CASE NO.

71
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.]
PONENTE: PEREZ, p:
TOPIC: ART. 164 165

Facts: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June

1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and
five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent,
Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by
Federico's and Cristina's only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased
his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren,
Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel
Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel's parents, Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco. Isabel's parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved
in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and
void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On 26 October
1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's
estate.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of administration on

the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina,
she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel's parents'
marriage being declared null and void.

Issue: who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent's estate

HELD: However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that

Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a
void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent

is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is

named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the

appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the

estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator's interest in the estate. 9
This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 10
In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent's estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's demonstrable
interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the
evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator
of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III's appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of
the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
he general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return . . . a true and complete
inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories
before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico's
exclusion of Cristina's other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings,
from the list of heirs.

CASE NO. 90
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner,
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.]
PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
TOPIC: Art. 189 Effects of Adoption

Facts: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a

petition 1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be
changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001, 3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial
court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.

Issue: W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

Held: For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which
he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a

middle name. Even Article 176 11 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's
surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters." Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the
adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate

child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21 of the
Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her

mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24
, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one
normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, 26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
CASE NO 109

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 169202. March 5, 2010.]
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
TOPIC: SURNAMES NCC 364-380

Facts: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose

Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being
married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport:
"Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as
her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner,
whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
DFA office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name
and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner's request having been
denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request. DFA
denied the request.

Issue: whether petitioner, who originally used her husband's surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held: tle XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as "Mrs."

We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision
indicates that the use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather
than obligatory.

A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. 13 She is
therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370,
but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further,
this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate
descent.

n the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted
to use her husband's surname in her old passport, requested to resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from
using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent.
However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which
involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another
woman, petitioner's marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not
involve a request to resume one's maiden name in a replacement passport, but a
petition to resume one's maiden name in view of the dissolution of one's
marriage.

Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of
the purview of Section 5 (d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married
woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires
the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if
she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will
not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in Section 5 (d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of
husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner's
marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use
of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail
over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the
use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law
prevails over a general law.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the

passport applicant's constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also
mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport
and travel documents proceeding from it 23 as a Philippine passport remains at
all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the
passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be surrendered to any
person or entity other than the government or its representative.