Britanie Naylor 1

POLS 5322-001
Regime Evaluation Assignment

Introduction

For this paper I will be analyzing the effectiveness of the Convention on Biological

Diversity (CBD). I will first provide some background to the Convention, then I will address

some issues. Finally, I will offer solutions to improve the effectiveness of the CBD.

Background

When approaching threats to the environment and sustainability one of the main

anthropogenic threats to biodiversity include habitat destruction, over-harvesting, pollution

invasive species, and human-induced climate change (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148). In an

attempt to address these issues, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) began. The

convention was completed in 5 sessions from July 1991-May 1992 (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.

149). There was a rush on the CBD because of the impending Earth Summit Conference. The

CBD included highlights (on) North-South contrasts in the distribution of biodiversity resources

and the many ways that natural resource management can conflict with important economic,

social, and political interests (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148). After the 5 sessions, the resulting

regime has 3 objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its

components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of genetic

resources. Parties are obligated to inventory and monitor biodiversity (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.

150). This was a great movement forward in regard to environmental sustainability and resource

distribution. However, the North seemed to benefit more and some developing countries

insisted that genetic resources belong to the states in which they are located and that access

should be based on mutual agreement between countries (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 148).
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Issues

Protecting the earths remaining biodiversity requires addressing the economic and

political pressures that cause habitat destruction, something that has proved almost impossible

(Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 200). In addition to addressing the economic and political pressures,

implementation of decisions under CBD have been less focused than in some of the other major

global environmental regimes (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 150). This reflects the more diffuse

nature of the regimes rules and norms, the absence of a strong lead-state coalition, the absence

of an enforcement mechanism, and a general lack of political will (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 150).

If we are going to make changes, there must be adequate levels of concern within governments,

and perhaps among the public at large, so that states decide to devote resources to examining and

addressing the problem with implementing potential solutions (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 197).

Unfortunately, another hurdle CBD has encountered is the lack of implementation of their

policies. No matter how well-meaning a treatys intention or how strong its control provisions

are, it will not yield measurable environmental benefits if states cannot implement it (Chasek, et

al., 2014, p. 205). The noncompliance can be traced to several different types of factors,

includinginsufficient capacity to implement, administer, or enforce relevant domestic policy

(Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 207). In addition to this lack of implementation, there has been parties

that have lied or simply never implemented the policies because large numbers can also

increase incentives for noncompliance, because of reduced fears of detection (Chasek, et al.,

2014, p. 203). The CBD is trying to take on too many parties at one time.

In addition to tackling a large number of participating parties, the CBD is faced with the

issue of making policies that can be applied to different parties. These participating parties have

different views and different ways of interpreting information. control measures and reporting
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requirements that are too complex or too vague allow states to make honest or intentional errors

when translating them to domestic law (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 212). In addition to these

multiple ways of interpretations, each environmental regime, as well as many other

international environmental policy initiatives, has its own set of control measures, reporting

requirements, monitoring systems, assessment mechanism, implementation procedures, meeting

schedules, financing requirements and review procedures (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 214). These

are variables that change cross borders, and even can differ within borders.

Two principal set of factors affect states ability to monitor domestic compliance with

environmental laws: (1) whether states have adequate feedback mechanisms, such as onsite

monitoring by inspectors, reporting requirements, and complaint mechanisms (Chasek, et al.,

2014, p. 209). This is especially obvious on different levels of development. While a developed

country will have very effective technology available for use of monitoring, developing countries

might not have technology that gives accurate readings or information. Developing countries

might also have a difficult time giving up resources to be saved because of their desire to catch

up to developed countries.

In an attempt to protect the earths remaining biodiversity, we must address economic and

political pressures. We must also make more focused decisions in relation to biodiversity use and

preservation. Stronger enforcement mechanisms are needed, as well as adequate concern from

governments and people. When policies are made, they need to be implemented. Follow up is

extremely important in the success of CBD policies. With so many participants, many think they

can slip through the cracks and lie about their resource use. In addition, these multiple parties

need a bridge of interpretation and implementation to ensure consistency across borders. It is

understood that each environmental regime has its own way of doing things, but the review
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process and approaches need to be more similar. Monitoring is the biggest issue and would solve

most of these dilemmas. All participating parties need adequate feedback mechanisms and

monitoring. In the next section I will show some ways this can happen.

Ways to improve effectiveness

I propose that the most effective way to improve CBD policies is to have monitoring and

reviewing done by other states in coordination with the house state. (a) method to pursue these

goals is to increase the coordination and perhaps integration of the monitoring and reporting

requirements between related regimes (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 217). For example, the United

States of America would go with the Africa reviewer and overlook the process, as well as offer

their own expertise. In turn, Africa would be able to send their reviewer to overlook the United

State of America and monitor their Natural Resource use. This approach would be very similar to

the ways of monitoring nuclear plants and bombs of today. Russia send over inspectors to check

on our reactors, and we send people to Russia to take the numbers on their reactors. The

international agenda must be set, negotiations convened, appropriate policies identified, strong

agreements reached, implementation strategies agreed to, treaties ratified, national and

international policies implemented and reported on, environmental problems monitored, and

international policies revised in light of new data and lessons learned (Chasek, et al., 2014, p.

199). All of this could be achieved with coordinated monitoring processes.

The most beneficial area of improvement would be the areas of particular need (that)

include environmental assessment and analysis, monitoring, regulatory infrastructure, (and)

enforcement (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 215). If we address this issue, the issue of strong

agreements, negotiations, identification of policies and strong agreements will all fall in place.

Appropriate monitoring and reporting is key to the success of the CBD. As said by Chasek et al.,
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Monitoring and reporting on environmental issues and regime implementation are essential

components of regime effectiveness (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 216). To support this, studies on

institutional effectiveness indicate that regimes employing systems of regular monitoring and

reporting have better levels of domestic implementation and compliance than those that do not

(Chasek et al., 2014, p. 216). The absence of any boundary rule or any monitoring effort to

ensure that a wall-defined set of authorized users are following the rules related to timing,

technology and quantity of harvesting is consistently associated with poor performance

(Ostrom, 2008, p. 28).

If we continue to allow states to self-monitor and report, there is little reason to expect

such self-correcting processes to suffice to maintain the resilience of environmental and resource

regimes (Young, 2009, p. 382). We need to enact a system of check a balances that is activated

across borders, not just within them. The most important measure of the effectiveness of an

environmental regime the extent to which it produces measurable improvements in the

environment is a function of 3 factors. First is regime design, particularly the strength of the

key control provisions aimed at addressing the environmental threat, but also the provisions on

reporting, monitoring, regime strengthening, noncompliance, and financial and technical

assistance. By offering monitoring of one state by another state, we would be able to break the

seemingly large numbers up into smaller groups, and ensure that no state is able to fall through

the cracks and in turn lie or change their numbers.

A move from private individual actors need to be made. Multiple examples exist where

moving to government ownership, private property or community control of a common-pool

resource has worked to help users achieve more efficient short-term results and potentially to

sustain the resource over the long term (Ostrom, 2008, p. 25).
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Now the question is who will be doing the cross border monitoring. Secretariats

coordinate and facilitate day-to-day regime operations, organize meetings of the parties and

subsidiary bodiesfacilitate communication among parties, manage regime reporting, (and)

gather and disseminate information on treaty implementation (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 216).

These secretariats would be able to cross borders and share the information they find with all

parties involved. Secretariats often compile this information and make it available to other

parties and the public (Chasek, et al., 2014, p. 217).

These secretariats could also be thought of as analysts. As is the case with ecosystems,

the specification of spatial boundaries separating specific institutions from their environments

requires judgment on the part of the analyst (Young, 2009, p. 379). These secretariat analysists

could monitor how when demand for a good exceeds supply, the price will rise, new entrants

are likely to conclude there are opportunities to make a profit by acting to increase supplies of

the good in question (Young, 2009, p. 382). This is an issue currently with depleting resources,

and a person that travels cross borders to monitor would be able to prevent this type of

exploitation. It is equally important to recognize the critical role of exogenous stresses or

pressures arising from forces outside a regime that can call into question its ability to manage the

human-environment interactions in question effectively (Young, 2009, p. 380). These stresses

could be decreased by an outside party that is able to explain different viewpoints.

Conclusion

The CBD has to tackle what seems like an impossible amount of issues. However, the

issues that come with having a large number of participating parties can be solved with

coordination and agreements across borders. In addition to these cross border agreements, parties

can send their own analytic secretariats to monitor each other use of resources. With this small
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change, the CBD would be able to produce a more focused approach. In addition, it would be

utilized more universally. There would be more agreement as well as more similar enactments of

the policies. In essence, all the team players would be on the same page.
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References

Chasek, P.S., Downr, D.L., & Brown, J.W. (2014). Global environmental politics (Sixth ed.).

Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ostrom, E. (2008, September). Institutions and the environment. Economic Affairs. Retrieved

December 5, 2016.

Young, O. R. (2009, October 2). Institutional dynamics: Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation

in environmental and resource regimes. Global Environmental Change. Retrieved December 5,

2016, from www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha.