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I

ez
Crossing: An Interview With
Major General Mohamed Abdel Halim Abou Ghazala
Z4e October 1973 Arab-Israeli War dramaticaU# confronted the
wqrld with unexpected realities: near superpower confrontation;
the oil emborgo; and a positive reappraisal of the Eggptian soldier
the planner and the combotont. The tactical 8kill and ferocitg
with which the Eggption armed force8 breached the Suez Canal
barrier-compkx to this diqI intrigues ond impreaee8 milita~ pr-
ofessionals.General Ghazala commonded the artillery force8 of the
Eggptian Second Armg during the October War. He was both a
planner and a ka&r of 8ome of the verg troop8 that stunned the
, world with their experti8e and braveW. In refponee to Military Reb
views reque8t, General Ghazaia agreed to re8pond to several ques-
tions concerning the pkuming and tactics ckweloped by the
Eggptian armed force8 prior to and during the Suez Canal croeeing
of October 1973.

Q: General Ghozak the successful em- leaders of these forces. Would you share
ployment of antitank guided missiles with us how you planned and prepared
(A TGMs), air defense artillery (ADA) and for this war?
field artillery (FA) by the Egyptian army
in the 1973 October War has had consid- A: To expfain all the details of the plan-
erable in@ence on US toctkal doctnne. ~g wo~d take too much time and
The integration of these elements was an space, so I wilf give a brief overview of
excellent example of the combined arms the plimning and preparation for the
effort. You were one of the pnncipaZ 1973 October War.

2 Novsmber
SUEZ CROSSING

In November 1972, the political de- canal surface when the croeeing began,
cision to use military force was made. How to achieve eurpriee tactically,
We had exhausted all peaceful means to operationally and etrategicdly? We all
break the etalemate of a no peace-no know that it is near impossible to conceal
war situation. Exteneive studies led to the preparation for a comprehensive
the conclusion that the Egyptian-Syrian offensive operation requiring the concen-
action muet be a total blow. The military tration of troops, the regrouping and
objective was the defeat of the Israeli maneuvering of vehicles and the stock-
armed forces deployed in the Sinai and piling of munition and supplies. To hide
the Syrian plateau. We would seize etra- offensive intentions is a serious and com-
tegic bndgeheade which would pave the plicated problem, especially when you
way for the complete liberation of occu- face an enemy that has a very highly
pied territories. This would impose a sophisticated intelligence system. To
juet, leeting and peaceful eolution to the make a long story ehort, we did compre-
problem. hensive studies on all aspecte of the
In other words, the political aim of operation. We worked out a detailed plan
that war wae to change the existing to choose the optimum month of the
political and military balance in the year, the best day of the month and the
Middle~ Eaet by undermining the basic optimum H-houn
concepts of Ieraeli national security doc- The month of october would ensure
trine. We would convince the world that full exploitation of Israels inter@ pOlit-
Israel could not impose peace by annexa- icel eituation and holidaye w~ch, in
tion of other lande. turn, would affect its military position.
With these airne in mind, the Egyptian The 6th of October as a D-day coin-

military plannere were faced with several cided with the day of Yom Kippur, aleo
probleme to be solved. The first problem the 10th of Ramaden which gave us six
wae the Suez Canal. It was a unique, moonlit houre sufficient time ta eetab-
extremely difficult water barrier. The Iieh ferriee and bridges.
Ieraelie had created numerous redundant 1400 as H-hour would provide a snit-

obetacles to thwart any successful croes- able number of daylight hours (three and
ing. They had integrated thie eystem of one-h~f ), enough for the Egyptiane to
obstacles with fire positione and fortified assault the canal, climb the sand ram-
poeitions to protect defendere and to part and capture Bar-Lev line strong-
inflict maximum losses on Egyptian points. It also would provide the
attacking forcee. Egyptian armed forcee (EAF) with
The second problem was how to deal enough daylight time to deliver two
with the Israeli armor counterattacks maseed air blowe. Conversely, it would
and counterblows which would increase give the Israelis the least possible day-
in eize and strength during the first light to concentrate their air force and
critical six hours eo that Egyptian engi- deliver their retaliatory strike. The /fact
neers could breach the send barrier on that the main Israeli armor reserves
the eastern bank of the canal. Another would need a minimum of six hours to
problem was the impact of the Israeli launch their counterblows meant it
etrongpointe along the Bar-Lev line on would have to be delayed until the next
various phases of the croesing operation. morning when the Egyptians would be
Further, there would be flames on the ready for them.

1979 3
MILITARY REVIEW

Q: Specifically, what were the ATGM, cross the canal. This would prevent the
ADA and FA concepts empbyed for the EAF from securing a footing on the east-
breaching of the BarLeu line during the ern bank an~ deny the EAF crossing of
first hours of the war? any armor.
, So, one of the most critical problems
was ta avoid the annihilation of the
A: Egyptian planning and preparation initial bridgeheads of infantry before the
for the offensive was oriented very log croseing of a sufficient heavy weapons
ically on the sequence of problems that and tank force ueing assault bridges and
had to be overcome in a successful crose- ferriee. The solution was to use ATGMs
ing. The most eenous problem was the and RPG 7s againat armor and use anti-
removal of the sand rampart on the aircraft missiles ageinet aircraft, espe-
eastern bank. It was so steep and irregu- cially SA 7s. As we had planned and
lar that amphibious and tracked vehiclee hoped, Israeli armor counterattacks were
even if ferried across could not climb out deetroyecf by our first infantry wave
of the canal under their own power. After which was heavily armed with ATGMs
a lot of experiments, we decided to use and RPG7s.
high-pressure water hoses to wash away To minimize the impact of the well-
the sand. We eucceeded in making a 7- organized and fortified Bar-Lev line, we
meter-wide gap in the rampart in two to planned to subject its strongpoints to
five hours. extremely heavy indirect and direct
The Israeli concept of defenee utilized preparatory artillery fire. This obliged
the fortified Bar-Lev line, the Suez the Israeli defenders to etay down in
Canal, the sand rampart and offensive their bunkers. The moment artillery fires
action by reserve armor. The Israeli de- were shifted to allow Egyptian
fensive plan called for a series of succes- assaulting teams to cross the canal,
sive, strong, armor counterattack and Egyptian armor and artillery pieces
blows of increasing size and strength to (positionad on elevated firing platforms
destroy any Egyptian troops that might constructed on the Weet Bank) were b,

Egyptian brldglni barges crossing to the Israali side of tha Srraz Canal
Reproduced by pennt.swn./ Born m Battle mabwme. Eshel.Dmmtt Ltd, 1s-1
SUEZ CROSSING

direct heavy pinpointad firee against A: It is a tough job to maintain comm-


these strongpoints. It was a well-con- and end control over large ground
ceived fire plan and it worked! forces. I cannot release this kind of infor-
mation without permission from my gov-
ernment.
Q: At the time of the 1973 October War,
the Egyptian army had several officers
who had attended Soviet military Q: The Egyptian army air defense um-
schools. What impact, if any, did Soviet brella proved highly successful. To what
military doctrine have on your planning factors would you ascribe this Isuccess?
and preparation ? Was it techno(o~cal superiority? De-
ployment? Massing? Or all three ele-
A: You know all about Preeident Sadats ments together?
decision to get rid of the Soviet advieere
in 1972 due to many reaeons. Several A: The Ieraeli military strategy de-
Egyptian officere had attended Soviet pendpd (before the October War) on air
military schools and, of course, had etud- superiority. Thie wae due to the better
ied Soviet military doctrine and tactics. aircraft they got from the American
But we also had officere who had arsenal. Tbie etrategy wae used to
attended Western military echoole and inhibit Egypt from thinking of launching
knew Western military doctrine and tac- a war. The Egyptian General Command
tics. Nonetheless, we came up with a lot eetimated the strength of the Israeli sir
of our own ideae and concepte which we force arrayed againet our forces to be
implemented in the October War. 550 aircraft, including 400 combat and
For example, the detailed plan of the reconnaieeance planes and 150 heli-
croesing was unique and was a purely copters and traneport planes. Since the
Egyptian technique. The way we dealt Israelis basically depended upon the sir
with the ramparts, the way we neu- force and since we did not have, nor
r
tralized the Israefi air force, the way we could we get, euperior performance air-
used our air defenee system and the way craft, our ordy solution was to set up a
we used ATGMseurely you realize that stxong air defense eyetem to prot&t both
it wae the first time theee kinds of vital tsrgete in the depth of our country
weapons were ueed effectively in combat. and our armed forces in the battle area.
At the same time, I cannot deny the Our air defenee plemers took into con-
impact not only Soviet military doctrine, sideration the following factore:
but also the Western military doctrine, Egyptian air defense (EAD ) forcee
had, to a certain extent, on our planning will confront the full etrength of the
and preparations. Israeli air force ( IAF), equipped with the
beet aircraft in the world.
The EAD had to deny all Ieraeli
Q: The detailed positioning and maneu- reconnaissance pfanes tkom carrying out
vering of kzrge Egyptian ground forces their miseione.
under fire-must have seriously strained The Egyptian offensive would take
your command and control capabilities. place on a very wide front, extending all
How did you maintain viable command along the Suez Canal. EAD euccess in
and control? accomplishing its miesion wae due to:

5
MILITARY REVIEW

l
The creative initiatives of EAD per- it off, bebind it the enemy had built his
sonnel in making numerous technicaf fortified defensive lines, forming one of
modifications on arms and equipments. the strongest defensive areas in history?
They succeeded in overcoming the ma- The first defensive line Iay on the east-
jority of the drawbacks in Russian equip- ern edge of the canal, along the sand bar-
ments and raised its teclmicrd efficiency rier, prepared with defensive fortified
to match the sophisticated Israefi planes. points occupied by reinforced pIatoon or
The excsflent preparation ~of the companies. These points were chosen to
theater of operations. Imagine the tough dominate both the areas suitable for
job in building the huge net of concrete crossing as weIl as the main approaches
fire positions that provided EAD forces from the Sinai to the canal. Each point
with their needed maneuver space! was built for tall-around defense and to
The EAD battery deployment plan provide protection against artillery
which provided the best coverage of alf shells weighing up to 1,000 pounds. They
enemy approaches to the Suez Canaf were also ehrronnded by dense wire
zone and thus inflicted heavy losses on entanglements and antitank and antiper-
the IAF. sonnel minefield 200 meters deep.
The excellent technical support pro- To make a long story short, it wae a
vided EAD batteries during the fighting problem to minimize the impact of these
and the fast recovery from damage points on various stages of the crossing
inflicted by IAF air-to-surface missiles operation. So, we decided to subject the
was a major factor of the success of the strongpoints, reserve positions, artillery
EAD. batteries-the whole Bar-Lev line-to
The EAD succeeded in resisting heavy indirect preparatory fires which
electronic countermeasures due to many would infict losses on the Israelis and
field-expedient things done by Egyptian cause them to stay down during the
officers during the fighting. entire crossing of the first waves.
The high level of training and the To do that, we worked out a detailed
morale of the man bebind the weapon. artillery fire plan which included minute
arrangements and measures to be ex-
ecuted throughout the entire operation.
Q: Genera4 the massing of your FA fire- We did a lot of calculations to work out
power was reportedly as intense and con- the optimum expenditure of ammunition
centrated as on any battlefield in history. artille~ reinforcement artillery regroup
How did you achieve such concentrated ing artillery maneuvers, what kind, size
fires? and strength of artillery antitank re-
serves; what size, kind and strength of
A: As you know, the succeeefid asssult artillery groups on all levsle; the system
of any water barrier is, in itself, a highly of operations; how ta maintain grids on
- complicated and sophisticated task. all levels-many things were done.
How, then, would you plan when you In conclusion, there are some lessons I
have a unique water barrier 180 to 220 would like to share herex
meters wide, with sides covered with YOU can defeat any. mace armor
layers of cement and iron, and so forth, attack by properly massed artillery firee.
and on the far bank there is a sand bar- A direct hit by a 100mm or larger

rier more than 26 meters high and, to top artillery shell can kill a tank.

6
SUEZCROSSING

The psychological effect of massed Saggers were actually antitank artillery


artillery fires is so powerful that many crews given to infantry subunite as rein-
defenders in fortified bunkers will forcements), some of them destroyed
become unwilling to continue fighting. more than 20 tanks in six days combat!
Target acquisition systems must be A good, well-trained soldier eqaipped
tailored to support specific artillery with an ATGM like the Sagger or the
weapons systems to maxirniz e artillery Dragon can easily destroy one or two
effectiveness. tanks before he could be kifled. That is
why you have to equate the 20 W to two
enemy tanks. This is what the Egyptii
Q: Were you concerned at all with Israeli soldier proved in combat. The key k pre-
counterbattery fires? paring a eoldier for combat is training
and morale.
A: I do not recall any Ieraeli battery
succeeding in neutralizing any of my bat-
teries during the war. I think that be- Q: Finully, Generak the Egyptian army
cause they were depending on the IAF has antitank guns, antitank missiles and
they neglected their artiiery. Egyptian tanks. What, in your opinw% is the best
artillery succeeded in effectively neu- antitank weapon? An antitank gun? An
tralizing Israeli artillery. ATGM? Another tank? Why?

A: I think that the word best is not


Q: Reports of this war were also highly the proper word. I would rather say the
complimentary of the individual Egyp- probably most effective. My answer is
tian soldiers fighting ability, especially the ATGM; the tank comes second.
those ATGlvf-canying infantrymen who Why? There are many reasons. Two of
moved forward to meet the Israeli tanks. them are The ATGM has more range
In your opinio% what was the key to pre- and more accuracy, and an ATGM can
paring such a soklier for combat? be mounted on an armored personnel car-
rier or helicopter. It con have the same or
A: To give you an example of how effec- better mobili~y than a tank.
tively and bravely those artillery Sagger-
men fought (those infsntWmen carrying #

Major General MohamedAbdel Hdim Abou


Gha?alacum=n tly is servingas the defenseand
armedforcesatwchdto the Egyptian Embassy
in Washington. He has graduated from numer-
ous military schools, including the French
A rtdlery School, the Soviet Academy of
., a
Armored Forces and the US Army War Colkge.
, -, He holds numerous academic degrees and has
translated numerous books on military science
fivm both English and Russian into Arabic. He
Q
*%.. hi. i is also the author of seuemd books on military
sub fects and has kctured at sevend US colleges
and- uniuersities.
d

1979 7

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