BAYAN v.

ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will
find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining
the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We

find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty.

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)

FACTS: Icelands (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was recognized by the
United Kingdom (P) in 1961 in return for Icelands (D) agreement that any
dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be
referred to the International Court of Justice. An application was filed before
the I.C.J. when Iceland (D) proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores in 1972. By postulating that
changes in circumstances since the 12-mile limit was now generally
recognized was the ground upon which Iceland (D) stood to argue that the
agreement was no longer valid. Iceland (D) also asserted that there would be
a failure of consideration for the 1961 agreement.

ISSUE: In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for
invoking the termination of a treaty, is it necessary that it has resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligation still to be performed?

HELD: Yes. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the
premise calling for the termination of a treaty, it is necessary that it has
resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be
performed.
The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland (D) cannot be said to have
transformed radically the extent of the jurisdictional obligation that was
imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
Advisory Opinion on Namibia
FACTS: Under a claim of right to annex the Namibian territory and under the
claim that Namibias nationals desired South Africas (D) rule, South Africa
(D) began the occupation of Namibia. South Africa was subject to a U.N.
Mandate prohibiting Member States from taking physical control of other
territories because it was a Member State of the United Nations.
The Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate of South Africa (D) was
adopted by the U.N and the Security Council adopted Resolution 276 (1970)
which declared the continuous presence of South Africa (D) in Namibia as
illegal and called upon other Member States to act accordingly. An advisory
opinion was however demanded from the International Court of Justice.

ISSUE: are mandates adopted by the United Nations binding upon all
Member States so as to make breaches or violations thereof result in a legal
obligation on the part of the violator to rectify the violation and upon other
Member States to recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in
such violations?

HELD: Yes. Member States of the United Nations are bounded by its
mandates and violations or breaches results in a legal obligation on the part
of the violator to rectify the violation and upon the other Member States to
recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in such violation. As
Member States, the obligation to keep intact and preserve the rights of other
States and the people in them has been assumed.
So when a Member State does not toll this line, that State cannot be
recognized as retaining the rights that it claims to derive from the
relationship. In this particular case, the General Assembly discovered that
South Africa (D) contravened the Mandate because of its deliberate actions
and persistent violations of occupying Namibia.
Hence, it is within the power of the Assembly to terminate the Mandate with
respect to a violating Member State, which was accomplished by resolution
2145 (XXI) in this case. The resolutions and decisions of the Security Council
in enforcing termination of this nature are binding on the Member States,
regardless of how they voted on the measure when adopted. South Africa (D)
is therefore bound to obey the dictates of the Mandate, the resolution
terminating it as to South Africa (D), and the enforcement procedures of the
Security Council.
Once the Mandate has been adopted by the United Nations, it becomes
binding upon all Member States and the violations or breaches of this
Mandate result in legal obligations on the part of the violator to rectify the
violation, and upon the other Member States to recognize the conduct as a
violation and to refuse to aid in such violation.

DANUBE DAM CASE(Hungary v Slovakia)37 ILM 162 (1998)

FACTS: In 1977, Hungary (P) and Czechoslovakia (D) signed a Treaty for the
construction of dams and other projects along the Danube River that
bordered both nations. Czechoslovakia (D) began work on damming the river
in its territory when Hungary (P) stopped working on the project and
negotiation could not resolve the matter which led Hungary (P) to terminate
the Treaty. Hungary (P) based its action on the fact that the damming of the
river had been agreed to only on the ground of a joint operation and sharing
of benefits associated with the project, to which Czechoslovakia (D) had
unlawfully unilaterally assumed control of a shared resource.

ISSUE: Shall watercourse states participate in the use, development and

protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner?

HELD: Yes. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. Hungary (P) was deprived of its rights to an equitable and
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube by Czechoslovakia
(D) and also failed to respect the proportionality that is required by
international law. Cooperative administration must be reestablished by the
parties of what remains of the project.