International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2014

Vol. 22, No. 1, 326, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2013.857704

Max Stirners Ontology

John Jenkins
Abstract
In his book The Ego and Its Own Max Stirner describes what happens when
individuals subordinate themselves to an absolute or a universal idea (God, an
ethical system, a political creed, etc.) in order to reap the associated rewards.
What he calls involuntary or unconscious egoism are faulty versions of practical
reason because they involve alienation, the pursuit of something that can never be
attained by the individual. These forms of egoism characterise the rationality of
agents who submit themselves to an absolute. However, proper egoism, as
understood by Stirner, implies that the self-interested agent is acting in accord with
reality, with how the world and the self actually are. Alienation is thereby avoided.
In what follows I want to examine whether the proper egoist can remain authentic
in this way and still effectively pursue her interests. Given the Stirnerian ontology,
with its distinction between proper and other forms of egoism, can the Stirnerian
agent engage in a meaningful form of individualism?
Keywords: egoism; will; reason; self; value; practices

(1) The Ego and Its Properties

In The Ego and Its Own the initial dialectical account of human development,
entitled A Mans Life, describes what happens when the child becomes the
youth.1 This dialectical account of the development of an individual human
consciousness culminates in the egoistic standpoint and is central to Stirners
concerns. It is the framework in which he presents his main critique of
modernity and reappears in different guises throughout his book. In the
Hegelian world of the mid-nineteenth century it provided Stirner with a
recognisable structure that rendered his work immediately accessible.2
Stirner calls the advent of youth the rst self-discovery, the rst undeication
of the divine. He believes this new phase to be an improvement on the earlier
one of childhood because the individual, having discovered the power of her
mind, is now in a position where she can control the external world.3 Prior to this
moment of self-discovery, the attitude of the individual is often one of
subservience to the universal idea, whatever form this latter might assume, e.g.,
externally imposed rules expressing parental control. But a contradiction emerges
in this second phase. The individual becomes devoted to the religious and moral
world of spirit and recognises that she has recreated what she had wanted to

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avoid as a child, namely the oppressive external authority that goes hand in hand
with acceptance of the principles associated with the prevailing universal or xed
idea.4
But why should people want this devotion to God or morality if it turns out
to be so damaging? Stirner locates the reason in his own ontological theory.
The rst point to make regarding this ontology is to emphasise that the
Stirnerian ego is not to be equated with any of its properties:

that we are men is the slightest thing about us, and has signicance only
in so far as it is one of our qualities [Eigenschaften], our property
[Eigentum]. I am indeed among other things a man, as I am a living
thing, therefore an animal, or a European, a Berliner, and the like; but he
who chose to have regard for me only as a man, or as a Berliner, would
pay me a regard that would be very unimportant to me. And why?
Because he would have regard only for one of my qualities, not for me.5

This is why Stirner expresses the difference between the individual and her
properties by referring to the former as The Unique One. In response to
criticism of The Ego and Its Own, Stirner wrote a reply in 1845.6 Here he
reiterates and reinforces his claim that the ego cannot be identied by
employing any general or universal concept, such as man:

Man [Der Mensch] as a concept or predicate does not exhaust what

you are because it has a conceptual content of its own and because it lets
itself stipulate what is human, what is a man, because it can be dened;
for that reason you can have absolutely nothing to do with it. Certainly,
as a man you have your share of the contents of the concept of Man, but
you do not thereby have it as You [als du]. The Unique One, by
contrast has no content whatever; it is indeterminateness itself. Content
and determination come to it through you.7

Thus, the liberation experienced by the Unique One is achieved via a reversal
of the relationship between an agent and her projects. The second point
concerns Stirners understanding of involuntary egoism. This type of self-
interested individualism corresponds to the period of youth. The involuntary
egoist adopts the principles (projects) of the spiritual realm having lost sight
of the fact that these principles themselves stem from the creative work of her
own ego. Not wanting to be identied with as a selsh human being, the
involuntary egoist still wishes to satisfy her interests and she endeavours to
achieve this by serving something higher. Now what is happening here,
Stirner believes, is that the ego which he takes to be indeterminate gets
committed to a pattern of inconsistent behaviour because it misunderstands its
own nature. Endeavouring to dene that nature in terms of (one of ) its
creatures, the ego forgets that individuality expresses itself as the indeterminate

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source of creative action and should not be controlled by its own products.
Thus, for instance, an agent might decide to adopt principles based on the
notions of humanity and justice. But for this particular ego, reasons for action
are now no longer actually provided and sanctioned by the individual, but by
the above-mentioned concepts. The hierarchical structure has been reversed,
with the principles doing all the determining.8 The solution presented in The
Ego and Its Own is a vision of the future individual unied within herself.
Although Stirner contends that all motivation has self-interest as its ultimate
end, he also wants to maintain that altruistic action (what agents do as a result
of their acceptance of universal principles) is inferior to egoism on other
grounds.9 That is, whether or not one accepts his examples of heteronomy as
inferior forms of egoism, we ought nevertheless to be (proper) egoists and not
altruists.10 What most advocates of altruism believe is the claim that the inter-
ests of others provide me with a reason to help them satisfy their needs
because the latter are from a moral point of view no different from my
own. As an ethical agent, I am essentially no different from other people, so
the fact that someone is in pain provides me with a reason to alleviate that
pain, whether or not I am the person suffering in this particular case. But if
this belief provides the motivational basis for my actions, then I have a reason
not just to pursue my own interests but also to assist others so that they can
satisfy theirs. My contention is that Stirners rejection of altruism (and heteron-
omy in general), understood in terms of his ontology, enables him to locate
value in the choices made by an isolated, detached ego. On this view, concern
for others is not a requirement if I wish my actions to be consistent with my
beliefs about other human beings. Any sort of alternative evaluation alienates
the ego from itself because it posits an identity between the self and its proper-
ties (either one attribute in particular, e.g. rationality, or a set of properties).
This results in a bifurcated personality where the creature becomes the
higher essence and produces a form of inauthentic agency. But if my ego
is unique and indeterminate, there can be no requirement to identify with any
of my attributes and hence no need to act in accord with moral principles.
Thus, proper egoism is superior to involuntary egoism (altruism) because the
moral agent is inauthentic moral action does not accord with the nature of
the self or ego, causing the split personality that results from mistaken beliefs
about what one has reason to do.
In the sections that follow, the Stirnerian ontology will be analysed and
assessed. I believe it ultimately fails to support any serious attempt to motivate
agents by appealing to the satisfaction of their self-interest.

(2) Stirners Notion of the Will

It has been suggested that, in The Ego and Its Own, Stirner wants us to
attribute ultimate value to the will, as opposed to reason and/or desire, when it

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comes to evaluating someones actions.11 The ego the indeterminate self is

understood as the will to choose between practical alternatives:

One does look at things rightly when one makes of them what one will
(by things objects in general are here understood, such as God, our
fellow-men, a sweetheart, a book, a beast, etc.). And therefore the things
and the looking at them are not rst, but I am, my will is ... Connected
with this is the discernment that every judgement which I pass upon an
object is the creature of my will; and that discernment again leads me to
not losing myself in the creature, the judgement, but remaining the
creator, the judger, who is ever creating anew. All predicates of objects
are my statements, my judgements, my creatures.12

If one does not ensure that the will has the upper hand, then one can be
possessed by both objects of desire and objects of thought:

The object makes us into possessed men in its sacred form just as in its
profane, as a supersensuous object, just as it does as a sensuous one.
The appetite or mania refers to both, and avarice and longing for heaven
stand on a level.13

This suggestion deserves some attention because it ties in with the argument
outlined in the preceding section. It is an attempt to justify Stirnerian egoism
by appealing to what the self actually is. Selessness is inferior to egoism
because only the latter places the will in this central position and is therefore
true to the nature of the self-determining human individual, whose ego
distances itself from its projects.
In The Ego and Its Own Stirner rejects both desire and reason as candidates
for the role of decision-maker. Indeed, reason is regarded by Stirner as a far
more dangerous force than uncontrolled appetites. But when a human agent
knowingly embraces egoism, she is in a position to steer clear of both forms
of slavery. But how exactly is the will supposed to operate in this ideal situa-
tion where it alone makes all the choices? If the will is to be regarded as
something separate from reason and desire, then one would have to explain
just how it enables the ego to get a grip on these two latter faculties.
What, for instance, is supposed to be the difference between acting on a
reason and an act of will? There would have to be some difference for Stirner
in order for him to be able to say that the way to escape the domination of
reason is to let the will take over. I assume here that a Stirnerian act of will
would be a case where I stop acting in a certain way or refuse to act because I
know that to do so would be to accept some form of heteronomy or imply
domination by some appetite or passion.
However, philosophers like Nagel who argue that reason can be a source of
intrinsic motivation would claim that my decision here is the result of rational

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14
deliberation. My attitude towards principles and passions stems from my
acceptance of the Stirnerian ontology outlined in the preceding section. The
Stirnerian agent reasons that action X is consistent with the notion that the ego
is and must remain detached from its projects. So willing something would
appear to be a reasoning procedure stemming from a belief about the nature of
individuality.
Stirner takes on board both desire and reason in his defence of an egoistic way
of life. But his very employment of these two faculties undermines his attempt to
allocate the decisive function to the will. Stirner attributes signicant value to an
individuals sensuality when the latter enables the ego to loosen the hold of uni-
versal principles or ideas. He says the tyranny of mind can only be broken
through the esh.15 But a critic of Stirner might regard this as an inconsistency,
given Stirners emphasis on the supremacy of the will. Here he seems to be con-
ceding that the ego should give due consideration to both the needs of the body
and those of the mind. Is this not to accept that the egoist is motivated by what
she considers to be the rational standpoint given her view of selfhood?
We have been unable to articulate how the will exercises its apparently
unique function. This is clearly a problem for Stirner, as the will of the proper
egoist is supposed to represent the particular feature of individuality that
dominates both reason and desire. I return to this topic later in this paper.

(3) Ego and Object A Question of Distance

For the Stirnerite, the point at which one comes to rely on universalisability in
moral deliberation is an example of the dialectical process at work in the
history of human consciousness. But it exemplies a dialectic in which there is
a further move beyond the altruistic, Christian or humanist perspective one
can become a proper egoist. Proper egoism is based on the claim that each ego
is unique and indeterminate. My Ich cannot be described in terms of an
essence my humanity, my Jewishness, my nationality, etc. Indeed, these
essences are products of the ego. So, unless the agent detaches her Ich from
all such determining properties, she is not in a position to achieve the degree
of understanding that enables her to moderate between and control the
conicting demands of sensuality and intellect.
By way of elucidating the Stirnerian account of uniqueness, I will rst
examine a distinction in contemporary moral philosophy between a neo-
Kantian view of the self and an ethical perspective that allows for more
individual characterisation of moral agents.
Take the case of two agents, where one is in pain and the other has the
aspirins. These two individuals can locate their reasons for action in shared
properties which are dened by the notions of personhood and sentience
motivational force is not derived from a consideration of the identity of the
referent. The situation characterises a neo-Kantian/Rawlsian moral universe, as

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envisaged by thinkers such as Rawls and Nagel. The fact that I am free from
pain and it is the other person who is suffering, or the realisation that one of
us is more intelligent or healthier than the other, has a more important social
position, and so on, are considered inessential and irrelevant, as far as our
search for the basis of moral motivation is concerned. The whole framework
assumes indeed that, when we make a moral decision, we do not know who
we are and thus are ignorant of what advantages or disadvantages we may
have. For Nagel, the moral standpoint requires:

the acceptance of universal practical principles which apply in the same

sense to everyone, and which are impersonally formulable, so that one
can arrive at any true conclusion about what the persons in a situation
should do, without knowing what ones place in the situation is, or
indeed whether one occupies a place in it at all.16

And here is Rawls describing the original position required for the
determination of the principles of justice:

Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his
place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do
not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological pro-
pensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.17

Although this moral perspective stands in stark contrast to the Stirnerian view
of agency, they share some striking procedural similarities. When he talks
about the original position Rawls is not articulating a framework for moral
deliberation in general. Important for our understanding of Stirnerian egoism is
the fact that both these thinkers want to detach the deliberating subject from its
projects (desires, beliefs, aspirations, social positions, talents, etc.). Consider
further the following account of the unencumbered self from Sandels
discussion of the Kantian/Rawlsian perspective:

Now the unencumbered self describes rst of all the way we stand
toward the things we have, or want, or seek. It means there is always a
distinction between the values I have and the person I am. To identify
any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always
to imply some subject me standing behind them, at a certain distance,
and the shape of this me must be given prior to any of the aims or
attributes I bear. One consequence of this distance is to put the self itself
beyond the reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all
No project could be so essential that turning away from it would call
into question the person I am.18

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To ensure the formulation of the appropriate moral principles, agents are

required to isolate themselves from their projects. In this way they discover
which principles should bind everyone.19 For Stirner however, the agent
isolates herself such that she is bound to no principles whatsoever. The
perspective of the isolated ego is the vantage point required so that the
individual can pursue her projects as she pleases.
One criticism that has been levelled at this type of ethical system is that it
ignores individuality altogether. Furthermore, this objection has come from
philosophers who want to defend the moral point of view, arguing that
individuality is an integral part of moral agency. Seyla Benhabib has contrasted
the standpoints of what she calls the generalised and the concrete other.
The former perspective involves the sort of reduction we have just been
considering, namely the removal of the personal and individual from the area
of moral choice:

In assuming the standpoint, we abstract from the individuality and

concrete identity of the other. We assume that the other, like ourselves, is
a being who has concrete needs, desires and affects, but that what
constitutes his or her moral dignity is not what differentiates us from
each other, but rather what we, as speaking and acting rational agents,
have in common. Our relation to the other is governed by the norms of
formal equality and reciprocity20

This reminds one very much of Stirners critique of impersonal altruism. The
standpoint of the concrete other brings into play the qualities that differentiate
humans from one another. We must take into consideration the fact that each
human being is an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-
emotional constitution.21 Preferring this latter approach, Benhabib says it
enables us to take on board the needs, desires and motivations of the other,
and also her various capacities and projects:

Our relation to the other is governed by the norms of equity and

complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to assume from
the other forms of behaviour through which the other feels recognized
and conrmed as a concrete, individual being with specic needs, talents
and capacities. Our differences in this case complement rather than
exclude one another. The norms of our interaction ... are norms of
friendship, love and care ... I conrm not only your humanity but your
human individuality.22

However, there is in this defence of individuality an anti-essentialist line of

argument that could also be directed against Stirners elevation of uniqueness.
Benhabib argues that the essentialist view, presented as the neo-Kantian/
Rawlsian quest for an objective ontological basis for practical reason, strips the

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individual of everything that distinguishes her from her fellow human beings.
How can this procedure provide the moral agent with a set of practical
principles which can ground her decisions about how she is to live her life,
especially when interacting with these other distinct agents?

noumenal selves cannot be individuated. If all that belongs to them as

embodied, affective, suffering creatures, their memory and history, their
ties and relations to others, are to be subsumed under the phenomenal
realm, then what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and
no one this moral and political concept of autonomy slips into a
metaphysics according to which it is meaningful to dene a self
independently of all the ends it may choose and all and any conceptions
of the good it may hold.23

In the real world, there is no guarantee that you will agree with me about my
assessment or description of any particular (moral) situation. I am no longer
like you, i.e., we are not just deliberative selves ignorant of our own distinctive
attributes, attitudes and goals. In the concrete moral arena, there can be no
effective interaction between what Benhabib calls the disembedded and
disembodied beings of the generalised self and others.24
This attention to the deciencies of the neo-Kantian approach might be
thought to pose difculties for Stirners emphasis on the autonomy of the
unique ego. The essentialist position, when it is construed in terms of deper-
sonalised selves, is attacked because of the inadequacies of its claim to thereby
provide a deliberative framework for morality. The latter must nd a place for
the individuality of moral agents. But in our analysis of Stirner we identied
the core concept of his egoism as the uniqueness of the individual, i.e., the
ego is not to be identied with any of its properties or attributes.
This stress on uniqueness has troublesome consequences for the Stirnerian
position. If I am to escape essentialism by not identifying with any xed idea,
e.g. by not acting as a rational human being, a child of God, a socialist, etc.,
then I need to retain my peculiarity by referring to myself in such a way that I
am signicantly different from others. Stirner repeatedly points out that his ego
is more than any description given in terms of the essentialists concepts. But
what remains if we separate ourselves from our properties in the way Stirner
suggests? Are we not making the same mistake as Benhabibs neo-Kantian
opponents? Application of the Stirnerian ontology would appear to present us
with egos that are identical with each other. The essentialist creates a situation
in which all agents regard themselves as partaking of the properties associated
with a particular concept, e.g. humanity. Individualistic modes of expression
have no role to play. But how precisely is Stirners ego to differentiate itself
from others if it does not have recourse to those very features from which it
seeks to distance itself ? Stirner claims that The Unique One is more than its

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properties. As he reminds us, it has no content whatever. But in what way

can it be more than its distinguishing characteristics and yet remain unique?
Commenting in The Ego and Its Own on the consequences of allowing
oneself to be guided by the xed idea of man, Stirner says that the subject is
again subjected to the predicate, the individual to something general; the
dominion is again secured to an idea.25 Moreover, in his reply to his critics,
he returns to the theme of the relationship between the Unique One and its
properties. He maintains that it is always possible to distinguish between what
I am (the properties that can be predicated of me) and who I am (the unique
subject of these predicates). Describing someone in terms of a predicate such
as man does not convey the egos individuality:

Speculation was directed to nd a predicate which would be so general

that everyone would be comprehended by it. Moreover, such a predicate
certainly shouldnt express what one ought to be, but rather what one is.
If Man were therefore this predicate, there would have to be understood
by it not something that each person is supposed to be for if this were
the case whoever had not yet become it would be excluded but
something that each person is. This What alone is not the expression
for the each one. It does not express who each one is Does that
predicate Man fulll the duty of predicates to fully express the subject,
and doesnt it leave out, in contradiction to the subject, precisely the
subjectivity; doesnt it say not who but only what the subject is?26

In the light of the above remarks and what we have already heard from
Stirner about the indeterminateness of the Unique One, we must proceed
carefully. If by man Stirner means an all-embracing concept that supersedes
all previous attempts to nd such a predicate, the alternative Stirnerian view
must imply that the ego both includes everything that separates one person
from others and excludes reference to everything that breaks down these
barriers. Stirner wants us to reach a point where we, as unique egos, are totally
distinct from our fellow human beings. We look at others and nd no motivat-
ing reason to interact positively or negatively with them, i.e., no reason based
on common characteristics.
Does this mean that Stirnerians cannot make reference to these shared
features when they try to identify themselves? What we have taken note of is
Stirners insistence on the individual not identifying with just one of these
features that potentially unite people. But if this is what he is anxious to
prevent, would it not be permissible to use a collection of characteristics to
dene the ego? What we would then have is individualisation achieved
through the amalgamation of diverse features to form a unique combination.
However, for the Stirnerite the problem with this suggestion is that the
combination is still made up of general (xed) ideas. This is, I believe, what
Stirner is getting at when he exhorts people to exclude each other wholly
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when deciding which course of action to take.27 Stirners motivational basis is

supposed to be the unique Ich, devoid of content. His proper egoist excludes
herself from others to the extent that she does not allow any property or
attribute she shares with them to constitute an intrinsic reason for action. If
individuals continue to use a motivational framework based on what unies
them whether this be a single xed idea or a collection of such concepts
then they are never going to act in accord with their own nature.
On the Stirnerian view, we identify the contentless Unique One (the who)
via the decisions that such an individual makes in the world regarding which
projects to pursue. As Paterson puts it:

His identity is rooted in and returns to an essential ego which is pure

nothingness in the sense of perpetual transcendence; but the series of
choices, actions, and ideas which issue from this fertile void become
extant in the world and form a uctuating but objective totality, which
constitutes the exoteric identity of The Unique One as he realises and
discloses himself in the world.28

These decisions will, of course, have an effect on what the individual is but I
think it is clear from what has been said above that Stirners viewpoint does
not hinge on the question whether it is possible for us to claim uniqueness by
appeal to a unique set of qualities. His view of the self is such that the ego is
not reducible to its properties, no matter how numerous, varied and unusual
they happen to be. True individuality is located in the who of the ego the
degree to which the contentless subject exercises control over its practical
decisions. As a proper egoist, it is my decision-making that distinguishes me
from other agents. My unique personality controls and utilises its qualities,
revealing itself to the extent that it creates its own projects and does not
recognise as binding any claim from any moral (conceptual) system. The
proper egoist fashions her own life as she pleases.
I contend that this interpretation of Stirner avoids certain implications of
Benhabibs attack on essentialism. Benhabibs understanding of uniqueness and
individuality is bound up with a persons own history an individual identies
herself by referring to her projects, her membership of particular social/political
groups, etc. This contrasts markedly with the Stirnerian perspective, where one
rst detaches the agent from her particular place in the community and then
expresses her uniqueness solely in terms of the choices made by such an
isolated individual.

(4) The Desire to Reason

Stirner locates individuality in the notion of a self that reveals its uniqueness
through its own history of self-determined choices. In this section, however, I

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will argue that Stirnerian egoism is self-defeating. First, by insisting that the
egoist maintain a degree of detachment from her projects, it necessarily
embodies a certain type of principled action. This critique will emerge from a
consideration of the rationale underlying Stirners ontology and his attempt to
elevate the will. Stirner here introduces features of heteronomy that he sought
to exclude with the introduction of the indeterminate Ich. Second, the proper
egoism of The Ego and Its Own sties the development of any useful and
persuasive theory of self-interested choice. The Stirnerian understanding of
selfhood prohibits agents from engaging in the type of choice required for a
meaningful and substantive account of self-interested action.
Returning to the tripartite structure we examined earlier, it is clear that
Stirner would reject a Socratic or Aristotelian view of the relationship between
an individuals will, desire and reason. From this perspective, a balance is
struck between the three elements whereby the just persons will (which can
be variously understood here as pugnacity, ambition, self-regard, etc.) and
desire are subordinated to reason. Thus, courageous action is to be valued
because it simultaneously avoids the extremes of recklessness and cowardice.
However, although Stirner would reject virtue ethics, there is an aspect of this
type of morality that highlights serious drawbacks of his own position
regarding the role of the will in human agency.
The virtuous agent is not always engaged in rational discourse. Education in
the virtues has as its goal a type of lifestyle and moral personality that reects
the achievement of reconciliation between reason, will and desire. It is the
establishment and maintenance of this equilibrium that lies at the heart of
Aristotles claim that the virtuous individual is a happy one. An agents endless
criticism of her own virtuous conduct would defeat the object of this type of
morality, which focusses on the development of moral character.
It would seem then, that a virtuous agent, by paying less attention to
reasoning, is following Stirners advice. But what is being ignored here is the
role that reason plays behind the scenes in the development of a virtuous
character. The fact that inculcating the virtues may not involve constant recourse
to a rational defence of the relevant principles does not mean that there is no
rational basis for this type of moral system one that can be called on should the
need arise. Thus, for instance, one might start to defend the virtues by showing
how they benet their possessor.29 The basis of this claim about well-being is the
idea that human beings can promote their own welfare by possessing certain
character traits, i.e. dispositions to act in certain ways. This in turn indicates that
there is a signicant level of commitment on the part of the virtuous agent to
certain ways of interacting with the world and other agents.
Now by referring back to his psychological egoism and his claim that only
proper egoism facilitates self-determination, opponents could argue that
Stirners defence of egoistic behaviour also has a rational basis which does not
involve continual reasoning. The critic tries to break up thoughts by

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thinking. The Stirnerite however, wants to go a stage further and avoid
being possessed by the process of cogitation:

A jerk does me the service of the most anxious thinking, a stretching of

the limbs shakes off the torments of thoughts, a leap upward hurls from
my breast the nightmare of the religious world, a jubilant whoop throws
off year-long burdens. But the monstrous signicance of unthinking
jubiliation could not be recognized in the long night of thinking and
believing.31

But we know that the Stirnerite also gives reasons why the self is not to be
understood in terms of attributes that it shares with other individuals. Admit-
tedly, this approach to practical reasoning cannot, by denition, generate an
understanding of selfhood that appeals to the character development associated
with virtue ethics. Nevertheless, there is an underlying rationale in The Ego
and Its Own. Stirners use of Hegelian dialectic, his psychological egoism and
his stress on the stultifying effects of principled action on the self-determining,
isolated ego are intended to alleviate the otherwise incurable imbalance that he
believes characterises agency in the modern period. Thus, the will of the
proper egoist has not been elevated above reason. On the contrary, her I
attempts to act in ways that are consistent with Stirnerian ontology it seeks
to ensure the individuals continual independence from the heteronomy she
believes inhibits the self-expression of the contentless human ego.
This critique can be developed further. Besides creating difculties for the
proper egoists weighting of reason, will and desire, acceptance of the isolated
self poses additional problems for Stirners brand of individualism. In The Ego
and Its Own he provides an informative example of an individual being pres-
surised to act in accord with a prevailing ethical principle but where the agent
does not succumb to the demands of the (moral) authorities. It is the case of
the French revolutionary who has told his friends that the world will have no
rest until the last king is hanged with the guts of the last priest.32 No
witnesses can be produced and so the authorities demand that the revolutionary
confess. If he lies, he will escape punishment. If he tells the truth, he will be
executed:

if he had the courage not to be a slave of truth and sincerity, he would

ask roughly this: Why need the judges know what I have spoken among
friends? If I had wished them to know, I should have said it to them as I
said it to my friends. I will not have them know it. They force them-
selves into my condence without my having called them to it and made
them my condants; they want to learn what I will keep secret. Come on
then, you who wish to break my will by your will, and try your arts
but the truth you shall not press out of me, for I will lie to you because I
have given you no claim and no right to my sincerity.33

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 MAX STIRNERS ONTOLOGY

If one accepts the Stirnerian ontology, then the revolutionarys ego should not
allow itself to be controlled by any underlying principles. According to the
example, a person can be committed to something without it being the case
that she regards the object of her commitment as holy or binding on individ-
uals. This latter notion, i.e. that the object is unshakeable (unverrckbare), is
one that Stirner rejects.34 The authorities cling to the idea that sincerity has
power over the revolutionary, that he somehow must yield to its demands. But
he simply does not view the world in the same way as his captors. They
appear to deny the possibility of someones acknowledging the existence of the
moral perspective and at the same time consistently refusing to act in line with
its principles. This is because the authorities take it for granted that their
prisoner has no right to rise above the level of generalisation implied by the
ethical framework. The fact that each individual is unique in the Stirnerian
sense is for them not a consideration that has any bearing on whether one
should tell the truth. It is assumed that the revolutionary shares their attitude to
confession this is what one ought to do as a rational human being. Moreover,
he does not regard the decision to remain silent as being forced upon him from
outside, as something which results from an objective moral law.35 If he did,
this would simply mean that he has an ethical code but one which differs from
that of the authorities.
However, there appears to be an inconsistency here connected with the
revolutionarys resolve. The liberated Stirnerian individual in this case cannot
tell the truth, as it is denitely not in his interest to do so, therefore he must
lie. This hardly constitutes a chain-breaking individualism which is
philosophically superior to the moralists belief in objective laws. (It is no
reply to remark that an egoist has the additional option of telling the truth
when it benets her. This is not a wise basis for interpersonal relations, even
for self-interested ones.) To put the point another way, the proper egoist applies
a principle when engaged in practical reasoning. Her actions are dictated by
her acceptance of a certain view of selfhood. Furthermore, Stirners insistence
on making the uniqueness of the detached ego the motivational ground of
action surely means that every proper egoist must act like the revolutionary. So
now we have a principle which applies to every Stirnerian egoist, one forced
on her from the inside. There is also the problem of commitment to reconsider
here. Surely the thoughts and actions of the revolutionary exemplify someone
who is unverrckbar. The isolated ego cannot afford to get so deeply
involved in its own projects.
A defender of proper egoism might object to our argument about principled
action and say that it only applies to situations involving (moral) conict.
There is no such restriction on egoistic action when the individual is simply
deciding which projects to pursue in order to live a fullled life. However, as I
mentioned at the beginning of this section, another telling critique can be
applied to the individualists evaluations whenever she is deliberating about
which goals to pursue. Self-interested choice as opposed to caprice requires
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of agents a marked degree of commitment, the self-imposition of disciplined

activity, the inculcation of at least some of the virtues and also recognition and
acceptance of the pre-existing values associated with what I will refer to as
practices.36 A whole range of activities that human beings regard as
worthwhile, i.e., in their interest, are simply beyond the reach of the consistent
Stirnerian. (In the next section, I shall also argue that the will does not play a
central role in an agents discovery of value.)
Take for instance any skill or talent that one wishes to foster and develop.
(Stirnerians cannot nip this in the bud by claiming from the outset that it is not
in the proper egoists interest to nurture any talent she happens to possess!)
Firstly, training in this art or skill will entail an associated background of
expertise and knowledge. The background exists prior to and independently of
the aspiring individual who wishes to achieve even a minimum degree of
competence in the activities characteristic of the practice. Second, in order to
reap the benets of achievement, one has to bring to the practice a certain
degree of dedication and commitment. Third, these required attitudes, them-
selves virtues, must combine with other virtues if the disciple is to progress:

It belongs to the concept of a practice that its goods can only be

achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relation-
ship to other practictioners. We have to learn to recognize what is due to
whom; we have to be prepared to take whatever self-endangering risks
are demanded along the way; and we have to listen carefully to what we
are told about out own inadequacies and to reply with the same
carefulness for the facts. In other words we have to accept as necessary
components of any practice with internal goods and standards of
excellence the virtues of justice, courage and honesty.37

The difculty for Stirner is obvious here. The proper egoist, supposedly
liberated from the constraints of all forms of heteronomy, nds that she is
unable to engage in a whole range of meaningful, worthwhile activities.
Enjoyment of the goods available to human beings who engage in the sort of
practice discussed above requires the inculcation of the virtues. However, liv-
ing a virtuous life is ruled out for the proper egoist because it would imply that
the detached agent is subjecting herself to a xed idea. (Even vicious action,
it seems, is unacceptable if it involves a degree of learning and commitment
that requires the subjection of the individual, e.g. I want to become an expert
thief so I take lessons from the Artful Dodger.)
I contend that the objections raised in this section are insurmountable for
Stirner. The pursuit of excellence and the enjoyment of the goods associated
with engaging in a practice are ruled out by the conditions for agency implied
by Stirnerian ontology. Furthermore, adopting the view of the self presented in
The Ego and Its Own commits the individual to the following principle: her
choices must not be generated by belief in xed ideas. So the proper egoist is
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 MAX STIRNERS ONTOLOGY

forced to accept a source of motivation that her own theory is supposed to

exclude. Stirners attempt to base his form of liberating individuality on the
notion of an Ich detached from its projects fails on its own terms. By insisting
that the unique human subject always remain at a safe distance from desires
and xed ideas, Stirner is committing the same sort of error as the youth he
criticises in The Ego and Its Own. The establishment of a contentless human
subject is supposed to ensure that the proper egoist can exercise the required
degree of autonomy, freeing her from restrictive attachments to xed ideas.
According to Stirner, the who of the self that we discussed in Section 3 can
then express her uniqueness through shaping her own life without recourse to
any motivational frameworks supplied by moral principles or religious beliefs
that could rule the Ich. This is what it means for Stirner to be an autonomous
agent. But acceptance of the subject so conceived as the motivational source
of action necessarily generates a new principle governing conduct, i.e. that a
human agent should not make any commitments or abide by any principles.
This is self-defeating. Due to the restrictions implicit in the Stirnerian ontology,
the autonomous Ich is once again compelled to express itself in a
heteronomous framework.
In the next section, I want to discuss further objections to Stirners view of
the relationship between evaluation and the individual.

(5) Radical Choice

Charles Taylor has challenged the idea that choice itself generates value.
According to Taylor, a human agent is not just a simple weigher, faced only
with options that claim to maximise/minimise the satisfaction of desires or
avoidance of pain. There are deeper issues at stake in decision-making,
questions of strong evaluation that have to do with a more profound sense of
value:

Whereas for the simple weigher what is at stake is the desirability of

different consummations, those dened by his de facto desires, for the
strong evaluator reection also examines the different possible modes of
life or modes of being of the agent. Motivations or desires dont only count
in virtue of the attraction of the consummations but also in virtue of the
kind of life and kind of subject that these desires properly belong to.38

Taylor claims that anyone incapable of engaging in this sort of evaluation is

not in a position to effectively communicate with her fellow human-beings,
unable to function as a potential partner of human communication.39 Further-
more, for Taylor this sort of deliberation about the value or worth of different
projects and alternatives lies at the heart of individual responsibility. We
describe all evaluators as responsible for the extent to which they act in accord

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with their attributions of value. But in the case of strong evaluators there is
another type of responsibility present i.e. the one that underlies the agents free
acceptance of something/someone as worthwhile or valuable in the rst place.
At this point in his presentation, Taylor begins a discussion of the notion of
radical choice. He points out that there is a line of argument in modern philos-
ophy that understands the second type of responsibility mentioned above in
terms of a choice which is not based on reasons for action. When I decide
between alternatives, I do not consider (and then accept) reasons for and
against the various practical possibilities on offer. For to the extent that a
choice is grounded in reasons says Taylor, the reasons are simply taken as
valid and are not themselves chosen.40 So, if I choose between X and Y and
want to claim responsibility for my decision, I have to account for my choice
in terms of ungrounded espousal, otherwise I am not really taking on responsi-
bility for my actions.41 Taylor goes on to argue that, if we want to retain
strong evaluation as an essential element of human personality, radical choice
must be rejected. This is because it cannot adequately account for an agents
responsibility when she makes a decision based on a consideration of the
worthwhileness of the various lifestyles on offer.
To illustrate radical choice, Taylor refers to the Sartrian example in
LExistentialisme est un Humanisme of the man faced with a moral dilemma
whether to join the Resistance or stay at home to look after his sick mother.
The resolution of the dilemma is what supposedly gives rise to value. That is,
there would appear to be no value at least not in the sense implied by the
notion of strong evaluation prior to the agents decision. But it is difcult to
see what exactly the agents choice brings to the situation such that we can
subsequently talk about the moral importance of the decision that was actually
made. Taylor concedes that, although reason has clearly done all that it can to
assist in the decision-making, the nal decision remains nonetheless. But then
it is not the choice itself which gives rise to value and this was what the
advocate of radical choice wanted to claim. She appears to assert on the one
hand that the agent creates value through the choice (this is what makes the
agent truly responsible for her actions) and on the other hand that there is
already (incommensurable) value present on both sides of the dilemma (this is
what makes the choice radical, i.e., independent of reasons).
Furthermore, argues Taylor, the vast majority of practical decisions facing
the agent do not have the features of Sartres example. He exemplies this
point by discussing the case where I have to decide between (A) looking after
a close relative and (B) going off on holiday. If I wish to argue that strong
evaluation only emerges as a result of the actual choice I make, then I can only
understand the practical decision in terms of desire-satisfaction. This is the
criterion I employ when faced with alternatives A and B above, dressing up
as a moral choice what is really a de facto preference.42 In effect this means
that the radical chooser is a simple weigher rather than a strong evaluator.
Should proponents of radical choice reply by denying that preferences play
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 MAX STIRNERS ONTOLOGY

any part in this sort of decision-making, then it is hard to see how any sense
can be made of the claim that the agent chooses in these situations. 43
There are important implications here for proper egoism. Firstly, if value is
not the exclusive creation of the individual, this is an unwelcome conclusion
for Stirner. It undermines any attempt to claim that the ego is the source of all
value.44 Taylors argument shows that values must be presupposed in order for
any strong evaluation to take place. This is obviously problematic for any
position that seeks to locate all value in the individual agents choice, as if this
were the sole guarantor of worthwhile action.
Secondly, although the Stirnerian position does not encourage action that
accords with moral principles, we have seen that Stirner seems to be commit-
ted to some sort of strong evaluation, based on his ontology. For instance, he
disapproves of the girl who sacrices her own interests to those of her family
and we have already noted his positive attitude towards the resolute French
revolutionary.45 Stirner wants to provide an answer to the question Have I
been able to determine what and who I am? This is an enquiry into the nature
of the self that lies at the heart of the strong evaluators approach to practical
issues.
Thirdly, as a strong evaluator an agent accepts the existence of objective
value. To concede that there are objective values is not to imply that they
provide all agents with binding reasons for action. But I want to argue that
even to admit the existence of objective reasons in a more limited sense is to
allot will and desire (once again) a secondary role in practical reasoning.
By objective values in a limited sense I have in mind primarily the sorts of
activity mentioned in the previous section those associated with practices.
The worth of a practice has to do with particular qualities of the valued object,
whatever it might be. These values must be discovered. They are independent
of our will and any desires that we just happen to have. This type of good is
described admirably by E. J. Bond during his comparison of the objective
value residing in an objects qualities and the objective value that is conned
to the ways in which an agent is affected by objects:

we said that listening to Brahms was a good for anyone who had the
capacity for appreciating Brahms, and that is not the same as to say that
it is a good for anyone who likes listening to Brahms, or for whom
Brahms is just their dish of tea. In the former case we are saying some-
thing about Brahmss music, namely that it possesses a certain value
which is available to some but not to all; in the latter case we are saying
nothing about Brahms music at all, but only about how certain people
are affected by it, and that need not be because they nd the same value-
bearing qualities in it, qualities which are discernible by some and not
all Values which depend on personal likes and dislikes, on how things
affect people exclusively, are thoroughly objective in that they must be

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discovered and are not subject to the will nor dependent upon desires
that just come to us, but they are not objective in this further sense.46

In terms of Bonds examples, I would argue that the values of a practice

involve the sort of qualities an agent must discover if she wants to appreciate
Brahms music. Given what I have said in the previous section, this type of
value is beyond the reach of the Stirnerian strong evaluator. Moreover, the
second objective category of value that Bond discusses is, like the rst, inde-
pendent of will and desire. But this further undermines Stirners understanding
of the self-determining individual. He wants to describe the liberated ego in
terms of the will dominating reason and desire. But if we accept Bonds analy-
sis, there is no central role for an agents will even in those cases where
nding out what makes life worthwhile is restricted to the way in which an
agent is affected by an objects qualities. As Bond says:

what is or would be rewarding or worthwhile for ourselves, as an activity

or an experience or a way of life is a matter of discovery through
experience; it requires living, not just thinking.47

Finding projects that are of value to us is a voyage of discovery and

experiment. The problem, for value-seeking individuals, caused by the
adoption of the Stirnerian egoistic perspective is twofold. Firstly, Stirners
notion of interest attempts to lead the would-be autonomous agent away from
binding principles and strong appetites while at the same time restricting her
movement within the connes of a principled ontology of the isolated self.
But, as we noted at the end of Section 4, he cannot launch an attack against
all principles and then retain one as the basis of his favoured form of egoism.
Proper egoism describes a motivational framework that attributes value to the
way in which the agent decides. This is implied by the Stirnerian understand-
ing of self-interested agency. It sets out a precondition that governs how agents
are to deliberate. But surely that is what, in The Ego and Its Own, the
supporter of the religious/moral standpoint was accused of doing. The religious
believer does not create value. She makes decisions informed by already-
existing beliefs about what is worthwhile.
Secondly, the principle underlying this normative position itself prevents
the Stirnerian individual from participating in a whole spectrum of worthwhile
activities. Elevating the will to a position of dominance over reason and desire
ignores the fact that the question of what is of value to someone is not a
matter of exercising their will or satisfying desires that they just happen to
have one cannot use ones will as the criterion for nding out what is worth-
while and a satised desire may turn out to be of no value to an individual.
Furthermore, while the pursuit of worthwhile projects requires an agent to
practise the virtues, Stirners insistence on adopting an attitude of detachment
from passions and ideas forbids the type of commitment implied by virtuous
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action. Indeed, the more deeply committed an agent is to any course of action,
the less she conforms to Stirners image of the detached egoist.
At this juncture of our discussion of evaluation, it might be objected that
we have dened value in such a way as to exclude any possibility of an
individual actually creating something that is worthwhile. If we accept that
there is such a thing as strong evaluation, then the values that guide us in prac-
tical reasoning must already exist before we make choices about which sort of
life we want to live, which projects to pursue and so on. This is also implied
by our use of words such as discovery when talking about how an individual
comes to appreciate particular value-bearing features of a practice or the pro-
cess by which agents realise that something is of value for them solely because
of the way(s) they are affected by it.
In reply, I would contend that acceptance of objective value as dened
above does not rule out creativity of this sort. We have been discussing how
evaluation is possible for individuals and have noted that certain sorts of value
are associated with the pursuit of a practice and also with the decision-making
involved in both normal practical decisions and moral dilemmas. But this need
not exhaust our account of value. For instance, nothing that has been said so
far necessarily excludes the possibility of artistic creativity. A gifted individual
might diligently follow the rules and traditions of a practice and then create
something of unique value in the art world. The result of the artistic enterprise
is not the simple revelation of something valuable that existed beforehand.
With reference to my remarks earlier about objective value in a limited sense,
the procedures inherent in the pursuit of a practice indicate that the individual
rst subjects herself to the values that to a large extent dene the current
practice. This subjection can then give rise to new art-works which in turn
revise the standards and values associated with the practice in question. These
new values thus retain an objective status but not in the sense that they exist
independently of human creative activity. 48
The same applies generally to the realm of practical reasoning. An
individuals lifestyle can articulate a unique response to the questions How
am I to live my life? and What is worthwhile?. There is no reason why new
values cannot emerge through an agents attempts to express her individuality
in the way she shapes her own life. Notice also that the existence of created
value does not necessarily contradict the framework outlined above, in terms
of which the attribution of human worth, merit or excellence is independent of
an agents will and desire. However, one might wish to expand on the notion
of discovering what is worthwhile. As we noted above, this suggests prima
facie that all excellence and merit is already in existence. But surely the notion
of an agents nding out what is worthwhile relies on belief in created value.
Otherwise, the example of appreciating Brahms the value-bearing qualities of
his music would be out of place. Brahmss music is presumably different
from that of Beethoven and did not exist prior to its composition.

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(6) Conclusion
The conception of the liberated self presented in The Ego and Its Own is a
bold attempt to establish a platform for the introduction of new values and a
novel interpretation of individuality. Stirner brings to the fore an aspect (the
Ich) of the self that lies beyond an individuals ends, no matter how these latter
are characterised (projects, desire-fullment, moral actions, etc.). His crucial
move is then to identify selfhood with this Ich as it distances the human agent
from traditional moral frameworks and their associated values. Because it is
devoid of content, Stirner argues that there are no dening properties of the
Ich available prior to its decision-making that could in themselves provide the
agent with a reason for action. Thus, the human individual is free to shape
herself as she chooses. Her uniqueness is allowed to determine her character
and reveals itself in the unfolding drama of a life unrestrained by religious and
moral forms of heteronomy. To this extent, value is no longer imposed on the
agent from outside, as it were. The type of individuality Stirner advocates is
itself a new understanding of the value of selfhood. The autonomous human
agent controls her present and future by continually keeping her own projects
at a distance. This, according to Stirner, is necessary in order to ensure the
integrity of the individual, who would otherwise be threatened by the divisive
nature of commitment to traditional morality (the bifurcation that results from
the struggle between an agents higher and lower selves).
However, our analysis of value has shown that various sorts of worthwhile
pursuits are ruled out for human individuals if Stirners proper egoist remains
detached in the way described. His emphasis on the will and his wish to make
this the motivational centre of human agency also fall foul of certain features
that characterise evaluation and decision-making. Moreover, if the isolated self
is a required precondition for autonomous decision-making, it is a type of
discovered value, necessary if an individual is to become a proper egoist.
Consequently, not everything that is worthwhile for this type of self-interested
individual comes into existence as a result of her decisions. Furthermore,
proper egoism describes a form of principled action. It therefore contradicts the
Stirnerian claim that, unlike the religious believer or the moral agent, the
proper egoist is fully autonomous because she does not subject herself to
the principles associated with xed ideas.49

Nuremberg, Germany

Notes
1 Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, ed. D. Leopold, trans. S. T. Byington
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 14 (10). Page numbers in
parentheses refer to Max Stirner, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Stuttgart: Reclam,
1981). Throughout this article I shall be treating ego and Ich as synonyms for
the Stirnerian self that is detached from its passions and projects. My use of ego

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 MAX STIRNERS ONTOLOGY

is not meant to carry any psychological connotations. Ego will sometimes refer to
Der Einzige/Unique One but it will be clear from the context.
2 For an interesting discussion of Stirners dialectic, see John F. Welsh, Max Stirners
Dialectical Egoism: A New Interpretation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010),
Chs 2 and 3.
3 Ibid., pp. 1415 (1011). At this stage the individual begins to use her rational
powers to renounce the authoritative claims of the family.
4 By xed idea Stirner means any idea that has subjected the man to itself. Stirner
recognises the existence of qualities that agents have in common and the evaluative
principles that underlie various forms of heteronomy. The principles are xed ideas
in that they rank the shared properties in accord with an evaluative framework that
determines the actions of individuals who possess those properties. Stirners proper
egoist accepts the existence of common qualities but ranks them according to her
own self-interested wants and desires, thereby reversing the relationship between
agent and value that characterises a xed idea.
5 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, pp.1567 (191).
6 The critics were: Szeliga [Franz Szeliga Zychlin von Zychlinksi] in his Der Einzige
und sein Eigenthum. Von Max Stirner. Kritik, in Norddeutsche Bltter, Band II,
IX. Heft. Berlin, March 1845, pp.134; Ludwig Feuerbach, ber das Wesen des
Christenthums in Beziehung auf den Einzigen und sein Eigenthum, in Wigands
Vierteljahrsschrift, Band II, Leipzig, July 1845, pp. 193205; and M[oses] Hess,
Die letzten Philosophen (Darmstadt: CW Leske, 1845), IV, pp.128.
7 Max Stirner, Stirners Critics, trans. Frederick M. Gordon, The Philosophical
Forum, 8(2/3/4) (1977), p. 67. Gordon has only translated parts of the original
work. For the German text see M. Stirner, Recensenten Stirners, in Max Stirner:
Parerga, Kritiken, Repliken, ed. Bernd A. Laska (Nrnberg: LSR-Verlag 1986),
p. 150. As we shall see in the course of this discussion, Stirners description here of
the Unique One encapsulates the insurmountable problem inherent in the Stirnerian
form of self-determination. How can the indeterminate self, by remaining indetermi-
nate, determine its own life projects?
8 See Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 38 (3940).
9 In my article, Max Stirners Egoism, in The Heythrop Journal, 50(2) (March
2009), pp. 24356, I argue that Stirner is a psychological egoist.
10 J. P. Clark thinks we can substitute the egoism vs. altruism question for Stirners
division of agency into proper and involuntary or covert egoism. See J. P. Clark,
Max Stirners Egoism (London: Freedom Press, 1976), p. 49.
11 Ibid., Ch. 3.
12 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, pp. 2978 (378).
13 Ibid., pp. 298 (379).
14 See T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1978).
15 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 60 (68).
16 T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, p. 108.
17 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, in T. Honderich and M. Burnyeat (eds)
Philosophy As It Is (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 62.
18 Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political
Theory, 12(1), (February 1984), p. 86.
19 The understanding of the Kantian/Rawlsian perspective given in what follows has
been criticised by a number of thinkers, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Liberalism,
Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 523; Richard
Daggar, The Sandelian Republic and the Encumbered Self, The Review of Politics,
61(2) (Spring 1999), pp.18495; and C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls,

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University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 133(4) (April 1985), pp.899900 and

p. 902. They point out that, although the Rawlsian position requires the conception
of the unencumbered self, Rawls does not think the identity of real individuals is
preserved when they are abstracted from their own ends and commitments. The
question for Rawls is which aspects of selfhood are relevant to the task of adminis-
tering justice, not which features are required in order to make sense of personal
identity. But of course this defence of Rawls does not vindicate Stirner. The latters
Ich is not just a conceptual tool partly characterising individuality. It is the key ele-
ment in the ontology of The Ego and Its Own, enabling Stirner to give the notion
of uniqueness the degree of motivational efcacy required for the continual practice
of proper egoism.
20 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p.159.
21 Ibid., p. 159. Sandel argues a similar line in Sandel, The Procedural Republic,
pp. 89, 90, 91.
22 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p.159.
23 Ibid., p.161.
24 Ibid., p. 152.
25 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 164 (201).
26 Stirner, Stirners Critics, p. 69 and Recensenten Stirners, p. 153.
27 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 162 (198).
28 R. W. K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993), p. 275.
29 See for example R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp.16391. I develop this point later in this section.
30 Ibid., p.132 (164).
31 Ibid., p. 133 (164).
32 Ibid., p. 264 (333).
33 Ibid., pp. 2645 (3334).
34 Ibid., pp. 299300 (38081).
35 Suren makes this point in P. Suren, Max Stirner ber Nutzen und Schaden der
Wahrheit (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1991), p. 247.
36 I borrow this concept from A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd edn (London:
Duckworth, 1987).
37 Ibid., p.191.
38 Charles Taylor, Responsibility for Self, in A.O. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Per-
sons (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), p. 288.
39 Ibid., p. 289.
40 Ibid., p. 290.
41 Ibid., pp. 28990.
42 Ibid., p. 293.
43 See Ibid. p. 293.
44 According to Clark (Max Stirners Egoism, p. 53), this is the role Stirner attributes
to the ego. Paterson erroneously believes that Stirner is a nihilist (The Nihilistic
Egoist, Ch. 10). Using the textual examples I mention when discussing Stirner as a
strong evaluator, Leopold (in his editors introduction to Stirner, The Ego and Its
Own, p. xxiv) correctly concludes that he is committed to a non-nihilistic view.
45 The pious girl is discussed in Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, pp. 1967 (2434).
46 E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),
p. 63.
47 Ibid., p. 62.
48 In Brian Magee, Wagner and Philosophy (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 131, Magee
develops this point about the need to revise standards:
T. S. Eliot has taught us that great artists have to create the standards by which their

24
 MAX STIRNERS ONTOLOGY

work is appreciated, and Wagners uvre offers what is probably the most extreme
example of this in the history not only of music but also of theatre, certainly of
opera. Tristan and Isolde was completely and utterly mystifying to many of the peo-
ple who heard it rst: singers could nd so little coherence in the music that they
were unable to learn their roles, and orchestral players declared their parts impossi-
ble to play. It is only because Wagner composed that sort of music that it now
sounds to us like music, but it did not sound to many people like music at rst.
And he himself had to learn how to compose it, just as listeners had to learn how
to listen to it.
49 My criticisms of the Stirnerian viewpoint also pose problems for Widukind De
Ridders claim in his article Max Stirner: The End of Philosophy and Political
Subjectivity (in Saul Newman [ed.] Max Stirner [London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011] pp. 14364), that Stirner offers the individual a point of departure that is free
of ideological domination. Even if one accepts that there is such a point of depar-
ture, there does not seem to be any way in which the Stirnerite can then go on to
effectively pursue her interests.

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