#11

Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. CA

Facts:
PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB) to pass through NCLEX as the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and
Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga were heavily damaged by the eruption
of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that operates and maintains NCLEX, was
furnished with the copy of the request to comment on. Thereafter, TRB and
PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum Agreement wherein PNCC was also
furnished with a copy. The latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX
provided they abide to the terms and conditions agreed upon. At around 2:30 a.m.
on January 23, 1993, Alex Send in, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-
employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going
north of the NLEX and saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion. Sendin,
Ducusin and Pascual requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was hazardous for
the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO's equipment supervisor
and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was
available as it was still very early. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to
Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men
arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the
sugarcane at the side of the road leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on
the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the
roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn
was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane
dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the
necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door
Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers
per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend RicardoGeneralao on
their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the
vehicle ran overthe scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the
scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car was totally wrecked.
Issue:
Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco and PNCC and
the latter be made to pay for damages.

Held:
Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable. There are three elements of a
quasi-delict:(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;(b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and(c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.[31]Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed b y the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.[32]It
also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.[33]The Court declared the
test by which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith ,[34] viz
:In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing
by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. The petitioner cannot escape liability
under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a
party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA: Both defendants,
appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of
the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its
duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private
agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since
there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of
sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There
should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered
sugarcane stalks still left along the toll way. The records show, and as admitted by
the parties, that Arnaiz's car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a hauler
truck.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or
damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries
caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA .PASUDECO's
negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of
PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent
acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. As such,
PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.

#12

Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc.,

G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012

Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her
friend, Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotels pool.
At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels pool attendant informed them that the swimming
pool area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room adjacent
to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up. When they came out of the
bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there were
the only ones there. The doors were also locked. After some time, Huang saw a
phone behind the lifeguards counter. As she went inside, the wooden countertop
fell on her head and knocked her down almost unconscious. Delia immediately
notified the hotel phone operator of the
incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swi
mming pool area and gave her an icepack.Huang demanded the services of the
hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr. Dalumpines, instead of immediately providing
the needed medical assistance, presented a Waiver and demanded that it be
signed by Huang, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any
assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the hotel. Thereupon, Huang consulted
several doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because she began experiencing
on and off severe headaches that caused her three sleepless nights. They all
said she had a serious brain injury. In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material
allegations. According to them, a sufficient notice on the glass door of the hotel
leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel
guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless,
the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2 )
housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and
(3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmers World Gym, which was open
until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in the hotels swimming pool area were
turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmers World
Gym near it was well- illuminated. Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse) was
informed that there was a guest requiring medical assistance. She hurriedly went to
the pool area. Although Huang looked normal as there was no indication of any
blood or bruise on her head, Ms.Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical
attention to which she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not
need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms.
Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpines came to check Huangs condition. Huang insisted
that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough. Dr.Dalumpines
requested Huang to execute a handwritten certification regarding the incident that
occurred that night. An X-Ray test was also suggested to Huang but she replied that
it was not necessary. She also refused further medical attention. On Aug 1996,
Huang filed a complaint for damages against respondents. The trial court dismissed
the Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, Huang belatedly raises the defense on
breach of contract. She maintains that that an implied contract existed between
them in view of the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of
its services its patrons and invitees. The CA
affirmed the TCs decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule
45. She also avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat
superior are applicable in this case. It was an accident caused by the fact that the
hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is normally
expected of them because they negligently locked the main entrance door of the
hotels swimming pool area.

Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.

Held:
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence but not
on any breach of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action can be
based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of the complaint
evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict
(negligence). It is evident from the complaint and from her open court testimony
that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by
respondents, through their management and staff. In quasi-delict, there is no
presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the
negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed. In
a breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there
was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there
was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of
respondeat superior is followed. It is now too late to raise the said argument for the
first time before the SC without causing injustice. As Huangs cause of action is
based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the
following requisites before respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is
upon her. Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the
alleged negligence of respondents. Other than herself-serving testimony that all the
lights in the hotels swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked,
which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of the accident
inside the hotels swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her
allegations. On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents
positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not
to put off the lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the
swimming pool surroundings, including the toilets and counters. There is a remote
possibility that the hotels swimming pool area was in complete darkness as the
aforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the lights radiate to the hotels
swimming pool area. Ergo, she cannot fault the Hotel for the injury she allegedly
suffered because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to the effect that
it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, she then cannot recover damages.
Even Huangs assertion of negligence on the part of respondents in not rendering
medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that
respondents afforded medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate
accident inside the hotels swimming pool facility. Moreover, the Hotel shouldered
the expenses for the MRI services at the Makati Med. Res Ipsa Loquitur
&Respondeat Superior :With regard to Huangs contention that the principles ofres
ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds
otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The
doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of
negligence. In the case at bench, even granting that respondents staff negligently
turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still
not fall on Huangs head had she not lifted the same. Records showed that she
lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head.
Doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing
that the employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court
and the CA found no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents, thus,
the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence. With the foregoing, the following
were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in the hotels swimming pool
facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that
eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents extended medical assistance to her. As
such, no negligence can be attributed either to or to their staff and/or management.
Third element: On the issue on whether Huangs debilitating and permanent injuries
were the result of the accident she
suffered at the hotels swimming pool area, the Court holds that there is no cogent
reason to depart from the lower courts findings. (1) Huang had a past medical
history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury.(2) The
findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995
accident and the brain damage suffered by Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that
the symptoms being experienced might have been due to factors other than the
head trauma she allegedly suffered.(3) Dr. Sanchezs testimony was hearsay. (4)
Medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom
petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified
to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given
probative value. All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents as
well as their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the
millions of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it necessarily
follows that First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract of
Insurance.

#13

Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 147)

Facts:
Mallari Jr. was the driving a passenger jeepney owned by his father, co-petitioner
herein. The jeep collided with the delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp. while
travelling on the National Highway in Bataan. Mallari Jr. proceeded to overtake
a fiera which had stopped in front of him. He negotiated the curve and moved in the
opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he passed the vehicle he saw
the delivery van of Bulletin and the vehicles collided. The points of collision were
the and the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of
the delivery van. The 2 right wheels of thedelivery van were on the right shoulder of
the road and pieces ofdebris from the accident were found scattered along the
shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger
jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side
resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually
died due to the gravity of his injuries.

The widow of Reyes filed a complaint to recover damages from Mallari, Jr. and Sr.
and Bulletin as well. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision
was the negligence of the driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact
that the left front portion of the delivery truck hit and bumped the left rear portion
of the passenger jeepney. On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower
court and held that it was Mallari Jr. who was negligent. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners herein should be held liable for the death of Reyes.

Held:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that Mallari Jr. and
Sr. who are responsible for the death of Reyes. The collision was caused by the sole
negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the
collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which
had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before
overtaking the Fiera. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars.
(a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to
it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Article 2185
of the NCC, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of a person driving a
motor vehicle if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
Petitioners herein failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal
presumption. Therefore they shall be liable for the loss of Reyes life.
#14
 #15

PLDT v CAGR No. 57079September 29, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound and fell
in an open trench on the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious
injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the
accident. Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning
signs placed near the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road
causing injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the
negligence of the independent contractor the company hired (Barte) and should be
the one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while
the CA under Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban

Held:
PLDT and Barte contends that the independent contractor placed signs on the road
and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive
the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting
the earth mound. SC finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its
original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the
lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent
omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries
and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,
as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The presences of warning signs could not have completely prevented the
accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident
mound.

#16

SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.

Facts:
Clara UY Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam
Navigation vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupundan, Negros
Occidental, cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced by the corresponding
bills of lading issued by the carrier Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the
morning of November 18, 1963,the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good
order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. About 2:00 p.m. of the same
day, said warehouse was razed by afire of unknown origin, destroying Servandos
cargoes.

Issue:

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the loss of the goods.

Held:No.

1. Article 1736 of the CC imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe
extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in
their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. The court a quo held that the delivery
of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the
delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse
occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the
loss is chargeable against the appellant.

2. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the
cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier. The
stipulation is valid not being contrary to law, morals or public policy.
3. The petitioners however, contend that the stipulation does not bind them since
it was printed at the back of the B/L and that they did not sign the same. However,
as the Court held in OngYiu vs. CA, while it may be true that a passenger had not
signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and
binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to
the regulation.

4. Also, where fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss,
the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance.In the case at bar, the
burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the
event.

5. There is nothing in the record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. It appears that it had not only notified UyBico and
Servando of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, UyBico had taken delivery of 907
cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.

6. Nor can the carrier or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of
the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by UyBico and
Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the
warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair
to impute negligence to the carrier, the latter having no control whatsoever over
the same.

#17

MERCURY DRUG v. SPS. HUANG

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990

Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641 Page 20 of 25 (truck). It has in its
employ petitioner
Rolando J. del Rosario asdriver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red1991 Toyota Corolla GLI
Sedan with plate number PTT 775(car).These two vehicles
figured in a road accident within the municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the car, while petitioner
Del Rosario was driving the truck. Both were traversing the C-5
Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going toPasig
City. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane
to its right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the
front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a
lamp post, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit
a lamppost, ran over the car
and zigzaggedtowards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.At the
time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt
(TVR). His drivers license had been confiscated because he
had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. The car was a total wreck.
Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen
Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires
continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Respondents fault petitioner
Del Rosario for
committing grossnegligence and reckless imprudence while driving, andpetitioner
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of
itsdriver.In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate andproximate cause of
the accident was respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner
Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the
trucks front right tire. The truck then swerved to the left,
smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the other
side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center
island and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further,
petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of all its employees.

ISSUE:

Whether mercury drug failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising its
employees despite the evidences presented by the petitioners.

HELD:

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee,
or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary
with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision ofthe performan
ce of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer
should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures
for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. In the instant case,
petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its
hiring procedure. According to Mrs.Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment
and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take
theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In the case of
petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that
he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the
position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man.
Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light
vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were
conducted on the motor skills development, perceptual speed,
visualattention, depth visualization, and eye and hand coordination and steadiness
of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were
also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del
Rosarioattended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001, February
5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar heat tended before
the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.It also
appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for
long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has
been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without
any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any company policy
requiring back-up drivers for
long trips.Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that itexercised due
diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the
day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was
holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his
superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded. No
disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario.
We therefore affirmthe finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed todischarge
its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.

#18
 Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas

G.R. No. 174156

FACTS:

Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila
when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas
learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the incident, was driven
by Atty. Flor's personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident
was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that
of Atty. Flor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an
accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas

HELD:
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil
Code
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit
and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on this basis that Filcar is primarily and
directly liable to Espinas for damages.
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a
person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not
by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
provides to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage
caused by one's act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the
person who committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for
exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed
by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action
predicated on an employee's act or omission may be instituted against the
employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
employee.
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously
liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise
due care and vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent damage to
another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the
tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter
under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered
merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor
vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with
Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish
that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order
that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable: The rationale for the
rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the
operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle
registration, viz: The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on
public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to
the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest
of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways. Employer-employee relationship between registered owner and
driver is irrelevant. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability
of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any
accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and
highways.
The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of
innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying public road
malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress
for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other
damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages
sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be
available to them.
To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also
prevent a situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape
liability by passing on the blame to anther who may have no means to answer for
the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We
take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their
registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the
financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.
Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party
 The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the
latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the
agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration. Filcar
cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope of his assigned
task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised
the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage because the
motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the
vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas. Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the driver and the driver
himself.This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against
the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law
principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right
to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may
be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

o Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is thus vicariously

liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner.
o The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a certain extent
so that the defense available thereunder cannot be used by the registered owner
o The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under
the doctrine of unjust enrichment
 #19
Professional Services, Inc. V. Natividad And Enrique Agana
Lessons Applicable: Res ipsa loquitur (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Art. 2176 Art. 2180 and Art. 1869 of the Civil Code

FACTS:
April 4, 1984: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.
Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid.
April 11, 1984: Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on
Natividad and found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her
left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana to
perform hysterectomy.
After a couple of days, Natividad consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
about the excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr. Ampil recommended that she
consult an oncologist.
May 9, 1984: The Aganas went to the United States to seek further treatment
and was told she was FREE from cancer.
August 31, 1984: Natividad's daughter found a piece of gauze protruding
from her vagina. Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house and extracted by hand a
piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width and assuring that the pain will
vanish.
When the pain intensified, Nativided went to Polymedic General Hospital
where Dr. Ramon Gutierrez found a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in
width which badly infected her vaginal vault which formed a recto-vaginal
fistula forcign her stool to excrete through the vagina.
October 1984: Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy the damage
February 16, 1986: Natividad died so she was substituted by her children
RTC: PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for damages for
negligence and malpractice
CA: absolved Dr. Fuentes upon the same advise from the PRC Board of
Medicine for failure to show that he placed the guages or concealed the fact
from Natividad

ISSUE:
W/N Dr. Fuentes may be held liable under the principle of res ipso loquitor

HELD:
NO. CA affirmed
Dr. Ampil as the negligent party
surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the
patient during the surgical operation
immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the
surgery noted in their report 2 sponges lacking
2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
element 3 "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to
be wanting
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and
showed his work to Dr. Ampil who allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating
room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with
the operation
res ipsa loquitur
not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere
evidentiary rule
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of negligence
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and supervision
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting consultant staff
control test is determining
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal,
from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing
that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients
doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes
knowledge of PSI
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on
Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of
resident doctors, nurses, and interns