Introduction to Part II
How can we gain moral knowledge? In some cases, to refute the skeptical position that refuses to credit
philosophers treat this question as a specific instance of
the more general question: how we can gain knowl-
edge of anything? This more general question is usually
framed by reference to a variety of skeptical challenges.
The deepest of these, and the ones hardest to answer,
are those that cast doubt on our ability to know
anything at all.
Consider, for instance, the relevant alternatives argu-
ment: in order to know that some claim is true, one
must first be able to decisively exclude all views that are
incompatible with the original claim. But one can
never do that. So one can never know anything.
Or consider the vicious circle argument: in order to
know that some claim is true, one must first know that
ones methods for sorting true from false beliefs are
reliable. But in order to know that ones methods are
reliable, one must first know some particular facts,
whose existence is vindicated by those methods. Since
knowing the facts requires knowing the methods, and
knowing the methods requires knowing the facts, we
cant escape from this vicious circle, and consequently,
we know nothing.
There are plenty of other general skeptical argu-
ments, i.e., arguments designed to impugn our knowl-
edge of anything at all. If knowledge requires a decisive
refutation of such skepticism, then knowledge may
well be an impossibility, since it is notoriously difficult
Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Second Edition. Edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.
2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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anyone with knowledge.
Discussions in moral epistemology rarely start by
considering these most radical forms of skepticism.
Instead, such discussions usually begin with the ass-
umption that we can know at least some things that
two and two are four, that there are rivers and moun-
tains and volcanoes on earth, that other people are
alive, can think, and can feel roughly as we do.
Importantly, the knowledge that gets taken for granted
in such discussions is straightforward, nonmoral knowl-
edge. The challenge in ethics typically originates by
noting important differences between the nonmoral
claims that are usually accepted as knowledge, and
moral claims, which often are not.
One perennial source of skepticism about moral
knowledge is the comparatively greater degree of disa-
greement about moral claims than about mathematical
or empirical claims. As we saw in Part I, some philoso-
phers use this fact about the scope of moral disagree-
ment to argue that ethics is not objective. But other
philosophers cite this fact as the basis for a more modest
claim. Even if widespread moral disagreement is com-
patible with ethical objectivity, such extensive
disagreement undermines the chance of ever knowing
right from wrong. For (it is claimed) if a belief remains
controversial among intelligent and rational people,
then we should suspend judgment on its merits.
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 72 int roduction
Allmoral beliefs are controversial in this way. And so
we should suspend belief about all moral matters.
Renford Bambrough, in his selection here, tries to
rebut this traditional criticism. (I also try my hand at
rebutting this argument in my article in Part I.)
Bambrough argues that we must ensure that compari-
sons between moral and nonmoral knowledge are fair,
and that when we do, we will see that moral knowl-
edge fares no worse than nonmoral knowledge. It
wouldnt do to impugn the possibility of scientific
knowledge just because there are a number of unsolved
scientific questions that engender controversy. After all,
there are a great many scientific claims that garner
near-universal consensus. But things are no different
when it comes to morality. Discussions of moral
knowledge often highlight the disputed cases, but there
is also a great deal of near-unanimity on many moral
matters for instance, that it is wrong to deliberately
withhold available anesthesia from a patient when
performing a very painful surgery.
In his very interesting selection here, George Sher
argues that it isnt the presence of widespread disagree-
ment alone that generates problems for moral knowl-
edge. Rather, it is this disagreement combined with
what he calls contingency namely, the claim that we hold
most of the moral beliefs we do largely as a result of
accidents of birth and upbringing.Were we born in very
different circumstances, or exposed to very different
influences, wed have very different moral beliefs from
the ones we presently hold. This fact, combined with
the existence of such broad ethical disagreement, casts
doubt on the reliability of our moral beliefs.
Bambroughs article considers this objection, too, as
well as a number of other traditional arguments for
moral skepticism. His reply is, as before, to try to estab-
lish the parity between moral and nonmoral beliefs. It
is true, says Bambrough, that we would have very
different nonmoral beliefs from the ones we presently
hold, were we to have been born or raised in very dif-
ferent circumstances from our actual ones. But just as
that fact does not undermine our claims to ordinary
nonmoral knowledge, neither should it undermine our
otherwise warranted claims to moral knowledge.
Still, we might ask why most of us are so confident of
having at least some moral knowledge that surgeons
ought to use easily available anesthetics, that genocide
and slavery are immoral, that offering nourishment and
love to a starving child is a morally good thing. Shelly
Kagan has an answer namely, that we rely on our case-
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specific intuitions to serve as a basis, and a criterion, for
establishing our network of justified moral beliefs. We
have very strong convictions about cases, and though
we neednt regard them as self-certifying, we do regard
them as warranted starting points for ethical investiga-
tion. He is no doubt correct about the way in which we
actually proceed in our moral justifications. Indeed, he
doesnt see any other plausible way to proceed in trying
to decide what is right and wrong. As Kagan argues,
however, our reliance on such convictions may well fail
to yield justified moral beliefs.
Kagans doubts are rooted in a set of disanalogies
drawn between the way in which we acquire justified
empirical belief and the manner in which we come to
hold the moral beliefs we do. The problem isnt that
there is more disagreement in ethics than in science.
Rather, the problem is that while we have some
account of the reliability of empirical belief, we lack
such an account in ethics. Certain of our empirical
beliefs strike us immediately as being correct, and,
further, we have a roughly coherent picture of the way
the natural world works that explains how our senses
are reliable indicators of its contents. Granted, certain
of our moral beliefs, too, strike us immediately as being
clearly correct. But here, claims Kagan, we lack a
coherent overall theory of morality that underwrites
our moral intuitions. Until we have a better-developed
account of the moral world, and of the moral sense that
would intuit its contours, it is doubtful that we are
justified in relying on intuitions in the crucial ways we
do when thinking about ethics.
Robert Audis contribution to this section offers a
detailed account and defense of ethical intuitionism,
which seeks precisely to justify our reliance on our
moral intuitions our strongly held, non-inferentially
formed moral beliefs. Intuitionism has a long history,
and Audi traces some of it, while updating its for-
mulation in several important ways. Intuitionism has
frequently been relied on to solve the regress problem,
an especially difficult skeptical worry about moral
belief. The regress problem states that every justified
moral belief requires supporting reasons that confer its
justification. These reasons have to come from other
beliefs. But these other beliefs will be either nonmoral
or moral. They cant be nonmoral, since, following
Hume, no moral belief is entailed by a nonmoral one.
But the supporting beliefs cannot be moral, either,
since any such supporting belief must itself be supported
by yet other moral beliefs, and so on, and so on (this is
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 int roduction
the regress that gives the argument its name). Since
moral beliefs require support, and no support can be
offered, no moral beliefs are justified. Hence we cannot
have any moral knowledge.
The ethical intuitionist solves this problem by denying
that all justified moral beliefs must receive support from
other beliefs. Rather, we are justified in believing some
moral claims just because we understand them. Such
beliefs are known as self-evident moral beliefs. Suppose
you believe as you very likely do that it is immoral
to torture children for the sole purpose of generating
sadistic pleasure. Do you really need to introduce
evidence in support of such a claim? All argument must
stop somewhere. Intuitionists claim that some highly
credible moral beliefs are satisfactory stopping points.
That these beliefs may not garner universal consensus is
neither here nor there. There are many truths, and some
justified beliefs, that will not attract the endorsement of
everyone. If some moral outliers fail to see the truth of
certain moral claims, that reveals a defect in their
understanding. It does not show that the self-evident
beliefs require outside support. Nor does it undermine
the status of such beliefs as self-evident.
The moral coherentist will have none of this.
Coherentists, here represented by Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, claim that beliefs are justified if, and to
theextent that, they cohere with ones other beliefs.
No beliefs are self-evident. Sayre-McCord here
provides a powerful argument against self-evidence.
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73
In a nutshell: we are justified in holding a belief only
if wehave reasons that support it; these reasons must
come from other beliefs, and not the belief itself;
therefore all epistemic justification must be inferential;
therefore there are no self-evident beliefs. If a line of
moral questioning cannot stop, though, with a self-
evident belief, then how can we avoid an infinite
regress? The coherentist argues that we need to
abandon the idea of a wholly linear chain of
justification, and instead consider that a belief can
receive support, and in turn lend support to, a variety
of other beliefs. So long as there is this mutual
support, a belief is justified.
This of course looks like an endorsement of circular
reasoning, since a belief s supporting evidence will
consist of other beliefs whose justification is ultimately
a matter of having received support from the initial
belief under scrutiny. Coherentists reply that fans of
self-evidence are no better off. Indeed, say coherentists,
they are worse off, since self-evidence is the epitome of
circular reasoning. To claim that a belief can provide
evidence for itself is to use the very belief in question
as its own support a very small circle indeed.
The debate between fans of self-evidence and fans of
coherentism represents a series of ongoing controver-
sies in moral epistemology. Readers are well-advised to
consider these arguments, and whether those of either
side can adequately address the worries raised by Kagan
and Sher.
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