25. People vs.

Malimit

DOCTRINE: The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact
the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate
neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.

FACTS:

At 8 pm, Onofre Malaki(victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin,
was busy cooking supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store

Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. to purchase chemical for his rice
farm

Batin had just finished cooking, he proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if supper is
to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused Ercarnacion Manolo
Malimit coming out of the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was
sprawled on the floor struggling for his life

Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw accused
Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo

o Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the store, Rondon
clearly recognized Malimit

Both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy
and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki.

Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in
a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was
opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket

TC: Convicted accused for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

One of the contentions of accused Malimit in this appeal is that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimonies of Rondon and Batin. He questions the credibility of the 2 witnesses
because they only revealed that they have knowledge of the crime and identified the accused as
the perpetrator, 5 months after the incident.

Date of the crime: April 15, 1991

Witnesses pointed at accused: September 17, 1991

ISSUE:

WON the testimonies of the witnesses may be appreciated by the court? YES

HELD:

Accused haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this
gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely
the date when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits, narrating that they saw the
appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of
Malaki's store.

As to his claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial
evidence negating his assertion, to wit:

1. After having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately
looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was
the only person they saw running away from the crime scene;

2. Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where
Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; and

3. Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.

Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15,
1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not
render their testimony less credible.

The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after
the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural
reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors,
as in this case, is of judicial notice.

At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with
regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh said
testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And although
the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.

Additional info:

The non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if accused was
indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime was not necessary for the prosecution to
present as evidence. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if
appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy
thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to
impeach Batin's credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the
blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.

26. People vs. Estoista

Facts: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence and convicted for
illegal possession of firearm under one information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which
the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father,
Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son live & in the same house, a little
distance from a 27hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon
grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from
the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a la borer of the
family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by the
accused. Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal
possession of firearms is cruel and excessive.
Issue: WoN the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is excessive.

Held: It is of the courts opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying
firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law
proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the
very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying
and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear
excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of
certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.
Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be
caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.

27. People vs. Munoz

FACTS: On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Feliciano Muoz, Marvin
Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men, went out in a jeep
at the behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers.
Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood
without further ado and without mercy. Mauro Bulatao was shot in the mouth and died instantly
as his son and daughter looked on in horror. Alejandro Bulatao was forced to lie down on the
ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. Aquilino Bulatao,
who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his
brains blown out. The four identified accused were convicted for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the
1987 Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. It further provides that neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty.

HELD: A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of
legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation. Thus, Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium
and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

28. People vs. Echegaray

FACTS: Right against cruel and unusual punishment

Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-
year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being
severe and excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of the constitution. He invokes the ruling in
Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is
cruel and degrading. He also argues that death is an excessive and cruel punishment for a
crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs.
Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the
taking of human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be imposed
where the crime was murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.

HELD: NO. The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case of Kemmler, it
was held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies
there something inhuman, barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life. It is
degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient, but must be
disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by 1) seriousness of the
crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the accused.

The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed by the jury. It was nullified
because the discretion in which the statute vested in trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards.

With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has no bearing on
Philippine experience and culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our
legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes crimes punished with death are
those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and
perversity, those that are repugnant and outrageous to common standards of norms and
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They also include crimes which are
despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is treated as an animal or dehumanized.

29. People vs. Purazo

FACTS:

This is another sickening case of incestuous rape.

A complaint for rape was filed against SOLOMON PURAZO alleging that "sometime in March
1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto," the accused who is the father of complainant
Rowena Purazo, a minor of twelve (12) years of age, did then and there willfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with her.

SOLOMON PURAZO was found guilty by the trial court of rape perpetrated against his own
twelve (12)-year old daughter ROWENA, was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify his
victim for moral damages.

The accused now seeking his exoneration laments his conviction and draws our attention to the
criminal complaint filed arguing that "(it) charged no specific instance when the offense was
committed." He likewise claims that the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The accused avers, in his first assigned error, that "the complaint miserably failed to describe
with particularity the specific time when the alleged rape was committed." The allegation that the
rape was committed in March 1997 is so vague that it did not give him the chance to make an
intelligent defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stating in the information the precise time the offense was committed
prevented the defendant to prepare an intelligent defense warranting his acquittal.

RULING:

No, the time and date is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Section 11, Rule 110, of
the Rules of Court, provides -

Sec. 11.Time of Commission of the Offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at anytime as near
to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.

In explaining the provision, the SC said that the time averred in the complaint or information
would only need, unless the precise time of commission of the offense is an essential element
thereof, to meet two (2) criteria: (a) it is as near to the actual date of commission of the offense
as the complaint or information of the prosecuting officer will permit; and, (b) the time ultimately
proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or information.

The SC have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or
place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.

30. Alejano vs. Cabuay

FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed
a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents
to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the
CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup detat.
Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid
indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of
the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court
orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.