SPOUSES ALBERTO GARRIDO AND COLOMA DAGURO, petitioners, (P3,000.00) pesos . . .
00) pesos . . . shall be paid pro rata monthly for ten (10)
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RUFINO AND CONRADA
SUPLEMENTO, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Franklin J. Andrada for private respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Tomas Hingco, a widower, originally owned Lot 209 of the Dingle
Cadastre, Iloilo. He married Consolacion Rondael, a widow, who had
a daughter Magdalena Rondael. In 1947 he donated one half (1/2)
of Lot 209 to his stepdaughter Magdalena subject to the condition
that she could not sell, transfer or cede the same. When he died,
Consolacion inherited the remaining half of Lot 209 which, in turn,
was inherited by Magdalena upon the death of Consolacion.
Consequently, the entire Lot 209 was registered in the name of
Magdalena Rondael, married to Lorenzo Daguro, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
T-13089.
In 1973 Magdalena sold a portion of Lot 209 (Lot 209-B) to Mariano
Platinos and Florida Macahilo. The remaining portion (Lot 209-A)
with an area of 343 square meters is the subject of this litigation.
In 1976 Lorenzo Daguro died. Magdalena then filed before the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition to cancel the lien
prohibiting her from disposing of Lot 209-A because she needed
money for her subsistence and medical expenses as she was then
in her 80's. Besides, she was sickly. 1 He deposition on oral
examination in connection with her petition was taken on 24
January 1979. 2
On 17 August 1978, during the pendency of her petition,
Magdalena executed a Conditional Deed of Sale of Lot 209-A in
favor of respondent spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento
"subject to the lien subsisting and annotated on the face of the
Certificate of Title." 3 Magdalena agreed to bear the cost of the
cancellation of the lien and respondents to be bound thereby as
long as it subsisted, with the understanding that in the event the
lien was not cancelled, the amount already paid would be
refunded. It was further stipulated that "out of the Nineteen
Thousand (P19,000.00) consideration . . . only Three Thousand
1
years and to convene (commence?) one (1) year from the date of
this Deed." 4
On 24 January 1979 the petition for cancellation of encumbrance
was denied for the reason that the ground cited for the cancellation
was not one of those allowed by Sec. 112 of Act 496 and that
Magdalena failed to produce the deed of donation which contained
the alleged restriction. Nonetheless, on 19 July 1979 Magdalena
executed with the conformity of her husband a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering Lot 209-A in favor of respondents, spouses Rufino and
Conrada Suplemento. 5 The deed was notarized on the same date.
On 13 April 1982, Magdalena died. On 2 December 1982 TCT No. T-
108689 was issued in the name of the Suplementos. 6
Magdalena had two (2) daughters but only one is still living, Coloma
Daguro, married to Alberto Garrido, the spouses being the
petitioners herein. They were based in Davao City and would visit
Magdalena only on occasions. In February 1984, Alberto Garrido
visited the Suplementos in the house where Magdalena used to
live. 7 He wanted to find out if the taxes on the house were being
paid. In reply, respondents showed him the Deed of Absolute Sale
signed by his parents-in-law and it was only then that he came to
know that Lot 209-A no longer belonged to his in-laws.
On 28 October 1985 petitioners Coloma Daguro and Alberto Garrido
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 209-A, reconveyance
and damages claiming that the deed was fictitious since
Magdalena's signature thereon "appears to have been traced" and
Lorenzo Daguro's signature was likewise a forgery since he died
prior to the execution thereof, or on 9 October 1976. 8
The trial court, relying on the deposition of Magdalena on 24
January 1979, found that she wanted to sell and did in fact sell Lot
209-A to the Suplementos. In addition, the court found that the
genuineness of Lorenzo Daguro's signature was not germane to the
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale as said signature was not
necessary to convey title to the paraphernal property of
Magdalena. To petitioners' credit, it held that no evidence was
adduced by respondents to show payment of any installment of the
balance of the purchase price to Magdalena before her death or to
her heir, Coloma. Thus, judgment was rendered on 19 October
1988 declaring the sale of 19 July 1979 valid but ordering the
Suplementos to pay petitioners P16,000.00 with legal rate of
interest until fully paid. 9
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
Iloilo trial court in its decision of 27 February 1991 10 and denied
reconsideration on 29 July 1991. 11
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that
they have no personality to assail the Absolute Deed of Sale and
the genuineness of the signature of Magdalena Rondael.
Petitioners assert that the issue raised in the trial court was
whether Magdalena Rondael could sell the property despite the
prohibition in the deed of donation. In ruling that they were
incapacitated to question the non-observance of the condition,
respondent court went beyond the issue, hence, exceeded its
jurisdiction.
We find for respondents. Petitioners have no personality to question
the violation of the restriction because they are not heirs of the
donor. When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
imposed by the donor, it is the donor who has the right to impugn
the validity of the transaction affecting the donated property,
conformably with Art. 764 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
right to revoke may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor and
may be exercised against the heirs of the donee, and the action
prescribes four years after the violation of the condition.
Petitioners' lack of capacity to question the non-compliance with
the condition is intimately connected with the issue regarding the
validity of the sale on account of the prohibition in the deed of
donation. Thus, we have established the rule that an unassigned
error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which
2
the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent,
may be considered by the appellate court. 12
Petitioners also submit that the finding of the appellate court that
the signature of Magdalena Rondael in the Deed of Absolute Sale is
genuine has been overtaken by events. In a letter dated 1 August
1991, the Regional Director of the NBI, Iloilo City, furnished the
Iloilo City Prosecutor with a copy of NBI Questioned Document
Report No. 413-791 dated 23 July 1991, purporting to show that the
questioned signature as well as the standard/sample signatures of
the deceased Magdalena Rondael were not written by one and the
same person, 13 hence, a forgery.
Admittedly, the NBI report was never adduced before the lower
courts; in fact, it is presented for the first time and only before this
Court. Obviously, this is not a newly discovered evidence within the
purview of Sec. 1, par. (b), Rule 37, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
should have thought of having the signature of Magdalena Rondael
on the deed of sale examined when the case was still with the trial
court. Nothing would have stopped them from doing so. Hence, it is
now late, too late in fact, to present it before this Court.
Petitioners' reliance on the NBI report as basis for new trial on the
ground of "newly discovered evidence" is a mistake. In the first
place, the rule is explicit that a motion for new trial should be filed
before the trial court and within the period for appeal. In the second
place, in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as "newly discovered" for the purpose of granting new
trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence had
been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have
been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and, (c) the evidence is
material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted would
probably alter the result. 14 At the pitch of these requirements is
that what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to
the knowledge of the party now submitting it; rather, that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in producing or
locating such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless
failed to secure it. The NBI report does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence because the second requirement was not
complied with. Petitioners did not exercise reasonable diligence in
procuring such evidence before or during trial. By their own
admission, the Fiscal sought NBI assistance only after the trial of
the case. They could have done so themselves when their case was
tried. Besides, when the City Prosecutor requested the NBI for a
handwriting examination in connection with petitioners' criminal
complaint for falsification against respondents, the initial response
of the NBI was: "no definite opinion can be rendered on the matter
due to lack of sufficient basis necessary for a scientific comparative
examination." 15 From there it can be deduced that petitioners did
not submit adequate documents before the NBI at the first
instance, thus showing their want of reasonable diligence in
procuring the evidence they needed for a new trial.
We accord finality to the finding of respondent court, supported as
it is by substantial evidence, that the alleged discrepancy between
the signature of Magdalena Rondael appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale and her signatures on the Conditional Deed of Sale,
petition to cancel the annotation prohibiting the sale of the
donated property, petitioners' reply to opposition, 16 transcript of
her deposition dated 24 January 1979, and the deed of sale of Lot
209-B, does not exist. Having alleged forgery, petitioners had the
burden of proof. Here, they utterly failed. They even attached to
their complaint five receipts purportedly signed by Magdalena but,
except for one which was signed "Magdalena Rondael," said
receipts were signed "Magdalena Daguro." 17 Besides, there is not
showing that the signatures presented as bases for comparison are
themselves genuine. On the other hand, the Deed of Absolute Sale
is a notarized document which carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon such public document with respect to its due
execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals of 27 February 1991 as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr.,
Quiason and Kapunan JJ. concur.
3
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-15939 January 31, 1966
ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist
that the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the
property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949
indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime,
otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous, and
they cite American authorities in support.
This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to
dispose were the only indication to be considered in deciding
whether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis
causa or inter vivos. But such is not the case. The Court in its
decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but
also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared
her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and further
forbade the registration of the deed until after her death. All these
features concordantly indicated that the conveyance was not
intended to produce any definitive effects, nor to finally pass any
interest to the grantee, except from and after the death of the
grantor.
We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or
interest in the properties described was meant to be transferred to
Doa Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor, Carmen
Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not ownership, certainly, for the
stipulation:
Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no se
registrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo
sino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante
necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration
Act, that the deed in question should not take effect as a
conveyance nor bind the land until after the death of the "donor".
Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Doa
Estela Magbanua, in view of the express condition that (paragraph
3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold,
or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other
persons or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Caridad
Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, and
such payment was to be made on the date the donee took
possession of Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy to
Caridad Ubalde would not definitely arise until after the death of
the donor, because only by then would it become certain that the
"donor" could not transfer the property to someone else, and such
payment must precede the taking possession of the property
"donated", it necessarily follows that the "donee's" taking of
possession could not occur before the death of the donor.
It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is one
that produces no effect until the death of the grantor, we are
clearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law.
We thus see no need of resorting to American authorities as to the
import of the reservation of the donor's right to dispose of the
donated property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear on this
point:
4
Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que
determina la adquisicion o el derecho a los bienes; desde el
montento en que la disposicion puede ser revocada
voluntariamente, se salva la linea divisoria entre unos y
otros actos: la donacion equivale a un legado; mas aun que
esto: es un legado en realidad. (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107)
Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha
de la ejecucion para el momento de su muerte, sino
que ademas se reserva la facultad de revocar a su arbitrio
la disposicion, entonces el acto no es valido bajo la forma de
contrato; hay en realidad una disposicion mortis causa que
exige las solemnidades del testamento. (V Manresa, 5th Ed.,
p. 109) (Emphasis supplied)
The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the
erroneous concept of the true nature of the juridical act, and does
not indicate that in the same is a true donation inter vivos.
Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of the
donor to convey the donated property to other parties during her
lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one) that
confirms the passing of the title to the donee. In reality, this
argument is a veritable petitio principii; it takes for granted what
has to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passed under
the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until
thedonor has died.
It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the
deed of donation of December 28, 1949 with that established in the
contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43 Phil.
874, invoked by appellants.
In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the late
Doa Carmen Ubalde imposed expressly that:
Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar,
vender, traspasar e hipotecar a cualesquiera personas o
 entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la Donataria
en concepto de Donacion mortis causa.

In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the
condition read:

It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be

installed in said factory fail, for any reason, to arrive, in the
City of Manila within the period of six (6) months from date
hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the party of the
second part at its option, such cancellation, however, not to
occur before the expiration of such six (6) months. (pp. 874-
875, cas. cit.).

In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after
six months, so that there could be no doubt that it was in force at
least for that long, and the optional cancellation can be viewed as a
resolutory condition (or more properly, a non-retroactive revocatory
one); but no such restriction limited the power of the donor, Doa
Carmen Ubalde, to set at naught the alleged conveyance in favor of
Doa Estela Magbanua by conveying the property to other parties
at any time, even at the very next instant after executing the
donation, if she so chose. It requires no argument to demonstrate
that the power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the
donation at any time, and that it meant that the transfer is not
binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to
channel the property elsewhere. Which, in the last analysis, as held
in our main decision, signifies that the liberality is testamentary in
nature, and must appear with the solemnities required of last wills
and testaments in order to be legally valid.

Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied. CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon and Zaldivar, JJ., COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N.
concur. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND
REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

5
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed
that of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City directing petitioner to
reconvey to private respondents the property donated to it by their
predecessor-in-interest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine College
(now Central Philippine University [CPU]), executed a deed of
donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion of Lot
No. 3174-B, for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A was
issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following
annotations copied from the deed of donation
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for
the establishment and use of a medical college with all its
buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third
party nor in any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and
the said college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone
bearing that name. Any net income from the land or any of its
parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus
and erection of a building thereon. 1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don
Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since 1939
up to the time the action was filed the latter had not complied with
the conditions of the donation. Private respondents also argued
that petitioner had in fact negotiated with the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property with another
land owned by the latter.
6
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents
to file the action had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the
conditions in the deed of donation because it never used the
donated property for any other purpose than that for which it was
intended; and, that it did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third
party.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply
with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void.
The court a quo further directed petitioner to execute a deed of the
reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of the donor,
namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993
ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of
title were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate
the rights of the donee thus making the donation revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition
mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property for the
establishment of a medical school, the donor did not fix a period
within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a period
was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner could not
be considered as having failed to comply with its part of the
bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its decision reversing
the appealed decision and remanding the case to the court of origin
for the determination of the time within which petitioner should
comply with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in
holding that the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of
petitioner are onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of the
donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would
render the donation revocable; (b) in holding that the issue of
prescription does not deserve "disquisition;" and, (c) in remanding
the case to the trial court for the fixing of the period within which
petitioner would establish a medical college. 2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the
conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don
Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his
donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration
which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when
a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the
donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila requiring the latter to
erect schools, construct a children's playground and open streets
on the land was considered an onerous donation. 3 Similarly, where
Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner
but imposed an obligation upon the latter to establish a medical
college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous
consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the
acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to
another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a
school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one. 4 It is not correct to say that
the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became
effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the
land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor.
The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. 5 If
there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all
rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed
lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of
private respondents is unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a
medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the
exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be
fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to
comply with the condition thereof. Since the time within which
the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will
of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance
7
and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of
donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations
from barring the action of private respondents upon the original
contract which was the deed of donation. 6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the
revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated
cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of
action arises when that which should have been done is not done,
or that which should not have been done is done. 7 In cases where
there is no special provision for such computation, recourse must
be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on
which the corresponding action could have been instituted. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the
starting point for the computation of the period. In this case, the
starting point begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and
opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it
by the donor.
The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and
the necessary buildings and improvements on the property cannot
be quantified in a specific number of years because of the
presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the
erection of an educational institution, such as government laws and
regulations pertaining to education, building requirements and
property restrictions which are beyond the control of the donee.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature
and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended,
the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies,
which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because
the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until
after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and
such period has arrived. 8
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the
different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More
than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its
favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence,
there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation
when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality
and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an
unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits. 9 Moreover,
under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors cannot
comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just
cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance,
there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission
claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a
gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least
transmission of rights and interests. 10 Records are clear and facts
are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up
to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to
comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its
obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just
and equitable now to declare the subject donation already
ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31
May 1991 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals of 18 June 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner
is directed to reconvey to private respondents Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the
subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
3910-A within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Quiason and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM
and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, respondents.
8
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs. Wilfredo Palma, et al., which
declared null and void the donation made by respondents of a
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality
of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim
and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of
land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be
used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. [1] This
donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor
of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of
Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was
constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated
parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since
the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School
Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur,
Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially
transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school
site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable
location which would fit the specifications of the
government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and
Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter.
Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were
constructed on the new school site and the school building
previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and
transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the
property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that
he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim
endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated
property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a
case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for
Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of
Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of
Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma,
Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its Decision
dated 20 August 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.[2] The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no
breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of
Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since it is still for
the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and
improvement of the school facilities within the community. The
Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the
donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of
exchange is a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs
(Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee, being the State had the greater
reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and onerous contract of
donation. It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to
technically preclude the donee from expanding its school site and
improvement of its school facilities, a paramount objective of the
donee in promoting the general welfare and interests of the people
of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if the
9
contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in question, the
doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests, which in the instant case, is the donee.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony
and reconciliation between the parties;
3. With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 22
October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds
that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition
imposed on the donation was violated.[4]
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following
issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID
ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A CONDITION IN THE
DONATION.[5]
The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.
 Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
the donation null and void for the reason that the acceptance was
not allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745 [6] and 749[7] of
the New Civil Code.
We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or
compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or
simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.
[8]
This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a
remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the
purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do
not amount to a demandable debt. [9] A conditional or modal
donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of
future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions,
limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior
than that of the donation given.[10] Finally, an onerous donation is
that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be
more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated.[11]
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous
type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms
of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not
by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard,
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the
rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of
the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which
is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build
a school on the donated property.[12]
10
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance
of the donation because:
xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The
acceptance may either be in the same document as the deed of
donation or in a separate public instrument. If the acceptance is in
a separate instrument, "the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly noticed
thereof. (Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs. Geraldez,
78 SCRA 245). If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept, But in
this case, it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the
donor and the fact that due notice has been given it must be
noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and
that showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation
perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of the
Philippines by Tolentino.)."
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as
exhibit "A" and "1" to determine whether there was acceptance of
the donation. This Court found none. We further examined the
record if there is another document which embodies the
acceptance, we found one.Although the Court found that in the
offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit
"8" appears to have been offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by
the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on
record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed
acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required
under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And according to Manresa, supra,
a noted civilist, the notation is one of the requirements of
perfecting a donation. In other words, without such a notation, the
contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not
perfected, the contract is therefore not valid.[13]
xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,
or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall
be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charge which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be
noted in both instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of
exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit
"8," was offered in evidence. However, private respondents now
question this exhibit because, according to them "there is nothing
in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been
admitted nor such exhibit appear on record."
11
Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial
court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this
exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of
Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the
validity of the donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the
acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take
respondents more than ten (10) years from the date of the
donation to question its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of
estoppel.[14]
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid
acceptance of the donation, the acceptance was not noted in the
Deed of Donation as required in Article 749 of the Civil Code,
hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a
donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated
to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[15]
the Court held:
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate
public instrument and that it was duly communicated to the
donors. Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do
contend is that such acceptance was not "noted in both
instruments," meaning the extrajudicial partition itself and the
instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two
instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was
made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument
contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this
donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness
and liberality of the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe
Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for
the separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month
later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion
that the annulment of the donation for being defective in form as
urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the
unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However,
we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a literal
adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice
to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is
also a policy of the Court to avoid such as interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the
acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In
the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of
the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that
the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by
Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in
conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no
notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form
over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the
acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate
instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later acknowledged by
Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately
constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the
donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association
of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being
dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property
that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence
of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the
acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the
donor.
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio
Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of
12
a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines, it
is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized
under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances
may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of
its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are not prohibited by law.
Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in
exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the condition
in the donation that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes
only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes"
convey? "School" is simply an institution or place of education.
[16]
"Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to
accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan,
project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be
attained, an intention, etc."[17] "Exclusive" means "excluding or
having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring
from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to
possession, control or use.[18]
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was
not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the
purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the
lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of
the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved
the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong
Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the
limited area of the donated lot.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,

JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001]

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. GLICERIA ALCANTARA,

LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE
REYES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of

Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of
land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of 94 square
meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.

The Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos consists of two

pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is
signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta
Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. [1] The second
page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that
Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and
deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the
signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the
right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other
witness.[2] The Acknowledgment reads:

13
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265
issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and to me
known to be the same person who executed the foregoing
instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her own free
and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages,
including the page on which this acknowledgement is written, has
been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental witnesses
at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of page 2 and both
pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of
Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY
PUBLIC
Until December
31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds
and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No.
143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
14
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that
he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara,
Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalinas only surviving
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating
unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against
petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of
Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of
Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-26603
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently,
respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo T. San
Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was
no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument,
thus rendering the donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial
court held that nowhere in Catalinas SSS records does it appear
that Violeta was Catalinas daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to
therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence
that the adoption was legal.On the other hand, the trial court found
that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court
ruled that respondents deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be
registered. The trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes
and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real
property inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina
Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and to
issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate of
Catalina Quilala;
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of
the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1.) and the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate
of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing
of probate proceedings of Catalinas alleged last will and testament.
[4]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without
prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate proceedings by the
interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the
lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied on February 11, 1998.[5] Hence, this petition for
review, raising the following assignment of errors:
15
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS
NOT REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE
LOWER COURTS RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT
THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.[6]
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation
executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the
Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument in order to be valid,[7] specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee,[8] and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee,[9]provided the donee is not disqualified
or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, [10] and
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property. [11] The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both
the donor and the donee.[12] It may be made in the same deed or in
a separate public document,[13] and the donor must know the
acceptance by the donee.[14]
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number
of the certificate of title as well as the technical description as the
real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for
and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity.
[15]
This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is
legally defined as an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
[16]
The donees acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation
made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her
appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of
the DONOR.[17]
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only
the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for
Violetas failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary
public, the same was set forth merely on a private
instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in
the form of public instruments shall
be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be
signed by the person or persons executing the same in the
presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon,
and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the
person or persons executing the same before a notary public or
other public officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgment. Where the instrument so acknowledged consists
of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment
is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not
contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary
public, except the page where the signatures already appear at the
foot of the instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by
the person or persons executing the instrument and their
witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this
fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the
acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a
sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of
16
land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said
acknowledgment. (underscoring ours).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on
which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and
one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the
other witness on the right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement
that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the
left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment
of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is
designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same
has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a
contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the
instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is
written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement
in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied
with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation null and
void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure,
it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is
explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
 It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts,
can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter
of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues Republic of the Philippines
should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement SUPREME COURT
proceedings affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Manila
Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we declare
herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its EN BANC
inofficiousness under Article 771,[18] in relation to Articles 752, 911
and 912 of the Civil Code.Moreover, property donated inter vivos is G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
subject to collation after the donors death, [19] whether the donation
HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,
was made to a compulsory heir or a stranger, [20] unless there is an
vs.
express prohibition if that had been the donors intention.[21] COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.
GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is Inocencio Rosete for respondents.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered
dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603. REYES, J.B.L., J.:

SO ORDERED. This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals

holding two deeds of donation executed on the first day of
December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be void
JJ., concur. for being donations mortis causa accomplished without the
formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions.

The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan

(Case No. 8892) on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and
other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both
deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged
that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then
already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two
notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his
brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato,
respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the
municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both
donations having been duly accepted in the same act and
documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations
were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The
defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring
that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in
consideration of past services rendered by them to the late
17
Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the
use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and
prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of
P2,000.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on
November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation were
executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without
pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter
vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy
dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties
donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during
the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the
donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the
three parcels of land described therein.
Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assigning as primary error the holding of the court below that the
donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they
were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had not
been executed with the formalities required for testamentary
disposition.
A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under
consideration, and on January 12, 1953, the majority rendered
judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void,
because they were donations mortis causa and were executed
without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and
ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the
possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants.
Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said donations should be
considered as donations inter vivos and voted for the affirmance of
the decision of the Court of First Instance. The donees then sought
a review by this Court.
The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical
nature of the donations in question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are
couched in identical terms, with the exception of the names of the
donees and the number and description of the properties donated.
The principal provisions are the following.
ESCRITURA DE DONATION
18
Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de
edad, vencino y residente del municipio de Agno,
Pangasinan, I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente:
Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de
edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de
su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hagor
y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a
favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno
palayero como se describe mas abajo.
(Description omitted)
Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe
Bonsato hasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y
estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido
todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea
movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa de sus
trabajos y aprecios a mi favor.
Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha
entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba
citados pero de los productos mientras vive el donante
tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo y la parte
como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato.
Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe
Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos
terrenos a su favor.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donancion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos
los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo
absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y
gravamen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea
conveniente.
En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno,
Pangasinan, I.F., hoy dia 1.0 de Diciembre, 1939.
Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato

Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de
Mabini, Pangasinan, I.F., declaro por la presente que acepto
la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi
favor.
(Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato
SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible
The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals
that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the last
paragraph, stressing the passage:
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donacion . . .
while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph,
wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and
consummated donation" of the properties to the respective donees,
petitioners herein.
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question
embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe
the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of
the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present
that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the
Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one
may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by
merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the
19
testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an
independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the
death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of
property by will and shall be governed by the rules
established for testamentary successions.
Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2
parte, pp. 573, 575 says:
No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las
donaciones mortis causa como institucion independiente,
con propia autonomia y propio compo jurisdiccional? La
respuesta debe ser negativa.
xxx xxx xxx
Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo
como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un
Museo. La asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de
muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the
same opinion:
"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o,
que han desaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis
causa por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto;
2.o, que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la
muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion
testamentaria.
And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p. 176,
reiterates:
(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis
causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las
donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el Codigo Civil su
caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos
hoy como una institucion suprimida, refundida en el
legado ... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones
mortis causa en nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya
 precedentemente por el pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que
constituye una communis opinion entre nuestros
expositores, incluso los mas recientes.
We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to
emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly
employed is merely a convenient name to designate those
dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of
donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or
dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the
latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following
characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108;
Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of
donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato.
The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras
viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a
reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the
donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the
absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations;
on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be
"irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of
the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or
restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil
Code, Art. 828).
20
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the
phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation
shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante
entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must
be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus
taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's
death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and
encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved
for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such
reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would
disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become
vested in the donees.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos
derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueo absoluto
de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y
puede ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.
Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict
with the irrevocability of the donation and its consummated
character, as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation, a
conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; New
Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule 123, sec. 59, Rules of Court).
Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor de
edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de su
largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hago y otorgo
una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado
Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se
describe mas abajo.
In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and
declared invalid for not having been executed with the formalities
of testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the transferor's
intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus,
in Cario vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not
to be given until thirty days after the death of the last of the
donors, but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had
been mentioned to inherit from us", the verb "to inherit" clearly
implying the acquisition of property only from and after the death
of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549;
92 Phil., 244, the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to
dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death,
and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left
undisposed by me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their
ownership until his death. While in David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz.
(Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herself all the
fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more
important, specially provided that "without the knowledge and
consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed
of in any way", thereby denying to the transferees the most
essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the
properties. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of
donation involved in this appeal.

That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the
donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no particular
significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits 1 and 2
constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have
identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such
consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the
transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title
to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the
conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the
Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid
because the formalities of testaments were not observed. Being
donations inter vivos, the solemnities required for them were those
prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in
Art. 749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly
complied with. As the properties involved were conjugal, the Court
of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not
affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et
al. from the predeceased wife of the donor.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the

Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against
respondents.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,

Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur

21
 On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of
donation[3] over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property in
favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]). The deed provided,
among others:
FIRST DIVISION
That for and in consideration of the benefits that may be derived
from the use of the above described property which is intended for
THE SECRETARY OF G.R. No. 164748 school purposes, the said DONORS do by by (sic) these presents
EDUCATION and DR. BENITO TRANSFER AND CONVEY by way of DONATION unto the DONEE, its
TUMAMAO, Schools Division Present: successors and assigns, the above property to become effective
Superintendent of Isabela, upon the signing of this document.[4]
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, Transfer
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143337[5] covering the portion
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and identified as Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the Ministry of
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the
Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However, the property was
HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY, Promulgated: not used for school purposes and remained idle.
SR., represented by IGNACIA
VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY, January 27, 2006 Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started
JR., SUSANA DULAY, construction of the Rizal National High School building on a parcel
ADELAIDA DULAY, of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The school site was
LUZVIMINDA DULAY and
about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the
CECILIA DULAY,
Respondents. spouses Dulay.
x------------------------------------ -------------
-x In a letter[6] to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the
spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to them
DECISION considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a period of
more than 13 years. On
August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 39[7] recognizing the right
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
of the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land because of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 which affirmed the
DECS failure to utilize it for the intended purpose. It further
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela,
resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer needed the
Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-2397
donated land considering its distance from the main campus and
The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were the owners [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period of time.
of a parcel of land located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela, with an area
On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at the age of
of 29,002 square meters. The lot was covered by Original
80.[8] His heirs sought the help of the Sangguniang
Certificate of Title No. P-6776.
22
Panlungsod of Santiago City via an undated letter[9] requesting the
approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the donated
property. The Sangguniang Panlungsod denied the request
inasmuch as the city government was not a party to the deed of
donation.[10]
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents,
filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of donation and
cancellation of TCT No. T-143337 before the RTC of Santiago City,
Isabela, Branch 35, against the DECS Secretary and Dr. Benito
Tumamao, the Schools Division Superintendent of
Isabela. Respondents alleged that there was a condition in the deed
of donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property
for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house
the Rizal National High School. Respondents alleged that the DECS
did not fulfill the condition and that the land remained idle up to
the present. Respondents also averred that the donation inter
vivos was inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more
than what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS complied with said
condition because the land was being used by the school as its
technology
and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not
inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels of
land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS acquired the
disputed property by virtue of purchase made on December 8,
1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the amount
of P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay Captain, Jesus
San Juan;[11] and (d) the action of the respondents had
prescribed. The OSG also claimed that students planted a portion of
the land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees; the
produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for the
construction of a school building on the subject property.
In their Reply,[12] respondents denied that the donated land was
being used as a technology and home economics laboratory, and
averred that there were no improvements on the
property. Moreover, the fact that rice was planted on the lot was
23
contrary to the intended purpose of the donation. The respondents
likewise denied that the property had been sold to
the barangay. While the other properties of the late donor had been
sold, the deeds thereon had not been registered, and the tax
declarations not yet transferred in the names of the purchasers.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On March 6, 2001, an ocular inspection of
the property was conducted by the parties and their respective
counsels, including the Presiding Judge. It was confirmed that the
land was barren, save for a small portion which was planted
with palay. A demolished house was also found in the periphery of
the donated lot.[13]
On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
of respondents. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby DECLARES the deed of donation, Exhibit A, executed by the
late Rufino Dulay, Sr. and his wife Ignacia Vicente over a portion of
the land covered by O.C.T. No. P-6776 and now covered by T.C.T.
No. T-143337 in the name of the donee Department of Education
and Culture as REVOKED. The defendant DECS is ORDERED to
execute the deed of reconveyance of the land in favor of the
plaintiffs heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In revoking the deed of donation, the trial court ruled that the
donation was subject to a resolutory condition, namely, that the
land donated shall be used for school purposes. It was no longer
necessary to determine the intended school purpose because it
was established that the donee did not use the land. Thus, the
condition was not complied with since the property was donated in
July 1981. Moreover, the DECS did not intend to use the property
for school purposes because a school had already been built and
established in another lot located in the same barangay, about two
kilometers away from the subject land. Finally, the trial court
rejected petitioners contention that the donation was inofficious.
Aggrieved, the OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
On July 30, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming
the decision. The court held that the DECS failed to comply with the
condition in the donation, that is, to use the property for school
purposes. The CA further ruled that the donation was onerous
considering that the donee was burdened with the obligation to
utilize the land for school purposes; therefore, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 764 of the New Civil Code did not
apply.Moreover, the CA declared that a deed of
donation is considered a written contract and is governed by Article
1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides for a 10-year
prescriptive period from the time the cause of action
accrues. According to the CA, the respondents cause of action for
the revocation of the donation should be reckoned from the
expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the DECS to comply with
what was incumbent upon it.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Petitioners seek relief from this Court via petition for review
on certiorari, contending that:
I. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THROUGH
THE RIZAL NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HAD COMPLIED WITH THE
CONDITION IMPOSED IN THE DEED OF DONATION.
II. RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO SEEK THE REVOCATION OF THE DEED
OF DONATION, IF THERE BE ANY, IS ALREADY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[15]
The Court shall resolve the issues raised by petitioners seriatim.
The donee failed to comply with the condition imposed in the deed
of donation
The issue of whether or not petitioner DECS was able to comply
with the condition imposed in the deed of donation is one of
fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query
necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence considering
24
mostly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and
to the whole and probabilities of the situation.[16] Under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari, for the simple reason
that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to
calibrate the evidence on record, as this is the function of the trial
court. Although there are well-defined exceptions to the rule,
nevertheless, after a review of the records, we find no justification
to depart therefrom.Moreover, the trial courts findings of facts, as
affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, are binding on this
Court, unless the trial and appellate courts overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would change the outcome of the
case. The case has been reviewed thoroughly, and we find no
justification to reverse the CA decision.
Petitioners, through the OSG, maintain that the condition (to use
the property for school purposes) is not limited to the construction
of a school building, but includes utilizing it as a technology and
home economics laboratory where students and teachers
plant palay, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees. The OSG
insists that the donee did not specify in the deed that the property
should be used for the construction of a school building. According
to the OSG, the proceeds of the harvest were used and are still
being used by the Rizal National High School for the construction
and improvement of its present school site. Moreover, it was
verified that there was palay planted on the donated property
during the ocular inspection on the property.
In their comment on the petition, respondents dispute petitioners
contentions, and aver that no evidence was presented to prove
that, indeed, palay, mahogany seedlings and fruit-bearing trees
were planted on the property.Respondents also emphasized that
when the trial court inspected the subject property, it was
discovered to be barren and without any improvement although
some portions thereof were planted with palay. Petitioners even
failed to adduce evidence to identify the person who planted
the palay.
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the
donated property was used for school purposes as indicated in the
deed of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have
complied with the condition of donation. It is not amiss to state
that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants,
there is nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the
condition of donation has been complied with by the defendant-
appellants. In the same breadth, the planting of palay on the land
donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the
school purposes referred to and intended by the donors when they
had donated the land in question. Also, the posture of the
defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as
technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National
High School is far from being the truth considering that not only is
the said school located two kilometers away from the land donated
but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land
donated that would reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have
been conducted therein. These observations, together with the
unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the trial court which
revealed that the land donated remains idle and without any
improvement thereon for more than a decade since the time of the
donation, give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the
defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply with what is
incumbent upon them in the deed of donation. [17]
In its Order[18] dated March 6, 2001, the RTC reiterated that during
the ocular inspection of the property conducted in the presence of
the litigants and their counsel, it observed that the land was
barren; there were no improvements on the donated property
though a portion thereof was planted with palay [and a demolished
house built in 1979.]
25
Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove
that the palay found in the property was planted by DECS
personnel or at its instance or even by students of
the Rizal National High School. No evidence was adduced to prove
that there were existing plans to use the property for school
purposes. Petitioners even debilitated their cause when
they claimed in the trial court that the barangay acquired the
property by purchase, relying on the certification of
former Barangay Captain Jesus San Juan.
The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed
when respondents filed their complaint
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that
respondents cause of action is already barred by prescription under
Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four years from the non-
compliance with the condition in the deed of donation. Since such
failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for
school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the
DECS utilized another property for the construction of the school
building, the four-year prescriptive period did not commence on
such date. Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply
with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its
advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous
because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation to
utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of
the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially
a contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.[19] We fully
agree with the ruling of the appellate court:
xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-year prescriptive period
for the revocation of donation provided under Article 764 of the
New Civil Code and instead apply the general rules on contracts
since Article 733 of the same Code, specifically provided that
onerous donations shall be governed by the rules on contracts.
Corollarily, since a deed of donation is considered a written DECS has no use for the property; hence, the same shall be
contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reverted to the respondents.
provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a
written contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of action Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 dated July 30, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
is from the expiration of the time within which the donee must
SO ORDERED. ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In the
instant case, however, it must be noted that the subject donation Associate Justice
fixed no period within which the donee can comply with the WE CONCUR:
condition of donation. As such, resort to Article 1197 of the New ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBA Chief Justice
Civil Code is necessary. Said article provides that if the obligation
does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it Republic of the Philippines
can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the SUPREME COURT
duration thereof. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the Manila
condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period
SECOND DIVISION
was contemplated by the donors. The donors could not have
intended their property to remain idle for a very long period of time
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
when, in fact, they specifically obliged the defendant-appellants to
utilize the land donated for school purposes and thus put it in good
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE
use. xxx[20] ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals,[21] a case vs.
squarely in point, we have established that the legal possibility of HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED
bringing the action begins with the expiration of a reasonable SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
opportunity for the donee to fulfill what has been charged represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA
upon it by the donor. Likewise, we held that even if Article 1197 RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
of the New Civil Code provides that the courts may fix the duration
when the obligation does not determine the period but from its G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE
intended, the general rule cannot be applied because to do so
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
would be a mere technicality and would serve no other purpose FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive vs.
multiplication of suits.[22] HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED
SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
Altogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA
donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for the purpose RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
specified in the deed of donation. The property remained barren
and unutilized. Even after respondents sought the return of the Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of
property before the courts, petitioner DECS still failed to draw up Imus, Cavite.
plans to use the property for school purposes. In fine, petitioner
26
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05456 2 which
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order of said
respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the
reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX,
Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84
therein.3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23,
1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both
deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel
of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit,
Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less. The
deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not
dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100)
years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a
violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the
deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the
donors.
27
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still
within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese
of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a
deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in
favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration
of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds
of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner
spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its
assailed decision.4
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C.
Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein
private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to
sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus
also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2)
grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss
filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the
cause of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a
real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a
cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said
motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their
respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private respondents,
the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has
prescribed.5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and
(b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of
prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for
reconveyance of real property.6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that
the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing
appellants' complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-
84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed
their separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by
respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated February 6,
1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein
private respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked
at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter,"
and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-
compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of
the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4)
years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the
property donated in case of violation of the condition therein,
hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As
aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself
that the violation of the condition thereof would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the
opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to
have the donation judicially declared null and void for the
reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so.
28
For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the
donee contemplated a court action during the execution of
the deed of donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be
violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto
null and void" would not appear in the deed of donation.9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the
rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.10 It called
attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that
prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a
violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation
even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary
for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the
contract.11 It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper
only when there is absence of a special provision granting the
power of cancellation.12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts
involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not
apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil
Code provides that donationsinter vivos shall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does
not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a
resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision
that the same shall be considered ipso factorevoked upon the
breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as
is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory
application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present
controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing
for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor
upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent
case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held therein that
said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party
the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without
need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the
resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of the
contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a
judicial declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of
that case was an onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the
Civil Code is governed by the rules on contracts, since the donation
in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because of its
provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory
condition, from parity of reasons said pronouncements in De
Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for
automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper.14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should
apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of
said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without
prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory
act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no
error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a
written contract prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that
Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of
non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed
of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the
automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the
contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the
case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private
respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the
same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents
have no cause of action against petitioners.
29
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged
breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of
donation that the property donated should not be sold within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the
deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an
undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners
and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case
before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction
on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which
right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition
against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for
an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid
policy may be considered applicable by analogy.1wphi1Under the
third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit
partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator
declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty
(20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also
necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by
gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being
an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of
prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to
the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For that
reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to
prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policy
expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of
donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an
integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory
provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No
reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph
in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said
proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause
of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth
violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
private respondents must fail.
justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case.19 The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case
with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition
in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and
another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No.
095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.

It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in SO ORDERED.

the deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in the
pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.
inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and Padilla, J., took no part.
resolving the same. Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation

against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the
very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the
same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the
motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by
the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue
of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said
provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the
issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised,
it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error
since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same
provision.

This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even

if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case:16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related
to an error properly assigned,17 or upon which the determination of
the question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by
the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error.18

Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in
the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice,
has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to
the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
30
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