US v.
De Guzman Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915)
Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio
Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder)
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant
was discharged before he pleaded on the
condition that he promised to appear and
testify as a witness for the Government against
his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the
murder. He denied ever saying anything that
implicated his co-accused and swore that
statements made by him were made in fear of
the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks
for the discharge of the Respondent though it
may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal
and expressly bars a future prosecution.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant should be discharged.
HELD:
Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no
provision for perjury should the Defendant fail
to comply with the agreement with the State.
However, looking at the legislative history of
the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful
performance is necessary to avail of the bar to
criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant
in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly
carry out his undertaking to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-
accused deprived him of the right to plead his
formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.
was made prior to his trial.
In RE exemption from SSS coverage:
Archbishop of Manila v. SSC [ GR L-15045, 20
January 1961]
En Banc, Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur, 3
concur in result, 1 reserves vote
FACTS:
On 1 September 1958, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with
the Social Security Commission a request that
Catholic Charities, and all religious and
charitable institutions and/or organizations,
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or
partially, operated by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, be exempted from
compulsory coverage of RA 1161, as amended
(Social Security Law of 1954). Acting upon the
recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social
Security Commission in its Resolution 572 (s.
1958), denied the request. The Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments
and raising constitutional objections, requested
for reconsideration of the resolution. The
request, however, was denied by the
Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. 1958);
hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section
5 (c) of RA 1161, as amended.
The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572
and 767, s. 1958 of the Social Security
Commission, with costs against appellant.
1. Definition of employer, employee, and
employment (as defined in law)
The term employer as used in the law is
defined as any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the
services of another person who is under his
orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by
the Government (par. [c], sec. 8), while an
employee refers to any person who
performs services for an `employer in which
either or both mental and physical efforts are
used and who receives compensation for such
services (par. [d] sec. 8). Employment,
according to paragraph [j] of said section 8,
covers any service performed by an employer
except those expressly enumerated thereunder,
like employment under the Government, or any
of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities including corporations owned
and controlled by the Government, domestic
service in a private home, employment purely
casual, etc.
2. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is
uncertainty
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature
would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the
case at bar, it is apparent that the coverage of
the Social Security Law is predicated on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship
of more or less permanent nature and extends
to employment of all kinds except those
expressly excluded. The definition of the term
employer is, thus, sufficiently comprehensive
as to include religious and charitable
institutions or entities not organized for profit
within its meaning. Had the Legislature really
intended to limit the operation of the law to
entities organized for profit or gain, it would not
have defined an employer in such a way as to
include the Government and yet make an
express exception of it.
3. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded
in new law
When RA 1161 was enacted, services
performed in the employ of institutions
organized for religious or charitable purposes
were by express provisions of said Act excluded
from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j], subpars.
7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has
been deleted by express provision of RA 1792,
which took effect in 1957. This is clear
indication that the Legislature intended to
include charitable and religious institutions
within the scope of the law.
4. Intent of law limited to corporations and
industries
The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length
upon the need of a law to meet the problems of
industrializing society and upon the plight of an
employer who fails to make a profit. But this is
readily explained by the fact that the majority
of those to be affected by the operation of the
law are corporations and industries which are
established primarily for profit or gain.
5. Valid exercise of police power; Social
justice
The enactment of the law is a legitimate
exercise of the police power, pursuant to the
policy of the Republic of the Philippines to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the
needs of the people throughout the Philippines
and shall provide protection to employees
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death. It affords protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and is
in full accord with the constitutional provisions
on the promotion of social justice to insure the
well being and economic security of all the
people.
6. Inclusion of religious organization does not
violate prohibition on application of public
funds for the benefit of a priest; does not
violate right to disseminate religious
information
The funds contributed to the System created by
the law are not public funds, but funds
belonging to the members which are merely
held in trust by the Government. Even assuming
that said funds are impressed with the
character of public funds, their payment as
retirement, death or disability benefits would
not constitute a violation of the cited provision
of the Constitution, since such payment shall be
made to the priest not because he is a priest
but because he is an employee. Further, the
contributions are not in the nature of taxes on
employment. Together with the contributions
imposed upon the employees and the
Government, they are intended for the
protection of said employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death
in line with the constitutional mandate to
promote social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people.
David v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the
question of when the barangay elections should
be held and questions the COMELECs schedule
of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of
May 1997. The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or
the Local Government Code which mandates
barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner
David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679,
should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides
that barangay elections should be held every 5
years. He also contends that there is a violation
of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay officials
is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of
the Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws that the later legislative
enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in Paras v. COMELEC had the opportunity
to mention when the next barangay election
should be when it stated that the next regular
election involving the barangay office is barely 7
months away, the same having been scheduled
in May 1997.
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution
provides that, The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three
years It is not to be construed as prohibiting
a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.
 Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector
of Customs [GR 30264, 12 March 1929]
En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur
FACTS:
Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909
provides that the manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad
valorem tax, while paragraph 197 provides that
vehicles for use on railways, and detached parts
thereof, are subject to 10% ad valorem. Dust
shield are manufactured of mixed wool and
hair, and are used in railroad cabins of the
Manila Railroad Company. The Insular Collector
of Customs decided that dust shields should be
classified as manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for.
Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the
Collector of Customs and held that dust shields
should be classified as detached parts of
vehicles for use on railways.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was
correct in classifying dust shields under
paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of
1909, and in refusing to classify them under
paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. It
thus affirmed the appealed judgment in its
entirety, without special taxation of costs in
either instance.
1. Nature of dust shields
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair
mixed. The component material of chief value is
the wool. The purpose of the dust shield is to
cover the axle box in order to protect from dust
the oil deposited therein which serves to
lubricate the bearings of the wheel. Dust
guard, which is the same as dust shield, is enactment must be operative, and the general
defined in the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of
American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as
follows: A thin piece of wood, leather, felt,
asbestos or other material inserted in the dust
guard chamber at the back of a journal box, and
fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of
the axle. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to
prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes
called axle packing or box packing.
2. Burden of proof on the validity of a legal
collection of duties upon who questions it
The burden is upon the importer to overcome
the presumption of a legal collection of duties
by proof that their exaction was unlawful. The
question to be decided is not whether the
Collector was wrong but whether the importer
was right.
3. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do
not extend their provisions; in case of doubt
It is the general rule in the interpretation of
statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend
their provisions beyond the clear import of the
language used. In every case of doubt, such
statutes are construed most strongly against
the Government and in favor of the citizen,
because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the
statutes expressly and clearly import. In the
case at bar, taking account the purpose of the
article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it is
used as a detached part of railway vehicles.
4. Particular enactment must be operative
over the general one in the same statute
Paragraph 141 is a general provision while
paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where
there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which in its
most comprehensive sense would include what
is embraced in the former, the particular
language are not within the provisions of the
particular enactment.
Almeda v. Florentino
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67
FACTS:
RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June
21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14 that the Board
shall have a secretary who shall be appointed
by it to serve during the term of office of the
members thereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709
amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of
Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as
amended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City
appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day,
the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its
secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent
Florentino to the position, purportedly under
Sec. 14 of the City Charter.
ISSUE:
Which law applies on the matter of the
appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal
Board of Pasay City?
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in
RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part
of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in
any way the provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183.
Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it
is manifested that the legislature so intended.
Laxamana v. Baltazar [GR L-5955, 19
September 1952]
First Division, Bengzon (p): 7 concur
FACTS:
In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga,
was suspended, vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar,
assumed office as mayor by virtue of section
2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, the provincial governor, acting under
section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (RA
180), with the consent of the provincial board
appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of
Sexmoan, who immediately took the
corresponding official oath. Thus, the quo
warranto petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the quo warranto
petition with costs.
1. Section 21(a) derived from Section 2180;
supplements, not repeal, Section 2195
Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that upon the occasion of the
absence, suspension, or other temporary
disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no
Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last
general election received the highest number of
votes. Section 21(a) of the Revised Election
Code provides that whenever a temporary
vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the
same shall be filled by appointment by the
President if it is a provincial or city office, and
by the provincial governor, with the consent of
the provincial board, if it is a municipal office.
The portion of Section 21(a) relating to
municipal offices was taken from section 2180
of the Revised Administrative Code. Thus, when
the office of municipal president (now mayor)
became permanently vacant, the vice-
president stepped into the office. Likewise,
when the municipal president is suspended, the
vice-president takes his place by virtue of
Section 2195. Sections 2180 and 2195, thus,
supplemented each other. It must also be noted
that paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to
municipal offices in general, other than that of
the municipal president.
2. Contemporaneous and practical
interpretation of re-enacted statute
sWhere a statute has received a
contemporaneous and practical interpretation
and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the
practical interpretation is accorded greater
weight than it ordinarily receives, and is
regarded as presumptively the correct
interpretation of the law. The rule here is based
upon the theory that the legislature is
acquainted with the contemporaneous
interpretation of a statute, especially when
made by an administrative body or executive
officers charged with the duty of administering
or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly
adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment.
The incorporation of Section 2180 of the
Revised Administrative Code as Section 21(a) of
the Revised Election Law did not have the effect
of enlarging its scope, to supersede or repeal
section 2195, what with the presumption
against implied repeals.
3. Particular over general
Even disregarding their origin, the allegedly
conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the
light of the principle of statutory construction
that when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the
former (Sec. 288, Act 190). Where one statute
deals with a subject in general terms, and
another deals with a part of the same subject in
a more detailed way, the two should be
harmonized if possible; but if there is any
conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of
whether it was passed prior to the general
statute. In the case at bar, section 2195
referring particularly to vacancy in the office of
mayor, must prevail over the general terms of
section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal (local)
offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be
deemed an exception to or qualification of the
latter.
4. Particular not repealed by general statute
unless there is manifest intent to repeal such
A special and local statute, providing for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed
by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and applications, unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms
of the general act are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law. It is a
canon of statutory construction that a later
statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily
not affect the special provisions, of such earlier
statute. Where there are two statutes, the
earlier special and the later general the
terms of the general broad enough to include
the matter provided for in the special the
fact that one is special and the other is general
creates a presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the
general, one as a general law of the land, the
other as the law of a particular case.
5. Executive Construction given weight by
Court
The contemporaneous construction placed
upon the statute by the executive officers
charged with its execution deserves great
weight in the courts. In the case at bar, the
Department of the Interior and the office of
Executive Secretary who are charged with the
supervision of provincial and municipal
governments, even after the Revised Election
Code was enacted, have consistently held that
in case of the suspension or other temporary
disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by
operation of law, assume the office of the
mayor, and if the vice- mayor is not available,
the said office shall be discharged by the first
councilor.
Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan [GR L-21516,
29 April 1966]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on leave
FACTS:
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative
franchise (RA. 399, 18 June 1949), for an electric
light, heat and power system at Butuan and
Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and
conditions established in Act 3636, as amended
by CA 132 and the Constitution. It was also
issued a certificate of public convenience and
necessity by the Public Service Commission on
18 March 1954. On 1 October 1950, Ordinance
7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or receipts
tax of any business operated in the city. This
ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14
December 1950), by enumerating the kinds of
businesses required to pay the tax. It was
further amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May
1961) by modifying the penal provision, and
further by Ordinance 148, approved on 11 June
1962 by including within the coverage of
taxable businesses those engaged in the
business of electric light, heat and power (sic).
On 13 April 1960, Ordinance 104 was enacted,
making it unlawful for any person or firm to cut
or disconnect the electrical connection of any
consumer in the city of Butuan without his
consent.
The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with
the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152; Petition
for declaratory relief), the court declared
Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and 148 of the City of
Butuan unconstitutional and ultra vires, as far
as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or
receipts of the business of electric light, heat
and power of Butuan Sawmill. The court also
annulled Ordinance 104 for being
unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive. Hence, the direct appeal on
questions of law to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
decision with costs against appellant City of
Butuan.
1. Taxation of franchise beyond citys
taxation power.
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the
City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of
Butuan Sawmill (see Section 2, Act 2264). The
inclusion of the franchised business of the
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the city of Butuan
within the coverage of the questioned taxing
ordinances is beyond the broad power of
taxation of the city under its charter; nor can
the power therein granted be taken as an
authority delegated to the city to amend or
alter the franchise, since its charter did not
expressly nor specifically provide any such
power. It must be noted that the franchise was
granted by act of the legislature on 18 June
1949 while the citys charter was approved on
15 June 1950.
2. Earlier special over the latter general
Where there are two statutes, the earlier
special and the later general the terms of the
general broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special the fact that one is
special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered
as remaining an exception to the general, one
as a general law of the land, the other as the
law of a particular case.(State vs. Stoll; Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty).
3. Construction must consider other
provisions of the same act; and its effects
Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264)
specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on
persons paying franchise tax. Further, the citys
interpretation of the provision would result in
double taxation against the business of the
franchisee because the internal revenue code
already imposes a franchise tax. The logical
construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264, that
would not nullify section 2 (j) of the same Act, is
that the local government may only tax electric
light and power utilities that are not subject to
franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself
authorizes additional taxation by cities or
municipalities.
4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police
power
The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting the
disconnection of any electrical wire connected
to any consumers building with the power
plant, without the consent of the consumer,
except in case of fire, clear and positive danger
to residents, or order of the authorities, is an
unwarranted exercise of power for the general
welfare The ordinance compels the electric
company to keep supplying electric current to a
company even if the latter does not pay the bills
thereof, and to that extent deprives the
company of its property without due process.
How the general welfare would be promoted
under the ordinance has neither been explained
nor justified. The general welfare clause was
not intended to vent the ire of the complaining
consumers against the franchise holder,
because the legislature has specifically lodged
jurisdiction, supervision and control over public
services and their franchises in the Public
Service Commission, and not in the City of
Butuan.
Arayata v. Joya
G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928)
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he
started paying the Government for such.
Because the number of lands he can hold is
limited, he conveyed some of the lots to
respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio
died before fully paying the Government for the
lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled
to own only one-half of the lot based on the
Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The
court then sought to deliver the property to
Florentino for liquidation and distribution.
Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16,
the widow receives all deeds of her deceased
spouse upon compliance with requirements of
the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal
property prevails or Act 1120s full conveyance
of the property to the widow.
HELD:
Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions
regarding acquisition, disposition, and
transmission of friar lands, which are contrary
to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is a general law, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is
while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law under its control and supervision.
must prevail. Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA province, city or municipality from which
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968. responsibility is exacted. What said article
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA requires is that the province, city or
Concepcion, J.: municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not
FACTS: necessarily detract from the City's "control or
supervision."
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and
took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered
injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the
same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of
Manila to pay damages.

ISSUE:

WON the City of Manila have control or

supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by
Teotico.

RULING:

Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged
that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good
conditionand manholes thereof covered by
the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect,