DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY

Administrative Law Project

Doctrine Of Estoppel

Submitted To:- Submitted By:-

Dr. Sridevi Maam Anshu Singh

(2014015)

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 TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMWNT3
MEANING OF ESTOPPEL..4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..5
EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL7
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: AN OUTLINE..8
NATURE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.9
APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL TO
GOVERNMENT.10
ESTOPPEL AGAINST A STATUTE..13
ESTOPPEL AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE..14
ESTOPPEL UNDER THE CONTRACT ACT16
ESTOPPEL UNDER TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.17
CONCLUSION19

BIBLIOGRAPHY20

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
On completion of this Project it is our present privilege to acknowledge our profound gratitude
and indebtedness towards our teachers for their valuable suggestion and constructive criticism.
Their precious guidance and unrelenting support kept us on the right track throughout the
project.
We gratefully acknowledge our deepest sense of gratitude to:-
Dr. P. Sri Devi of Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University, Visakhapatnam for
providing us with the infrastructure and personal attention which proved to be a blessings.

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 MEANING OF ESTOPPEL
Estoppel in simple words is a bar which prevents a party from asserting a fact or putting up claim
inconsistent with the position he previously took. It is said to be a rule which preludes a person
from saying one thing at one time and another thing, totally in consistent with the earlier one, at
another stage.
In Blacks New Dictionary, estoppel is indicated to mean that a party is prevented by his
own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of other party who was entitled to rely on such
conduct and has acted accordingly.
According to Oxford Dictionary of Law estoppel is a rule of evidence or a rule of law that
prevents a person from denying the truth of a statement he has made or from denying facts that
he has alleged to exist, The denial must have been acted upon (probably to his disadvantage) by
the person who wishes to take advantage of the estoppel or his position must have been altered as
a result1.
When a person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another
person to believe a thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative
shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative,
to deny the truth of the thing. The former person is thus stopped from denying the truth of his
previous statement. He, thus, cannot both approbate and reprobate, because of invocation of rule
of estoppel against him.

In other words, estoppel is a rule, whereby a party is precluded from or to say estopped from
denying the existence of some state of facts which he had previously asserted and on which the
other party has relied or is entitled to rely upon. According to Wade and Forsyth the basic
principle of estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation or representation

1 Quoted inSharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2002 SC 322.

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of face causes the other to act to his determent in reliance on the truth of it is not allowed to deny
it later, even though it is wrong. Estoppel, thus, gives way to justice to prevail over the truth2.

In Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore ,Sahai, J., stated Estoppel is a rule of equity flowing out of
fairness striking on behavior deficient in good faith. It operates as a check on spurious
conducting by preventing the inducer from taking advantage and assailing forfeiture already
accomplished. It is invoked and applied to aid the law in administration of justice. But for it great
many injustices may have been perpetrated.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

England was conquered by the Normans in the year 1066. The period preceding this date is
called that of Anglo- Saxon law of which little is known. There was no common law for the
whole of England at any time before the Norman Conquest. With the Norman Conquest, the
period of tribal rule came to an end and feudalism was installed. It prepared and paved the way
for the development of Common Law.3

The creation of Common Law (Comune Ley) was to be exclusive work of the Royal Courts of
Justice, usually called the courts of the West minister, after the name of the place where they sat
from the thirteenth century. Common Law is that part of the law of England which before the
Judicature Acts, 1873-1875 was adjudicated by the Common Law courts (especially the former
Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas), as opposed to equity, or that part of the law which
was administered by the Court of Chancery at Lincoln's Inn.

2 Wade, H.W.R. & Forsyth, C.F.; Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p.237

3 Kumar, Narender; Nature and Concepts of Administrative Law, 1st Ed., Allahabad
Law Agency, Faridabad, 2011, p. 366.

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Blackstone defines Common Law as the municipal law of England or the rule of civil conduct
prescribed to be inhabitants of the kingdom. It is experience expressed in law. It is composed
of established customs, established rules and maxims such as the King can do no wrong.4

In the earlier times the Common Law courts provided no remedy in many cases where one was
required. Hence the custom grew of applying for redress to the King in parliament or to the King
in Council, who referred the matter to the Chancellor. In later times petitions were presented to
the Chancellor directly. The Chancellor being an ecclesiastic, and keeper of the King's
conscience, did not feel bound to follow the rules of Common Law, but gave such relief as he
thought the petitioner or plaintiff entitled to in equity and good conscience. Equity thus
represents the conscience of law, and a moral correction of law in order to accord more with
justice.

Common Law was administered by King's Justice on circuit and three Common Law courts,
namely, King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. King's Courts administered equity also
but at that time they did not regard themselves as administering a new body of law. They were
trying to give relief in hard cases. Of the three courts of Common Law, the Exchequer was not
only a court of law but was also an administrative department, its secretarial section being called
a Chancery. The head of this section was called a Chancellor, whose business was to collect State
revenue and to decide disputes concerning the same. The Court of the Exchequer department met
thrice a year on the occasion of the three great feasts of the temple. The Chancellor has been
described by Maitland as the King's prime minister.5

If a person wanted to start an action at Common Law, he had to obtain a writ on payment of
prescribed fees from the Chancery section. The Chancellor issued such writs. It should be noted

4 A Dictionary of Law, 5th Ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 95.

5 Wade, H.W.R. & Forsyth, C.F.; Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006,
p.236

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that in the 13th Century the available writs covered a very narrow ground. An injured party could
only sue at Common Law if his complaint came within the scope of an existing writ or form of
action. Many genuine cases remained unredressed and the plaintiff was without a remedy
because his cause of action did not fit into any of the existing forms of action.6

Therefore the King and the King alone in his council who had wide discretionary powers to do
justice among the subjects. By 1348 A.D. the King completely assigned his equity jurisdiction to
the Chancellor. Initially the Chancellors were ecclesiastical persons. This was only 1529 A.D. Sir
Thomas Moore was the first Lawyer- Chancellor from the year 1530 A.D. and from then
onwards the Chancellors were persons trained in law. This Common Law and Equity were
administered by side by side by parallel process for a long time. However, the Judicature Acts,
1873-1875 merged the jurisdictions and from then onwards, codes in England have been Courts
of Law as well as Equity. Equity, in a way, gained a supremacy in that Section 25(11) of the
Judicature Act, 1875 provides that where the rules of Common Law and Equity were in conflict
on a particular point, the rules of Equity would prevail. In India, all Courts are Courts of Law
and also Courts of Equity. The principles of Equity found statutory recognition in India.

EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

Promissory estoppel is a relatively new development. In order to trace the evolution of the
doctrine in England, we need to refer to some of the English decisions. The early cases did not
speak of this doctrine as estoppel. They spoke of it as raising equity
This principle of equity made sporadic appearances but it was only in 1947 that it was restated as
a recognized doctrine by Lord Denning in Central London Properties Trust Ltd. v. High Trees
House Ltd7, who asserted: A promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in
fact acted upon is binding.

6 Moorgate Mercantile Co. v. Twichings, (1975) 3 All ER 314

7 1947) KB 130

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In the formative period the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked by the promisee
unless he had suffered detriment or prejudice. All that is required is that the party asserting
the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given by him. The alteration of position by the
party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. In India, there are two stages in the
evolution of the application of this doctrine; pre-Anglo Afghan case and post - Anglo Afghan
case. Prior to this case, the position was that promissory estoppel did not apply against the
Government. But the position altered with this case.
In Union of India v. Indo Anglo Afghan Agencies Ltd. 8, the Government of India announced
certain concessions with regard to the import of certain raw materials in order to encourage
export of woollen garments to Afghanistan. Subsequently, only partial concessions and not full
concessions were extended as announced. The Supreme Court held that the Government was
estopped by its promise. Thereafter the courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel
even against the Government.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: AN OUTLINE

Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd 9., 17
expressing the doctrine stated:

Once a promise has been made by a person knowing that it would be acted upon by the person
to whom it is made and in face it is no acted upon, then it is inequitable to allow the party
making the promise to go back upon it.

In this case, during the Second World War, people left London owing to bombardment and as a
result, a number of flats remained unoccupied. A had left out his flat to B for 99 years at the
rate of 2500 a year. He, however, due to war conditions, agreed to reduce the rent by fifty per
cent. After the war was over, the tenants returned. A demanded full amount of rent to which B
objected relying on As assurance.

8 AIR 1968 SC 718

9 AIR 1971 SC 1021 : 1970 SCR (2) 854

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The Court applied the doctrine of estoppel and granted relief to B. The doctrine of Promissory
Estoppel is premised to be conduct of a party making a representation to the other so as to enable
him to arrange its affairs in such a manner as if the said representation is acted upon.19 In
Sharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Promissory Estoppel was defined as:

an estoppel which arises when there is a promise which promisor should reasonably except
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promise
and which does induce be avoided only by enforcement of promise.

the principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his words or conduct
made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create
legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending
that it would be acted upon by the other party , the promise or representation
would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back
upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the
dealings which have taken place between the parties. 10

Dixon, J., an Australian Jurist in Grundt v. The Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Miners
Ltd11., explained:

It is often said that the party asserting the estoppel must have been inducted to act to his
detriment. Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to no misunderstanding, it
does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or prevent a
determent to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the
assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting.12

This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that
which would flow from the change of position if the assumptions were deserted that led to it.

10 Kumar, Narender; Nature and Concepts of Administrative Law, 1st Ed., Allahabad
Law Agency, Faridabad, 2011, p. 366.

11 AIR 2004 SC 4559

12 1996 (85) ELT 242 Bom

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 Sahai, J., explaining the basis of the doctrine in Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore13, observed
Estoppel is a rule of equity flowing out of fairness striking on behaviour deficient in good faith.
It operates as a check on the spurious conducting by preventing the intruder from taking
advantage and assailing forfeiture already accomplished. It is invoked and applied to aid the law
in administration of justice. But for it, great many injustices, may have been perpetrated.

NATURE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

It has been said that the rule of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action. It
cannot be a cause of action; it can only be a shield and not a sword. Since the doctrine has been
usually invoked by way of defence, it has come to be identified as a measure of defence.

But, in the present day judicial tendency appears to be that estoppel can be used as a sword also.
Stating that there are estoppels and estoppels Lord Denning held that some do give rise to
cause of action, some do not. In the species of estoppel called proprietary estoppel, says the
learned Lord it does give rise to cause of action.

Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, but the whole concept is more correctly viewed
as a substantive rule of law. It is necessary to make it clear that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel or equitable estoppel is not based on the principle of estoppel but it is a doctrine evolved
by equity in order to prevent injustice.

Estoppel by conduct proceeds on the rule of substantive law and equity where a promise made
by a person knowing that it would be acted on by the person to whom it is made and in fact it is
so acted and it is inequitable to allow the party making the promise to go back upon it.

It being an equitable principle evolved for doing justice, there is no reason, said Bhagwati, J.,
why it should be given only limited application by way of defence. It can be the basis of cause
of action.14

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Though commonly named as promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in
the realm of estoppel. The basis of the doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always,
true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law.

APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL TO

GOVERNMENT

Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine it must yield when the equity
so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have
subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to the Government to abide by the promise made
by it, the court would not raise equity in favour of the promise and enforce it against the
Government.

When the Government is able to show that due to the facts which have transpired subsequent to
the promise being made, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to
carry out the promise made, the court would have to balance the public interest in the
Government carrying out the promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to alter his
position to his prejudice and the public interest likely to suffer if the Government were to carry
out the promise, and determine which way the equity lies.

The case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh 15, is a trendsetter
regarding the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government. In this
case the Chief Secretary of the Government gave a categorical assurance that total exemption
from sales tax would be given for three years to all new industrial units in order them to establish
themselves firmly. Acting on this assurance the appellant sugar mills set up a hydrogenation
plant by raising a huge loan. Subsequently, the Government changed its policy and announced
that sales tax exemption will be given at varying rates over three years. The appellant contended

14 Wade, H.W.R. & Forsyth, C.F.; Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 2006, p.236

15 AIR 2004 SC 4559

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that they set up the plant and raised huge loans only due to the assurance given by the
Government. The Supreme Court held that the Government was bound by its promise and was
liable to exempt the appellants from sales tax for a period of three years commencing from the
date of production.

In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. v. Ulhasnagar Municipality 16, the municipality
agreed to exempt certain existent industrial concerns in the area from octroi duty for a period of
seven years. However, later on it sought to impose duty. This was challenged and the Supreme
Court, while remanding the case to the High Court, held that where the private party had acted
upon the representation of a public authority, it could be enforced against the authority on the
grounds of equity in appropriate cases even though the representation did not result in a contract
owing to the lack of proper form.

However, the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana 17, cast a shadow on the Motilal
case where it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available against the
exercise of executive functions of the State. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Godfrey
Phillips India Ltd., soon removed this doubt. The Court held that the law laid down in Motilal
case represents the correct law on promissory estoppels

In State of Punjab v. Nestle India18 Ltd., 33 the Apex Court said:

promissory estoppel long recognised as a legitimate defence in equity was held to find cause
of action against the Government, even when, and this needs to be emphasized, the
representation sought to be enforced was legally invalid in the sense that it was made in a
manner which was not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the statute.

It has also been made clear that the Government could not, on some undefined and undisclosed
ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it. Nor, the
Government could claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte
appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation had arisen. The doctrine of estoppel

16 1996 (85) ELT 242 Bom

17 AIR 1980 SC 1285 : 1980 SCR (3) 689 : (1981) SCC (1) 11

18 AIR 1979 SC 621

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cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duties under the
law. The doctrine of cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by the law.

It cannot be used to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by
law. There can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The
legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative functions by resort to the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.

ESTOPPEL AGAINST A STATUTE

The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to statutes. In other words, a person who makes a
statement as to the existence of the provisions of a statute is not estopped, subsequently, from
contending that the statutory provision is different from what he has previously stated. A person
may not represent the true status of a statute or law, but the other person who relies on such a
representation is at liberty to find out the position of law on the matter and as the maxim says,
ignorance of law is no excuse.19

In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana 20, a municipality granted exemption from octroi
for developing a mandi, but subsequently is revoked the exemption. Later it againgranted the
exemption in keeping with the terms of the original sale of plots, but levied taxes again. Even so,
a claim of estoppel against its legislative power was not allowed.

So is the case with the tax laws. If the law requires that a certain tax be collected, it cannot be
given up, and any assurances by the Government that the taxes would not be collected would not
bind the Government, when it chooses to collect the taxes. Thus it was held that when there was
a clear and unambiguous provision of law that entitles the plaintiff to a relief, no question of
estoppel arises.

The following conditions have been laid down as necessary to invoke no estoppel against a
statute:
19 Wade, H.W.R. & Forsyth, C.F.; Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p.236

20 (1990) 4 SCC 668 (670).

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 The parties must bilaterally agree to contract irrespective of statutory provisions of the
applicable Act. The agreement entered into by the parties must be expressly prohibited by the
Act.

The provision of law must be made for public interest and not pertain to a particular class of
persons.

The agreement of the parties should not have been merged into an order of the court which by
the conduct of the parties had been dissuaded from performing its statutory obligations.

So, it is a well settled catena of decision that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be
invoked against the provisions of Statutes.

ESTOPPEL AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE

Estoppel, as a rule of evidence, may be read in distinction to equitable principle of promissory
estoppel. While the former is more correctly described as a principle of law, the latter is known
as a rule of equity. As a principle of law estoppel applies only to representations about past or
present facts21. The basic premise of estoppel is that a person, who by some statement or
representation of facts causes another act in reliance on the truth of it, is not allowed to deny it
later, even though it is wrong.
The principle of estoppel embodies in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 22 is
commonly known as a rule of evidence. The Section reads as under: When one person has by his
declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing
to be true and to act on such belief, neither he nor his representatives shall be allowed in any suit
or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that

21 Wade, H.W.R. & Forsyth, C.F.; Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, New
Delhi, 2006, p.236

22 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621.

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thing. To invoke the principle of estoppel enshrined in the Section, the following three conditions
are necessarily be satisfied:
(I).there must be a declaration, act or omission on the part of a person;
(ii).by the said declaration, etc., that person must have intentionally caused or permitted another
person to believe a thing to be true; and
(iii).he must have intentionally caused or permitted the said another person, to act upon such
belief.
Section 115 explains that a party is precluded from denying the existence of some state of facts
which he had previously asserted and on which the other party has relied or is entitled to rely on.
That is, a man should keep his words, all the more so when the promise is made with the
intention that the other party should act upon it.

As a rule of evidence, embodied in Section 115, estoppel may lie against the Government on a
representation or statement of facts, if the statement does not operate against the statute.

In Delhi University v. Ashok Kumar23, the respondent, a student after passing the Secondary
School Certificate Examination of the Gujarat Board was admitted provisionally in the B.A. I
year course in the Delhi University. After over a year, the University informed him that he was
ineligible to join the course because the Gujarat Board Examination had been recognized by the
appellate University as equivalent to Matric Examination while the qualification to join B.A. I
year Course was passing the Higher Secondary Examination. However, the Statute had
authorized the Academic Council of the University to grant exemption from the admission
requirements. The High Court of accepted the plea of the estoppel raised by the student
against the University. The Court stated that estoppel was within the meaning of Section 115 of
the Evidence Act, 1872, might arise from the silence as well as words, the Court held inaction
of the University for over a year amounted to a representation by it that it had approved his
admission and. therefore the University would now be estopped from doing that.
In Shri Krishna v. Kurukshetra University24, the Apex Court had ruled that the University could
not cancel the candidature of the appellant-student for the not complying with the attendance

23 (1938) 59 CLR 641.

24 Crabb v. Arun DC, (1976) Ch. 179.

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requirement, as the respondents failed to tale the adequate care to scrutinize his examination
from at the relevant time to ascertain whether the candidate fulfilled the necessary conditions.

ESTOPPEL UNDER THE CONTRACT ACT

Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to
which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any
law to which he is subject. Persons not competent to contract

1. Minors

2. Persons of unsound mind

3. Persons disqualified by law

Minor

The term Minor is explained in sec 3 of Indian Majority Act 1875.A minor is a person who has
not completed eighteen years of age25

Where a guardian has been appointed to take care of a minors person or property under the
guardian and Wards Act 1890 or where the superintendence of minors property is assumed by a
Court of Wards, and The person becomes major on completing the age of 21 years

Effects of minors contract

Sec.10 & 11 make it clear that any agreement made by a minor is void ab initio (not existent
from the very beginning) Mohri bibi V. Dharmodas Ghosh(1903)

No estoppel against a minor

25 Halsburys Laws of England, XV, 168., Cited in Kumar, Narender; Nature and
Concepts of Administrative Law,

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 Where a minor by misrepresenting his age has induced the other party to enter into a
contract with him, he cannot be made liable for the contract. There can be no estoppel against a
minor. It means he is not estopped from pleading his infancy in order to avoid a contract.26

PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND

As per sec.12, A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at
the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment
as to its effects upon his interest

The section requires two conditions

1. He should be capable of understanding the nature and contents of the contract.

2. He should be capable of forming a rational judgment about the effects of the contract on
his interest.

ESTOPPEL UNDER TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.

English law of estoppel is that where a grantor has purported to grant an interest in land which he
did not at the time possess but subsequently acquires, the benefit of his subsequent acquisition
goes automatically to the earlier grantee or, as it is usually expressed, feeds the estoppel.

1. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act embodied this doctrine of feeding the grant by
estoppel.

2. Section 43 says that where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is

authorized to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property
for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any
interest which the transferor may acquire in such property, at any time during which the
contract of transfer subsists.
26 A Dictionary of Law, 5th Ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 95.

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 3. Section 43 further provides that nothing in this section shall impair the right of
transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said
option.27

4. The doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppels may be illustrated by an example.

5. Let us suppose that A , a Hindu , who has separated from his father B , sells to C three
fields , X , Y and Z , representing that A is authorized to transfer the same . Of these
fields Z does not belong to A, it having been retained by B on the partition, but on Bs
dying, A as heir obtains Z. C not having rescinded the contract of sale, may require A to
deliver Z to him.

6. The following are the conditions for application of the doctrine of feeding the grant by
estoppel .1) There must have a fraudulent or erroneous representation of ownership by
the transferor.

7. 2) The transferee must have acted on the fraudulent or erroneous representation of the
transferor.

8. 3) The transferor should not have transferable title on the property transferred.

9. 4) The transfer should be for consideration.

10. 5) The transferor must subsequently acquire title upon the property transferred on the
basis of fraudulent or erroneous representation of ownership.

11. 6) The contract of transfer must be subsisting when the transferee exercises his right to
recourse the doctrine of feeding the grant be estoppel.

12. If these conditions are fulfilled the transferee can exercise his option only during
continuance of the contract and only in respect of the interest which the fraudulent or
erroneous transferor acquires in such property. But there are some circumstances where

27 Quoted in Sharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2002 SC 322.

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 the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel has no application. These circumstances are
as follows:-

13. 1) This section is not applicable if the transfer is not for consideration.

14. 2) This section does not apply if the transfer is invalid for being forbidden by law or
contrary to public policy.

15. 3) This section is not applicable if the contract comes to an end before acquisition of the
property by the transferor.

16. 4) This section has no application to Court sales.

17. 5) The right is not available against the bonafide purchasers for value without notice.

18. In the case of Mohori Bibi Vs. Dharamdas, it was held by the Privy Council that no
estoppel can arise by reason of a false statement where truth is known to both the parties.

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 CONCLUSION
The Doctrine of Estoppel is necessary to maintain flexibility in the law of the land. The
Government and other parties are kept under check from making promises for which they can be
held accountable as discussed before. It is inequitable that the promisor should be allowed to
resize from the assurance or representation having regard to what the promisee has done or
refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation. So the citizens can rest
assured about the lawful promises made.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNET SOURCES

www.google.co.in

http://hanumant.com/index.php/articles/general-articles/41-promissory-estoppel-
application-to-the-govt-by-divya-bhargava.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_citation
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l249-Promissory-Estoppel.html
http://www.indiankanoon.org/
http://www.manupatra.com
https://www.westlaw.com
https://lawyersclub.com

BOOKS REFERRED

Ratanlal DhirajlalEvidence: Book

Batuk Lal.Evidence :Book

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

The Contract Act 1872

The Transferr of Property Act

Avtar singh The Contract Act: Book

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