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POLS 5322-001
Regime Evaluation Assignment
Introduction
For this paper I will be analyzing the effectiveness of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). I will first provide some background to the Convention, then I will address
some issues. Finally, I will offer solutions to improve the effectiveness of the CBD.
Background
When approaching threats to the environment and sustainability one of the main
invasive species, and human-induced climate change (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148). In an
attempt to address these issues, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) began. The
convention was completed in 5 sessions from July 1991-May 1992 (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.
149). There was a rush on the CBD because of the impending Earth Summit Conference. The
CBD included highlights (on) North-South contrasts in the distribution of biodiversity resources
and the many ways that natural resource management can conflict with important economic,
social, and political interests (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148). After the 5 sessions, the resulting
regime has 3 objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of genetic
resources. Parties are obligated to inventory and monitor biodiversity (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.
150). This was a great movement forward in regard to environmental sustainability and resource
distribution. However, the North seemed to benefit more and some developing countries
insisted that genetic resources belong to the states in which they are located and that access
should be based on mutual agreement between countries (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148).
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Issues
Protecting the earths remaining biodiversity requires addressing the economic and
political pressures that cause habitat destruction, something that has proved almost impossible
(Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 200). In addition to addressing the economic and political pressures,
implementation of decisions under CBD have been less focused than in some of the other major
global environmental regimes (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 150). This reflects the more diffuse
nature of the regimes rules and norms, the absence of a strong lead-state coalition, the absence
of an enforcement mechanism, and a general lack of political will (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 150).
If we are going to make changes, there must be adequate levels of concern within governments,
and perhaps among the public at large, so that states decide to devote resources to examining and
addressing the problem with implementing potential solutions (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 197).
Unfortunately, another hurdle CBD has encountered is the lack of implementation of their
policies. No matter how well-meaning a treatys intention or how strong its control provisions
are, it will not yield measurable environmental benefits if states cannot implement it (Chasek, et
al., 2014, p. 205). The noncompliance can be traced to several different types of factors,
(Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 207). In addition to this lack of implementation, there has been parties
that have lied or simply never implemented the policies because large numbers can also
increase incentives for noncompliance, because of reduced fears of detection (Chasek, et al.,
2014, p. 203). The CBD is trying to take on too many parties at one time.
In addition to tackling a large number of participating parties, the CBD is faced with the
issue of making policies that can be applied to different parties. These participating parties have
different views and different ways of interpreting information. control measures and reporting
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requirements that are too complex or too vague allow states to make honest or intentional errors
when translating them to domestic law (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 212). In addition to these
international environmental policy initiatives, has its own set of control measures, reporting
schedules, financing requirements and review procedures (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 214). These
are variables that change cross borders, and even can differ within borders.
Two principal set of factors affect states ability to monitor domestic compliance with
environmental laws: (1) whether states have adequate feedback mechanisms, such as onsite
2014, p. 209). This is especially obvious on different levels of development. While a developed
country will have very effective technology available for use of monitoring, developing countries
might not have technology that gives accurate readings or information. Developing countries
might also have a difficult time giving up resources to be saved because of their desire to catch
up to developed countries.
In an attempt to protect the earths remaining biodiversity, we must address economic and
political pressures. We must also make more focused decisions in relation to biodiversity use and
preservation. Stronger enforcement mechanisms are needed, as well as adequate concern from
governments and people. When policies are made, they need to be implemented. Follow up is
extremely important in the success of CBD policies. With so many participants, many think they
can slip through the cracks and lie about their resource use. In addition, these multiple parties
understood that each environmental regime has its own way of doing things, but the review
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process and approaches need to be more similar. Monitoring is the biggest issue and would solve
most of these dilemmas. All participating parties need adequate feedback mechanisms and
monitoring. In the next section I will show some ways this can happen.
I propose that the most effective way to improve CBD policies is to have monitoring and
reviewing done by other states in coordination with the house state. (a) method to pursue these
goals is to increase the coordination and perhaps integration of the monitoring and reporting
requirements between related regimes (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 217). For example, the United
States of America would go with the Africa reviewer and overlook the process, as well as offer
their own expertise. In turn, Africa would be able to send their reviewer to overlook the United
State of America and monitor their Natural Resource use. This approach would be very similar to
the ways of monitoring nuclear plants and bombs of today. Russia send over inspectors to check
on our reactors, and we send people to Russia to take the numbers on their reactors. The
international agenda must be set, negotiations convened, appropriate policies identified, strong
agreements reached, implementation strategies agreed to, treaties ratified, national and
international policies implemented and reported on, environmental problems monitored, and
international policies revised in light of new data and lessons learned (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.
The most beneficial area of improvement would be the areas of particular need (that)
enforcement (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 215). If we address this issue, the issue of strong
agreements, negotiations, identification of policies and strong agreements will all fall in place.
Appropriate monitoring and reporting is key to the success of the CBD. As said by Chasek et al.,
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Monitoring and reporting on environmental issues and regime implementation are essential
components of regime effectiveness (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 216). To support this, studies on
institutional effectiveness indicate that regimes employing systems of regular monitoring and
reporting have better levels of domestic implementation and compliance than those that do not
(Chasek et al., 2014, p. 216). The absence of any boundary rule or any monitoring effort to
ensure that a wall-defined set of authorized users are following the rules related to timing,
If we continue to allow states to self-monitor and report, there is little reason to expect
such self-correcting processes to suffice to maintain the resilience of environmental and resource
regimes (Young, 2009, p. 382). We need to enact a system of check a balances that is activated
across borders, not just within them. The most important measure of the effectiveness of an
environment is a function of 3 factors. First is regime design, particularly the strength of the
key control provisions aimed at addressing the environmental threat, but also the provisions on
assistance. By offering monitoring of one state by another state, we would be able to break the
seemingly large numbers up into smaller groups, and ensure that no state is able to fall through
A move from private individual actors need to be made. Multiple examples exist where
resource has worked to help users achieve more efficient short-term results and potentially to
sustain the resource over the long term (Ostrom, 2008, p. 25).
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Now the question is who will be doing the cross border monitoring. Secretariats
coordinate and facilitate day-to-day regime operations, organize meetings of the parties and
gather and disseminate information on treaty implementation (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 216).
These secretariats would be able to cross borders and share the information they find with all
parties involved. Secretariats often compile this information and make it available to other
These secretariats could also be thought of as analysts. As is the case with ecosystems,
the specification of spatial boundaries separating specific institutions from their environments
requires judgment on the part of the analyst (Young, 2009, p. 379). These secretariat analysists
could monitor how when demand for a good exceeds supply, the price will rise, new entrants
are likely to conclude there are opportunities to make a profit by acting to increase supplies of
the good in question (Young, 2009, p. 382). This is an issue currently with depleting resources,
and a person that travels cross borders to monitor would be able to prevent this type of
pressures arising from forces outside a regime that can call into question its ability to manage the
Conclusion
The CBD has to tackle what seems like an impossible amount of issues. However, the
issues that come with having a large number of participating parties can be solved with
coordination and agreements across borders. In addition to these cross border agreements, parties
can send their own analytic secretariats to monitor each other use of resources. With this small
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change, the CBD would be able to produce a more focused approach. In addition, it would be
utilized more universally. There would be more agreement as well as more similar enactments of
the policies. In essence, all the team players would be on the same page.
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References
Chasek, P.S., Downr, D.L., & Brown, J.W. (2014). Global environmental politics (Sixth ed.).
Ostrom, E. (2008, September). Institutions and the environment. Economic Affairs. Retrieved
December 5, 2016.
Young, O. R. (2009, October 2). Institutional dynamics: Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation