Last weeks sarin attacks by the Syrian government against civilian targets in Khan Sheikhoun, and the

subsequent U.S. retaliatory missile strikes against a Syrian air base, raise many new questions about
Syrias six-year civil war.

Much of this coverage has focused on implications for the future of U.S. policy. But theres another big
question: Why would Syrian President Bashar al-Assad use chemical weapons and risk international
condemnation and retaliation?

Assad has been the dominant force in the Syrian civil war, which has cost more than 400,000 Syrian
lives. The opposition is increasingly fragmented and the Syrian government has for the most part held
tightly to the reins of power using conventional weapons.

[Trump just bombed Syria. What next?]

When the Assad regime deployed chemical weapons in 2013, the Obama administration unexpectedly
held off from retaliating militarily, having failed to get congressional approval for military action. The
decision to use chemical weapons last week generated pictures of dying children and international
condemnation for the violations of international norms and law along with U.S. military retaliation.

Why then use chemical weapons, and risk international condemnation and retaliatory strikes, when
other equally effective military options were available?

Assad took a calculated risk

A recent New York Times article offers one answer cited by Syrian civilians and foreign experts alike. The
regime took a calculated risk to demonstrate its own impunity and the Wests impotence, thereby
demoralizing opposition forces. We agree. This episode vividly demonstrates a tactic autocratic
governments often employ: the deliberate initiation and escalation of risky conflicts to demonstrate
strength and shore up support.

This strategy often intentionally violates international law or norms in this instance, the chemical
weapons taboo. In a 2011 paper in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science (ungated version), we
document a similar pattern with regard to human rights law, particularly the U.N. Convention Against
Torture (CAT).

Our work dealt with a puzzling phenomenon first documented by other scholars: Autocrats with the
worst human rights records appear to be among the most willing to sign human rights treaties. Typically,
the opposite is true, and states sign treaties when they are already largely in compliance.

Staying in power is the goal

Our explanation for this behavior followed precisely the Assad regimes logic today. Heres how this
plays out. Human rights conventions increase the legal and other liabilities of leaders found to be
ordering torture and other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment. But leaders are only likely to pay
these penalties once they are removed from office. Leaders willing to fight to the bitter end would find
these risks minimal.

[After Syria, is there still a taboo against the use of chemical weapons?]
Similarly, violating the chemical weapons taboo opens a leader like Assad to greater risk of personal
punishment after leaving office, and leaves Syria open to international retaliation in response to
chemical attacks. To leaders who intend to cling to office, and who are confident in the ability of their
regime to withstand external attack, such costs are of minimal concern.

Leaders in this position are extremely unlikely to relinquish power except by extreme force. Determined
autocrats who are confident of their military position vis--vis their opponents may find the cost of
military and economic international sanctions small. In fact, violations of international norms allow
these leaders to credibly signal their resolve to stay in power and put down the opposition.

[Calls for prosecuting war crimes in Syria are growing. Is international justice possible?]

Leaders who are less sure of their ability to hold on to power, in contrast, are hesitant to cross the line
and violate international norms. These less-secure leaders are also more willing to negotiate with any
emergent opposition.

Assads attacks, then, were designed to leave the opposition demoralized, with a sense that continued
rebellion was futile and international support was lacking. Having withstood a U.S. attack and reveled in
defiance, Assad may even find a boost in his popular support.

There may be domestic gains as well

Autocratic leaders and the Assad regime in particular dont look to incite only international
disputes to rally domestic support and to demoralize their opponents. Sometimes, they rely on domestic
opponents to serve a similar end.

Many analysts, for instance, argue that Assad has for years been deliberately empowering, or at least
avoiding direct conflict with, the Islamic State. This radical group instills fear among religious minorities
and moderates, who then back the regime out of fear of the extreme alternative. Foreign powers hoping
to see an end to the Syrian civil war out of humanitarian concerns, of course, are in a similar
conundrum.

In a recent working paper co-authored with James Raymond Vreeland and inspired by a book by Milan
W. Svolik, we show that using fear in this way is a common tool of autocrats. Leaders, we argue, may
have an incentive to adopt policies that enable mass insurrection against the regime. Fear of the chaos
that could erupt in the absence of leadership then turns would-be challengers from within the ruling
elite into those who actually rally behind the regime.

What do these theories say about the recent U.S. missile strike

Perhaps, from Assads perspective, the chemical attacks were a calculated gamble gone wrong. Assad
risked and experienced a U.S. military response but after all, he escaped attack on previous occasions.
The regime paid a relatively modest penalty for its actions: damage to the Shayrat Airfield and some, but
not universal condemnation. Civilian and opposition forces have gained a morale boost.

But if, as U.S. officials suggest, the U.S. strike is a one-off event and one that intentionally imposed
only limited military costs the effect may be quite different. While Assad runs an even greater risk
from continuing to use chemical weapons, the threat of similar retaliation seems a cost he might be
willing to bear.
If so, the signal he sends through the use of chemical weapons is all the more damning. Through
continued defiance of international norms after the missile strike, the regime appears all the stronger,
and the U.S. all the more impotent, than before. This means the Assad regime is likely to continue to risk
international confrontation in a bid to shore up its domestic position.