LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter I
BACKGROUND, BASIC CONCEPT AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Historical background of land titles.
In the early days, land was literally free
to all who might come and get it, just as free
as the air and the sea. People were nomads,
roaming from place to place. To claim
absolute ownership of a particu-lar piece of
land was thought absurd. Almost
instinctively, however, one would fight for the
land upon which he happened to have
stopped first; but, when the seasons
changed, or the corn did not seem to grow
well any more, he would pack up his
belongings and move elsewhere. It was the
prevailing theory that, after all, God owned
all the land and merely permitted those who
hold it who worked on it. The growth of a
landlord class, living on rents, was even
frowned upon. It was not likely that they
ever had any concept of ownership in land
until they learned to cultivate the fields
intensively, and that seems to have been the
history of all migratory peoples. But even
intensive agriculture did not necessarily bring
the idea of land ownership with it. A great
many of the earliest agricultural societies, if
not all of them, were communal in
organization.1
1 guardians or trustees.3
In England, according to some writers,
consciousness in land ownership was
awakened only with the Norman Conquest
and that was about the middle of the
eleventh century. By the effect of the
Conquest, title to lands in all England was
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vested in William the Conqueror, and
consequently this served as the basis of the
entire structure of land laws in that country.
It was then he made the rule that private
land ownership or title must emanate from
the State.
In the Philippines, the English theory
finds a close parallel. For, immediately upon
the domination of this country by Spain the
Crown spared no time to proclaim full
ownership over all our lands so that private
land titles since then could only be acquired
from the govern-ment either by purchase or
by the various modes of land grant. One
exception to this rule was where one could
establish that as claimant he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land from time immemorial
and such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had been a private
property even before the Spanish
domination. Another exception later
recognized, refers to church property. In
cases squarely decided, it was held that the
King of Spain was not the owner of
ecclesiastical property and therefore title
thereto could not have passed to the United
States by the Treaty of Paris. 2 By the
Spanish Law, whatever was given to the
service of God became incapable of private
ownership, being held by the clergy as
recording; (b) writing into the record, but
The history of the land law, as may be
observed in the Philip-pines as well as in
most other countries, is one of slow growth
and development. Compared with other
branches of law, it is considered as one of
MIDTERMS
the most conservative. This can be illustrated
by our own Land Registration Act which,
though enacted in 1902 or more than half a
century ago, still has most of the original
features preserved therein. Thus, it is not
strange to note that the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law,
which had continued to remain in our statute
books over the years in spite of the
advantages offered by the Torrens system,
had to be discontinued and abrogated only
lately by Presidential Decree No. 892 issued
on February 16, 1976.
23 Traces of early recorded land
transactions.
In the United States the earliest
recorded transaction involv-ing sale of land
took place in 1627, as revealed in the Record
of the Plymouth Colony. The process at the
beginning was to have the transaction
directly written, not copied, into the record
book and signed therein by the parties
thereto. As affirmed by law, the purpose of
recording was not only to afford right of
priority to the purchaser or grantee, but also
to prevent fraudulent conveyances. Among
the principal features found in the recording
statutes were: (a) acknowl-edgment of the
deed before the governor or other duly
authorized officials as a prerequisite to
this was later supplanted by copying of the
whole deed therein, as a means to
accomplish recording; and (c) priority of title
to depend upon priority of date of recording,
unless transfer of ownership was
accompanied by actual possession.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
It is surprising to note, however, that
even for so long ago there already existed
some sort of recording system for land titles.
Ac-cording to Wormser, in his work entitled
The Law, the Greeks had gone much ahead
with an excellent system of land recording
through which title to land could be verified
or checked up before buying it. He reveals of
a record found in Tenos, dating about 200
B.C., which contains some fifty entries of
land transfers, and comparatively they are in
standardized form which would be intelligible
to any modern title examiner. It is also
observed that they had contracts of lease,
and the form of these contracts is
astonishingly well developed. It is believed
that much of this craftsmanship in real estate
matters was borrowed from the advanced
civilization of Egypt and Mesapotamia, where
real estate practices flourished to a high
degree of perfection at a much earlier date.
23 Land title, defined and
distinguished.
Without an attempt at an elaborate
definition, it maybe suffice to say that land
title refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the
owner or the extent of his interest, and by
which means he can maintain control, and as
a rule, assert right to exclusive possession
2 encumbrance thereon.
and enjoyment of the property. But pos-
session and ownership are two distinct and
separate concepts. One may own a thing and
not possess it; or one may possess it and not
own the thing. Possession may signify the
outward evidence of title, but is not
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necessarily the title itself. Thus, the right of
possession such as that enjoyed by a
usufructuary or a lessee, does not carry
along with it the legal title or ownership.
Title should not be confused with color
of title. Although the lat-ter may give the
semblance or appearance of one, it still falls
short of title in the legal sense. Neither may
estate be taken to mean title necessarily. For
an estate, strictly speaking, merely
represents the nature, extent, degree and
quantity of a persons interest in land.
However, one who has the estate in fee
simple is regarded as having the title as an
absolute owner, and as such he can exercise
full pow-ers of disposition over his land, with
complete freedom from control by third
persons, and subject only to legislative and
constitutional powers of the State.
23 Deeds, nature and essentials.
By the term deed, we refer to a written
instrument executed in accordance with law,
wherein a person grants or conveys to
another certain land, tenements or
hereditaments. In real estate conveyanc-ing,
its significance has a broader sense so as to
embrace practically any contract or
agreement affecting real estate, whether
involving transfer of title or a mere
According to Rufford G. Patton, co-
author of American Law of Property, after
going over the varied statutory definitions
given in a number of states, a deed may be
defined substantially as an instrument in
MIDTERMS
writing by which any real estate or interest
therein is created, alienated, mortgaged or
assigned, or by which the title to any real
estate may be affected in law or equity. To be
effective as a legal conveyance without
reformation, a deed must as a rule have a
grantor, a grantee, words of grant,
description of the property in-volved,
signature of the grantor, and, as required
specifically under the Philippine law, we may
add also at least two witnesses and a notarial
acknowledgment. Attestation is required in
the case of a will and testament. A deed may
be a very informal instrument, and yet be
perfectly good to convey so long as it
contains the essentials prescribed by
statutes. But even when valid, the use of
informal instruments, or the employment by
a layman of printed blanks, is a practice that
is to be discouraged, bearing in mind that
the matter of transferring or encumbering
title to real estate is an important legal
operation.
It was held that a deed will not be
declared void if by any reasonable rule it can
be upheld.4 A deed defective in form, by
reason of failure to comply with the legal
requirements, may grant an equitable right
but it is insufficient to pass the legal title.5
However, it is a general rule that deeds
executed outside the state shall be valid if
they comply with the forms prescribed by the
law of the place of execution.
23 Types of estates.
Types of estates in land may be divided
into two main groups, namely: (1) the
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freehold estate, which indicates title of
ownership; and (2) the less-than-freehold
estate, which signifies some sort of a right
short of title. Under the first group, we have
the following as the most common types: (a)
fee simple; (b) fee tail; and (c) life estate.
Whereas, the most common types under the
second group are: (a) estate for years; (b)
tenancy from period to period; and (c)
tenancy at will. Except the term fee simple,
all the rest of the above terminolo-gies are
rarely in use in the Philippines.
By fee simple is meant an absolute title;
it is an absolute estate in perpetuity. It is
where title to land is conferred upon a man
and his heirs absolutely and without any
limitation imposed upon the estate. The word
simple signifies that it is without qualification
or restriction.
Fee tail, which was derived from the
Roman system of restrictive estates, is one
designed to pass title from the grantee to his
heirs, the intent of the grantor being to keep
the property in the grantees line of issue. In
England, it was considered not only as the
basis of family fortune but also the source of
family pride.
Life estate is one held for the duration of
the life of the grantee. In some cases,
however, it may terminate earlier as by
3 It is elementary that a grantor can
forfeiture. To illustrate, an estate may be
given to a widow for life provided she shall
remain a widow, so that the moment she
remarries, the estate terminates. In the
Philippines, this type of estate closely
resembles the usufruct of a widow, which she
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may enjoy as long as she lives, but which
automatically merges with the naked
ownership of the children upon her death.
Estate for years is in the nature of a
lease, and therefore is short of title. The
grantee or lessee takes over the possession
of the land for a period agreed upon but the
grantor retains the legal title to the property.
The term may be up to ninety-nine years
which is the maximum period allowed by the
Civil Code, except where the lessee is an
alien.
Tenancy from period to period is also in
the nature of a lease which may run from
month to month or from year to year, with
the peculiarity of automatic renewal from
time to time, unless expressly terminated by
either party. However, if by the terms of the
lease the period can only be extended by
written consent of the parties, no right for
extension can arise, without such written
consent.6
Tenancy at will is another form of lease
agreement where a person is permitted to
occupy the land of another without any stipu-
lation as to period, but either party reserves
the right to terminate the occupation at will
or at any time.
convey no greater estate than what he has
or in which he has an alienable title or
interest.7
23 Development of legal system of
transferring titles.
MIDTERMS
On the basis of written conveyances, the
system or method of effecting transfer of
land titles has undergone three stages of de-
velopment, each of which may be treated as
a distinct system. The first of these consists
in the production and delivery of the deed
and other title papers by the grantor to the
grantee, a process of transfer complete in
itself, without need of further registration or
recording. This system is still in use in some
parts of the United States and in many
countries in England. The second system
may be considered an improvement of the
first, with the requirement that the deed of
conveyance must be registered or recorded
in order to be deemed sufficient in law or
binding upon third persons. While
registration is different from recording, as
will be discussed here later, by general
usage, the term registration has been
understood to mean also re-cording. As a
matter of fact, in the Philippines, both terms
are used interchangeably. Registration in its
technical significance is being used in some
places in England and in Ireland and
Scotland, while recording is being adopted in
some places in the United States. Hol-land
and, Denmark. The third system, which
resembles a system of judicial registration
such as being followed in Germany, Austria,
the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland,
provides for the registra-tion of title or
ownership itself, instead of mere evidence or
muni-ment of title. This last system is
identical to what we now have in the
Philippines, copied from Massachusetts. It is
otherwise known as the Torrens system
which had its origin from Australia and later
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found adherence in New Zealand, Western
Canada, London, Hawaii, Chicago, Minnesota
and some other States in America.
Registration of title distinguished from
recording of evidence of title.
Registration of title and recording of
evidence or muniments of title are not the
same. In title registration, the state provides
a public record of the title itself upon which a
prospective purchaser or someone else
interested may rely. On the other hand,
recording acts provide for the recording of
deeds of conveyance and other in-struments,
without guaranteeing the title, leaving to the
prospective purchasers or other persons
interested to examine the instruments in the
records and formulate their own conclusions
as to their effect on the title.
As pointed out by Chief Justice Start of
Minnesota, the new registration system
differs from the old registration or recording
system, as follows: The basic principle of
this (new) system is the registration of title
of land, instead of registering, as the old
system requires, the evidence of such title.
In one case, only the ultimate fact or
conclusion that a certain named party has
title to a particular tract of land is registered,
and a certificate thereof delivered to him. In
the other, the entire evidence, from which
4 registration, the rights acquired by the
proposed purchasers must, at their peril,
draw such conclusion, is registered.8
Registration of title is preferred to
recording or registration of evidence of title,
for the former aims at presenting the
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prospective purchaser or mortgagee the net
result of all the previous dealings with the
property, while the latter presents the
dealings themselves before such prospect
who is left to investigate for himself. In one
case, the final answer to the various
operations in the past is given; in the other,
only the figures are given and the party in
interest is left to work out for the final
answer to himself and at his own risk.
Under the Torrens system now in force
in the Philippines, we are adopting the
registration of title, rather than the recording
of mere evidence or muniments of title,
which implies a departure from the orthodox
principles of property law.9
23 Systems of registration.
In the Philippines, we used to have three
systems of registration of land titles and
deeds, namely: (a) the system under the
Spanish Mortgage Law; (b) the Torrens
system; and (c) the system of record-ing for
unregistered lands. By virtue, however, of
Presidential Decree No. 892 issued February
16, 1976, the system of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law has been
abolished.
Under the Torrens system of
registrant are guaranteed by the government
for which purpose there is provided an
assurance fund which is made available to
pay for damages that may be suffered by the
registrant as a consequence of the operation
of the Land Registration Act. Registration
MIDTERMS
under this system is governed principally by
Act 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act; and to bring more lands
under the operation of the Torrens system,
subsequent laws were enacted, such as, Act
2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act,
and Commonwealth Act 141, also known the
Public Land Act. A Torrens title is conclusive
against the whole world, including the
government, and to a holder thereof in good
faith it is guaranteed to be indefeasible,
unassailable, and imprescriptible.
The other system of recording is
governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act
3344. This law provides for the registration
or recording of transactions, affecting
unregistered lands. However, by virtue of
Presidential Decree 892, instruments
affecting title or rights to lands heretofore
recognized or registrable under the Spanish
Mortgage law may meanwhile be recorded
under Act 3344, but only within a limited
period of six months from February 16,
1976. It is worth noting, however, that as a
peculiarity of this second system, registration
thereunder does not afford the registrant an
absolute protection inasmuch as by express
provision of Act 3344 any right recorded
thereunder shall yield to any third person
with better right.
To simplify and streamline land
registration proceedings, Presidential Decree
No. 1529 was issued on June 11, 1978,
otherwise known as the PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE, governing
registration of lands under the Torrens
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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system as well as the record-ing of
transactions relating to unregistered lands,
including chattel mortgages. This Decree
consolidates, in effect, all pre-existing laws
on property registration with such
appropriate modifications as are called for by
existing circumstances.
23
24 Registration, purpose and effect in
general.
As originally conceived, registration is
merely a species of notice. The act of
registering a document is never necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. The purpose of the legislature in
providing a system of registration is to afford
some means of publicity so that persons
dealing with real property may search the
records and thereby acquire security against
instruments the execution of which has not
been revealed. The system maintains a
permanent record of landholdings, in order to
prevent fraudulent claims to lands by
concealment of transfers.
It is a settled rule that the recording of a
conveyance constitutes a notice to all the
world, but this is rather too broad; probably,
the more accurate statement is that the
record imparts constructive no-tice to such
persons only as would have been entitled to
protection against the conveyance in case it
5
had not been recorded. While, gener-ally, the
operation of the record is prospective and
not retrospective, yet under the Torrens
system a subsequent conveyance may defeat
a prior unrecorded conveyance.
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Under the rule of notice, it is presumed
that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrefutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good
faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object
of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of
what the record contains any more than may
be permit-ted to show that he was ignorant
of the provisions of the law. The rule that all
persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law.
The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless
litigation.10
Another purpose of registration is to
notify and protect the inter-ests of strangers
to a given transaction, who may be ignorant
thereof, but the non-registration of the deed
evidencing such transaction does not relieve
the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder.11 Thus, as between the parties to
a sale, registration is not absolutely neces-
sary to make it valid and effective, for actual
notice is equivalent to registration.12
It is to be borne in mind, however, that
where a document so registered is invalid or
legally defective, registration will not in any
way render it valid or cure its defect. Thus, it
was held that where a donation does not
show the donees acceptance and the proper
MIDTERMS
noti-fication thereof to the donor, even if the
instrument was registered, it could not
produce any legal effect against third
persons.13
Registration does not vest title. It is not
a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of such title over a particular
property. It does not give the holder any
better right than what he actually has,
especially if the registration was done in bad
faith. The effect is that it is as if no
registration was made at all.14
Registration without effect if
accomplished under wrong system.
Transactions involving land titled under
the Torrens system cannot be registered with
legal effect under another system. Thus, the
rule can be laid that the filing and recording
of an instrument in the office of the Register
of Deeds, when the law does not require
such filing and recording, will not produce
constructive notice to third persons. In other
words, where the law or a registration
system does not require a particular
instrument to be recorded or registered, or, if
it does require, such registration was
accomplished under the wrong system, such
registration is legally ineffective and cannot
bind the property.15
A notice of attachment affecting
registered land recorded under Act No. 3344
is not a notice to the whole world, is legally
ineffective, and does not have the effect of
binding the property for purposes of
execution; hence, the sale carried out by
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
virtue of said levy is invalid and has no legal
effect.16
Along the same line, an authority on the
subject expressed him-self, thus: The record
operates as a constructive notice only when
the instrument itself is one of which the
registration is required or authorized by the
statute. The voluntary recording, therefore,
of an instrument, when not authorized by the
statute, would be a mere nullity, and would
not charge subsequent purchasers with any
notice of its contents or of any rights arising
under it.17
The above rule heretofore followed to
the contrary notwith-standing, under Sec.
113(d) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, it
has now become possible that tax sale,
attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens,
adverse claim, and other instruments in the
nature of involuntary dealings with respect to
unregistered lands, if made in the form
sufficient in law, be admissible to record in
the Office of the Register of Deeds.
23 Registration, original distinguished
from subsequent.
When right of ownership or title to land
is for the first time made of public record
under any of the existing systems of
registration, what is thereby accomplished is
6 Another point of distinction, if it need
known as original registration, as
distinguished from subsequent registration.
Thereafter, any trans-action affecting such
originally registered land, if in order, may be
registered in the Office of the Register of
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Deeds concerned, in which case a filed for registration or of an answer filed by
subsequent registration is accomplished.
Under the Torrens system, for the
purpose of obtaining the original registration
of title to land, the owner thereof is required
to apply therefor with the proper court. If the
court after hearing finds that the applicant
has title proper for registration a decree of
confirmation and registration is entered to
bind the land and quiet title thereto. The
Administrator of Land Registration
Authority, as an officer of the court issues
18
the corresponding decree in the pre-scribed
form, which is subsequently transcribed by
the Register of Deeds upon title form
denominated Original Certificate of Title.
Then, when the same property thus originally
registered becomes the subject of sale,
mortgage, lease, or other registrable
transaction, the instrument evidencing the
transaction is filed directly with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land lies for registration. Whether
the title is cancelled and a new one issued in
lieu thereof as in the case of a sale, or the
transaction involved is merely annotated on
the existing title as in case of an
encumbrance, what is thereby accomplished
is subsequent registration, as distin-guished
from original registration.
be, may refer to original registration
proceeding brought before the land
registration court to determine title of
ownership to the land on the basis of an
application
MIDTERMS
a claimant in a cadas-tral registration case,
as distinguished from subsequent
registration proceeding where incidental
matters after original registration may be
brought before the land registration court by
way of motion or petition filed by the
registered owner or a party in interest.
23 Constitutionality of registration
laws.
In some states adopting a land
registration system similar to that in force in
the Philippines, their statutes were at the
outset objected to on constitutional grounds.
In Illinois, for instance, the law was attacked
on the ground that it provided for the
performance of judicial duties by the
registrar of deeds particularly in the matter
of determining, after original registration, the
validity of liens pre-sented for registration
against the title. It was held, however, that
the act was valid for the reason that, while
the powers conferred were admitted to be
quasi-judicial, they were not of a nature such
that their exercise was vested solely and
exclusively in the courts.19 In Massachusetts,
the land registration act was also attacked on
constitutional grounds, namely, that it
provided for a diversion of judicial power and
that in its operation there was lack of
provision for due process, but here again it
was held to be constitutional.20
In the Philippines, the constitutionality of
our registration law was questioned on the
ground that it deprived a person of his
property without due process of law by
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merely failing to register his right or title in
accordance with the prescribed system. Now,
however, it is definitely settled that the
legislative branch of the government has the
power to provide a system for recording or
registration of land ti-tles. Of course, it has
no power to dispose of a mans property
without due process of law, but it does have
power to provide for a system or procedure
to register title to land, and to declare that if
the owner of the property does not record his
title papers, and by reason of such failure a
third person, relying upon the records,
acquires interest in the land adverse to the
negligent owner, the right of such innocent
third person shall be upheld as against that
of the other who slum-bered upon his right. 21
The state, as sovereign over the land
situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem,
which shall be binding upon all persons
known or unknown.22
0 Real, not personal, property as
object of registration.
As only real property or real rights may
be object of registration under the existing
land registration laws, it may be well to
under-stand the distinction between real
property and personal property.
7 According to Article 414 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, all things which are or may
be object of appropriation are considered
either real property or personal property,
also called immovable and movable,
respectively. Such division is not of a recent
scheme. The idea of dividing property into
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real and personal was originally con-ceived
by the early Roman jurists. Real property
includes not only the land but also the
buildings and improvements existing
thereon, as well as other things permanently
affixed thereto. A plumbing fixture would be
considered personal property if it could be
removed without causing damage to the land
or the building where it is installed, but real
property if its removal would damage the
property.
While land may literally mean the bare
soil of the earth, it has its generally accepted
meaning as to include whatever may be
found on its surface as a permanent
attachment or improvement thereon, such as
buildings, fences, trees, plants and growing
fruits, while they are attached to the land or
form an integral part thereof.23 It could even
include the minerals that may be found
under the surface, if legally allowable.
However, in this jurisdiction private
ownership of mineral deposits does not
necessarily follow from the ownership of the
land.
Lands classified as forest, even if this be
subsequently stripped of trees and its forest
cover by loggers and settlers, and may actu-
ally be planted to crops or covered with
grass, are not susceptible of private
ownership, much less object of application
for registration by private persons, until and
after such lands have been reclassified or
otherwise released from forest to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain by
official proclamation.
MIDTERMS
0 Modes of acquiring land titles.
Of the various methods of modes of
acquiring titles to lands, mention may be
made of the following: (a) by public grant;
(b) by adverse possession; (c) by accretion;
(d) by reclamation; (e) by pri-vate grant or
voluntary transfer; (f) by involuntary
alienation; (g) by descent or devise; and (h)
by emancipation patent.
Title by public grant.
The conveyance of public land by the
government to a private individual is
generally known as public grant. How the
government makes such grant is well
illustrated by what actually took place in the
Philippines after its discovery by Magellan in
1521. It was held that by discovery and
conquest the entire Philippine territory
became the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown. With this as
basis, the Spanish government began to
handle the direct distribution of public lands
to settlers, vassals and other people by the
issuance of royal grants and concessions in
varied forms.
No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or
implied from government.24
It seems but only logical that title to
land must emanate from some source for it
cannot just issue forth from nowhere. And
consistent with the general tendency
observed in different countries, the
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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government or head of the state is vested
with such power to make public land grants
according to existing statutes.
The case of Estate of Don Mariano San
Pedro vs. CA, G.R. No. 103727 and Engracio
San Pedro, et al. vs. CA, G.R. No. 106496,
December 18, 1996 wrote finis to the long
festering cases involving the infamous Estate
of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The
Supreme Court en banc has ruled with
finality that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
which covered 173,000 hectares of land in
five provinces and five Metro Manila cities, is
null and void and therefore no rights could
be derived therefrom. The heirs, agents,
privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf
of said estate are disallowed to exercise any
act of possession or ownership, dispose of in
any manner, the whole or any portion of the
estate and should immediately vacate the
same, if any of them are in possession
thereof.
In writing finis to the cases, the
Supreme Court said:
The most fantastic land claim in
the history of the Philip-pines is subject
of controversy in these two consolidated
cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have
8 been laying claim to the ownership of,
against third persons and the
government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares of
314,047 quiniones on the basis of a
Spanish Title entitled Titulo de
Propiedad Numero 4136 dated April 25,
MALIPOL
1894. The claim, according to the San
Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in
the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan,
Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such
Metro Manila cities as Quezon City,
Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig
and City of Manila, thus affecting in
general lands extending from Malolos,
Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City
and the land area between Dingalan Bay
in the north and Tayabas Bay in the
south.
Considering the vastness of the
land claim, innumerable disputes
cropped up and land swindles and
rackets prolifer-ated resulting in tedious
litigation in various trial courts, in the
appellate court and in the Supreme
Court, in connection therewith.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 892 which took effect on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was
abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should cause their lands covered
thereby to be registered under the Land
Registration Act within six (6) months from
the date of effectivity of the said Decree or
until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-
compliance therewith will result in a re-
classification of their lands. Spanish titles can
no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership.
Moreover, in the case of Widows and
Orphans Association, Inc. vs. CA, 212 SCRA
360, the Supreme Court categorically
MIDTERMS
enunciated that the alleged Spanish title,
Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, had become
bereft of any probative value as evidence of
land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as
contained in Resolution dated February 6,
1985 in a related case entitled case Benito
and WIDORA vs. Ortigas, G.R. No. 69343. On
March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment
was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF
LAND
0 Public Grant; The Regalian Doctrine
a. Before the Treaty of Paris on
April 11, 1899, our lands, whether
agricultural, mineral or forest were
under the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish crown, hence,
private ownership of land could only be
acquired through royal concessions.
It is a trifle late at this point to argue
that the government had no right to include
certain properties in a reservation for
provincial park purposes when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.
The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain. It is elementary
in the law governing natural resources that
forest land can not be owned by private
persons.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Tax declarations are not conclusive proof
of ownership in land registration cases.
(Falomo vs. CA, 266 SCRA 392).
4 Proof of acquisition from the State
No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, it is indis-
pensable that there be a showing of title
from the State.
One claiming private rights must prove
that he has com-plied with C.A. No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as
well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public land.
The possession of public agricultural
lands, however, long the period may have
extended, never confers title upon the pos-
sessor. Petitioners have failed to comply with
the mandatory 30-year period of possession.
(Gardula vs. CA, 184 SCRA 617).
c. Forest lands or forest reserves are not
capable of pri-vate appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property.
A positive act of the government is
needed to declassify land which is classified
9 must be under claim of ownership.
as forest, to convert it into alienable or
disposable land or for other purposes.
Although the classification of lands is a
government pre-rogative which it may opt to
exercise to the detriment of another, still
MALIPOL
private interests regarding the same are not
prejudiced and the possessor in good faith is
respected in his right not to be disturbed.
It is an iron doctrine that
prescription can never lie against the
government.
The classification of forest land or
any land for that matter is descriptive of
its legal nature or statues, and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land
looks like. (Dela Cruz vs. CA, 186 SCRA
230).
0 Title by prescription.
This method of acquiring land by
prescription is recognized not only in the
Philippines but practically anywhere else in
the world. By this method, a possessor of
land who may not be the owner, after the
lapse of a certain period prescribed in the
law, may assert ownership thereof as against
anyone except the true owner or one with a
better title based on an earlier possession
which he had not abandoned. The character
of occupancy which may ripen into a title by
adverse possession must as a rule be one
which is actual or physical, adverse, open
and notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted, coupled with the fact that it
It must be borne in mind, in this
connection, that adverse pos-session or
prescription does not run against private
lands brought under the operation of the
MIDTERMS
Torrens system, nor against public land
except where the law expressly so provides.
Laches should not be confused with
prescription. Laches is different from, and
applies independently of, prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of
delay, laches is concerned with the effect of
delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches
is principally a question of inequity of
permitting a claim to be enforced, this
inequity being founded on some change in
the condition of the property or the relation
of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity,
whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on a fixed time; laches
is not.
Acquisitive Prescription
Definition and Requisites:
In Heirs of Maninquing vs. CA, 276
SCRA 601, the Supreme Court held that:
0 Prescription, in general, is a mode of
acquiring (or losing) ownership and real
rights through lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession be
in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either
voluntary or extraordinary. Ordinary
prescription requires possession in good
faith and with just title for ten (10)
years. In extraordinary prescription,
ownership and other real rights over
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for 30 years without
need of title or of good faith.
1 A prescription title to real estate is not
acquired by mere possession thereof
under a claim of ownership for a period
of 10 years, unless such possession was
acquired con justo titulo y buena fe
meaning with color of title and good
faith.
Petitioners have not satisfactorily
met the requirements of good faith and
just title where the period of possession
is short of the 30-year requirement
mandated by Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. (Titong vs. CA, 287 SCRA 102).
c. Meaning of Just Title for
purposes of acquisitive prescription
A donation propter nuptias which is
void for failure to comply with formal
requisites, could still constitute a legal
basis for adverse possession. With clear
and convincing evidence of possession, a
private document of donation may serve
as basis for a claim of ownership. While
a verbal donation under which the
claimant and his predecessor-in-interest
10 have been in pos-session of the land in
question is not effective as a transfer of
title, still it is a circumstance which may
explain the adverse and exclusive
character of the possession.
MALIPOL
3 Prescription in favor of a co-
owner.
While prescription, as a rule, does
not run in favor of a co-owner as long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership, it may take place where it
is clearly shown that the co-owner has
repudiated the co-ownership, and that
the other co-owners were appraised of
the repudiation.
Co-ownership; Termination of the same
after subdivision.
In Sps. Serafin and Anita Si vs. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 122047, Oct. 12, 2000, the
basic question is whether there is still co-
ownership after the physical division of the
lot owned in common and whether the right
of pre-emption or redemption still exists.
It was held that after the physical
division of the lot among the brothers, the
community ownership terminated, and the
right of preemption or redemption for each
brother was no longer available. (Del Rosario
vs. Bansil, 179 SCRA 662; Caro vs. CA, 113
SCRA 10; Caram vs. CA, 101 Phil. 315).
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code,
there is co-ownership when-ever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. There is no co-
ownership when the different portions owned
by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described. (Dela Cruz
vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307). This situation makes
MIDTERMS
inapplicable the provision on the right of
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code,
as follows:
Article 1623. The right of legal pre-
emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty (30) days
from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as
the case may be. The Deed of Sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-
owners excludes that of ad-joining
owners.
The private respondent was well-
informed of the impending sale of his
brothers share in the land. In a letter dated
Feb. 22, 1979, he told his brother [W]ell
you are the kind of yourselves, and you can
sell your share of Leveriza. Co-owners with
actual notice of the sale are not entitled to
written notice. A written notice is a formal
requisite to make certain that the co-owners
have actual notice of the same to enable
them to exercise their right of redemption
within the limited period of thirty days. But
where the co-owners had actual notice of the
same at the time thereof and/or afterwards,
a written notice of a fact already known to
them, would be superfluous. The statute
does not demand what is unnecessary.
Co-ownership; Rights of the co-owners.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
In the City of Mandaluyong vs. Antonio
Aguilar, et al., G.R. No. 137152, Jan. 29,
2001, the effects of co-ownership were once
again explained. Under the co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. During the
existence of the co-ownership, no individual
can claim title to any definite portion of the
community property until the partition
thereof; and prior to the partition, all that
the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire
land or thing. Article 493 of the Civil Code
however provides that:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners shall be limited to the
portion which may be allowed to him in
the division upon termination of the co-
ownership.
Before partition in a co-ownership, every
co-owner has the abso-lute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property.
11
The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or
mortgage his interest, except as to purely
personal rights. He may also validly lease his
undivided interest to a third party
independently of the other co-owners. The
effect of any such transfer is limited to the
MALIPOL
portion which may be awarded to him upon
the partition of the property.
Article 493 therefore gives the owner of
an undivided interest in the property the
right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided inter-est. The co-owner, however,
has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common, because his right over the
thing is represented by a quota or ideal
portion without any physical adjudication. If
the co-owner sells a concrete portion, this,
nonetheless, does not render the sale void.
Such a sale affects only his own share,
subject to the results of the partition but not
those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale.
As co-owners, all that the respondents
had was an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the lots. This,
however, did not mean that they could not
separately exercise any rights over the lots.
Each co-owner had the full ownership of his
undivided inter-est in the property. He could
freely sell or dispose of his interest
independently of the other co-owners. And
this interest could have even been attached
by his creditors. The partition terminated the
co-ownership by converting into certain and
definite parts the respec-tive undivided
shares of the co-owners. The subject
property is not a thing essentially indivisible.
The rights of the co-owners to have the
property partitioned and their share in the
sale delivered to them cannot be questioned
for no co-owner shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership. The partition was
MIDTERMS
merely a necessary incident of the co-
ownership; and absent any evidence to the
contrary, this partition is presumed to have
been done in good faith.
Along the same vein, it was said that
where there are several co-owners and some
of them die, the heirs of those who die, with
respect to the part belonging to the
deceased, become also co-owners of the
property together with those who survive.
(Cid vs. Peralta, 24 Phil. 142)
Partition of land need not be in writing.
Once again the Supreme Court in Kilario
vs. CA, G.R. No. 134329, Jan. 19, 2000, said
that an extrajudicial settlement of estate is
valid although executed in an unregistered
private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and registered
to be valid. In fact, the requirement that a
partition be put into a public instrument and
registered under Rule 74, Section 2, Rules of
Court has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to
serve as a constructive notice to others. The
intrinsic validity of the parti-tion not
executed with the prescribed formalities is
not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Article 1358, NCC, requiring a
public instrument for acts which have for
their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights
over immovable property is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which
does not affect the validity or enforceability
of the acts of the parties among themselves.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Neither does the statute of frauds under
Article 1403, NCC apply because partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that
it does not involve a transfer of property
from one to the other but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor
of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. (see also Heirs of Joaquin Teves
vs. CA, 316 SCRA 632).
Co-ownership; Sale of the whole
property; Effect.
Once again the Supreme Court in Tomas
Claudio Memorial College, Inc. vs. CA, G.R.
No. 124262, Oct. 12, 1999, said that even if
the co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his share but not
those of the co-owners who did not consent
to the sale. Under Article 493, NCC, the sale
or other disposition affects only the sellers
pro indiviso share and the transferee gets
only what corresponds to his grantors share
in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.
12
Along the same vein, it was ruled that
pursuant to Article 494, NCC, no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
MALIPOL
No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-
owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Co-Ownership.
Once again, the Supreme Court in Sps.
Alexander and Adelaida Cruz vs. Eleuterio
Leis, et al., G.R. No. 125233, Mar. 9, 2000
ruled that a co-owner who redeems a
property subject of a co-ownership without
the other co-owners joining him cannot claim
exclusive ownership of the property. In this
case, the property was inherited by the co-
owners, but it was forfeited in favor of the
government for non-payment of taxes. Only
one of the co-owners redeemed it and
claimed exclusive ownership.
It was said that the redemption of the
land did not terminate the co-ownership. It
did not give him/her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership. (see Paulmitan
vs. CA, 215 SCRA 866). The reason can be
traced from Adille vs. CA, 157 SCRA 455,
where it was said that the right to
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner
with respect to his share alone (Article 1612,
1889, 1514, New Civil Code). The
redemption by one co-owner did not put to
an end the existing state of co-ownership.
(Article 489, New Civil Code).
In this case therefore, the co-owner who
exercised the right of redemption holds the
other portions of the property in trust for the
others.
PRESCRIPTION
MIDTERMS
A persons possession of a parcel of land
covered by a TCT cannot render nugatory the
right of the holders of a certificate of title.
The reason is that prescription does not run
against registered land. A title, once
registered, cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Moreover, in asserting ownership by
donation, petitioners were in effect assailing
the title of respondents. A Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked, the issue on
its validity can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. (Ong,
et al. vs. Sps. Cabucos, G.R. No. 148056,
Apr. 19, 2001; Baluyot vs. CA, G.R. No.
122947, July 27, 1999).
Fraud in transfer of land; A case of
implied trust.
In Sps. Del Campo vs. Heirs of
Regalado, Sr., G.R. No. 108228, Feb. 1,
2001, a co-owner of a parcel of land sold the
entire lot to an-other. Title was issued to the
buyer but the buyer was aware of the
possession by the co-owners and the sale
over a portion of the land to another. It was
said that although the buyers certificate of
title became indefeasible after the lapse of
one year from the date of the decree of
registration, the attendance of fraud in its
issuance created an implied trust in favor of
petitioners and gave them the right to seek
reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully
obtained by the former. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust
ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when
the right of the true and real owner is
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
recognized, expressly or implicitly such as
when he remains undis-turbed in his
possession, the said action is imprescriptible,
it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title. (David, et al. vs. Malay, et al., G.R. No.
132644, Nov. 19, 1999). Having established
by clear and convincing evidence that they
are the legal owners of the litigated portion
included in TCT No. 14566, it is only proper
that reconvey-ance of the property be
ordered in favor of petitioners. The alleged
incontrovertibility of buyers title cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents because
certificates of title merely confirm or record
title already existing and cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud.
(Esquivias vs. CA, 272 SCRA 803).
It is also a well-settled rule that failure
and intentional omission to disclose the fact
of actual physical possession by another
person during registration proceedings
constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud
to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of
a third person. (Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas vs.
CA, 270 SCRA 309). In this case, buyer knew
of the fact that he did not have a title to the
entire lot and could not, therefore, have
validly registered the same in his name alone
because he was aware of petitioners
possession of the subject portion as well as
13
the sale over a portion of the property.
A fundamental principle in land
registration that the certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor
MALIPOL
of the person whose name appears therein,
in this case the private respondents father,
Antonio Francisco. A title once registered
under the Torrens system cannot be defeated
even by adverse, open and notorious
possession; neither can it be defeated by
prescription. (Heirs of Brusas vs. CA, 313
SCRA 176).
Petitioners cannot prove their ownership
of the subject parcels of land through tax
declarations and corresponding tax receipts
in-asmuch as they are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. (Cervantes vs.
Francisco, G.R. No. 118982, Feb. 19, 2001).
Upon the lapse of one year from the
issuance of the original of the original
certificate of title, his title to the property
already became indefeasible and can no
longer be controversial.
Vda. de Retuerto vs. Barz
G.R. No. 148180, Dec. 19, 2001
Facts:
In 1996, Pedro Barz, respondents
predecessor-in-inter-est, filed an application
for confirmation of title over the lot in
question with the CFI. The court declared
Pedro Barz the lawful owner of the said
property; consequently, an original certificate
of title was issued in his name in 1968.
Petitioners contest such title and claim
that as early as 1929, their predecessor-in-
interest, Panfilo Retuerto, bought the
property from Juana Perez Barz, mother of
MIDTERMS
Pedro Barz, and that in 1937, the CFI of
Cebu adjudicated said property to Panfilo
Retuerto. This alleged sale was, however, not
registered.
Also, petitioners alleged fraud,
contending that Pedro Barz misrepresented
with the land registration court that he
inherited the whole of Lot 896 when in truth
and in fact a por-tion thereof designated as
Lot 896-A had already been disposed of to
Panfilo Retuerto; hence, a constructive trust
was created over the property for and in
behalf of Panfilo Retuerto and his heirs.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents,
declaring them absolute owners of the land.
The CA affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court resolved the following issues:
768 May petitioners still contest
respondents title?
The Supreme Court ruled, NO.
Upon the lapse of one year after 1968,
when Pedro Barz was issued an original
certificate of title, his title to the prop-erty
already became indefeasible and can no
longer be contro-verted.
Also, both the alleged sale in 1929 and
the claimed favo-rable adjudication by the
CFI of Cebu in 1937 cannot be given effect
because nowhere has it been shown that a
decree of reg-istration was ever issued
affecting the property.
0
1 Are petitioners guilty of laches?
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Yes. Despite the alleged decision in
1937 by the CFI in favor of Panfilo
Retuerto, the latter failed to intervene
and introduce the said decision in the
petition for confirmation of title filed by
Pedro Barz in 1966. Also, since the
issuance of OCT in the name of Pedro
Barz in 1968, no action had been taken
by petitioners directly attacking said title
and seeking reconveyance of the
property. It was only sometime in 1989
or twenty-one (21) years later, when
they were finally impleaded by private
respondents in an action for quieting of
title that petitioners actively asserted
ownership of the subject property in
their answer to the complaint.
0 Is there constructive trust?
No. Constructive trusts are created
in equity to prevent unjust enrichment,
arising against one who, by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains
or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold.
Petitioners failed to substantiate
their allegation that their predecessor-
in-interest has acquired any legal right
14 to the prop-erty subject of the present
controversy. Nor had they adduced any
evidence to show that the certificate of
title of Pedro Barz was obtained through
fraud.
MALIPOL
Even assuming arguendo that Pedro
Barz acquired title to the property
through mistake or fraud, petitioners are
nonethe-less barred from filing their
claim of ownership. An action for re-
conveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes within ten
years from the time of its creation or
upon the alleged fraudulent registration
of the property. Since registration of real
property is considered a constructive
notice to all persons, then the ten-year
prescriptive period is reckoned from the
time of such registering, filing or
entering. Thus, petitioners should have
filed an action for reconveyance within
ten years from the issuance of the OCT
in 1968. This, they failed to do so.
Demand for partition is imprescriptible.
0 A parcel of land was owned in
common. However, one of the co-
owners took possession of a part of
it, but did not by any express or
implied act show that he repudiated
the co-ownership. Can the other co-
owners ask for partition? Why?
Ans. Yes, because his possession hardly
proved an act of repu-diation as
there was no showing that said
possession was to the exclusion of
the other co-heirs.
The action for partition has not
yet prescribed. An action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by laches. (Del Banco vs.
MIDTERMS
IAC, 156 SCRA 57). Each co-owners
may demand at any time the
partition of the common property.
(Art. 494, NCC; Mercedes
Deirparine, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 11257, December 4, 1998).
Possession of co-owner cannot ripen to
ownership.
3 May the possession of a co-owner
ripen into ownership? Why?
Ans. No. The possession of a co-owner
cannot ripen into owner-ship for the
reason that the possession was
merely in the concept of a trustee
for the other co-owners. In Salvador
vs. CA, 243 SCRA 239, it was held:
The possession of a co-owner
is like that of a trustee and shall not
be regarded as adverse to the other
co-owners but in fact as beneficial
to all of them. Acts which may be
considered adverse insofar as
owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or
profits from the property, erection
of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon, and the
payment of land taxes, cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, if it
is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably con-stituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of
the other co-owners.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Thus, in order that a co-
owners possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or
the other co-own-ers, the following
elements must concur: (1) that he
has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners; (2) that such positive
acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners; and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
Trust; Implied trust; 10-year period to
question title.
In Purita Salvatierra, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 107797, Aug. 26, 1996, it appears
that in 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died
without any issue. He was survived by his
brothers Tomas, Bartolome, Ve-nancio,
Marcario and a sister Marcela. He left several
properties but it appears that Anselmo
registered Lot no. 26 in his name with
evident bad faith. The question raised before
the Supreme Court was the applicable
prescriptive period to file an action, whether
it is based on Article 1391 or Article 1144,
NCC.
15 The Supreme Court said that the
prescriptive period is based on Article 1144
of the Civil Code as it involved fraud in
registering Lot no. 26 in Anselmos name. In
effect, an implied trust was created by virtue
of Art. 1456 of the New Civil Code which says
that property acquired through mistake or
MALIPOL
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
Concept of implied trust.
Implied trust is defined as the right,
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial
enjoyment of property, the legal title to
which is vested in another and is further
subdivided into resulting and con-structive
trust. (Ramos, et al. vs. CA, 61 SCRA 284).
While resulting trust is one raised by
implication of law and presumed to have
been contemplated by the parties,
constructive trust, on the other hand, is one
raised by construction of or arising by
operation of law. (Ramos, et al. vs. CA).
Action for reconveyance in implied trust.
An action for reconveyance of registered
land based on an im-plied trust may be
barred by laches. The prescriptive period of
such actions is 10 years from the date the
right of action accrued. (Vda. De Nuculaban
vs. CA). It was held in Armamento vs. CA, 96
SCRA 178, that an action for reconveyance of
registered land based on implied trust
prescribes in 10 years even if the decree of
registration is no longer open to review.
Effect of registration of document.
In Duque vs. Domingo, 80 SCRA 654, it
was also said that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the Register of
Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the
MIDTERMS
whole world, and, therefore, discovery of the
fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time of registration. Such registration is
deemed to be a constructive notice that the
alleged fiduciary or trust relationship has
been repudiated. It is now settled that an
action on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years from the date the right
of action accrued.
Trust; Resulting trust.
The theory of the petitioners in Morales,
et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 117228, June
19, 1997, was that the money used by Celso
Avelino in purchasing a property belonged to
his parents and that he was merely asked to
purchase the property. The evidence,
however, shows that the money belonged to
him; that he declared the property under his
name; paid the taxes; caused the survey by
the Bureau of Lands, and; sold the property
to respondents. The theory of the petitioners
was that there was an implied trust.
The SC ruled that there was no trust,
citing the third paragraph of Art. 1448, NCC,
which states:
However, if the person to whom
the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the
price of the sale, no trust is implied by
law, it being disputably presumed that
there is a gift in favor of the child.
Concept of trust.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Trust is the legal relationship between
one person having an equitable ownership in
property and another person owning the
legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and exercise of
certain pow-ers by the latter. The
characteristics of trust are:
It is a relationship;
0 It is a relationship of fiduciary in
character;
1 It is a relationship with respect to
property, not one involv-ing merely personal
duties;
2 It involves the existence of
equitable duties imposed upon the holder of
the title to the property to deal with it for the
benefit of another; and
3 It arises as a result of a
manifestation of intention to create the
relationship.
Trusts are either express or implied.
Express trusts are created by the intention of
the trustor or of the parties, while implied
trusts come into being by operation of law,
either through implication of an intention to
create a trust as a matter of law or through
the im-position of the trust irrespective of,
16
and even contrary to, any such intention. In
turn, implied trusts are either resulting or
construc-tive trust. Resulting trusts are
based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines
the equitable title or interest and are
MALIPOL
presumed always to have been contemplated
by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved
in a transaction whereby a person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is
obligated in equity to hold the legal title for
the benefit of another. On the other hand,
constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse
of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right
to property which ought not, in equity and
good conscience, to hold (Huang vs. CA, 236
SCRA 420; Vda de Esconde vs. CA, 253
SCRA 66 [1996]).
Example of resulting trust.
A resulting trust is exemplified by Art.
1448 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust
when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another for the purpose
of having the beneficial interest of the
property. The former is the trustee,
while the latter is the beneficiary.
However, if the person to whom the title
is conveyed is a child, legitimate or
illegitimate, of the one paying the price
of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it
being disputably pre-sumed that there is
a gift in favor of the child.
The trust created under the first
sentence of Art. 1448 is some-times referred
MIDTERMS
to as a purchase of money resulting trust.
The trust is created in order to effectuate
what the law presumes to have been the
intention of the parties in the circumstances
that the person to whom the land was
conveyed holds it as trustee for the person
who supplied the purchase money.
To give rise to a purchase money
resulting trust, it is essential that there be:
0 An actual payment of money,
property or services, or an equivalent,
consisting valuable consideration; and
1 Such consideration must be
furnished by the alleged ben-eficiary of a
resulting trust (76 Am Jur. 2d. Trusts 180).
Exceptions to implied trust.
There are recognized exceptions to the
establishment of an im-plied resulting trust.
The first is stated in the last part of Art. 1448
itself. Thus, where A pays the purchase
money and title is conveyed by absolute
deed to As child or to a person to whom A
stands in loco parentis and who makes no
express promise, a trust does not result, the
presumption being that a gift was intended.
Another exception is, of course, that in which
an actual contrary intention is proved. Also
where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud.
Burden of proof in trust.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
As a rule, the burden of proving the
existence of a trust is on the party asserting
its existence, and such proof must be clear
and satisfactorily show the existence of the
trust and its elements. While implied trusts
may be proved by oral evidence, the
evidence must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, and
should not be made to rest on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declara-tions.
Trustworthy evidence is required because
oral evidence can easily be fabricated. (Salao
vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65; OLaco vs. Co Cho
Chit, 220 SCRA 656; Ong Ching Po. vs. CA,
239 SCRA 341).
Prescription after ten years, when it
applies.
In Reyes vs. CA, 315 SCRA 626, it was
once again said that an action for
reconveyance of a real property based on
implied or con-structive trust prescribes in
ten years, the point of reference being the
date of the registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property. The rule applies only when
the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust
is not in possession of the property.
The reason for the rule is that, the one
who is in actual pos-session of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may
17
wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
and determine the nature of the adverse
MALIPOL
claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession.
Implied Trust; Imprescriptibility of
Action.
0 A parcel of land used to be the
conjugal property of Gregorio Yap
and Rosario Diez. The former died
leaving as heirs his wife and
children. To facilitate the approval of
a loan, she executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the
property signed by the heirs except
Gregorio Yap, Jr., then a minor. The
title was cancelled and Rosario
exercised the rights of ownership
over the property. The heirs filed an
action for partition alleging that the
extrajudicial settlement was
simulated and void, but the RTC
dismissed the action which was
affirmed by the CA, holding that the
same was valid. In fact, both courts
ruled that Gregorio Yap, Jr. was
barred by laches. Is the ruling
correct? Why?
Ans. Yes. The extrajudicial settlement is
valid, but Gregorio Yap, Jr. was not
barred by laches since he was a
minor at the time the extrajudicial
settlement was executed. The
registration of the land under
Rosario merely created an implied
trust in her favor by analogy to
Article 1451 of the Civil Code which
provides:
MIDTERMS
When land passes by
succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be
put in the name of another, a
trust is established by
implication of law for the
benefit of the true owner.
In the case of OLaco vs. Co
Cho Chit, 220 SCRA 656, Art. 1451
was held as creating a resulting
trust, which is founded on the
presumed intention of the parties.
As a general rule, it arises where
such may be reasonably presumed
to be the intention of the parties, as
determined from the facts and
circumstances existing at the time
of the transaction out of which it is
sought to be established (Huang vs.
CA, 235 SCRA 420).
For prescription to run in favor
of the trustee, the trust must be
repudiated by unequivocal acts
made known to the cestui que trust
and proved by clear and conclusive
evidence. Furthermore, the rule that
the prescriptive period should be
counted from the date of the
issuance of the Torrens certificate of
title applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance of property under the
Property Registra-tion Decree
(Huang vs. CA). Since the action
brought by petitioner Yap to claim
his share was brought shortly after
he was informed by Jovita Ancog of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
their mothers effort to sell the
property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.s claim
cannot be considered barred either
by prescription or laches. (Ancog, et
al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 112260,
June 30, 1997).
0 Title by accretion.
When soil and earth, weeds and other
deposits are washed away from other places
and gradually settle down and attach
themselves to ones land that used to border
on a stream or local body of water, the owner
of this land becomes the owner of the
additional area thus formed by accretion. The
law in point is Article 457 of the New Civil
Code which provides that. To the owners of
lands adjoining banks of rivers belongs the
accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters.
However, this law cannot be invoked for
application to cases where the accretion is
caused by action of the bay which is a part of
the sea, being a mere indentation of the
same.26 Such alluvial formation along the
seashore is part of the public domain and,
therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse
possession by private persons. It is outside
the commerce of man, un-less otherwise
declared by either the executive or legislative
branch of the government.27 Neither may
such rule on accretion be invoked by an
18
owner of an estate adjoining a pond or
lagoon with respect to land left dry by the
natural decrease of the water, anymore than
a portion of such estate may be lost by its
inundation due to an extraordinary flood, in
the light of Article 459 of the same Code.
MALIPOL
In the absence of evidence that the
change in the course of the river was sudden
or that it occurred through avulsion, the
presump-tion is that the change was gradual
and caused by accretion. How-ever, in case
of erosion of ones land, although this may
be covered by a Torrens title, it was held that
registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of
his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. But
accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the
current become the property of the owners
of the banks. Such ac-cretions are natural
incidents to land bordering on running
streams and the provisions of the Civil Code
in that respect are not affected by the Land
Registration Act or the Property Registration
Decree.28
It is thus essential that the land where
the accretion takes place be adjacent to the
banks of rivers, and that the accretion is due
to the gradual action of the current of the
rivers. Where the land is not formed solely
by the natural effect of the water current of
the river bordering the land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, i.e., it is artificially
induced by the erection of bamboo stakes
and later on by an adobe retaining wall for
the purpose of holding the garbage and other
refuse being deliberately dumped everyday
into the bank of the river, it is a man-made
accre-tion and a part of the public domain.29
MIDTERMS
However, on the question of whether the
accretion becomes automatically registered
land just because the land which receives it
is covered by a Torrens title thereby making
the alluvial property imprescriptible, it was
held to be not so, just as an unregistered
land purchased by the registered owner of
the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing,
and registration under the Torrens system is
quite another. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts or the
Property Registration Decree does not vest or
give title to the land, but merely confirms
and thereafter protects the title al-ready
possessed by the owner, thereby making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.
To obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedure has
been provided.30
Under Article 370 of the old Civil Code,
beds of rivers abandoned because of a
natural change in the course of the water
belong to the owners of the land bordering
thereon throughout their respective extends.
Thus, it was held that the fact that the
applicant acquired through homestead patent
the lot to which the dry river bed is adja-
cent, is no hindrance to acquisition of
ownership by accretion. After the title to the
homestead has become absolute, the land
ceases to be public and becomes one of
private ownership entitled to all the benefits
granted by law.31 But said Article 370 applied
therein has been superseded by Article 461
of the new Civil Code, such that river beds
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners, whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to
the area lost, unless the owners of the lands
adjoining the old beds pay the value thereof.
Another problem that may arise is when
an island should spring up in the midst of a
stream or river. As the title to the bed of a
stream or river vests in the State, islands
formed by accretion to such bed belong to
the State and not to the owner of either
shore. Stated oth-erwise, where an island
springs up in the midst of a stream, it is an
accretion to the soil in the bed of the river,
and not to the land of the riparian owner,
although it afterwards may become united
with the mainland.
Accretion is oftentimes confused with a river bank but on a sea bank.
alluvium, or with accession. For the
purpose of distinction, it may be said that
alluvium refers to the deposit itself, while
accretion denotes the act; on the other hand,
accession refers to the right of the owner of
the principal thing to all that it may produce
or that may be united to it, whether naturally
or artificially, under the theory that the
accessory follows the principal.
The issue on whether or not the land is
alluvial, or of public or private domain, or
whether
19 private respondents are riparian
owners, is proper for ventilation in the
registration case now pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Silay City.33
ACCRETION
MALIPOL
As a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457 of the Civil Code, accretion requires
the concurrence of the following elements:
0 The accumulation of soil or
sediment must be gradual and imperceptible;
1 It is the result of the actions of the
waters of the river;
Ans. It is part of the public domain. Article
2 The land where the accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil
is deposited, while al-luvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the river
bank.
The disputed land is an accretion not on
Laguna de Bay is a lake, the accretion of
which, by mandate of Article of the Spanish
Law on Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner
of the land contiguous thereto.
As part of the public domain, the
disputed land is intended for public use and
so long as the land in litigation belongs to
the national domain and is reserved for
public use, it is not capable of being appro-
priated by any private person, except
through express authorization granted in due
form by a competent authority. (Navarro vs.
IAC, 268 SCRA 74).
Accretion; If land is the result of the
dumping of sawdust, it is public.
MIDTERMS
0 Accretion was formed as a result
of the dumping of sawdust by the
Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent
to its sawmill operations,
somewhere at an area near
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River.
The question was whether the land
is private or public. Decide.
457 of the Civil Code provides: To
the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the
waters. In the earlier case of
Meneses vs. CA, 246 SCRA 374
(1995) it was ruled that accretion as
a mode of acquiring property under
Art. 457, NCC requires:
0That the deposit of soil or
sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
1That it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river (or
sea);
2That the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).
These are called the rules on
alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or
streams any accretion gradually
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
received from the effects of the
current of waters.
However, if the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders,
soil, and other filling materials on
portions of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River bounding their
land, it cannot be claimed, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil
and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting
from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River. In Hilario vs.
City of Manila, 19 SCRA 931 (1967),
it was held that the word current
indicates the participa-tion of the
body of water in the ebb and flow of
waters due to high and low tide.
The accretion was man-made
or artificial. In Republic vs. CA, 132
SCRA 514, this Court ruled that the
requirement that the deposit should
be due to the effect of the current
of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil
Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Putting it differently,
alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs.
20 Director of Lands, et al., 16 C.A.
Rep. 211, where the land was not
formed solely by the natural effect
of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and
deliberate intervention of man, it
MALIPOL
was deemed a man-made accretion
and, as such, part of the public
domain. (Vda. De Nazareno, et al.
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 98405, June
26, 1996).
Title by reclamation.
This method suggests the filling of
submerged land by deliberate act and
reclaiming title thereto. In some states there
exists some sort of an either express or
implied grant to the effect that the owners of
the adjacent upland may fill the adjacent
land under water, subject only to the
paramount power of the government to
establish harbor lines, and as soon as this is
completed the reclaimed land becomes an
integral part of the adjoining land so that the
owner has full title to one as much as the
other. In the Philippines, there exists no such
grant, express or implied, to private
landowners. It is only the govern-ment that
can assert title to reclaimed land. Land
reclaimed from the sea as a result of the
construction by the government of a
breakwater fronting the place where it is
situated, is held to belong to the state in
accordance with Article 5 of the Law of
Waters of 1866.34 However, the government
may declare it property of the adjoining
owners and as an increment thereto only
when it is no longer necessary for public use.
Under Republic Act No. 1899, approved
June 22, 1957, the National Government
granted to all municipalities and chartered
cities the authority to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation by
MIDTERMS
dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and
repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities or
chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Any and all such land
reclaimed will become property of the
respective municipalities or chartered cities;
but the new foreshore along the reclaimed
areas shall continue to become property of
the National Government.
0 Title by voluntary transfer.
A private grant is the usual means by
which title to land is transferred by the owner
himself or his duly authorized representa-
tive. Here the consent or cooperation of the
grantor is an essential element. This transfer
is given effect by the voluntary execution of
a deed of conveyance in certain prescribed
form, completed by the recording or
registration thereof in a public office. The
purpose of such registration is to serve public
notice at least constructively, and thereby
legally bind third persons. Under the Torrens
system, as we shall find in the latter part of
this work, it is the registration that is the
operative act to convey the land and affect
title thereto. In other words, the legal title to
the land does not pass until the conveyance
shall have been duly registered or made of
public record.
Title by involuntary alienation.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
This method of transfer does not require
the consent or coop-eration of the owner of
the land, and, in fact, is usually carried out
against his will. For the more common forms
of involuntary aliena-tion, we have them in
connection with judgments of the courts in
expropriation or condemnation proceedings.
Land is forcibly acquired by the state through
the exercise of eminent domain, or by way of
escheat or forfeiture. It may also be
confiscated, seized or attached, and
subsequently sold at public auction to the
highest bidder. We have the execution sale
by the sheriff to satisfy a money judgment,
the tax sale to satisfy unpaid taxes and
penalties, the auction sale by a public officer
in foreclosure of mortgage. Some authorities
even consider the sale of property under
special order of the court for and in behalf of
a minor or a person under legal disability as
falling within the category of involuntary
alienation in the same way as a sale by
judicial administrator or executor of an
estate of a decedent. Under this mode of
acquiring land, the purchasers are generally
subject to the rule of caveat emptor.
0 crops; (3) to participate in the guarantee
1 fund program whereby the farmer will have
2 to deposit with the cooperative association
3 Title by descent or devise.
Title by descent may be acquired by
virtue of hereditary suc-cession to the estate
21
of a deceased owner. To be an heir, it
requires certain degree or relationship with
the decedent. In the case of devise, however,
succession need not be in favor of a relative.
Even a stranger may acquire title by devise if
appropriate disposition has been made in his
MALIPOL
favor by the testator in the latters will.
Where the heirs en-titled would so prefer,
title to land under this method may formally
be transferred without proceeding in court.
Under the provisions of Rule 74, Section 1, of
the Rules of Court, they may agree upon an
extrajudicial settlement or partition of the
estate of the decedent, provided there are no
debts left by him which remain unsettled.
Title by emancipation patent or
grant.
To the above modes of acquiring land
title, a new one has been added for the
purpose of ameliorating the sad plight of
tenant-farm-ers. By virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27, tenant-farmers are deemed
owners of the land they till. While the tenant-
farmer is given a certificate of land transfer,
this does not, however, make him the full
owner until after he shall have complied with
certain obligations, namely: (1) to be a
member of a cooperative association
organized for the purpose; (2) to improve
farm practices such as may ensure better
one cavan per hectare per harvest, the
proceeds of which deposit will be utilized to
guarantee land amortization; (4) to allow
rural bank to retain 5% of his product,
everytime he borrows, to constitute a trust
fund the disposition of which shall be subject
to the rules promulgated by the Department
of Local Governments and Community
Development;
MIDTERMS
(5) to pay real estate tax on the land; and
(6) to pay to the landowner within fifteen
years by amortization the full value of the
land as fixed in the Presidential decree.
Under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 266 setting forth the mechanics
for the registration of ownership or title to
lands acquired under Presidential Decree No.
27, after the tenant-farmer shall have fully
complied with the above obligations, he will
be issued an emancipation patent or grant
which, upon being filed with the Office of the
Register of Deed, shall constitute a
conclusive authority for the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the
grantee. Where such grant involves land not
previously registered under the Torrens
system, the emancipation patent covering
the same, if filed with the Register of Deeds,
will automatically place such land under the
operation of the Torrens system without need
of the usual formal-ity of publication and
judicial hearing, and thereupon the Register
of Deeds shall issue an original certificate of
title in the name of the grantee on the basis
of a duly approved survey plan.
However, Presidential Decrees Nos. 27
and 266 have now been superseded by
Republic Act No. 6657 known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) whereby the welfare of the land-less
farmers and farmworkers will receive the
highest consideration to promote social
justice and to move the nation toward sound
rural development and industrialization.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
Such land acquired under the land By possession is meant possession
reform program is not trans-ferable except exercised either by the same person who
by hereditary succession or in favor of the holds and enjoys the property or by another
government. To insure that this rule is not in his name, in accordance with Article 524 of
violated, Section 106 of Presidential Decree the Civil Code. The term contemplates not
No. 1529 expressly provides that no only material but also symbolic possession,
voluntary deed or instru-ment purporting to which is acquired by the execution of a public
be a subdivision, mortgage, lease, sale or instrument.36
any other mode of encumbrance or
conveyance of private agricultural land, As to the means of determining
which may principally be devoted to rice or ownership between two or more purchasers,
corn or any portion thereof, shall be Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides,
registered, unless accompanied with an among other things, that if it should be real
affidavit of the vendor or executor, stating property, it shall belong to the person
that the land involved is not tenanted, or if acquiring it who first recorded it in the
tenanted, the same is not primarily devoted Registry. Should there be no inscription, the
to the production of rice and/or corn. property shall belong to the person who first
took pos-session of it in good faith, and, in
0 Recording not indispensable to prove the absence thereof, to the person who
ownership. presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
There can be no doubt that under Article
709 of the Civil Code titles of ownership of
real estate which are not properly recorded
or entered in the Registry of Property shall
not prejudice the rights of third persons; but
the Supreme Court of Spain in construing
this article of the Code held in its judgment
of December 16, 1892, that from the fact
that the ownership of the piece of property is
not re-corded in the Registry in favor of the
person in possession thereof, it cannot be
inferred that such person is not the owner of
22
the property, provided it be shown that he
acquired the same, that the property is not
registered in the name of another, and that
he has been in the quiet and peaceful
possession thereof.35

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter II
TORRENS SYSTEM: ORIGIN, NATURE,
AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
0 Origin of the Torrens system.
The world owes the Torrens system of
land registration to a British customs officer,
Sir Robert Richard Torrens. While a commis-
sioner of customs in South Australia, Torrens
was inspired by the comparative facility with
which ships or undivided shares therein were
negotiated and transferred in accordance
with the English Mer-chants Shipping Act. So
much so, that when he became a registrar of
deeds and was confronted with the problems
of title to land usually characterized by
endless confusion and uncertainties, he
devised a scheme of registration of title,
reforming the old existing system of
registration of deeds, and to this end he used
the Merchants Ship-ping Act as his pattern,
with appropriate modifications. Then, when
he became a member of the First Colonial
Ministry of the province of South Australia,
he took the initiative of introducing in the
new parliament a bill embodying his scheme
for land registration. After overcoming some
opposition, it was passed and came to be
known as the Real Property Act (No. 15) of
1857-58. In no time the system has grown
to be universally known as the Torrens
system.
23
According to Arnold Guyot Cameron, in
his discussion of the Torrens system, no legal
or economic principle is of greater moment
than this system, and he forecasted that it
would interest every owner of property,
MALIPOL
without exception, every lawyer and every
financier who would soon see real estate
becoming an asset as liquid as other factors
of wealth upon which banks may be expected
to loan funds.
0 Basic idea of the system
As originally conceived by Sir Robert, the
author of the system, the registration of land
may be accomplished by pursuing certain
defi-nite courses. The person, for instance,
who claims to be the fee-simple owner, either
at law or in equity, files an application to
have the land placed in his name on the
register of titles. His application is then
submitted for scrutiny to a barrister and a
conveyancer, who are usu-ally known as
examiners of titles. Then it is determined
whether the application passes certain tests,
namely: (1) whether the description of the
land sought to be registered is definite and
clear; (2) whether the applicant is in
undisputed possession thereof; (3) whether
he ap-pears to be rightfully entitled thereto;
and (4) whether by the evidence of title
submitted it can safely be concluded that no
other person may be prejudiced by the
adjudication of the property to the applicant.
Upon the applicant passing all such tests, a
certificate of title is issued describing the
nature of his estate and his certificate vests
in him an indefeasible title. This certificate of
title thereafter becomes the basis of future
transactions affecting the property described
therein, such as sale, mortgage, lease and
other forms of deeds and conveyances. The
system as adopted in the Philippines is in
MIDTERMS
principle, practically identical to that basic
idea as conceived in the original plan.
0 Advantages of the system.
As viewed by an authority on the
subject, the Torrens system presents at least
a dozen advantages, namely:
0 It abolishes endless fees.
1 It eliminates repeated examinations
of titles.
2 It reduces records enormously.
3 It instantly reveals ownership.
4 It protects against encumbrances
not noted on the Torrens certificate.
5 It makes fraud almost impossible.
6 It assures.
7 It keeps up the system without
adding to the burden of taxation.
Because the beneficiaries of the
system pay the fees.
8 It eliminates tax titles.
9 It gives practically eternal title as
the State insures per-petually.
0
1 It furnishes state title insurance
instead of private title insurance.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
2 It makes possible the transfer of
titles or of loans within the compass
of hours instead of a matter of days
and weeks.1
0 Comparative benefits offered.
The benefits of this system, compared
with other pre-existing systems, have
been summarized by Sir Robert Richard
Torrens as follows:
0 It has substituted security for
insecurity.
1 It has reduced the cost of
conveyance from pounds to shil-
lings, and the time occupied from
months to days.
2 It has exchanged brevity and
clearness for obscurity and
verbiage.
3 It has so simplified ordinary
dealings that he who has mas-tered
the three Rs can transact his own a valid title by the transferor, but by the
conveyancing.
4 It affords protection against fraud.
5 It has restored to their just value
24 many estates, held under good-
holding titles but depreciated in
consequence of some blur or
technical defect, and has barred the
re-occurrence of any similar faults.
MALIPOL
6 It has largely diminished the
number of chancery suits, by
removing those conditions that
afford ground for them.
And according to Sheldon, another
authority on the subject, there is the eighth
benefit in that the system safeguards the
rights of infants and others under disability,
as no one can deal with the land except
through the registrars office, where all rights
clearly appear and must be respected.2
0 Stability owed to Government
backing.
The stability of the Torrens system is
very much enhanced by the guarantees of
the government in the form of title insurance
backed up by a permanent assurance fund.
The theory of the assurance fund may be
restated thus: The act of registration is the
operative act, and the transfer and vesting of
the title is effected, not by the execution of
an instrument of transfer, not by the act of
the owner of the land, not by the transfer of
State acting through its officer, the Registrar;
and because it transfers and vests the title
by the issue of a certificate which is declared
by stat-ute to be conclusive evidence of an
indefeasible title to the land, the State
creates a fund for the compensation of such
persons as may be injured by the divesting
and cutting off of rights and interests under
this statutory declaration.3
0 Purpose of Torrens law.
MIDTERMS
The real purpose of the Torrens system
of registration is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once the title was registered, the owner
might rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. The proceeding
for the registration of land under the Torrens
system is a judicial proceed-ing, but it
involves more in its consequences than does
an ordinary action.4
This system of registration relieves the
land of unknown liens or claims, just or
unjust, against it. But it is not intended that
lands not truly owned may be acquired
thereby. It is intended only that the title,
which the petitioner has, shall be registered
and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens
of whatsoever character, except those which
shall be noted in the order of registration and
in the certificate issued.5
Persons bound notwithstanding lack
of registration.
If a purchaser, mortgagee or grantee
should fail to register his deed, would the
transaction have any effect as such? Viewed
in the light of our existing registration laws,
the conveyance shall not be valid against any
person unless registered, except (1) the
grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3)
third persons having actual notice or
knowledge thereof.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
That the grantor must be bound, there
can be no doubt for he cannot deny his own
act as may affect him adversely. As to his
heirs and devisees, they must also be bound
for they are considered mere extension of
the grantor. As to third persons having actual
notice or knowledge of the transaction to
them the purpose of registration, that is, to
create constructive notice, is more than
accomplished; to them registration is a
surplusage.
0 Basic laws to bring lands under
operation of the system.
With Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act, approved by the
Philippine Commission on November 6, 1902,
and which took effect on February 1, 1903
(January 1, 1903, according to Sotto v.
Sotto, 43 Phil. 688), our door was thrown
open to welcome the new scheme in land
registration, bearing the name of its famous
exponent in what is known as the Torrens
system. The text of our Land Registration
Act, however, is not original, the same being
a close reproduction of the Massachusetts
Act of 1898, which in turn was copied from
other sources.
The nature of the proceedings under the
Land Registration Act is in the main judicial,
but also voluntary in the sense that landown-
25
ers whose holdings have not come within the
operation of the Torrens system are under no
obligation to bring them within.
Consequently, and with the aim of bringing
more results, the government thought of
introducing some pressure by the enactment
MALIPOL
of Act No. 2259, other-wise known as the
Cadastral Act, taking effect February 11,
1913. The proceeding under the latter
measure is also judicial, but compulsory with
respect to landowners whose holdings may
be affected as the cadastral survey
progresses. Unlike the case under the
ordinary land registration proceeding where
the owners may apply for registration of their
titles to property whenever they find it
convenient, under the Cadastral Act the
government initiates the cadastral survey,
followed by the proceeding in court for the
settlement and adjudication of the property
involved. Here, the government files the
petition, while the private claimants file their
answers to assert their claims or lose them if
they should fail.
Again, with the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act)
taking effect on December 1, 1936, which
constitutes a compilation of all pre-existing
laws relative to lands of the public domain
with proper amendments, the government
made manifest its long standing policy to
bring lands segregated from the mass of
public lands within the operation of the
Torrens system. Under the Public Land Act,
the proceeding may either be judicial or
administrative. For the confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles, Section 51 of
this Act requires that application for
registration shall be heard in the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)6 in
the same manner and shall be subject to the
same procedure as established in the Land
Registration Act for other application, except
that a notice of all such applications,
MIDTERMS
together with the plan of the lands claimed,
shall be immediately forwarded to the
Director of Lands who may ap-pear as a
party in such cases. This, of course, is
accomplished through judicial proceeding.
However, titles to public lands may also
be disposed of through administrative
proceeding in certain forms of concession as
(1) for homestead settlement, (2) by sale,
(3) by lease, and (4) by confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles through
administrative legalization (free patent).
Under the provisions of Section 122 of
the Land Registration Act, whenever public
lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to
persons or to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of the Torrens system and shall
become registered lands.
0 Codification of registration laws.
To cope with the growing need to update
the Land Registration Act and to codify the
various other laws relative to registration of
property, and further with a view to
strengthen the Torrens system, Presidential
Decree No. 1529 was issued on June 11,
1978, entitled Property Registration
Decree. Thus, all pre-existing laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, in conflict or inconsist-ent with any
of the provisions of the new Decree have
been repealed or modified accordingly.
0 Outline of general procedure in an
ordinary land registration case.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be
registered under Act 496, the following
requisites should all be satisfied:
0 Survey of land by the Bureau of
Lands or a duly licensed private
surveyor;
1 Filing of application for registration
by the applicant;
2 Setting of the date for the initial
hearing of the application by the
Court;
3 Transmittal of the application and
the date of initial hear-ing together
with all the documents or other
evidences attached thereto by the
Clerk of Court to the Land Regis-
tration Commission (now National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration);7
4 Publication of a notice of the filing of
the application and date and place
of hearing once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philip-
pines;
26
5 Service of notice upon contiguous
owners, occupants and those known
to have interest in the property by
the Sher-iff;
MALIPOL
6 Filing of answer or opposition to the
application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
7 Hearing of the case by the Court;
8 Promulgation of judgment by the
Court;
9 Deeds who is to be assisted by a Deputy
Issuance of the decree by the Court
declaring the decision final and
instructing the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration
Administrator to issue a decree of
confirma-tion and registration;
0 Entry of the decree of registration in
the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration;
1 Sending of copy of the decree of
registration to the corre-sponding
Register of Deeds (Registrar of Land
Titles and Deeds); and
2 Transcription of the decree of
registration in the registra-tion book
and the issuance of the owners
duplicate original certificate of title
of the applicant by the Registrar of
Land Titles and Deeds, upon
payment of the prescribed fees.8
0 New designations of Land
Registration Commission and Reg-
isters of Deeds.
Executive Order No. 292 instituting the
Administrative Code
MIDTERMS
of 1987 has reorganized the National Land
Titles and Deeds Regis-tration Administration
renamed it Land Registration Authority to
be headed by an Administrator who is to be
assisted by two Deputy Administrators. The
Office of the Register of Deeds for each city
or province to be headed by a Register of
Register.
In view of the foregoing innovations, the
designations of Com-missioner of Land
Registration, Deputy Commissioner, Land
Reg-istration Commission, Register of Deeds,
Office of the Register of Deeds, and other
similar terms found in this book have been
modified conformably to the above changes,
except those which refer to quoted doctrines
in the actual case citations.
23 New designations of courts as
reorganized.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, the Court of Appeals has been
abolished and in lieu thereof there has been
created the Intermediate Appellate Court
with powers, among other things, to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues in cases falling within
its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings. Later in
July, 1986, the Chief Executive reorganized
this court and restored the Inter-mediate
Appellate Court to its original name of Court
of Appeals.9 On the other hand, the Courts
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts,
and the Courts of Agrarian Relations have all
been abolished and replaced by the Regional
Trial Courts, while the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Courts have been replaced by the Metro-
politan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.10

Accordingly, the pre-existing

designations of the various courts as may be
encountered in this work have been renamed
conformably to their respective equivalent
designation as above-mentioned.

27

MALIPOL
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter III
APPLICATION IN ORDINARY
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
23 Who may apply.
Under Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the following persons may file in
the proper Regional Trial Court application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
23 Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
24 Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
25 Those who have acquired ownership
of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right or accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
26 Those who have acquired ownership
of land in any other manner provided for by
law.
28
Where the land is owned in common, all
the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.
MALIPOL
Where the land has been sold under
pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an
application for the original registration of the
land, provided, however, that should the
period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the
vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted
for the applicant and may continue the
proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may
apply for original reg-istration of any land
held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the
instrument creating the trust.
It is to be observed that except for the
simplification of the origi-nal provision of
Sec. 19 of Act 496, as amended, Sec. 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not
rendered totally obsolete the pre-existing
law, at least as regards applications which
may be filed by the fol-lowing persons,
unless herein indicated otherwise, to wit:
23 The person or persons claiming,
singly or collectively, to own the
legal estate in fee simple.
Ownership of a particular parcel of land
may rest singly in one person or collectively
in two or more persons. If singly, there may
not be any problem; but if collectively, the
difficulty may arise when join-ing them
together for the purpose of filing a joint
application. A parcel of land jointly owned by
two or more individuals cannot be object of
partial registration with respect to one co-
owner, to the exclusion of the others. So
then, if the co-owners cannot come together
MIDTERMS
for one reason or another, the remedy is to
split the land by subdivision, as-signing to
each of them his corresponding share. This
done, anyone of them may file a separate
application for registration. Thus, where
applicants own merely an undivided share
less than fee simple in the land described in
the application, the application should be
dismissed without prejudice to the right of
the various owners of the undivided interests
in the land jointly to present a new
application for registra-tion.1
By legal estate in fee simple, means
an interest in real estate in the form of
absolute ownership, subject only to legal
limitations.
The word persons includes both
natural and juridical persons. Thus, it was
held that the San Juan de Dios Hospital,
which is a foundation of public interest, is a
juridical persons in accordance with Article
35 (now Art. 44) of the Civil Code, and had
rights and personality of its own to apply for
registration and obtain a decree and title.
The Government itself recognized the legal
personality of the San Juan de Dios Hospital
when it promulgated Act No. 1724 approving
and ratifying the agreement entered into by
the Secretary of War of the United States, as
representative of the Government of the
Philippines, and the Archbishop of Manila, as
representative of the Roman Catholic
Church.2
The person or persons claiming, singly
or collectively, to have the power of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
disposing of the legal estate in fee
sim-ple.
This class refers to persons who are
authorized to act jointly or severally for and
in behalf of a principal. In this case, the
appoint-ment of the agent or his power of
attorney need be attached to the application.
While this is liable to be abused, it is to
be borne in mind that the relations of an
agent to his principal are fiduciary and in
regard to the property forming the subject
matter of the agency, he is estopped from
acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that
of his principal. Action in personam will lie
against an agent to compel him to return or
retransfer to his principal the real property
committed to his cus-tody as such agent and
also to execute the necessary documents of
conveyance to effect such retransfer. The
principals right of action to compel a
reconveyance is not extinguished through the
registration of the land in favor of the agent;
though the final decree of registration may
not be reopened after expiration of one year
from the date of its entry, there appears to
be no reason why the agent should not be
compelled through a suit in equity to make
such reparation as may lie within his power
for the breach of trust committed by him,
and, as long as the land stands registered in
his name, such reparation may take the form
29
of a conveyance or transfer of title to the
cestui que trust, i.e., the principal.3 The
reason for this is that the title obtained
under this Act by an encargado or overseer
in his own name over a parcel of land
without the knowledge and consent of the
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owner does not affect the right of ownership
and title of the latter.4
The person or persons claiming, singly
or collectively, to own or hold any land under
a possessory information title, acquired
under the provision of the Mortgage Law of
the Philippines and the general regulations
for the execution of the same. (Rendered
obsolete by Pres. Decree No. 892)
A possessory information which is based
on a claim by virtue of continuous and
adverse possession, when approved by the
Court in a possessory information
proceeding, and recorded in the Registry of
Property, confers upon the claimant a
presumptive right of owner-ship which may
ripen into a record of ownership after twenty
years of uninterrupted possession from the
date of entry, according to article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
While possessory information title is not
absolute in the sense that it may yield to a
third person with a better right, still, as a
basis of claim for ownership when seeking
registration under the Torrens system, it has
the same efficacy as all other titles
enumerated in Act No. 809, in connection
with the provisions of Act No. 496.5
It is to be borne in mind, however, that
by virtue of Presiden-tial Decree No. 892
holders of Spanish titles or grants can no
longer invoke the same for purposes of
applying for original registration of title under
the Torrens system six months after February
16, 1976.
MIDTERMS
Minors or other persons under
disability, through their le-gally
appointed guardians, but the person
in whose behalf the application is
made shall be named as applicant
by the guardian.
As guardian referred to above is the one
appointed by the court for the estate of the
minor or incompetent pursuant to the provi-
sions of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. It is to
be noted, however, that under the provisions
of Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil
Code, the father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under
parental authority, and considered also as
the guardian of the childs property, subject
to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court. In view of such
legal innovation, it is submitted that an
administrator designated by law for the
property of a minor child may, without be-ing
judicially appointed as guardian, apply for
registration in behalf of his ward.
Corporation, through an officer duly
authorized by vote of its board of
directors.
The mere fact that one holds the
position of president of a corpo-ration does
not confer upon him the power to represent
the corpora-tion in an act of strict ownership.
Thus, it was held that the powers of the
president of a corporation are such only as
are conferred upon him by the board of
directors or vested in him by the by-laws. If
there is nothing in the by-laws conferring any
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
particular authority upon him, he has, from
his office alone, no more power over the
corporate property and business than has
any other director. The president has no
implied authority as such, to act as the agent
of the corpora-tion, but like other agents he
must derive his power from the board of
directors of the corporation.6
When a corporation is not shown to
possess a board of direc-tors, a petition in
the Court may be presented in its behalf by a
duly authorized person.7
Under the Constitution of the Philippines,
no private lands may be owned by a
corporation or association by transfer or
assignment, unless at least sixty percent of
its capital belongs to Filipinos. Neither may a
corporation be permitted to hold or own real
estate except such as may be reasonably
necessary to enable it to carry out the
purposes for which it is created; and, if
authorized to engage in agriculture, such
corporation is restricted to the ownership and
control of not to exceed 1,024 hectares of
land.8
It is to be noted, in this connection, that
under the 1987 Con-stitution, Art. XII, Sec.
3, private corporation or association may
not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease for a period not
30
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed 1,000 hectares in area. It can thus
be inferred that such private corporation, or
association, even if 100% of its capital
belongs to Filipinos, are disqualified to apply
MALIPOL
for original registration of its title to alienable
lands of the public domain.9 However, this
constitutional prohibition which was also
provided in the 1973 Constitution, Art. XIV,
Sec. 11, does not contemplate to cover
vested right to such land prior to the date of
its adoption. Accordingly, it was held that the
constitutional prohibition has no retroactive
application to acquisition of such alienable
lands of the public domain when the
corporation already had acquired vested right
thereto at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect. Vested right has to be respected;
and a right is vested when the right to
enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present
interest.10
The Government of the Philippines, or
of any province or municipality
therein, through any agency by it
respectively and duly authorized.
An executor or administrator duly
appointed under the laws of the
Philippines on behalf of the estate
of the deceased.
While the administrator of an estate is
the one designated by law to file an
application for registration in behalf of the
estate of the deceased, it does not
necessarily follow that the heirs will be
entirely powerless to intervene when
circumstances so warrant. Thus, it was held
that, notwithstanding the appointment of a
judicial adminis-trator, the heirs have a right
to intervene when they believe the
administrators acts are prejudicial to their
MIDTERMS
interests: and it cannot be said that the
administrator answers with his bond for any
damage he may cause to the interests of the
estate, since such bond might not be
sufficient to cover said damages.
Tenant, mortgagor, seller in pacto de
retro, and married woman, under certain
conditions.
A tenant is one who holds or possesses
lands or tenements by any kind of title,
either in fee, for life, for years, or at will. In a
popular sense, he is one who has the
temporary use and occupation of lands or
tenements which belong to another, the
duration and other terms of whose
occupation are usually defined by an
agreement called lease, while the parties
thereto are placed in the relation of landlord
and tenant.12
When one or more tenants for a term of
years file an application, the legal
requirement is that they must be joined by
those claiming reversionary interest in the
property which makes up the fee simple at
common law, and, if such tenants own
undivided shares less than a fee simple in
the whole land, they cannot apply without
joining the other tenants owning the rest of
the undivided shares so that the whole fee
shall be represented in the proceeding.
In the case of an owner who had
previously mortgaged his prop-erty, he
cannot apply for registration of his title
without the written consent of the
mortgagee, in the same way that a married
woman cannot apply without the written
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
consent of her husband, unless the rights or
interests involved in the latter constitute her
paraphernal property. In case the mortgagee
refuses to give his consent, the appli-cation
may be allowed provided that the title be
made subject to such mortgage, which shall
be specified in the decree of registration.
With respect to the right of the vendor in
a sale under pacto de retro to apply for
registration, it was held that he may apply
for the registration of his right over the
property sold; but, for this purpose, he must
previously obtain the written consent of the
purchaser, and if the latter refuses to give it,
he must set forth in his application the sale
with right of repurchase, in order that the
same may likewise be recorded in the decree
of registration.13
In such a case, what would happen if the
period for redemp-tion reserved for the
vendor-applicant has elapsed and ownership
consolidated by operation of law, and said
vendor lost all his rights in the property? In
that case, the new and lawful owner is
entitled to be subrogated in place of the
applicant or previous owner, pending
registration, and he may continue the
proceedings in the case and finally obtain
title as owner.14
Who
31 may apply.
In Heirs of Luis Gonzaga vs. CA, 261
SCRA 327, the Supreme Court held that in a
cadastral case, the court has no jurisdiction
in an earlier case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void.
MALIPOL
A certificate is not conclusive evidence of
title if it is shown that the same land had
already been registered and an earlier
certificate of title for the same is in
existence.
Form and contents of application.
The application for land registration shall
be in writing, signed by the applicant or the
person duly authorized in his behalf, and
sworn before any officer authorized to
administer oath for the prov-ince or city
where the application was actually signed. If
there is more than one applicant, the
application shall be signed and sworn to by
and in behalf of each. The application shall
contain a descrip-tion of the land and shall
state the citizenship and civil status of the
applicant, whether single or married, and, if
married, the name of the wife or husband,
and, if the marriage has been legally
dissolved, when and how the marriage
relation terminated. It shall also state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the
land and those of the adjoining owners, if
known, and, if not known, it shall state the
extent of the search to find them. It shall
further state whether the property is
conjugal, paraphernal or exclusively owned
by the applicant.
The application may be substantially in
the form prescribed in Sec. 15 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Essential requisites for
original registration proceedings must be in
accordance with the Land Registration Act.
MIDTERMS
Incidentally, it may be asked: In case of
failure to include a veri-fication as required in
an application for registration as in motions
and petitions filed in land registration
proceedings, would it be fatal enough as to
justify an outright refusal or disallowance on
the part of the court? Many authorities
consider the absence of verification a mere
formal, not jurisdictional, defect and the
court is not justified to refuse to allow and
act in the case. Verification of a pleading is
simply a condition affecting its form, and
noncompliance therewith does not render the
pleading fatally defective. The purpose of
verification is simply to secure an assurance
that what are alleged in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of
imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith.16
May a non-resident file application.
A non-resident is not precluded from
filing an application for registration provided
he be represented by an agent residing in
the Philippines, presenting with the
application the appointment or power of
attorney, showing the full name and postal
address of the agent, and agreeing that the
service of any legal process upon such agent
shall have the same legal effect as if served
upon the applicant in the Philippines. If the
agent dies or becomes insane or leaves the
country in the course of the proceeding, the
applicant is bound to ap-point a new agent or
representative, and, in case of failure to do
so, the application may be dismissed.17
Where to file application.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
The court that should take cognizance of
a registration case is that which has
territorial jurisdiction over the property.
Thus, the application for registration may be
filed with the clerk of the Re-gional Trial
Court of the province or city where the land
is situated. However, in the City of Manila the
application should be filed with the General
Land Registration Office (now the Land
Registration Authority). The Clerk of Court
may not accept any application unless it is
shown thereon that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy
thereof, including all annexes.18
Fees payable upon filing application.
Section 111 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 fixes a new sched-ule of fees payable
to the clerk of court or his deputies upon
filing an application for registration of land,
on the basis of its assessed value for the
current year.
If the property has not been assessed
for taxation, the fees pay-able shall be based
on the current market value, and, for this
purpose, the applicant shall file a sworn
declaration of three disinterested persons
fixing such market value as to their
knowledge constitutes a fair valuation of the
property.
32
Proceeding for registration of land, one
in rem.
The proceeding for the registration of
land under the Torrens system is in rem, and
MALIPOL
not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem,
dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted
and carried to judg-ment without personal
service upon the claimants within the state
or notice by mail to those outside of it.
Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. Such a proceeding would
be impossible were this not so, for it would
hardly do to make a distinction between
constitutional rights of claimants who were
known and those who were not known to the
plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.19
Nature of Registration Proceedings;
effects of decree.
In Cacho vs. CA, 269 SCRA 159, the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule that:
A land registration proceeding is in
rem and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding and conclusive
against all persons including the
government and its branches.
A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive
not only on the questions actually
contested and determined but also upon
all matters that might be litigated or
decided in land registration
proceedings.
Action to recover title to land, one in
personam.
An action to redeem or to recover title to
or possession of real property is not an
action in rem or an action against the whole
MIDTERMS
world, like a land registration proceeding or
the probate of a will; rather it is an action in
personam, so much so that a judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard.20
Actions in personam and actions in rem
differ in that the former are directed against
specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed
against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world.21
An action to recover a parcel of land is a
real action, but it is an action in personam,
for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing. An action for resolution of a contract of
sale of real property is an action in
personam.22 If, on the other hand, the object
is to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established,
and if any one in the world has a right to be
heard on the strength of allegation of facts
which, if true, show an inconsistent interest,
the proceeding is in rem.23 For instance, an
application for the registration of land under
the Torrens system is an action in rem, for
the judgment which may be rendered therein
is binding upon the whole world. 24 The
probate of a will is a proceeding in rem,
because the order of probate is effective
against all persons wherever resid-ing.
Quasi in rem distinguished from
in rem.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
An action quasi in rem differs from the
true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the
property. All proceedings hav-ing for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way designated
quasi in rem. The judg-ment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.26
What to accompany application.
The application, which need be
presented in duplicate, must be accompanied
with: (a) tracing-cloth plan duly approved by
the Director of Lands, together with two
blueprint or photographic copies thereof; (b)
three copies of the corresponding technical
descriptions;
(c) three copies of the surveyors certificate;
(d) all original muniments of title 27 in the
possession of the applicant which prove his
rights, to the title he prays for or to the land
he claims; and (e) certificate in quadruplicate
of the city or provincial treasurer of the
assessed value of the land, at its last
33
assessment for taxation, or, in the absence
thereof, that of the next preceding year.
However, in case the land has not been
assessed, the application may be
accompanied with an affidavit in
MALIPOL
quadruplicate of the fair market value of the
land, signed by three disinterested persons. 28
Amendments of application.
With respect to amendments of the
application for registration, including joinder,
substitution or discontinuance of parties,
Section 19 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
permits them at any stage of the
proceedings upon such just and reasonable
terms as the court may order. However,
amendments which shall consist in a
substantial change in the boundaries or an
increase in area of the land and applied for
or which involve the inclusion of an additional
land shall be subject to the same
requirements of publication and notice as in
the case of original application. Section 18 of
the same Decree permits the consolidation in
a single application of two or more parcels of
land belonging to the same applicant or
applicants provided they are situated within
the same province or city, or the splitting of
the application by striking out one or more
parcels.
amendments in matters of land descriptions,
Of the amendments effected during the
pendency of an appli-cation, the more
common is the substitution of the name of
the new owner for the original applicant.
Thus, it has been held that the new and
lawfull owner is entitled to be subrogated in
the place of the original applicant, pending
registration, and he may continue the
proceedings in the case and finally obtain
title as owner.29 This may be accomplished by
filing a motion with the court, with the deed
at-tached thereto, praying that said deed be
MIDTERMS
considered in relation with the application.
The same procedure is followed in the case
of a new encumbrance being created or an
old one being extinguished.
But if the amendment involves a change
in the description of the land applied for by
including land not previously included, it is
not permissible to make amendments or
alterations in the descrip-tion of the land
without the publication of new notifications
and advertisements making known to
everyone the said alterations and
amendments. Otherwise, the law would be
infringed with respect to the publicity which
characterizes the procedure, and third
parties who have not had an opportunity to
present their claims might be seriously
affected in their rights, through failure of
opportune notice.30 From this it can be
inferred that if the amendment or alteration
sought to be made will operate to decrease,
and not increase, the original area of the
land covered and previously published, it
may not be necessary to have a republication
of the notices. And what is true of the
is likewise true of the amendments in the
corresponding plans submitted with the
application, for they always go together.
At this juncture, observation may be
made of the fact that the duty to publish
such notice in the Official Gazette is not
incumbent upon the applicant but upon the
Administrator of Land Registration Authority.
Hence, in the remote event that the
publication or republi-cation, as the case may
be, was inadvertently omitted, it would seem
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
that the failure cannot be the responsibility,
much less the fault, of the applicant.
Besides, when the Administrator has filed
with the case the certificate that he has
served the notice as directed by the court, by
publishing or mailing, such certificate shall
be conclusive proof of such service as
expressly provided by Section 32 of Act No.
496, as amended by Section 24 of P.D. No.
1529. Thus, unless it be first shown that
there was no such certificate filed with the
records of the case, it would not seem that
the court can properly pass upon and
determine an issue as to whether there had
been due publication or not. Furthermore,
even without such certificate attached to the
records and declared by law to be conclusive,
by legal presumption it can be taken for
granted that a public officer has regularly
performed his official duty. And to permit
such a legal presumption to be rebut-ted
after a good many years since the
termination of the case will not only
endanger judicial stability but also violate the
underlying principle of the Torrens system.
Amendments
Section 18 of P.D. No. 1529 allows the
court, at any time, to order an applicant to
be amended by striking out one or more of
the parcels of land applied for or by a
severance of the application.
34
Section 19 of the Decree specifically
states:
Amendments to the applicant
including joinder, substitu-tion, or
MALIPOL
discontinuance as to the parties may be
allowed by the court at any stage of the
proceedings upon just and equitable
terms.
Amendments which shall consist in
a substantial change in the boundaries
or an increase in area of the land
applied for or which involve the inclusion
of an additional land shall be subject to
the same requirements of publication
and notice as in an original application.
(See Sec. 23 P.D. No. 1529)
Under the law, there is a need to comply
with the required pub-lication and notice if
the amendment of the application and notice
if the amendment of the application consists
in:
A substantial change in the boundaries;
An increase in the area of the land
applied for; or
The inclusion of an additional land.
An amendment due to change of name
of the applicant does not require publication.
(Director of Lands vs. IAC, 219 SCRA 339).
Amendments to the application may be due
to change in parties or substantial change in
the boundaries or increase in the area of the
land applied for. In the former, neither laws
(Act No. 496 and P.D. 1509) require
republication and registration may be allowed
by the court at any stage of the proceedings
upon just and reasonable terms. (Sec. 19,
P.D. 1529). On the other hand, republication
MIDTERMS
is required if the amendment is due to
substantial change in the boundaries or
increase in the area of the land applied for.
It is the publication of specific
boundaries of lands to be reg-istered that
would actually put the interested parties on
notice of the registration proceedings and
enable them, if they have rights or interest in
the property, to show why the application for
registration should not be granted. (Fewkes
vs. Vasquez, 39 SCRA 514).
In the case of Benin vs. Tuason, 57
SCRA 531, the Supreme Court explained the
reasons why an amendment consisting of the
inclusion of an area not originally applied for
registration must be published:
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the
registration court may allow, or order,
an amendment of the application for
registration when it appears to the court
that the amendment is necessary and
proper. Under Section 24 of the same
Act, the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking
out one or more parcels of land by
severance of the application. The
amendment may be made in the
application or in the survey plan, or in
both since the application and survey
plan go together. If the amendment
consists in the inclusion in the
application for registration of an area or
parcel of land not previously included in
the original application, as published, a
new publication of the amended
application must be made. The purpose
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
of the new pub-lication is to give notice
to all persons concerned regarding the
amended application. Without a new
publication the registration court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the area or
parcel of land that is added to the area
covered by the original publication, and
the decision of the registration would be
a nullity insofar as the decision concerns
the newly included land. The reason is
because without a new publication, the
law is infringed with respect to the
publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have
not had the opportunity to present their
claim might be prejudiced in their rights
because of failure of notice. But if the
amendment consists in the exclusion of
a portion of the area covered by the
original application and the original plan
as previously published, a new
publication is not necessary. In the
latter case, the jurisdiction of the court
over the remaining area is not affected
by the failure of a new application. (See
Secs. 18 and 19, P.D. 1529).
In Director of Lands, et al. vs. Benitez,
et al., 16 SCRA 557, citing Philippine
Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122,
the Supreme Curt also held that a Court
order amending the official plan so as to
include a land not previously included therein
35
is a nullity unless new application is made as
a preliminary to such step. An additional
territory cannot be included by amendment
of the plan without new publication.
Where land borders on road.
MALIPOL
If the application describes the land as
bordering on a public or private way or road,
the applicant should indicate whether he
claims any portion thereof, and whether he
desires to have the line of the way or road
determined.31
Plans to be approved by Director of
Lands and submitted in evidence.
As required by Sec. 17 of P.D. No. 1529,
the applicant shall file with his application a
survey plan of the land sought to be regis-
tered.
For this purpose, the Bureau of Lands
may, upon application therefor, make private
land surveys, for which a reasonable charge
shall be made. However, private land surveys
may also be made by private land surveyors
who are duly qualified; but no plan of such
survey, whether it be original or subdivision,
may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of
Lands.32
The original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for approved by the Director of
Lands, must be submitted in evidence. The
submis-sion of such plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. And
unless the plan and its technical description
are duly approved, the same are not of much
value. The non-submission thereof by the
applicant, who claims that the same may be
with the Land Registra-tion Authority for the
purpose of having them checked or verified,
is not justified inasmuch as it is not the
function of this Authority to check the
MIDTERMS
original survey plan for lack of authority to
approve such survey plans.33 However, mere
approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands
is no proof in itself of the ownership of the
land covered by said plan.34
Incidentally, where an applicant seeks to
register a portion of a municipal street
included in the plan approved by the Bureau
of Lands, although it has been already
abandoned and no longer in use, the street
still remains property for public use, until the
proper government authority shall have
converted the same into patrimo-nial
property of the municipality. Stated
otherwise, in the absence of such conversion,
the abandoned street remains property for
public use and cannot be appropriated by
any private individual, even with the consent
of the municipality, much less may it be
applied for and registered as private property
of the applicant. Article 424, paragraph 1, of
the New Civil Code provides that property for
public use in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities consists of the provincial
streets, city streets, municipal streets, as
well as the squares, fountains, pub-lic
waters, promenades, and public works for
public service. Hence, unless so converted
into patrimonial property of the local
government concerned, such abandoned
street remains property for public use and,
as such, is not susceptible of private
ownership.
Signature of Directors of Lands on
survey plan is required other-wise
the title is void.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
A controversy arose as to the validity of
a title where the survey plan for the land
applied for was not signed by the Director of
Lands. In UP vs. Rosario, 355 SCRA 591, the
Supreme Court said that the title is void if
the Director of Lands did not sign the survey
plan on the land applied for. It was said that
P.D. No. 1529, requires the Director of Lands
to sign and approve the survey plan for the
land applied for, otherwise, the title is void.
Sec. 17. What and where to file
The application for land registration shall
be filed with the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall filed
together with the application all original
muniments of ti-tles or copies thereof
and a survey plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept
any application unless it is shown that
the applicant has furnished the Director
of Lands with a copy of the application
and all the annexes.
No plan or survey may be admitted in
land registration proceed-ings until approved
by the Director of Lands. The submission of
the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. Unless a plan and its
technical description are duly approved by
36
the Director of Lands, the same are of no
value. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177).
The allegation that the signature
approval for the survey plan was nowhere to
MALIPOL
be found is an important jurisdictional fact
that must be ventilated before the trial court
in Republic vs. IAC, 209 SCRA 90, the
Supreme Court stated that void ab initio
land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership. Thus, as the title is void and
owner traces her rights to it, her claim would
have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher
than its source. (De Santos vs. IAC, 157
SCRA 295).
The rationale behind the ruling can be
traced to jurisprudential rules that what
defines a piece of land is not the size or area
mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing
the land and indicating its limits. (Turquesa
vs. Valera, 322 SCRA 573).
When the technical description
appearing in the title is clearly erroneous, the
courts have no other recourse but to order
its cancel-lation and cause the issuance of a
new one that would conform to the mutual
agreement of the buyer and seller as laid
down in the deed of sale. (Veterans
Federation of the Philippines vs. CA, 345
SCRA 348).
Muniments of title.
By muniments, we refer to instruments
or written evidences which the applicant
holds or possesses to enable him to
substantiate and prove title to his estate.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529 requires, besides
the plan of the land, that all original
muniments of title within the control of the
applicant be filed also with the applica-tion.
MIDTERMS
Considering, however, the danger of losing
the original of such valuable evidence of title,
we believe that the requirement of filing
them with the application is not mandatory
so long as they can be produced before the
court, during the hearing whenever required
or necessary.
Land applied for when object of
mortgage or lease.
When an applicant is made subject to an
existing mortgage, the holder of which has
consented thereto, or to a recorded lease, or
when the registration is to be made subject
to such mortgage or lease executed after the
time of the application and before the date of
the transcription of the decree, the applicant
shall, if required by the court, file a certified
copy of such mortgage or lease and shall
cause the original, or, in the discretion of the
court, a certified copy thereof, to be
presented for registration before the decree
of registration is entered, and no registration
fee shall be charged for registering such
original mortgage or lease or such certified
copy.35
It may be added here that, where the
land has been sold under pacto de retro, not
only the vendor but also the vendee may
apply for registration with the vendors right
of repurchase stated in the decree as a lien.36
Court may require other papers.
Under Section 21 of P.D No. 1529, the
court is not bound to re-quire only such facts
as are prescribed by the Land Registration
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Act. It may, by general rule, require facts to
be stated in the application in addition
thereto, and not inconsistent therewith, and
may even require the presentation of any
additional papers.
Dealings in land before issuance of
decree.
With the filing of an application for
registration, the land de-scribed therein does
not cease to become open to any lawful
transac-tion. If the transaction takes place
before the issuance of the decree of
registration, Section 29 of Act No. 496 gives
the interested party two alternatives as to
what to do with the instrument, namely: (1)
to record the instrument relating thereto in
the office of the Register of Deeds in the
same manner as if no application for
registration had been made; or (2) to
present such instrument to the Regional Trial
Court, together with a motion praying that
the same be considered in relation with the
pending application. In the latter case, the
Court, after notice to the parties concerned,
may order the registration of such land
decreed subject to the encumbrance created
by said instru-ment, or in case of transfer of
ownership, that the decree be issued in the
name of the purchaser or transferee. Of
course, such decree of registration may only
be so ordered where there is no serious
37
controversy between the parties as to the
validity of the instrument affecting the land
adjudicated in the decision. This is so
because the Regional Trial Court, acting as a
cadastral court or a court of land registration,
has no authority to adjudicate issues that
MALIPOL
should be ventilated in an ordinary civil
action, such as the question of whether or
not the contract of sale was really entered
into recording with the Office of the Register
of Deeds the instrument relating to the land
involved in the pending registration
proceeding has now been eliminated.
However, if the motion is filed after the
decision of adjudica-tion has become final
but before the issuance of the decree by the
Administrator of Land Registration Authority,
the court shall require the interested party to
pay the fees prescribed as if such instrument
had been presented for registration in the
office of the Register of Deeds.
If the order of the court granting such
motion is received by the Administrator after
the issuance of the decree of registration, he
shall thereupon forward the order to the
Register concerned for compliance therewith.
With the issuance of the decree of
registration and its transcrip-tion on an
original certificate of title in the Office of the
Register, the land shall thereupon become
registered land under the Torrens system,
and thereafter all deeds relating to such
property shall be registered only in the
registration book for property registered
under the Torrens System.38 So also, a
conveyance in fee made after the rendition of
judgment confirming the title of the vendor
as applicant, may be registered directly with
the Register after the issuance of the original
certificate of title in the name of the vendor,
for the purpose of cancelling such title and
MIDTERMS
issuing a transfer certificate of title in the
name of the vendee.39
Reference of application to title
examiners.
Under the original scheme of the Torrens
system, the initial step that the court takes
upon the receipt of the application for
registration is to submit it for scrutiny to a
barrister and a conveyancer who are usually
known as examiners of title. Thus, Section
37 of the Land Registration Act of
Massachusetts provides that immediately
after the filing of a petition, the court shall
enter an order referring it to one of the
examiners of title, who shall file in the case a
report thereon, concluding with a certificate
of his opinion upon the title. We used to
have a similar provision in Section 30 of our
Land Registration Act in the Philippines, but
this is no longer in force, the same having
been repealed by Section 2 of Act No. 2556.
Reference of application to Director of
Lands and Solicitor General.
If the applicant invokes the benefits of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, as superseded
by Commonwealth Act No. 141, or otherwise
seeks the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title to public
agricultural land, the Clerk of Court shall
forward the case to the Solicitor General,
through the Director of Lands, within five
days from the receipt of the application. 40
The Solicitor General, af-ter investigation of
the facts alleged in the application or
otherwise brought to his attention, which he
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
may deem advisable in the interest of the
Government, shall return the papers of the
case to the Clerk of Court as soon as
practicable within three months, as required
by Section 51 of the Public Land Act.

38

MALIPOL
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter IV
PUBLICATION, ANSWER, AND DEFAULT
Publication of notice.
Under the provision of Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Administrator of Land Registration Authority,
upon receipt of the order of the court setting
the date for initial hearing, shall cause a
notice of the hearing to be published in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. The
notice is to be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land
involved, including adjoining owners so far as
known, and in general to all whom it may
concern. The notice requires all persons
concerned to appear in court on the date and
time indicated to show cause why the
application for registration should not be
granted. The publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.
The publication in the Official Gazette
binds the whole world, inclusive of those who
may be adversely affected and those who
factu-ally have been innocent of such
publication. This is the only way to give
meaning to the finality and indefeasibility of
the Torrens title to be issued, as against the
argument that such rule could result to
39
actual injustice.1
Publication of notice of initial hearing in
a Newspaper of general circulation
mandatory requirement.
MALIPOL
In Director of Lands vs. CA, 276 SCRA
276, the Supreme Court held that land
registration proceedings are actions in rem.
It is not necessary to give personal notice to
the owners or claimants of the land sought to
be registered, to vest the court with
authority over the res. Instead, it is the
publication of notice of the application for
reg-istration which serves to apprise the
whole world that such petition has been filed
and whosoever is minded to oppose it, may
do so within 30 days before the date set by
the court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear the case. (Director of
Lands vs. CA, 276 SCRA 276). In this case,
the petitioner did not oppose the institution
of land registration proceedings despite
notice of publication. Failing to oppose the
same at its institution, petitioner is now
estopped to contest the validity of the
decree. (Ignacio vs. Ba-silio, et al., G.R. No.
122824, Sept. 26, 2001).
As a proceeding in rem, the decree of
registration issued in land registration cases
is binding upon and conclusive against the
entire world. (Cacho vs. CA, 269 SCRA 159).
Under Section 28 of the Land Registration
Act (Act No. 496),which was the law in force
at the time of the institution of the
proceedings, petitioner had one year after
the entry of the decree to file a petition for
review. However, he failed to contest the said
entry. Thus he is bound now by the rule that
upon the expiration of one year, every
certificate of title issued in accord-ance with
Act No. 496 shall be incontrovertible.
MIDTERMS
Worthy to note, despite the foregoing
rule, petitioner is not with-out a remedy. The
landowner whose property has been
wrongfully registered in anothers name,
after the one year period, could not ask for
the court to set aside the decree, but he
could bring an ordinary action for damages if,
as in this case, the property has passed unto
the hands of innocent purchasers for value.
(Ching vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9; Sy vs. IAC, 162
SCRA 130).
Laches, when it applies.
Bar by laches appears particularly
pertinent in this case. Laches is meant the
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reason-able time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or
passage of time, but is principally an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement
of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
While a question of jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, a party may be barred from
raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.
Laches sets in if it would take 18 years
for a person to file an action to annul the
land registration proceedings, especially so if
the registrant has already subdivided the
land and sold the same to in-nocent third
parties. A partys long inaction or passivity in
asserting his rights over disputed property
precludes him from recovering the same.
(Heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz vs. CA, 298 SCRA
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
172; Aurora Ig-nacio vs. Valeriano Basilio, et
al., G.R. No. 122824, Sept. 26, 2001).
Absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the Land Registration
Court can not validly confirm and register
title to the applicant. Admittedly, the above
provision (Section 20, P.D. 1529) provides in
clear and categorical terms that publication
in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
However, the question boils down to whether,
ab-sent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration
court can validly confirm and register the
title of private respondents. We answer this
query in the negative. This answer is
impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due proc-ess rationale
behind the publication requirement.
It should be noted further that land
registration proceedings is a proceeding in
rem. Being in rem, such proceedings requires
construc-tive seizure of the land against all
persons, including the state who have rights
to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must
be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from
contesting the application which they had no
40
knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as
an owner seeking the inscription of realty in
the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only
his ownership but also the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one
MALIPOL
who institutes an action for recov-ery of
realty. He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task which rests upon the
applicant can best be achieved when all
persons concerned, may, the whole world
who have rights or interest in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited
to come to court and show cause why the
application should not be granted. The
elementary norms of the process require that
before the claimed property is taken from the
concerned parties and registered in the name
of the applicant, the said parties must be
given notice and op-portunity to oppose.
Purpose and effects of publication.
The primary purpose and effects of
publication of the notice of application are
(1) to confer jurisdiction over the land
applied for upon the court, and (2) to charge
the whole world with knowledge of the
application of the land involved, and invite
them to take part in the case and assert and
prove their rights over the property subject
thereof.
The case of Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA
531, clearly explains the effects of
publication and non-publication of the
application, as follows:
The settled rule, further, is that
once the registration court had acquired
jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or
parcels, of land in the registration
proceedings in virtue of the publica-tion
of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned
MIDTERMS
and described in the application. If it is
later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands
not included in the original application
as published, then the registration
proceedings and the decree of
registration must be declared null and
void insofar but only insofar as the
land not included in the publication is
concerned. This is so, because the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the land
not included in the publication the
publication being the basis of jurisdiction
of the court. But the proceedings and
the decree of registration, relating to the
lands that were included in the
publication, are valid. Thus, if it is
shown that a certificate of title had been
issued covering lands where the
registration court had no jurisdiction,
the certificate of title is null and void
insofar as it concerns the land or lands
over which the registration court had
not acquired jurisdiction.
This case of Benin, nonetheless, ruled
that if the area of the land appearing in the
decree of registration and as reproduced in
the original certificate of title is bigger by
only 27.10 square meters than that
published, the entire parcel of land decreed
being more than 879 hectares, then the
difference is not so substantial as would
affect the identity of the land. The failure to
publish the bigger area does not perforce
affect the courts jurisdiction.
It is also the rule that a land registration
court which has val-idly acquired jurisdiction
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
over a parcel of land for registration of title
thereto by the publication cannot be divested
of said jurisdiction by a subsequent
administrative act consisting in the issuance
by the Director of Lands of a homestead
patent covering the same parcel of land.
Thus, in the situation presented in the
case of de los Angeles vs. Santos, 12 SCRA
625, if the applicants succeed in proving
their allegations in their application for
registration that they are owners pro-indiviso
and in a fee simple of the land involved, then
the court would have to order a decree of
title issued in favor of the applicants and
declare the homestead patent a nullity which
vested no title in the patentee as against the
real owners.
With respect to persons who have been
charged with knowledge of the application of
land by the publication of the notice of initial
hearing, who have or claim rights to the land
involved and fail to assert them, their failure
cannot operate to exclude them from the
binding effects of the judgment that may be
rendered therein.
Form of notice.
The aforementioned Section 23 requires
that copy of the notice of initial hearing duly
attested by the Administrator of Land Regis-
41
tration Authority be posted by the Sheriff of
the province or city in a conspicuous place on
each parcel of land as well as on the bulletin
board of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated at least fourteen days in
advance of the date set for the hearing. The
MALIPOL
notice shall be substantially in the form
prescribed in said Section 23. Said Section
never meant to dispense with the
requirement of notice by mailing and by
posting.2
The date of mailing of the motions,
pleading, or any other papers, which
may include instruments as the deed of
donation, is considered the date of filing
as shown by the post office stamp on
the envelope or registry receipt.3
Mailing and proof of publication and
notice.
The time fixed by law for the initial
hearing of the case is not less than forty-five
days nor more than ninety days from the
date of the order. And within seven days
after the publication of the notice in the
Official Gazette, the Administrator of Land
Registration Authority shall cause a copy of
the notice to be mailed to every person
named therein whose address is known.
If the applicant seeks to have the line of
a public way deter-mined, the Administrator
shall cause a copy of said notice to be mailed
to the city or municipal mayor and the
provincial governor concerned. If the land
borders on a river, navigable stream, or
shore, or an arm of the sea where a river or
harbor line has been established, or on a
lake, or if it otherwise appears from the
application or the proceed-ings that a tenant-
farmer or the national government may have
a claim adverse to that of the applicant,
notice shall be given in the same manner to
MIDTERMS
the Department of Agrarian Reform, the
Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the
Director of Mines and/or the Di-rector of
Fisheries and Acquatic Resources. Other
persons may also be furnished the same
notice if the court may deem it proper. The
court, whenever deemed possible, shall
require proof of actual notice to all adjoining
owners and to all persons who appear to
have interest in or claims to the land
involved. Mailing of notices to such persons
shall be by registered mail, if practicable.
The certification of the Administrator and
of the sheriff con-cerned to the effect that
the notice of initial hearing, as required by
law, has been complied with shall be filed in
the case before the date of initial hearing,
and shall be conclusive proof of such facts. 4
It may be stated, in this connection, that
strong considerations of policy require that
this legal presumption of conclusiveness be
al-lowed to operate with full force. A party to
an action has no control over the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as
a land court; he has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of such official in
the performance of his duties.5
Minors and persons under disability
given due representa-tion.
Upon the return day of the notice, and
proof of service of all orders of notice issued,
the court may appoint a disinterested person
to act as guardian ad litem for minors and
persons not in being, unascertained,
unknown, or out of the Philippines, who may
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
have an interest. The compensation of the
guardian or the agent shall be determined by
the court and paid as part of the expenses of
the court.6 Ordinarily, a guardian ad litem
has no authority to act or bind a mi-nor in
any transaction with respect to his estate, his
authority being restricted only to matters
connected with the litigation at hand; but he
can however do so with the approval of the
court.7
Notice essential to due process.
The rights and interests of a person in
realty, who is not made a party to an action
affecting the ownership or possession
thereof, are not thereby prejudiced.8 Thus,
the purpose of the notice and pub-lication
thereof is to invite all persons concerned who
may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to come to the court and
show cause why the application should not
be granted. In other words, everybody is
welcome to become a party to the case if he
has any rights to enforce or interests to
protect. To deprive him of that opportunity
will be to deprive him of his right or property
without due process of law.
Incidentally, it may be well to
understand what is due process of law. This prescribed by the proper lawmaking body of
phrase has been discussed a great many
times by the courts and by writers on
42
constitutional law. This same idea is couched
in different language in the different
constitutions of the different states of the
Union. In some, the phrase is the law of the
land. In others, due course of law. These persons is not deprived of his property or of
different phrases, however, have been given
MALIPOL
practically the same definition by the
different courts which have attempted an
explanation of them. The phrase due proc-
ess of law was defined by Judge Story, in his
work on Constitutional Law, as the law in its
regular course of administration through the
courts of justice.9
Due process of law is not that the law
shall be according to the wishes of all the
inhabitants of the State, but simply
First. There shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of
the govern-ment;
Second, That this law shall be
reasonable in its operation;
Third, That it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and
Fourth, That it shall be applicable
alike to all citizens of the state or to all
of a class.
When a person is deprived of his life or
liberty or property, therefore, under a law
the state and such law is within the power of
said department to make, and is reasonable,
and is then enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed, and is
applicable alike to all the citizens of a
particular class within the state, such
judgment or the reopening of the decree of
MIDTERMS
his life or of his liberty without due process
of law.10
Personal notice necessary but not
indispensable.
By the description in the notice, To all
whom it may concern, all the world are
made parties defendant. To require personal
notice as a prerequisite to the validity of
registration would absolutely prohibit the
foreclosure of unknown claims, for the
reason that per-sonal notice could never be
given to unknown claimants. The great
difficulty in land title arises from the
existence of possible unknown claimants.
Known claimants can be dealt with. They
furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the
transfer of title. Courts have held that in
actions in rem, personal notice to owners of
a res is not necessary to give the courts
jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the
res. Nei-ther may lack of such personal
notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title
issued in a registration proceeding. For the
State, as sovereign over the land situated
within it, may provide for the adjudication of
title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature
of a proceding in rem, which shall be binding
upon all persons, known or unknown.11
Thus, notice of application and initial
hearing by publication is sufficient and the
mere fact that a person purporting to have a
legitimate claim in the property did not
receive personal notice is not a sufficient
ground to invalidate the proceedings
although he may ask for the review of the
registration, if he was made the victim of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
actual fraud. However, lack of actual notice
or knowledge of the pendency of the
proceedings does not of itself constitute
fraud.12
Who may oppose or answer.
Any person claiming an interest,
whether named in the notice or not, may
appear and file an opposition or answer on or
before the return day, or within such further
time as may be allowed by the court. The
answer shall state all the objections to the
application, and shall set forth the interest
claimed by the party filing the same and
apply for the remedy desired, and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some
person in his behalf.13 All that is required to
give him a standing in court is that,
according to his answer, he has some kind of
an interest in the property even though the
same is of a purely equitable nature, and
that a homestead applicant is deemed also
con-templated. It is not essential that he
make a claim to the title of the property.14 A
lessee who has introduced substantial
improvements on a parcel of land as public
land, pursuant to a lease agreement with the
Government, has an interest on the land,
and mandamus will lie to compel the trial
court to permit said lessee and his counsel to
appear and oppose the application for
registration of said land under Act No. 496 to
43
cross-examine witnesses of the applicant.15
Failure to file an answer or opposition within
the period granted by the court or within a
reasonable time thereafter constitutes
abandonment of the opposition.16 But once
an opposition has been formally filed, it is
MALIPOL
improper for the court taking cognizance of
such registration case to order the dismissal
thereof on the ground that the opposition
failed to appear on the day set for the
hearing.17
Where one who may justly oppose an
application for registra-tion should find
himself out of time, it is an error of
procedure to file a motion to intervene, for
the proper procedure should be to ask for the
lifting of the order of general or special
default, and then, once lifted, to file an
opposition to the application.18 This is so
because proceedings in land registration are
in rem and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for and not the
determina-tion of any right not connected
with the registration.19
Requisites of an opposition.
It is important to note the kind of
answer authorized under Sec-tion 25 of P.D.
No. 1529. It is quite different from an answer
permitted by law in actions in the courts of
first instance. It has two requisites, namely:
(1) It shall set forth all the objections to the
application and
(2) It shall state the interest claimed by the
party filing the same. Nothing more is
required. Inasmuch as the interest of the
respond-ent is nowhere again mentioned
throughout the whole extent of the law, it is
but fair to assume that the real purpose of
the provision which contains mention of such
interest was to require the answer to disclose
the objections to the application, the
MIDTERMS
requirement that the opponent show his
interest being merely for purpose of making
plain, full, and clear the objections to the
application.20
As expressly provided also in the
aforecited Section 25, where the opposition
or adverse claim covers only a portion of the
lot applied for and said portion is not
properly delimited on the plan attached to
the application, or in case of undivided co-
ownership, conflicting claims of ownership or
possession, or overlapping of boundaries, the
court may require the parties to submit a
subdivision plan duly ap-proved by the
Director of Lands.
Is affirmative relief obtainable in
answer?
This question was answered in the
negative in the case of City of Manila vs.
Lack (19 Phil. 324) adhering to the theory
that the re-spondent is merely an objector,
one who prevents but cannot obtain. This
ruling, however, has been rendered obsolete
with the subse-quent passage of an
amendatory measures, Act No. 3621,
providing that where there is an adverse
claim, the court shall determine the
conflicting interests of the applicant and the
adverse claimant or oppositor, and after
taking evidence shall dismiss the application
if neither of them succeeds in showing that
he has title proper for registration, or shall
enter a decree awarding the land applied for,
or any part thereof, to the person entitled
thereto, and such decree, when final, shall
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
entitle such person to the issuance of an
original certificate of title.21
The new rule seems to be in keeping
with the procedure under the Public Land
Act, permitting any number of persons
(Section 50) to seek judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title to land by
presenting their respective applications,
praying that the validity of the alleged title or
claim be inquired into and determined
accord-ingly. So also in cadastral
proceedings, where an answer or claim may
be filed with the same effect as an
application for registration.
Basic ground for opposition.
May a person present an opposition to
an application for reg-istration on the ground
that the land applied for is property of the
government? It looks as though the
oppositor in this case considers the interests
of the government also as his own. It was
held, how-ever, that an application for
registration may be objected to, if the
opposition is based on the right of dominion
or some other real right opposed to the
adjudication or recognition of the ownership
of the petitioner, whether it be limited or
absolute; and if none such rights of the
respondent have been injured by the
judgment, he cannot have, on his part, the
44
right to appeal from the said judgment,
whatever it may be, as neither the basic Act
nor any other law on this matter grants
anyone the right to appeal on behalf of
another party and not in his own name and
by reason of his own interest. It is only the
MALIPOL
legal personal right of the respondent,
prejudiced by the judgment of the lower
court, that can be considered as a valid
ground.22
If the ground, therefore, is the property
applied for is property of the government, it
is incumbent upon its duly authorized repre-
sentative to present the opposition and not
any private individual.
However, where a private individual
opposing an application for registration
alleges that while the land sought to be
registered was part of the public domain for
which he had a sales application ap-proved
by the Bureau of Lands and was in actual
possession thereof by authority of said
Bureau, it was held that such an opposition
can-not be dismissed inasmuch as it is
predicated upon actual possession which
constitutes sufficient interest to make the
oppositor an adverse claimant within the
meaning of Sec. 34 of Act No. 496.23
Effect of failure to answer.
If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court may at once
upon motion of the applicant, no reason to
the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded and the application to
be taken for confessed. By the description in
the notice, To all whom it may concern, all
the world are made parties defendant and
shall be concluded by the default and order.
After such default and order, the court may
enter a decree confirming the title of the
MIDTERMS
applicant and ordering registration of the
same.24
Thus, it was held that when no answer in
writing nor any op-position is made to an
application for registration of a property in
the Court, all the allegations contained in the
application shall be held as confessed by
reason of the absence of denial on the part
of the opponent. A person who has not
challenged an application for registration of
land, even if the appeal afterwards
interposed is based on the right of dominion
over the same land, cannot allege damage or
error against the judgment ordering the
registration, inasmuch as he did not allege or
pretend to have any right to such land.25
So also, it was held that a claimant
having failed to present his answer or
objection to the registration of a parcel of
land under the Torrens system or to question
the validity of such registration within a
period of one year after the certificate of title
had been issued, had forever lost his right in
said land, even granting that he had any
right therein.26
General default not a guarantee to
success of application.
That no person is entitled to have the
land registered under the Torrens system
unless he is the owner in fee simple of the
same, even though there is no opposition
presented against such registration by third
persons, has been affirmed by the courts
many times. One of the primary and
fundamental purposes of the registration of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
land under the Torrens system is to secure to
the owner an absolute indefeasible title, free
from all encumbrances and claims
whatsoever, except those mentioned in the
certificate of title issued, and, so far as it is
possible, to make the certificate issued to the
owner by the court absolute proof of such
title. In order that the petitioner for the
registration of his land shall be permitted to
have the same registered, and to have the
benefit resulting from the certificate of title
finally issued, the burden is upon him to
show that he is the real and absolute owner
of the land he is applying for. The petitioner
is not necessarily entitled to have the land
registered under the Torrens system simply
because no one appears to oppose his title
and to oppose the registration of the land.
He must show, even though there is no
opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he owns the legal estate in fee simple.
Courts are not justified in registering
property under the Torrens system simply
because there is no opposition interposed.
Courts may, even, in the absence of any
opposition, deny the registration of the land
under the Torrens system, upon the ground
that the facts presented did not show that
the petitioner is the owner in fee simple, of
the land which he is attempting to register.27
The applicant must prove that he has
just title to the property inasmuch as just
45
title is never presumed. He cannot merely
rely on the absence or weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors. By express
provision of Art. 1129 of the New Civil Code,
for the purposes of pre-scription there is just
title when the claimant came into possession
MALIPOL
of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights.28
Order of default may be set aside.
The power of the court, in the exercise
of its discretion, and in accordance with the
immemorial usage of courts of justice
operating under our system of procedure, to
set aside an interlocutory default order and
permit a person to come in and make
defense for any good cause shown cannot be
questioned. The power to set aside such a
judg-ment is a power inherent in courts of
general jurisdiction, and may, so it has been
declared, be exercised without the grant of
statutory authority.29 Moreover, an
interlocutory judgment or order remains
under the control of the court, in the absence
of a legal provision to the contrary, until the
final decision of the case, and may be modi-
fied and rescinded, on sufficient grounds
shown, at any time before the entry of final
judgment.30 Accordingly, while it may be an
error of procedure to file a petition to reopen
and/or review on the ground of fraud
pending the promulgation of the judgment,
the interests of substantial justice and the
speedy determination of the controversy
should have impelled the trial court to lift its
order of general default and once lifted to
allow the petitioners to file his opposition to
the application.31
Issuance of order of general default
presumed.
MIDTERMS
Where the record in a land registration
case does not affirma-tively show an order of
general default, it is deemed that such order
was issued. For, in the absence of showing to
the contrary, a judicial proceeding is
presumed to be regular, and all steps
required by law to be taken before the court
may validly render judgment, have been so
taken.32
General default distinguished from
special default.
Under Sec. 26 of P.D. No. 1529, a
general default may be or-dered by the court
if no person appears and answers within the
time prescribed. This is done, as a rule, upon
motion of the applicant when the case is
called at the initial hearing, but may also be
ordered by the court motu proprio. Of
course, if the applicant himself fails to
appear, the court may dismiss his application
without prejudice.
Where a party appears at the initial
hearing without having filed an answer or
opposition and asks the court for time within
which to file the same, and this has
accordingly been granted, in case of failure
of such party to file his answer or opposition
within the period allowed, he may be
declared specially in default. In other words,
a special default operates only against
certain specific person or persons.
Order of default, when appealable.
As a rule in ordinary civil cases, a party
who has been declared in default loses his
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
standing in court and, consequently, cannot
appear later on, adduce evidence and be
heard, and for that reason he is not entitled
even to notice. Neither can he appeal from
the judgment rendered, and the only
exception is when the party in default files a
motion to set aside the order of default on
the ground or grounds stated in Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, in which event he is
entitled to notice of all proceedings.33
However, in registration proceedings,
where a party appeared and presented an
answer in opposition and later amended it,
although rejected by the court, he did not
lose thereby his standing in court, and the
order excluding his answer, which is
equivalent to declaring him in default, is
appealable as soon as the decision ordering
the issuance of the decree in favor of the
adverse party shall have been rendered.34
Withdrawal of application in a land
registration case does not ter-minate
proceedings if there is an adverse claim.
In a land registration case, when the
applicant withdraws her application with the
consent of the court, and only the Director of
Lands and the private oppositors are left, it
does not mean, that the withdrawal
terminates the proceedings.
46
They theorized that with the withdrawal
of the application for registration in the main
case, the conflicting interest between the
applicant and the oppositors was obliterated,
thereby effectively terminating the case itself
MALIPOL
cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court said
that:
As the Director of Lands has
registered herein an adverse claim, the
lower court was bound to determine the
conflicting interest of said claimant and
the applicant-appellee, and in case
neither succeeds, under the evidence, in
showing proper title for registration, it
may dismiss the case . . .
An opposition presented by the Director
of Lands is, for all intents and purposes, as
conflicting interest as against that of the
applicant or of the private oppositors,
asserting a claim over the land sought to be
registered. Consequently, the withdrawal by
either the applicant or any of the private
oppositors from the case does not ipso facto
obliterate the conflicting interests in the
case. Neither is the case terminated because
under the above-cited law, as amended, the
trial court is required to resolve the claims of
the remaining parties, the withdrawal of the
application by the applicant and/or some
private oppositors notwithstanding.
Section 37 of Act No. 496 (the former
Land Registration Act) as amended by Act
No. 3621, an oppositor who claims ownership
over the property covered by the application
of a part thereof, may now claim in his
answer that the land be registered in his
name in the same proceeding. (Director of
Lands vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 47380, Feb.
23, 1999).
MIDTERMS
On the question in Biblia Toledo-Banaga,
et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127944, Jan.
28, 1999, bordered on the necessity of
requir-ing the registered owner to first
surrender the Torrens title before the
Register of Deeds can cancel such title and
issue a new one, the Supreme Court ruled:
Petitioners contention that the
execution of the final and executory
decision which is to issue titles in the
name of pri-vate respondent cannot
be compelled by mandamus because of
the formality that the registered owner
first surrenders her duplicate Certificates
of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of
P.D. 1529 cited by the Register of Deeds,
bears no merit. In effect, they argue
that the winning party must wait
execution until the losing party has
complied with the formality of surren-
der of the duplicate title. Such
preposterous contention borders on the
absurd and has no place in our legal
system. Precisely, the Supreme Court
had already affirmed the CAs judgment
that Certificates of Title be issued in
private respondents names. To file
another action just to compel the
registered owner, herein petitioner Tan,
to surrender her titles constitute
violation of, if not disrespect to the
orders of the highest tribunal.
Otherwise, if execution cannot be had
just because the losing party will not
surrender her titles, the entire
proceeding in the courts, not to say the
efforts, expenses and time of the
parties, would be ren-dered nugatory. It
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
is revolting to conscience to allow
petitioners to further avert the
satisfaction of their obligation because of
sheer literal adherence to technicality, or
formality of surrender of the duplicate
titles. The surrender of the duplicate is
implied from the executory decision
since petitioners themselves were
parties thereto. Besides, as part of the
execution process, it is a ministerial
function of the Register of Deeds to
comply with the decision of the court to
issue a title and register a property in
the name of a certain person, especially
when the decision attained finality.

47

MALIPOL
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter V
HEARING AND EVIDENCE
Application of Rules of Court.
By express provision of Rule 143 of the
Rules of Court, the rules contained therein
are not applicable to land registration and
cadas-tral cases, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and when practicable
and convenient. Thus, Chief Justice Moran, in
his com-mentaries on the Rules of Court,
elaborated on this point by stating that the
provisions abolishing exceptions and bill of
exceptions are applicable by analogy to land
registration and cadastral cases, and, in
suppletory character, those provisions
regarding service of notices, motions,
pleadings, and other papers, the rules
regarding subpoena, bill of discovery,
adjournment, trial by commissioners and
judgment, whenever they are not
inconsistent with special provisions of law.
The Rules of Court may be applied in
cadastral cases when two conditions are
present: (1) analogy or need to supplement
the cadas-tral law; and (2) practicability and
convenience.1 The same rule is true in
ordinary land registration proceedings.
Assignment to referee.
48
Under the provision of Section 27 of P.D.
No. 1529, the court may either hear the
parties and their evidence or refer the case
or any part thereof to a referee, also known
as commissioner, the lat-ter clothed with
power to hear the parties and their evidence
MALIPOL
and make report thereon to the court. Trial
before a referee may be held in any
convenient place within the province or city,
and at the time and place of trial fixed by
him after reasonable notice thereof served to
the parties. In deciding the application for
registration, the court may rely on the report
submitted to him, or set such report aside for
cause shown, or even order that it be
recommitted to the referee for further
findings.
Thus, it was held that if a party fails to
make timely and specific exceptions to the
report of a referee and the report is
confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by
the findings and cannot be heard to dispute
their truthfulness or escape the legal
consequences flowing therefrom. The trial
judge, however, retains a discretion to accept
the report of the referee in part and set aside
in part or reverse it entirely even where no
exceptions to the referees report are taken. 2
Trial by commissioner is also governed
by Rule 33 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Motion to dismiss.
The Land Registration Act does not
provide for a pleading simi-lar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss.
However, where it shall become necessary
for the expeditious termination of land
registra-tion cases, it was held that such
motion to dismiss as provided in the Rules of
Court may be availed of by the parties in
land registration proceedings under Rule 132
thereof.3
MIDTERMS
Dismissal without prejudice.
If in any case without adverse claimant
the court finds that the applicant does not
have title proper for registration, Section 37
of Act No. 496 permits that a decree be
entered dismissing the application, which
decree may be ordered to be without
prejudice. The applicant may, if desired,
withdraw his application at anytime before
final decree, upon terms to be fixed by the
court.
When a decision or decree dismissing
the application is ordered to be without
prejudice, it simply means that it is not a
conclusive judgment and the principle of res
judicata does not apply. In other words, the
applicant is not precluded from filing later on
another application for registration of the
same property, the moment he can improve
his position as, for instance, some additional
evidence tending to establish or complete his
title to the property has been found.
Accordingly, a renewal of an application
for registration of the same parcel of land or
an amendment thereto upon a ground
different from that alleged in the previous
application may only be allowed if the
dismissal of the first application was without
prejudice and not when the ownership or title
to the piece of land was litigated by the same
parties and a judgment rendered for one
party and against the other.4
While such dismissal without prejudice
seems to be conditioned upon the absence of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
an adverse claimant, as may be seen in the
original main provision of Section 37 of Act
No. 496, which expressly specifies a case
without adverse claimant, we believe,
however, that with its amendment by Act No.
3621, particularly the inclusion of the proviso
which states that in a case where there is
an adverse claim, the court shall determine
the conflicting interests of the ap-plicant and
the adverse claimant, and after taking
evidence shall dismiss the application if
neither of them succeeds in showing that he
has proper title for registration, there seems
to be no reason why dismissal without
prejudice may not also be decreed where
there is an adverse claimant. But, where an
applicant filed a motion for dismissal without
prejudice over the objection of an oppositor,
it was held that it is incumbent upon the
court to determine the conflicting interests
between the applicant and the adverse
claimant, and only in case neither succeeds
to show by evidence that he has proper title
for registration, may it order such dismissal.5
Requisite for reinstatement of case
previously dismissed without
prejudice.
The dismissal of the action at the
request of the plaintiff, even without
prejudice to his right to reinstate the same,
becomes
49 a final decision after the expiration
of the time within which an appeal may have
been taken, and the cause cannot be
reinstated without new notices and new
citations to all of the persons interested.
Such interpretation of Section 37 of Act No.
496 may work hardship upon the petitioner
MALIPOL
in a particular case. However, it is the safer
rule to fol-low even at the cost of an
occasional hardship, to adhere to the right
principle.6
From the foregoing doctrine, it can be
inferred that if a retrial which in a sense is
also a form of reinstatement of the case
should be sought before the order for
dismissal has become final or before the
lapse of the period within which to appeal,
the requisite of publica-tion of new notices
and new citations to all persons interested
may be dispensed with.
Courts with jurisdiction to hear land
registration cases.
Originally, the Court of Land Registration
created by Section 2 of Act No. 496 was
conferred exclusive jurisdiction over all
applica-tions for registration of title to land
and buildings or interest therein, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications, and with jurisdiction
over such other questions as may come
before it under the Land Registration Act,
subject, of course, to the right of appeal. By
virtue, however, of Act No. 2347, the Court
of Land Registration was abolished, and all
the powers and jurisdic-tion theretofore
conferred upon said Court were conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) of the respective
provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.
The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
MIDTERMS
(formerly known as City Courts, Municipal
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Court), may
exercise del-egated jurisdiction in cadastral
and land registration cases upon being
assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and
determine such cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots the value of which does not
exceed P20,000.00, such value to be
ascertained by affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if
there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. The decisions in these cases may
be appealed in the same manner as decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the municipal courts
to try and determine cadastral and land
registration cases is not an original and
exclusive power but is merely delegated to
them in proper cases by the Regional Trial
Courts with the approval of the Supreme
Court. When a mu-nicipal court is assigned
to hear and determine a cadastral or land
registration case, it sits in behalf of the
Regional Trial Court making such assignment
and acts like the latter court. For this reason,
the appeal from the decisions of the
municipal courts so acting should be directly
taken to the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court in the same manner as
appeals are taken from the Regional Trial
Court.8
The rule no longer holds that a regional
trial court sitting as a land registration court
has limited jurisdiction and has no authority
to resolve controversial issues. The Regional
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Trial Court acting as land registration court
now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over
applications for original registration of title to
lands but also over petitions filed after
original registration of title with power to
hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or peti-tions.9
Jurisdiction of courts over land cases.
In Omandan, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 128750, Jan. 18, 2001, the Supreme
Court resolved the issue on the effect of the
trial courts decision in a possessory action to
the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a
homestead application and decision of the
DENR on the protest over the homestead
patent. It said that Sections 3 and 4 of the
Public Land Act, gives primarily to the
Director of Lands and ultimately to Secretary
of Agriculture (now Secretary of DENR) the
authority to dispose and manage public
lands. In this regard, courts have no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the
decree of reg-istration issued by Director of
Lands. Only the DENR Secretary can review
on appeal such decree. In this case, the trial
courts ruling that respondents title be
cancelled, which is a reversal of the Director
of Lands award in favor of Lasola, was an
error. The DENR under CA 141 had prior
jurisdiction over the patent on the subject
matter, which is the contested homestead
50
area.
DENRs jurisdiction over public lands
does not negate the au-thority of the courts
of justice to resolve questions of possession
and their decisions stand in the meantime
MALIPOL
that the DENR has not settled the respective
rights of public claimants. But once the DENR
has decided, particularly with grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT
and then TCT later, its decision prevail.
Therefore, the appellate court did not err
in upholding the right of private respondents
and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and
surrender the land to said respondents.
Regional Trial Courts now have plenary
Jurisdiction over land registration
proceedings.
The Property Registration Decree
provides that said courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
original for registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petition. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the
Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits,
orders and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration,
with the exception of stenographic notes,
within five days from the filing or issuance
thereof (Sec. 2, par. 2, P.D. No. 1529).
Regional Trial Courts therefore no longer
have limited jurisdiction in original land
registration cases (Association of Baptists for
World Evangelism, Inc. vs. First Baptist
Church, 152 SCRA 393), so that there is no
more dis-tinction between its general
jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction
conferred by the Land Registration Act. The
reason for the change can be traced from the
case of Averia vs. Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459,
MIDTERMS
where it was held that the aforequoted
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree
(P.D. No. 1529) has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former
law (Act 496) when acting merely as a
cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon
the regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed
after original registration title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions.
Under the amended law, the court is
now authorized to hear and decide not only
such non-controversial cases but even the
conten-tious and substantial issues x x x
which were beyond its competence before. It
has removed the principle that a land
registration court has limited jurisdiction
except where there was then unanimity
among the parties or none of them raised
any adverse claim or serious objection.
Rule before to P.D. No. 1529.
Even before the explicit grant of general
and exclusive jurisdic-tion over original
registration of title to lands and over
petitions filed after such original registration
by P.D. No. 1529, the special and lim-ited
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts which
did not extend to cases involving issues
properly litigable in other independent suits
or ordinary civil acts had time and again
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
been relaxed by the Supreme Court.
(Moscoso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 705; citing
Florentino vs. Encar-nacion, 79 SCRA 193).
Such exceptions were based not alone on the
fact that the land registration courts are
likewise the same Regional Trial Courts, but
also under the following conditions: (1) the
parties have mutually agreed or acquiesced
in submitting the aforesaid issues for
determination by the court in the registration
proceedings; and
(2) the parties have been given full
opportunity in the presentation of their
respective sides of the issues and of the
evidence in support thereof; and the court
has considered the evidence already of
record and is convinced that the same is
sufficient and adequate for render-ing a
decision upon the issues. Whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited jurisdiction
was then held to be not in reality a
jurisdictional question but a procedural
question involving a mode of practice which
may be waived. (Moscoso vs. CA, supra.;
Zuniga vs. CA, 95 SCRA 740; Santos vs.
Ganayo, 116 SCRA 431).
Delegated jurisdiction.
51 Section 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 (known as
the Judiciary Reorganiza-tion Act of 1980) as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, allows inferior
courts, by way of delegated jurisdiction in
certain cases, to hear and deter-mine
cadastral or land registration cases. The
provision states:
MALIPOL
Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in
cadastral and land reg-istration cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or
contested lots, the value of which does
not exceed one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their
deci-sions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
Pursuant to the said law, the Supreme
Court issued Administra-tive Circular No. 6-
93-A dated November 15, 1995 authorizing
the inferior courts to hear and decide the
cadastral or land registration cases
mentioned in the aforequoted law.
In International Hardwood and Veneer
Co. of the Philippines vs. University of the
Philippines, 200 SCRA 554, the Supreme
Court held that pursuant to R.A. 3990, which
establishes a central experiment station for
the use of the UP in connection with its
research and ex-tension functions,
particularly by the College of Agriculture,
College of Veterinary Medicine and College of
Arts and Sciences, the above reserved area
MIDTERMS
was ceded and transferred in full ownership
to the University of the Philippines subject to
any existing concessions, if any. When it
ceded and transferred the property to UP, the
Republic of the Philippines completely
removed it from the public domain and
removed and segregated it from a public
forest; it divested itself of its rights and title
thereto and relinquished and conveyed the
same to UP; and made the latter the
absolute owner thereof.
UP may validly apply for registration of
its title to the land ceded to it by the law.
Other persons or entities to whom a land
might have been similarly ceded by the
Republic of the Philippines by law may thus
also properly apply for registration of title
thereto.
A public land sales applicant is not a
proper party to file for registration of the
same land covered by his sales application.
By filing such application, he acknowledges
that he is not the owner of the land and that
the same is public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands. He
perforce could not claim holding the land
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. (Palawan Agricultural and
Industrial Co., Inc. vs. Director of Lands, 44
SCRA 15).
However, an applicant is not barred from
pursuing his applica-tion although his
predecessor-in-interest was a free patent
applicant if the latter, at the time he filed
such public land application, had already
acquired an imperfect title through
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
continuous 30-year pos-session in the
concept of an owner. (Director of Land
Management vs. CA, 205 SCRA 486).
A mortgagee, or his successor-in-
interest to the mortgage, can-not apply for
the registration of the land mortgaged,
notwithstand-ing lapse of the period for the
mortgagor to pay the loan secured or
redeem it. Such failure to redeem the
property does not automatically vest
ownership of the property to the mortgagee,
which would grant the latter the right to
appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose
of it. If the mortgagee registers the property
in his own name upon the mortgagors failure
to redeem it, such act would amount to a
pactum commissorium which is against good
morals and public policy. (Reyes vs. Sierra,
93 SCRA 472).
An anticheretic creditor cannot also
acquire by prescription the land surrendered
to him by the debtor. His possession is not in
the concept of owner but mere holder placed
in possession of the land by its owners. Such
possession cannot serve as a title for
acquiring dominion. (Ramirez vs. CA, 144
SCRA 292).
A person or entity whose claim of
ownership to land had been previously
denied in a reinvindicatory action, and the
52
right of own-ership thereto of another upheld
by the courts, cannot apply for the same
land in a registration proceedings. Kipdales
vs. Baguio Min-ing Co., 14 SCRA 913, the
Supreme Court held that if the former cases
were reinvindicatory in character and the
MALIPOL
pending ones are land registration
proceedings, such difference in forms of
action are irrelevant for the purpose of res
judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a
different remedy sought or a diverse form of
action does not prevent the estoppel of the
former adjudication. x x x Since there can be
no registration of land without applicant
being its owner, the final judgment of the
Court of Appeals in the previous litigation
declaring that the mining companys title is
superior to that of the applicants shall be
conclusive on the question in the present
case. The Court also ruled that the vesting
of title to the lands in question in the
appellee Baguio Mining Company has
effectively interrupted and rendered
discontinuous the possession claimed by
applicants.
Land titles; as between the parties to a
donation of an immovable property, all
that is required is for said donation to
be contained in a public document.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides
inter alia that in order that the donation of
an immovable may be valid, it must be made
in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.
Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code
explicitly states that the titles of ownership,
or other rights over immovable property,
which are not duly inscribed or annotated in
the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
third persons. From the foregoing
provisions, it may be inferred that as
between the parties to a donation of an
MIDTERMS
immovable property, all that is required is for
said donation to be contained in a public
document. Registration is not necessary for it
to be considered valid and effec-tive.
However, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry
of Property now Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds. Although the non-registration of a
deed of donation shall not affect its validity,
the necessity of registration comes into play
when the rights of third person are affected,
as in the case at bar. (Gonzales, et al. vs.
CA, et al., 358 SCRA 598).
It is actually the act of registration that
operates to convey registered land or affect
title thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act), as amended by
Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), provides: Sec. 51.
Conveyance and other dealings by registered
owner. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or
other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered
land, shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence
of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, . . .
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our
jurisdiction that registration in a public
registry creates constructive notice to the
whole world. (Dizon vs. CA, 236 SCRA 148).
Land registration under P.D. 1529. Land
registration courts can now hear and
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
decide even controver-sial and
contentious cases.
A petition for the surrender of the
owners duplicate certificate involves
contentious questions which should be
threshed out in an ordinary case, because
the land registration court has no jurisdiction
to try them. Presidential Decree 1529,
however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and to promote the expeditious
termination of cases. The decree had
eliminated the distinction between general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court
and the latters limited jurisdiction when
acting merely as a land registration court.
Land registration courts, as such, can now
hear and decide even contro-versial and
contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues.
That court now has the authority to act
not only on applica-tions for original
registration, but also on all petitions filed
after the original registration of title. Coupled
with this authority is the power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. Especially where the
issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with
the question of registration, the land
registration court commits no error in
assuming jurisdiction.
53
It is equally important to consider that a
land registration courts decision ordering the
confirmation and the registration of title,
being the result of a proceeding in rem,
binds the whole world. Thus, the trial courts
ruling consolidating the ownership and the
MALIPOL
title of the property in the name of herein
respondent is valid and binding not only on
petitioners, but also on everyone else who
may have any claim thereon.
Jurisdiction of Land Registration Court.
P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the
distinction between general jurisdiction
vested in the RTC and latters jurisdiction
when acting merely as a land registration
court. Indeed, in several cases, it has been
held that a petition for the surrender of the
owners duplicate certificate involves
contentious questions which should be
threshed out in an ordinary case, because
the land registration court has no jurisdiction
to try them. Presidential Decree No. 1529,
however, in-tended to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and to promote the expeditious
termination of cases. In more recent cases,
therefore, the Supreme Court declared that
this Decree had eliminated the distinction be-
tween general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the latters limited
jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. Land registration courts,
as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well
as those involving sub-stantial issues.
(Talusan, et al. vs. Tayag, et al., 356 SCRA
263).
Thus, it cannot be contended that the
RTC is, in a land regis-tration case, barred
from ruling on the validity of the auction
sale. That court now has the authority to act
not only on applications for original
registration, but also on all petitions filed
MIDTERMS
after the original registration of title. Coupled
with this authority is the power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or peti-tions. Especially where
the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up
with the question or registration, the land
registration court commits no error in
assuming jurisdiction. (Talusan, et al. vs.
Tayag, et al., supra.).
Extent in exercise of jurisdiction.
The procedure in the Court of Land
Registration (now Regional Trial Courts) runs
not only against the respondent but against
the world; and the court deals not so much
with the relative rights of the applicant and
the respondent, as with the absolute rights of
the applicant against the world, manifested
by the indefeasibility of the title when
registered. The court cannot permit a faulty
title to be registered simply because it
happens to be better than a still more faulty
one presented by the respondent.10
Inherent power of State to adjudicate
title.
The State has control over the real
property within its limits. The condition of
ownership of real estate within the State,
whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen,
is subject to its rules concerning the holding,
transfer, liability to obligations, private or
public, and the modes of establishing title
thereto, and for the purpose of determining
these questions, it (the State) may provide
any reasonable rules of procedure. The State
possesses not only the right to determine
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
how title to real estate may be acquired and
proved, but it is also within its legislative
capacity to establish the method of
procedure. The State, as sovereign over the
land situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or
in the nature of proceeding in rem, which
shall be binding upon all persons known or
unknown.11
However, the land registration court has
no jurisdiction over non-registrable property,
such as a navigable river which is part of the
public domain, and cannot validly adjudge
the registration of title thereof in favor of a
private applicant. Thus, where it has been so
adjudged, the river not being capable of
private appropriation or acquisition by
prescription, the title thereto may be
attacked, either directly or collaterally, by the
state which is not bound by any pre-scriptive
period provided by the Statute of
Limitation. 12
Rules of procedure in registration
cases.
A land registration proceeding is one
which is undoubtedly in rem, in character;
the default order issued by the court was
entered against the whole world, except as
against those who have appeared and filed
their pleadings in the registration case.13
54
While land registration is a proceeding in
rem and binds the whole world, the single
possession of a certificate of title under the
Torrens system does not necessarily make
MALIPOL
the holder a true owner of all the property
described therein.
Being in the nature of a proceeding in
rem, a registration pro-ceeding somewhat
akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation
leading to a judicial decree of registration. In
one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is
no defendant. In another sense, the
Government, in the case of a cadastral
proceeding, or the applicant, in the case of
an ordinary registration proceeding, is the
plaintiff, while all the other claimants or
oppositors are defendants. In accordance
with Section 2 of the Land Registration Act,
the Court of Land Registration, before it was
abolished, was authorized to make from time
to time general rules and forms for
procedure, conforming as nearly as may be
to the practice in special proceedings in
regional trial courts, but subject to the
express provisions of this Act and of general
laws. In effect, therefore, the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence govern
registration proceedings, subject to some
recognized exceptions. Thus, the judge, for
special reasons, may change the order of the
trial, and for good reason, in the furtherance
of justice, may permit the parties to offer
evidence upon their original case.
The reason for the exceptions is made
stronger when one con-siders the character
of registration proceedings and the fact that
where so many parties are involved, and
action is taken quickly and abruptly,
conformity with precise legal rules should not
always be expected. Even at the risk of
violating legal formulae, an opportunity
MIDTERMS
should be given to parties to submit
additional corroborative evidence in support
of their claims of title, if the ends of justice
so require.14
In land registration proceedings, the
formal presentation of evi-dence (Sec. 35,
Rule 132) may be dispensed with when the
documents, spread in the record, have been
identified, marked, and subjected to cross-
examination.15
Proceedings for ordinary registration
under Land Registration Act and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Public Land Act,
distinguished.
The proceedings under both laws are the
same in that they are against the whole
world, both take the nature of judicial
proceed-ings and for both the decree of
registration issued is conclusive and final.
The main differences between them,
however, are that: (1) Under the Land
Registration Act, there exists already a title
which is to be confirmed by the court;
whereas, under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied
for belongs to the State, and the occupants
and possessors claim an interest only in the
same by virtue of their perfected title or
continuous, open and notorious possession;
(2) Under the Land Registration Act, the
court may dismiss the application with or
without prejudice to the right to file a new
application for the same land; whereas,
under the Public Land Act, while the court
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
has jurisdiction or power to adjudicate the
land in favor of any of the conflicting
claimants, it cannot however dismiss the
application without prejudice or permit a new
application to be filed for the same land; (3)
Under the Land Registration Act, the ordinary
risk that an applicant runs is to have his
application denied without losing his land,
assuming that there was no oppositor who
could establish in his favor title proper for
registration; whereas, under the Public Land
Act, if the applicant fails, even if there was
no oppositor, he runs the risk of losing the
land applied for as it will be declared land of
the public domain and the decision to that
effect becomes res judicata.16
Evidence necessary to prove title.
An applicant for registration of land, if
he relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto must prove not only the genuineness
of said title but also the identity of the land
therein referred to.17
In land registration cases, the burden of
proof is upon the appli-cant to show that he
is the real and absolute owner in fee
simple.18
Ownership in fee simple may be proven
with the presentation of documentary
evidence which may be in the form of a chain
55
of titles derived from an old Spanish grant,
such as a royal grant (titulo real), special
grant (concession especial), adjustment title
(composicion con el estado) and title by
purchase (titulo de compra).
MALIPOL
Possessory information title (titulo
possesorio), though not a fee simple title, is
a prima facie evidence of the fact that the
possessor of the land to which it refers is the
owner thereof. However, it was held that,
according to paragraph 3 of Section 19 of Act
No. 496, as amended, a possessory
information is not sufficient to confer title
susceptible of registration. In addition to it, it
is required that the applicant be the owner of
the property or that he has been in actual
possession thereof for the period required by
law. When it appears that the applicants has
not been in open and continuous possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership of the
land he seeks to register, he cannot
successfully invoke the benefits afforded by
paragraph (6) of Section 54 of Act No. 926,
as amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45
of Act No. 2874. In accordance with the
provisions of Article 393 of the Mortgage
Law, the possessory information could not
ripen into a record of ownership if the
applicant did not remain in open pos-session
of the land, did not comply with the
proceedings prescribed by law, and, lastly,
did not secure final registration of his alleged
ownership.19
Of course, it is to be borne in mind that
under Presidential Decree No. 892 holders of
Spanish titles or grants can no longer invoke
the same as a basis of ownership for the
purposes of apply-ing for registration under
Act 496, six months after February 16, 1976.
However, if it is not intended to prove
ownership but only to show that the land
covered by a Spanish title, such as a
possessory information title, is no longer
MIDTERMS
public land but private property and as such
is not available for a public grant under the
Public Land Law, all that may be needed is to
establish the validity of the possessory
information and produce its effect as title of
ownership by showing the fact that such
possessory information title was duly
registered within the non-extendible period
of one year from April 17,1894 until April 17,
1895, as provided in the Maura Law or the
Royal Decree of February 13,1894. Only in
default of such timely registration may the
land revert to the State as part of the public
domain.20
Another proof that may be shown to
substantiate ones title is a tax deed. But it is
not considered absolute or fee simple,
particularly under the Philippine law. It was
held that proceedings for the sale of land for
non-payment of taxes are in personam, and
a purchaser of a tax title takes all the
chances in the sense that the tax title does
not give the claimant a new perfect title but
only a derivative title of the apparent interest
of the tax delinquent. It would therefore be
necessary to present further evidence to
establish title to the tract of land formerly in
the possession of the tax delinquent, before
title to it can be obtained.21 While failure to
declare land for taxation may be taken to
mean that the claimant did not believe
himself the owner,22 yet neither tax receipts
nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evi-
dence of the right of possession over the
realty unless supported by other effective
proof.23 Tax receipts are not evidence of title
to land, unsupported by other proper proof.24
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
While tax declarations and tax receipts
showing payment of taxes are not conclusive
evidence of ownership,25 yet when they are
coupled with open, adverse, and continuous
possession in the concept of owner, such
documents constitute evidence of great
weight in sup-port of the claim of ownership.
They constitute at least proof that the holder
had a claim of title over the property.26
However, the failure of the vendee to declare
property in his name does not militate
against his acquiring title thereto. Experience
has shown that common people do not
generally attend to the transfer of tax
declarations in their names even in cases
where they acquired the property through
purchase.27
Ownership may also be proven by an
applicant who seeks judi-cial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete title, upon meeting
any of the following requirements of Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act Nos. 1942 and
6236, to wit:
a) Those who, prior to the transfer
of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, have applied for the purchase,
com-position, or other form of grant of
lands of the public domain under the
laws and royal decrees then in force and
56 have insti-tuted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but
have, with or without default upon their
part, or for any other cause, not
received title therefor, if such applicants
or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands
MALIPOL
continuously since the filing of their
applications. (Repealed by PD 1073).
(b) Those who, by themselves or
through their predeces-sors in interests,
have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preced-ing
the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclu-sively presumed to
have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions hereof. (Amended
by PD 1073).
Thus, any occupant of a public
agricultural land, who is a citizen of the
Philippines, is entitled to have a certificate of
title issued to him therefor upon proving
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof since July
26, 1894, or as later re-quired by law for at
least thirty years but to be since June 12,
1945, or earlier.28 However, this being a mere
privilege granted by the
State, it may be taken advantage of only up
to December 31, 1987, the deadline fixed by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, unless further
extended by subsequent legislation. This
grace period was conceived to promote social
justice by giving land to the landless and to
favor actual occupants of lands who, because
MIDTERMS
of the harsh technicalities of the law, could
otherwise never acquire title to land they
always believed and knew to be their own.
The legislative intent was to be lenient and
liberal in the confirmation of land titles.
Where it appears that the evidence of
ownership and posses-sion adduced by an
applicant in a land registration proceeding
are so significant and convincing, the
government is not necessarily relieved of its
duty from presenting proofs to show that the
land sought to be registered is part of the
public domain, to enable the courts to evalu-
ate the evidence of both sides.29
So, also, where a parcel of land the
registration of title to which is applied for has
been possessed and cultivated by the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for
a considerable number of years without the
government taking any action to dislodge the
occupants from their holdings and where the
land has passed from one hand to another by
inheritance or by purchase, the burden is
upon the gov-ernment to prove that the land
which it avers to be of public domain is really
of such nature.30
The bare statement of the applicant that
the land applied for has been in the
possession of her predecessors-in-interest
for more than 20 years, does not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible and
conclusive evidence required in land
registration.31
Incidentally, it is important to note that
the general rule that the finding of fact of the
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
trial courts and the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon the Supreme Court, admits of
certain exceptions, and an illustration of one
of them is where the facts and circumstances
in the record render untenable that the land
in question constitutes an accretion to a
private fishpond, when in fact it is man-made
and artificial and not the result of the gradual
and imperceptible sedi-mentation by the
waters of the rivers.32
Nature of the requirement to submit
original tracing cloth.
The submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application
of original registration of land is a mandatory
requirement. (Director of Lands vs. IAC, 219
SCRA 33). The reason for this rule is to
estab-lish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of
land or a portion thereof already covered by
a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining
land. (Director of Lands vs. CA, 158 SCRA
568). The failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioners application
for registration. (Angel del Rosario vs.
Republic, G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002).
57 The contention that the same was
submitted to the branch clerk of court, but
the latter submitted the same to the LRA has
no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve
the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to
present it in evidence in the trial court.
(Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Isabel
MALIPOL
Tesalosa, 236 SCRA 336). The Court of
Appeals appropriately quoted from the
Supreme Courts decision in Director of Lands
vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 604, in which it was
similarly claimed that applicant failed to
present the tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for because it had been forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority. Rejecting the
contention, the Supreme Court, through
Justice Nocon, held that it is undisputed that
the original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for was not submitted in evidence by
respondent, which omission is fatal to his
application. The submis-sion of the original
tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement
of mandatory character.
Respondents counsel on the other hand
contends that he sub-mitted the original
tracing cloth plan, together with other
documents, to the Clerk of Court when he
filed the application. The application and
supporting documents were then elevated to
the Land Registra-tion Commission (now the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registra-tion
Administration) for approval of the survey
plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent
argues the fact that the Commissioner of
Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial
Hearing would indicate that respondent had
submitted all the pertinent documents
relative to his application.
This argument had already been
disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
68 SCRA 177, wherein the Supreme Court
held:
MIDTERMS
Of course, the applicant attempts
to justify the non-sub-mission of the
original tracing cloth plan by claiming
that the same must be with the Land
Registration Commission which checked
or verified the survey plan and the
technical description thereof. It is not
the function of the LRC to check the
original survey plan as it had no
authority to approve original survey
plans. If, for any reason, the original
tracing cloth plan was forwarded there,
the applicant may easily retrieve the
same there-from and submit the same in
evidence. This was not done.
Respondent further contends that
petitioner failed to object to the blue print
copy of the survey plan when the same was
offered in evidence, thereby waiving the
objection to said evidence.
Rule 1, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:
These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and conven-ient.
Neither does the advance survey plan,
which was attached to petitioners application
and marked in evidence, suffice to comply
with the requirement of the law. Although in
one case (Republic vs. CA, 167 SCRA 150), it
was ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
cloth plan, together with the lots technical
description, was sufficient to identify the land
applied for registration, both the blueprint
copy and the technical description were
certified as to their correctness by the
Director of Lands. In this case, what was
marked in evidence, the advance survey plan
and the technical description, lacked the
necessary certification from the Bureau of
Lands.
The prayer that the trial court
proceedings be reopened in order for him to
be able to present in evidence either the
original tracing cloth plan or the sepia copy
(Diazon Polyester Film) in lieu thereof
pursuant to the NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No.
66 dated may 2, 1985, does not hold water.
He contends that the original tracing cloth
plan or the sepia copy thereof may be
considered as newly discovered evidence
which, when admitted in evidence, may alter
the result of the case.
That cannot be done. For evidence to be
admitted under Rule 53, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must
comply with the following requisites: (a) the
evidence was discovered after the trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is ma-
terial, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
58
or impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.
In this, the original tracing cloth plan could
not be considered as newly discovered
evidence since it was already available upon
the filing of the application for registration.
MALIPOL
Although it could not be produced during the
trial because it was still in the custody of the
LRA at that time, it was his failure to exercise
reasonable diligence in producing the same
that accounts for its non-presentation in
evidence. With regard to the sepia copy of
the cloth plan, it is apparent that the prayer
to allow its presentation is a mere
afterthought because it was never offered in
evidence during the trial and petitioner had
already turned over his original tracing cloth
plan to the branch clerk of court for
submission to the LRA. He should have
submitted in evidence the sepia copy duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of
the original tracing cloth plan while the case
was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly
offers it on appeal.
In Director of Lands vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 65663, Oct. 16, 1992, the Supreme
Court emphasized the requirement and ruled
that the submission of the tracing cloth plan
is a mandatory requirement for registration.
They said in Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177 that the failure to submit in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan is
fatal, it being a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. In Director of Lands vs.
IAC, 219 SCRA 339, it was said that it is of
no import that petitioner failed to object to
the presentation of the certified copy of the
said plan. What is required is the original
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for and
objection too such requirement cannot be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Title to public lands established through
continuous occupation.
MIDTERMS
An open, continuous, adverse, and
public possession of land of the public
domain from time immemorial by private
individual per-sonally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be
public, to become private property. It has
been held that in view of the length of time
applicants predecessor-in-interest, added to
his own, had possessed the land in question,
the subject property had already acquired a
private char-acter. A judicial confirmation
proceeding should, at most, be limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed
is of the character and length of time
required by law as it is not so much one to
confer title as it is to recognize a title already
vested.33 Such open, adverse, public, and
continuous possession from July 26, 1894
(later, fixed for at least thirty years) is
sufficient, provided the possessor makes
proper application therefor. The possessor
under such circumstances acquires by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant
but a grant of the government, and the
actual issuance of a title is not necessary in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts.34
While possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession,
possession under paragraph 6 of Section 54
of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b)
of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained
by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of
a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may
be constructive, is not a mere fiction.35
It is to be noted also that mere casual
cultivation of a portion of public land and the
raising thereon of cattle do not constitute
pos-session under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to presumption of
grant from the State. While grazing livestock
over the land is, of course, to be considered
with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy thereof by
grazing livestock upon it, without substantial
enclosures or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a
claim of title through acquisitive
prescription.36
Under Article 531 of the New Civil Code,
possession may be acquired by any of the
following ways: (1) by the material
occupation of the thing; (2) by the exercise
of a right; (3) by the fact that it is subject to
the action of our will; and (4) by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned here
that the execution of a notarial deed of sale
is equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold
59
and places the vendee in legal possession
thereof, conformably to Article 1498 of the
new Civil Code. This possession may ripen
into ownership by prescription, unless the
contract contains any impedi-ment to
prevent the transfer of title to the property
MALIPOL
from the vendor to the vendee, or if it can be
inferred therefrom any intention of the
vendor to withhold delivery or transfer of title
thereto.37
Title established through composition
with State.
The title by composition with the State
used to be considered a title of conclusive
ownership in favor of the party who appears
therein as the grantee.38 But even then, for
purposes of registration under the Torrens
system, it was held insufficient unless the
identity of the subject property be
established by satisfactory and conclusive
evidence.39
Where Spanish titulo de composicion
had been recorded in the registry of
property, it was then considered evidence of
absolute and exclusive ownership.40 However,
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892,
such Spanish title can no longer be used
from and after August 16, 1976, as evidence
of ownership in land registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.
An application for a titulo de
composicion, if not approved by the proper
Spanish authority, could not by itself vest
title, but the claimants continuous
occupation and cultivation thereof since then,
under claim of ownership, may ripen into a
title. Thus, the claimant by virtue of his long
possession may be entitled to be respected
in his ownership, if he seeks confirmation of
his imperfect title thereto under Section 48
of the Public Land Act.41
MIDTERMS
It would seem, however, that while the
Spanish grant known as titulo de
composicion can no longer serve to establish
ownership, the same may still be used as
basis of continuous possession which
eventually may lead to ownership. Thus, in
an application for regis-tration involving 128
hectares all allegedly covered by a
composition title, but only 25 hectares of
which was successfully adjudged on the basis
of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession for the duration of the period
prescribed by law, and a second application
for registration was filed for the rest of the
area predicated on construc-tive possession
based on the same composition title, it was
held that since the composition title was
allegedly lost and not even a secondary
evidence thereof could be produced,
constructive possession could not be
considered and the area claimed thereunder
should remain still part of the public domain
and may be object of public grant under the
Public Land Act.42
Collection of rents as evidence of
ownership.
While collection of rent may be
considered an attribute of an owner, it is not
safe to assume that all who collect rents are
owners. Thus, it was held that the mere fact
that a municipality continued to collect
revenues or rentals from the residents who
occupy any parcel of land comprised within
its district is not proof that the said
municipality is the proprietor of such realty;
it might be considered to be a usufructuary
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
of the land in question, but without right to
enter it in the proper registry.43
Prescription as basis of ownership.
The owner or proprietor of real property,
provided with the most legitimate and
perfect title other than a Torrens title, may
be deprived and depossessed thereof by
usurpers who, by the lapse of time (thirty
years) specified by law, acquire the same by
prescription to their benefit and to the
prejudice of the legitimate owner.44 And
where there was a sale, by the purchasers
possession for at least ten years, assuming it
to be actual, open, public, peaceful and
continu-ous under claim of ownership, to the
exclusion of any other rights and adverse to
all claimants, such purchaser will have
acquired title thereto.45 So, also, even if a
testament which was held to be invalid for
not having been executed with all the
requirements of a valid will, or a valid
donation mortis causa, may still supply the
basis for a claim of ownership after the death
of the testator, where such claim is coupled
with the claimants open, continuous and
adverse possession for a period of over thirty
years, for in that case such possession has
ripened into a title by prescription over the
parcel of unregistered land.46
60 As a rule, prescription does not run
against the government. The exception is
where it is so expressly provided by law,
such as Act No. 648 which under the old rule
mentioned prescription of ten years as
running against the government. Hence,
where the evidence in the case proved an
MALIPOL
adverse possession of the land in question
for ten years, it was granted to the petitioner
and ordered inscribed in his name as owner.47
Section 54, paragraph 6 of Act No. 926,
which is in substance a continuation of Act
No. 648 and an extension of its provisions to
all the lands in the Philippines, provides as
follows:
All persons who by themselves or
their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive and
no-torious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by
said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
under bona fide claim of ownership
except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall
be conclu-sively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and to have
received the same and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title to such land under
the provisions of this chapter.
(Repealed. See Section 14, Subsection
(1), P.D. 1529, Appendix H.)
As to requisite of prescription,
possession must be that of owner, and it
must be public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.
Acts of a posses-sory character done by
virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the
part of the real owner are not sufficient. 48
Thus possession by permission or license
from the owner is not adverse and cannot
ripen into title, no matter how long continued
or however exclusive it may be. The
MIDTERMS
possession of the occupant under such
circumstances is considered as the
possession of him upon whose pleasure it
continues.49 Actual possession of land
consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own
property.50
As a rule, an adverse possession cannot
be predicated on the possession of the
parent as against the child, or on the
possession of a child as against its parent.
Thus, where; a father became insane, and
one of his sons took over the management of
his farm during the rest of his lifetime, and
remained in possession of it for the statutory
period, it was held that these facts did not
warrant the presumption of a conveyance to
the son by the father or of a release to him
by the other heirs subsequent to their
fathers death.51
Likewise, between trustee and cestui
que trust or between agent and principal,
prescription will not lie in view of the theory
that one is a mere extension of the
personality of the other. As was held, the
possession of a trustee, under an express
trust, is not adverse to that of a cestui que
trust. Until the trust is openly repudiated the
cestui que trust must rely upon the integrity
and faithfulness of his trustee without
forfeiting his rights. Indeed, the trustees
possession of trust property is the possession
of the cestui que trust, whether the trust be
express or implied. That is, a trustee cannot
set up title adverse to his cestui que trust, so
long as the trust is acknowledged. It
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
becomes adverse only from the time of
known public and open disavowal, such as
may amount to an ouster. In case of such
disavowal, there must be positive and
continued disclaimer of title, and an assertion
of adverse right brought home to the party,
before the statute of limitations operates.
As between co-owners, however, it was
held that from the mo-ment one co-owner
asserts adverse possession of the thing
owned in common to the exclusion of the
other co-owner, the period of prescrip-tion
begins to run and the excluded co-owner
should demand partition and, if necessary,
bring an action for partition, otherwise he
may, by his inaction, lose his rights.53
For evidence to establish adverse
possession, it may be shown that the
claimant constructed permanent buildings on
the land, col-lected rentals therefrom; that
other persons sought and obtained
permission from him to erect other buildings
thereon; that he col-lected the fruits of trees
on the land; that questions of boundaries
between adjoining properties were consulted
with him; and that he has paid religiously the
taxes on the property. Such circumstances
indicate acts of dominion in derogation to
that of other claimants of ownership.54
Public
61 instruments as evidence of
ownership.
If the applicant acquired by purchase the
land he is seeking to register, it would be
necessary that he prove the sale by means of
a written document. Consistent with the
MALIPOL
requirement of Article 1403, No. 2,
paragraph (e) of the Civil Code, evidence of
an agreement for the sale of real property or
an interest therein cannot be received
without the writing subscribed by the seller
or his agent, or a secondary evidence of its
contents, otherwise the contract is
unenforceable.
While it may be said that the Statute of
Frauds is applicable only to executory
contracts, yet where the seller denies the
existence of a verbal sale of land or refuses
to deliver the land, the transaction cannot be
proved by parol evidence. Thus, on this point
Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the
Rules of Court (Vol. III, p. 180) very ably
made a distinction by the following
illustrations:
(1) A buys a parcel of land from B.
The purchase is not evidence by a
written agreement. X takes possession
of the land. A filed an action for
ejectment against X. A may introduce
evidence as to his oral contract of
purchase with B, because the action is
neither for a violation of that contract
nor for the performance thereof.
(2) A buys a piece of land from B.
The contract is en-tered into verbally.
Thereafter, B refuses to deliver the land
to A. A filed an action against B. In this
case, the action is for a violation of the
contract of sale and inasmuch as the
contract is merely oral it is
unenforceable against B. It cannot
therefore be proved.
MIDTERMS
To restate the rule, the Statute of Frauds
does not apply when the case is neither for
violation of a contract nor for the
performance thereof.55
Accordingly, it was held that since the
enactment of Act No. 190 (now superseded
by the Rules of Court), contracts of sale of
realty cannot be proven by means of
witnesses but must necessarily be proven by
written instruments, and these must be
subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent, or proven by secondary evidence of
their contents. No other evidence is,
therefore, admissible at trial except the
documentary evidence referred to, insofar as
regards such contracts, and these are
ineffectual as evidence unless they are drawn
up in writing in the manner aforestated.56
However, where parol evidence is
presented to prove a verbal sale relative to
real estate and the other party does not
object on time, the said party waives the
benefits of the law and such parol evidence is
competent and admissible.57
Public instruments notarized by a notary
or a competent public official, with all the
solemnities required by law, are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the
latter.58 However, a private document may
serve as basis of a claim of ownership, if
coupled with clear and convincing evidence
of possession,59 So, also, an oral donation,
though not valid for lack of the formalities
prescribed by law, may nevertheless
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
constitute a sufficient basis for exercising
acts of possession which may ripen into
ownership.60 Similarly, the sale of real
property which does not comply with the
Statute of Frauds is enforceable if it is
ratified and it is deemed ratified by the
failure to object to the presentation of oral
evidence to prove the sale infringing the
Statute of Frauds, or by the acceptance of
benefits under the sale.61
On the other hand, a private document
is valid contract of sale between the parties,
since sale is a consensual and is perfected by
mere consent. It accords to the vendee the
right to compel the vendor to execute the
proper public document. Besides, a private
document can be fully and partially
performed to remove it from the operation of
the statute of frauds. Being a valid
consensual contract, a private document can
effectively transfer the possession of the lot
to the vendee by constitutum possessorium
(Article 1500 NCC).62
Doctrine of part performance, an
exception.
While as a general rule an oral
agreement to sell a piece of land is not
provable, where however there has been
partial performance of the sale contract the
principle excluding parol evidence will not ap-
62
ply. And among other circumstances
indicating partial performance of an oral
contract of sale of realty may be mentioned
relinquishment of rights, continued
possession, building of improvements, tender
of payment, rendition of services, payment of
MALIPOL
taxes, surveying of the land at the vendees
expense, etc.63
Partition among heirs not covered by
statute of frauds.
Partition among heirs or renunciation of
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason
that it does not involve transfer of property
from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to
property by the heir renouncing in favor of
another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance. Hence, it is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the Statute
of Frauds is applicable to executory and not
to completed or executed contracts, and that
the performance of the contract takes it out
of the operation of the Statute of Frauds;
and on the grounds of equity, where no
rights of creditors are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into oral agreement for distribution of the
estate among themselves.64
Determination of registrable title.
While it is true that a Regional Trial
Court acting as a land registration court has
limited or special jurisdiction, it is
nonetheless true that when by law
jurisdiction is conferred upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary
power to exercise such jurisdiction and make
it effective.65 Thus, where the question arises
as to whether or not the title claimed by a
particular party is registrable and the
resolution thereof depends upon whether the
MIDTERMS
instrument upon which he bases said claim of
title is a true deed of sale or a mere
equitable mortgage, it is obvious that the
court should have jurisdiction and legal
authority to determine said question, for
otherwise it cannot properly exercise its
jurisdiction to determine whether said party
has a registrable title or not. So also in the
process of carrying out its function to
determine whether a certain party has a
registrable title, it may be incumbent upon
the court to determine not only the nature
but also the validity of a document upon
which the appli-cant, claimant or oppositor
bases his claim over the land sought to be
registered. Such question is not foreign but
intimately related to the subject matter
placed by law under its jurisdiction. To hold
that such question must be submitted for
adjudication in a separate and independent
action would be clearly contrary to the
general rule that multiplicity of suits must be
avoided, and is, furthermore, expensive,
dilatory, and impracticable. Comparatively
speaking, the power and jurisdiction of a
Court of First Instance acting as a court of
land registration is similar to that enjoyed by
the same court acting as a probate court.
Consistent with the same trend, it was
held that where the issue of the genuineness
of a document is presented in a land
registration case, the Regional Trial Court
sitting as a land registration court should not
in any manner hesitate to determine the
conflicting claims of the parties; otherwise,
that would practically reduce said court to
impotence to determine questions of fact,
since claims on such a disputed land more
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
often than not are based on documents of
title, and it is only natural that the issue of
genuineness would be raised against said
documents.67
However, in a proceeding seeking
consolidation of ownership, where the
petitioner filed the petition in the original
registration case under Section 112 of Act
No. 496, and the question raised was
whether the transaction affecting the
registered land was truly a pacto de retro
sale or an equitable mortgage, it was held by
the Supreme Court that the court sitting as a
land registration court is without jurisdiction
to determine the controversial nature of the
transaction.68
It is to be borne in mind that the above
ruling on the limited power of the land
registration court refers to the exercise of
jurisdic-tion over a controversy coming up
not during the original registration
proceeding, when title to the land was being
determined, but rather in a subsequent
proceeding affecting an already titled land,
coming up as an incidental matter after
original registration. Had such con-troversy
on whether the transaction was a sale under
pacto de retro or merely an equitable
mortgage been brought up before the land
registration court in the course of the original
registration proceeding, when ownership of
63
the land applied for was being determined,
cer-tainly such court could have properly
passed upon the issue in order to determine
whether the applicant had title proper for
registration. Thus, with respect to petitions
or motions on incidental matters filed after
MALIPOL
original registration under the provision of
Sec. 112 of Act 496 or under Sec. 108 of P.D.
1529, the court may not determine substan-
tially controversial cases.
It may be worth considering, in this
connection, that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court (land registration, etc.) is in
reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in
essence a procedural matter, involving a
mode of practice which may be waived.
Generally, an issue properly litigable in an
ordinary civil action under the general
jurisdiction of the court should not be
resolved in a land registration proceeding.
But if the parties acquiesced in submitting
that issue for determination in the land
registration proceeding and they were given
full opportunity to present their respective
sides and their evidence, the land registra-
tion court would have jurisdiction to pass
upon that issue.69
Requisites of registrable title.
The Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove that: (a) the land is
alienable public land; and (b) his open,
continu-ous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same are
either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
(Republic vs. Divinaflor, G.R. No. 116372,
Jan. 18, 2001).
MIDTERMS
In this case, the applicant acquired
ownership of the land by sale in 1973 from
the former possessor who began possessing
and occupying the same in the concept of an
owner since 1939. The buyer acquired a
registrable right over the property, thus,
when the Direc-tor of Lands initiated a
cadastral case over the land and he filed an
answer, it was proper for the court to order
the registration and confirmation of the lot in
his name.
Land already covered by patent cannot
be registered.
The issue in Orchard Realty and
Development Corporation vs. Republic, G.R.
No. 136280, Aug. 30, 2001, was whether
there can be an application for registration of
a parcel of land already covered by patent.
In resolving in the negative, the Supreme
Court said that a land covered by a title
which is outstanding cannot be subject of an
applicant for registration unless the existing
title which has become indefeasible is first
nullified by a proper court proceeding, which
was precisely resorted to in this case by the
Solicitor General when he filed an action for
reversion of the OCT in the name of
Belarmino, and the subsequent titles derived
therefrom under Section 101 of the Public
Land Act which reads:
Section 101. All actions for the
reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead, in the proper courts, in the
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
name of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

The parcel of land applied for by

petitioner having been already acquired
through free patent in the name of Rosita
Belarmino, with the corresponding original
certificate of title having been issued to her
at the time of the filing of petitioners
application for registration, the land had
ceased to be alienable and disposable and,
therefore, could not have been acquired by
petitioner by continuous, open and public
possession under the concept of owner within
the contempla-tion of Section 14 (1) of P.D.
1529 (Property Registration Decree). The
proper procedure was to have Rosita
Belarminos title annulled first in order to
prevent proliferation of titles over the same
piece of land and safeguard the integrity of
the Torrens system of registration.

Genuineness of title and identity of

land.

An applicant for registration of land, if

he relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto, must prove not only the
genuineness of his title thereto, but also the
identity of the land therein mentioned. The
document in such a case is either a basis of
his claim for registra-tion or not at all. If he
only claims a portion of what is included in
64
his title, he must clearly prove that the
property sought to be registered is included
in that title.70 Discrepancy in area occasioned
by accretion does not affect identity of the
land.71

MALIPOL
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter VI
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
Decree and judgment compared.
The term decree as used in the Land
Registration Act has been confused with
decision and judgment, especially in the
interpretation of Section 38 of the same Act,
which provides, in part, for the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the competent
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court)1 a petition for re-view within one year
after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Unless we understand the true
meaning of the term decree as last used, we
may not be able to know when to commence
counting the prescribed period; one may
easily be misled to count it from the entry of
the decision or judgment when that should
not be the case.
Section 37 of Act No. 496 provides that
if in any case without adverse claim the court
finds that the applicant does not have title
proper for registration, a decree shall be
entered dismissing the ap-plication, and such
decree may be ordered to be without
prejudice. The decree referred to here is
without doubt the court decision or judgment
65
of dismissal. And when it provides further for
the entry of a decree awarding the land
applied for, or any part thereof, to the person
entitled thereto, whether the applicant or an
adverse claimant, it seems quite clear that
the term again refers to a court decision or
MALIPOL
judgment of adjudication. But, when the
same law subsequently pro-vides in Section
38 for the issuance of a decree of
registration and then fixes one year from the
entry of such a decree within which a person
deprived may file a petition for review, the
term no longer conveys the idea of a court
decision or judgment; rather, it refers to the
decree of registration as issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration (now
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority).2
Thus, it was held that after trial in a
registration case, three actions are taken.
The first adjudicates ownership in favor of
one of the claimants. This constitutes the
decision the judgment the decree of the decision without prejudice (sin perjuicio)
court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second ac-tion is the declaration of the court
that the decree is final, ordering the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office
(Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority) to issue the corresponding decree
of registration. Such order is made if within
thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy
of the decision or judgment no appeal is
taken therefrom. This again is a judicial
action, although at a less degree than the
first. The third and last action devolves upon
the Land Reg-istration Authority which was
created for the due effectuation and
accomplishment of the laws relating to the
registration of land. This office prepares and
issues the final decree containing the
technical description of the land, which
decree may not be issued until after the
finality of the court decree or judgment of
adjudication.3
MIDTERMS
It will therefore be observed that while a
judgment may always be considered a
decree, not all decrees are judgments; and it
is all the more when referring to a decree of
registration issued by the Administrator,
which is distinct from the court decree
dismissing an application or awarding land to
the applicant or an adverse claim-ant.
When judgment becomes final.
Without some fixed way of determining
when a decision is final, the parties litigant
could never know when they could enforce
their rights under the judgment, or when the
litigation is in fact termi-nated. Even a
becomes final after the period within which
to perfect an appeal shall have elapsed, and
that is, upon the expiration of thirty days
from the date on which the party who may
appeal has been served with a notice of the
judgment.4 While the period for appeal is
fixed, it gives allowance by deducting
therefrom the time during which a motion to
set aside the judgment has been pending.5
While under the provision of Section 39
of The Judiciary Re-organization Act of
1980,6 the period to appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases is limited
to fifteen days only from date of notice
thereof, considering that no record on appeal
is now required for such appealed cases,
exception to the rule is made with respect to
appeals in special pro-ceedings and other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
under the applicable provisions of the Rules
of Court.
Even assuming that the judgment was
erroneous, such error, unless jurisdictional,
could have been corrected by a regular
appeal. Decisions, whether erroneous or not,
become final after the period fixed by law;
otherwise, litigation would be endless, no
questions would be finally settled, and titles
to property would become precari-ous if the
losing party were allowed to reopen them at
any time in the future.7
How about if the Supreme Court in a
subsequent case changes its doctrine in the
interpretation of a law? Will the new doctrine
retroact as of the date of the effectivity of
said law? Under such a predicament, it was
held that a subsequent re-interpretation of
the law may be applied only to new cases but
certainly not to an old one finally and
conclusively determined, inasmuch as judicial
doctrines have only prospective operation.
Stated otherwise, posterior changes in the
doctrine of the Supreme Court cannot
retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final
ruling in the same proceeding where the
prior adjudication was had, whether the case
be civil or criminal in na-ture.
When judgment does not become
final after lapse of period.
66
In a certain case,9 the decision was
served to the parties con-cerned on August
23, 1940, requiring the applicants to submit
an amended plan for approval by the court
before final decree and title could be issued.
MALIPOL
Motion to reconsider and set aside said
decision was filed on March 13, 1941, or
after the lapse of more than thirty days from
notice. It was contended that the court had
lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for
reconsideration because its decision had
become final. Held: That said decision could
not acquire finality until the amended plan
which the applicants were ordered to submit
was presented to and approved by the court.
Such a decision, which leaves something yet
to be done by the parties and the court
before it can be enforced, has in various
cases been declared to be interlocutory and
not appealable.
Form of judgment.
A judgment or decision constitutes the
opinion of the court after taking into
consideration the evidence submitted by the
parties in the controversy. In land
registration proceedings, it may dismiss the
application for registration or order the
confirmation and registration of title to land
in the name of the applicant or any of the
oppositors, depending upon the
conclusiveness of their respective proofs or
evi-dence.
Under Section 28 of P.D. No. 1529, in a
case where only a por-tion of the land
subject of registration is contested, the court
may render partial judgment provided that a
subdivision plan showing the contested and
uncontested portions approved by the
Director of Land is previously submitted to
said court.
MIDTERMS
As provided in Section 29 of P.D. 1529,
judgment may be ren-dered confirming the
title of the applicant, or the oppositor as the
case may be, to the land or portions thereof
upon finding that the party concerned has
sufficient title proper for registration, after
considering the evidence and the reports of
the Administrator of Land Registra-tion
Authority and the Director of Lands.
The decision of the trial court in a land
registration case, order-ing the issuance of a
decree, is not in itself a decree of registration
within the meaning of Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act,10 or Section 31 of P.D. No.
1529.
Issuance of decree.
As provided by law, if the court finds
after hearing that the ap-plicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application
or adverse claim and proper for registration,
a decree of confirmation and registration
shall be entered. Every decree of registration
shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto
subject only to the exceptions stated in
Section 39 of Act No. 496 (now Section 44,
P.D. No. 1529). It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons including the National
Government and all the branches thereof,
whether men-tioned by name in the
application, notice or citation, or included in
the general description To all whom it may
concern.11
Although formerly the final decree was
actually prepared by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, who used to be an
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
administrative officer, the issuance of such
decree can hardly be considered a ministerial
act for the reason that said Chief was acting
not as an administrative officer but as an
officer of the court and so the issuance of a
final decree is a judicial function and not an
administrative one.12
Incidentally, it may be asked: May
decree of registration be issued pending
appeal? In any event, it was held that
execution pending appeal is not applicable to
a land registration proceeding. It is fraught
with dangerous consequences inasmuch as
innocent pur-chasers may be misled into
buying real property upon reliance on a
judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a
judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is
violative of the explicit provision of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree
be issued only after the decision adjudicating
the title becomes final and executory, and it
is on the basis of said decree that the
Register of Deeds concerned issues the
corresponding certificate of title.13
Statutory liens affecting title.
Under Section 39 of Act 496, as
amended by Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529,
every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pur-suance of a decree of
67
registration, and every subsequent purchaser
of registered land taking a certificate of title
for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate and any of the
MALIPOL
following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First, Liens, claims or rights arising
or existing under the laws and
Constitution of the Philippines which are
not by law required to appear of record
in the Registry of Deeds in order to be
valid against subsequent purchasers or
encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estates taxes
levied and assessed within two years
immediately preceding the acquisition of
any right over the land by an innocent
purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect
taxes payable before that period from
the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private
way established or recognized by law, or
any government irrigation canal or
lateral thereof, if the certificate of title
does not state that the bounda-ries of
such highway or irrigation canal or
lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the
property or limitation on the use thereof
by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential
Decree No. 27 or any other law or
regulations on agrarian reform such as
Republic Act No. 6657 known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
But if there were easements or other
rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered
MIDTERMS
land which for any reason have failed to be
registered, such easements or rights shall
remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such
failure, and shall be held to pass with the
land until cut off or extinguished by the
registration of the servient estate, or in any
other manner.14
The legal easement contemplated should
have been pre-exist-ing at the time of
registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to
respect it. Thus, where the easement is not
pre-existing, and is sought to be imposed
after the land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act, or the Property
Registra-tion Decree for that matter, proper
expropriation proceeding should be had, and
just compensation paid to the registered
owner thereof. For it is elementary that
public use may not be imposed on private
property without proper expropriation
proceedings and payment of just
compensation made to the owner.15
Stated otherwise, pre-existing roads and
streets at the time of the original registration
of a privately-owned land, even if not seg-
regated from the area of the land thus
registered, shall be respected as a subsisting
lien or public servitude imposed by operation
of law; but this rule does not apply to cases
where the road or street was constructed
subsequently to the acquisition and
registration of the land, in which latter case
the private owner cannot be deprived of such
property or right without due process and
just compensation.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Unrecorded liens.
The first exception mentioned in Section
39 of Act No. 496 relat-ing to encumbrances
which may be deemed to affect registered
land, although no specific annotation thereof
appears on the certificate of title, includes
liens, claims or rights arising or existing by
operation of law but which the statutes of
the Philippines Islands cannot re-quire to
appear of record in the registry. Just what
are those liens, claims or rights which cannot
be required by statutes to be recorded or
annotated on the certificate of title, are
difficult to conceive, except probably such as
would entail a deprivation of property
without due process of law or an impairment
of contractual obligations. Such lien,
however, could not possibly be the one
alluded to in the first exception under Section
39 of Act No. 496, for, if a statute directing
the registration of said lien would contravene
the due process or the impairment clause in
the Bill of Rights, the imposition upon a
purchaser, for value, in good faith of the
obligation to respect such liens, even if not
noted in the certificate of title, would be
worse and, hence, unconstitutional.16 Thus,
the legal absurdity that would result
therefrom would be quite obvious, and the
only reasonable recourse is to construe the
exception as referring only to statutory liens
not required by law to appear of record in
68
the Registry of Deeds. And this conjecture
readily finds support in the present text of
the Land Registration Act of Massachusetts, 17
from where we copied ours, containing an
equivalent provision reading as follows:
First, liens, claims or rights arising or
MALIPOL
existing under the laws or constitution of the
United States or the statutes of this
commonwealth which are not by law
required to appear of record in the registry
of deeds in or-der to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of
record.
Encumbrance created by administrative
directive, null and void.
After the liberation of the Philippines
from the Japanese occupa-tion, the
Secretary of Justice issued Circular No. 14,
series of 1945, giving directives to all
Registers of Deeds to insert in all certificates
of title to be issued pursuant to sales or
transfers consummated during the Japanese
occupation, as well as in those involving
cancellation of mortgages by virtue of
payments effected during the same period,
the following words or annotation: subject
to such further disposition as the government
may adopt regarding transactions
consummated during the Japanese
occupation. Such annotation without doubt
would be an encumbrance on the title or a
charge upon the property in the sense that it
would make the title to the property subject
to any action which the government may
take on the validity of pay-ments made with
Japanese war notes during the occupation.
On the question of the legality of such
encumbrance, it was held that, according to
Section 39 of Act No. 496 amended, every
subsequent purchaser of a registered land
under the Torrens system, who takes a
transfer certificate for value in good faith,
shall hold the same free of all encumbrances,
MIDTERMS
except those noted on the certificate and any
of the legal encumbrances, enumerated in
the law. Hence, Circular No. 14, Series of
1945, of the Secretary of Justice, directing
the an-notation of an encumbrance not
originally shown on the certificate of title nor
being one of those enumerated in the law, is
unwarranted and illegal, and the Registers of
Deeds are not bound to comply with such
directive.18
Meanwhile, in a certain case where the
Land Registration Commission issued a
circular instructing the Register of Deeds to
withhold or suspend the registration of any
instrument affecting certain property with
expanded area covered by a certificate of
title, and thereafter the Court of First
Instance issued an order to the contrary,
directing the Register of Deeds to register
any instrument of conveyance or
encumbrance that may be presented for
registration affecting the same property, on
the question as to whether the land
registration court had the power to issue
such an order where there existed a
substantial controversy over the ownership of
the increased or expanded area, it was held
that the issue may be considered seri-ous
enough so as to be litigated in an appropriate
proceeding before a court of general
jurisdiction, since the proceedings provided
in the Land Registration Act after original
registration are summary in nature and are
inadequate for the litigation of the issues
prop-erly pertaining to ordinary civil actions.
Thus, the judge of the land registration court
was considered to be without power to order
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
the cancellation of the title and issuance of a
new one in this case.19
Undisclosed encumbrances strictly
construed.
The title intended to be created by the
Land Registration Act is one not subject to
hidden defects, to undeveloped or inchoate
claims, to any sort of restriction, limitation or
reduction except those shown in the
certificate of title and in the law itself as
having been preserved against the land.
Such being the case, the exceptions which go
to restrict or defeat the purpose of the Act
will not be enlarged beyond the actual
signification of the words used or extend
beyond the limits which the words
themselves actually set.
Thus, where the law (Section 44, P.D.
No. 1529) makes excep-tions to the rule of
indefeasibility, such as that referring to
taxes within two years after the same have
become due and payable, that exception
shall be inapplicable to taxes that are not
due and payable within the period specified.
Under the tax laws, taxes are not due and
payable until they have been levied and
assessed. Hence, in a case20 involving a sale
of registered land which was not fully
assessed at the time of the purchase, and
thereafter additional taxes thereon were
69
assessed and levied with retroactive effect as
of previous years, it was held that such taxes
paid for the years previous to the date of the
purchase, they not having been either due or
payable and not having even been assessed
or levied prior to the date of the purchase,
MALIPOL
do not constitute a lien on the property and
should therefore be re-funded to the
purchaser. Here is an instance where Torrens
system subordinates the right of the
government to collect taxes in certain cases
to the creation of an indefeasible and
unimpeachable title and in consideration of
the principle that it is better that the
government lose a tax occasionally rather
than registered title be uncertain al-ways.
Adverse possession not an
encumbrance.
The meaning of the phrase free of all
encumbrances as used in Section 44 of P.D.
No. 1529, which is guaranteed to every
applicant who receives a certificate of title
issued by virtue of a decree of reg-istration
as well as to every subsequent purchaser
who in good faith and for a valuable
consideration receives a certificate of title,
does not include adverse possession of a
third person who subsequent to the decree of
registration entered and occupied the
registered land.21 Thus, it was held that an
adverse possession of property by another is
not an encumbrance in law, and does not
contradict the condition that the property is
free from encumbrance; nor is it a lien,
which connotes security for a claim.
Form of decree.
Every decree of registration shall bear
the day of the year, hour, and minute of its
entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the
MIDTERMS
General Land Registration Office (now the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority) in his ex officio capacity as Clerk
of Court in land registration matters. The
decree shall state whether the owner is
married or unmarried, and if married, the
name of the husband or wife, provided that if
the land adjudicated is conjugal property, it
shall be issued in the names of both spouses.
If the owner is under disability, it shall state
the nature of the disability, and if a minor, his
age. It shall contain a description of the land
as finally determined by the court, and shall
set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in
such manner as to show their relative
priority, all particular estates, mortgages,
easements, liens, attachments and other
encumbrances, including rights of tenant-
farmer, if any, to which the land or owners
estate is subject, and may contain any other
matter properly to be determined in
pursuance of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The de-cree shall be stated in a convenient
form for transcription upon the certificate of
title.23
In concrete form, a decree of
registration may be substantially as follows:
Decree No. 145230
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Court of First Instance
Quezon Province
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Case No. 1232, L. F. C. Record No.
22862, having been duly and regularly
heard in accordance with the provisions
of law, it is hereby decreed that
Alejandra de los Reyes, a widow,
Filipino, and resident of Sariaya, Quezon
Province is the owner in fee simple of
certain land situated in said Province
more particularly bounded and described
as follows:
(Technical description of the
land)
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court
that said land be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree in the
name of said Alejandra de los Reyes,
subject, however, to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in section 44
of said law as may be subsisting, and to:
. . . . . ..
WITNESS the Honorable . . . . . . . .
Judge of said Court, the 30th day of
June, A.D., Nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight.
Issued at Quezon City, Philippines,
the 1st day of August, A.D., 1978, at
8:30 a.m.
70
Attest:
______________
______________
____
MALIPOL
Commission
er of Land
Registr
ation
(Seal of the L.R.C.)24
A decree of registration issued pursuant
to the Land Registra-tion Act only confirms
the ownership of the applicant over the land
subject of the application. Thus, the fact that
the decree which was is-sued in the name of
a person describes him as married to
someone, is merely descriptive of his civil
status at the time and cannot be taken as
proof that the land was acquired during their
coverture. Stated otherwise, the
circumstance that the land was registered
during their marriage cannot in itself
constitute proof that it was acquired during
their marriage inasmuch as registration of
land under the Torrens system does not
confer title, but merely confirms title already
existing and which is registrable.25
Now, however, to remove any possible
doubt as to whether the property being
decreed is exclusively owned by a spouse or
the con-jugal property of the spouses,
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requires that if the land adjudicated by the
court is conjugal property, the decree should
be issued in the name of both spouses.
Decree of land includes buildings
and improvements ther-eon.
MIDTERMS
The registration of land in the name of a
particular person vests in him not only the
title to the land but also the title to the
improve-ments thereon, unless special
reservation is noted with respect to the
improvements.26 In line with this principle, it
is incumbent upon the owner of the building
and improvements existing on the land
object of the registration to present a timely
objection, that is, during the pendency of the
registration proceeding, setting forth his
claim to the building and improvements and
seeking to have them excluded as part and
appurtenances of the land.
When land is registered under the
Torrens system and a person other than the
owner makes valuable improvements in good
faith thereon, the lien given to such person
by Article 361 (now 448) in relation to Article
453 (now 456) of the Civil Code may be
noted in the certificate of title by means of a
petition filed in the original case wherein the
decree of registration was entered.27 If the
owner of the new improvements is the same
registered owner of the land, the no-tation of
said new improvements on the certificate of
the title would seem to be a surplusage. By
legal presumption, they belong to the owner
of the land unless otherwise expressly noted
in his certificate of title.
Ownership of building alone cannot be
registered separate-ly.
Registration of buildings and
improvements is merely inciden-tal to the
registration of the land where they stand.
That being the case, no separate decree of
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
registration nor certificate of title can be
issued covering the buildings and
improvements alone. Thus, it was held that
the owner of the land is authorized by law to
register with the land such
buildings,improvements, or interests as he
may have therein, but in no wise is the
owner of the land and the buildings
authorized to apply for registration
separately and independently, nor can the
land of the one and the building of the other
erected thereon have legal existence in the
registry as entities independent of one
another.28 This, however, does not preclude
the registration of the building or
improvements jointly with the land in the
same registration proceeding under Section
112 of Act No. 496. Now under Sec. 108 of
P.D. No. 1529.
Decree proper in land registration.
The Land Registration Act expressly
recognizes two classes of decrees in land
registration proceedings, namely, decrees
dismissing the application and referred to in
Section 37, and decrees of confirma-tion and
registration dealt with in the next succeeding
four sections of the Act. It will be noted that
Section 38 speaks of the latter class, the
decrees of registration. It says: x x x. Every
decree of registration shall bind the land, and
71
quiet title thereto, x x x. Such decree shall
not be opened by reason of absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived
MALIPOL
of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to
file in the competent Regional Trial Court a
petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree x x x.
The law defines or describes the decree
of registration, prescribes the form and
contents of every such decree, and provides
for its en-try.29
The lower court has no jurisdiction to
order the issuance of a decree of registration
after the aggrieved party has perfected his
ap-peal. A Torrens title issued on the basis of
a judgment that is not final, such judgment
having been appealed, is a nullity, as it is
violative of the explicit provision of the Land
Registration Act, which requires that a decree
shall be issued only after the decision
adjudicating title becomes final and
executory, and it is only on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned
may issue the corresponding certificate of
title.
When decree of registration
becomes final.
A decree of registration shall not be
reopened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived
of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by actual
fraud to file in the competent Regional Trial
Court a petition for re-view within one year
MIDTERMS
after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of the said term
of one year, every decree or certificate of
title issued accordingly shall be
incontrovertible. If there is any such
purchaser, the decree of registration shall not
be opened, but shall remain in full force and
effect forever, subject only to the right of
appeal, and provided that no decree or
certificate of title issued to persons not
parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or
annulled. But any person aggrieved by such
decree in any case may pursue his remedy
by ac-tion for damages against the applicant
or any person for fraud in procuring the
decree. And the phrase innocent purchaser
for value or an equivalent phrase that may
be used in the law shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.31
What may be subject to the right of
appeal as mentioned in the foregoing
paragraph is the order of the court which
may grant or deny the petition filed for
review. Where before the expiration of one
year from the issuance of the decree the
property has been sold to a third person and
a petition is filed for review on the ground of
actual fraud and it is shown that the
purchaser is not an innocent purchaser for
value, in the event that this petition is denied
and appeal may be taken therefrom but such
third person should be made party to the
appeal, otherwise the decree or certificate of
title issued to him cannot be cancelled or
annulled. On the other hand, if the petition is
granted the adverse party may appeal from
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
the order, but in such cases it has been
considered the better practice to withhold the
ap-peal meanwhile until the final
determination of the controversy for at that
stage such appeal may become unnecessary
where the original findings have not been
disturbed.
While a decision in land registration
proceeding becomes final after the expiration
of thirty days from the date of service of its
notice, the decree of registration does not
become final until after the lapse of one year
from the date of its issuance and entry.
Accordingly, it was held that the petition for
review under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act must be presented within
one year after the entry of the decree of
registration described and defined in Section
40 of the same Act. And, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the date noted on
the final decree of registration as of its
issuance and entry, must be regarded as the
true data of such entry, and the year within
which a petition for review must be
presented begins to run from that date.32
Consistent with the same trend, it was
held that the adjudica-tion of land in a
registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the
72
final decree. As long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed,
the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing may set
MALIPOL
aside the decision or decree and adjudicate
the land to another party.33
Conclusiveness of decree of
registration.
A land registration proceeding is in
rem, and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the Government
and its branches, irrespective of whether or
not they were personally notified of the filing
of the ap-plication for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said
application, because all interested parties are
considered as notified by the publication
required by law.34
A decree of registration, once final,
cannot be attacked by a per-son who was a
minor at the time of its issuance and now
has become of age. Thus, it was held that
the right of action to this effect has
prescribed, without any exception, not even
by reason of age. Neither would there be
found merit in an allegation that the decreed
owners held the property in trust or as co-
heirs, when they applied for and obtained
registration thereof in their names, without
opposition, upon establishing the fact that
their possession had been open and as
owners, and in that capacity, they acquired
the same.35
A decree that has become final shall be
deemed conclusive not only on the questions
actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or
decided in the land registra-tion proceedings.
MIDTERMS
So, where the title of the claimants was
confirmed therein on the basis of a certain
partition agreement entered into by the
parties in interest and approved by the
probate court in a previous separate case,
and the legality and validity of such partition
agree-ment could have been questioned on
the ground that it was entered into by the
lawyers of the parties without their
expressed authority, this should have been
assailed in the land registration proceedings.
The decree having been final, to permit them
now to question the legality and validity of
such partition agreement and to secure a
declaration of its nullity in another action, if
successful, would result in the setting aside
of the decree which cannot be reopened after
the lapse of one year from the entry
thereof.36
The court has no jurisdiction to decree
again the registration of land already decreed
in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land is null and
void. This is so, because when once decreed
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title
to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the
proceeding being in rem.37
Neither has the court jurisdiction to
decree portions of forest and mineral lands
any more than riverbeds and foreshores.
Such lands of the public domain are not
susceptible of private appropriation and,
therefore, not proper subject of registration.
In a case where the land applied for
appears to be within the unclassified and
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
unreleased portion of forest lands, it was
held that, pending its classification and
release therefrom, the courts are in-
competent and lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
the land to a private claimant or applicant for
registration under the Land Registration Act.
For in that way the courts would, in effect,
release such property from the unclassified
category. The power to classify or reclassify
such lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government
and not of the courts. Hence, in the absence
of such classification, the land remains an
unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition. This should
be so under the time-honored Constitutional
precept and also in conso-nance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right of
ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.39
Reason for finality of decree.
When once a decree of registration is
made under the Torrens system, and the
time has passed within which that decree
may be questioned, the title is perfect and
cannot later on be questioned. The Supreme
Court of the United States in a certain case 40
said that there would be no end to litigation
if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated
appeals or actions, compel a court to listen
73
to criticism on its opinions or speculate on
chances from changes in its member-ship.
The very purpose of the Torrens system
would be destroyed if the same land may be
subsequently brought under a second action
for registration.41
MALIPOL
It has been observed that, just for the
sake of sticking to the rule relating to the
finality of a decree of registration, the
constitutional right of a person may almost
be sacrified. In a cadastral proceeding
involving original registration of certain lots,
some of the adverse claimants were not
notified of the hearing despite the fact that
they had filed their answers and the lots
stood contested in the records of the case.
The hearing was had in their absence, and
the title to the property was confirmed in
favor of the other claimants. Here, it is clear
that the adverse claimants were deprived of
the opportunity to be heard and to adduce
evidence deprived of their day in court.
Neither were they notified of the judgment
against them. Thereafter, the decree of
registration was issued, and so were the
certificates of title in favor of the only parties
who had been notified of the hearing. More
than one year having elapsed since the
issuance of the decree of registration, the
question here is whether under the
circumstances the decree may be reviewed
and set aside. It was held that the review of
the decree provided for in Section 38 of Act
No. 496 (now Section 32), P.D. No. 1529)
was no longer available on account of the
expira-tion of one year. However, it was
suggested that an equitable remedy is still
available to the persons deprived and that is
to compel the persons in whose names the
land in question had been wrongfully
registered to reconvey it to them, provided,
of course, that the land had not yet been
transferred to an innocent person for value.42
MIDTERMS
Amendment of decree to include new
owners.
While the law permits the amendment of
the decree of registra-tion and the
corresponding certificate of title after one
year for the purpose of noting down the
extinguishment of any right, or the crea-tion
of new real rights not appearing in the
certificate, or correcting errors, yet, when
the amendment is for the purpose of
including new owners in the certificate, it
cannot be made, even with the consent of
the original owner and on the ground that
the liens noted in the certificate are
fraudulent. The trial court has no jurisdiction
to amend the decree of registration for the
purpose of including new owners after the
lapse of one year.43
Change of decree from owner to
purchaser.
In a cadastral proceeding, title to a
parcel of land was adju-dicated to A, but
upon motion of B as transferee of A, the land
was decreed to and the certificate of title
issued in the name of B and in this certificate
some land was included which was not
covered in Bs deed. After one year had
passed within which decrees can be
reopened for fraud, and after the action to
recover damages for the fraudulent
procurance of the title had been barred by
prescription, this action was instituted by the
Government, as devisee under the will of A,
to recover such portion of the lot decreed to
B as was not included in his deed. It
appeared that the Government had been
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
properly represented in court at the hearing
of Bs motion to have the certificate issued in
his name and that the Government had also
made a motion in the original proceeding to
have the certificate issued in his name and
that the Government had also made a
motion in the original proceeding to have the
adjudication amended for clerical error. No
appeal had been taken by the Government
from the adverse ruling of the court upon
either of these motions. HELD: That the
controversy over the title to the questioned
property was concluded by the unappealed
orders and that this action to compel B to
surrender a part of the property covered by
the Torrens certificate is not maintainable.44
Decree to non-claimants; effect of
subsequent dealings.
The Court has no jurisdiction to decree a
lot to persons who have put no claim to it
and have never asserted any right of owner-
ship thereon. Thus, where the property so
erroneously adjudicated to non-claimants
was subsequently mortgaged to an innocent
third persons, it was held in an earlier ruling
that the creditor-mortgagee could acquire no
higher or better right than what the
mortgagors had in the property, which in the
instant case was nothing. It was hinted that
the mortgagee should collect his credit from
the mortgagors in a personal action and
74
perhaps from the assurance fund. It was
real-ized, however, that such ruling would
impair public confidence in the certificate of
title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would
have to inquire in every instance as to
MALIPOL
whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued which is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Such a ruling
was, therefore, subsequently modified so
that even if the certificate of title issued to
non-claimants is declared null and void, the
rights of an in-nocent third person (the
mortgagee in this case) who relied upon the
correctness of the certificate cannot be
disregarded. As the rule now stands, upon
the cancellation of the certificate of title in
the name of the non-claimants and its re-
issuance in the name of the rightful owner,
the property should likewise be subject to
the mortgage lien noted in the certificate to
be cancelled. For the collection of the mort-
gage credit in this case, the mortgagee may
sue the primary obligors together with the
new registered owner of the property
mortgaged, without prejudice to any right
which the latter may have against the
assurance fund.45
While a decree cannot be entered in
favor of one who has put no claim to the lot
adjudicated, that rule is not without
exception, as, for instance, where it appears
that the answer of one of the claimants
substantially alleges the co-ownership
acquired through inheritance, such answer
conferred jurisdiction to decree the land
claimed in favor of all persons whom
evidence shows to be co-owners of the
property. The law (Section 11, Act No. 2259,
as amended) so authorizes and in the
interest of substantial justice so requires.46
Writ of possession; persons entitled
thereto.
MIDTERMS
A writ of possession issued in a land
registration proceeding implies the delivery
of possession of the land to the successful
litigant therein. It is, in effect, a writ of
execution commanding the sheriff to enter
the land and give possession thereof to the
person entitled un-der the judgment. This is
available not only to the adjudged owner but
also to any subsequent purchaser of the
property, provided no such writ has even
been issued before. Incidentally, if in the
implementa-tion of a writ of possession it
should become necessary to demolish and
remove something constructed on the land, a
writ of demolition may likewise issue,
especially considering that the latter writ is
but a complement of the former which,
without such writ of demolition, would be
rendered ineffective.47
For the purpose of applying for a writ of
possession, it may not be necessary to wait
for the final decree of registration issued by
the Ad-ministrator of The Land Registration
Authority. As fittingly observed by the
Supreme Court, public order and the
interest of the parties demand that once
judgment of confirmation of title has been
rendered the successful partys interest be
protected from any damage which the
defeated party may cause him by remaining
in the possession to which said successful
party is entitled by virtue of his title and of
the courts decree confirming it.48 In other
words, after registration has once been
awarded, the granting of a writ of
possession, while, for the most part,
dependent on the factual circumstances,
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
becomes a matter of expediency, and the
mere fact that a charge or lien is previ-ously
acknowledged as binding the land should not
militate against its immediate issuance.49
According to the existing law, a writ of
possession may be avail-able in any of the
following cases, namely: (1) in land
registration proceeding, which is a for the purpose of en-forcing its orders,
proceeding in rem; (2) in extrajudicial
foreclos-ure of mortgage; (3) in judicial
foreclosure of mortgage, which is a
proceeding quasi in rem, provided that the
mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged
property and no third person had intervened;
and
(4) in execution sales.50
Pending appeal from a decision granting
an application for registration, the trial court,
for special reasons, may issue a writ of
possession to the winning party in
accordance with Section 1440 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court).51
Against whom may writ of possession
lie.
In land registration proceedings, the
court, when asked for by the successful
claimant, may issue a writ of possession not
75
only against the persons who appeared in
the proceedings and answered but also
against those who, having been served with
process, did not appear or answer,52 and not
only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also
MALIPOL
against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the proceedings up to the issuance of
the final decree. However, it cannot be used
either against the party in whose favor the
land was decreed to be registered or against
his representatives or his successors in
interest.53 This power is inherent in the court
judgments or decrees, not to mention
Section 17 of Act No. 496, which has been
repealed by Final Section (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code. In a registration case
the judgment confirming the title of the
applicant and ordering its registration in his
name necessarily carries with it the delivery
of possession which is an inherent element of
the right of ownership. The issuance of the
writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by
existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the
generally accepted principles upon which the
administration of justice rests.54
But when other persons have
subsequently entered the property, claiming
the right of possession, the owner of the
registered property or his successors in
interest cannot dispossess such persons by
merely asking for a writ of possession. The
remedy is to resort to the courts of justice
and institute a separate action for unlawful
entry or detainer, or for reinvindicatory
action, as the case may be.55
Will right to issuance of writ of
possession prescribe?
In the Sorogon case,56 it was assumed
to be the law and a well-settled doctrine in
MIDTERMS
this jurisdiction that a writ of possession
must be issued within the period of time in
which a judgment in ordinary civil actions
may be summarily executed (Section 17, Act
No. 496, as amended), upon the petition of
the registered owner or his successor in
interest and against all parties who claim a
right to or interest in the land registered
prior to the registration proceedings.
We believe, however, that the above
opinion, insofar as it sug-gests a fixed period
of time, or five years, within which a writ of
pos-session may be issued, was
unintentionally assumed, or at least not
contemplated in connection with registration
proceedings, taking into account that the
determination of this point was unimportant
in the consideration of the particular issue
presented in that case. And, furthermore,
Section 17 of Act No. 496, which seems to
have contributed as a factor leading to such
a conclusion, was already repealed by Final
Section (b) of the Revised Administrative
Code.
It is, therefore, submitted that, so long
as no writ of possession has previously been
issued, the ruling in the Manlapaz case57 still
holds as the correct doctrine, which has not
yet been abandoned, and that is to the effect
that the right of the applicant or a
subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance
of a writ of possession of the land registered
would never prescribe. This view is supported
by the cita-tion of the Court of Section 46 of
Act No. 496 (now Section 47, P.D. No. 1529),
which provides that no title to register land
in derogation to that of the registered owner
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Furthermore, it was held in a more
recent case that the provi-sion in the Rules
of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within five years by motion, and
after five years but within ten years by an
action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil
actions and is not ap-plicable to special
proceedings, such as land registration cases.
This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against
the losing party. In special proceedings, the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or
facts; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse party had been in possession of the
land and the losing party desires to oust him
therefrom.58
Once a judgment has become final and
executory, the prevailing party is entitled as
a matter of right to a writ of execution, and
76
the issuance thereof is the courts ministerial
duty, compellable by man-damus. The
exception lies when, after a judgment has
become final and executory, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its ex-
ecution impossible or unjust, in which case
MALIPOL
the interested party may ask the court to
stay its execution or prevent its
enforcement.59
A writ of execution is not appealable
where there is no allegation that it has varied
the tenor of the judgment; otherwise, a case
would never end for as often as an order of
execution is issued, it would be appealed. 60
Collateral attack not bar to writ of
possession.
If a decree of registration has been
obtained by fraud, the ag-grieved party may
file, within one year from the date of
issuance and entry of the decree of
registration, a petition for review of the
proceed-ing with the court that issued the
decree in order to have the latter set aside.
But it cannot be collaterally attacked by
persons claiming title to or interest in the
land prior to the registration proceeding.
Therefore, the fact that the petitioners have
instituted, more than one year after the
decree of registration had been issued, an
ordinary action with the Regional Trial Court
attacking the validity of the decree on the
ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance
of the writ of possession applied for by the
registered owner.61
It is well-settled, of course, that a
Torrens title cannot be col-laterally attacked.
The issue on the validity of the title can only
be raised in action expressly instituted for
that purpose.62
When writ of possession may not issue.
MIDTERMS
Where the parties against whom a writ
of possession is sought have been in
possession of the land for at least ten years,
and they entered into possession apparently
after the issuance of the final decree, and
none of them had been an oppositor in the
registration proceeding, the writ of
possession will not issue. The judge issuing
the writ of possession under such
circumstances acted without juris-diction and
beyond his powers, for which reason both he
and those seeking to take possession of the
land must be restrained from carry-ing out
the writ so issued in order that the latter
may not enter into possession without due
process of law.63
In a certain case64 the petition for a writ
of possession was denied, for the reason that
prior thereto one had already been is-sued,
and the new possessors were not a party to
the registration proceeding, that is, their
claim and interest arose or accrued after said
proceeding.
Thus, the persons who took possession
of the land after final adjudication of the
same in registration proceedings cannot be
sum-marily ousted through a writ of
possession secured by a mere motion.
Regardless of any title or lack of title of said
persons to hold posses-sion of the land in
question, they cannot be ousted without
giving them their day in court in a proper
independent proceeding.65
Stated otherwise, petition for a writ of
possession may not be granted ex parte.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Where the trial court heard and granted the
peti-tion for such a writ, without prior notice
to the adverse parties in accordance with
Rule 15, Section 4, of the Rules of Court,
thereby denying them of their right to be
heard and sustain their claim, it was held
that the trial court acted in violation of the
Rules and the order granting the writ of
possession should be nullified.66 This writ of
possession should not be confused with that
which may be asked in connection with
foreclosure sale where the purchaser is
entitled to immediate possession upon
posting of a bond in an amount fixed by the
court for the use of the property during the
redemption period, in spite of the fact that
copy of the petition or motion was not served
the mortgagor-debtor, for in that case such
motion is expressly permitted by law to be
filed ex parte.
Ordinary means to recover
possession.
There are three kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession of real property: the
first is the summary action established by
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, known as an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
which seeks the recovery of physical
possession only, and is brought within the
period of one year from the act of
dispossession or the expiration of the
77
tenants right of possession, in the proper
inferior court; the second is the accion
publiciana, the same being for the recovery
of the right to possess and is deemed to be
plenary action to be instituted in the Regional
Trial Court; and the third is the accion
MALIPOL
reivindicatoria, which seeks the recovery of
ownership, including, of course, possession,
which is also within the jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts.67
Judgment when considered res
judicata
A final judgment in an ordinary civil case
determining the ownership of land is res
judicata in a registration proceeding where
the parties and the property are the same as
in the former case.68 While dismissal of a civil
case upon petition of defendant by reason of
plaintiffs failure to appear might not be
considered res judicata,69 under the new
Rules, it now has the effect of adjudication
on the merits unless otherwise provided by
the court.
The essential requisites of the existence
of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment
must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the first and the second
actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of
subject matter, and (c) identity of causes of
action.70
To illustrate, we have a case where A
endeavored to secure title to a tract of land
under the Public Land Act, and B, a confident
claimant, had notice of the proceeding but
did not intervene; while the Director of Lands
who also had notice joined issue. The trial
court dismissed the proceeding, declaring the
property as land of the public domain, and
MIDTERMS
this decision was later confirmed by the
Supreme Court. Subsequently, B sold a
portion of the land to C who now ap-plied for
the title thereto on the basis of certain
Spanish grant from which the seller B derived
his title. QUESTION: Whether the deci-sion in
the previous case in which A was the
applicant, involving the same property
constitutes res judicata as against C, the
successor in interest of B. HELD: Res
adjudicata, and Cs application should be
dismissed.71
Another illustration is where a party
defendant has been de-clared in a previous
case to be the rightful possessor and owner
of a disputed land, the opposition and claims
of the plaintiff therein are considered
judicially settled in a subsequent proceeding
instituted by the same defendant for the
registration of the same land in his name.72
Likewise, the decision in a case between the
same parties for the recovery of land
constitutes res judicata in a subsequent
registration proceeding where the ownership
of the same land is sought to be registered.
Again, the decision in the case of unlawful
detainer is res judicata on the matter of the
possession of the same land subsequently
litigated. For a party cannot, by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case, escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause
of action shall not be twice litigated between
the same parties or privies.73
For purposes of expediency, where there
is a case for ejectment between parties who,
one against the other, claim the same parcel
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
of land or lot in a cadastral case, it has been
customary or the practice of courts to hold a
joint hearing of both the ejectment and the
cadastral cases in which the same parcel of
land is litigated and to render a decision in
both cases in its double role, as court of first
instance of general jurisdiction and as
cadastral court of limited jurisdiction.74
It may be restated, incidentally, that
where an ejectment or unlawful detainer was
filed in the Municipal Trial Court and while
pending therein an action for reconveyance
was filed in the Regional Trial Court involving
the same parties and the same subject
matter, it was held that an unlawful detainer
action has an entirely different issue from
that of an action for reconveyance of title.
What is involved in unlawful detainer case is
merely the issue of material possession or
possession de facto; whereas in an action for
reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So
much so that the pendency of an action for
reconvey-ance of title over the same
property does not divest the Municipal Trial
Court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible
entry or unlawful detainer cases nor will it
preclude or bar execution of judgment in the
ejectment case where the only issue involved
is material possession or possession de
facto.75
78 Once a judgment has become final, it is
too late to raise any question as to its
correctness because a final judgment or
order on the merits, rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent
case between the same parties and their
MALIPOL
successors in interest litigating upon the
same thing and issue, regardless of how
erroneous it may be.76
Public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgment of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were instituted was to
put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time
limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set
up to spur on the slothful. While access to
the courts is guaranteed, there must be a
limit thereto. Thus, once a litigants rights
have been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, the loser
should not be granted an unbridled license to
come back for another try. The prevailing
party should not be harassed by subsequent
suits.77
In more or less the same vein, it was
held that where owner-ship is a matter
settled definitely and conclusively by the
Supreme Court, it must be deemed well
beyond the reach of review. Once such
decision has become final, it is binding upon
all inferior courts and beyond their power or
authority to alter or modify. The rulings of
the high court in previous case constitute the
law of the case. By law of the case is withdraws his application before the final
meant that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the
case, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.78
MIDTERMS
An objection or defense of res judicata,
however, must be inter-posed or set up in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise
it shall be deemed waived in accordance with
the provision of Rule 9, Section 2, of the
Revised Rules of Court. Such failure is a
procedural infirmity which cannot be cured
on appeal.79
Judgment when not considered res
judicata.
A judgment dismissing an application for
the registration of land does not operate as a
conclusive adjudication (res judicata)
between the applicant and the opponent who
has successfully resisted the application. For
that reason, the applicant or any person
deriving title from him may institute another
proceeding for the registration of the same
land, and the fact that he or his predecessor
in interest was unsuccessful in the former
proceeding does not constitute a bar
thereto.80
So also, where the application for
registration has been dis-missed by the court
without prejudice, the decree of dismissal,
even if it has become final, does not
constitute res judicata. If the applicant
decree, the proceeding may be dismissed,
upon terms to be fixed by the court. In such
a case, the applicant may later file again an
application for the same property.
Where the court acted without
jurisdiction, the decision ren-dered is null
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
and void and can never attain finality, and
may be attacked any time. Thus, in a case
involving land actually occupied by the
municipal government, on which it had built
structures such as the public market, the
police building, the puericulture center, and
the public abattoir, object of an application
for registration by alleged private owners by
virtue of long possession and declarations for
taxa-tion purposes in their names and of
their predecessor-in-interest, while the
municipal government also had the same
property declared in its tax declarations, it
was held that the land in question being a
public property the Land Registration Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the
application for registration of such public
property of the municipality and any decision
previously adjudicating the same as of
private ownership is null and void and could
never attain final-ity, and as such it can be
attacked at any time. The action brought by
the municipality in this case cannot be barred
by reason of res judicata.81
Remedies available to aggrieved party in
registration proceedings.
An aggrieved party in a registration
proceeding may avail him-self of the
following remedies: (1) new trial; (2) appeal;
(3) review of decree of registration; (4) relief
from judgment; (5) reconveyance; and (6)
79
recovery of damages.
New trial.
A motion for new trial is equivalent to a
motion for reconsidera-tion. Section 14 of
MALIPOL
Act No. 496, as amended by Section 1 of Act
No. 1484, expressly provides that in
registration proceedings the trial court may
grant a new trial in any case that has not
passed to the appellate court, in the manner
and under the circumstances provided in
Sections 145,146, and 147 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now Rule 147 of the Rules of
Court).
Grounds for new trial.82
Within the period for taking an appeal,
the aggrieved party may move the trial court
to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the
following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:
Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party
has probably been impaired in his rights;
or
Newly discovered evidence, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial,
and which is presented would probably
alter the result.
Evidence was insufficient to justify the
decision, or the decision is against the
law.
Within the same period, the aggrieved
party may also move for reconsideration
upon the grounds that the damages awarded
MIDTERMS
are excessive, that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final
order, or that the decision or final order is
contrary to law.
Within thirty days after notice of the
judgment in an action, the aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment and grant a new trial for one or
more of the following causes materi-ally
affecting the substantial rights of said party:
Fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party
has probably been impaired in his rights;
Newly discovered evidence, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial and
which if presented would probably alter
the result;
Procedure in motions for new trial.
The motion shall be made in writing
stating the ground or grounds therefor, a
written notice of which shall be served
by the movant on the adverse party.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in
the manner provided or proof of motions. A
motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph
(a) of the preceding section shall be
supported by affidavits of merits which may
be rebutted by affidavits. A motion for the
cause mentioned in paragraph (b) shall be
supported by affidavits of the witnesses by
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
whom such evidence is expected to be given,
or by duly authenticated documents which
are proposed to be introduced in evidence.
A motion for reconsideration shall point
out specifically the findings of conclusions of
the judgment or final order which are not
supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making ex-press reference
to the testimonial or documentary evidence
or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or conclu-sions.
(Sec. 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court).83
How motion for new trial acted upon.
The trial court may set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial,
upon such terms as may be just, or may
deny the motion. If the court finds that
excessive damages have been awarded or
that the judgment or final order is contrary
to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly. (Sec. 3,
Rule 37, Rules of Court).84
The conditions under which a judge may
grant a new trial are very broad. The judge
may grant a new trial on his own motion on
finding that the evidence was insufficient to
justify his decision or that his decision was
against the law.85
80
The granting of the new trial being an
act of discretion of the trial judge, his action
is not appealable, so long as he has not
abused his discretion.86
Effect of granting motion for new trial.
MALIPOL
If a new trial be granted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court, the original judgment shall be
vacated, and the action shall stand for trial
de novo, but the recorded evidence taken
upon the former trial so far as the same is
material and compe-tent to establish the
issues, shall be used upon the new trial
without retaking the same.87
In other words, new trial does not mean
that the parties shall have to introduce anew
all the proofs they presented before. It only
means that there shall be a new
consideration of the evidence already
presented and of the law applicable to the
case for the purpose of rendering new
judgment. The presence of the parties may
be for the purpose of oral argument or the
submission of evidence on a particu-lar
aspect of the case as decreed in the order
granting the new trial. And the non-
appearance of a party could mean that said
party is submitting the case for new
judgment without further argument.88
Effect of motion for new trial on period
to appeal.
The period of thirty days begins to run
immediately upon the receipt of the decision,
but stops running upon the presentation of a
motion for a rehearing until said motion is
decided and notice thereof given to the
appellant. The thirty days continue to run
again on the day on which notice of the order
denying the motion for rehearing is
received.89
MIDTERMS
Appeal.
Section 14 of the Land Registration Act
provides that every or-der, decision and
decree of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) in registration
proceedings may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court in the same manner as in
ordinary actions, and, for that purpose, the
pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now Rules of Court) are
applicable, except as otherwise provided in
said section.
It may be mentioned here, however, that
such remedy which may result in the setting
aside or annulment of a decision of the Re-
gional Trial Court sitting as a land court may
not be availed of in an-other Regional Trial
Court which is of the same category in the
same judicial district on the principle that a
judge of a branch of one court should not
annul the order of a judge of another branch
of the same court in the same judicial district
because both of them are judges of the same
category who act coordinately and
independently of each other, and the only
exception is where the second judge acts in
the place of the first judge in the same
proceeding. Pursuant to the policy of judicial
stability, the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be interfered
with by another court of concurrent
jurisdiction. This is regarded as an
elementary principle of high importance in
the administration of justice that the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or vacated by
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
another court of concurrent jurisdiction.90
Needless to say, an effective ordering of legal
relationship in civil society is possible only
when each court is granted exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter properly brought
to it. To allow coordinate courts to interfere
with each others judgment or decree would
obviously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the proper administration of
justice.91
We are not unmindful of the fact,
however, that the above prin-ciple that a
judge of a branch of one court cannot annul
the order of a judge of another branch of the
same court in the same judicial district as a
matter of policy for judicial stability, as held
in previous cases (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Torres and Mas v. Dumara-og), has been
abandoned, it being subsequently held that
the adoption of such principle would
practically amount to judicial legislation
affecting, as it will, the provisions of the
Revised Judiciary Act.92 While it is now the
rule that a Regional Trial Court or a branch
thereof has jurisdic-tion to annul a final and
executory judgment rendered by another
court of first instance or a branch thereof,
such relief can no longer be granted where a
judgment not only has become final and
executory but also is deemed terminated,
even if partially satisfied, with the execution
of said judgment by the Sheriff.
81
Formal exceptions to rulings, orders, or
a judgment of the court are unnecessary;
but for all purposes for which an exception
has heretofore been necessary, it is sufficient
that a party, at the time the ruling or order
MALIPOL
of the court is made or sought, makes known
to the court the action he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the
court and his grounds therefor; and if a party
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or
order at the time it is made, the absence of
the objection does not thereafter prejudice
him.94
An appeal may be taken by serving upon
the adverse party and filing with the trial
court, within thirty days from notice of order
or judgment: (a) notice of appeal, which
shall specify the parties to the appeal,
designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from, and state the court
to which the appeal is taken; (b) appeal bond
in the amount of one hundred twenty pesos,
unless the court fixes a different amount;
and (c) record on appeal, which shall state,
among other things, the full names of all the
parties to the proceeding, the caption of the
record on appeal, the order or judgment
from which the appeal is taken and, in
chronological order, copies of all plead-ings,
petitions, motions, and all interlocutory
orders relating to the appealed order or
judgment.95
The requirements of the Rules of Court
relative to the perfec-tion of an appeal in
ordinary cases apply in the same manner
and with equal force and effect to appeals
from a decision of a regional trial court in
registration and cadastral proceedings. Thus,
it was held that where the losing party
appeals from the decision of the cadastral
court, he has to perfect his appeal in the
same manner as in an ordinary case for
MIDTERMS
which purpose an appeal bond is necessary
to answer for the regular costs, should he
lose his appeal.96
Period to perfect an appeal.
It is important to observe that Section
14 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No.
2347, referring to registration cases and
Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by Act No. 1123, applicable to
ordinary civil cases, do not say that the time
consumed by the court in considering a
motion for new trial should be deducted from
the time within which a bill of exceptions
(now record on appeal) should be filed or the
appeal perfected. Notwithstanding this
silence, the Supreme Court, in a series of
cases cited, enunciated the rule of exclusion
aforementioned. If the court had then
proceeded upon a strict criterion, interpreting
and applying only the letter of the law, there
is no doubt that it could not have laid down
the rule that the time which the court
employs in considering a motion for a new
trial, or a motion for reconsideration which is
equivalent thereto, should be deducted from
the thirty days granted to perfect an appeal
in ordinary civil as well as in registration
cases. But the rule invariably followed and
observed in this jurisdiction is that the time
employed by the court in deciding motions
for new trial should not be counted.97
If the party appealing does not
prosecute his appeal within the time limited,
the original order, decision, or decree shall
stand as if no appeal had been taken.98
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
While there is no question that the
decision rendered in a land registration case,
once final, can no longer be appealed, orders
that may be issued thereafter, such as, an
order directing certain correc-tions in the
decision as well as an order for the issuance
of a final decree of registration, may be
appealable. These orders are not inter-
locutory in nature, and whether they are
justified or not is precisely the issue that
must be threshed out in the appeal.99
When extension may be allowed.
Extension of time within which to file the
record on appeal, if necessary, should be
asked before the expiration of the thirty-day
period. If the time has already expired, there
is no more time to be extended; if the time is
still running, there is time which may be
extended. In the latter case, the matter of
extension is within the sound discretion of
the court.100
Review of decree of registration.
This remedy is available only to an
aggrieved party who has been deprived of
land or any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration, and the only ground
that may be invoked for this purpose is
actual fraud. A petition for review of a decree
82
of registration may be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the city or province where the
land lies, within one year after the date of
the entry of the de-cree, provided that no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest therein. Upon the expiration of said
MALIPOL
term of one year, every decree or certificate
of title issued in accordance therewith
becomes incontrovertible.101
But, suppose before the actual entry or
issuance of the decree of registration, a
person who has been the victim of actual
fraud desires to file a petition for review. Will
he be required to wait yet for the decree of
registration to be issued by the Administrator
of National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration? If that were so,
then that would be justice delayed and
therefore justice denied.
To resolve such a question, we have to
confront ourselves with the task of
interpreting the meaning of the provision of
Section 38 of Act No. 496, relating to the
filing of a petition for review within one year
after entry of the decree. Giving this
provision a literal in-terpretation, according
to the Supreme Court, it may at first blush
seem that the petition for review cannot be
presented until the final decree has been
entered. But on further reflection, it seems
obvious that such could not have been the
intention of the legislature and that what it
meant would have been better expressed by
stating that
such petition must be presented before the
expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree. Statutes, the Court continued, must
be given a reasonable construction and there
can be no possible reason for requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final
decree is entered before urging his claim of
fraud. It was therefore held that a petition
MIDTERMS
for review under Section 38, Act No. 496
(now Section 32, P.D. No. 1529), may be
filed at any time after the rendition of the
courts decision and before the expiration of
one year from the entry of the final decree of
registration.102
After such a petition for review has been
filed, the incidental question that may arise
is, within what period may it be answered or
opposed by the adverse party? Or, may this
party be declared in default if he fails to
answer or oppose the petition within fifteen
days? In this connection, it was held that by
the mere lapse of fifteen days after service of
copy of the petition, the adverse party may
not be de-clared in default under Rule 18,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, for said Rule
applies to civil action, and a land
registration case is not an action, within the
purview of Rule 2, Section 1, of the Rules of
Court, such Rules pursuant to Rule 143
thereof not being applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases . . . except
by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.103
Grounds for review of decree limited to
actual fraud.
A decree of registration cannot be
reviewed on any other ground,
notwithstanding the fact that one year has
not yet elapsed since its issuance, because
Section 38 of Act No. 496 only allows such
revision when it was procured by fraud
neither absence nor minority being a ground
therefor.104 Fraud as used in said section
means actual fraud proved as of a time of or
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
prior to judicial action and not subsequent
thereto. A judicial error committed is not
synonymous with actual fraud.105
The fraud must consist in an intentional
omission of fact re-quired by law to be stated
in the application or a willful statement of a
claim against the truth. It must show some
specific acts intended to deceive and deprive
another of his right. The fraud must be actual
and extrinsic, not merely constructive or
intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear,
convincing and more than merely
preponderant, be-cause the proceedings
which are assailed as having been fraudulent
are judicial proceedings which by law, are
presumed to have been fair and regular.106
Thus, in a case where the applicant
contends that the claim-ant is a Chinese
citizen, being a daughter of a Chinese father,
and, consequently, that it is fraudulent to
allow her to purchase the lot in question at
the auction sale, it was held that the
argument is entirely out of place, because
the claimant was not a party in the original
reg-istration proceedings and even if the
allegation were true the alleged fraud is not
the fraud that vitiates a Torrens title,
inasmuch as it was utilized in the
procurement of the decree. In order to
obtain a review of the decree of registration,
an applicant must not only have an es-tate
83
or interest in the land, but also show fraud in
the procurement of the decree, and not
thereafter.107 Failure and intentional omission
on the part of an applicant for registration to
disclose the fact of actual physical possession
of the premises by the party seeking to
MALIPOL
review the decree constitutes actual fraud. It
is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact,
upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person.108
However, the rule that a petition for
review on the ground of ac-tual fraud may be
filed with the competent court cannot be
availed of where the land involved is not
private in nature but one that belongs to the
public domain.109
It is to be borne in mind, in this
connection, that even though the fraud
committed was actual, and it was invoked
within one year from the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration, if the property
has already been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value, a petition for review of
the decree of registration will no longer
prosper. Thus, it was held that the setting
aside of the original decree issued in a land
registration proceeding is operative only
between the par-ties to the fraud and the
parties defrauded or their privies, but not
against purchasers in good faith and for
value (which term includes an innocent
mortgagee) and the successors in interest of
the latter; as to them the decree shall
remain in full force and effect forever.110
The conditions justifying review of a
decree of registration may be stated as
follows: (1) That the plaintiff is the owner of
the land ordered registered in the name of
the defendant, or that the plaintiffs lien or
interest in said property does not appear in
the decree or title issued in the defendants
name; (2) that the registration was procured
MIDTERMS
through actual fraud, or that the omission of
the lien or interest was fraudulent; (3) that
the property has not been transferred to an
in-nocent purchaser for value; and (4) that
the action is filed within one year from the
issuance and entry of the decree of
registration. The fraud contemplated here
must be extrinsic. And it is extrinsic when it
is employed to deprive a party of his day in
court, thereby preventing him from asserting
his right to the property registered in the
name of the applicant.111
Where, however, fraud was committed
before the issuance of the decree of
registration, but which was not pleaded in
the same proceeding between the parties,
inquiry into the same is barred after the
judgment on the merits has become final,
and this rule applies not only to the parties
directly involved but also to those in privity
with them. Under the circumstances, Section
38 of Act 496 (now Section
32, P.D. No. 1529) which allows review of
judgment within one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree cannot be
invoked.112
It may not be amiss to mention here a
growing tendency to con-sider lack of due
process as another ground for review of a
decree of registration. Thus, it was held that
considering that a decree issued in
pursuance of a valid decision in land
registration proceedings, obtained by fraud
may be annulled within one year from entry
of said decree, there is more reason to hold
that the same, if entered in compliance with
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, for
want of due process, may be reviewed, set
aside and cancelled upon petition filed within
the same period, provided that no innocent
purchaser for value will be injured thereby. A
decision rendered without notice to the
parties of record is void for lack of due
process.113 But even if the ground relied upon
by claimants to the effect that the original
title lacked the essential requirements
prescribed by law for its validity, where said
claimants allowed a considerable number of
years before they woke up to invoke the
alleged error of the court when it decreed the
registration of land in question, it was held
that nothing more can be done about it for
under the law and jurisprudence prevailing in
this jurisdiction a decree of registration can
only be set aside within one year after the
entry thereof.114
So also the mere fact that a person was
not personally notified of the registration
proceedings that resulted in a decree of
registration does not constitute in itself a
case of fraud that would invalidate the
decree, because such proceedings being in
rem, the same operate as against the whole
world and the decree issued therein is
conclusive adjudication of the ownership of
the land registered, not only against those
parties who appeared in such proceedings
but also against who were summoned by
84
publication but did not appear.115
On the other hand, where an oppositor,
through counsel, an-nounced his opposition
to the registration of the land involved but
later abandoned the same, he cannot say
MALIPOL
that he was fraudulently deprived of his day
in court to entitle him to the remedy under
Section 38 of Act 496; and a petition for
review of a decree of registration will be
denied where the petitioner had notice of the
original proceeding but failed to substantiate
his claim. For the purpose of his remedy,
mere allegation of fraud is not enough.
Specific intentional acts to deceive and
deprive another of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and
proved. There must be actual or positive
fraud, as distinguished from constructive
fraud, to entitle one to the reopening of a
decree of registration, and it must be
extrinsic, not intrinsic, fraud. This is
necessary to maintain the stability of judicial
decisions and save the precious time of the
courts from being wasted by unnecessary
proceedings. Otherwise, the floodgate of
delay will be opened, thus contributing to the
perennial problem of clogging of court
dockets. No premium should be given to
sheer negligence of parties, or otherwise
delay in the administration of justice will be
encouraged.116
Constructive fraud, how committed.
Constructive fraud, as distinguished
from actual fraud, does not mean down right
dishonesty of some sort, but an unintentional
deception, negligence, mistake of fact, or
any transaction which equity regards as
wrongful and to which it attributes the same
or similar effects as those which follow from
actual fraud. Where a person may have acted
without malice in procuring exclusive Torrens
title in her name, but as in truth she is not
MIDTERMS
the owner of the whole land and another
party has been deprived of his rights with no
fault of his own, an equitable remedy for
damages may be granted him even if the
property has already been conveyed to an
innocent third person. The reason for the rule
is that nobody should be allowed to enrich
himself at the expense of another. As to the
action for damages, ac-tual fraud need not
be pleaded and proved, constructive fraud
being sufficient.117
At any rate a petition to reopen a decree
cannot be denied out-right without hearing.
Thus, the action of the lower court in denying
the petition for review of a decree of
registration, filed within a year from the
entry of the decree, without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation of
actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the
petition was predicated, was held to be error,
because the lower court should have afforded
the petitioner to prove it.
Reopening of decree not an
exclusive remedy.
The fact that Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529
authorizes the filing of a petition for the
revision of the decree and reopening of a
registration case within one year, on the
ground of actual fraud, does not mean that
an interested party may not file an action
either for damages or to compel the
registered owner to reconvey the registered
property to the true owner. The courts have
on several occasions upheld this right of a
party injured by the wrongful or fraudulent
registration of a parcel of land to avail
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
himself of this remedy. In other words, the
remedy of petitioning for the revision of the
decree within one year is not exclusive
during that period. It will be remembered
that a decree of registration may be
reopened only on the ground of actual fraud,
downright dishonesty or deceit.119 There may
be a case wherein the registration of a parcel
of land may not have been secured by actual
fraud, but only through a mistake or
unintentional deception, or constructive
fraud. In such a case, the only remedy
remaining to an injured party or the true
owner of the land deprived of it by its wrong-
ful registration would be to file a petition to
compel the registered owner to convey the
property to him or to ask for damages even if
the period of one year from the issuance of
the decree has not yet expired. The choice of
remedies is given to a party injured by
registration.120
However, in a more recent decision on
the matter, we may consider as an exception
to the general rule that a decree of land
registration court may still be reviewed even
after the lapse of the one-year period
prescribed by law where the Solicitor-General
was not directly furnished a copy of the
courts decision and the court has no
jurisdiction over the case.121
Relief from judgment.
85
Rule 38, Section 2, of the Rules of Court,
which is substantially the same as Section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides
that when a judgment or order is entered, or
any proceeding is taken, against a party in a
MALIPOL
Court of First Instance through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
he may file a petition in such court praying
that the judgment, order, or proceeding be
set aside. This relief is applicable to land
registration cases if the petition is filed within
the time therein provided and the decree of
registration is not yet issued. Thus, it was
held that an order of default and the decision
wherein said order is included, entered in a
registration proceeding, may be set aside
even after thirty days from its promulgation,
by reason of fraud, surprise, or excusable
negligence, if a motion is filed to that effect
within six months from the date of the
decision, under Section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now Rule 38, Sections 2 and
3, Rules of Court), and before the
Commissioner of Land Registra-tion shall
have issued the decree of registration in
pursuance of the order to that end.122 In case
of actual fraud, however, the motion may be
filed even after the issuance of the decree of
registration, provided it is within one year
thereafter, but the statute that may be
invoked is Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529,
instead of Rule 38.
It should be borne in mind, further, that
Rule 38 applies only when the one deprived
of his right is a party to the case. The rule
does not apply to one who was never made a
party for lack of the requisite notice.123
But even if the one seeking relief from
judgment was party to the case, where he
had filed a timely motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, and this motion was denied,
he is precluded to file a petition for relief
MIDTERMS
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. These
two remedies motion for new trial or
reconsideration and petition for relief are
exclusive of each other. It is only in proper
cases where a party aggrieved by a
judgment has not been able to file a motion
for new trial that a petition for relief can be
filed and entertained.
Form and contents of petition;
period of filing.
The petition must be verified, filed within
sixty days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be
set aside, and not more than six months
after such judgment or order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be, which he may prove if his
petition be granted.125
The period of six months within which a
petition for relief may be filed should be
computed not from the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of, but from
the entry of such judgment or order. And
under Rule 36, Section 2, a judgment or
order is entered by the clerk after expiration
of the period for appeal or motion for new
trial, i.e., after thirty days from notice
according to Rules 37 and 41.126
Reconveyance.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
While the land wrongfully registered
under the Torrens system still stands in the
name of the person who caused the true
owner to be prejudiced or deprived of his
right, an action in personam will lie to
compel a reconveyance of the property. As a
remedy, this is always available so long and
as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. And to avoid
the improper transfer or passing to an
innocent third person, and preserve the claim
of the real owner, a notice of lis pendens may
be caused to be annotated on the certificate
of title immediately upon the institution of
the action in court.
Although this remedy of reconveyance is
seemingly based merely on equity, it has the
full sanction of the law for it is so provided in
Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by
Act No. 3322, that in all cases of registration
procured by fraud the owner may pursue all
his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder
for value of a certificate of title.
Thus, it was held that the sole remedy of
the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in
anothers name is, after one year from the
date of the decree, not to set aside the
decree, but, respecting the decree is
86
incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the
court of justice for reconveyance, or for
damages if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 127
Such action may only be maintained by the
MALIPOL
owner of the property who has been
prejudiced, and not by a mere homestead
applicant.128 It is to be borne in mind,
however, that the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court), in the exercise of
its jurisdiction as a land registration court,
has no authority to order a reconveyance of
a property erroneously registered in
anothers name.129
Where a complaint for reconveyance
merely alleges that the defendant purchased
the land from another person who had a
defec-tive title thereto, but has failed to
allege that said defendant was a purchaser in
bad faith or with notice of the defect in the
title of his vendor, it was held that the
complaint may be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.130 So, also, where the
land claimed in defendants counterclaim was
registered in the name of plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest since 1928 and it was
only on November 19, 1952, date of
defendants answer, that he sought its
reconveyance to him, and there was no proof
of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in
the proceedings incident thereto, nor was
there any claim that fraud had intervened in
the issuance of said title, and the period of
one year within which intrinsic fraud could be
claimed had long expired, it was held that
plaintiffs title became indefeasible under
Section 38 of Act No. 496, as amended by
Act No. 3630, (now Section 32 of P.D. No.
1529).
A person, who succeeds in having a
piece of real estate regis-tered in his name is
without doubt insulated by law from a
MIDTERMS
number of claims and liens. There are,
however, a number of instances or causes by
which such insulation may be cut loose. The
registered owner, for instance, is not
rendered immune by the law from the claim
that he is not the real owner of the land he
had registered in his name, in which case the
registered land may be ordered reconveyed
to the rightful, but as yet unregistered,
owner. The rule of indefeasibility of Torrens
title is not subject only to the exception
provided in Section 38 of Act 496, for a
petition for review. Thus, in a case where a
complaint in which the plaintiff, in whose
name a parcel of land is registered, seeks to
be declared the owner of certain lot is
diametrically disputed by defendant who
alleges that he is the only owner of said lot
by virtue of a Supreme Court decision, the
nature of defendants opposition amounts to
an action for reconveyance, which sufficiently
vests and clothes the trial court with
authority to adjudicate and settle the
question of ownership.132
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. This rule
applies only when the plaintiff of the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property. Since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in active possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property does not prescribe. (Vda. de
Cabrera vs. CA, 267 SCRA 339).
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
It is an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner of property may be barred
from recovering possession of the property
by virtue of laches. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. CA,
supra.).
Reconveyance is a remedy of a
landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another, but which remedy can not
be availed if the property has passed to an
innocent purchaser for value.
Once a title is registered, the owner may
rest assure, without the necessity of waiting
in the portals of the court or sitting in the
mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.
Every person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate and the law will not oblige him
to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
A purchaser in good faith is one who
buys property of another without notice that
some other persons has a right to or interest
in, such property and pays a full and fair
price. For the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of same persons in the
87
property.
Good faith is not a visible, tangible fact
that can be seen or touched but rather a
state or condition of the mind which can only
be judged by actual or tokens or signs.
MALIPOL
(Legarda vs. CA, 280 SCRA 642; see also
Cruz vs. CA, 281 SCRA 491).
Reconveyance of real property.
Proper remedy if the property has not
passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. (Lucena vs. CA, G.R. No.
L-77468, Aug. 31, 1999).
Requisites of an action for
reconveyance: (a) clear and convincing
evidence of title to the property; and (b) fact
of fraud committed by the party who
registered the property in his/her name. Said
action presupposes the existence of a
defrauded party who is the lawful owner of
the disputed property an element not
established in this case. (Heirs of Brusas vs.
CA, G.R. No. 126875, Aug. 26, 1999).
Trustee may be compelled to reconvey.
The complaint in a certain case, which
prays for the reconvey-ance of a cadastral
lot, alleges that the plaintiff is the owner
thereof, and that, being illiterate, she asked
Sumangil to claim the same for her in the
cadastral proceeding; but Sumangil
committed a breach of trust by claiming the
lot for himself, so that it was adjudicated in
his favor. HELD: that this action could not be
dismissed on the ground that the period of
one year provided for in Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act (No. 496) for the
review of a decree had elapsed, and plaintiff
had not availed herself of this remedy. The
complaint did not seek the review of the
decree or the reopening of the cadastral
MIDTERMS
case, but the enforcement of a trust. Hence,
Section 38 of Act 496 does not apply. The
estate of Juan Ringor, as the successor-in-
interest of the trustee Sumangil, is in equity
bound to execute a deed of reconvey-ance of
this lot to the cestui que trust, the plaintiff. A
trust such as that which was created
between the plaintiff and Sumangil is sacred
and inviolable. The Torrens system was never
calculated to foment betrayal in the
performance of a trust.133
Section 96 of P.D. No. 1529 contains a
proviso affirming that nothing in said Act
shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of
any action which he may have against any
person for such loss or dam-age or
deprivation of land of any estate or interest
therein without joining the Treasurer of the
Philippine Archipelago as a defendant
therein. It was held that an action such as
the present, seeking the reconveyance of
land wrongfully registered in the name of the
trustee, is covered by this proviso and that
can hardly admit of doubt.134
However, children of the trustee, who,
after several conveyances by the father of
the property held in trust to other parties,
became owners of or acquired the land, are
not liable for the acts of their fa-ther, nor
should they assume, upon acquiring the land,
the obligation of their father as such
trustee.135
As a matter of fact, a child may be
regarded as a third person with respect to
certain deals by his own father. Thus, it was
held that where a daughter acquires property
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
of her father, not by right of succession but
by a deed of absolute sale, the authenticity
and due execution of which is not assailed, in
accordance with the principle that a contract
does not bind third persons who did not
intervene therein, the daughter is a total
stranger to any previous transaction entered
into by her father respecting the same
property without any intervention on her
part.136
Action for reconveyance as a remedy of
a defrauded owner.
An action for reconveyance of a property
is a sole remedy of a landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously
reg-istered in anothers name after one year
from the date of the decree so long as the
property has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. The action does not seek
to reopen the registration proceeding the set
aside the decree of registration but only
purports to show that the person who
secured the registration of the property in
controversy is not the real owner thereof.
Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an
action for reconveyance to prove by clear
and convincing evidence his title to the
property and the fact of fraud. (Abejaron vs.
Nabasa, et al., 359 SCRA 47).
Reconveyance as a remedy; meaning.
88
Reconveyance is a remedy of the
landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another but which recourse cannot
be availed of if the property has passed to an
MALIPOL
innocent purchaser for value. (Legarda vs.
CA, 280 SCRA 642).
The term reconvey means to convey
back to former place, or to transfer back to
former owner, as an estate, and
reconveyance being a transfer of realty
back to the original or former grantor.
(Lacorte vs. CA, 286 SCRA 24).
As distinguished from, a contract of
reconveyance.
A contract of reconveyance therefore,
presupposes the existence of a prior
agreement wherein a party to whom
property was conveyed undertakes to
reconvey the same to the other party under
certain terms and conditions. (Lacorte vs.
CA, 286 SCRA 24).
Such agreements may be in the nature
of a contract of sale with a right or
repurchase or an equitable mortrgage. In
fine, a contract of reconveyance is but a
necessary consequence of the exercise of a
partys right to repurchase the property
subject of a contract of sale with a right to
repurchase or of an equitable mortgage.
In an action for reconveyance, what is
sought is the transfer of the property which
has been wrongfully and erroneously
registered in another persons name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a
better right. (Dela Cruz vs. CA, 286 SCRA
230).
Requisites for this action to prosper.
MIDTERMS
It is a condition sine qua non for an
action for reconveyance to prosper that the
property should not have passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
(Armamento vs. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 179,
citing Clemente vs. Lukban, 93 Phil. 931).
When a person obtains a certificate of
title to a land belonging to another and he
has full knowledge of the rights of the true
owner, he is considered guilty of fraud, and
he may be compelled to transfer the land to
the defrauded owner so long as the property
has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. (Brusas vs. CA, 313
SCRA 176).
Prescription of the action.
The prescriptive period within which to
file an action for recon-veyance of property
based on an implied trust is 10 years from
the date of issuance of a certificate of title
thereon in accordance with Article 1144 of
the New Civil Code and Jurisprudence. (see
Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. CA, 227 SCRA 33),
citing the case of Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC,
159 SCRA 178).
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of
land based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of
the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property, the right
to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks
to quiet title to the property, does not
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
prescribed. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. CA, 267
SCRA 339).
Period of prescription governed by
Articles 1139 to 1155 of the Civil Code;
Gerona vs. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 153
ruling no longer applicable.
To bolster the position in the Vda. de
Cabrera, 11 SCRA 153, ruling, the Supreme
Court held that the CAs reliance on Gerona
vs. de Guzman, supra, is misplaced. In
Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, the
Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine laid
down in the earlier Gerona case was based
on the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act. No.
190) which provided that an action based on
fraud pre-scribed within four years from the
date of discovery. However, with the
effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30,
1950, the provisions on prescriptive periods
are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155.
Since implied and constructive trusts are
obligations created by law, then the
prescriptive period to enforce the same
prescribes in ten years.
Thus, in Marquez vs. CA, 300 SCRA 563,
when Rafael Marquez, Sr., or one reason or
another, misrepresented in his unilateral affi-
davit that he was the only heir of his
unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir
of his wife when in fact their children were
89
still alive, and managed to secure a transfer
certificate of title under his name, a
constructive trust under 1456 was
established. Constructive trusts are created
in equity in order to preven unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
MALIPOL
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse
of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right
to property which he ought not, in equity and
good conscience, hold.
Nature of an action for reconveyance
based on a fictitious deed of sale.
The right to file an action for
reconveyance on the ground that the
certificate of title was obtained by means of a
fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for
declaration of its nullity, which ac-tion does
not prescribe. (Article 1410, Civil Code of the
Philippines; Lacsamana vs. CA, 288 SCRA
287). Hence, the fact that the alleged sale
took place in 1971 and the action to have it
declared void and inexistent was filed in
1983 is of no moment. (Yana vs. Acaylar, 136
SCRA 52). To reiterate, an action for
reconveyance based on void contract is
imprescriptible. (Casipit vs. CA, 204 SCRA
684, Castillo vs. Madrigal, 198 SCRA 556).
What an action for reconveyance
attacks.
An action for reconveyance attacks not
only the judgment of the cadastral court, it
likewise seeks confirmation by the court of
plaintiffs title to the land. (Linzag vs. CA,
291 SCRA 304).
It is settled that a party deprived of his
property in a cadastral proceeding may file
within one (1) year from entry of the decree,
a petition for review. After the lapse of the
said period, if the property has not yet
MIDTERMS
passed on to an innocent purchaser for
value, an action for reconveyance may still
be filed by the aggrieved party. An action for
reconveyance attacks only the judgment of
the cadastral court, it likewise seeks
confirmation by the court of plaintiffs title to
the land. (Linzag vs. CA, 291 SCRA 304).
Buyer in bad faith.
At the time of the sale of the property,
the lot was registered under the names of
other persons than that of the seller. The
buyer knew about it. in Samonte vs. CA, 361
SCRA 173, it was said that the buyer is a
buyer in bad faith, not in good faith. He
cannot pretend to be a purchaser in good
faith. It is axiomatic that one who buys a
property from a person who is not a
registered owner is not a pur-chaser in good
faith. The general rule is that a person
dealing with registered land has a right to
rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of making further
inquiries. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions: when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title
in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonable prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation.
One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith; and hence does not merit the
protection of the law.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of
title is not entitled to the protection of
the law, for the law cannot be used as a
shield for frauds.
He cannot claim that he already acquired
valid title to the prop-erty. The inscription in
the registry, to be effective, must be made in
good faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee
who takes the certificate of title with notice
of a flaw. A holder in bad faith of a certificate
of title is not entitled to the protection of the
law for the law cannot be used as a shield for
frauds.
In this case, it was contended that the
action for reconveyance has already
prescribed since it was filed in 1975 when
the transfer was done in 1957. In setting
aside the contention, it was said that
generally an action for reconveyance of real
property based on fraud may be barred by
the statute of limitation which requires that
the action must be commenced within four
(4) years from the discovery of fraud, and in
case of registered land, such discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the date of
the registration of title. (Veracruz vs.
Dumatol, 307 SCRA 198).
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, however,
90 provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust
MALIPOL
for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
As it had been indubitably established
that fraud attended the registration of a
portion of the subject property, it can be said
that the buyers were trustees thereof on
behalf of the surviving heirs. An action based
on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten (10) years from the time of its creation
or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of
the property. (Serna vs. CA, 308 SCRA 527).
The defense of prescription was held to
the untenable. The gen-eral rule that the
discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken
place upon the registration of real property
because it is considered a constructive
notice to all persons does not apply in this
case. Instead, the ruling in Adille vs. CA, 157
SCRA 455, which is substantially on all fours
with the present case is applicable.
In Adille, petitioner therein executed a
deed of extrajudicial par-tition
misrepresenting himself to be the sole heir of
his mother when in fact she had other
children. As a consequence, petitioner
therein was able to secure title to the land in
his name alone. His siblings then filed a case
for partition on the ground that said
petitioner was only a trustee on an implied
trust of the property. Among the issues
resolved by the Supreme Court in that case
was prescription. Said petitioner registered
the property in 1955 and the claim of private
respondents therein was presented in 1974.
MIDTERMS
The Supreme Courts resolution of
whether prescription had set in therein is
quite apropos to the instant case:
It is true that registration under
the Torrens system is constructive notice
of title, but it has likewise been our
hold-ing that the Torrens title does nor
furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore
no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration oper-ates as a universal
notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot
dismiss private respond-ents claims
commenced in 1974 over the estate
registered in 1955. While actions to
enforce a constructive trust prescribes in
ten years, reckoned from the date of the
registration of the property, we, as we
said, are not prepared to count the
period from such a date in this case. We
note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to
get hold of the property exclusively for
himself begin-ning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral
affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that
he is the only heir and child of his
mother Feliza with the consequence that
he was able to secure title in his name.
Accordingly, we hold that the right of
the private respondents commenced
from the time they actually discovered
the petitioners act of defraudation.
According to the respondent Court of
Appeals, they came to know of it
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
apparently only during the progress of
the litigation. Hence, prescription is not
a bar.
One-year period for reopening of decree
not applicable to ac-tion for
reconveyance.
An action for reconveyance or damages,
instituted after the ex-piration of one year
from the date of the issuance of the decree,
has not prescribed because it is not one for
the reopening of a decree. The law affords
various remedies to persons who have been
deprived of their lands or interests therein by
virtue of the operation of the Land
Registration Act. For instance, an action for
reconveyance or damages may also be
maintained. And, in appropriate cases, a
recourse may be had to the Assurance Fund.
The equitable action for reconveyance or
damages is not barred by the lapse of one
year.137 But in order to succeed in such action
for reconveyance, actual fraud in securing
the title must be proved.138
As a matter of fact, in a certain case, 139
the remedy of reconvey-ance was made
available after the lapse of more than ten
years. In that case the original certificate of
91
title was issued in the name of the trustee in
the year 1909, and this title was
subsequently cancelled and replaced by
transfer certificate as a consequence of
cadastral proceedings and other incidents,
with the last certificate remaining in the
MALIPOL
name of the trustee issued in the year 1928.
And only there-after was the attempt made
to have the property reconveyed, and it
prospered.
Thus, as has been shown, such action to
reconvey will not pre-scribe so long as the
property stands in the name of the trustee.
To allow it would be to permit a trustee to
acquire title by prescription as against his
principal and true owner. That certainly
would be illogical and inconsistent with the
well-settled rule that all benefits derived by
the possession and acts of an agent should
accrue to the benefits of his principal. In
short, an action to compel a trustee to
convey the property registered in his name in
trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust
does not prescribe.140
On the other hand, if the title holder is
other than a trustee, the rule of
imprescriptibility of action may not apply.
Accordingly, it was held that an action for the
recovery of title to realty, on the ground that
the defendant had obtained a transfer
certificate of title by means of a fraudulent
deed of sale, is virtually an action for the
annulment of the deed by reason of fraud,
which action should be filed within four years
after the discovery of the fraud, or from the
date of the registration of the deed of
conveyance.141 Subject to the same limitation
is the remedy of an owner who was
fraudulently deprived of his realty, which has
subsequently been sold to an innocent
purchaser for value; he may only file an
action for damages against the person who
perpetrated the fraud within four years after
MIDTERMS
the discovery of the deception.142 Knowledge
by the defrauded party of facts which in the
exercise of proper prudence and diligence
would enable him to learn of the fraud is
usually deemed equivalent to discovery.143
The defense of prescription cannot be
set up in an action the purpose of which is to
recover property held by a person in trust for
the benefit of another. Accordingly, where A,
through fraudulent representation,
succeeded in having the original certificate of
title standing in the name of B cancelled and
a new one issued in the name of A, thereby
enabling the latter to possess the land and
appropriate its produce, it was held that this
way of acquiring title creates what is called
constructive trust in favor of B as the
defrauded party and grants to this party a
right to vindicate the property regardless of
the lapse of time.144 But assuming arguendo
that the action for reconvey-ance has not
prescribed, the right to bring such action
may be barred by laches if no step is taken
towards that direction reasonably after the
title to the property has been issued under
the Torrens system, and as in particular case
decided a period of forty-three years was
allowed to elapse.145
Remedies available to aggrieved parties.
Grounds for reopening of decree of
registration
The rights of a person, deprived
of land or of any estate or interest
therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
actual fraud, to raise the same issue
is recognized by law (Section 32,
P.D. 1529) as valid and legal basis
for reopening and revising a decree
of registration.
The distinctions are significant
because only actual and extrinsic
fraud has been accepted as ground
for judgment to be annulled or, as in
this case, a decree of registra-tion
reopened and reviewed.
Failure and intentional omission
of the applicant to disclose the fact
of physical possession by another
person constitutes an allegation of
actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact
upon which ben-efit is obtained to
the prejudice of a third person.
In Exquivas vs. CA, 272 SCRA 803, the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule that:
Although a review of the
decree of registration is no longer
available after the expiration of one
(1) year period from entry thereof
an equitable remedy is still available
to those wrongfully deprived of their
property, i.e., to compel
92 reconveyance of the property.
Recovery of damages.
A person who is wrongfully deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein,
without negligence on his part, by the
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registration in error of another person as
owner of such land, may successfully
maintain an action for damages, begun
before the action is barred, against the
person in whose favor the decree of
registration was is-sued, notwithstanding
lack of actual fraud in obtaining such decree
and notwithstanding the denial of a petition
for review on the ground of fraud.146
Damages
Remedy of an owner who has
fraudulently deprived of his land which was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser
for value, is to file an action for damages
against the person who perpetrated the fraud
within four (4) years from the date of
discovery of the deception. (delos Reyes vs.
CA, 185 SCRA 81).
Quieting of title under Article 476, NCC
The ground or reason for filing must be
an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding, acts of physical intrusion into
the property may be considered grounds for
an action for forcible entry but definitely not
one for quieting of title. (Titong vs. CA, 187
SCRA 102).
Reversion of fraudulently titled land.
In an application for free patent, the
applicant declared under oath that the land
was agricultural and not claimed or occupied
MIDTERMS
by anyone and that he has been in
continuous possession of the same. He
alleged that he introduced improvements.
These are contrary to the facts that there
was an application for the same land for a
foreshore lease. In this case, it was held that
applicant was guilty of making false
statements in his application for a free patent
thus justifying the annulment of his title.
Section 91 of C.A. No. 141 provides:
The statements made in the
application shall be consid-ered as
essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the
basis of such application, and any false
statement therein or omission of facts
altering, changing or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in
such state-ments, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the
material facts set forth in the application
shall ipso facto produce the cancellation
of the concession, title or permit
granted. It shall be the duty of the
Director of Lands, from time to time and
whenever he may deem it advisable, to
make the necessary investigations for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the
material facts set out in the application
are true, or whether they continue to
exist and are maintained and preserved
in good faith, and for the purpose of
such investigation, the Director of Lands
is hereby empowered to issue
subpoenas and subpoena duces tecum
and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory
process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
this section, the existence of bad faith,
fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and
illegal modification of essential facts
shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail
to obey a subpoena duces tecum
lawfully issued by the Director of Land or
his authorized delegates or agents, or
shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions,
and on the basis of such presumption,
an order of cancellation may issue
without further proceedings.
It is true that, once a patent is
registered and the corresponding certificate
of title is issued, the land covered by them
ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property, and the Torrens
Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of issuance of such patent.
How-ever, as held in Director of Lands vs. de
Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the
State may still bring an action under Section
101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, for the
reversion to the public domain of land which
has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Such action is not barred by
prescription, and this is settled law.
The indefeasibility of a title not attach to
titles
93 secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. The registration of a
patent under the Torrens System merely
confirms the registrants title. It does not
vest title where there is none because
registration under this system is not a mode
of acquiring ownership. (Baguio vs.
MALIPOL
Republic, et al., G.R. No. 119682, Jan. 21,
1999).
Requisites for claiming damages.
For an action against any person for
damages for the wrongful deprivation of land
to prosper, it must be established: first, that
the person is in reality wrongfully deprived of
his land by the registra-tion in the name of
another of the land by actual or constructive
fraud; second, that there was no negligence
on his part; third, that he is barred or in any
way precluded from bringing an action for
the recovery of the land or interest therein;
and, fourth, that the action for compensation
has not prescribed.147
Who are liable for damages.
As a rule, the person who caused the
damage should be the one liable therefor.
But it may be possible that, due to
insolvency or other reason, nothing could be
recovered from him. For the purpose of filling
in this gap and maintaining public confidence
in the Torrens system, the government has
provided for compensation to answer for
such damages in favor of any person who,
without negligence on his part, sustains loss
or damage by reason of the operation of the
system, under certain conditions. We shall
elaborate on this subject in the latter part of
this work.
When judgment in land registration
cannot be used to eject a possessor.
MIDTERMS
May a winning party in a land
registration case effectively eject the
possessor thereof, whose security of tenure
rights are still pending determination before
the DARAB.
The Supreme Court said, No. In Heirs of
Roman Soriano vs. CA, et al., 363 SCRA 87,
a judgment in a land registration case cannot
be effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are
still pending determination before the
DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing
party in a land registration case cannot be
placed in possession of the area while it is
being occupied by one claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a declaration
that the latters occupancy was unlawful.
Possession and ownership are distinct
legal concepts. There is ownership when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in a manner nor
prohibited by law and consist-ent with the
rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, among which are the
right to enjoy the thing owned and the right
to exclude other persons from possession
thereof. On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess
means to actually and physically oc-cupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may
be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a
holder. A person may be declared owner but
he may not be entitled to possession. The
possession may be in the hands of another
either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS MIDTERMS
REVIEWER
have improvements thereon of which he may means of livelihood. The exercise of the right
not be deprived without due hearing. He may of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of
have other valid defenses to resists the rights of an agricultural tenant.
surrender of possession. A judgment for
ownership, therefore, does not necessarily
include possession as a necessary incident.

There is no dispute that the title over

the land under litigation has been confirmed
with finality. Such declaration pertains only
to ownership and does not automatically
include possession, especially so where there
is a third party occupying the said parcel of
land, al-legedly in the concept of an
agricultural tenant.

While the issue of ownership of the

subject land has been laid to rest in the final
judgment of the land registration court, the
right of possession thereof is, as yet,
controverted. This is precisely what is put in
issue in the security of tenure case filed by
petitioners before the DARAB.

It is important to note that although

private respondents have been declared
titled owners of the subject land, the
exercise of their rights of ownership are
subject to limitations that may be imposed
by law. (PNB vs. CA, 275 SCRA 70). The
Tenancy Act provides one such limitation.
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of
tenure and they have the right to work on
94
their respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is established. Security
of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural
lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is
tantamount to deprivation of their only
MALIPOL
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Chapter VII
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Torrens title, defined.
A Torrens title is the certificate of
ownership issued under the Torrens system
of registration by the government, thru the
Register of Deeds naming and declaring the
owner in fee simple of the real property
described therein, free from all liens and
encumbrances except such as may be
expressly noted thereon or otherwise
reserved by law. Legally defined, a certificate
of title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the Register of Deeds. 1
Hence, it is regarded as conclusive with
respect to all matters contained therein, and
when the owners duplicate thereof is
presented with any volun-tary instrument
filed for registration it serves as a conclusive
author-ity granted for the Register of Deeds
to enter a new certificate or to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance
with what may be purported in such
instrument.
A certificate of title accumulates all the
ultimate facts with re-spect to a particular
piece of registered land in one single
document, making out a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee
simple title which the owner has in fact. Once
95
issued, the cer-tificate is the evidence of the
title which the owner has.2 The official
certificate will always show the status of the
title and the person in whom it is vested. The
basic principle of the system is the
registration of the title to the land, instead of
MALIPOL
registering as under the old system the mere
evidence of such title.3
Except under the Torrens system, the
government does not issue any certificate of
title or official declaration of ownership with
the characteristic of finality and
conclusiveness.
Simple possession of a certificate of title
under the Torrens sys-tem does not make
the possessor the true owner of all the
property described therein.4
Where the certificate of title is in the
name of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the certificate of title.5
Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,
Indefeasibility of a free patent title
As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs.
Heirs of Jose Alivales, 168 SCRA 198, an
original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent partakes of
the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding, as long as the land
disposed of is re-ally part of the disposable
land of the public domain and becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of
promulgation of the order of the Director of
Lands for the issuance of patent. (Republic
vs. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227; Ingran vs.
Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498; Lopez vs. Padilla,
G.R. No. 27559, May 18, 1972; a homestead
patent, one registered under the land vs.
San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; El Hogar Filipino
vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Duran vs. Oliva, 113
MIDTERMS
Phil. 144; Pajomayo vs. Manipon, G.R. No.
33676, June 30, 1971).
Again, in Lopes vs. CA, 169 SCRA 271,
citing Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of
Nueva Ecija, Br. 1, 123 SCRA 516 and
Pajomayo, et al. vs. Manipon, et al., 39 SCRA
676, the Supreme Court held that once a
homestead patent granted in accordance
with the Public Land Act is registered
pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the
certificate of title issued in virtue of said
patent has the force and effect of a Torrens
title issued under the Land Registration Act.
However, indefeasibilty of the title may
not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General,
from filing an action for reversion. In Heirs of
supra., the Supreme Court held that:
As correctly pointed out by the
respondent, CA, Dr. Ali-walas title to
the property having become
incontrovertible, such may no longer be
collaterally attacked. If indeed there had
been any fraud or misrepresentation in
the title, an action for reversion
instituted by the Solicitor General would
be the proper remedy.
(Section 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of
Lands vs. Juagod, G.R. No. 14702, May
21, 1981; Lopez vs. Padilla, supra.;
Republic vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 100709,
Nov. 14, 1997).
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Process in the entry of initial certificate
of title.
After the judgment directing the
registration of title to land has become final,
the court shall, within fifteen days from entry
of judgment, issue an order directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority to issue the corresponding decree
of regis-tration and certificate of title. The
clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days
from entry of judgment, certified copies of
the judgment and of the order of the court
directing the Administrator to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title, and a cer-tificate stating
that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become
final. Thereupon, the Administrator shall
cause to be prepared the decree of
registration as well as the original and
duplicate of the corresponding original
certificate of title, and where the property
covered is conjugal, the same must be in the
names of both spouses. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the
decree of registration. The decree of
registration shall be signed by the
Administrator, entered and filed in the Land
Registra-tion Authority. The original of the
original certificate of title shall also be signed
by the Administrator and shall be sent,
together
96 with the owners duplicate
certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the
city or province where the property is
situated for entry in his registration book.6
MALIPOL
Certificate as evidence of title.
The registration under the Torrens
system and the issuance of a certificate of
title do not give the owner any better title
than what he actually has. He does not
obtain anything bigger than what his title
represents by virtue of the certificate. He
secures his certificate by virtue of the fact
that he has fee simple title. If he obtains a
certificate of title, by mistake, to more land
than he really and in fact owns, the
certificate should be corrected. The
certificate should not be altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except to
correct errors, and this can be done only in
the same registration proceeding directly,
and not in a collateral proceeding.7
In recognition of the proverbial virtuality
of a Torrens title, it has been repeatedly held
that, unless bad faith can be established on
the part of the person appearing as owner on
the certificate of title, there is no other
owner than that in whose favor it has been
issued.8
A Torrens certificate is the best evidence
of ownership of regis-tered land, not of the
civil status of the owner.9
A mortgagee has the right to rely on
what appears in the cer-tificate of title, and
in the absence of anything to excite suspicion
is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the
mortgagor appearing on the face of the
certificate.10
MIDTERMS
Who has right to possess owners
duplicate certificate.
Section 41 of Act No. 496, as amended
by P.D. No. 1529, provides that the owners
duplicate certificate shall be issued by the
Register of Deeds in the name of the person
in whose favor the land was de-creed, and
further disposes that said duplicate shall be
delivered to the registered owner. The mere
fact that another person has a right to
participate as a co-heir in the property
covered by the title does not give him the
right to withhold the owners duplicate. What
he may do is to institute a separate action in
court with the end in view of obtaining his
corresponding share or participation.
Following the same principle, a mortgagee
cannot as a matter of right withhold the
owners duplicate certificate, while his
mortgage subsists. The right of the owner to
keep in his possession the owners duplicate
certificate cannot be questioned, but his right
may be waived by him if he voluntarily
surrenders the certificate to his creditor as a
token of good faith.11
Doubt has been raised as to the proper
venue in an action seek-ing relief for the
delivery of a certificate of title. In such a
case, it was held that inasmuch as it was not
possible for the court to decide the main
relief without passing upon the claim of the
parties with respect to the title to and
possession of the land in question, the action
should be determined pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies.12
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Original and transfer certificates of
title.
When land has been adjudicated and
decreed in the name of its owner in a
registration proceeding, the title that may be
issued for the first time in pursuance of such
a decree is denominated Original Certificate
of Title. (In California, it is called Initial
Certificate of Title.) When this title is
cancelled and replaced by another title, by
reason of a subsequent sale or transfer, the
new certificate issued is denominated
Transfer Certificate of Title. All subsequent
titles are known as transfer certificates.
Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides
that the certificate first registered in
pursuance of the decree of registration in
regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled
in the registration book Original Certificate
of Title, entered pursuant to decree of the
Court of Land Registration, dated at (stating
time and place of entry of decree and the
number of the case). This certificate shall
take effect upon the date of the transcription
of the decree. Subsequent certificates
relating to the same land shall be in like
form, but shall be entitled. Transfer from
number (the number of the next previous
certificate relating to the same land), and
97
also the words Originally registered (date,
volume, and page of registration).
Land registered in the name of two
different persons.
MALIPOL
The question of who is the owner of the
land registered in the name of two different
persons has been presented for
determination not only here but also in other
countries. In some jurisdictions, where the
Torrens system is adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his
excellent discussion of the Australian Torrens
system, says: The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date
pre-vails, whether the land comprised in the
latter certificate be wholly, or in part,
comprised in the earlier certificate.14 Hogg
adds, however, that if it can be clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construc-
tion relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title
of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive. 15 On the
other hand, Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: Where two certificates
purport to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails. x x x. In successive
registration, where more than one certificate
is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under
the prior certifi-cate is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof. While the acts in this country
do not expressly cover the case of the issue
of two certificates for the same land, they
provide that a registered owner shall hold the
title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is
MIDTERMS
that where two certificates purport to include
the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold the title.16
In the above discussion, no distinction
was drawn between an in-itial or original
certificate of title and such transfer
certificates as may be derived therefrom.
Incidentally, where two transfer certificates
of title happen to be issued on different dates
to two different persons covering the same
parcel of land, even if both owners be
presumed to be title holders in good faith, it
does not necessarily follow that the one who
holds the earlier title should prevail. On the
assumption that there was regularity in the
process of registration leading to the
eventual issuance of such transfer
certificates, it would be a better procedure to
trace back their individual original certificates
from which they were derived. Now, if there
is only one common original certificate of
title from which the two transfer certificates
came from, it would be safe to conclude that
the transfer certificate issued at an earlier
date along the line should prevail, barring
anomaly in the process of registration. But if
there are two original certificates, then
whichever of the two transfer certificates
traceable to the earlier origi-nal certificate
should prevail. The efficacy of the transfer
certificate springing from the original
certificate issued at a later date cannot be
any better than its original source.
However, while it may so that there exist
two transfer certifi-cates of title issued on
different dates covering a common property,
and it appears that the earlier title was
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
obtained in the registration of the sale even
if the seller never delivered to the buyer the
correspond-ing owners duplicate, and
neither could said buyer explain how he was
able to obtain his Torrens title, it was held
that such title, even if issued at an earlier
date, must be spurious and cannot prevail
over the title issued at a later date.17
Protection of innocent third person.
Where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The
effect of such an outright cancellation would
be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone deal-ing with
property registered under the Torrens system
would have to inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly or
irregularly issued by the court. And this is
contrary to the evident purpose of the law.18
Every person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the
property.19
Evidence in the case at bar discloses
that when petitioner purchased the subject
98
property on June 10, 1970, the title thereto
was in the name of her vendor Rafaela
Donato alone.20 The rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title
MALIPOL
is well-settled.21 The remedy of the
defrauded party is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused the fraud
or were instrumental in depriving him of the
property.22 In the case at bar, because the
action prescribes in 10 years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the
property, the action is said to have already
prescribed because it was filed 15 years after
the issuance to TCT No. T-32682.23
Even if a decree in a registration
proceeding is infected with nullity in view of
a clear denial of procedural due process, still
an innocent purchaser for value relying on a
Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is
protected.24
An innocent purchaser for value or any
equivalent phrase shall be deemed, under
the Torrens system, to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee; or other encumbrancer
for value.
The rule is that only as long as the
property is still in the name of the person
who caused the wrongful registration and has
not passed to an innocent third person for
value will an action lie to compel that third
person to reconvey the property to the real
owner.25
Incidentally, a question may arise as to
whether it is sufficient for a prospective
purchaser or subsequent encumbrancer to
rely upon what appears on the owners
duplicate certificate of title, to which we may
answer in the affirmative but only as to the
condition of the fee title and as to all
MIDTERMS
voluntary encumbrances affecting the same,
such as mortgage, lease or other
transactions resulting from voluntary
agreement of the registered owner. As to
involuntary encumbrances, however, such as
notice of attachment, lis pendens or adverse
claim, to play safe one must make due
inquiry or examine the original copy of the
same certificate of title in the office of the
Registrar of Land Titles and Deeds, unless
the memorials or annotations made on the
owners duplicate certificate are brought up
to date.
Thus, it was held that a mortgagee has
the right to rely on what appears in the
certificate of title, and, in the absence of
anything to excite suspicion, is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the mortgagor
appearing on the face of said certificate. The
lien of an innocent mortgagee for value must
be respected and protected, even if the
mortgagor obtained his title through fraud.
The remedy of the person prejudiced is to
bring an action for damages against those
who caused the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of
the Philippines may be filed for recovery of
damages against the Assurance Fund.26
Nothing in the law would suggest that
where the land had been mortgaged by the
fraudulent transferee, such fact would stop
the suit by the legitimate owner against the
latter to recover title to the land. Of course,
the lawful registered owner must respect the
lien thereon acquired by the mortgagee in
good faith and for value.27
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
However, the protection that the law
gives to an innocent pur-chaser for value
does not apply to a case where the certificate
of title covers property of the public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral
lands. Thus, it was held that any title issued
on such non-disposable lands, even in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
should be cancelled.
Good faith, how determined.
Good faith, or the lack of it, is in its last
analysis a question of intention; but, in
ascertaining the intention by which one is
actuated on a given occasion, we are
necessarily controlled by the evidence as to
the conduct and outward acts by which alone
the inward motive may, with safety, be
determined. So it is that the honesty of
intention, the honest lawful intent, which
constitutes good faith, implies free-dom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to
put a person on inquiry, and so it is that
proof of such knowledge that overcomes the
presumption of good faith in which the courts
always indulge in the absence of proof to the
contrary. Good faith, or the want of it, is not
visible, tangible fact that can be seen or
touched, but rather a state or condition of
mind which can only be judged of by actual
or fancied tokens or signs.29
99
It has been held that a purchaser in
good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest on such
property and pays a full and fair price for the
MALIPOL
same at the time of such purchase or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other person in the property. It is enough
that he examines the latest certificate of title
which was issued in the name of the
immediate transferor.30
Registration without effect unless made
in good faith.
It is a settled rule that the inscription in
the registry, to be effective, must be made in
good faith.31 Thus, when one purchases
property with full knowledge that his vendor
has previously sold the property to another
person, he acquires only the right, if any,
which the vendor then had.32
The defense of indefeasibility of the
Torrens title does not extend to a transferee
who takes the certificate of title with notice
of a flaw in his title, so that his heirs, who
are only the juridical continuation of his
personality, and are subrogated by right of
succession to all his rights and obligations
hold the property subject to the equities in
favor of other persons.33
The defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title was disre-garded when the
transferee who took it had notice of the flaws
in the transferors title. No right passed to a
transferee from a vendor who did not have
any in the first place. The transferees bought
the land registered under the Torrens system
from the vendors who procured title thereto
by means of fraud. With this knowledge, they
can not invoke the indefeasibility of a
MIDTERMS
certificate of title against the private
respondent to the extent of her interest. This
is because the Torrens system of land
registration, though indefeasible, should not
be used as a means to perpetuate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property.
Mere registration of sale is not good enough,
good faith must concur with registration.
Otherwise registration becomes an exercise
in futility.34
Holder in bad faith, not protected.
Section 39 of Act No. 496 (now Section
44 of P.D. 1529) protects not only the person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of
a decree of registration, but every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith. Conversely, a holder in bad faith of a
certificate of title is not entitled to the
protec-tion of the law,35 for the law cannot be
used as a shield for frauds.36
In another case,37 the petitioners claim
that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of
title do not mention any lien or encumbrance
on their lots, they are purchasers in good
faith and for value, and as such have a right
to demand from respondents some payment
for the use of the alley. However, the Court
of Appeals found as a fact that when
respondents acquired the two lots which
form the alley, they knew that said lots could
serve no other purpose than as an alley.
The existence of the easement of right-of-
way was therefore known to petitioners who
must respect the same, in spite of the fact
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
that their transfer certificates of title do not
mention any burden or easement. It is an
established principle, so our Supreme Court
affirmed, that actual notice or knowledge is
as binding as registration.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser
cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claims that he acted in good faith under
the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe
that such defect exists, or his willful closing
of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in his vendors title, will not make
him an inno-cent purchaser for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact
defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required
of a prudent man in a like situation. 38 So,
also, a person who bought registered land
from the wrong party, not knowing that the
vendor was a mere impostor, did so at his
peril, and the law does not give him the
benefit afforded an innocent purchaser for
value.
The buyer of a parcel of land who could
not have failed to know or discover that the
land sold to him was in the adverse
possession of another, is a buyer in bad faith.
100
Accordingly, for the recovery of possession of
such land so held in bad faith, moral and
exemplary damages may likewise be
recoverable.39
MALIPOL
The purchaser of registered land from
one who is not the regis-tered owner and
whose only evidence is a deed of sale in his
favor is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all the factual
circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there is any flaw in the title of
the transferor or in his capacity to transfer
the land.40 By legal presumption, he is bound
to know that which he has failed to find out
due to his inaction. Thus, one who builds a
house on anothers registered land believing
this to be his own registered lot, because he
did not investigate properly, is held to be a
builder in bad faith. He is deemed to have a
presumptive knowledge of the pertinent
Torrens title covering the particular land, the
area involved, and the extent of its
boundaries.41
When actual knowledge of purchaser
does not constitute bad faith.
In a case where A sold the same
property first to B and then to C, C as a
purchaser in good faith for value registered
the deed and obtained a title in his name,
free from all liens and encumbrances.
Thereafter, C sold the same property to D
who relied on Cs good title. But before D
finally acquired the property, he became
aware of the fact that there was some
trouble or pending litigation involving the
same property between A and B, the
information having been relayed to him by
the tenant of the place. From these facts two
ques-tions have been raised, namely: (1)
whether D is a purchaser in good faith,
MIDTERMS
notwithstanding his knowledge of the
pending litigation; and
(2) whether D acquired valid title to the
property free from lien or encumbrance.
With respect to the first question, it was
held that D is still a purchaser in good faith,
notwithstanding his knowledge of the pend-
ing litigation, because of the fact that C from
whom he bought the property was not a
party to the litigation. D stepped only into
the shoes of C, a previous purchaser in good
faith, and thereby he became entitled to all
the defenses available to C, including those
arising from the acquisition of the property in
good faith and for value. With respect to the
second question, it was held that C acquired
valid title to the property, in view of Article
1544 of the Civil Code providing that
registration in the Registry of the real
property the ownership of which is claimed
by different persons shall have the effect of
transfer-ring ownership thereof to the party
who, in good faith, first recorded it in the
Registry of Property. Furthermore, Article
526 of the Civil Code provides that He is
deemed a possessor in good faith who is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Again, under Section 39 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 2011, every person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of
a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate. When the pending litigation
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
between A and B is finally decided, the
decision of the court cannot operate to divest
the right of D who is not and has never been
a party to the litigation, either as plaintiff or
as defendant.42
Co-owners entitled to separate
certificates.
Where two or more persons are
registered owners, as tenants in common, or
otherwise, one owners certificate may be
issued for the whole land, or a separate
duplicate may be issued to each for his
undivided share.43
It has been observed in actual practice
that some registers of deeds issue separate
duplicates bearing the names of all the co-
own-ers of the undivided shares constituting
the whole estate, while other registrars issue
separate duplicates each bearing only the
name of a co-owner to whom it is issued,
setting forth the specific share belong-ing to
him. This latter procedure seems to be more
in keeping with the letter of the law; yet we
see nothing wrong with the other procedure
of naming in each duplicate certificate all the
registered co-owners, for in that way such
copy is truly a duplicate of the original.
A co-owner cannot validly refuse to
surrender his co-owners certificate when
101
required by the Register of Deeds to enable
the latter to register or annotate therein a
document executed by another co-owner in
favor of a third party. If such co-owner would
like to contest the existence, legality or
import of the deed, the said document must
MALIPOL
first be registered and thereafter its
authenticity and legality litigated in a
separate proceeding.
Sale by co-owners.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the
owner of an undivided interest in the
property has the right to freely sell and
dispose of only his rights, participation and
interest in an undivided property held in
common with others, but has no right to sell
a specific part, by metes and bounds, of the
property. The sale or other disposition can
affect only his undivided share, and the
transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantor in the property owned in common.45
It is elemental that until a partition is made
among co-owners, no one of them can claim
any particular portion of an undivided
property as exclusively his own. That portion
cannot be ascertained until such time as the
co-ownership shall have ceased.46 It is the
essence and juridical nature of co-ownership
that each co-owner is the owner of the
whole, and over the whole he exercises
rights of dominion, but at the same time he
is the owner of a part which is truly abstract,
because until division is effected, such part is
not physically determined.47
Accordingly, each co-owner may alienate
his undivided or ideal share in the
community, even without the consent of his
co-own-ers, although the latter may exercise
their right of redemption in accordance with
law. But the rights acquired by purchasers
from a co-owner are the same as those
which the grantor had as co-owner in an
MIDTERMS
ideal share in the property held in common.
Before partition, conventional or judicial, no
co-owner may dispose of any physically
identified portion of the common property,
and any conveyance by a co-owner is subject
to the result of a subsequent partition.
However, the fact that the contract of sale
made by a co-owner purports to sell a
concrete portion of the property held in
common does not render the sale void, for it
is a well-established principle that the
binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so.48
A co-owner who signs not as a seller but
only as an instrumental witness to a sale
involving his share in the property may be
bound by the conveyance. Thus, it was held
that a co-heir who signs a deed of sale
executed by the other co-heirs conveying the
community prop-erty in favor of someone,
not as vendor but only as an instrumental
witness, without objecting to the sale of his
alleged share in the property, is bound by the
conveyance, and he cannot afterwards sue
for partition after the vendee has already
acquired ownership of the property by
adverse possession.49
Registration of sale with right of legal
redemption.
For the purposes of registering a deed of
sale, which may be subject to a right of legal
pre-emption or redemption that may be
exercised within thirty days from the date of
written notice by the vendor, it is now
directed by Article 1623 of the New Civil
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Code that such deed of sale be not recorded
in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners. The evident purpose
of this affidavit of the vendor is to impress
upon the affiant the neces-sity of making
true, not false, statement in the narration of
facts therein.50
Article 1623 of the New Civil Code,
which took effect August 30,1950,
superseded Article 1524 of the old Civil Code
with the follow-ing innovations: (a) The
period of nine days formerly made available
for legal redemption has been increased to
thirty days; (b) notice in writing is now
required, and instead of reckoning the
redemption pe-riod from the time the
redemptioner had actual knowledge of the
sale or from the time the sale was registered
in the Registry of Property, the period of
thirty days must be counted from the notice
in writing given by the vendor; and (c)
affidavit of the vendor that written notice has
been given to all possible redemptioners
should accompany the deed of sale when
presented for registration. Incidentally, it
may be stated here that in legal redemption
consignation is not necessary, and much
more so when the right was exercised in time
and in the proper form.
102
Of course, co-owners with actual notice
of the sale are not enti-tled to written notice.
Such formal requisite is prescribed in the law
to make certain that the co-owners have
actual notice of the sale to enable them,
within the limited period of thirty days, to
MALIPOL
exercise their right of redemption. But,
where the co-owners had actual notice of the
sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, a
written notice of a fact already known to
them would be a plain act of supererogation.
The purpose of the law then having been
fully served, written notice here becomes
superfluous. The statute, it is submitted,
would not demand the unnecessary.52
Splitting or consolidation of titles.
Upon petition by a registered owner of
two or more parcels of land distinctly
described in a certificate of title, the Register
of Deeds may cancel the certificate and issue
in lieu thereof several new cer-tificates each
covering one or such number of parcels as
the owner may desire, without the necessity
of obtaining a prior authority of the court. So
also, a registered owner of several distinct
parcels of land described in separate
certificates of title may, if he desires, cause
that all his certificates be cancelled and in
lieu thereof a single certificate be issued for
the different portions thereof, by direct
application to the Register of Deeds. The
former practice of securing the approval of
the court before a registered owner may split
or consolidate his titles has been done away
with by Republic Act No. 440, amending
Section 44 of Act No. 496, and Section 49 of
P. D. No. 1529.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or
complex, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the
Bureau of Lands, together with the
corresponding technical description and the
MIDTERMS
owners duplicate certificate of title, is
presented for registration, the Register of
Deeds may, without requiring further court
approval of said plan, register the same
under the Land Registration Act; provided,
how-ever, that he has to annotate on the
new certificate of title covering the street,
passageway, or open space, a memorandum
to the effect that except by donation in favor
of the national government, province, city or
municipality, no portion thereof so delineated
on the plan shall be closed or otherwise
disposed of by the registered owner without
the approval of the Court of First Instance of
the province or city in which the land is
situated.53
The partition of a parcel of land already
covered by a certificate of title could be
made even administratively by merely
submitting the subdivision plan to the Land
Registration Commission for ap-proval and
thereafter requesting the Register of Deeds
concerned for the issuance of new
certificates of title provided there are no
streets or passageways included in the
subdivision. But where there is no unanimity
in the will of the co-owners as regards the
partition and the co-owners themselves
deem it wise and expedient to bring the
matter to court under Section 112 of Act No.
496 (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the
court can acquire jurisdiction to hear the
petition but only after notice to all parties in
interest.54
Although the new plan indicates an
increase in the area of the registered land,
identifiable and identified through its fixed
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
and unchanging boundaries, and the
difference between the old and the new plans
came about because of errors in the survey
and technical description in the old plan, the
registered owner may avail himself of Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529 for the correction of the
old plan and approval of the new plan. A true
resurvey of registered land resulting in an
increase in the area does not fall under
Republic Act No. 440, and the approval of the
plan by the Commissioner of Land Registra-
tion does not give the plan any validity.55
It may not be amiss to state here that
by operation of Presi-dential Decree No. 957
issued July 12, 1976, a subdivision plan of a
registered land wherein a street,
passageway, or open space is delineated,
otherwise known as complex plan, need be
submitted to the National Housing Authority
for action and, if found in order, for approval
of the same, and the subdivision plan so
approved is then to be submitted to the
Director of Lands for final approval, thus do-
ing away with the pre-existing requirement
indicated above to have such complex plan
submitted for further approval of the Court.
It is required that upon registration of such
approved complex plan, a memorandum be
effected by the Register of Deeds concerned
on the corresponding certificate of title to the
effect that, except by way of donation in
favor of a city or municipality, no portion of
103
any street, passageway, or open space so
delineated on the plan shall be closed or
otherwise disposed of by the registered
owner without the requi-site approval of the
National Housing Authority. This requirement
MALIPOL
contemplates to cover subdivision projects
with lots to be sold to the public.
However, by express provision of Section
6 par. 1(f), of the Property Registration
Decree (No. 1529), one of the functions of
the Commissioner of Land Registration (now
the Administrator of Land Registration
Authority) is to verify and approve
subdivision, con-solidation, and consolidation
subdivision survey plans of properties titled
under Act No. 496, except those covered by
Presidential Decree No. 957, the latter being
placed under the charge of the National
Housing Authority.
In case a registered owner desires to
consolidate several lots into one or more,
requiring new technical descriptions for the
purpose, it is necessary that the
consolidation plan showing the lots to be
affected, as appearing before and after the
consolidation, be passed thru the
Administrator, without whose authority the
Registrar of Land Titles and Deeds cannot
issue any new certificate of title for the
consolidated lot or lots, in accordance with
the provisions of Republic Act No. 440.
Title to street areas not subject to sale
as residential lots.
When street areas are marked in a
subdivision for the use of the public in
general and the purchasers of the residential
lots therein in particular, the subdivision
owner cannot sell them for any other
purpose without violating the contract or
understanding with the purchasers of the
MIDTERMS
residential lots therein. Indeed, after adding
the cost of the streets to the price of the
residential lots, as has invariably been the
practice, the owner of the subdivision has no
legal nor moral right to sell those street lots
for any other purpose. While the owner of
the subdivision retains title to the street lots,
he cannot compel the government to
purchase them from him, nor can he be
compelled to donate said land and transfer
his title to the government so that the latter
may open and maintain the streets. And so
long as he retains the title and ownership of
said street areas, he is under obligation to
pay the land taxes thereon as well as to
reimburse the government for lowland filling
expenses if any.56
Action for partition not necessary in
case of subdivision of land into various
lots.
Before the amendment of Section 44 of
Act No. 496 by Republic Act No. 440, an
owner of a registered land might subdivide
the same into various lots and petition the
court for the issuance of two or more
certificates of title for the lots into which the
property was subdivided. Based on the same
principle, it was held that to subdivide or split
a land among co-owners or co-heirs, it would
not be necessary to insti-tute an action in
court for partition, it being sufficient to
present a petition to that effect in the same
cadastral or registration proceeding, as the
case may be, and the court could grant it
under Section 44 of Act No. 496.57
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
With the amendment introduced by
Republic Act No. 440, however, the
intervention of the court may now be
dispensed with and the necessary petition
may be brought direct to the Register of
Deeds who is authorized to issue two or
more certificates of title for the distinct
parcels of land or for the various lots shown
on approved subdivision plan, provided no
street or passageway or any alteration in the
original perimeter of the land as subdivided
is involved.
Torrens title binds the land to system
forever.
The obtaining of a decree of registration
and the entry of a cer-tificate of title shall be
regarded as an agreement running with the
land, and binding upon the applicant and all
successors in title, that the land shall be and
always remain registered land, and subject
to the provisions of Act No. 496 and all acts
amendatory thereof.58
It will thus be seen that in case a new
system of registration should ever be
adopted later in the Philippines, there can be
no shift-ing from the Torrens system of
registration without the consent of the owner
because that would be an infringement of the
agreement provided in the Land Registration
Act as running with the land.
104
Torrens title not subject to
prescription.
MALIPOL
By express provision of Section 47 of
P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not
only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors because
the latter merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely
the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor in interest.59
A title once registered cannot be
defeated, even by adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Registered title under
the Torrens system cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.60
What is said in the opinion of the court
regarding the acquisi-tion of title to real
property by adverse possession does not
apply to titles registered under the provisions
of Land Registration Act (No. 496). Section
46 of that Act provides that title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered
owner cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.61
Not even the Government may acquire
by prescription registered land owned by a
private individual. Thus, where the
Government took such a registered property
for road purposes in 1934, there being no
transfer of said land to the Government and
the registered owner continued to pay the
taxes thereon, although the said property
MIDTERMS
had been used as road continuously up to
1955, it was held that such regis-tered
property cannot be lost to the Government
by prescription, and the registered owner is
entitled to be paid of the price thereof, upon
his executing the corresponding conveyance
in favor of the Government who is to pay for
all the expenses incident to the execution
and registration of the deed of conveyance.62
While prescription never prevails against
a Torrens title, streets and public
thoroughfares existing on the registered land
before the issuance of the original certificate
of title are not deemed included and
therefore not within the coverage of non-
prescriptibility.63
The immunity of registered land from
the effects of prescrip-tion cannot be free
from evil. In fact, this rule has been criticized
as being likely to prove unworkable
eventually, since land might thus remain in
perpetuity as the property of an owner who
had long since abandoned all claims to it.64
We believe though that the rule must stand,
however, harsh it may seem, for the sake of
stability of our land registration system.
Incidentally, it was held that an adverse
claimant of 8 registered land, undisturbed in
his possession thereof for a period of more
than fifty years and not knowing that the
land he actually occupied had been
registered in the name of a relative, is not
precluded to file an ac-tion for reconveyance
which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to
property, as against the registered owner
who was relying upon a Torrens title which
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
could have been fraudulently, illegally or
wrongfully acquired.65 To such adverse
claimant in undisturbed possession the
remedy of an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible.66
Land registration; titled land cannot be
acquired by prescription.
In Carvajal vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
98328, October 9, 1997, it was said that an
application for registration for an already
titled land constitutes a collateral attack on
the existing title. For, under the law, (PD
1529) no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. A torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The title may be
challenged only in a proceeding for that
purpose, not in an application for registration
of land already registered in the name of
another person. After one year from its
registration, the title is incontrovertible and
is no longer open to review. The remedy of
the landowner, whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in
anothers name, is to institute an ordinary
action for reconveyance or if the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value for damages.
(Gonzales vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 587; Legarda &
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In view of
105
the nature of a torrens title, a land
registration court has the duty to determine
whether the issuance of a new certificate
alters a valid and existing certificate of title.
MALIPOL
Along the same vein, the SC said in Sps.
Mariano & Erlinda Laburada, etc. vs. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, that
the land registration court has no jurisdiction
to order the registra-tion of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier
land registration case. A second decree for
the same land would be null and void (MWSS
vs. CA, 215 SCRA 783; Pamintuan vs.
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558), since the principle
behind original registration is to register a
parcel of land only once. (P.D. 1529, Sec. 14;
Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154).
Right to recover possession equally
imprescriptible.
To a registered owner under the Torrens
system, the right to re-cover possession of
the registered property is equally
imprescriptible, since possession is a mere
consequence of ownership. And if prescrip-
tion is unavailing against the registered
owner, it must likewise be unavailing against
the latters hereditary successors, because
they merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law.67
Laches, too, may not be considered a
valid defense for claim-ing ownership of land
registered under the Torrens system. Where
prescription would not lie, neither would
laches be available.
Laches when to defeat imprescriptibility
of Torrens title.
While it cannot be denied that no title to
registered land in dero-gation to that of the
MIDTERMS
registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession, this legal
guarantee may in appropriate cases yield to
the right of a third person on the equitable
principle of laches. Accordingly, in an action
brought to recover the possession of certain
land covered by a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a free patent, it was held that,
while the defendant may not be considered
as hav-ing acquired title by prescription
based on his and his predecessors long
continued possession for 37 years, the
registered owners right to recover the
possession of the property as well as the title
thereto from the defendant has, by the long
period of 37 years and by patentees inaction
and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand, thus bar-ring the original owner
from recovering the possession of such titled
land by laches.69
We submit, however, that the equitable
principle of laches as applied in the above-
cited case of Mejia v. Gamponia, if ever relied
upon as a precedent, will tend to destroy the
principle underlying the Torrens system,
particularly as regards the indefeasibility of a
cer-tificate of title which by law does not
yield to prescription. A perusal of the above
case discloses some peculiar facts and
circumstances. It appears that on March 13,
1916, Free Patent No. 3699 was issued to
Domingo Mejia, but that before this patent
was registered under Section 122 of Act No.
496, or, in other words, before Original Cer-
tificate of Title No. 380 was issued to him on
July 26, 1916, Mejia had already sold the
same property to Zacarias Ciscar on March
24, 1916. The latter having died, the
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
property passed by inheritance to Roque
Sanchez who on January 21, 1940, sold the
same property to Andres Gamponia. None of
these transfers was registered and the
certificate of title remained with the original
owner. Meanwhile, the heir of said registered
owner sought to recover the property from
Gamponia, not only on the ground that the
sale made in 1916 by Domingo Mejia was
null and void for being violative of the Public
Land Act, but also on the ground that such
property covered by a Torrens title in the
name of said Domingo Mejia could not be
lost by prescription. It is clear that when
Original Certificate of Title No. 380 was
issued in the name of the original patentee
Domingo Mejia, the property was already
sold by him to Ciscar. Such being the case,
Mejia had no reason to hold the title and if
he did he was a holder in bad faith, and so
anyone else who might have succeeded him
as heirs. They are not entitled to the
protection afforded by law to third persons
acquiring property in good faith and for
value; the heirs as mere extensions do not
get any better title than that of their
deceased predecessors in interest. Hence, if
at all the right of Gamponia to the property
in question should ever be upheld as it was
properly upheld in the decision, it may not be
necessary to attribute it to laches as may be
running against the particular Torrens title
herein involved, inasmuch as this title is
106
deemed to be void since the beginning for
being in the hand of a holder in bad faith
who procured it even after having sold the
property therein described. The same
conclusion, of course, would have been
arrived at after all, but not on the basis of
MALIPOL
the equitable principle of laches as against
the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title which
is expressly guaranteed by law but, rather, as
against the possession of a person relying
upon a void certificate of title who had no
valid claim on the property.
We do not lose sight of the fact,
however, that in another case where the
vendee continued in possession of the
property in pursu-ance of a deed of sale,
which was deficient for lack of approval of an
executive authority as required by law, but
which the vendor never bothered to question
during his lifetime, nor his heirs who
succeeded to the estate, all of them having
kept silent, never claiming the land as their
own until almost 30 years later, it was held
that their quies-cence and inaction are
sufficient to command the imposition of
laches against their adverse claim.
Vigilantibus non dormientibos sequitas
subvenit.70
In a long line of decisions, the Supreme
Court has uniformly held in favor of the
registered owner who had been in possession
of the property in dispute for a considerable
period of time. Having been registered
owners of lot for more than 40 years and
having possessed it during said period, their
title had become indefeasible and their
possession could not be disturbed.71 Also
failure of the deceased or his predecessors-
in-interest to take steps to assert any right
over the disputed land for 20 years from date
of registration of title is fatal to their cause of
action on the ground of laches.72
MIDTERMS
In a more explicit case, however, the
Supreme Court restated the rule in no
uncertain terms, as follows: Suffice it to
state that laches, adverse possession, and
prescription can have absolutely no effect on
the ownership of the registered owner or his
successors-in-interest. This is a cardinal rule
under the Land Registration Act.73
Torrens title; indefeasibility of the same;
prescription.
The basic question in Heirs of Leopoldo
Vencilao, Jr. etc. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
123713, April 1, 1998, was this: between
two (2) sets of claimants of real property,
those claiming ownership by acquisitive
prescription, and those asserting ownership
on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the
certificate of the vendor as mortgagee and
the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale, who
has a better right?
Held: The latter has a better right,
hence, the one who claims to have been in
possession for 30 years does not enjoy
recognition. Note that the land in question
has been titled more than 30 years before
petitioners filed an action in court.
Prescription does not run against registered
land. Under Sec. 47 P.D. 1529, no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by pre-
scription or adverse possession. A title, once
registered, cannot be de-feated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession. The
certificate of title issued is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
appears therein. It is binding and conclusive
upon the whole world. All persons must take
notice and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
Evidentiary value of certificate of title
A certificate of title is conclusive
evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein, and other matters
which can be litigated and decided in land
registration proceedings. (Carvajal vs. CA,
280 SCRA 251).
Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a
Torrens title
The rule is well-settled that prescription
does not run against registered land title,
once registered, can not be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession.
Tax declarations and tax receipts can not
prevail over a certifi-cate of title which is an
incontrovertible proof of ownership. (Heirs of
Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. vs. CA, 288 SCRA
574).
Efficacy of certificate of title based on a
107 patent
An original certificate of title issued by
the Register of Deeds under an
administrative proceeding is as indefeasible
as certificate of title issued under judicial
MALIPOL
proceedings. (Cagayan de Oro City Land-less
Residents Association vs. CA, 234 SCRA 20).
Torrens title not subject to collateral
attack.
Torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one year after the date of the
issuance of the decree of registration. Such
attack must be direct, and not by a collateral
proceeding.74 The title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.75
Thus, land erroneously included in a
Torrens title cannot be recovered in a
reivindicatory action instituted by a stranger
to the title. The Land Registration Act defines
the methods by which a wrongful
adjudication of land title may be corrected,
and an indirect or collateral attack cannot be
allowed as relief against the error.
Neither may a Torrens title issued in the
name of an alien in 1940, which might
appear to be in violation of the Constitution,
be collaterally attacked. The rule on this
matter is that this issue can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Moreover, it is a well-known
doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is
irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of
the court is to see to it that this title is
maintained and respected unless challenged
in a direct proceeding.77 The court has
consistently ruled that a Torrens title cannot
be attacked collaterally. The issue on its
validity can be raised only in an action
MIDTERMS
expressly instituted for that purpose. The
efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System
must be protected.78
By express provision of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, Section 48, it has been
made clear that a certificate of title cannot
be subject to collateral attack. Such title
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Probative value of Torrens title.
As provided in Section 47 of Act No.
496, the original certificate in the registration
book, any copy thereof duly certified under
the signature of the Register of Deeds and
also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be
received as evidence in all the court of the
Phil-ippines, and shall be conclusive as to all
matters contained therein principally, the
identity of the owner of the land covered
thereby except so far as provided in the Land
Registration Act.79
This rule is not true, however, with
respect to the contents of the annotations or
memoranda on a certificate of title. Thus, it
was held that the memorandum of a power
of attorney made on the back of an original
certificate of title is not admissible as
evidence of the contents of said power of
attorney, but only of the fact of its execution,
of its presentation for notation, and of its
notation for the purposes of constructive
notice to the public in connection with the
creation of preferential rights to the
registered land covered by the title.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Pre-existing claims and liens on
registered land.
Under the Torrens system of
registration, claims and liens of whatever
character, except those mentioned by law,
existing against the land prior to the
issuance of the certificate of title, are cut off
by such certificate if not noted thereon, and
the certificate so issued binds the whole
world, including the government.81
Thus, an annotation on the back of a
certificate of title of a deed of donation,
which was executed prior to its issuance
without a court order, is null and void; it is
an unauthorized and illegal amendment of
the certificate of title.82 However, where a
certificate of title over a parcel of land has
been issued to an applicant subsequent to a
sale made by him of a portion thereof not
excluded from the title so issued, co-
ownership between said applicant and his
vendee arises, for the issuance of a Torrens
title does not operate to destroy the validity
of executed contracts especially as between
the parties thereto.83
If there had been a breach of trust, as
when the agent registered the property in his
name and adverse to the interests of his
principal, the proper remedy is not a petition
108
in the land registration proceed-ing but a
separate action. This is specially true where
there are third persons affected. Even if the
transfers made were null and void, the nullity
of such transfers cannot be determined by a
MALIPOL
motion in the registration proceedings but in
a separate action.84
Persons to be named on certificate.
Section 48 of Act No. 496 requires that
every certificate of title shall set forth the
names of all the persons interested in the
estate in fee simple in the whole land, and a
duplicate certificate may be issued to each
person named, the Registrar of Land Titles
and Deeds noting in the registration book
and upon each certificate to whom such
duplicate was issued. It will thus be seen that
it is not only the owners whose names must
appear on the certificate, but all persons
interested in the estate. Interests are not
confined to ownership, but include leasehold
right, mortgage right, right of easement, and
other forms of lien or burden upon the land
covered by the title. To each of such persons
in interest, a duplicate certificate of title may
be is-sued.
Certificate in name of wife; property
covered not necessarily paraphernal.
The registration of land in the name of
the wife, without express declaration that it
is paraphernal property, does not deprive the
husband of his rights therein as such
husband, in accordance with Section 70 of
the Land Registration Act. There being
nothing in the certificate of title to show that
the property is paraphernal property,
evidence may be introduce to show its real
nature and character.85 By express provision
of Section 70 of Act No. 496, nothing
contained in said Act shall in any way be
MIDTERMS
construed to relieve registered land or the
owners thereof from any rights incident to
the relation of husband and wife.
However, where property was acquired
by the wife with her exclusive and private
fund before her marriage, despite her own
subsequent declaration jointly with her
children to the contrary, it cannot change the
character of the property from paraphernal
to conjugal.86
In a certain case decided by the Court of
Appeals it was held that the mere fact that
the Torrens title was issued in the name of
Ger-vacia Alejandrino, the wife of Chua Joco,
does not alter the concept of that property.87
For, property acquired during the marriage
per-tains to the conjugal partnership
regardless of the form in which the Torrens
title is then or thereafter taken.88 The fact
that the Torrens title describes the owner as
the wife of Chua Joco, without express
declaration in the same title that the
property was paraphernal, is a cautionary
notice to the whole world that said property
is conjugal in nature. Hence, a former ruling
that the addendum married to in a Torrens
title is only a sort of description of civil status
is deemed abandoned and no longer
controlling. Accordingly, where the land was
acquired and the improvements thereon
were constructed during marriage, the
property is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partner-ship, unless it can be
proven to pertain exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband alone, even if his civil status
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
was described as single, was not deem without ef-fect when, as in this case, a
sufficient to destroy this presumption.89
It may be interesting to note, however,
that in another case90 an apparent deviation
from the foregoing doctrine seems to have
been favored. Here, a question of law was
raised on appeal, namely: Whether or not a
sale under pacto de retro of a parcel of land
covered by a certificate of title issued in the
name of a married woman, with-out the
consent of her husband, may be annulled to
the prejudice of a purchaser in good faith,
upon subsequent evidence presented by the
husband to the effect that said property was
acquired; at the expense of the common
fund of their conjugal partnership. It was
established as a fact that the parcel of land,
which is the subject matter of the sale, was
registered in the name of the married woman
to whom a certificate of title was issued as a
result of the cadastral proceedings. The
husband contends that the land in question
was acquired during marriage, and the
husband alone, not the wife even with the
permis-sion of her husband, can alienate it.
HELD: That while it is true that according to
Article 1401, No. 1 (now Article 153, No. l) of
the Civil Code, to the conjugal partnership
belongs property acquired for a valuable
consideration during the marriage at the
expense of the com-mon fund, whether the
acquisition is made for the partnership or for
109
one of the spouses only, by virtue however of
the principles underlying the Torrens system
of registration under which the ownership of
the parcel of land in question was registered,
the provisions of Article 1401, No. 1 (now
Article 153, No. 1) of the Civil Code are
MALIPOL
undivided half presumably belonging to their
purchaser in good faith has acquired said
parcel of land registered in the name of the
wife. The purchaser who relied upon the
certificate of title need not inquire whether
said lot had been acquired by her with
money exclusively belonging to her, or at the
expense of the common fund of her conjugal
partnership with her husband. To the
purchaser, the only legal truth upon which he
had to rely was that the land is registered in
the name of the seller and that her title
under the law is absolute and indefeasible.
In more or less the same vein, it was
held that, where the prop-erty sold by a
widow was in fact conjugal in nature because
it was her husband who initiated its purchase
on the installment basis and had paid several
installments on account up to the time of his
death in 1946, but thereafter the widow
continued with the installments and paid the
price in full in 1951 when the subdivision
company executed a final deed of sale in her
favor, describing her civil status as widow,
the subsequent purchaser who acquired the
property from said widow without actual
knowledge of the history of the previous
transaction and who relied on the face of the
certificate of title did acquire valid title
thereto even as against the husbands heir.91
Likewise, where a couple living as man
and wife, and before they were joined in
lawful wedlock, acquired land and registered
it in the name of the man alone, the sale
made by the latter of the entire property
after the death of his wife cannot be annulled
by their chil-dren with respect to the
MIDTERMS
mother. They claimed that as successors and
heirs of their deceased mother they could not
be deprived of their rights for their title
under the Torrens system should be
imprescriptible. It was held that their claim
would be correct if the title to the registered
land were in the name of their father and
their mother, and not in the name of their
father alone.92
Thus, the Supreme Court has suggested
in a certain case decided that it would be the
better rule that if the property registered
under the Torrens system is conjugal the
certificate of title covering such property
should have been issued in the name of both
husband and wife, instead of only one of
them with the name of the other spouse
merely forming part of what may be
regarded as descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner.93 After all, where a
piece of land is paraphernal in origin, the
mere fact that the husband signed a
mortgage deed thereof as a co-mortgagor
does not by itself alone suf-fice to convert it
into conjugal property.94
It is to be noted, however, that by
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 45, it
is now a matter of requirement that where
the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership, the certificate of title should be
issued in the names of both spouses. Hence,
if the title appears in the name of the
husband or of the wife alone, it can legally be
presumed that the property covered is the
exclusive and private property only of the
spouse thus named.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
Of course, the legal presumption that all
properties acquired during marriage are
conjugal is rebuttable. Hence, it was held
that despite the fact that the property was
acquired during coverture, it may be proven
to be paraphernal by the following
circumstances: The disputed land is in the
name of the wife; the property was of such
substantial value as the husband then by
himself could not have af-forded to buy; the
purchase price was furnished by the wifes
mother or that it was an established practice
of the wifes parents to so pro-vide their
children with money to purchase realties for
themselves; and, the husband expressly
acknowledged in the deed of sale that he did
not have any interest in the property.95
Sale of wife of her portion in conjugal
property void.
The wife cannot sell her portions in lands
standing in the name of her husband, even if
said portion were assigned to her in a parti-
tion of their conjugal property made during
the marriage, for in the absence of an
express declaration in the marriage
settlement, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order.96 Consequently, the character of these
portions of lands as conjugal partnership
110
property has never changed. However, the
wife can sell as agent of the husband these
portions as part of the conjugal partnership
assets. Also, the wife may bind the conjugal
partnership with the consent of the husband,
according to Article 172 of the Civil Code.97
MALIPOL
Neither would the death of either
husband or wife make the surviving spouse
de facto administrator of the conjugal estate
or invest him or her with power to dispose of
the same. The sale of conjugal property by
the surviving spouse without the formalities
established for the sale of the property of
deceased persons is null and void, except as
to the portion that may correspond to the
vendor in the partition.98 Meanwhile,
therefore, the surviving spouse could not
have actually sold any object that may be
regarded as certain or determinate, pending
partition of the estate, and to admit such
transaction to registration would be violative
of a principal feature of the Torrens system
regarding the stability of ones title to land,
for which the Government issues a certificate
of title of absolute owner-ship with the full
guarantee of the law.
After the death of either husband or
wife, the properties ac-quired by the spouses
during their marriage cease to belong to the
conjugal partnership which was then
dissolved and instead become the properties
of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased. Thus, the surviving spouse cannot
validly alienate the properties of the
partnership before any partition of the
properties is made and in the absence of
proof that the heirs have renounced their
inheritance from the deceased. The sale shall
be valid only as to the portion that may
correspond to the surviving spouse in the
partition.99
MIDTERMS
Widows right to contest fictitious sale
even before liquidation of conjugal
estate.
A sale without consideration is fictitious.
It is not only annul-lable but does not exist in
contemplation of the law. Hence, where the
sale of conjugal property was fictitious and
therefore nonexistent, the widow who has an
interest in the property subject of the sale
may be allowed to contest the sale, even
before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, making the executor party-
defendant if he refuses to institute the suit.100
So also, in another case, it was held that
the wife has a cause of action to secure the
annulment of a sale voluntarily entered into
by her deceased husband in favor of a third
person where it is her posi-tion that the
contract was simulated and executed by the
husband for the purpose of defrauding the
wife.101
Where a contract is absolutely simulated
or fictitious, it is in-existent and void from
the beginning, and under Article 1410 of the
Civil Code any action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of such a
contract does not prescribe.102
Certificate in name of both spouses.
It has been held in a number of cases
that property acquired during marriage,
although registered in the husbands name or
in the wifes name, by legal presumption,
belongs to the conjugal part-nership just the
same. Now, when the property is registered
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
in the names of both spouses, may it be
shown that it really belongs to either spouse?
In answering this question, the issue to be
resolved is: How far is a Torrens title
conclusive and incontestable?
In the case of Paterno Vda. de Padilla
vs. Bibby Vda. de Pa-dilla,103 it was held that
the property may be shown to be really of
either spouse, though recorded in the names
of both. The underlying reason, according to
the Court, is the confidential relation
between husband and wife. Because of the
feelings of trust existing between the
spouses, certificates of title often secured in
the names of both, or of either, regardless of
the true ownership of the property, and
regardless of the source of the purchase
money. It is thus but fair that on liquidation
of the partnership, the trust should be
recognized and enforced, so that the real
ownership of the property may be es-
tablished.
The principle that a trustee who takes a
Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration is one of
the well-known limitations upon the finality
of a decree of title, in line with the ruling in
Severino vs. Severino,104 and this is because
a certificate of title under the Torrens system
should not be turned into an instrument for
deprivation of ownership. It is said that the
111
Torrens plan, created to protect dominion, is
not a Frankenstein that destroys this very
dominion. A trust, deriving its strength from
confidence, which runs through with the woof
and warp of the social fabric, does not lose
that character on the plea that a Torrens
MALIPOL
certificate of title is conclusive. Any rule that
permits the violation of a fiduciary duty
would be a reproach to any legal system.
And this principle should apply with peculiar
force to the relations between husband and
wife. In normal marriage, the spouses trust
each other so implicitly that they attach little
or no importance to what appears in legal
docu-ments, fully and unreservedly believing
that no technicality would be availed of to
claim what in truth pertains to one or the
other.
Another reason considered by the Court
why evidence of the nature of any property
as paraphernal should be allowed, despite
the Torrens certificate, is this: As the
manager of the conjugal partner-ship is the
husband, he may, without let or hindrance,
deal with and dispose of any property
appearing in the names of both spouses,
even if the property should really be
paraphernal. In the course of years, any such
property may have been sold, transformed or
substituted. Upon liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, to forbid an investiga-tion of the
true source of the purchase price of the
original property, after many years of
marriage, would make liquidation impossible
to trace and identify the paraphernal
property. The law positively ordains that the
wifes property (dowry and paraphernal)
should be returned, even before the payment
of the debts of the conjugal part-nership.
This mandate of the law cannot be complied
with when the means to that end is withheld
and forbidden.
What title covers.
MIDTERMS
It is a well-settled rule that a Torrens
certificate of title cov-ers the land described
therein, together with all the buildings and
improvements existing thereon, unless an
express reservation shall have been
annotated on the certificate. It does not
include such pub-lic thoroughfares as were
already in existence at the time title was
acquired.105
But, where the owner of a house erected
on a registered land belonging to another is a
builder in good faith, the subsequent pur-
chaser of the land who knows of the true
circumstances cannot evade his responsibility
to pay due compensation or damage for the
removal of such improvements, upon the
mere pretext that the certificate of title
covering the land at the time of his purchase
did not contain any encumbrance relating to
the value of such improvements. This is
specially true in a case where the
improvement were introduced on the land
after the institution of the registration
proceeding which culminated in the issuance
of the original certificate of title, and it was
not possible to annotate thereon the fact of
the ownership of the building.106
The issuance of a Torrens title does not
confer title to navigable streams within the
registered property, nor is it conclusive on
their non-existence, unless the boundaries or
such stream had been ex-pressly delimited in
the registration plan, so that delimitation of
their course may be made even after the
decree of registration has become final. Not
even by prescription may ownership of a
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
navigable stream or of its bed be acquired. 107
Thus, where the lot sought to be registered
is or forms part of the bed of a navigable
stream, creek or river, the decree or title to it
would not give the registered owner thereof
any right or title thereto. Navigable rivers
cannot be appropriated and registered under
the Land Registration Act.108
Land mistakenly included in title.
The mere fact that a certificate of title
was issued under the Torrens system in the
name of a person does not necessarily make
him the true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title
under the Torrens system, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, he does
not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the land illegally
included. Thus, the inclusion of public
highways in a certificate of title does not
thereby necessarily give to the holder of such
certificate said public highways. And the rule
holds true even if the original certificate of
title, where the misplaced land description
was included, has been cancelled and the
mistake repeatedly carried over to
subsequent transfer certificates of title.109 So
also, where certificates of title of two lots
sold to different persons by a common
vendor are interchanged, resulting in the
112
issuance to each vendee of a transfer
certificate of title covering the wrong lot, the
court may decree that said certificates of title
be cancelled and a correct one issued in
favor of each vendee, without requiring the
vendees to execute in favor of each other the
MALIPOL
corresponding instru-ments to effect the
exchange.110
Real estate tax as a lien.
Under the law, real estate tax
constitutes a burden on the land superior to
all other liens of any kind whatsoever and is
enforceable against the property whether in
the possession of the delinquent or any
subsequent owner or possessor and shall be
removable only by the payment of the taxes,
penalties and costs. In accordance with the
pro-vision of Section 365 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Section
21 of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise
known as the Assessment Law, the
government may proceed against and follow
the property for the collection of any unpaid
taxes thereon; and, as far as the
Government and the collection of that tax
are concerned, it is enough that the land
sought to be taxed is not lost, and it is of no
consequence whether it is still in the hands
of the delinquent or of any other person, a
purchaser or otherwise. In the case of the
latter, he acquires the land subject to the tax
lien. The law in this respect is mandatory and
gives the taxing officer no authority to make
any distinction or qualification as to the
manner of its enforcement. He must collect
the tax by the only means prescribed by law.
The direct liability of the registered land,
however, is not with-out limitation. Under the
provision of Section 44 of Presidential De-
cree No. 1529, its liability is limited only to
such real estate taxes as may be levied and
assessed within two years immediately
MIDTERMS
preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
so that for any taxes thereon that may be
due before that period the government may
only resort to collect directly from the
taxpayer alone.
Special tax for filling and other statutory
liens.
The special tax for filling lowlands falls
within the second exception of Section 39 of
Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2011
and by Section 4 of Act No. 3621, to the rule
established therein that every person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of
a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith, shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting.112
Thus, a mortgagee who purchases real
property mortgaged to him may not avoid
the payment of the special land tax due and
unpaid although he has no notice of the
existence of such an obligation.113
But there may be other tax liens which
may not be shown on the face of the
certificate of title and yet they are as binding
to and enforceable against the real property
described therein as any other ordinary
encumbrance expressly noted thereon. Of
these may be mentioned the liability of a
taxpayer delinquent in the payment of his
income tax. Under the provision of Section
315 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, income
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
tax delinquency constitutes a lien in all the
properties of the taxpayer. So also, war
profits tax, as imposed by Republic Act No.
55, makes liable all properties acquired by
the taxpayer between December 8, 1941,
and February 26, 1945. These liens exist by
opera-tion of the law, and, as they are not
shown on the certificate of title, the burden
on a particular property may be such as to
absorb its full value.
It may also be worth mentioning here
that by operation of Ar-ticle 2242 of the new
Civil Code, the following although not shown
or annotated on a certificate of title, may
constitute an encumbrance on the
immovable described therein:
Unpaid price or balance of sale of
real property;
Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and
other workmen, as well as of architects,
engineers and contractors engaged in
the construction, reconstruction or repair
of build-ings, canals or other works; and
Claims of furnishers of materials used in the
con-struction, reconstruction or repair of
buildings, canals or other works.
It may be stated, however, that the
materialmans lien attaches merely to the
113
immovable property for the construction and
repair of which the obligation was incurred,
such as for the unpaid value of the lumber
used in the construction of the building. It
attaches only to such structure, which in
MALIPOL
itself is real property, without necessarily
extending to the land.114
Suppose, while the balance of the
purchase price of real property remains still
unpaid, the vendee mortgages it to a third
person and the mortgage is subsequently
foreclosed. To resolve the question of
whether the vendor may still collect the
unpaid balance, it was held that under
Articles 2242 and 2249 of the new Civil Code
the unpaid vendor has the right to share pro
rata with the mortgagee of the same
property out of the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale, although, unlike the
mortgage which should be registered, the
unpaid vendors lien need not be registered
in order to enjoy preference. The forego-ing
ruling of the Supreme Court, however, was
reconsidered later by resolution in the same
case holding that the full application of said
Articles 2242 and 2249 demands that there
must first be some sort of proceedings where
the claims of all preferred creditors may be
bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, or
the settlement of a decedents estate under
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other liq-
uidation proceedings of similar import; and in
the absence of such proceedings, the vendor
as creditor of the balance of the purchase
price would not acquire the character and
rank of a statutory lien co-equal to the
mortgagees recorded encumbrance, and
must remain subordinate to the latter.115
With all due respect to the above Court
resolution, we would like to point out the
fact, which might have been overlooked, that
by express provision of Article 2242 of the
MIDTERMS
Civil Code the right of the unpaid vendor to
the balance of the purchase price constitutes
not a mere money claim but an
encumbrance upon the property sold, and as
further reinforced by Article 2243 of the
same Code such right is to be considered as
legal mortgage of real property. Thus, it
cannot be regarded as a mere claim by a
creditor collectible in an insolvency
proceeding or other liquidation proceedings
of similar import. This is specially so since
under Section 8, paragraph 9, of the
Insolvency Law, persons having legal
mortgages are not bound by any agreement
at the meeting of the insolvents creditors,
unless such mortgage is abandoned in
preference to mere money claim pursued in
the insol-vency proceedings.
As a rule, of course, statutory lien
subsist and bind the whole world, even
without the benefit of registration under the
Torrens system, and that is so because
everyone is presumed conclusively to know
the law which provides for such liens.
However, while the annotation of statutory
liens in the corresponding certificates of title
is not a matter of legal necessity, if so
annotated it could not in any manner
whatsoever injure the rights of the party
bound thereby. On the other hand, the
annotation would inure to the benefit of the
pub-lic, particularly those who may
subsequently wish to buy the property
involved or have a business transaction in
connection therewith. It would facilitate the
enforcement of a legal, statutory right, which
cannot be barred by laches.116
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
REVIEWER
A new statutory-lien is provided by
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
relating to any disposition of the land or
limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27,
which is intended to emancipate tenants
from the bondage of the soil, and any other
laws and regulations on agrarian reforms.
Preference of credits affecting same
property.
The determination of preference of
credits may depend upon whether they are
registered or annotated on the corresponding
cer-tificate of title. Under the provision of
Article 2249 of the new Civil Code, where
there are two or more credits with respect to
the same specific real property, not
registered or otherwise annotated on the
corresponding certificate of title, they shall
be satisfied pro rata, after payment of the
MIDTERMS
taxes and assessments due the government.
However, under the provision of Article 2242
of the same Code, for purposes of satisfying
several credits registered or annotated on
the title in virtue of attachments or
executions, the rule is preference of payment
according to priority of the credits in the
order of the dates of their registration.

114

MALIPOL