheparcel,inferentiallyyields(atleastfortheminimallyrationalagent)anoughtcommitment

withrespecttoBertiesmailingtheparcel.

Nowconsidercasesofbeliefwithquantificationalcomplexity,i.e.,complexityinvolvingquantifiers(andperhaps

connectivestoo).Suchabeliefisalogicallycomplexcommitmentstatevisvisasetofsequencesofcoredescriptive

contents.So,forinstance,thebeliefthatanyonewhopinchedUncleWilloughbysparceloughttomailit,isalogically

complexcommitmentstateofthelogicaltype()[(Ought)],withrespecttoasetofsequencesofcore

descriptivecontents{<Bertiepinchedtheparcel,Bertiemailstheparcel>,<AuntAgathapinchedtheparcel,Aunt

Agathamailstheparcel>,...},etc.Again,theessentialfeatureofthistypeofcommitmentstateisitsconstitutive

inferentialroleinthepsychologicaleconomyoftheagent.Forsomeonewhosebeliefhastheuniversallyquantified

declarativecontentinquestion,otherbeliefswithdeclarativemoralcontentareintheoffinginthesensethatthe
complexcommitmentinvolvedintheuniversallyquantifiedbelief,whencombinedwithanappropriateadditionalbelief

(e.g.,thebeliefthatBertiepinchedtheparcel)rationallyinferentiallyyieldsanoughtcommitmentwithdeclarativemoral

content(e.g.,thebeliefthatBertieoughttomailtheparcel).

TheaspectoflogicalcomplexityarisingfromembeddedOughtoperatorsgetsaccommodatedtoo,withinthis

framework.Eachbelieftypeinvolvingembeddeddeonticoperatorswillhaveitsdistinctive,constitutive,inferentialrole

inthepsychologicaleconomyoftherationalagent.Itisthebusinessofdeonticlogictosystematizetheselogicalroles.

Aswesaid,onthisapproachthereisawholerecursivehierarchyofcommitmenttypesofincreasinglogical

complexity,correspondingtothehierarchyofincreasinglycomplexlogicalformsexhibitedbydeclarativesentencesthat

canexpresstheoveralldeclarativecontentofabelief.Eachsuchcommitmentisdirectedtowardacoredescriptive

content,orasequenceofcoredescriptivecontents,orasetofsequencesofcoredescriptivecontents.Andeachsuch

commitmenthasaconstitutiveinferentialroleinpsychologicaleconomyaroleinvolvingthecoredescriptivecontent(s)

[16]
towardwhichthecommitmentisdirected.

Theseobservationsaboutbeliefswithlogicallycomplexdeclarativecontentcanbeextended,mutatismutandis,

toassertions.Whereasabasecaseassertionisaspeechactoftakingalogicallysimplestancewithrespecttoasingle

coredescriptivecontent,anonbasecaseassertionisaspeechactoftakingalogicallycomplexstancewithrespectto

severalcoredescriptivecontents.Alogicallycomplexstanceplaysaconstitutiveinferentialroleinthedynamicsof

sociolinguisticintercoursethatisanalogoustotheconstitutiveintrapsychologicalinferentialroleoflogicallycomplex

beliefs.Theconstitutiveinferentialroleisthis:tocombinewithothersociolinguisticstances,takenbymakingadditional

assertions,togenerateoftenautomaticallyandimplicitlycertainfurtherstancesthatarelogicallyimpliedbyones

overtstancetakingspeechacts.Implicitisstancesandoughtstancesarethusintheoffingwhenonemakesa

logicallycomplexassertion:suchanassertion,incombinationwithappropriateadditionalones,willlogicallygenerate

[17]
implicitisstancesoroughtstanceswithrespecttocertaincoredescriptivecontents.

Suppose,forexample,thatoneasserts,eitherJeevesmailedtheparcelorBertieoughttomailtheparcel,and

onealsoassertsJeevesdidnotmailtheparcel.Theformerassertionisalogicallycomplexstancetakingspeechact,of

thelogicaltype[v(Ought)],withrespecttothesequenceofcoredescriptivecontents,<thatJeevesmailedtheparcel,

thatBertiemailsthatparcel>.Thelatterassertionisaspeechactoflogicaltype,withrespecttothecoredescriptive

content,thatJeevesmailedtheparcel.Inperformingthesetwospeechactstogether,onetherebycomestooccupy,asa

matterofthelogicofspeechacts,anoughtstancewithrespecttothecoredescriptivecontent,thatBertiemailsthe

[18]
parcel.

3.NDCasaconsistentmetaethicalposition
Ourmaintaskhasbeentoprovideaframeworkforbeliefandassertionthatrendersthebasic

tenetsofNDCconsistent.AccordingtoNDC,judgmentsandstatementswithmoralcontentaregenuinebeliefsand

assertions,havingcognitivecontent,andyettheoveralldeclarativecontentofsuchanitemisnotdescriptive.Ifone

acceptsthesemanticassumption,thensuchaviewisoutrightinconsistent(sinceaccordingtothatassumptioncognitive

contentjustisdescriptivecontent).Accordingtoourframeworkthisassumptionisnottakenforgranteditisquite

consistentwithourframeworktoholdthatsomebeliefsandassertionslackoveralldescriptivecontent.Consider,once

again,basecasemoralbeliefsandlogicallycomplexmoralbeliefs.

Aswehavealreadynotedinpassing,nothinginthenotionofabasecasebelieforassertion,construedasan

oughtcommitmentwithrespecttoacoredescriptivecontent,forcesonustheclaimthattheoveralldeclarativecontent

ofasuchabelieforassertionisdescriptivecontent.Andthepointgeneralizes:inlightoftheprevioussection,nothingin

thenotionofamoralityinvolvinglogicallycomplexbelief(orassertion)understoodasalogicallycomplexcommitment

withrespecttoamultiplicityofcoredescriptivecontents(wherewhatisessentialaboutthebelieforassertionisits

constitutiveinferentialrole)forcesonustheclaimthattheoveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptive.Thus,theposition

wecallnondescriptivistcognitivismisrenderedconsistentbyourproposedframework.

Ontheotherhand,theframeworkcertainlydoesnotentailnondescriptivistcognitivism.Rather,itisneutralwith

respecttocompetingmetaethicalpositionsthatrecognizethatmoralthoughtanddiscourseinvolvesgenuinebeliefsand

assertionsthatis,competingversionsofcognitivism.Inparticular,ourframeworkisconsistentwithdescriptivist

metaethicalviews.Thedescriptivist,thatis,couldgrantwhatwehavesaidaboutoughtcommitmentsandis

commitmentsbeingdistinctcommitmenttypes,andaboutbeliefsandassertionswithcomplexoveralldeclarativecontent

beinglogicallycomplexcommitmentsvisaviscoredescriptivecontents,withouthavingtodenythatmoralityinvolving

beliefsandassertionshaveoveralldescriptivecontent(thefundamentalclaimofthedescriptivist).Ourframework,

recall,leavesopenwhetherornottheoveralldeclarativecontentofamoralbeliefisdescriptive.

IV.OnthePlausibilityoftheFramework

Acriticmightbeinclinedtosaythatwearetradingintheimplausibilityofmetaethicaldescriptivism,withits

burdensomemetaphysicalcommitments,foracomplicatedandadhocframeworkforbeliefandassertion,andthusthat

thereisamoreorlessstraighttradeoffmetaphysicalextravaganceforsemanticcomplexity.Notso,however,aswe

willnowexplain.

Notonlyistheframeworkconsistentwithdescriptivism(asalreadyexplained),butthereisgoodreasonforthe

descriptivisttoembraceourframework:viz.,doingsoallowsthedescriptivisttoaccommodatestronglyheldanddeeply

sharedinternalistintuitionsaboutmoralthoughtanddiscourse.Adoptingtheframework,descriptivistswouldmaintain

thatthebeliefthat,e.g.,Bertieoughttomailtheparcelisbothaniscommitmentwithrespecttotheoveralldeclarative

content(whichtheyunderstandtobedescriptive),thatitoughttobethatBertiemailstheparcel,andanought
commitmentwithrespecttothecoredescriptivecontent,thatBertiemailstheparcel.Giventhespecificactionoriented

functionalroleandphenomenologydistinctiveofoughtcommitments,descriptivistscouldtherebyneatlycombinetheir

viewwithinternalism.(Thepointgeneralizestoencompassmoralityinvolvinglogicallycomplexcommitmentsaswell,

sinceactionorientationisinferentiallyintheoffingforthesetoo.)Sodescriptivistshavenoreasontosupposethat

ourframeworkbegsanyimportantmetaethicalquestionsagainstthem,andtheyhavegoodreasontopositivelyembrace

it.

Anadequatemetaethicalpositionshouldbefaithfultothephenomenaitseekstounderstand.Ifthephenomena

aresufficientlycomplex,thenacorrespondingdegreeofcomplexityinonesmetaethicalpositionistheoretically

appropriatenotadhoc.Moraljudgmentandmoraldiscoursehaveinternalistaspectsaformofcomplexityinthe

phenomenawhosetheoreticalilluminationevidentlyrequiresthekindofcomplexityexhibitedbyourproposed

[19]
framework.Soevendescriptivistshaveamplereasontoembracetheframework.

V.NondescriptivistCognitivismversusDescriptivistCognitivism

Althoughwewillnotattempttoexplainwhywethinkthatallofthevarioustraditional

metaethicalviewsareunsatisfying,wedowanttosaysomethingabouttheplausibilityofourviewvisvisdescriptivist

versionsofcognitivism.Doingsoisespeciallyimportantbecause,asjustexplained,thereisaversionofinternalist

descriptivismthatdrawsuponourownproposedgenericframeworkforbeliefasawayofcombiningtheideathatmoral

judgmentsaregenuinebeliefs(andmoralstatementsaregenuineassertions)withtheideathattheyareactionguiding.

Whypreferournondescriptivistcognitivismtodescriptivism?Inparticular,whypreferourviewtothekindof

descriptivistcognitivismthataccommodatestheinternalisticaspectsofmoraljudgmentandmoraldiscourse?

Wewillbrieflymentionthreephilosophicalreasonsfordoubtingthatthedeclarativecontentofmoralbeliefsis

descriptive.FirstiswhatJackson(1998)callsthelocationprobleminethicstheproblemoflocatingputativemoral

factsandpropertiesinthenaturalworld.PaceJacksonandothermoralrealists,wedonotthinkthattheeffortsof

philosopherstolocatemoralfactsandpropertieshasbeen,oreverwillbe,successful.Here,wereferourreadersto

someofourpastwritingsinwhichweshow(sowethink)thatvariousrealistattemptstosolvetheprobleminevitably

fail,andaredestinedtokeeponfailing.(SeeHorganandTimmons1991,1992a,1992b,1996a,1996b,andTimmons

1999.)Ofcourse,evenifonecannotsolvethemetaphysicallocationproblemforethics,onemight,likeMackie,holdthat

affirmativemoraljudgmentspurporttodescribeorpickoutworldlymoralfactsandpropertiesandthuspossessgenuine

descriptivecognitivecontent,butthattherearenosuchfactsandproperties.I.e.,onecanembraceanerrortheory.Soit

maybegrantedthatmerefailuretosolvethelocationproblemisfarfromdecisiveevidenceagainstdescriptivism.But

thelocationproblemviewedinlightofthenexttwoproblemsispartofanoverallcaseagainstdescriptivistviewsin

ethics.
Second,inarguingthatmoraljudgmentsareaspeciesofbelief,partofourplanwastoshow

thatconstruingthemasbeliefsdoesnotcommitonetothefurthertheoreticalclaimthattheypossessdescriptivecognitive

content.Thepointhereisthatattributingtosuchbeliefsthissortofcontentisgratuitousforpurposesofunderstanding

themasbeliefsandunderstandingtheirdistinctiveactionguidingroleinourlives.Inlightoftheirpsychologicalroleand

associatedphenomenology,theresimplyisnoapparentneedtoburdenthemwithakindoftheoreticalcommitment

which,giventhelocationproblem,cannotbedischarged.

Third,thecaseagainstdescriptivismreceivesadditionalsupportfromconsiderationsofconvervatismwith

respecttothenatureandevolutionofhumanconcepts.Appliedtomoralnotionstheargumentwouldgolikethis.Moral

discourse,andmoralconceptsemployedinsuchdiscourse,playanindispensableroleinhumanlifethatwouldsurvive

rejectionoftheideathatthereareobjectivemoralfactsthatmoralclaimspurporttodescribe.Indeed,afterMackie

arguedthatallaffirmativemoralsentencesarefalsebecausetheyinvolve(sohethought)metaphysicalcommitmentsto

ontologicallyqueerproperties,hedidnotadvocateeliminatingtheuseofmoralconceptsandmoraldiscourserather,

hewentontoproposeanormativeethicalsystembasedonacertainconceptionofhumanflourishing.Nowifweassume

thathumanconceptstendtoevolveinabroadlypragmaticwayandarethusnotlikelytohaveapplicationconditionsthat

aremoredemandingthanisrequiredforthepurposestheyserve,thenthefactthatmoraldiscoursewouldsurvivethe

rejectionofobjectivemoralfactsandpropertiesstronglysuggeststhatsuchdiscoursedoesnothaveanysuch

metaphysicalcommitments.

VI.SemanticIlluminationbyTriangulation

Ourmaintaskiscompleted:wehavesketchedtherudimentsofanewkindofmetaethical

theory,involvingagenericconceptionofbeliefandassertionthatrenderstheviewaconsistentposition,andwehave

indicatedbrieflywhatvirtuesourviewhasvisvisthemorestandardmetaethicaloptions.Obviously,fillingoutthe

theoryanddefendingitagainstallrelevantchallengeswouldrequireabookoratleastaseriesofarticles.However,in

thespaceremainingwewilladdress,ifonlyinapreliminaryway,certainquestionsandmattersofdetailthathavevery

likelyoccurredtotheattentivereader.Inthissectionwewillmakesomeremarksaboutphilosophicalmethodologyin

relationtofillingoutourpositivemetaethicalstoryaboutthesemanticsofmoralthoughtanddiscourse.Then,inthe

followingsection,wewilltakeupmorespecificquestionsconcerningtruthascription,logicalembedding,moral

progress,andmoralseriousness.

Accordingtoournondescriptivistcognitivism,thecontentsofmoralbeliefsandassertionsare

suigenerisinthesensethattheycannotbereducedtooranalyzedasequivalenttoothertypesofdeclarativeor

nondeclarativecontents(orevenacombinationofthetwo).Inthisrespect,ourviewisunlikeoldernondescriptivist

viewsaccordingtowhich,forinstance,moralbeliefsandassertionsareprimarilycommandsandsohaveprescriptive

contentasprimaryinadditiontoanydescriptivecontenttheymayalsopossess.Inrejectingallreductivesemantic
projectsinrelationtounderstandingmoralthoughtanddiscourse,theappropriateresponsetoquestionslikeWhatisthe

contentormeaningofmoraljudgment,M?issimplytorepeatthecontentofthejudgmentinquestion.Thus:Whatis

thecontentofGenocideiswrong?Answer:genocideiswrong.However,offeringonlysuchadisquotationalresponse

tothesekindsofquestionsaboutcontentdoesnotmeanthatourviewisdeeplymysteriousorthatweareobscurantists

aboutmattersofmoralsemantics.Quitethecontrary.Wemaintainthatonegainssufficientsemanticilluminationofthe

natureofnondescriptivecognitivecontentpreciselybycomingtounderstandthepsychologicalstatesandspeechactsthat

haveit,asstatesandspeechactsinvolvingacertaindistinctivekindofcommitment(orstancetaking)withrespectto

certaincoredescriptivecontents.Suchunderstandinginvolvescomingtoappreciateinenoughdetailthepsychological

roleandassociatedphenomenologydefinitiveoftherelevantpsychologicalstates,and,correspondingly,bycomingto

appreciateinenoughdetailthesortofsociolinguisticroleoftherelevantspeechacts.Inshort,illuminatingthe

characteristicrolesofmoralthoughtanddiscoursehelpsoneunderstandthesuigeneriskindofcognitivecontentmoral

beliefsandutterancespossess.Wecallthiskindofmethodologyforilluminatingcontent,triangulation,whichwehave

employedinsketchingoursemanticstoryaboutbothbasecaseandlogicallycomplexmoralbeliefsandassertions.Thus

ourbreakwithmetaethicaltraditioninvolvesnotonlyourproposedmetaethicaltheorybutourmethodologyaswell.

VII.WorktobeDone

Weturnfinallytovariouschallengesthatmayhaveoccurredtoourreaders,inorderto

indicateatleastroughlyhowweproposetodealwiththem.Specifically,wetakeupissuesoftruthascription,logical

embedding,moralprogress,andmoralseriousness.

1.Truthascription

AccordingtoNDC,moraljudgmentsaregenuinebeliefs,andmoralutterancesaregenuine

assertions.Buttheconceptsofbeliefandassertionarelinkedbyplatitudestotheconceptoftruth:abeliefisa

psychologicalstatethataimsattruthtoassertistosetforthastrue.Howdoesourviewdealwithmattersoftruth?After

all,beingnondescriptivists,weclaimthatmoralbeliefsandassociatedspeechactslackoveralldescriptivecontentthey

arenotinthebusinessofrepresentingorpurportingtodescribetheworld.

Onourview,theproperwaytogainilluminationaboutmattersoftruthinrelationtomoral

thoughtanddiscourseistofocusontruthascriptionstomoralstatementsasmetalingusticspeechacts,andaskaboutthe

natureofthesespeechacts.Whenonethinksorremarks,Theclaimthatapartheidoughttobestoppedistrue,what

isonedoing?Theappropriateanswerinvolvesnotingthatsuchatruthascriptionconstitutesamorallyengagedsemantic

appraisal:onethatisinfusedwithonesownmoralcommitment.Themainideacanperhapsbeconveyedbysayingthat

truthascriptionstomoralstatementsinvolveakindofappraisalinwhichsemanticandmoralarefusedwhichisto

[20]
beexpected,sinceordinaryusesofthetruthpredicateoperateinaccordancewithschemaT.
 Inrecentyears,socalledminimalisttreatmentsoftruthhavebeendevelopedanddefendedviewsthatattempt

tomakesenseoftruthascriptionwithoutrobustmetaphysicalcommitments.Ourviewisintheminimalistspiritthough

wewouldinsistontwothings.First,tounderstandtruthminimalisticallyinonediscoursedoesnotcommitoneto

[21]
minimalisminrelationtoeverymodeofdiscourse. Second,thereisaninterestingstorytobetoldaboutmoraltruth

ascriptionourviewisnotasimpleredundancyview.

2.Embedding

Acertainprobleminvolvingembeddedcontextshasbeenfrequentlypressedagainstvarious

formsofnondescriptivism.Onecommonwayofraisingtheembeddingchallengeistopointoutthatinferenceslikethe

followingseemtobevalid:(1)Oneoughtnottokill(2)Ifoneoughtnottokill,thenoneoughtnotpaysomeonetokill

thus,(3)Oneoughtnotpaysomeonetokill.Theproblemfor,say,anemotivististhataccordingtoemotivism,the

meaningofpremise(1)istobeunderstoodintermsofitsnoncognitiveemotiveroleinthoughtandassertion,viz.,to

expressonesemotionandinfluencetheattitudesofothers.However,inpremise(2),where(1)occursasthe

antecedentoftheconditional,(1)isnotexpressedwithitstypicalemotiveroleonewhoaffirmspremise(2)isnot

therebycommittedtoaffirmingitsantecedent.Butthenitappearsthatonehastosaythatoneoughtnottokilldiffers

inmeaninginitstwooccurrencesintheargumentwhichimpliesthat,despiteappearances,theargumentisnotvalidit

commitsthefallacyofequivocation.Thecriticpressingthisobjectionpresumablythinksthatonlyifmoralstatements

havedescriptivecontent,andsocanbeunderstoodintermsofsomesetofdescriptivetruthconditionssomethingthata

statementcarriesfromunembeddedtoembeddedcontextscanwemakesenseofmoralmodusponensandothersuch

[22]
validinferences.

Ourreplytothischallengeisimplicitinourabovediscussionoflogicalcomplexity.In

developingourframeworkinconnectionwithlogicallycomplexmoralbeliefsandassertions,wenotedthatthe

declarativecontentofsuchbeliefsandstatementscanbetriangulatedintermsoftheirconstitutiveinferentialrolein

modusponensandotherargumentforms.Thus,theconditionalstatement,Ifoneoughtnottokill,thenoneoughtnot

paysomeonetokill,istobeunderstoodprimarilyintermsofitsroleinmediatinginferencefromanaffirmationofits

antecedenttoanaffirmationofitsconsequent,asinthelittleargumentfeaturedabove.Soonourview,togetahandleon

embeddedmoralclaimsinvolvesunderstandingtheroleofthekindsoflogicallycomplexstatementsthatembedthem.

Whatonecansayaboutthecontentsofembeddedandunembeddedoccurrencesofsomeonemoralclaimisthat(1)they

sharethesamecoredescriptivecontent,(2)inanembeddedcontextanoughtcommitmentwithrespecttothatcore

contentissuspended,butnevertheless(3)theoverallclaimcontainingtheembeddedcontextexpressesalogically

complexcommitmentstatewhoseconstitutiveroleininferenceissuchthatanoughtcommitmentwithrespecttothe
relevantcoredescriptivecontentisintheoffing.Tomaketheseobservations,wethink,istomakesenseofvalid

inferenceinvolvingembeddedmoralconstituents.

Oftenwhentheembeddingissueisraised,thoseposingthechallengeassumethatonemustfirstgiveanaccount

ofthemeaningofmoralstatements,andthenshowthattheirmeaning(accordingtothegivenaccount)remainsconstant

whenthestatementsareembedded.But,givenourproposedframeworkforbeliefandassertion,thismethodological

assumptiongetscalledintoquestion.Onourapproach,whatitisforastatementSwithnondescriptivecognitivecontent

tohaveconstantmeaning,whetherunembeddedorinvariousembeddedcontexts,justisforthestatesandspeechacts

whoseoveralldeclarativecontentincludesS(i.e.,whoseoveralldeclarativecontentisexpressiblebyastatementwithS

asconstituent)tofigureincertainspecificconstitutiveinferentialconnectionsinvolvingSscoredescriptivecontent.

Thisisadialecticalreversal,turningthestandardembeddingproblemonitshead.(Remember:onourapproach,one

explainsnondescriptivecognitivecontentbyexplainingthepsychologicalstatesandspeechactsthathaveit,ascertain

distinctivekindsofpsychologicalorsociolinguisticcommitmentswithrespecttocertaincoredescriptivecontents.Such

[23]
commitmentsbearconstitutiveinferentialconnectionstooneanother.)

3.Moralprogressandtakingmoralityseriously

Foradescriptivistrealist,intellectualmoralprogressisamatterofonesmoralbeliefs

comingtobetterapproximatethemoralfacts.Butifmoralbeliefandassertionarenotprimarilyinthebusinessof

describingorrepresentingintheworldmoralfacts,thenhowcanwemakesenseofgenuinemoralprogress?Putanother

way,howcanourviewdistinguishbetweenmerechangeinmoralbeliefandgenuineprogress?And,relatedly,ifthereis

nometaphysicalanchorformoralthoughtanddiscourse,thenwhytakeitseriously,whynotconstruemoraldiscussion

anddisputesasbeingmorelikedisputesaboutmattersoftaste?

Thesechallengesfocusonourirrealistmoralmetaphysics,andweconsiderthemtobesome

ofthemostdifficultforanymoralirrealist.Here,then,isanindicationofhowwewouldrespondtothesechallenges,

thoughtheycertainlydeserveamorethoroughreplythanwecanofferhere.

Ofcourse,onourview,moralprogressofthesortinquestionisnottobeunderstoodasa

matterofbringingonesbeliefsintocloserproximitytoarealmofmoralfacts.Weproposethat,instead,onethinkof

moralprogressassomethingtobejudgedfromwithinacommittedmoraloutlook:whenonemakesjudgmentsabout

moralimprovement,onedoessofromanengagedmoralperspective.Injudging,forexample,thatmoralprogresswas

madeintheUnitedStateswiththerejectionofslavery,weareemployingourcurrentmoraloutlookandnotsimply

registeringthefactthatonemoralreactiontoslaverywasreplacedwithanotherwearemakingamoraljudgmentabout

slaverywhichwethinkisbackedbyreasons.ThiswayofdealingwithmoralprogressisverymuchakintowhatWright

saysaboutthenotionofmoralprogressavailabletoaminimalistaboutmoraltruth.
 [T]heminimalistwillhavetoadmitthatsuchideasofprogress,ordeterioration,areonesforwhichwecanhave

useonlyfromwithinacommittedmoralpointofviewandthattherefinementofwhichourmoralsensibilities

arecapablecanonlybeamatterofapproachingacertainequilibriumasappraisedbytheexerciseofthosevery

sensibilities.(Wright,1992:1689).

Again,wethinkthechallengetomakesenseofmoralseriousnessdoesnotrequiresome

metaphysicalbackingformoralthoughtanddiscourse.Rather,onourview,thechallengeregardingmoralseriousnessis

plausiblyunderstoodasamoralchallenge:whyoughtwetakeourmoralviewsseriously?Andtheappropriateresponse

tosuchachallengeistogivemoralreasonsreasonsthat,forinstance,willlikelyappealtotheimportantroleof

moralityinpeopleslives.Likeourreplytothemoralprogresschallenge,ourreplyhereistoviewthechallengeasone

[24]
tobeappropriatelydealtwithfromwithinacommittedmoraloutlook.

VIII.Conclusion

Wethinkitistimeforachangeinmetaethics,andonlybychallengingcertainpervasive

philosophicalassumptionsisonelikelytomakeprogress.Ourproposalistorethinkfundamentalassumptionsaboutthe

natureofbeliefandassertionspecifically,wechallengetheideathatallbeliefeligibleandassertiblecontentsare

descriptivewhatwecallthesemanticassumption.Wehavesetforthaframeworkforbeliefandassertionthatdoesnot

presupposethesemanticassumption,thusallowingforthepossibilityofbeliefsandassertionsthatarenotdescriptive.

Nondescriptivistcognitivismembracestheframework,andalsomaintainsthattheoveralldeclarativecontentofmoral

beliefsandassertionsisinfactnotdescriptive.Thevirtuesofthismetaethicalpositionaregreat.Itsurelydeservestobe
[25]
takenseriouslyasatheoreticaloptioninmetaethics.Indeed,wesubmitthatitoughttobethedefaultview.

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[1]
Bothsidesagreethatsomethingmoreisrequiredforbeingagenuinebeliefandagenuineassertionthanhavingdeclarative
content.Theyagree,forinstance,thatifthedeclarativecontentofmoraljudgmentsandstatementsisreducibleto(i.e.,synonymous
with,orparaphrasableby,ortheoreticallymodelableby)thekindofcontentthatislinguisticallyexpressablebycertain
nondeclarativesentencese.g.,imperativesthenthejudgmentsandstatementsinquestionarenotfullfledgedbeliefsand
assertions.So,eventhoughitisgrammaticallypermissibletoappendbelievesthat(andlikewiseassertsthat)toanysentence
withdeclarativecontent,thesharedassumptionisthatbeingafullfledgedbelieforassertionrequiresmoreviz.,declarativecontent
thatisnotreducibletonondeclarativecontent.
[2]
Inthispaperwerestricttalkofdescriptivecontenttoindicatecontentthatrepresentstheworldasbeingacertainway.Onemight
usedescriptivecontentinabroadwaythatwouldapplytoanymeaningfuldeclarativesentence,butthatisnothowweareusing
theexpression.Tosaythatthedeclarativecontentofamentalstate,judgment,orsentenceisdescriptive,then,istosaythatit
purportstodescribeorpickoutsomekindoffactintheworld.Inmetaethics,suchfactsmightbeunderstoodtohaveastrongmind
independentstatus,asthemoralrealistclaims,ortheymightbetetheredtothebeliefsorattitudes(actualorideal)ofindividualsor
groups,asrelativistsandrationalistswouldhaveit.Inshort,tohavedescriptivecognitivecontentistopurporttobedescriptiveof
somesortoffactmorerobustinnaturethanisconsistentwithaminimalistunderstandingoffacttalk.
[3]
Itisalsoworthnotingthatthesemanticassumptionispresupposedwhenphilosophersemploythedirectionoffitmetaphorin
attemptingtodistinguishbeliefsfromdesires.Beliefs,itissaid,aimatthetruthandcanbeappropriatelycharacterized(atleastin
contrasttodesires)aspsychologicalstatesthataresupposedtofittheworldbeliefsthatfailtodosoaremistaken.Desires,itissaid,
haveanoppositedirectionoffit:theyaimatsatisfaction,whichobtainswhentheworldfitsthem.

[4]
Errortheoriestooembracethesemanticassumption,althoughwithatheoreticaltwist.Anerrortheoristassumesthatnondefective
cognitivecontentisdescriptive,waytheworldmightbe,content.Giventhisassumption,moralevaluativecontentisthenconstrued
asdefectivecognitivecontent:ontheonehanditisbeliefeligibleandassertoric,becauseitpurportstoconstituteorspecifya
genuinewaytheworldmightbebutontheotherhanditisdefective,becauseitdoesnotinfactdoso.Thischaracterizationholds
fortheclassicversionoferrortheoryinMackie(1977),andalsoforthemorerecentversioninSchiffer(1990).
[5]
Itiscrucialtounderstand,however,thatweretainthetraditionalassumptionthatgenuinecognitivecontentisnotreducibleto
contentexpressiblebynondeclarativesentencesi.e.,weassumethatifmoraldeclarativecontentwerereducibletonondeclarative
content,thenitwouldnotbecognitivecontent,andmoraljudgmentsandstatementswouldnotbefullfledgedbeliefsandassertions
(cfnote1).

[6]
Arewe,then,socalledminimalistsaboutbeliefandassertion?Thatdependsonhowoneusesthetermminimalism.Lettype
1minimalismbetheclaimthatmoraldeclarativecontentcountsascognitivecontentevenifitisreducibletonondeclarative
contentandlettype2minimalismbetheclaimthatmoraldeclarativecontentcountsascognitivecontentevenifitisnotdescriptive
content.Weespouseminimalismoftype2,butnotoftype1.(Thetwotypesofminimalismwillberegardedasequivalentby
someonewhoacceptsthefollowingmodifiedsemanticassumption:alldeclarativecontenteither(i)isdescriptivecontent,or(ii)is
reducibletotonondeclarativecontent.Wedenythemodifiedsemanticassumption,ofcourse,inadditiontodenyingthesemantic
assumptionitself.)
[7]
Someonewhoisatype1minimalistaboutbeliefandassertion(cf.note6)willalsorejectthesemanticassumption,buton
differentgroundsthanwedoviz.,onthebasisoftheclaimthatdeclarativecontentautomaticallycountsascognitivecontenteven
ifitisreducibletonondeclarativecontent.(Atype1minimalistwillconsiderthetermnoncognitivismaninappropriatelabelfor
metaethicalpositionsaffirmingthereducibilityofdeclarativetonondeclarativecontent.)Butinsofarasthetype1minimalist
embracesthemodifiedsemanticassumption(cf.note6),themenuofmetaethicaloptionswillremainlargelyasitwasbefore,except
thatthecategoriesofbeliefandassertionwillnowbeappliedtothekindsofpsychologicalstatesandspeechacts
describedbytraditionalversionsofnondescriptivismlikeemotivismandprescriptivism.Sinceweourselvesdenythemodified
semanticassumption,however,ourpositionopensupfertilenewmetaethicalterritoryevenfromtheperspectiveoftype1
minimalism.For,itremainsanimportanttheoreticalnoveltytoclaim,aswedo,thatmoralcontentisakindofcognitivecontentthat
isneitherdescriptivenorreducibletonondeclarativecontent.
[8]
TheparcelcontainsUncleWilloughbysbookmanuscriptthatheleftonthehalltable,tobemailedtothepublisher.Bertie
(Wooster)hasreluctantlypinchedtheparcelwiththeintentionofdisposingofit,atthebehestofhiserstwhilefianceFlorence
Craye.SeeP.G.Wodehouse(1967),JeevesTakesCharge.Wesaymoreaboutlogicandembeddingbelow.
[9]
Seeforexample,Mandelbaum(1955)andSmith(1993)forcharacterizationsofthesefeaturesandalsothosewementioninthe
nextparagraph.
[10]
Tosaythatmoraljudgmentsdirectlydisposeustowardactionindependentlyofpreexistingdesires,andthattheyhave
motivationalforceindependentlyofsuchdesires,leavesitopenwhether(i)thesejudgmentsplaythiscausalroleallbythemselves,or
instead(ii)theygeneratenewdesireswhichthenplaythatrole.
[11]
Aproblemwithstandardversionsofinternalismisthattheymaketheconnectionbetweenmoraljudgmentandappropriate
motivationexceptionless.Althoughweourselvesmaintainthatpartoftheconceptofamoraljudgmentisthatsuchjudgments
typicallyaremotivational,wealsoholdthattheconnectiontomotivtionissoft:itallowsthepossibilityofabnormalcasesin
which(forsomeexplicablereason)thetypicalmotivatingaspectisdeadenedorabsent(cf.Timmons1999,pp.14042).Moreover,it
shouldbeacknowledgedthattheactionguidingroleofmoraljudgmentsissometimessomewhatindirect,forinstancewhenone
condemnspersonslongdeadforactionstheyperformedlongago.Still,normallytheactionguidingaspectofmoraljudgmentis
operativeeitherdirectlyoratleastindirectly,withrespecttopotentialbehaviorinsituationseitheractualorcounterfactual.
[12]
Unlessotherwiseindicated,whenwespeakofthecontentofajudgment(orassertion)wemeanitsoveralldeclarativecontent.
Nondescriptivistcognitivismclaimsthatthiskindofcontentiscognitive,whilealsoclaimingthatitisnotdescriptive.Inthecourse
ofthediscussionbelowwewilldescribeanadditional,inner,kindofcontentinvolvedinmoraljudgmentswhichisdescriptive
butisdistinctfromtheiroveralldeclarativecontent.
[13]
Forsimplicityssake,wefocusexclusivelyonmoralbeliefsexpressiblelinguisticallybythedeonticoperatoritoughtto
bethat,thusignoringthosekindsofmoralbeliefsexpressiblelinguisticallybyoperatorslikeitispermissiblethatanditis
goodthat.Weleaveopenhowexactlytounderstandtheselatterbeliefsastypesofevaluativecommitmentstate,althoughwe
expectthatourgeneralapproachtounderstandingoughtcommitmentstatescanbeappropriatelyadaptedtotheunderstandingof
evaluativecommitmentstatesoftheseothersorts.
[14]
Whatwearecallingastanceisasociolinguisticorientationwhoseroleinsocialdynamicsislargelyparalleltotheroleofa
commitmentstatewithinapersonsownpsychologicaleconomy.(Indeed,astanceisaninterpersonalkindofcommitmentstate,as
distinctfromthepsychologicalkind.)Thenotionofanassertionasastancetakingspeechactcertainlydeservesfurther
elaborationasdoesthenotionofastanceitself,andthedistinctionbetweenisstancesandoughtstances.Inourview,onecanmake
agoodstartonthesemattersbyconsideringthetreatmentofthespeechactdimensionofmorallanguageinHare(1952,1970).Much
ofwhatHaresaysaboutthemoralstatementsasspeechactsisbothplausibleandconsistentwithourownproposedframeworkfor
beliefandassertion.
[15]
Notethatbasecasemoralcommitmentstatesarenotlogicallycomplexinthissense,eventhoughtheydohavedeonticlogical
complexity,formalizableintermsofasingledeonticoperatorappendedtoanatomicsentence.Also,weshouldnowmakea
clarificatorycommentaboutourofficialformulationofnondescriptivistcognitivisminsectionIabove.Thesis(1)ofNDCmentions
declarativejudgmentsandstatementswithmoralcontenttheseincludenotonlybasecasemoraljudgmentsandstatements,but
alsologicallycomplexoneswithconstituentmoralcontent.
[16]
Whatwehavesaidhererepresentsonlyasketchofanaccountoflogicallycomplexcommitmentstatesvariousquestionsare
leftopen,formoreextensivetreatmentelsewhere.Forinstance,weareinclinedtoaddtwofurtherclaims.First,alogicallycomplex
belieforassertionwhoseoveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptivewillcountbothasalogicallycomplexcommitmentwithrespectto
amultiplicityofcoredescriptivecontents,andasaniscommitmentwithrespecttoitsoveralldeclarativecontent.Second,although
alogicallycomplexdeclarativecontentcanitselfbetheobjectofaniscommitment(oranoughtcommitment),thisissoonlyifthis
declarativecontentisdescriptive.
Wealsosuspectthatamoreextensivetreatmentshoulddistinguishbetweenlogicalcommitmentsandpsychological
commitments,andshouldallowforthepossibilitythatalogicalcommitmentcanexistevenintheabsenceofcorresponding
psychologicalcommitment.(Suchacommitmentwouldnotbeabelief,sincebeliefsarepsychologicalstates.)Ifanagentfailsto
makearationallydictatedinference,forinstance,thenthatagentstillhasalogicalcommitmentwhosedeclarativecontentisthe
conclusionoftheinference,eventhoughtheagentlackstheappropriatebelief.
[17]
Incallingastanceimplicitwemeanthatitisoperativewithinsociolinguisticdynamicswithoutbeingexplicitlyexpressedby
meansofanewassertion.Thatis,itissociolinguisticallyimplicit.Ontheotherhand,oneormoreofthepartiesintherelevant
discoursecommunitymightfailtorealizethatcertainstancesexpressedovertlybyassertionslogicallygenerateaspecificfurther
stance.Perhapsoneshouldsaythatrelativetothoseparties,thelogicallygeneratedstanceismerelylogical,ratherthanbeing
sociolinguisticallyimplicit.Cf.theanalogouspointaboutmerelylogicalcommitmentsvs.psychologicalcommitments,inthe
precedingnote.
[18]
Ourapproachtologicallycomplexbeliefsandassertionswithmoralcontentcanbesuitablygeneralizedtoaccountfor
noncommittalpsychologicalstates(andassociatedutterances),suchaswonderingwhetherBertieoughttomailtheparcel.Sucha
stateinvolveshypotheticallytryingonanoughtcommitment.Tounderstandsuchstatesinvolvesunderstandingtheirvarious
rolesintheoverallpsychologicaleconomyoftypicalagents,especiallytheirroleinmoralreasoning.Often,whenwonderingabout
somemoralclaim,anagentthinksthroughtheissuebycombiningthehypotheticalmoralcommitmentinquestionwithbeliefs(both
moralandnonmoral)inaprocessofmoralreasoninginwhichsheorheistracingouttheimplicationsofadoptingthehypothetical
commitment.Thegenericnotionoftryingonanoughtcommitmentappliesmutatismutandistoafullrangeofnoncommittal
psychologicalstates,including,forexample,hopingthatandfearingthatstateswithmoralcontent.
[19]
Moreover,ourpointhereaboutbeingfaithfultothecomplexityofthephenomenaappliesmutatismutandistononcommittal
psychologicalstates(andassociatedutterances)withmoralcontent,statesofthesortdiscussedintheprecedingnote.Whenone
hypotheticallytriesonanoughtcommitmentinonesstateofwondering(orhoping,orfearing,etc.),thisincludestryingonthe
internalist,actionorientedaspectoftheoughtcommitment.
[20]
Accordingtowhatwecallcontextualsemantics,manytermsincludingthetruthpredicatearesubjecttocontextually
variablesemanticstandards.Inthecaseofmoralthoughtanddiscourse,whichisnondescriptiveinoveralldeclarativecontent,
typicallythecontextuallyoperativesemanticstandardsgoverningthetruthpredicatedictateamorallyengagedusetheusewehave
justexplained.Butinsomecontextsthesemanticstandardsdictateamorallydetacheduseofthetruthpredicate,underwhich
truesignalslanguageworldcorrespondenceonthisusage,onlystatementswhoseoveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptiveare
eithertrueorfalse.ForfurtherdiscussionofcontextualsemanticsingeneralandofthetruthpredicateinparticularseeHorgan(1994,
1995,1996),HorganandTimmons(1993),andTimmons(1999),ch.4.
[21]
Thus,weareinclinedtoadvocateakindofpluralismabouttruthaccordingtowhichthereisaunivocalnotionoftrutheven
thoughtruthascriptionmayinvolvemoreorlessrobustmetaphysicalcommitmentsinrelationtodifferentareasofthoughtand
discourse.PluralismabouttruthisalsofeaturedinWright(1992).
[22]
Thereissomecontroversyabouthowforcefulthiskindofobjectionreallyissomeclaimthatitcaneasilybeskirtedbythe
emotivistandbyotherbrandsofnoncognitivism.SeeHorwich(1990)andStoljar(1993).ButseeDreier(1996)andSinnott
Armstrong(forthcoming)whopressthedifficultyoftheproblem.
[23]
Ourapproachdoesassume,ofcourse,thatthereisanintelligiblenotionoflogicalconsequencethatappliestobeliefsand
assertionswhetherornottheiroveralldeclarativecontentisdescriptive.Butitissurelyplausiblethatthisissoi.e.,thatlogic
governspsychologicalcommitmentsandsociolinguisticstances,eventhosewithnondescriptivedeclarativecontent.Indeed,in
lightofourremarksabouttruthascriptioninsectionVII.1above,considertruththeoreticaccounts(incontrasttomodeltheoretic
accounts)ofnotionslikelogicaltruthandlogicalconsequenceforinstance,thatofLeBlancandWisdom(1993),withits
substitutionaltreatmentofthequantifiers.Iftruthvalueassignmentsareextendedtoencompassbasecaseoughtstatementsin
additiontoatomicstatements,thentheresultingtruththeoreticaccountoflogicaltruthandofthelogicalconsequencerelationcan
beinterpreted(i)asapplicabletomorallyengagedusesofthetruthpredicate,hence(ii)asalsoapplicabletomorallyengaged
thoughtanddiscourse(whichconformstoschemaT),hence(iii)asapplicabletobeliefsandassertionsevenwhentheiroverall
declarativecontentisnotdescriptive.Moreover,presumablythepossibleworldsemanticsofdeonticlogiccouldbesmoothly
incorporatedintosuchatruththeoreticapproach,withpossibleworldsconstruedasspecifiablebyCarnapstylestate
descriptions:maximalconsistentsetsofatomicstatementsandnegationsofatomicstatements.Elaboratingthesebriefremarksisa
taskforanotheroccasion.
[24]
Forsomeelaborationofthevariouschallengesandrepliesfeaturedinthissection,seeTimmons(1999),ch.4.
[25]
WerespectfullydedicatethispapertoR.M.Hare,whosepioneeringworkinmetaethicshasinspiredusinmanyways.A
predecessorofthepaperwaspresentedataconferencein1994attheUniversityofFloridaentitledHaresHeritage,honoring
Prof.HareontheoccasionofhisretirementatFlorida.VersionswerealsopresentedattheUniversityofHouston,theUniversityof
Ljubljana,andtheUniversityofMexico.Forhelpfulcommentsanddiscussionwethanktheaudiencesatthoseuniversities,andalso
StephenBarker,PaulBloomfield,WilliamNelson,MichaelPendlebury,StuartRachels,JohnTiensonandananonymousreferee.