CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND wrongs and injustices that were
ongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or
agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event
we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to
assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him,
as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost
the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which
he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will
become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966
a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return
card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the
trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED
TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that
the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of
hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the
period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966,
as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and
the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-
appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied
upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid
down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the
motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those
raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much
earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the
Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it
"without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of
which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in
issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and
by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that
is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on
his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for
him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over
his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court
could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition
in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final
and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do
either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to
pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and
gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to
show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution
he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for
leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology.
Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations,
this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St.
Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For
with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it
shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck
from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam
from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to
cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what
he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to
bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession
of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all
in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility.
That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the
Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you
remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent
for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face
you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir.
Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its
truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is
not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have
told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
 xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the
ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ...
We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We
were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited
until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after
seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your
duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom",
your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by
our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty,
what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is
a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as
to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings
to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender
our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our
self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves
to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of
the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to
spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For
we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many
weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with
a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are
utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-
impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has
been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition
we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the
same petition different reasons may read different justices to the
same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may
 be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has
placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's
discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the
Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the
fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at
a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit"
resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has
been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not
"decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of
the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the
Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are
often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance,
not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it
in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power
of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of
decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in
general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days
in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed
it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco,
I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to
the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment,
he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of
appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor
on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each
time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations
are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said
the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people
have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.
Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before
the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose
the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
12
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens
whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen
to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner,
and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the
bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for
law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are
in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can
only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity
to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges.
No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as
great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal
the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to
speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence."
(State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders
no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ...
to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but
to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law.
4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to
submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice
as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the
judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame
of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that
he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979.
June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge
or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not
exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at.
the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice
the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a
fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find
that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused
to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the
general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-
year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office
to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to
the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity,
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
 "It may be (although we do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view,
the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to
enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all
times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in
their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in
the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing
a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree
on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a
proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that
my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the
cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as
the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work
to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is
proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and
duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but
the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to
bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to
the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized
suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended
and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the
guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that
freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re
Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully
retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in
the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers
in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of
this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power
to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer
that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered
the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if
based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a
case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to
criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to
 subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in
the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring
possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally
concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a
widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack,
direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity
of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct
upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who
is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as
well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to
try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does
not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the
ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of
government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that
the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served
by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right
does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than
is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the
filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the
protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members
of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief
Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been
attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the
letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right
to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to
reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful
and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence,
or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of
the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to
him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of
insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so
directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him
and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate
the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the
public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever
have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due
regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge
alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The
sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the
accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his
other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far
as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution
and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference
has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here
sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of
this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to
maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by
an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal
insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act
constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think
entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized
in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the
court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner
of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the
judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his
passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ...
No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal
letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting
upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99
N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in
Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the
accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision:
"It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been
robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention
of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney."
"If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by
writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that
they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney
at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer,
and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this
case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2
Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49
 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so
far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may
be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being
under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a
member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention
to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime
or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases
of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The
reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or
with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom
Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said
law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that
one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him
in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still
is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo.
He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
 members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number
of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one
in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to
be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being
guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into
,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard
of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr.
Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably
arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency
of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of
this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making
any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that
this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court
are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the
dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members and some former members of this Court
to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."
18
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with
the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep
the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is
now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of
its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief
Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice
Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement
from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice
Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by
publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
 A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding,
constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by
courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice
in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment
in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt
therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude
from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated.
Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all
that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the
courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which
made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way.
Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against
this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his
client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his
announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the
publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle
the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot
be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to
its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism
is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness,
real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of
the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the
"complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts
as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not
as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident
of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is
vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded
that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does
not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy
demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these
may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by
the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree
and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again
fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be,
as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
G.R. No. L-42992 August 8, 1935
FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner,
has not been acted upon to date, for the reason that the question whether or not the
decision which has already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the
first assignment of error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been
determined, for which purpose the case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said
attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as follows:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to
do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the
same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which
the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in
the administration of justice.
When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving
him a period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his
motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt
because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.
The phrases:
. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and
a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls . . . .
. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage . . . .
and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in
the administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an
inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt
of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceed in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of
outraging and mocking from which the words "outrage" and "mockery" used
therein are derived, mean exactly the same as all these, according to the
Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132 and 513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after
the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in
his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he
states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism,
a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise
than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of
the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which
those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is
that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2
of Legal Ethics, which reads as follows:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend
themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against
unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but not otherwise, such
charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be
protected.
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend
the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where
the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention
is no excuse from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are
justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified
by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always
be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of
intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into
consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in
order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others by following the bad example,
from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said
attorney with the justice it deserves.
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and,
reiterating what this court said on another occasion that the power to punish for contempt
is inherent in the courts in order that there be due administration of justice (In reKelly, 35
Phil., 944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said
courts may not fail in their mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within
the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is
ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has
been stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was
declared that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct", until the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood for
the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand for the application of that basic
principle now.
The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such
is found in a second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out
of which arise more bitter feelings than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous
language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing
on the merits. It is hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely
uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion here judicially penalized.
Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is
directed to words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the
growth of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be
set side by side with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case
of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in
phraseology will be noted. One came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came
from a judge and is accepted.
The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the
respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts.
Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will
justify not alone punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe
that the action taken in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by
such methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every
wind.1avvphil.et
The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a
hostile court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case
is lost, which he thinks should have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts
will do well charitably to overlook professional improprieties of the moment induced by
chagrin at losing a case.
So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar,
permit me to offer a few corroborative authorities.
Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer
authority in the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he
said: "No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members
of the bar. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability
to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very
judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system." (Ex
parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and
subsequently was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former
capacity, in sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again,
that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded
expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case
where a judge decides for one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both
parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is
great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which
often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought
to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of
disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such
outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor
[1877], 26 Am. Rep., 747.)
The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client
the leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a if:
famous case, he said: "When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of (a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
thinking for the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be (b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or
sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by between a present client and the prospective client.
the necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
that I cannot find in all this or in the evidence in the case anything that would have professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his
affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find there anything that relations with paying clients.
obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those
words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)
In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the
Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-
General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited members of the court to A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006
Malacaang previous to formulating the decision, and there, following a secret
conference, had offered them a banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated against
the respondent by the Attorney-General were halted by the court. In he opinion it was MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M.
said: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that memory of the JOAQUIN, Complainants,
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a vs.
social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with
scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human
sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too DECISION
drastic action. It may result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their
clients' causes. Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The
Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of TINGA, J.:
the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do
well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the
lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect
and consideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003 against
that the language of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross
the dignity of the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No.
constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando
accept his disavowal of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a
member of the bar of long and honorable standing with this blemish. With due deference M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for
to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent therefrom. Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
Vickers, J., concurs.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-
mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT prejudice of petitioners therein.
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
The facts are as follows:
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of
the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person. On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against
aid. them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded
not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan 2 found the accused guilty
of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the
accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan
but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial,
respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration,
with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the
Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone
inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he
had moved out without any forwarding address.
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to
personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from
respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to
discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the
petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of
arrest5 had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for
seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that
he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of
homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original
counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But
only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the
Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent
also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the
Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts
that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional
obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate
remuneration.
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He
stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day,
he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3
May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket
fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting
the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He
considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the
effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the
lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to
the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to
formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin
(PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and
complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the
Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the
Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the
registry receipt issued for the letter.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case
and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the
Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would
be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as
respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls
complainants made to his office.
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.1awph!l.net
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three
complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory
conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights
to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8
The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005,
Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the
imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. 10 On 12
November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve
Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to
recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented,
whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No.
152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension
recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent
has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the
property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their
life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any
other profession in society. x x x12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of
time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to
File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit
it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having
failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent
filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed the ad
cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that
the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely
fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to
safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid,
respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants.
The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had
changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings 14 he filed, it can
be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to
complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the
Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that
situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had
constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew
that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have
been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as
counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not
return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all
unresolved matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a
lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed
the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have
informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given
instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent
in handling the case of the accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the
Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the
accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from
the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate
measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on
his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the
alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the
recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence
to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their
stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad
cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by
securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule
138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes
to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to
abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its
final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause. 16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was
primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v.
Boncavil17 that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve
the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and
the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that
his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also
to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.18
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated
without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently
disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a
machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings
account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19 Respondent has
neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between
the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe
v. Atty. Magulta:20
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering
is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.21
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to
his profession. x x x 22
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend,
his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the
case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of
remuneration.
Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the
shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the
accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan
G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato." 23 Rule
14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to
discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the
defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that
"salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not
done so.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6)
months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not
explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to
file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court
of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months
suspension.25The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
[G.R. No. 452. March 18, 1905. ]
In the matter of JOSE ROBLES LAHESA
Jose Maria Marcaida, for Jose Robles Lahesa.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AT LAW; NEGLIGENCE. The Supreme Court exacts, and should
exact, from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official
duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results
in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the detention of accused persons
pending appeal.
DECISION
CARSON, J. :
Jose Robles Lahesa, a lawyer practicing before this court, as duly appointed counsel for
the appellants in the case of the United States v. Julian Tulagan Et. Al. on February 5,
1904, and on February 12, 1905, the Solicitor-General gave notice of motion to dismiss
the appeal in said case on the ground of abandonment and failure to prosecute the
same. The said Lahesa was also appointed counsel for the appellant in the case of the
United States v. Julio Liuag, on the 12th of August, 1904, and on February 11, 1905, this
court, on its own motion, issued a rule to the said Lahesa to show cause of why the
appeal in that case should not be dismissed on like grounds, and further, to show cause,
if any he had, why this court should not impose disciplinary punishment for grave neglect
in the performance of his duty as a lawyer and officer of this court.
Said motion and rule on for hearing Monday, February 20, 1905, when Jose Maria
Marcaida appeared on behalf of said Lahesa, and said he had been instructed by said
Lahesa to inform the court that he could not appear personally in response to its rule,
because he found it necessary to go elsewhere on the day and at the hour fixed for the
hearing, that he had no ground on which to oppose the dismissal of the appeals in said
cases, and further, that he had taken no action in the said cases because, in his opinion,
"there was no defense to be made on behalf of any of the defendants for whom he had
been assigned as counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library
An examination of the record in the case of the United States v. Julian Tulagan Et. Al.
shows that the appellants were sentenced in the trial court to long terms of imprisonment
for the crime of robo en cuadrilla, from which sentence they appealed, and it appearing
that they were too poor to employ a lawyer, this court, in accordance with the law
provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet the said
Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever in behalf of the defendants in said
case, though more than a year has elapsed since the date of said assignment. An
examination of the record in the case of the United States v. Julio Liuag shows that the
defendant was sentenced to seventeen years and four months imprisonment for the
crime of homicide, from which sentence he appealed, and it appearing that he was too
poor to employ a lawyer, this court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet
the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever on behalf of the defendant
in that case, though more than six months have elapsed since the date of his
assignment.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by
appellants (1) Francisco Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto
Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our
Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Upon this statement of facts it can not be doubted that the said Jose Robles Lahesa has WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
been guilty of grave negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel, and as an Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304
officer of the court. is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

This court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous (1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303,
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN
those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases and the AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO
detention of accused persons pending appeal. We are of opinion, therefore, that a fine of CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
200 pesos, Philippine currency, should be imposed upon the said Jose Robles Lahesa, ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
said fine to be paid to the clerk of this court within ten days of receipt of notice of this the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
order. So ordered. with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH by lethal injection;
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 138874-75 CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
Plaintiff-Appellee, ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are
Present: sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

DAVIDE, JR., C.J. (3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES
PUNO, ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was
- versus - PANGANIBAN, committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
QUISUMBING, special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
YNARES-SANTIAGO, homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is
CARPIO, declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; JOSMAN AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY"; CORONA, mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN PAHAK"; ARIEL CARPIO MORALES, of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;
BALANSAG, DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY CALLEJO, SR.,
TAGALOG"; JAMES ANTHONY UY alias AZCUNA, (4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
"WANGWANG"; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", TINGA, heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts
Accused-Appellants. NAZARIO, and of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b)P25,000.00 as temperate
GARCIA, JJ. damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Promulgated:
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that
July 21, 2005 RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar. IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, ON THE APPELLANTS.[2]
as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellencys
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO

A. LARRAAGA

I
I PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;
II
II RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS; WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF
BELIEF.
III
LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI; III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY
IV DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY DEFENSE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
EVIDENCE;
IV
V THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY; AND HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[3]

VI
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.[1] D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

B. AZNAR I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER
JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR
I ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT II
DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-
OF LAW. AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION
II FOR DNA TESTING;[4]
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA
AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY
ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF RUSIA. In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga
submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to
III show that the examination conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.
APPELLANT AZNAR.
 In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration [5], Aznar submitted to this
Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police
investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of
his involvement in this case but because he had in his possession a pack of shabu and
firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment [6] praying
that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new
argument raised. He responded to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively
quoting portions of our challenged Decision.
In his consolidated comment [7] to Aznars supplemental motion for
reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit
should not be given consideration. On February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging
that the Solicitor General read out of context certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued
that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of
his arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General
filed a rejoinder stating that Aznars reply actually supports the undersigned counsels
(Solicitor Generals) position that Atty. Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his
innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt, thus, it would be useless to
call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-
rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James
Andrews alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the
grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously
raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned.
In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, [8] we ruled that, "this would be
a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons
already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by
the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants
Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised
therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial determination. They are mere
rehash of the arguments set forth in their respective briefs which we already considered,
weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we
deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:
This Court erred
first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process
when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of
Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case
in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions from isolated pieces of
evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for
review.[9]
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias
testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it
must be stressed that Rusias testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving
credence to Rusias testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical
evidenceand the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no
reason why we should not uphold the trial courts findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias
testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical
evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together.[10] The presence of Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine
at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-
awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that
only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing
his testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what
he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed
attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel
Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a
vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he
bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nenes Store while the white van, driven by Cao, was
waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of quarreling male and female
emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on
the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All
these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong
anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why
should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even assuming that his testimony
standing alone might indeed be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so
when considered with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts
rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and
crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot
attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear
and positive evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible
as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused. [13]
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or
classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein appellants
by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the
above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the
latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows
that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time
and place.[14] They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong
sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel,
Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on
July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required
proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1)
hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies
plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights
from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas
presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but
a reality.Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy
and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16,
1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and
Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of
Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows
Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified
that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy
and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She
recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at
Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard
Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing
testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon,
Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July
17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. [15] And over and above
all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of
Rusia, we are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the
commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time
that Larraaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female
students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a
certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraagas attempt to snatch their young
daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate of
Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this
representation a copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996,
addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos,P.
del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan
and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho,
Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for
the record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a
first year high school student of your University of San
Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your good office
about an untoward incident involving our daughter and
another student of your school.
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other
classmates, Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar,
while on their way to get a ride home near the school
campus, a black Honda Civic with five young male
teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped
beside them, and simultaneously one of them, which
was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA,
a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed Rochelle by
her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She
resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people
were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly
sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still
now, she is suffering the shock and tension that she is
not supposed to experience in her young life. It is very
hard for us parents to think about what shed been
through.[16]
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not
enhance Larraagas chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion of
Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense
witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert
but an archaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual
inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to
testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar
submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises
nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is
a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong
case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen
such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor Generals
observation that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznars cause. We
quote his keen reflection on the matter:
xxxxxx
Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,
acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of
 Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant
Aznars claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not
Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznars
recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that
accused-appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject
crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this Honorable
Courts findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that: The
arrest of Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the
investigation of the case because witnesses came out and identified
Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims
on the night they disappeared. Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was in
the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the Chiong sisters
celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: x x x
I did not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next
move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him under
surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire
to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly, this statement is not an indictment
of the investigation that the police undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades
against alleged influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the
victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police
officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants and
successfully prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears
that Atty. Villarin would want to impress that he, rather than those
promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was not
due solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not
was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting
inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who
did everything to make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of
a smoking gun that would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they
have been convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the
subject crimes; this is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant
case. Indeed, judging by the substance of his affidavit, he would not
be testifying in case a new trial is held on anything that has not been
said and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated
opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his self-
congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing
to get a promotion when almost everyone else did. [17]
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the
examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such
study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception.
Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it during trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia
testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of
a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the
reasons why we cannot give our assent to such argument. First, Inspector Edgardo
Lenizo,[18] a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse match those of
Marijoy.[19] Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were
the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.
[20]
Third, the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted.
[21]
And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be
that of Marijoy[22] which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at
the ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at
this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person
laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families
who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and
claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration that Rowen
and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josmans instruction "to get rid"
of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes
were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate
was submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,
[23]
with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants
filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence
by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.[24]
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage
of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office,
and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his
brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is
extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that
minority is a significant factor in the imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the
Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as
the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate,
and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed
by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and
penalty, there being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our
Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of
evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in
response to appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. But, even the element of
reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded
any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on
our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which
demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco
Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are
hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil
Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, A.C. No. 6174
copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file Complainant, Present:
an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and
James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority. The motion is
likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.
- versus -
CARPIO,
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN Chairperson,
ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. BRION,
PEREZ,
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as SERENO, and
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, REYES, JJ.
or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client. Respondent.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in Promulgated:
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written November 16, 2011
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating
nor understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and DECISION
the principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation PEREZ, J.:
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196 [1] of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint [2] for
disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City
Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent
drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks. [3] Respondent
advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter
before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. [4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by respondent
for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latters daughter
Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as
counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the

Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he
drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to
their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as
professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he
rendered.It was allegedly their understanding that complainant would have to retain the
services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement,
engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant
against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand
letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal
cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time
friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30 years since complainant is the
godmother of Ms. Torralba.[7] Respondent claimed that it is in this light that he
accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters request that they be represented by him in
the cases filed against them by complainant and complainants daughter. He maintained
that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does
not evidence the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and
Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint proceedings should only be construed
as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties
achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts
proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other
checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to
vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for the
pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.[8]
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, [9] as
adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant
regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa and I.S. No.
03G-19582-84 entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba. Respondent stated that the
movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise mother
and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants
and complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal
favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the
moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored
checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The
fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that
respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal
cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by referring to
complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor [10],
respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-client relationship. Such admission
effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying
with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established and extends
beyond the duration of the professional relationship. [11] We held in Burbe v. Atty.
Magulta[12] that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.[13]
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a] lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing
parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof
that he had obtained the written consent of the conflicting parties, respondent should be
sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns
of the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.[15]
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.[16]
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client.[18] This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [19] Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.[20] Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
 fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.[21]
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was eventually
engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of action by
another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to represent the opposing
party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting
from the attorney-client relationship.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of
the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of
law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information
and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this
Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.
JESSIE R. DE LEON, A.C. No. 8620
Complainant,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,
-versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Promulgated:
Respondent.
January 12, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns
respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he
filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened.
Antecedents
On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon
City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due
to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River
shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600
square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds
of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No. 4674MN of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.[1]
De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two
years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of
dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The
respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-
claimin relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with
counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at the time
of filing.[2]
De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as
follows:
xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the
making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so
participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they
were already dead as of that time, which is punishable under Article
172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.
Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified
Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial
proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN;
Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial
proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he falsely
made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and
cross-suing the adverse parties.
12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts,
complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise violated:
(a) His Lawyers Oath:
xxx
(b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:[3]
xxx
On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to comment on De Leons
administrative complaint.[4]
In due course, or on August 2, 2010,[5] the respondent rendered the following
explanations in his comment, to wit:
1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the
Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and Leonardo
Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;
 2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material
allegations of the Governments complaint in Civil Case No.
4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family,
informed him:
a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from
Georgina Flores;
b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively
managing the family business, and now co-owned the
properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their
parents, Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, had
executed in their favor; and
c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute
sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly
assumed that their parents had already caused the
transfer of the TCTs to their names.
3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were the
ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo)
consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an extension
to file responsive pleading dated February 3, 2006 the fact that it
was the family of the defendants that had engaged him, and that
he had then advised the children of the defendants to seek the
assistance as well of a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer;
4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his
honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then
still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he
would have most welcomed the information and would have
moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for
that reason;
5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood
or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death certificates of
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial
court of that fact; and
6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed
the criminal complaint for falsification brought against him (Atty.
Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The
same office denied the complainants motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2010.
On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply,[6] whereby he
asserted that the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim
family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent
was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their
being already deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless
the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the
criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the
Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior
referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based
on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits.
Ruling
We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or
falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the
patently frivolous complaint.
I
Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth
All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have sworn to the
vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,[7] viz:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath, providing:[8]
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the
Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All
attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys
are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation by others. [9] The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from
engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or
omission contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if
it is broad enough to include such element).[10]
To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the
Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:[11]
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn
duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.
Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption
of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others
for as long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from
their character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the
statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to
the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such
cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their
clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of privilege, they
can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal
prosecution or actions for damages.[12]
Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by reason of their office
and in recognition of the vital role they play in the administration of justice, attorneys hold
the privilege and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
tribunals or offices only during good behavior.[13]
II
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility
On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with counterclaim and cross-
claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the persons whom the Government
as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.[14] He alleged therein that:
2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are
ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2)
parcels of land, together with the building and improvements
thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805)
139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to Leonardo C.
Lim and William C. Lim, of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del
Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo Lim and William Lim
are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful
owners thereof.
In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and
interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby
represent the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as
substitute/representative parties in this action. In this manner, a
complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this
case can be reached without undue delay. A photo copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by herein
defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in favor of said
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as Annex 1
hereof.
xxx
21. There is improper joinder of parties in the
complaint. Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly
compelled to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which
they have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation in.
22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this suit,
as it was the one who, by its governmental authority, issued the titles
to the subject property.
This action is barred by the principles of prescription and
laches for plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly
against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering defendants
acquired the subject property in good faith and for value. If truly
plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on the subject property,
it should not have waited thirty (30) years to bring suit.
Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint in
intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.[15] He expressly named therein as
defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the
original defendants, but also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William
Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged
in the answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.[16]
The following portions of De Leons complaint in intervention in Civil Case No.
4674MN are relevant, viz:
2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino
citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46
C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be
served with summons and other court processes;
3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age
and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del
Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the property in
question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;
4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office
in Malabon City, where he may be served with summons and other
court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of
registering decrees of Land Registration in Malabon City under the
Land Registration Act;
xxx
7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of land
located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is attached to this
Complaint as Annex G, and copy of the location plan of the
aforementioned property is attached to this complaint as Annex H and
is made an integral part hereof;
8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on
intervenors property, most of them employees of defendant spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who
had gained access to intervenors property and built their houses
without benefit of any building permits from the government who had
made their access to intervenors property thru a two panel metal gate
more or less 10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate
and with permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo
and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee illegally entered
intervenors property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall
now separating intervenors property from the former esquinita which
is now part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoos and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lees property and this illegally allowed
his employees as well as their relatives and friends thereof to illegally
enter intervenors property through the ladders defendant spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said
employees and relatives as well as friends to build houses and
shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as permit to
occupy said illegal buildings;
9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no. 3 as
described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at its opening on C.
Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance to
intervenors property as could be seen from Annex H hereof and thus
preventing intervenor from entering into his property resulted in
preventing intervenor from fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits
from his property;
10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later
on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only
people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter
intervenors property and their control over intervenors property
is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising illegal
beneficial rights over intervenors property at intervenors loss
and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate income
from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenors
property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from
enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of
access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon Navotas
River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public
property exclusively to enrich their pockets;
xxx
13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working
and helping one another in their actions to inhibit intervenor
Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his
property;
On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the defendants named in De
Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an answer to the complaint in intervention
with counterclaim and cross-claim,[17] stating that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx
are now both deceased, to wit:
xxx
2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are
ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee
Lim are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by
the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago
acquired the same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased. Copy of the TCT No.
M-35929 is attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 1-A.The same title has
already been previously submitted to this Honorable Court
on December 13, 2006.
xxx
The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called clarification
and submission,[18] in which he again adverted to the deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu, as follows:
1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed
before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of Defendants in
the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DENR;
2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that
the two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon,
which are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been
sold and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention
defendants Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to said Motion as
Annex 1 thereof.
3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject
property, have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the
property. It is on this factual ground that this Motion for
 Substitution is based and certainly not on the wrong position of
Intervenor de Leon that the same is based on the death of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.
4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the
demise of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has
any significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show
the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death certificates
are attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 2 hereof.
5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal
Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is the
clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein movants-
defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the said
principal complaint.
6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the
indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR,
being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject property
and the real parties-in-interest in this case. Without them, no final
determination can be had in the Principal complaint.
7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon,
which is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically, if
not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim, and
likewise, may as well be a proper subject of the Principal Complaint of
plaintiff DENR.
8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein
movants-defendants Lim should be substituted as defendants in the
principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated June 3,
2009, which has been filed in this case.
WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most
respectfully submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the
Principal Complaint and pray that the same be granted.
xxx
Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the aforequoted
pleadings of the defendants?
A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent
directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-
claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu were already deceased.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings
might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still
living, we still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For
one, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties
when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such,
his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an
attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of
ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e.,
Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of
the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that
the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as
a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the
litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint
in intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and
William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other
party.
III
Good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar
According to Justice Cardozo, [19] xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however
innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in
such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.
A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer
every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and
the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous
complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings
any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.
The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the
respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil
Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter
of the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of
the accusation apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint
sooner than later.
WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed
against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
[A.C. No. 5041. November 23, 2004]
SALVADOR G. VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON F.
ISHIWATA, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Complainant Salvador G. Villanueva seeks the disbarment of Atty. Ramon F.
Ishiwata, herein respondent, for gross professional misconduct.
In his amended complaint filed with this Court on April 12, 1999, [1] complainant
alleged that sometime in May, 1994, he hired respondent to handle his case, NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-05-03808-94[2] against J.T. Transport, Inc. for payment of his unpaid wages,
separation pay, and other benefits.
Due to insistence of respondent, complainant executed a Special Power of
Attorney designating the former as his attorney-in-fact.[3]
In the course of the proceedings at the NLRC, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement whereby for a consideration of P225,000.00, complainant
agreed to release J.T. Transport from all its obligations to him. As a result, respondent
signed a Quitclaim and Release for and on behalf of complainant. The NLRC then
considered NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03808-94 closed and terminated.
Sometime between June and August 1998, J.T. Transport delivered four (4) checks
to respondent in the sum of P225,000.00 as payment of complainants claims. However,
respondent gave complainant only P45,000.00 as first installment, without advising him
that the settlement award had been paid in full.
Subsequently, complainant learned that J.T. Transport had fully settled its
obligations to him. Thus, he made repeated demands upon respondent to deliver to him
the balance. But the latter refused to comply, prompting complainant to hire the services
of a new lawyer who sent respondent a demand letter. Still, respondent refused to pay.
In his comment on the complaint, respondent denied the charge. He alleged that it
was actually one Zenaida Villanueva, claiming to be complainants wife, who actually
engaged his services. Due to a serious ailment, he secured the services of another
person to do research work for a contingent fee with complainants acquiescence. In fact,
from the amount of P225,000.00, he paid that other person P33,000.00 with
complainants knowledge.
Respondent also alleged that since J.T. Transport paid in installments, the sums
delivered to complainant were also in installments. Initially, complainant
received P45,000.00. As the money came in, respondent paid complainants
wife P90,000.00 in two installments, one in the sum of P11,000.00 and another in the
amount of P79,000.00. However, the receipts she signed were misplaced by
respondents secretary. Respondent deducted his 25% attorneys fee or P56,250.00 from
the award. According to his computation, all the payments are in the total sum
of P224,250.00, leaving only P750.00 due and owing to complainant.
On October 11, 1999, we resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90)
days from notice.[4]
On July 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court Resolution
No. XVI-2004-225 dated April 16, 2004, adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The latter found respondent guilty
as charged and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year; that he return the sums of P90,000.00 and P33,000.00 to complainant; and that his
attorneys fee in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03808-94 be reduced from 25% to 10% of
the settlement award.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Canon 16 and Rules 16.01 to 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come to his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon Transport
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements; giving notice promptly Less:
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
P22,500.00 - Representing the allowable 10%

Respondent violated the above provisions and should thus be penalized.

____________ - attorneys fees

Obviously, respondents failure to return the balance to complainant upon demand

P199,500.00 - Amount due to complainant
gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed
on him. His act is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to
something not his and which he had no right. As found by the Investigating Less:
Commissioner, out of the settlement amount of P225,000.00, respondent gave
complainant only P45,000.00. His claim that he gave complainants alleged wife the P45,000.00 - Actual amount paid to
amount of P11,000.00 and P79,000.00 is not true. He could not show the corresponding
receipts. In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza,[5] we held that conversion by a lawyer of the funds _____________ complainant
entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of the public
confidence in the legal profession.
P154,500.00 - Total balance which respondent

The relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature.
[6]
Under his oath, a lawyer pledges himself not to delay any man for money and he is
bound to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients. A lawyer should thus refrain
from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage
of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Accordingly, any money collected for the
client or other trust property coming into the lawyers possession should promptly be
reported by him.[7] A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the erring
lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court. [8]
We agree with the holding of the Investigating Commissioner that since what
respondent handled was merely a labor case, his attorneys fee should not exceed 10%,
the rate allowed under the Labor Code. [9] Accordingly, his legal fee should be reduced
from P56,250.00 to P22,500.00 only.
We likewise sustain the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent
should pay the complainant the following amounts:
should pay complainant
The IBP Board of Governors recommended penalty of one (1) year is in order. In a
recent case[10] wherein respondent lawyer failed to deliver to his clients the sum
of P236,000.00 awarded to them by the trial court, we imposed upon him suspension
from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Ishiwata is hereby declared guilty of
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of a copy of
this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. He is ordered to restitute to complainant the sum of P154,500.00 from
notice. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate them to all courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies
for their information and guidance.

P225,000.00 - Total amount received from J.T.