Hobbes and The Social Control of Unsociability

Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability
Oxford Handbooks Online

Quentin Skinner
The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes
Edited by Al P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra
Print Publication Date: Mar 2016

Subject: Philosophy, History of Western Philosophy (Post-Classical)
Online Publication Date: Dec 2013 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199791941.013.012
Abstract and Keywords
In addition to the three causes of war mentioned by Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan,

he adds stubbornness, unsociability, and arrogance in chapter 15. Since it is
impracticable to eliminate these unsociable forms of behavior as illegal, Hobbes
considers the recommendation of Italian Renaissance writers on civil conversation that
such behavior can be inhibited by mocking or ridiculing it. However, he urges that no
man reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem
of any other because such behavior causes quarrels and war. While this reasoning is
prudential, he also gives a moralistic reason. Scornful laughter is a sign of cowardice and
consequently dishonorable. As for dealing with unsociable people, Hobbess suggestion is
that the sociable must tolerate them, and toleration requires self-control.
Keywords: Hobbes, arrogance, civil conversation, sociability, unsociability, self-control, tolerance
HOBBES warns us in chapter 13 of Leviathan that there are three principal elements in our
nature that cannot fail to engender quarrels and war. The first is our competitiveness,
which makes us try to master the persons and property of others. The second is our
associated lack of trust, which prompts us to anticipate and respond to any threatened
assaults. The third is our thirst for glory, which leads us to react with hostility toward any
apparent signs of being undervalued.1 These propensities render us dissociate from one
other, as a result of which men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
grief) in keeping company.2 Still worse, we are apt to invade, and destroy one another,
whether in the name of making gains or protecting ourselves or upholding our elevated
sense of our value and worth.3 Cumulatively these invasions give rise to a war of every
man, against every man in which everyone is equally condemned to living without other
security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them
withall.4
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If any form of social life is to be possible, these destructive tendencies will obviously have
to be curbed and controlled. Hobbes turns in chapter 17 of Leviathan to consider how we
can hope to introduce the necessary methods of restraint. He concludes that the only
means by which men can hope to win security from their common enemies and the
injuries of one another will be to erect a visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them
by feare of punishment from engaging in acts of violence.5 More specifically, he argues,
the one and only route to security lies in covenanting, every man with every man, to
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men,
thereby agreeing to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his
Judgment.6
(p. 433) Hobbess analysis in chapter 13 of the unsociable qualities that dictate this
drastic solution appears at first sight to be complete. If we turn to chapter 15, however,
we find that he has more to say. There are various other passions, he now maintains, that
are common to mankind and are no less capablealthough in a more indirect wayof
giving rise to conflicts and war. Some people are Stubborn, Insociable, Froward,
Intractable, and these failures of civility are contrary to the fundamentall Law of
Nature, which commandeth to seek Peace.7 Others are prey to vengeful feelings of
vainglory, which provoke them into glorying in the hurt of another and thereby tendeth
to the introduction of Warre.8 Still others are prideful, thinking themselves better than
other men and refusing in consequence to enter into conditions of Peace.9 Finally, there
are those who suffer from overweening arrogance, who require for themselves, that
which they would not have to be granted to others and likewise undermine the prospects
of peaceful life.10
At the beginning of chapter 17 Hobbes argues that these more indirect threats to human
security will similarly have to be controlled by coercive force. He even suggests, rather
strangely, that the requirement of modesty will have to be enforced by the terror of some
Power.11 But he never enlarges on this suggestion, nor does he ever explain how the use
of legal means to compel men to follow the social virtues would be practicable. Even if we
cannot hope, however, to use the force of law to impose modesty upon the arrogant, or
tractability upon the froward, it remains obvious that these unsociable and potentially
contentious forms of behavior will somehow have to be resisted and controlledor at
least managed and coped withif any tolerable social life is to be sustained. How, then,
can this be done?
The question of how to cope with the unsociable had been widely canvassed in
Renaissance moral theory and especially in the genre of Italian writings on the topic of la
civil conversazione.12 Among numerous treatises on this subject, those which enjoyed the
widest circulation in England were Baldassare Castigliones Libro del cortegiano of 1528,
Giovanni della Casas Galateo of 1558, and Stefano Guazzos Civil conversazione of
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1574.13 All these texts were soon translated into English,14 and Castigliones Courtier was
reprinted at least six times in London (p. 434) before the end of the sixteenth century.15 A
number of imitations also appeared, including Simon Robsons Courte of civill courtesie of
1577, which purported to be a translation of an Italian text,16 and Lodowick Brysketts
dialogue of 1606, entitled A discourse of civill life, the avowed aim of which was to frame
a gentleman fit for civill conversation.17
When these writers speak about what Castiglione (in Thomas Hobys translation of 1561)
describes as manerlye conversation,18 they are not referring merely or even principally
to habits and styles of speech. As Guazzo makes clear in criticizing those who refuse to
take part in conversation, he does not mean that they are unwilling to talk; he means that
that they are unwilling to come together in social life. The contrast he draws throughout
The Civile Conversation, as George Pettie expresses it in his translation of 1581, is always
between solitarinesse and Conversation.19 Guazzos basic aspiration is to show that
solitarinesse ought to be taken altogether out of the world, & company & conversation
to be chosen.20 Too be shorte, he concludes, my meaning is, that civile conversation is
an honest commendable and vertuous kinde of living in the world.21
Castiglione similarly speaks in The Courtier about how a man should conduct himself in
hys lyving and conversation.22 When the respected figure of Federico Fregoso turns to
this question in book II, he expresses himself largely in negative terms. The courtier must
never be stubborne and full of contencion, thereby stirring men to argument, and he
must be no lyer, no boaster, nor fonde flatterer.23 Later Federico adds that, besides
taking care not to bragg and boast of them selves, courtiers should never act vainly and
pridefully, never show a proude and haughtye stomake.24 A good courtier will always
behave with reverence and respect, and will never stray beyond the recognized
boundaries of social life.25
The underlying suggestion that the ideal of civil conversation can best be grasped by
reflecting on what it means to fail in civility is taken up at greater length by Guazzo in the
opening book of The Civile Conversation. He begins by distinguishing between those
whose lack of sociability debars them from civil conversation and those who cannot easily
be excluded in spite of the fact that their conduct leaves much to be desired.26 Turning to
the latter group, Guazzo proceeds to itemize a number of social vices that undermine the
conditions of civilized social life. First he speaks of the (p. 435) slanderous, who with the
falsenesse of their tongues, seeke to blemishe the brightnesse of others names.27 Then
he turns to the contentious and the obstinate,28 who are ready even for very trifles to
engage in dyre debate and strife.29 These are the people whom della Casa had already
described (in Robert Petersons translation of 1576) as the froward, whose conversation
consisteth in overtwharting other mens desiers, and whose testiness turns friends into
foes.30 Next Guazzo criticizes the boasters and the vainglorious,31 together with those
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whom he describes as the ambitious,32 who seeke in companie to goe before others33
and are proud, haughty, and contemptuous.34 Here too he echoes della Casa, who had
spoken with similar distaste of those who make a vaine glorious boasting of them selves:
vaunting and telling in a bravery, what wonderfull exploits they have doone.35 Finally
Guazzo rounds on those who suffer from presumpteous arrogancy and are blinded by
love of themselves.36
Given that all these vices are inimical to social life, they will somehow have to be
managed and controlled. But this brings us back to our original question: how can this be
done? Here the writers on civil conversation may be said to draw an implicit distinction
between those types of behavior which are likely to strike us as merely embarrassing or
irritating and those which may appear, in addition, to be seriously insulting or offensive.
They all agree that in the latter case, where a gentlemans standing or reputation may be
in question, there is only one proper response, and that is to issue a challenge to a duel.37
When the count in book I of Castigliones Courtier lists the attributes of the ideal courtier,
he simply assumes that one reason why courtiers need to be skilful on those weapons
that are used ordinarily emong gentlemen is that there happen often times variaunces
betwene one gentleman and an other, wherepon ensueth a combat.38 He warns us that
we must have a foresight in the quarelles and controversies that may happen, but he is
insistent that a courtier must stand ready to fight whenever he muste needs to save his
estimation withall.39 Guazzo likewise observes that dueling is not merely a frequent
occurrence but that men of honor can hardly avoid such combats if they are to ensure
that their reputations remain intact. As the figure of Annibale remarks, he has known
many occasions on which certaine Gentlemen have convayed themselves into some close
place, where because the one would not live with the name (p. 436) of an evil speaker, &
the other of a false accuser, they have made an ende of their lives and their quarrels both
together.40
Simon Robson in his Courte of civill courtesie of 1577 speaks yet more emphatically about
the need to stand ready to exact private revenge. If someone impugns my honor with
reprochefull names, there can be no question of allowing such an insult to pass. I must
either offer the first blowe (if the place serve for it) or els chalenge him into the feild.41
If, Robson later repeats, the other give mee the first lie, or like disgrace, it is not inough
to say hee lieth againe: but I must needs offer a blow, or chalenge the feeild.42 Robson is
even willing to provide advice on precisely how such challenges should be phrased. You
should declare that, if any body have any quarell to mee, I have businesse into sutche a
place, sutche a day, at sutche an hower: I wil have but my selfe and my man, or but my
selfe and my freinde, there hee may finde mee if hee dare.43 By these means the civilities
will be upheld, but your lethal purpose will nevertheless be made clear.
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If, however, we are confronted not with insults but merely with the ill-mannered and
condescending behavior of the prideful, the arrogant, and the vainglorious, then our aim
should be to respond condescendingly in turn. More specifically, as the figure of Annibale
proposes in book II of Guazzos Civile Conversation, we should seek to shame such
persons, bringing them into line by means of satirizing and ridiculing them in manner of
mockerie, or of scorn until they are driven to amende their manners and life.44 Guazzo
is proposing, in other words, that laughing to scorn may be one of the most effective
means of curbing and controlling the most prevalent forms of unsociability.
Guazzos advice derives from a number of more general beliefs that he shares with other
writers on civil conversation about the nature of laughter and the range of emotions it
may be said to express. The accounts they offer owe an obvious debt to various classical
writers, especially Aristotle in his Rhetoric and the Roman rhetoricians influenced by his
analysis, above all Cicero and Quintilian.45 Hobbes is no less indebted to the same
authorities, and it is important in this connection to remember that he was not only a
deep admirer of Aristotles Rhetoricwhich he characterized to John Aubrey as rare46
but also the author of the earliest English translation of Aristotles text, which he
published anonymously as A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique in 1637.47
(p. 437)Aristotle examines the phenomenon of laughter in the passage from book II of the
Rhetoric in which he reflects on the manners of youth. One characteristic of young people
is said to be that (in the words of Hobbess translation) they are Lovers of Mirth, and by
consequence love to jest at others.48 Inquiring into the feelings expressed by their mirth,
Aristotle suggests that Jesting is witty Contumely, having previously explained that
contumely is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.49 Aristotles basic idea is
thus that the laughter induced by jesting is generally an expression of scorn, a suggestion
already present in his earlier observation that among the sources of pleasure are
ridiculous Actions, Sayings and Persons.50 As he points out himself,51 he had already
pursued these implications in his Poetics, especially in his brief section on comedy.52
Comedy deals in the risible, and the risible is an aspect of the shameful, the ugly, or the
base. If we find ourselves laughing at others, it will be because they exhibit some fault or
mark of shame that, while not painful, makes them seem appropriate objects of
contempt.53
These assumptions are more fully explored in Roman antiquity54 and may even be said to
be reflected in the Latin language itself, in which the verb to laugh, ridere, is scarcely
distinct from the verb to mock, deridere. The fullest exploration is provided by Cicero in
book II of his De oratore, in which the figure of Caesar is persuaded to discourse about
the concept of the laughable. He begins by offering a restatement and elaboration of
Aristotles argument. The place or region, he lays down, in which laughable matters
may be said to be found is occupied by turpitudo and deformitas.55 Caesar speaks of
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deformitas only at the end of his introductory remarks, where he brutally observes that
in physical deformity and weaknesses of the body there is a lot of good material for
making jokes.56 He mainly concentrates on the potential for derisive laughter to be
found in those whose conduct is turpis, that is, base or foul, shameful or ignoble. As he
summarizes, the things that chiefly and even solely provoke laughter are the sorts of
remarks that note and call attention to something shameful, although without doing so in
a shameful way.57 We do not laugh at serious improbity, for this (p. 438) deserves
punishment as opposed to mockery; nor should we laugh at peoples misery, for no one
likes to see the wretched taunted. We should recognize that the materials for producing
ridicule are to be found in the vices of those who neither enjoy esteem nor have suffered
calamity.58 It is here that we come upon the base and the shameful, whose vices are
deserving of mockery and whose manners if elegantly touched on, give rise to laughter.
59
The other leading rhetorician who examines the connections between laughter and scorn
is Quintilian in book 6 of his Institutio oratoria. He quotes Ciceros contention that
laughter has its source in a certain kind of deformitas or turpitudo,60 and he adds that
those sayings which excite laughter are often false (which is always ignoble), often
cleverly distorted, always base and never honorable.61 He concludes that laughter is
never very far removed from derision, and thus that the overriding emotion expressed by
it will generally be one of disdainful superiority.62 As he later summarizes, the most
ambitious way of glorying over others is to speak derisively.63
It was essentially this view of laughter that the Renaissance writers on civil conversation
inherited.64 We find it most fully restated and developed by Castiglione in book II of The
Courtier, in which the figure of Bernardo Bibbiena responds at length to Lady Emilias
request that he should explain the value of jests and howe we should use them.65 What
passion of the soul, Bernardo begins by asking, can be so powerful as to make us burst
out in an almost uncontrollable way, as we do when we laugh? One of the feelings
involved must always be some form of joy or happiness. As Bernardo puts it, laughing
alwaies is a token of a certein jocundenesse and merrie moode that he feeleth inwardlie
in his minde.66 But this joy is of a peculiar kind, appearing as it does to be connected
with feelings of contempt. Whenever we laugh we are mockinge and scorninge, seeking
to scoff and mocke at vices.67 Later in the discussion he repeats that most jesting is
grounded upon scoffing, and involves deceit, or dissimulacion, or mockinge, or
rebukinge of others.68
This understanding of the emotions expressed by laughter is strongly endorsed by the

English writers on civil conversation. Simon Robson in his Courte of ciuill courtesie treats
it as obvious that to laugh is to mock or deride.69 To say that someones behavior (p. 439)
is worthy the laughyng at is to claim that it deserves disprayse, or mockyng by those
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who know how to comport themselves.70 Lodowick Bryskett writes in similar terms in his
Discourse of civill life. He acknowledges that urbanity requires our jesting to be sharpe
and wittie, and yet not bitter or overbiting, but he adds that a discreet or wittie jest
cannot be much worth, or move men to laugh, unles it have a certaine deceit or offence
intended.71
We encounter a comparable line of argument among the neo-Ciceronian rhetoricians of

the same period, who are no less interested in the power of words to affect peoples
behavior and hence to regulate social life. Among the English vernacular rhetoricians by
far the most influential was Thomas Wilson, whose Arte of rhetorique was first published
in 1553 and went through at least seven printings before the end of the century.72 Wilson
includes in his treatise an extensive section entitled Of delitying the hearers, and
stirryng them to laughter. We laugh alwaies, he agrees, at those thynges, whiche
either onely or chiefly touche handsomely, and wittely some especiall fault, or fonde
behavior in some one body, or some one thing.73 Our aim in provoking laughter will
generally be to elicit scorne out right.74
What specific actions or attributes particularly deserve to be laughed to scorn? The

Renaissance writers reiterate that physical deformity provides an excellent subject for
jokes. Castiglione goes so far as to suggest that the hedspring that laughing matters
arise of, consisteth in a certain deformitie or ill favourednesse.75 It is true that he warns
us to take heed of too much taunting in touching a man, especially in the ill
favourednesse of visage or yll shape of bodye. But he nevertheless accepts without
demur that the misshapes and vices of the bodie minister manie times ample matter to
laughe at, if a man can discreatly handle it.76
If we shift, however, from physical to moral deformity, we come upon a contrast between
the Renaissance writers and their classical authorities. Cicero had argued that neither
tragic miseries nor grave improbities are fit subjects for laughter; our mockery should be
limited to those who are turpis, foul, or base in some way. The figure of Bernardo in
Castigliones Courtier agrees that we ought not to scoff and mocke at serious
wickedness nor at persons of such miserye that it should move compassion.77 But when
he turns to those who deserve to be laughed at, he prefers to speak of using ridicule not
against those who are foul and base but rather against those who display the specific
vices of incivility. The sort of people who rightly much provoke laughter,78 (p. 440) he
maintains, are those who bragg and boast of themselves, who are proude and
haughtye,79 and who passe the degree in speaking of themselves with affectation and
vaingloriousness.80 Guazzo writes in close agreement with this sense of priorities. He too
speaks of proud and haughty halfe Gentlemen who make boast of the woorthinesse of
their auncestours, dismissing them as contemptible and therefore to bee laughed at.81
He also speaks of those who suffer from vaineglorie and like to put difference
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betweene themselves and other, concluding once again that these are among the people
who particularly deserve to bee laughed at.82 It is chiefly against unsociability, they
agree, that scornful laughter should be deployed.
We can now see how the writers on civil conversation reach the conclusion that laughter
can serve as a potent means of social control. They have laid it down that to laugh is
generally to express contempt. If, then, we can manage to direct our laughter, as they
suggest, against the boastful, the vainglorious, and the proudin a word, against the
uncivilwe can perhaps hope to cure them of their incivility. Since they will not wish to
be viewed with contempt, we can expect them to take considerable pains to change their
behavior, if only in the hope of avoiding further ridicule. Laughter can thus be used as a
means of discouraging people from acting oute of measure and of keeping them firmly
within the established bounds of civil conversation and sociability.83
Castiglione accordingly concludes that the kinde of jesting that is somewhat grounded
upon scoffing seemeth verie meete for great men, who can use it to shame and humiliate
those who go beyond bounds and need to be disciplined.84 Thomas Wilson likewise
emphasizes the controlling power enjoyed by those who, when time serveth, can geve a
mery answere, or use a nippyng taunte. Confronted with some socially unacceptable
form of behavior, such people have the ability to abash the person who has failed in
civility and make hym at his wittes ende, through the sodein quip & unloked frumpe
geven. Wilson assures us that I haue knowen some so hit of the thumbes by the
rebuking and reforming power of laughter that they have been unsure whether it were
beste to fighte, chide, or to go their waie. Nor is their discomfiture surprising, for wher
the jest is aptly applied, the hearers laugh immediatly, & who would gladly be laughed to
scorne?85 The clear implication is that once you have been abashed, and putte out of
countenaunce in this way, you will take considerable pains to ensure that it does not
happen again.86
It is true that some scruples are occasionally expressed at this stage in the argument. If,
as Guazzo puts it, we find a companion on the brink of committing some absurditie
either in wordes or in matter, we might think it more magnanimous to attempt
discreetely to prevent him. We ought perhaps to take holde of him and staye him
(p. 441) up: not staying till hee fall, to make the companie fall a laughing, and him selfe to
bee ashamed. We should be ready to demonstrate in a friendly manner the good

account wee make of him, and give him to understande howe jealous wee are of his
honour, thereby preventing him from having reason to thinke him selfe had in
contempt.87
Much more emphatically, Giovanni della Casa wholly rejects the idea of using derisive
laughter as a means of imposing civility. Della Casas Galateo is an attempt, very much in
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the spirit of Castigliones Courtier, to explain how best to conduct ourselves in our
familiar conversation, and behaviour with men.88 As a papal Nuncio, however, and a
firm believer in the principles of the Counter-Reformation, della Casa writes in tones of
considerable moral earnestness.89 He warns us that under no circumstances should we
allow that a man should scorne or scoffe at any man, what so ever he be: no not his very
enimy, what displeasure so ever he beare him.90 Anyone who has a sporte and a
pleasure to make a man blush is guilty of spitefull behaviours of a kind that make him
unworthy to beare the name of an honest gentleman. If we wish to follow good maner
& honesty, we must make sure that we scorne no man in any case.91
Della Casa is unusual, however, in placing so much emphasis on these scruples.

Generally, the writers on civil conversation are not merely willing but eager to show us
how to deploy the restraining power of laughter to hold the social vices at bay. First we
need to deal with the contentious and the obstinate,92 those whom della Casa had
described as the froward, whose conversation consisteth in ouertwharting other mens
desiers, and whose testiness turns friends into foes.93 Castiglione tells the following
anecdote about how to cope with such frowardness:
A worthie Gentlewoman in a noble assembly spake pleasauntly unto one, that shall
be namelesse for this tyme, whome she to shewe hym a good countenance,
desired to daunce with her, and he refusing both that, and to heare musick and
many other entertainmentes offred him, alwaies affirming suche trifles not to be
his profession, at last the Gentlewoman demaundyng him, What is then your
profession? He aunswered with a frowning looke: To fight.
Then saide the Gentlewoman: Seing you are not nowe at the warre nor in place to
fight, I woulde thinke it beste for you to bee well besmered and set up in an
armorie with other implementes of warre till time wer that you should be
occupied, least you waxe more rustier then you are.94
The ladys mockery, Castiglione assures us, produced exactly the desired effect. Her response
gave rise to muche laughinge of the standers by, thereby turning the froward (p. 442) warrior
into an object of general contempt.95 As Castiglione summarizes, she left him with a mock in
such a way that his foolishe presumpcion was laughed to scorn.96
We also need to know how to deal with the boastful and the vainglorious. Here Guazzo
sets aside his earlier anxieties about the potential dangers of ridicule. Not only does he
speak with particular contempt of boastful ignorance, but he offers several examples to
illustrate how the power of laughter can be used to expose this failing to well-deserved
scorn. One case he cites is that of a visit paid by Alexander the Great to the house of the
celebrated painter Apelles. Alexander began reasoning of painting to his host and
proceeded to speak in a manner impertinent and contrarie to that art. Whereupon the
wise Painter whispered him in the eare, that hee shoulde speake no more of that matter,
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or els that he shoulde speake softly, for that his prentices laught him to scorne.97 A
second and, as Guazzo puts it, a more odious example is that of the poore feeble
Sophist who came before King Cleomenes and reasoned in his presence of valour and
force. The king immediately fell a laughing, and replied that, if an eagle were to speak
to him of strength he would listen, but if a swallow were to do so I shoulde not forebeare
laughing at such vaingloriousness.98
Finally, we need to be able to control the pride and haughtiness of those who, in Guazzos
words, seeke in company to goe before others and treat their supposed inferiors with
disdain.99 Wilson tells the story of a gentleman of great landes & small witte who
talked largely at a supper, and spake wordes scant worth the hearyng. One of his
hearers, muche greeved with his foolie, saied to hym: Sir I haue taken you for a plaine
meanyng gentleman, but I know nowe, there is not a more deceiptfull bodie in al
Englande. When another guest remonstrated, he retorted that I must nedes say he is
deceiptful, for I toke hym heretofore for a sober wittie young man, but now I perceive, he
is a foolish bablyng felowe. The power of this kind of ridicule to impose control is
explicitly underlined. Wilson ends by telling us that they al laughed, and the gentleman
was muche abashed.100
Hobbess civil philosophy has rarely been considered in relation to the genre of writing on
civil conversation, and we have even been urged to see in Leviathan an aspiration to
transcend any trivial concerns with what Hobbes describes in chapter 11 as Decency of
behaviour and such other points of the Small moralls.101 But in fact Hobbes was
intimately acquainted with, and much preoccupied by, Renaissance traditions of writing
on precisely these themes. There can be no doubt in the first place that he made a close
study of several leading Italian texts on la civil conversazione. While he was serving as
tutor to the Earl of Devonshire in the 1620s he compiled a catalogue of the (p. 443) earls
library in which he recorded copies of Castigliones Courtier in English, French, Italian,
and Latin102; della Casas Galateo in Latin103; and Guazzos Civile Conversation in
English, Italian, and Latin.104 Hobbes and the young earl studied Castigliones Courtier
together, and Hobbes even required his pupil to produce a Latin translation of the
opening book.105
It is clear, moreover, that Hobbes was much indebted to these writers in formulating his
own account of sociable life. He closely follows their anatomy of incivility, focusing as
they had done on the froward and obstinate, the boastful and vainglorious, and those who
are marked by arrogance and pride. More generally, he is in basic agreement with the
principles of civil conversation as laid down by Castiglione, Guazzo, and their followers.
First and most basically, he fully endorses their broad understanding of the concept of
conversation itself. When he summarizes the laws of nature at the start of chapter 18 of
The Elements of Law, he explains that they are described as laws because they are
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dictates of natural reason and are specifically described as moral laws because they
concern mens manners and conversation one towards another.106 When he turns in
chapter 3 of De cive to examine the injustice involved in failing to honor our contracts and
promises, he describes this failure to observe the laws of nature as inimical to our
conversatio with our fellow citizens.107 And when he offers his further summary of the
laws of nature at the end of chapter 15 of Leviathan, he goes so far as to proclaim that
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the
conversation, and Society of man-kind.108
Hobbess aim, in other words, is not merely to show men how they can be brought to live
in obedient subjection to the laws of the state; it is also to show them how they can hope
to follow a peaceable, sociable, and comfortable way of life.109 He wants, in short, to
make men fit for what he calls Civill Society.110 As he puts it in summary in the Review
and Conclusion of Leviathan, the question is not merely how to impose obedience but also
how to produce a constant Civill Amity among men.111
When Hobbes goes on to consider how such a code of sociability might be imposed, he
similarly draws on a number of classical arguments that the writers on civil conversation
had already invoked. These intellectual allegiances are most clearly revealed in Hobbess
analysis of laughter and the range of passions it may be said to express. It is true that, in
his first and fullest analysis in chapter 9 of The Elements, he begins with a noisy
proclamation of his own originality: There is a passion which hath no name, but (p. 444)
the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance we call LAUGHTER, which is always
joy; but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, hath not
hitherto been declared by any.112
After this self-congratulating flourish, however, the analysis that Hobbes offers is very
similar to the one already developed by Castiglione on the basis of his classical
authorities.113 Hobbes agrees that what generally provokes us to laugh is a sense of our
own superiority over other peoples incapacities or absurdities.114 As he phrases it in his
formal definition: the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of
others, or with our own formerly.115 He also agrees that the laughter in which we
express our joy at this sudden imagination of our own odds and eminence116 cannot fail
to embody an element of condescension and contempt. Men laugh at the infirmities of
others, by comparison of which their own abilities are set off and illustrated, and at jests
in which the wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant discovering and conveying to
our minds some absurdity of another.117 To laugh is to glory over others, and is thus to
dishonor them.118 To be laughed at is consequently to be derided, that is, triumphed
over119 and viewed with scorn.120
Page 11 of 26

For Hobbes, accordingly, laughter can hardly fail to be seriously offensive, and he
explicitly insists in The Elements that there is only one way in which it can be indulged
without offence.121 This is when we laugh together in company at the follies of the
world. When this happens, we pour scorn upon absurdities and infirmities abstracted
from persons and all the company may laugh together.122 But in all other instances our
laughter takes the form of recommending ourselves to our own good opinion, by
comparison with another mans infirmities or absurdity.123 The possibility that we might
sometimes laugh self-deprecatingly at our own absurdity is explicitly ruled out. Hobbes
goes so far as to assert that when a jest is broken upon ourselves we never laugh
thereat.124 So it is hardly surprising, he concludes, that men take it heinously to be
laughed at, for in fact they are being treated as worthy only of contempt.125
Summarizing in a harsh passage at (p. 445) the end of chapter 9, in which he compares
human life with a race, he ends by declaring that it is when we see another fall that our
disposition to laugh comes into play.126
A similar analysis reappears in chapter 6 of Leviathan. Laughter, Hobbes again affirms, is

almost invariably an expression of superiority and a means of glorying over others:
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is
caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly
applaud themselves.127
Hobbes had spoken in The Elements about the infirmities of others as a cause of laughter,
but here he echoes still more strongly the classical and Renaissance view that deformity
is likewise an appropriate object of mirth. As he intimates, however, he is chiefly
interested in moral rather than physical deformity, and this emphasis is brought out still
more clearly in his final attempt to supply a definition of laughter, which he puts forward
in his De homine of 1658. Here he rounds off his observations by aligning himself yet
more closely with the writers on civil conversation, claiming that invariably, the passion
of laughter is a sudden commendation of oneself prompted by the indecorousness of
someone else.128
Hobbes endorses so many of the arguments originally deployed by the writers on civil
conversation that, when it comes to the question of how to impose sociability, one might
expect him once more to follow their lead. But at this stage he suddenly takes a very
different tack. Not only does he part company with their line of argument, but it would
scarcely be an exaggeration to say that much of what he goes on to suggest is framed as
a direct response to, and repudiation of, what they had earlier proposed.
First of all, Hobbes is utterly dismissive of the idea that we should seek to enforce civility
by means of private revenge. He refuses even to permit the state to treat vengeance as a
Page 12 of 26

possible justification for punishment. The aym of Punishment, he roundly declares, is

not a revenge.129 As for avenging incivilities by dueling to the death, he denounces this
practice as nothing better than an upstart and vainglorious custom not many years since
begun, amongst young and vain men.130 He objects that the alleged hurts assuaged by
duels are not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and are therefore not worth the attention of
anyone that is assured of his own courage.131 He expresses bewilderment that men are
prepared to use such lethal violence merely to uphold their sense of self-worth and are
consequently ready to fight for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any
other signe of undervalue.132 He praises the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other
both antient, and moderne Common-wealths for refusing (p. 446) to pay any heed to the
offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other
harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached.133 Most dismissively of all, he
maintains that the real reason why vainglorious young men are prone to engage in such
murderous acts of vengeance is that, paradoxically, they lack courage and magnanimity.
As wise legislators recognize, the true cause of such griefe consists not in the
contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue,) but in the
Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.134
Hobbes is no less vehemently opposed to the further suggestion that incivility may be
controlled by derision and ridicule. He first announces his dissent in chapter 16 of The
Elements of Law. It is one of the laws of nature, he declares, That no man reproach,
revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem of any
other.135 The same contention recurs in chapter 3 of De cive, in which he explicitly
insists that laughter amounts to just such an expression of disesteem and contempt. It is
prescribed by the law of nature, he repeats, that no one should exhibit hatred or
contempt of other people by what they do, or by what they say, or by how they look at
them, or by laughing at them.136 Finally, he makes the same point with no less emphasis
in chapter 15 of Leviathan, in which he again declares that it is a precept of the law of
nature That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or
Contempt of another.137
Here Hobbes is directly opposing the generally accepted view among the writers on civil
conversation about how to control unsociability. But at the same time he is closely
aligning himself with earlier critics, notably Giovanni della Casa, who had already voiced
similar doubts. It is true that Hobbess reasons for forbidding scornful laughter are at
first rather different from those of della Casa. As we have seen, della Casas objection had
been that such mockery is an instance of dishonorable incivility in itself. By contrast,
Hobbess initial argument is at least as much prudential as moral in character. As he
explains in The Elements, his reason for outlawing laughter is that all signs which we
shew to one another of hatred and contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel
and battle and consequently serve to undermine civil peace.138 The same argument is
Page 13 of 26

more expansively developed in the opening chapter of De cive. Hobbes now explains that
because all pleasure and exaltation of the mind consists in being able to think highly of
oneself by comparison with others, it is impossible for people to avoid exhibiting some
mutual contempt, whether they express it by laughter, or by words, or by some gesture or
other sign.139 As he warns us, however, nothing gives (p. 447) greater offence to the
mind than such behavior, and nothing is more likely to give rise to a desire to hurt and a
consequent relapse into violence and the state of war.140 A similar argument reappears in
chapter 15 of Leviathan, in which Hobbes warns us yet again that the reason why we
must never behave contemptuously is that all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to
fight, insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged,
with the result that they fall not merely into breaches of the peace but eventually into a
condition of war.141
If we turn, however, to Hobbess final remarks about laughter in Leviathan, we encounter

a wholly different argument. He now aligns himself with the most irenic of the writers on
civil conversation and denounces scornful laughter in the same moralistic tones. He had
already spoken with disapproval in The Elements, declaring that it is vain glory, and an
argument of little worth, to think the infirmities of another sufficient matter for his
triumph.142 But in Leviathan he goes much further. Closely echoing della Casa, he now
maintains that scornful laughter is a sign of cowardice, and is therefore dishonorable. It
is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who
are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of
other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of
Pusillanimity.143 To which he adds, echoing Guazzo, that such laughter also embodies a
failure of magnanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free
others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.144 Hobbess final
reason for rejecting scornful laughter is thus the same as his reason for condemning
duels: both appear to reflect high confidence, but both are in truth expressions of
cowardice.
The conclusion at which Hobbes finally arrives, however, merely raises once again the
question from which we started out. He forbids us to control the unsociable by means of
any form of physical or even verbal violence. But he agrees that the froward, the
vainglorious, the prideful, and the arrogant are prone to act in violation of the laws of
nature, and are liable in consequence to generate conflict and war. If there is to be any
prospect of leading a peaceable, sociable, and comfortable way of life, they will
somehow have to be coped with or controlled.145 But how?
Hobbes is by no means bereft of answers and has three different suggestions to make.
The first carries us back to Guazzos distinction between those who, while lacking civility,
will nevertheless have to be admitted to civil conversation, and those whose behavior is
Page 14 of 26

so unsociable that they will have to be excluded. Hobbes agrees that, in the case of those
who are irredeemably untrustworthy or intractable, the only solution will be (p. 448) to
prevent them at the outset from taking any part in civil life. Turning first to the
untrustworthy, he argues that anyone who breaketh his Covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society,
that unite themselves for Peace and Defence.146 Later he adds that anyone who is so
intractable that, for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected will likewise
have to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto.147
Hobbes briefly mentions a second possibility in chapter 18 of Leviathan, although he

scarcely develops it. He suggests that, once a civil association has been instituted, it may
be possible for the sovereign to deter men, by means other than the imposition of
coercive force, from doing disservice to the commonwealth and thereby jeopardizing the
peaceful conversation of mankind. Specifically, he suggests, the sovereign may be able to
penalize such unsociable subjects with some form of ignominy while at the same time
honoring and rewarding good citizenship, thereby harnessing mens inherent
competitiveness and encouraging habits of civility in others.148
Hobbess principal suggestion, however, simply takes the form of a plea for forbearance.
He sees little prospect of being able actively to control the behavior of froward,
vainglorious, prideful, and arrogant men. Although their conduct is inimical to peace, the
only effect of trying to control them will be to jeopardize peace itself. His final word is
thus that such people will simply have to be tolerated. As he puts it at the outset of his
discussion in chapter 15 of Leviathan, the watchword has to be That every man strive to
accommodate himselfe to the rest.149 This injunction is one of the pathways to peace and
is consequently one of the laws of nature. It is also the very definition of sociability, for
the observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE.150 If peace is to be preserved, what
will somehow have to be mustered in the face of incivility is an unfeigned and constant
endeavour to act in a manner that remains modest, and tractable and truly sociable at
all times.151
Hobbes is usually thought of as the political writer par excellence who insists that the key
to peace lies in subjecting ourselves to the laws of an absolute sovereign whose duty is to
keep us all in awe. But this is only one half of his argument. If peace is to be preserved,
we also need to maintain a high and unremitting level of self-control, even in the face of
unsociable people whose conduct is all too likely to prompt us to react toward them with
hatred and contempt. At the heart of Hobbess civil philosophy lies the demanding
insistence that, since the unsociability of such people cannot be restrained either by the
state or by the disciplining forces of civil society, the only way to prevent their behavior
from leading to war will be to control ourselves. Self-control, as much as the coercive
force of law, is the key to peace.
Page 15 of 26

(p. 449) Acknowledgments

For commenting on drafts I am deeply indebted to the two editors of this volume and to
Susan James, Noel Malcolm, Tim Raylor, Raffaella Santi, Keith Thomas, and Phil
Withington.
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Hobbes, Thomas. 1839. Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda de homine in Thomae

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Notes:
(1) On this theme, see Slomp 2000.
(2) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 190.
(3) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 190, 194.
(4) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 192.
(5) Hobbes 2012, ch. 17, vol. 2, 254.
Page 18 of 26

(6) Hobbes 2012, ch. 17, vol. 2, 260.
(7) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232.
(8) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232. For Hobbes on vainglory see Cooper 2010.
(9) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 234.
(10) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 234. Hoekstra 2013 powerfully argues that Hobbess
anxiety about our disposition to view others with contempt grounds his theory of human
equality. If we are to live a secure and comfortable life, we must do everything to uphold
the cause of peace. But if we give in to pride and arrogance, we are sure to provoke
conflict and war. We must therefore be willing to acknowledge human equality in the
name of peace.
(11) Hobbes 2012, ch. 17, vol. 2, 254. For Hobbes on modesty, see Cooper 2010.
(12) In this section and in section 3 I draw extensively on Skinner 2013, esp. 215.
(13) These writers are considered together in Whigham 1984, Panichi 1994, and Borrelli
2000, 6792. See also Burke 1993, 98102; Mnager 1995, 14985, and (on della Casa)
Farneti 2000, esp. 494504. For the reception of the genre in Tudor England, see
Richards 2003, 29-33, 4447, 6364.
(14) See Castiglione 1561; della Casa 1576; Guazzo 1581.
(15) The British Library catalogue records two printings in English (1561, 1588) and four
in Latin (1571, 1577, 1585, 1593).
(16) Richards 2003, 13.
(17) Bryskett 1606, 5.
(18) Castiglione 1994, 102.
(19) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 18r.
(20) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 17v.
(21) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fos. 22r-v.
Page 19 of 26

(26) For this distinction see Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 27r.
(27) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 27r.
(28) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 39v.
(29) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 40v.
(30) della Casa 1576, 25.
(31) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 41v.
(32) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 43v.
(33) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 44r.
(34) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 44v.
(35) della Casa 1576, 36.
(36) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 2v.
(37) On the place of the duel in writings on civil conversation, see Peltonen 2003, 4458.
(40) Guazzo, 1581, bk. 1, fo. 29v.
(41) Robson 1577, 24.
(42) Robson 1577, 24.
(43) Robson 1577, 21.
(44) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 4v.
(45) My discussion of the classical sources draws on (but also corrects) Skinner 2004.
(46) Aubrey 1898, vol. 1, 357.
(47) Hobbes began by making a Latin paraphrase of Aristotles text, which he seems to
have produced in the early 1630s; the English translation, which he published in 1637, is
Page 20 of 26

based on this text. Hobbess Latin paraphrase is preserved at Chatsworth as Hobbes MS

D.1: Latin Exercises (bound MS volume with Ex Artistot: Rhet. at 1143).
(48) [Hobbes] 1986, 86.
(49) [Hobbes] 1986, 70, 86.
(50) [Hobbes] 1986, 57.
(51) Aristotle 1926, I. 11. 28, 128, and III. 18. 7, 466.
(52) It may be, however, that Aristotle is referring to a fuller discussion in the now lost
book II of his Poetics.
(53) Aristotle 1995, 1449a, 44.
(54) In quoting from Cicero and Quintilian I have used the Loeb editions but supplied my
own translations.
(55) Cicero 1942, II. 58. 236, vol. 1, 372: Locus autem, et regio quasi ridiculi
turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur.
(56) Cicero 1942, II. 59. 238, vol. 1, 374: Est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis
bella materies ad iocandum.
(57) Cicero 1942, II. 58. 236, vol. 1, 372: haec enim ridentur vel sola, vel maxime, quae
notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter. On Cicero and laughter as
ridicule, see OCallaghan 2007, 3841.
(58) Cicero 1942, II. 59. 238, vol. 1, 374: materies omnis ridiculorum est in istis vitiis
quae sunt in vita hominum neque carorum neque calamitosorum.
(59) Cicero 1942, II. 59. 238, vol. 1, 374: eaque belle agitata ridentur.
(60) Quintilian 2001, VI. 3. 8, vol. 3, 66, referring to Cicero De oratore, II. 58. 236, vol. 1,
372: [Risus habet] sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine.
(61) Quintilian 2001, VI. 3. 6, vol. 3, 66: ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est [hoc
semper humile], saepe ex industria depravatum, praeterea <semper humile,> numquam
honorificum.
(62) Quintilian 2001, VI. 3. 8, vol. 3, 66: A derisu non procul abest risus.
(63) Quintilian 2001, XI. 1. 22, vol. 5, 20: Ambitiosissimum gloriandi genus est etiam
deridere.
Page 21 of 26

(64) Herrick 1964, 3657.
(67) Castiglione 1994, 15556.
(68) Castiglione 1994, 179, 188.
(69) Robson 1577, 1011.
(70) Robson 1577, 10.
(71) Bryskett 1606, 246.
(72) Baumlin 2001, 283, 289-90. On Wilson see Mack 2002, 7678, 8384, 9699; Shrank
2004, 182219.
(73) Wilson 1553, sig. T, 2v.
(74) Wilson 1553, sig. T, 3r.
(80) Castiglione 1994, 16364.
(81) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 37r.
(82) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 39r.
(85) Wilson 1553, sig. T, 2r.
(86) Wilson 1553, sig. T, 2v and 3v.
(87) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 28v.
Page 22 of 26

(88) della Casa 1576, 4.
(89) As noted in Burke 1993, 98102.
(90) della Casa 1576, 62.
(91) della Casa 1576, 63.
(92) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 39v.
(93) della Casa 1576, 25.
(97) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 22r. A different version of the story can be found in Brathwait
1630, 276.
(98) Guazzo 1581, bk. 2, fo. 23v.
(99) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 44r.
(100) Wilson 1553, sig Aa, 4v.
(101) Hobbes 2012, ch. 11, vol. 2, 150. Cf. Farneti 2000, 489, 498.
(102) Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth), MS E. 1. A, 69, 70, 126.
(103) Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth), MS E. 1. A, 84. The work is listed as Galataeus de

moribus.
(104) Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth), MS E. 1. A, 83, 84, 128.
(105) Malcolm 2007, 4.
(106) Hobbes 1969, 18. 1, 95.
(107) Hobbes 1983, III. III, 109.
(108) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 242.
(109) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 242.
(110) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 238.
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(111) Hobbes 2012, vol. 3, 1132.
(112) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 41.
(113) This is perhaps surprising, for in the intervening period the classical theory had
been extensively criticized. For details see Skinner 2004, 14953.
(114) See Morreall 1983, 414 on Hobbes as the strongest defender of the superiority
theory of laughter.
(115) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42. See also Hobbes 1983, I. II, 90, where he adds in still more
classical vein that we laugh at turpitudo as well as infirmitas.
(116) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 41.
(117) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 41-2.
(118) Hobbes twice equates laughing at people with dishonoring them. See Hobbes 1969,
9. 13, 41.
(119) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42.
(120) Hobbes connects laughter specifically with scorn in Leviathan: see Hobbes 2012, ch.
6, vol. 2, 88.
(121) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42.
(122) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42.
(123) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42.
(124) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42.
(125) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42. For laughter as a means specifically of expressing and
soliciting contempt (contemptus) see Hobbes 1983, I. VII, 94.
(126) Hobbes 1969, 9. 21, 48.
(127) Hobbes 2012, ch. 6, vol. 2, 88.
(128) Hobbes 1839, XII. 7, 108: universaliter passio ridentium, est sui sibi ex indecoro
alieno subita commendatio.
(129) Hobbes 2012, ch. 28, vol. 2, 486.
(130) Hobbes 2012, ch. 27, vol. 2, 466.
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(131) Hobbes 2012, ch. 27, vol. 2, 466.
(132) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 192.
(133) Hobbes 2012, ch. 27, vol. 2, 480.
(134) Hobbes 2012, ch. 27, vol. 2, 480.
(135) Hobbes 1969, 16. 11, 86.
(136) Hobbes 1983, III. XII, 113: lege naturali praescriptum esse, nequis vel factis, vel
verbis, vel vultu, vel risu, alteri ostendat se illum vel odisse, vel contemnere.
(137) Hobbes 2012 ch. 15, vol. 2, 234.
(138) Hobbes 1969, 16. 11, 86.
(139) Hobbes 1983, I. V, 94: Cumque omnis animi voluptas omnisque alacritas in eo sita
sit, quod quis habeat, quibuscum conferens se, possit magnifice sentire de se ipso,
impossibile est quin odium & contemptum mutuum ostendant aliquando, vel risu, vel
verbis, vel gestu, vel aliquo signo.
(140) Hobbes 1983, I. V, 94: qua quidem nulla maior animi est molestia, neque ex qua
laedendi libido maior oriri solet.
(141) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 234.
(142) Hobbes 1969, 9. 13, 42; cf. also Hobbes 1983, I. II, 90.
(143) See Hobbes 2012, ch. 6, vol. 2, 88 and the reiteration of the argument in the Latin
version at 89.
(144) See Hobbes 2012, ch. 6, vol. 2, 88 and the reiteration of the argument in the Latin
version at 89.
(145) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 242.
(146) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 224.
(147) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232.
(148) Hobbes 2012, ch. 18, vol. 2, 276; cf. ch. 28, vol. 2, 490.
(149) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232.
(150) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232.
Page 25 of 26

(151) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 240.
Quentin Skinner
Quentin Skinner is the Barber Beaumont Professor of the Humanities at Queen Mary,
University of London. Among his books are Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of
Hobbes (1996); Hobbes and Civil Science (2002) and Hobbes and Republican Liberty
(2008).
Page 26 of 26

Hobbes and The Social Control of Unsociability

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Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability

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Print Publication Date: Mar 2016

Abstract and Keywords

In addition to the three causes of war mentioned by Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan,

Keywords: Hobbes, arrogance, civil conversation, sociability, unsociability, self-control, tolerance

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

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This understanding of the emotions expressed by laughter is strongly endorsed by the

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

We encounter a comparable line of argument among the neo-Ciceronian rhetoricians of

What specific actions or attributes particularly deserve to be laughed to scorn? The

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

bee ashamed. We should be ready to demonstrate in a friendly manner the good

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Della Casa is unusual, however, in placing so much emphasis on these scruples.

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

A similar analysis reappears in chapter 6 of Leviathan. Laughter, Hobbes again affirms, is

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

possible justification for punishment. The aym of Punishment, he roundly declares, is

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

If we turn, however, to Hobbess final remarks about laughter in Leviathan, we encounter

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Hobbes briefly mentions a second possibility in chapter 18 of Leviathan, although he

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

(p. 449) Acknowledgments

Brathwait, Richard. 1630. The English Gentleman. London.

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Hobbes, Thomas. 1839. Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda de homine in Thomae

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mnager, Daniel. 1995. La Renaissance et le rire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

Panichi, Nicola. 1994. La virt eloquente: La civil conversazione nel Rinascimento.

Richards, Jennifer. 2003. Rhetoric and Courtliness in Early Modern Literature.

Robson, Simon. 1577. The courte of ciuill courtesie. London.

Skinner, Quentin. 2013. Hobbes, Laughter and Civil Conversation, in Lantidoto di

(1) On this theme, see Slomp 2000.

(2) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 190.

(3) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 190, 194.

(4) Hobbes 2012, ch. 13, vol. 2, 192.

(5) Hobbes 2012, ch. 17, vol. 2, 254.

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

(6) Hobbes 2012, ch. 17, vol. 2, 260.

(7) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 232.

(9) Hobbes 2012, ch. 15, vol. 2, 234.

(14) See Castiglione 1561; della Casa 1576; Guazzo 1581.

(16) Richards 2003, 13.

(17) Bryskett 1606, 5.

(18) Castiglione 1994, 102.

(19) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 18r.

(20) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 17v.

(21) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fos. 22r-v.

(22) Castiglione 1994, 149.

(23) Castiglione 1994, 121.

(24) Castiglione 1994, 155.

Subscriber: Cambridge University Library; date: 10 April 2017

(25) Castiglione 1994, 121.

(27) Guazzo 1581, bk. 1, fo. 27r.