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RULE 39: EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF October 1, 1996, the Omnibus Order dated November
JUDGMENT 22, 1996 and the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 by the
G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002 On February 10, 1998, CA denied Aidas MR.
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by
herein petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course
These 2 petitions stem from the decision of RTC
to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15,
Cebu Br. 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The 1st
1997 the entire case records to the CA. Aida filed with
seeks the reversal of the CAs decision setting aside
the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of
that Gabriel had failed to file with the CA a Record on
the RTC. The 2nd prays for the reversal of the resolution
Appeal. CA denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
of the CA denying the motion to dismiss.
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
On September 23, 1996, RTC Cebu Branch 20, petition in G.R. No. 133628. SC consolidated the
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among two petitions.
others the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; ISSUES:
the forfeiture of Gabriels 1/2 share in the net conjugal
I. The core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
assets in favor of the common children; the payment to
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in
the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the HELD: Petitions are denied for lack of merit.
use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the G.R. No. 132592:
smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed
within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
when superior circumstances demanding urgency
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to outweigh the damages that may result from the
modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
Appeal. instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
RTC granted Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion become a tool of oppression and inequity.
to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by In this case, considering the reasons cited by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees or urgent circumstance that outweighs the
the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents damage which respondent would suffer if he
ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the were ordered to vacate the house. We note that
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that
B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys she did not intend to use said house, and that she has
fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%. two (2) other houses in the US where she is a
In another motion to modify the decision, permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To
9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
appeal. Respondent Gabriel filed a consolidated than the exception.
written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed Similarly, we are not persuaded that the
for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was
On November 22, 1996, RTC denied Aidas properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt
motion for moral and exemplary damages and the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said
litigation expenses but gave due course to the amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts
execution pending appeal. judgment was already on appeal.

In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez Fajardo vs. Quitalig

elevated the case to the CA. On March 21, 1997, CA A.M. No. P-02-1535
March 28, 2003
rendered its decision setting aside the Order dated
Return of Writ of Execution
the litigation process is carried out without
unnecessary delay.
Facts: A complaint for ejectment filed by Fajardo and
Perez against Maria Datuin was finally decided against SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of
the latter. The decision being final and executory. Upon execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
motion of complainant, the Court issued a Writ of immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in
Execution on March 7, 2000 which was brought by part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full
respondent Sheriff to the defendant Datuin on March 9, within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ,
2000. However the writ was not executed on first the officer shall report to the court and state the
instance because Datuin asked for a 2-week period to reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect
move out. during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
Thereafter, the writ was still not executed because the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
Sheriff alleged that there was a restraining order taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or
prohibiting him to do so. On March 24, 2000 upon its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
verification from the court, complainant found out that shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
there was no restraining order. So he told the shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. promptly furnished the parties.
Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the
barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of We find respondents explanation to be utterly
Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a
but when they reached the place, respondent did not sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within
do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report
her personal properties. His reason is that an employee of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic
of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully
to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the
to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ Reports.
of execution can no longer be implemented.

By his own words, respondent admitted his

Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he
showed partiality in favor of the defendant to his should have immediately executed the Writ when he
prejudice. served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.

In his Comment respondent denied the charge and Second, he should have immediately reported to
asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had the MTCC that he was unable to enforce the Writ
already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as because another court had issued a TRO enjoining him
evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. He from doing so. Third, he should have informed the
also pointed out that he had made an inventory of the parties, particularly the plaintiff or his counsel, about
personal properties recovered from the subject his inability to enforce the Writ. Fourth, he should have
premises. That he had done so was attested to by immediately enforced it twenty days after its issuance.
defendants mother, and witnessed by the barangay
captain and two councilors.
Fifth, he should have made periodic Reports to the
MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied and the
The OCA found respondent to have been negligent in parties furnished a copy thereof. Sixth, within thirty
the performance of his duty as a sheriff and days from his receipt of the Writ, he should have
recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine promptly made his Return, a copy of which he should
of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a have immediately furnished the parties.
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute

Issue: Whether the findings of the OCA is correct disrespect, if not outright defiance, of the MTCCs
authority. In the absence of instructions to the
Held: Yes, the OCA is correct. As frontline officials of
contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with
the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to
reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with
maintain public trust in the performance of their
its mandate.
duties. Having the forsworn duty to uphold the majesty
of the law, they must see to it that the final stage in


In several cases, the Court has said that the failure to the COMELEC First Division did not refer the said
make a return of a writ within the required period is motion to the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, petitioner,
nonfeasance. citing Kho v. COMELEC brought the instant special civil
action for certiorari before the SC.
PANULAYA 1. WON Execution pending appeal is proper in Election
G.R. No. 155618. March 26, 2003. EN BANC. cases.
Motion for Execution pending appeal; Forum 2. WON respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
1. Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal
Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. was well within the discretionary powers of the trial
Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the 2001 in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that
elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should
Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the show not merely a reversible error committed by the
duly elected Mayor. trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. The decision of the trial court was In this case, no grave abuse of discretion was
rendered after almost one year of trial and revision of committed by the trial court in granting execution
the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the pending appeal. However, the COMELEC set aside the
candidate with the plurality of votes. Petitioner aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is
thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending
Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on
petitioners motion, respondent filed on with the While it was indeed held that shortness of the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. remaining term of office and posting a bond are not
20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial court. good reasons, the SC stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:
Respondent likewise appealed the trial courts decision A valid exercise of the discretion to allow
to the COMELEC, where it was docketed as EAC No. A- execution pending appeal requires that it
12-2002. should be based upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. The following
The COMELEC dismissed SPR No. 20-2002 after finding constitute good reasons and a
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of combination of two or more of them will
discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Thus,
suffice to grant execution pending
the trial court directs and orders the immediate
execution of its Decision promulgated on April 18, appeal: (1.) public interest involved or
2002, to install protestant/petitioner EDGAR Y. SANTOS will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness
as the duly elected Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis of the remaining portion of the term of
Oriental, to take his oath of office and assume the the contested office; and (3.) the length
functions and duties of Mayor after he shall have filed a of time that the election contest has been
bond. After petitioner posted the required bond, the pending.
trial court issued the Writ of Execution.

On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was rendered after almost one year of trial and revision
of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, he of the questioned ballots and found petitioner as the
filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002. candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the
Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while
his motion for reconsideration and supplemental meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the
petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were pending, respondent Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as determined by the trial court in the election protest,
SPR No. 37-2002. The petition contained the same had to be respected and given meaning. The
prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the
20-2002. services of a mayor even while the election protest was
pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued an Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante determined to have been chosen by the people.
and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of
Mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but


All that was required for a valid exercise of the ground for summary dismissal of the case, and
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that constitutes direct contempt of court.
the immediate execution should be based upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale
why such execution is allowed in election cases RCBC vs. MAGWIN
is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judges G.R. No. 152878
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the
law to the proclamation by the board of May 5, 2003

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant

execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon
Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the grab-the-
proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their
efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective
Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to
office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the
prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed
will of the electorate.
and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it
ready for pre-trial are matters which should have been
2. Yes. Respondent was guilty of forum-
clarified and resolved in the first instance by the court
shopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the
COMELEC. a quo.

Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an FACTS: On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that Anderson Uy. On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a
one or the other court would make a favorable writ of attachment. On 4 June 1999 the writ was
disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights attached. In the meantime, summons was served on
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
each of the defendants, respondents herein, who filed
on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the their respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel
other action will, regardless of which party is Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On
consideration. 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ
of attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse
quo denied.
decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was
dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for
petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts pre-trial. For about six (6) months thereafter,
order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. discussions between petitioner and respondents
Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy
while the same was very much pending before the
and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518,
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.
supplemental petition. In doing so, respondent sought
to increase his chances of securing a favorable On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
decision in another petition.
payment scheme for the corporation which on was
Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated
forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent
petition should have been dismissed outright by the Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin
COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a Marketing Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as
Director thereof. Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his
signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the
terms and conditions of the restructuring. Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000
and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court of
On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without Rules of Civil Procedure. In the main, petitioner argued
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner that the court a quo had no authority to compel the
as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an
unreasonable length of time . . .." amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-
trial conference on the ground that no compromise
Subsequently, the petitioner moved for agreement was turned over to the court a quo.
reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial
court of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the ISSUE:
case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of 1) Whether or not the petitioner is required to pay
the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as again the requisite docket fees.
an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
defendant in the civil case. 2) Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a claim
for failure of the parties to submit to a compromise
On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case agreement.
No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only HELD:
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff 1) No. There is no substantial policy worth
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the
Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its docket fees when it has already discharged this
loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
conditions specified in said letter." complaint for collection of a sum of money. The
procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of
petitioner's Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not submit raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed
a compromise agreement because only defendant complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to
Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, which the original case pertained. A complaint that is
2000 letter . . .." Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings
foregoing submissions of petitioner while respondents with the concomitant full attention of the same trial
Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and
Sy neither contested nor supported them. control over the case that was previously dismissed,
which in the context of the instant case is a waste of
The trial court, in an undated Order (although a judicial time, capital and energy.
date was later inserted in the Order), denied
petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 What judicial benefit do we derive from starting
for pre-trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to the civil case all over again, especially where three (3)
submit a compromise agreement. of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not
On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its contested petitioner's plea before this Court and the
Notice of Appeal from the said Orders. On 16 courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference?
November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of
one of which inserted the date "6 November 2000" in petitioner's complaint without the usual procedure for
the undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for pre- the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo
trial in the civil case, and the other denying due course invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting
dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are should we rule otherwise.
interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be
taken . . .." It must be emphasized however that once the
dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court
cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and willingness to discuss a possible compromise is
executory dismissal although without prejudice divests expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears
the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well that one of the parties, before the commencement of
as any residual power to order anything relative to the the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the compromise but the other party refused the offer,
complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite
we are to concede that the trial court retains efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the negotiations still fail, only then should the action
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon continue as if no suspension had taken place.
would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on
the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court
setting aside of the order of dismissal and the to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
reinstatement of the complaint. encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
2) only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a
deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
Besides the semantic and consequential attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our ruling litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a
case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the middle ground between petitioner and respondents, we
action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for must not interpret the trial court's Orders as dismissing
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was the action on its own motion because the parties,
in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their
with the other parties within fifteen (15) days from case as exhibited in their several manifestations and
notice of the order to do so and held - motions.

Since there is nothing in the In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost
Rules that imposes the interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court
sanction of dismissal for failing may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
to submit a compromise but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power
agreement, then it is obvious is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
that the dismissal of the chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
complaint on the basis thereof acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
amounts no less to a gross Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
procedural infirmity assailable contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial
by certiorari. For such grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-
submission could at most be appearance in the case, the courts should consider
directory and could not result lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving
in throwing out the case for the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme
failure to effect a compromise. to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton
While a compromise is failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
encouraged, very strongly in rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
fact, failure to consummate courts should decide to dispense rather than wield
one does not warrant any their authority to dismiss.
procedural sanction, much less
an authority to jettison a civil Clearly, another creative remedy was available
complaint worth P4,000,000.00 to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil
. . . Plainly, submission of a Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
compromise agreement is justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a
never mandatory, nor is it compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of
required by any rule. herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on
the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and
As also explained therein, the proper course of the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch
action that should have been taken by the court a quo, in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference
upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to was the best-suited solution to the problem as this
discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and
and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If the dispute quickly and genuinely reconciled. By
means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to Thereafter, Principal Management Group requested
sway the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise. payment from iligan City for the portions of the project
which they already finished. Iligan City on the other
Dismissing the civil case and compelling hand responded on the negative, stating that the
petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly agreed price of 14M will only be paid upon completion
and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not of the project.
resolving, the disagreement. This case management
strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so PMGI filed a complaint for the rescission of the MOA
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action, and damages against City of Iligan. The latter then
perhaps, may have already been admitted by its filed its answer. Nevertheless, PGMI moved for partial
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4) summary judgment claiming that there was no genuine
defendants not willing to contest petitioner's issue as to the obligation of the City of Iligan and that
allegations, and more critically, since this approach the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath
promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard the genuiness of the Letter of Credit and the MOA.
work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have
The Trial Court granted the motion of partial summary
aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if
judgment. On the other hand, City of Iligan filed a
without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they
Considering that the MR by Iligan was denied, Iligan
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of
City filed a notice of appeal.
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was then filed
lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better by the PGMI, which was granted over the objection of
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and Iligan City.
final disposition of the cases before the court.
The Court is convinced that there are good reasons to
City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its
Inc. adjudication is based on [petitioners] own admission
hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious and would
G.R. No. 145260 only serve to delay execution of the final order subject
of the instant motion. The fact that an appeal in this
July 31, 2003 case if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely dilatory
tactic has been declared by the Supreme Court as a
Executions Pending Appeal
good and sufficient reason upon which to issue
Facts: Mayor Franklin M. Quijano, acting for and in execution of the order under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
behalf of the City of Iligan, Requested from the Revised Rules of Court.
Sangguinang Panlungsod, a resolution authorizing him
The CA affirmed the decision. The appellate court also
to open a domestic Standby Letter of Credit in the
ruled that certiorari would not be allowed in this case,
amount of 14M in favor of Land Bank Realty
because there were other remedies still available to
Development Corporation and/or PNCC with the
petitioner, like the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay
Principal Management Group as the funder. The City
the execution or the filing of a motion for
Council approved Quijanos request and passed board
resolutions. A MOA on a turn-key arrangement was
entered into by the parties for the construction of a Issue: Whether the Order granting execution pending
sports complex which upon completion will be turned appeal was proper.
over to Iligan City for acceptance and the issuance of
Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to Held: Yes.
enable Land Bank Realty-PMGI to call on the SLC.
Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2
The construction site was donated by San Miguel of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Enterprises Inc. wherein Iligan City, as donee, would
provide for all the expenses for the transfer of the "SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.--
occupants therein. Thereafter, the construction of the
Sports Complex was stopped due to the refusal of (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending
some occupants therein to vacate for the failure of appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice
Iligan City to provide them for disturbance to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
compensation. jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said The ascertainment of good reasons for execution
court may, in its discretion, order execution of a pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the
judgment or final order even before the expiration of trial court, and the appellate court will not normally
the period to appeal. disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be
proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of
"After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for discretion.
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court. Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed, this
"Discretionary execution may only issue upon good Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon
reasons to be stated in a special order after due which to authorize immediate execution is when an
hearing." appeal is clearly dilatory

There are three requisites for the execution of a VILLARUEL vs FERNANDO

judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must be filed by
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b) Judgments
there must be good reasons for execution pending
appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a Judgments; One of the exceptions to the rule that a
special order. judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception modified in any respect except only to correct clerical
to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be errors or mistakes is when circumstances transpire
obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
final and executory; (b) the right of appeal has been unjust and inequitable.
renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is
lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d)
the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation
having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and
Office (ATO), Department of Transportation and
the records of the case have been returned to the court
Communication (DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D.
of origin -- in which case, execution shall issue as a
Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou
matter of right.
M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant,
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil
yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be Aviation Training Center (CATC).
allowed except if, in the courts discretion, there are
good reasons therefor.

Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995
exception to the general rule, the existence of "good addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the
reasons" is essential. These reasons must be stated in Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective
a special order, because unless these are divulged, it 2 May 1995.
will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised by the lower On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC
court. Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that reconsideration of the detail order.
justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it
become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order,
enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary
of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents request for
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
both the trial and the appellate courts was that the 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
partial adjudication of the case was based on preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending
petitioners own admission; hence, any appeal based investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
on that point would be unmeritorious and merely
dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return
reason upon which to issue execution."
to their mother unit since more than 90 days had extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file
already lapsed. Respondents also sought the petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a file the memorandum.
result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia
the action taken on respondents request for On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
reconsideration of the detail order. counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the alleged that the trial courts decision never became
Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia OSG failed to file Petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
detail of respondents. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner trial courts order granting respondents motion for
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their execution. Petitioner further asserted that the
mother unit. On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Resolution of the Ombudsman superseded the decision
Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a of the trial court.
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, which the The Ombudsmans Resolution
trial court granted on February. approved the following recommendation of the
reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial
court was appointed Chairman of the Commission on PREMISES
Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled CONSIDERED,
and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court, respondent MODESTO
Pasay City.On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an ABARCA, JR., is hereby
order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge found GUILTY of
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary violation of Section 7(d)
mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply of Republic Act 6713,
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia for which the penalty of
directing petitioner to recall respondents to their Suspension Without
mother unit until further orders by the trial court. Pay for Six (6) Months
is hereby
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the recommended
writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to pursuant to Section
cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to 10(b), Rule III of
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer Administrative Order
within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of No. 07, in relation to
26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court Section 25(2) of
granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of Republic Act No. 6770.
indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench
warrant against petitioner. It is also respectfully
recommended that the
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General charge against
(OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the respondents
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding REYNALDO FERNANDO
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. Also the trial and MARY LOU
court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file CLEOFAS be DISMISSED
an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, courts ruling that the nature of the case before the
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial
granted respondents motion for the dismissal of the court. The former deals with a violation of RA 6713
petition for certiorari for being moot and academic. office while the latter deals with an ultra vires act
punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to do with


the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are Spouses JAIME and PURIFICACION MORTA vs.
separate and distinct from each other. Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial
Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and Sheriff DANILO O.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao,
finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating Section 7 Albay
of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts
decision unjust and inequitable. A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1513

HELD: NO. The Ombudsmans Resolution Does NOVEMBER 12, 2003

Not Render the Execution of the Trial Courts
Decision Unjust and Inequitable

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans

Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section
7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the trial courts decision
finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists FACTS: In their Administrative Complaint , Spouses
that the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the Jaime and Purificacion Morta Sr. charged Judge Antonio
execution of the trial courts decision unjust and C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial Court of
inequitable. Guinobatan, Albay with gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, bias and delay in the disposition of Civil
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired Case No. 481, entitled Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental and Atty. Mariano Baranda,
no longer be modified in any respect except only to Jr., for Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits Injunction, and Civil Case No. 482 entitled Jaime Morta,
of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is Sr. and Purificacion Padilla vs. Jamie Occidental, Atty.
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral, for Damages
the decision rendering its execution unjust and with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
inequitable. This, however, is not the case here. In the
present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution
prior to the finality of the trial courts decision. The
Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 Complainants, who are the plaintiffs in the
while the trial courts decision became final and aforementioned civil cases, alleged that on March 29,
executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of 1994, the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay
the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant rendered a decision in their favor. The defendants
the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial appealed to the Regional Trial Court which dismissed
court. the aforesaid cases on the ground that the claims for
damages are tenancy-related problems which fall
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
not and could not supersede the decision of the trial (DARAB). The plaintiffs filed a petition for review with
court holding petitioner liable for damages. The action the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the RTC.
filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is However, in its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
completely different from the action instituted by the lower courts ruling that the cases fall within the
respondents before the trial court. The two actions, original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. Thereafter,
which are clearly separate and distinct from each the First Division of this Court, acting on the petition for
other, presented two different causes of action. review on certiorari filed by the plaintiffs, rendered its
Petitioners cause of action arose from respondents decision affirming the decision of the Municipal Trial
alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 Court, Guinobatan, Albay in Civil Case Nos. 481 and
whereas respondents cause of action resulted from 482 and thereby setting aside the decision of the Court
petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.
the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents
were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the issue
in the civil action before the trial court was whether
respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of
Complainants now alleged that despite the fact that
mandamus and damages.
the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case
had already become final and executory, the
respondent Judge still refused to issue a writ of Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA
possession in their favor. 415(2003)


The execution of a judgment may be stayed,

In his Answer/Comment, respondent judge explained nothwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
that he had denied complainants Motion for the judgment by the Supreme Court if there are
issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time supervening facts and circumstances which either
Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by have a direct effect upon a matter already litigated
this Court on June 10, 1999, they had already been and settled or create a substantial change in the rights
ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the or relations of the parties therein which would render
Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil Case No. execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
1920. In Civil Case No. 1920, respondent judge ordered inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the
complainants to vacate the disputed lots. A Writ of interest of justice.
Execution/Demolition was thereafter issued on January
29, 1998. On the other hand, the DARAB Decision, FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a
which became final and executory on October 27, parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon
1998, directed them to cease and desist from located at Road 4, Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City,
disturbing the peaceful possession of therein petitioner covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80384, and
Jaime Occidental. a parcel of land located in Caloocan City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The couple
mortgaged the said properties in favor of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as
The OCA found that the explanation of respondent security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the couple
judge for not granting the Motion for Execution, filed by was able to pay only the amount of P18,000.
complainants, was sufficient. According to the court
administrator, the records showed that they had On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as vendors,
indeed been evicted from the lots they were claiming and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as vendees,
when Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided executed a deed of absolute sale with partial
by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1999. Moreover, it assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land
emphasized that this Court had merely affirmed the covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon for
Decision of the MTC insofar as the award of damages the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the
was concerned. amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property,
the balance of P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS
for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses
Geli thereafter took possession of the property. In the
meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was survived
ISSUE: Whether execution of a final judgment may be by her husband Emilio Geli and their children.
Emilio Geli and his children failed to settle the amount
of P32,000 to the GSIS. The latter forthwith filed a
complaint against Emilio Geli and his children with the
HELD: YES. We agree with the OCA that respondent Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the rescission of
judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of the deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of
execution/possession. His action was consistent with mortgage. The defendants therein alleged, by way of
the Decision of this Court in GR No. 123417 affirming special defense, that the plaintiffs Spouses Serrano
that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latters failed to furnish them with a detailed statement of the
Order directing defendants not to molest complainants account due from the GSIS, thus amounting for their
in their peaceful possession was rendered moot when failure to remit the balance of the loan to the GSIS. On
they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of September 6, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment
the final and executory judgments in Civil Case No. ordering the rescission of the said deed.
1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution
of a final judgment may be refused, as in this case, Emilio Geli and his children appealed the decision to
when there has been a change in the situation of the the CA on October 19, 1984. During the pendency of
parties that would make its execution inequitable. the appeal, the GSIS foreclosed the real estate
mortgage over the property for non-payment of the
P50,000 loan secured by the said property. At the sale


on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A THE RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THUS RENDERING
certificate of sale over the property was thereby issued EXECUTION INEQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES
by the sheriff in its favor on August 30, 1986. On
October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio Geli HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition.
paid the redemption price of P67,701.844 to the GSIS. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is
Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the said a matter of right on the part of the prevailing
amount with the notation for the account of Arturo party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of
Serrano were issued. Accordingly, on February 22, the trial court to enforce its own judgment once
1988, the GSIS executed a certificate of redemption5 it becomes final and executory. It may happen,
and turned over to Emilio Geli the owners copy of TCT however, that new facts and circumstances may
No. 80384 in the names of the Spouses Serrano. Emilio develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered
Geli did not inform the Spouses Serrano and the CA and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new
that he had paid the redemption price to the GSIS. matters had developed after the appeal has been
dismissed and the appealed judgment had become
After the remand of the records, the Spouses Serrano final and executory, which the parties were not aware
filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994 a motion for the of and could not have been aware of prior to or during
execution of the trial courts September 6, 1984 the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in
Decision. On February 15, 1994, the trial court issued existence at that time. In the first situation, any
an order granting the motion and forthwith issued a attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an
writ of execution. The writ, however, was not executory decision must fail. Once a judgment has
implemented as the Spouses Serrano were then in the become final and executory, the only remedy left for
United States. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule
an alias writ of execution on motion of the plaintiffs. 38 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no other
This, too, was not implemented, because of the prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the
defendants change of address. On May 9, 1996, the judgment on equitable grounds predicated on facts
trial court issued an order granting the motion of the occurring before the finality of judgment. In the
plaintiffs for a second alias writ of execution. On second situation, the execution may be stayed,
September 6, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed
quash the same claiming, for the first time, that judgment by this Court. It is required, however,
defendant Emilio Geli had already redeemed the that the supervening facts and circumstances
subject property in 1988 from the GSIS. According to must either have a direct effect upon the matter
the defendants, this constituted a supervening event already litigated and settled or create a
that would make the execution of the trial courts substantial change in the rights or relations of
decision unjust and inequitable. the parties therein which would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible
On May 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in
denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. It the interest of justice. The interested party may file
noted that the payment by defendant Emilio Geli of the a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by the
redemption price to the GSIS took place before the CA trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the
dismissed the appeal and before the decision of the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and
RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not further supervening facts. Evidence may be adduced
constitute a supervening event warranting a quashal of by the parties on such supervening facts or
the writ of execution. circumstances.

The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount
redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987 of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to
while his appeal was pending in the CA, the said the GSIS for the account of the petitioners was made
redemption was a supervening event which rendered while the appeal of the private respondents from the
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the summary judgment of the RTC was pending. The
trial court against them unjust and inequitable. summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become
final and executory. It behooved the said respondents
Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the Supreme to prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where
Court. they should have invoked the payment of the
redemption price as a ground for the reversal of the
trial courts summary judgment in their favor. The
respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners.
Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite
docket fees for their appeal, which resulted in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. CA
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for review
CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents on certiorari.
allowed the decision of the trial court to become final
and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of the ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that
summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be petitioners monthly receivables from the Foremost
frustrated by the respondents payment, through Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from execution.
Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in
1987. HELD: The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that
an order of execution of a final and executory
D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
AGENCY, INC., vs. ARNULFO ORPIA, et.al. otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005
Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to
PROPERTIES EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION; deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC
exemption pertains only to natural persons and
Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
not to juridical entities
On February 9, 1995, respondents, who were employed
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution.
as security guards by petitioner, and assigned to
Only the properties of the losing party shall be the
Fortune Tobacco, Inc. filed with the Labor Arbiter a
subject of execution, except:
complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims
against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. L.A. rendered a (a) The losing partys family home constituted in
Decision, declaring that all the respondents except accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as
Antonio Cabangon Chua are jointly and severally liable may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof,
to pay complainants P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, the homestead in which he resides, and land
overtime pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave necessarily used in connection therewith, subject to
pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund of the limits fixed by law;
firearms bond, and ten 10% percent of all sums owing
to complainants is hereby awarded as attorneys fees. (b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;

Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC. (c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC affirmed with housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was the amount fixed by law;
dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter (d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
became the sole liability of petitioner. The records were three (3) months;
then remanded to the Arbiter for execution.
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers,
execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an
existing services agreement. Thus, petitioners (f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
receivables with Foremost were garnished. personal services within the month preceding the levy
as are necessary for the support of his family;
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution and Garnishment" which was (g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
opposed by respondents. Arbiter denied the motion accruing or in any manner growing out of any life
and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of insurance;
money to respondents pro rata. The MR was likewise
denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the NLRC. (h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in
NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to his trade or employment of a value not exceeding
post a bond within the reglementary period. Its MR was three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
likewise denied. Petitioner then filed with the CA a
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law."
The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are G.R. No. 157616
exempt from execution. It is apparent that the
exemption pertains only to natural persons and July 22, 2005
not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA
correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity, Effect of Judgments
does not fall within the exemption, thus:

"We cannot accede to petitioners position that the Facts:

garnished amount is exempt from execution.
The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain International Exchange Bank to finance their project for
and clear on what properties are exempt from the construction of townhouses. To secure the payment
execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads: of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) over the said property. The
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. construction was delayed resulting to the failure of Sps.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the Digos to pay their loan which subsequently caused the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM. Consequently,
execution:x x x x x x x x x the property was sold at public auction, with the bank
as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00, which
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the appeared to be the account of the spouses Digos at the
judgment obligor for his personal services within the time. The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff
four months preceding the levy as are necessary for was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register
the support of his family. of Deeds.

The exemption under this procedural rule should be

read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive When the period to redeem the property was
law which proscribes the execution of employees about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from
wages, thus: the bank to redeem property, to which the bank after
previous refusal agreed to one month extension.
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to However, instead of repurchasing said property, the
execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance. extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to
Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant dismiss which was granted by the trial court.
to favor only laboring men or women whose works are
manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property
the reward of a days labor for immediate or present to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was
support, and such persons are more in need of the filed by Sps. Digos against the bank, Perez and Ragua,
exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court of Appeals, for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial
140 SCRA 304 (1985)]. foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by
them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined well as the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff,
only to natural persons and not to juridical and the Torrens title issued to them.
entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of
salaries, wages and earning from the personal
The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first
services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule
complaint that they were not notified of the sale at
further requires that such earnings be intended for the
public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid
support of the judgment debtors family.
for the property was unconscionably low compared to
It stands to reason that only natural persons whose the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They
salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his also admitted their failure to pay their amortization on
own and that of his familys support are exempted their loans. However, they alleged this time that the
under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner and the sale at public auction were illegal because the
security agency is not covered by the exemption. bank charged much more than the amount due on
their loan account, to wit: interest of 26% per annum
on the loan account covering January 2, 1998, whereas
Perez vs. CA
under the promissory note executed in favor of the
bank, the new interest rate should commence only on action which are distinct and independent, although
March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account, arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of
and 5% penalty charges on top of the 26% interest per fact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no
annum, as shown by the banks statement of account. bar to subsequent actions on the others.
The spouses Digos also averred that although they
pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account and a The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the
moratorium on the payment of their account, they subsequent action will not render the judgment in the
were unaware of the erroneous computation of the prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are not
balance of their loan account. They maintained that distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by
the banks consolidation of its title over the property on difference in the claims for relief.
September 19, 1999 was premature because they were
given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property. Comparing the material averments of the two
complaints, it would appear that separate primary
Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on rights of the respondents were violated by the banks
similar grounds of res judicata, splitting of a single institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial the real estate mortgage and the sale at public
court denied. The MR was also denied. auction; hence, the respondents had separate and
independent causes of action against the bank, to wit:
Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA (a) the first complaint relates to the violation by the
rendered judgment dismissing the petition and bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial,
affirming the assailed orders. The appellate court foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an
declared that there was no identity of causes of action extension of the period for the respondents to redeem
in the two cases because the first action was one for the property with damages; (b) the second complaint
injunction and redemption of the property, whereas the relates to the breach by the bank of its loan contract
second action was for the nullification of the with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of their unpaid
computation of the balance on the respondents account with the bank.
account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were
not estopped from filing their second action. The However, we are convinced that the institution by
petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the the respondents of their second complaint anchored on
said decision, which the appellate court denied. their claim that the bank breached its loan contracts
with them by erroneously computing the actual and
Issue: Whether or not the judgment in the first case is correct balance of their account when the petition for
res judicata to the second case. extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
was filed by it designed to avert the dismissal of their
Held: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action consists complaint due to splitting causes of action and res
in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint
several parts or claims and instituting two or more and the dismissal of their appeal through their
actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim negligence. The Court is constrained to conclude that
or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be this was a last-ditch attempt to resuscitate their lost
made the subject of two or more different actions. cause, a brazen violation of the principle of res
A single act or omission may be violative of
various rights at the same time, such as when the act Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal provides in part:
obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a
cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment
be violated by several acts or omissions, there would or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
separate and distinct primary rights are violated by judgment or order, may be as follows:
one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right
should be violated by two distinct and separate legal (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with
wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either other matter that could have been raised in relation
case, two causes of action would result. Causes of thereto, conclusive between the parties and their


successors in interest by title subsequent to the evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a
commencement of the action or special proceeding, case can always be renewed by the mere expedience
litigating for the same thing and under the same title of joining new parties in the new suit.
and in the same capacity.
The ultimate test to ascertain identity of
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or causes of action is whether or not the same
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to evidence fully supports and establishes both the
have been adjudged in a former judgment which first and second cases. The application of the
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or doctrine of res judicata cannot be excused by merely
which was actually and necessarily included therein or varying the form of the action or engaging a different
necessary thereto. method of presenting the issue.

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept
judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second
by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter that branch, otherwise known as collateral estoppel or
has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between
court of competent jurisdiction without fraud or the first case wherein judgment is rendered and
collusion. the second case wherein such judgment is
involved, there is no identity of causes of action.
There are four (4) essential requisites which must As explained by this Court:
concur for the application of this doctrine:
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
(a) finality of the former judgment; action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
over the subject matter and the parties; particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
former judgment between the same parties will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or
(d) there must be, between the first and second question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit;
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
causes of action.[31] conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue
arising in the second. In order that this rule may be
A judgment or order is on the merits of the case applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either
when it determines the rights and liabilities of the from the record itself or by the aid of competent
parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in
pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not issue in the second suit was involved and decided in
necessary that a trial, actual hearing or argument on the first. And in determining whether a given question
the facts of the case ensued. For as long as the parties was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look
had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their behind the judgment to ascertain whether the
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the
order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on the second action would have authorized a judgment for
ground that the complaint does not state a cause of the same party in the first action.
action is a determination of the case on its
merits. Such order whether right or wrong bars another In the present case, before the private respondents
action based upon the same cause of action. The filed their first complaint, they already knew that the
operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by balance of their account with the bank
a mere right of appeal where the appeal has not been was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make
taken or by an appeal which never has been perfected. a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce
their account to P3,500,000.00.
Indeed, absolute identity of parties is not a
condition sine qua non for the application of res If indeed the bank made an erroneous
judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared identity of computation of the balance of their account as claimed
interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found by the private respondents in their second complaint,
in the second action, res judicata still applies if the this should have been alleged in the first complaint as
party against whom the judgment is offered in
one of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as
private respondents unequivocably admitted in their to defeat the application of the principle ofres judicata.
first complaint that the balance of their account with
the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the
amount for which the bank sought the foreclosure of statement of a different form of liability is not a
the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property different cause of action, provided it grows out of the
at public auction; they even sought judicial recourse to same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
of the one-year period therefor. causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the pleadings
Relying on these admissions on the part of the in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a
private respondents, and the fact that the bank has second action after the loss of the first, merely by
already consolidated its title over the property, the having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery
Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of opened by the pleadings in the first.
the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment
of the case on the merits. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in
The attempt of the respondents in their second issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
complaint to avoid the application of the principle suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question or which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for
a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case, the same wrong or injury.
between the same parties or their privies, the former
adjudication of that fact, right or question is binding on A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective equitable, must present to the court, either by the
of whether the causes of action are the same. The pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
ruling of the CA that the action of the private which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
respondents and their legal theory in their second liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
complaint were different from their causes of action piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest
different cause of action is one that proceeds not only to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
different factual footing as not to require the trial of presentation is allowed.
facts material to the former suit; that is, an action that
can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF
raised in the plaintiffs original complaint are concluded THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), vs. TOMAS TOH, SR.,
In this case, the private respondents second G.R. No. 144018. June 23, 2003. SECOND
complaint cannot be maintained without trying the
facts material to the first case, and the second case EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE GROUND
cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues OF ADVANCED AGE
raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of
the bank. FACTS: On August 29, 1997, Private respondent Tomas
Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan Toh, Jr., and
Antonio Tan Toh executed a Comprehensive Security
The principle of res judicata applies when the Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein the Tohs
opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for
exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as
pleading of a different legal theory would have Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, to Catmon
convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in Sales International Corporation (CASICO). Said credit
the first action which, with the use of diligence the line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed
the same for another year, subject to the following
plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line from P22
they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories million to P7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as
operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal one of the sureties of CASICO.


must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard
On March 17, 1999, Toh Sr. sued petitioner for the and fast rule.
recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the
amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages. He claimed In this case, the trial court granted private respondents
that petitioner had debited, without his knowledge and motion for discretionary execution due to his advanced
consent, said amount from his savings and current age, citing our ruling in De Leon v. Soriano. It
accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the concluded that old age is a good reason to allow
money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of execution pending appeal as any delay in the final
by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO) disposition of the present case may deny private
from petitioner. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has
Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored with defendant bank. The Court of Appeals found said
by FEBTCO allegedly for having been drawn against ruling in conformity with sound logical precepts,
insufficient funds. inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time
would render the ultimate judgment ineffective. It
Petitioner bank, in its answer averred that the debiting further stressed that the trial court was in the vantage
of Tohs bank accounts was justified due to his surety position to determine whether private respondents
undertaking in the event of the default of CASICO in its advanced age and state of health would merit the
payments. execution private respondent prayed for.

On July 30, 1999, private respondent filed a Motion for In De Leon, the SC upheld immediate execution of
Judgment on the Pleadings, which the lower court judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. It ruled that
granted. Thereafter, Toh Sr. filed a Motion for her need of and right to immediate execution of the
Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2, Rule 39 decision in her favor amply satisfied the requirement of
of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and
pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age justice, outweighing the security offered by the
and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy supersedeas bond. In the subsequent case of Borja v.
his money deposited in petitioners bank. The RTC Court of Appeals, the SC likewise allowed execution
granted private respondents Motion for Discretionary pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-old man on the
Execution. ground that the appeal will take years to decide with
finality, and he might very well be facing a different
Petitioner without filing a motion for reconsideration of judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal
the trial courts order brought the matter to the CA in a and the decision on his complaint, even if it be in his
special civil action for certiorari. The CA dismissed it. favor, would have become meaningless as far as he
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also himself was concerned.
denied. Hence this appeal.
In the present case, private respondent Toh is already
ISSUE: WON THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF ADVANCED AGE OF be denied that he is already of advanced age. Not a
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TOMAS TOH, SR. IS PROPER. few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no
one could claim with certainty that his tribe would be
RULING: Yes. The grant of execution pending appeal always blessed with long life.
on the ground of advanced age of private respondent
Tomas Toh, Sr. is proper as it is well within the sound Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in
discretion of the trial court. the trial court. But that judgment is still on appeal
before the CA. It might even reach the SC before the
Discretionary execution is permissible only when good controversy is finally resolved with finality. As well said
reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment in Borja, while we may not agree that a man of his
before finality or pending appeal or even before the years is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate
expiration of the time to appeal. Good reasons are his apprehension that he will not be long for this world
compelling circumstances justifying the immediate and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the finally passes away.
prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become
unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the
adverse party who may apparently have no case PANOTES VS CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT
except to delay. CORPORATION

The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give FACTS: Panotes is the president of the Provident
examples of good reasons to justify execution. The Village Homeowners Association, Inc.. He filed a
determination of what is a good reason must, complaint before the National Housing Authority (NHA)
necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of
against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR),
the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ
of execution must necessarily be controlled by the owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina
judgment of the judge in accordance with his own City. The complaint alleges that PROSECOR violated
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free some of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
from the control of anothers judgment or conscience. It 957, one of which is its failure to provide an open


space in the said subdivision. Later in a Resolution, the Court, Makati City, RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch
NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident Clerk of Court, and EMERITA GARON, G.R. No.
Village an open space which is Block 40. PROSECOR did 148090
not appeal the said resolution hence the same became
final and executory. Panotes then filed a motion for November 28, 2006
execution of the NHA Resolution. However it was found
that the records of the case were mysteriously missing.
Hence, his motion was provisionally dismissed without
prejudice. Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City
Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC),
respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the
lots sold were those comprising Block 40. CTDC was
unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to
have Block 40 utilized as open space of Provident FACTS: The private respondent Emerita Garon
Village. ("Garon") filed an action for sum of money docketed as
against Project Movers Realty and Development
When Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as Corporation ("Project Movers") and Stronghold
president of the Provident Village Homeowners Insurance Company, Inc. ("Stronghold Insurance").
Association, she filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for revival of the
NHA Resolution. Impleaded therein as defendant was
CTDC, whom she alleged as successor-in-interest of In an Order dated 19 September 2000, the
PROSECOR. Later HLURB rendered its Decision in favor Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 4 ("trial
of Bumatay, reviving the NHA Resolution and declaring court") granted Garons motion for summary judgment,
Block 40 of the Provident Village as open space for the which included that all other claims and counter-claims
said subdivision. Said decision was affirmed by HLURB of the parties are hereby ordered dismissed.
Board of Commissioners and the Office of the
President. CTDC went to the CA which in turn reversed
the decision of the Office of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the NHA Resolution dated August 14, On 6 October 2000, Garon filed a motion for
1980 may be enforced against CTDC. execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000,
Stronghold Insurance moved for the reconsideration of
HELD: No. An action for revival of judgment is no more the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court and in
than a procedural means of securing the execution of a an Order dated 23 January 2001, the trial court denied
previous judgment which has become dormant after Stronghold Insurances motion for reconsideration for
the passage of five years without it being executed lack of merit.
upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended
to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the In an Order dated 8 February 2001, the trial
judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness court granted Garons motion for execution pending
of the first judgment. appeal. The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of
P20 million to answer for any damage that Project
Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by
sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and reason of the execution pending appeal. On 14
PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli Bumatay February 2001, Branch Clerk of Court Richard C. Jamora
and respondent CTDC, the latter not being the ("Jamora") issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.
On 16 February 2001, Stronghold Insurance
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not
bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not filed a notice of appeal. Stronghold Insurance also filed
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to
divest the rights of a party who has not and never been
a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be assail the trial courts 8 February 2001 Order and the
writ of execution pending appeal. In its Resolution 8 of
issued only against a party to the action and not
against one who did not have his day in court. 23 February 2001, the Court of Appeals enjoined the
trial court, Jamora and Garon from enforcing the 8
February 2001 Order. However, it turned out that
notices of garnishment had been served before the
HONORABLE NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as
Court of Appeals issued the temporary restraining
Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial
order (TRO). In its Order dated 7 March 2001, the trial
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing
court denied Stronghold Insurances Urgent Motion for party with notice to the adverse party;
the recall of the notices of garnishment.
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;

ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to (c) the good reasons must be stated in the
justify execution pending appeal. special order.

HELD: As a discretionary execution, execution

pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons
No. In granting the motion for execution pending exist for immediately executing the judgment before
appeal, the trial court ruled: finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration
of the period to appeal. Good reasons, special,
A perusal of [t]he records of the instant case important, pressing reasons must exist to justify
will sustain plaintiffs claim that defendants raised no execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an
valid or meritorious defenses against the claims of instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well
plaintiff. The Court notes with interest the fact that become a tool of oppression and inequality. Good
defendants admitted the genuineness and due reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such
execution of the Promissory Notes and Surety urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the
Agreement sued upon in this case. losing party may suffer should the appealed judgment
be reversed later.
We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon
failed to present good reasons to justify execution Fujiki v Marinay
pending appeal. The situations in the cases cited by
the trial court are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Caete, Caete filed an action
for compensation for his illness. The Workmens Rule 39 Sec 48 : Foreign Judgments- A recognition of a
Compensation Commission found the illness foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.
compensable. Considering Caetes physical condition It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
and the Courts finding that he was in constant danger effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
of death, the Court allowed execution pending appeal. case which was already tried and decided under
In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al., De Leon, et al. foreign law.
defaulted on an agreement that was peculiarly
personal to Asuncion. The agreement was valid only FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
during Asuncions lifetime. The Court considered that national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Sorianos health was delicate and she was 75 years old Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January
at that time. Hence, execution pending appeal was 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
husband, who was ill. where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
The posting of a bond, standing alone and
absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
successful party is not a good reason to justify May 2008 in Q.C. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
execution pending appeal as a combination of However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
circumstances is the dominant consideration which from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
impels the grant of immediate execution. The bond is Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
only an additional factor for the protection of the able to reestablish their relationship.
defendants creditor.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
judgment pending appeal are the following: between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be review on foreign judgments.
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese on grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office the protection of party expectations, as well as
(NSO). respecting the jurisdiction of other states.

RTC dismissed the petition. SolGen agreed the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.
petition.Fujiki' s MR was denied. Thus, a direct recourse FEDERICO A. SERRA
to SC from RTC under Rule 45 on a pure question of G.R. No. 203241.July 10, 2013. SECOND

Final and executory judgment may be executed

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize by motion within five years; Exception
the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule FACTS: Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) and
108 of the Rules of Court. petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy wherein Serra agreed to lease his land in Masbate
HELD: Yes. However, the effect of a foreign judgment to RCBC for 25 years.
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must However, when RCBC informed Serra of its decision to
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with exercise its option to buy the property, the latter
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. For replied that he was no longer interested in selling the
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment property. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against Serra in the RTC
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
Makati which ordered Serra to execute and deliver the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. Serra appealed to
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact the CA.
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of
the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and Meanwhile, Serra donated the property to his mother,
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in Leonida Ablao who subsequently sold the same to
Hermanito Liok. A new land title was issued in favor of
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra before the
certification or copy attested by the officer who has RTC of Masbate City.
custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the The CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance
case. On 15 April 1994, the decision in the Specific
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Performance case became final and executory upon
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. entry of judgment.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of
marriage void does not require relitigation under a RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision
dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 48(b),
Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for
judgment or final order against a person creates a Certiorari before the SC. In separate Resolutions dated
presumptive evidence of a right as between the 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final
parties and their successors in interest by a and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of respectively, the SC found neither reversible error nor
Court states that the judgment or final order may be grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of
the decision in the Specific Performance case. This was technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of
opposed by Serra arguing that the motion for execution procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
was already barred by prescription and laches, and
in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in
the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to serve the ends of justice.
Buy. The RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for
execution. RCBCs motion for reconsideration was HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO
likewise denied. Thus, RCBC filed this petition. YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
WON RCBCs motion for execution was already barred "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
by prescription and laches. DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY

RULING: G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and
executory judgment may be executed by motion within FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with
five years from the date of its entry or by an action some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation
after the lapse of five years and before prescription of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against
sets in. This rule, however, admits of exceptions as respondent Gaudioso alleging that Magdaleno Ypon
when execution may be made by motion even after the died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
lapse of five years. These exceptions have one
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J. Claiming to be
common denominator: the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that cancellation of the certificates of title, leading to their
where the delays were occasioned by the subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of
judgment debtors own initiatives and for her petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives
advantage as well as beyond the judgment and successors-in-interest.
creditors control, the five-year period allowed
for enforcement of the judgment by motion is In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of
suspended. Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School;
and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
seeks to enforce the decision which became final and petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the
to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest,
of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
then transferred it to Liok. Serras action prompted
RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in RTC found that the subject complaint failed to state a
the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for cause of action against Gaudioso. The plaintiffs therein
his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year due to the counsels failure to state the date on which
period to enforce through a motion the decision in the his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Compliance was issued. Petitioners, who were among
Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, sought direct
RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within the five-
year period for enforcement of a decision through a ISSUE: Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case
motion. on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.
The purpose of prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping HELD: The petition has no merit.
on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC
has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has
which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had
relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause been instituted but had been finally closed and
of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.In this
be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those
prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be lies the need to institute the proper special
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, proceeding in order to determine the heirship of
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
defendants. dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed the proper appreciation of the questions before
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship
be made in the corresponding special which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
the same. devoid of any legal effect.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR. G.R.
are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in No. 172852
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession January 30, 2013
of property. This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2)
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are immediately took possession of the lots after
seeking the establishment of a status or right. depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National
Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court

ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in During the pendency of the case, or on
a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses
action. Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement
whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of
the parcels of land in favor of the former in
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship
may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
(P1,786,400.00) as provisional payment and just
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily
compensation in an amount to be determined by a
submitted the issue to the trial court and already
panel of commissioners. Forthwith, the panel was
presented their evidence regarding the issue of
constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC Both parties elevated the CA judgment to the
recommending the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just Court. The respondents petition was docketed as G.R.
compensation. The report was adopted and approved No. 172942 where he sought, in the main, that the 12%
by the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996. 5 interest rate be reckoned from the date of taking of the
property and not from the date of finality of the
The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then Decision dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The
by the Court, in a Decision dated May 7, 2002, when Court denied his petition on August 22, 2006 for failure
the matter was elevated for review in a petition to sufficiently show that the CA committed any
docketed as G.R. No. 142971. When the said decision reversible error in the questioned judgment. The
became final and executory on September 20, 2002, respondents motion for reconsideration of the said
the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, decision was denied with finality on November 27,
before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of 2006.
execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4,
2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion The petitioner prays for the annulment of the
and ordered the issuance of the writ. award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view of
the termination of the eminent domain case upon
In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of the
away and they were substituted in the case by herein writ of execution. The petitioner further asserts that
respondent. the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 which
did not explicitly pronounce the payment of interest
On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the can no longer be modified lest the basic principles of
respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the remedial law be defiled.
difference between the just compensation due and the
provisional payment already made. The respondent avers that Section 10, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court mandating the payment of legal
On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a interest on just compensation forms part of every
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the judgment rendered in eminent domain cases even if
petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation the same was not directly ordered therein. The
computed from the time of actual taking of the lands. respondent also claims that the award of just
compensation must be reckoned from the date of
taking of subject lots and not from the date of finality
On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion
of G.R. No. 142971 because just compensation, before
and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and
it is paid, constitutes loan or forbearance of money that
executory judgment that did not specifically direct the
entails the imposition of a 12% interest per annum.
payment of legal interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA as to the

Adamant, the respondent sought recourse
reckoning point from which the legal interest be
before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to
computed has obtained its finality.
pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation computed from the time of
actual taking of the property up to the date of payment HELD: YES. The petition is denied on the ground of res
of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment. A
from the time the decision awarding just perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently
compensation became final and executory on shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly
September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.
December 23, 2003.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of
Subsequently, the CA rejected the respondents judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
the execution stage and after the judgment of just when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, it found judgment of the court, as long as it remains
the second contention meritorious and awarded legal unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated those in privity with them. Stated differently,
December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a
affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to the second case of a fact or question already settled in a
time of full payment. previous case.


The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has anew through the present recourse. Thus, the
become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as
can no longer question the respondents entitlement to the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to
the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts the ruling in the former.
determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning
point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on
the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter