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RULE 39: EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF October 1, 1996, the Omnibus Order dated November
JUDGMENT 22, 1996 and the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 by the
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ RTC
G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002 On February 10, 1998, CA denied Aidas MR.
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by
herein petitioner.
FACTS:
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course
These 2 petitions stem from the decision of RTC
to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15,
Cebu Br. 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The 1st
1997 the entire case records to the CA. Aida filed with
seeks the reversal of the CAs decision setting aside
the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of
that Gabriel had failed to file with the CA a Record on
the RTC. The 2nd prays for the reversal of the resolution
Appeal. CA denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
of the CA denying the motion to dismiss.
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
On September 23, 1996, RTC Cebu Branch 20, petition in G.R. No. 133628. SC consolidated the
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among two petitions.
others the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; ISSUES:
the forfeiture of Gabriels 1/2 share in the net conjugal
I. The core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
assets in favor of the common children; the payment to
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
NO
attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in
the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the HELD: Petitions are denied for lack of merit.
use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the G.R. No. 132592:
smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed
within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
when superior circumstances demanding urgency
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to outweigh the damages that may result from the
modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
Appeal. instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
RTC granted Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion become a tool of oppression and inequity.
to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by In this case, considering the reasons cited by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees or urgent circumstance that outweighs the
the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents damage which respondent would suffer if he
ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the were ordered to vacate the house. We note that
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that
B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys she did not intend to use said house, and that she has
fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%. two (2) other houses in the US where she is a
In another motion to modify the decision, permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To
9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
appeal. Respondent Gabriel filed a consolidated than the exception.
written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed Similarly, we are not persuaded that the
for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was
On November 22, 1996, RTC denied Aidas properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt
motion for moral and exemplary damages and the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said
litigation expenses but gave due course to the amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts
execution pending appeal. judgment was already on appeal.
In his Comment respondent denied the charge and Second, he should have immediately reported to
asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ
already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him
evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. He from doing so. Third, he should have informed the
also pointed out that he had made an inventory of the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about
personal properties recovered from the subject his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have
premises. That he had done so was attested to by immediately enforced it twenty days after its issuance.
defendants mother, and witnessed by the barangay
captain and two councilors.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the
MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the
The OCA found respondent to have been negligent in parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty
the performance of his duty as a sheriff and days from his receipt of the Writ, he should have
recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should
of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a have immediately furnished the parties.
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was rendered after almost one year of trial and revision
of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, he of the questioned ballots and found petitioner as the
filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002. candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the
Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while
his motion for reconsideration and supplemental meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the
petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were pending, respondent Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as determined by the trial court in the election protest,
SPR No. 37-2002. The petition contained the same had to be respected and given meaning. The
prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the
20-2002. services of a mayor even while the election protest was
pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued an Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante determined to have been chosen by the people.
and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of
Mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an FACTS: On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that Anderson Uy. On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a
one or the other court would make a favorable writ of attachment. On 4 June 1999 the writ was
disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights attached. In the meantime, summons was served on
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
each of the defendants, respondents herein, who filed
on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the their respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel
other action will, regardless of which party is Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On
consideration. 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ
of attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse
quo denied.
decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was
dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for
petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts pre-trial. For about six (6) months thereafter,
order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. discussions between petitioner and respondents
Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy
while the same was very much pending before the
and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518,
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.
supplemental petition. In doing so, respondent sought
to increase his chances of securing a favorable On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
decision in another petition.
payment scheme for the corporation which on was
Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated
forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent
petition should have been dismissed outright by the Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin
COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a Marketing Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as
Director thereof. Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
5|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the
terms and conditions of the restructuring. Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000
and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court of
On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without Rules of Civil Procedure. In the main, petitioner argued
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner that the court a quo had no authority to compel the
as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an
unreasonable length of time . . .." amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-
trial conference on the ground that no compromise
Subsequently, the petitioner moved for agreement was turned over to the court a quo.
reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial
court of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the ISSUE:
case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of 1) Whether or not the petitioner is required to pay
the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as again the requisite docket fees.
an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
defendant in the civil case. 2) Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a claim
for failure of the parties to submit to a compromise
On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case agreement.
No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only HELD:
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff 1) No. There is no substantial policy worth
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the
Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its docket fees when it has already discharged this
loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
conditions specified in said letter." complaint for collection of a sum of money. The
procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of
petitioner's Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not submit raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed
a compromise agreement because only defendant complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to
Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, which the original case pertained. A complaint that is
2000 letter . . .." Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings
foregoing submissions of petitioner while respondents with the concomitant full attention of the same trial
Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and
Sy neither contested nor supported them. control over the case that was previously dismissed,
which in the context of the instant case is a waste of
The trial court, in an undated Order (although a judicial time, capital and energy.
date was later inserted in the Order), denied
petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 What judicial benefit do we derive from starting
for pre-trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to the civil case all over again, especially where three (3)
submit a compromise agreement. of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not
On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its contested petitioner's plea before this Court and the
Notice of Appeal from the said Orders. On 16 courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference?
November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of
one of which inserted the date "6 November 2000" in petitioner's complaint without the usual procedure for
the undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for pre- the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo
trial in the civil case, and the other denying due course invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting
dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are should we rule otherwise.
interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be
taken . . .." It must be emphasized however that once the
dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
6|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and willingness to discuss a possible compromise is
executory dismissal although without prejudice divests expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears
the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well that one of the parties, before the commencement of
as any residual power to order anything relative to the the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the compromise but the other party refused the offer,
complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite
we are to concede that the trial court retains efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the negotiations still fail, only then should the action
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon continue as if no suspension had taken place.
would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on
the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court
setting aside of the order of dismissal and the to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
reinstatement of the complaint. encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
2) only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a
deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
Besides the semantic and consequential attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our ruling litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a
case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the middle ground between petitioner and respondents, we
action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for must not interpret the trial court's Orders as dismissing
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was the action on its own motion because the parties,
in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their
with the other parties within fifteen (15) days from case as exhibited in their several manifestations and
notice of the order to do so and held - motions.
Since there is nothing in the In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost
Rules that imposes the interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court
sanction of dismissal for failing may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
to submit a compromise but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power
agreement, then it is obvious is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
that the dismissal of the chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
complaint on the basis thereof acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
amounts no less to a gross Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
procedural infirmity assailable contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial
by certiorari. For such grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-
submission could at most be appearance in the case, the courts should consider
directory and could not result lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving
in throwing out the case for the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme
failure to effect a compromise. to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton
While a compromise is failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
encouraged, very strongly in rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
fact, failure to consummate courts should decide to dispense rather than wield
one does not warrant any their authority to dismiss.
procedural sanction, much less
an authority to jettison a civil Clearly, another creative remedy was available
complaint worth P4,000,000.00 to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil
. . . Plainly, submission of a Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
compromise agreement is justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a
never mandatory, nor is it compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of
required by any rule. herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on
the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and
As also explained therein, the proper course of the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch
action that should have been taken by the court a quo, in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference
upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to was the best-suited solution to the problem as this
discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and
and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If the dispute quickly and genuinely reconciled. By
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
7|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to Thereafter, Principal Management Group requested
sway the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise. payment from iligan City for the portions of the project
which they already finished. Iligan City on the other
Dismissing the civil case and compelling hand responded on the negative, stating that the
petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly agreed price of 14M will only be paid upon completion
and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not of the project.
resolving, the disagreement. This case management
strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so PMGI filed a complaint for the rescission of the MOA
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action, and damages against City of Iligan. The latter then
perhaps, may have already been admitted by its filed its answer. Nevertheless, PGMI moved for partial
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4) summary judgment claiming that there was no genuine
defendants not willing to contest petitioner's issue as to the obligation of the City of Iligan and that
allegations, and more critically, since this approach the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath
promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard the genuiness of the Letter of Credit and the MOA.
work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have
The Trial Court granted the motion of partial summary
aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if
judgment. On the other hand, City of Iligan filed a
without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they
Considering that the MR by Iligan was denied, Iligan
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of
City filed a notice of appeal.
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was then filed
lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better by the PGMI, which was granted over the objection of
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and Iligan City.
final disposition of the cases before the court.
The Court is convinced that there are good reasons to
City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its
Inc. adjudication is based on [petitioners] own admission
hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious and would
G.R. No. 145260 only serve to delay execution of the final order subject
of the instant motion. The fact that an appeal in this
July 31, 2003 case if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely dilatory
tactic has been declared by the Supreme Court as a
Executions Pending Appeal
good and sufficient reason upon which to issue
Facts: Mayor Franklin M. Quijano, acting for and in execution of the order under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
behalf of the City of Iligan, Requested from the Revised Rules of Court.
Sangguinang Panlungsod, a resolution authorizing him
The CA affirmed the decision. The appellate court also
to open a domestic Standby Letter of Credit in the
ruled that certiorari would not be allowed in this case,
amount of 14M in favor of Land Bank Realty
because there were other remedies still available to
Development Corporation and/or PNCC with the
petitioner, like the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay
Principal Management Group as the funder. The City
the execution or the filing of a motion for
Council approved Quijanos request and passed board
reconsideration.
resolutions. A MOA on a turn-key arrangement was
entered into by the parties for the construction of a Issue: Whether the Order granting execution pending
sports complex which upon completion will be turned appeal was proper.
over to Iligan City for acceptance and the issuance of
Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to Held: Yes.
enable Land Bank Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC.
Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2
The construction site was donated by San Miguel of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Enterprises Inc. wherein Iligan City, as donee, would
provide for all the expenses for the transfer of the "SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.--
occupants therein. Thereafter, the construction of the
Sports Complex was stopped due to the refusal of (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending
some occupants therein to vacate for the failure of appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice
Iligan City to provide them for disturbance to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
compensation. jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
8|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said The ascertainment of good reasons for execution
court may, in its discretion, order execution of a pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the
judgment or final order even before the expiration of trial court, and the appellate court will not normally
the period to appeal. disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be
proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of
"After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for discretion.
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court. Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed, this
"Discretionary execution may only issue upon good Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon
reasons to be stated in a special order after due which to authorize immediate execution is when an
hearing." appeal is clearly dilatory
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995
exception to the general rule, the existence of "good addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the
reasons" is essential. These reasons must be stated in Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective
a special order, because unless these are divulged, it 2 May 1995.
will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised by the lower On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC
court. Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that reconsideration of the detail order.
justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it
become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order,
enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary
of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to Cal at DOTC.
delay.
Without acting on respondents request for
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
both the trial and the appellate courts was that the 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
partial adjudication of the case was based on preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending
petitioners own admission; hence, any appeal based investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
on that point would be unmeritorious and merely
dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return
reason upon which to issue execution."
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
9|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
to their mother unit since more than 90 days had extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file
already lapsed. Respondents also sought the petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a file the memorandum.
result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia
the action taken on respondents request for On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
reconsideration of the detail order. counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the alleged that the trial courts decision never became
Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia OSG failed to file Petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
detail of respondents. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner trial courts order granting respondents motion for
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their execution. Petitioner further asserted that the
mother unit. On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Resolution of the Ombudsman superseded the decision
Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a of the trial court.
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, which the The Ombudsmans Resolution
trial court granted on February. approved the following recommendation of the
reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial
court was appointed Chairman of the Commission on PREMISES
Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled CONSIDERED,
and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court, respondent MODESTO
Pasay City.On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an ABARCA, JR., is hereby
order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge found GUILTY of
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary violation of Section 7(d)
mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply of Republic Act 6713,
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia for which the penalty of
directing petitioner to recall respondents to their Suspension Without
mother unit until further orders by the trial court. Pay for Six (6) Months
is hereby
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the recommended
writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to pursuant to Section
cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to 10(b), Rule III of
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer Administrative Order
within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of No. 07, in relation to
26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court Section 25(2) of
granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of Republic Act No. 6770.
indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench
warrant against petitioner. It is also respectfully
recommended that the
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General charge against
(OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the respondents
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding REYNALDO FERNANDO
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. Also the trial and MARY LOU
court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file CLEOFAS be DISMISSED
an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, courts ruling that the nature of the case before the
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial
granted respondents motion for the dismissal of the court. The former deals with a violation of RA 6713
petition for certiorari for being moot and academic. office while the latter deals with an ultra vires act
punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to do with
The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount
redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987 of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to
while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made
redemption was a supervening event which rendered while the appeal of the private respondents from the
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the summary judgment of the RTC was pending. The
trial court against them unjust and inequitable. summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become
final and executory. It behooved the said respondents
Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the Supreme to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where
Court. they should have invoked the payment of the
redemption price as a ground for the reversal of the
ISSUE: THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE REDEMPTION
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners.
CONSTITUTED A SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH CHANGE
Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
13 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
docket fees for their appeal, which resulted in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. CA
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review
CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents on certiorari.
allowed the decision of the trial court to become final
and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that
summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be petitioners monthly receivables from the Foremost
frustrated by the respondents payment, through Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from execution.
Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in
1987. HELD: The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that
an order of execution of a final and executory
D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
AGENCY, INC., vs. ARNULFO ORPIA, et.al. otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to
PROPERTIES EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION; deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC
exemption pertains only to natural persons and
Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
not to juridical entities
FACTS:
"Rule IV EXECUTION
On February 9, 1995, respondents, who were employed
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution.
as security guards by petitioner, and assigned to
Only the properties of the losing party shall be the
Fortune Tobacco, Inc. filed with the Labor Arbiter a
subject of execution, except:
complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims
against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. L.A. rendered a (a) The losing partys family home constituted in
Decision, declaring that all the respondents except accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as
Antonio Cabangon Chua are jointly and severally liable may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof,
to pay complainants P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, the homestead in which he resides, and land
overtime pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave necessarily used in connection therewith, subject to
pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund of the limits fixed by law;
firearms bond, and ten 10% percent of all sums owing
to complainants is hereby awarded as attorneys fees. (b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC. (c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC affirmed with housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was the amount fixed by law;
dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter (d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
became the sole liability of petitioner. The records were three (3) months;
then remanded to the Arbiter for execution.
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers,
execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an
existing services agreement. Thus, petitioners (f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
receivables with Foremost were garnished. personal services within the month preceding the levy
as are necessary for the support of his family;
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution and Garnishment" which was (g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
opposed by respondents. Arbiter denied the motion accruing or in any manner growing out of any life
and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of insurance;
money to respondents pro rata. The MR was likewise
denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the NLRC. (h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in
NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to his trade or employment of a value not exceeding
post a bond within the reglementary period. Its MR was three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
likewise denied. Petitioner then filed with the CA a
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law."
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
14 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are G.R. No. 157616
exempt from execution. It is apparent that the
exemption pertains only to natural persons and July 22, 2005
not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA
correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity, Effect of Judgments
does not fall within the exemption, thus:
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept
judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second
by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or
has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between
court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or the first case wherein judgment is rendered and
collusion. the second case wherein such judgment is
involved, there is no identity of causes of action.
There are four (4) essential requisites which must As explained by this Court:
concur for the application of this doctrine:
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
(a) finality of the former judgment; action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
over the subject matter and the parties; particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
former judgment between the same parties will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or
(d) there must be, between the first and second question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit;
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
causes of action.[31] conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue
arising in the second. In order that this rule may be
A judgment or order is on the merits of the case applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either
when it determines the rights and liabilities of the from the record itself or by the aid of competent
parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in
pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not issue in the second suit was involved and decided in
necessary that a trial, actual hearing or argument on the first. And in determining whether a given question
the facts of the case ensued. For as long as the parties was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look
had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their behind the judgment to ascertain whether the
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the
order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on the second action would have authorized a judgment for
ground that the complaint does not state a cause of the same party in the first action.
action is a determination of the case on its
merits. Such order whether right or wrong bars another In the present case, before the private respondents
action based upon the same cause of action. The filed their first complaint, they already knew that the
operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by balance of their account with the bank
a mere right of appeal where the appeal has not been was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make
taken or by an appeal which never has been perfected. a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce
their account to P3,500,000.00.
Indeed, absolute identity of parties is not a
condition sine qua non for the application of res If indeed the bank made an erroneous
judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity of computation of the balance of their account as claimed
interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found by the private respondents in their second complaint,
in the second action, res judicata still applies if the this should have been alleged in the first complaint as
party against whom the judgment is offered in
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
17 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
one of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as
private respondents unequivocably admitted in their to defeat the application of the principle ofres judicata.
first complaint that the balance of their account with
the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the
amount for which the bank sought the foreclosure of statement of a different form of liability is not a
the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property different cause of action, provided it grows out of the
at public auction; they even sought judicial recourse to same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
of the one-year period therefor. causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the pleadings
Relying on these admissions on the part of the in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a
private respondents, and the fact that the bank has second action after the loss of the first, merely by
already consolidated its title over the property, the having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery
Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of opened by the pleadings in the first.
the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment
of the case on the merits. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in
The attempt of the respondents in their second issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
complaint to avoid the application of the principle suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question or which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for
a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case, the same wrong or injury.
between the same parties or their privies, the former
adjudication of that fact, right or question is binding on A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective equitable, must present to the court, either by the
of whether the causes of action are the same. The pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
ruling of the CA that the action of the private which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
respondents and their legal theory in their second liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
complaint were different from their causes of action piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest
different cause of action is one that proceeds not only to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
different factual footing as not to require the trial of presentation is allowed.
facts material to the former suit; that is, an action that
can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF
raised in the plaintiffs original complaint are concluded THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), vs. TOMAS TOH, SR.,
in defendants favor. AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG
CITY, BRANCH 214
In this case, the private respondents second G.R. No. 144018. June 23, 2003. SECOND
DIVISION. QUISUMBING
complaint cannot be maintained without trying the
facts material to the first case, and the second case EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE GROUND
cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues OF ADVANCED AGE
raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of
the bank. FACTS: On August 29, 1997, Private respondent Tomas
Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan Toh, Jr., and
Antonio Tan Toh executed a Comprehensive Security
The principle of res judicata applies when the Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein the Tohs
opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for
exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as
pleading of a different legal theory would have Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, to Catmon
convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in Sales International Corporation (CASICO). Said credit
the first action which, with the use of diligence the line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed
the same for another year, subject to the following
plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line from P22
they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories million to P7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as
operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal one of the sureties of CASICO.
On July 30, 1999, private respondent filed a Motion for In De Leon, the SC upheld immediate execution of
Judgment on the Pleadings, which the lower court judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. It ruled that
granted. Thereafter, Toh Sr. filed a Motion for her need of and right to immediate execution of the
Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2, Rule 39 decision in her favor amply satisfied the requirement of
of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and
pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age justice, outweighing the security offered by the
and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy supersedeas bond. In the subsequent case of Borja v.
his money deposited in petitioners bank. The RTC Court of Appeals, the SC likewise allowed execution
granted private respondents Motion for Discretionary pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-old man on the
Execution. ground that the appeal will take years to decide with
finality, and he might very well be facing a different
Petitioner without filing a motion for reconsideration of judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal
the trial courts order brought the matter to the CA in a and the decision on his complaint, even if it be in his
special civil action for certiorari. The CA dismissed it. favor, would have become meaningless as far as he
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also himself was concerned.
denied. Hence this appeal.
In the present case, private respondent Toh is already
ISSUE: WON THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF ADVANCED AGE OF be denied that he is already of advanced age. Not a
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TOMAS TOH, SR. IS PROPER. few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no
one could claim with certainty that his tribe would be
RULING: Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal always blessed with long life.
on the ground of advanced age of private respondent
Tomas Toh, Sr. is proper as it is well within the sound Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in
discretion of the trial court. the trial court. But that judgment is still on appeal
before the CA. It might even reach the SC before the
Discretionary execution is permissible only when good controversy is finally resolved with finality. As well said
reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment in Borja, while we may not agree that a man of his
before finality or pending appeal or even before the years is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate
expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons are his apprehension that he will not be long for this world
compelling circumstances justifying the immediate and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the finally passes away.
prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become
unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the
adverse party who may apparently have no case PANOTES VS CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT
except to delay. CORPORATION
The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give FACTS: Panotes is the president of the Provident
examples of good reasons to justify execution. The Village Homeowners Association, Inc.. He filed a
determination of what is a good reason must, complaint before the National Housing Authority (NHA)
necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of
against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR),
the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ
of execution must necessarily be controlled by the owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina
judgment of the judge in accordance with his own City. The complaint alleges that PROSECOR violated
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free some of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
from the control of anothers judgment or conscience. It 957, one of which is its failure to provide an open
ISSUE: Whether the NHA Resolution dated August 14, On 6 October 2000, Garon filed a motion for
1980 may be enforced against CTDC. execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000,
Stronghold Insurance moved for the reconsideration of
HELD: No. An action for revival of judgment is no more the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court and in
than a procedural means of securing the execution of a an Order dated 23 January 2001, the trial court denied
previous judgment which has become dormant after Stronghold Insurances motion for reconsideration for
the passage of five years without it being executed lack of merit.
upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended
to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the In an Order dated 8 February 2001, the trial
judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness court granted Garons motion for execution pending
of the first judgment. appeal. The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of
P20 million to answer for any damage that Project
Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by
sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and reason of the execution pending appeal. On 14
PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay February 2001, Branch Clerk of Court Richard C. Jamora
and respondent CTDC, the latter not being the ("Jamora") issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.
On 16 February 2001, Stronghold Insurance
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not
bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not filed a notice of appeal. Stronghold Insurance also filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to
divest the rights of a party who has not and never been
a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be assail the trial courts 8 February 2001 Order and the
writ of execution pending appeal. In its Resolution 8 of
issued only against a party to the action and not
against one who did not have his day in court. 23 February 2001, the Court of Appeals enjoined the
trial court, Jamora and Garon from enforcing the 8
February 2001 Order. However, it turned out that
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.
notices of garnishment had been served before the
HONORABLE NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as
Court of Appeals issued the temporary restraining
Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
20 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
order (TRO). In its Order dated 7 March 2001, the trial
9
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing
court denied Stronghold Insurances Urgent Motion for party with notice to the adverse party;
the recall of the notices of garnishment.
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;
ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to (c) the good reasons must be stated in the
justify execution pending appeal. special order.
RTC dismissed the petition. SolGen agreed the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.
petition.Fujiki' s MR was denied. Thus, a direct recourse FEDERICO A. SERRA
to SC from RTC under Rule 45 on a pure question of G.R. No. 203241.July 10, 2013. SECOND
law. DIVISION. CARPIO.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of
marriage void does not require relitigation under a RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision
dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 48(b),
Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for
judgment or final order against a person creates a Certiorari before the SC. In separate Resolutions dated
presumptive evidence of a right as between the 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final
parties and their successors in interest by a and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of respectively, the SC found neither reversible error nor
Court states that the judgment or final order may be grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
22 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of
the decision in the Specific Performance case. This was technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of
opposed by Serra arguing that the motion for execution procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
was already barred by prescription and laches, and
in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in
the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to serve the ends of justice.
Buy. The RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for
execution. RCBCs motion for reconsideration was HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO
likewise denied. Thus, RCBC filed this petition. YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA
ISSUE:
vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A.
WON RCBCs motion for execution was already barred "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
by prescription and laches. DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed the proper appreciation of the questions before
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship
be made in the corresponding special which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
the same. devoid of any legal effect.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR. G.R.
are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in No. 172852
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession January 30, 2013
of property. This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; EMINENT
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
DOMAIN; LEGAL INTEREST
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2)
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are immediately took possession of the lots after
seeking the establishment of a status or right. depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National
Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.