Int. J. Middle East Stud.

6 (1975), 363-385 Printed in Great Britain 363

Ira M. Lapidus

THE SEPARATION OF STATE AND RELIGION

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY
ISLAMIC SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION
Islamic studies progress.1 In recent years a great deal of work has been done on
the Umayyad period, on the early history of Shi'ism, and on the origins of the
Muslim schools of law. A broader current of research has yielded numerous
studies of the 'ulamd' and their place in Muslim religious and communal life.
New historical information and new points of view are gradually modifying
received perspectives on Muslim religious movements and on the nature of
Muslim religious elites. In view of these developments, it seems timely to
consider one important question implicit in the research concerning the nature
of Islamic societies: What is the relationship between state and religion in
Islam? In particular, what was this relationship in classical Islamic times, and
what is the heritage of early Islam for later Islamic societies ?
The prevailing view among Islamists is that classical Islamic society does not
distinguish between the religious and political aspects of communal life. The
Caliphate was both the religious and the political leadership of the community
of Muslims, whose individual believers and subjects belonged to a polity defined
by religious allegiance.
This view of the seamless web of Islamic political and religious institutions
has its basis in the experience of the Muslim community of Medina under
Muhammad's leadership. Since Muhammad was the Prophet who revealed
God's will in all of life's concerns, belief in Islam entailed both loyalty to a chief
1
This paper has gone through several stages of preparation, in the course of which
it has been much improved by the generous help of friends and colleagues. Professors
Michael Dols and Franz Rosenthal have read the paper with great care, correcting points
of detail and commenting on the larger implications and problems of the essay. Professor
Wilfred Madelung has been especially helpful in correcting errors of fact and interpreta-
tion, and has offered me an important correction of perspective, putting the Hanbali move-
ment in the context of several parallel developments. Conversations with Dr Hava
Lazarus-Yafeh, Richard Bulliet, and Emmanuel Sivan have also helped refine my
thinking on this point. Preliminary presentations at Princeton University and at the
International Congress of Orientalists have elicited other helpful comments too numerous
to mention in detail. I am grateful for this generous assistance, and gratified to be part of
a community of scholars willing to share so generously of their time and knowledge.
I would also like to thank Lisa Gerrard for her tasteful editorial assistance.
24-2
364 Ira M. Lapidus

whose authority derived from his religious position, and membership in the
umma - the community that he led. In this case, religious and political values
and religious and political offices were inseparable.
After Muhammad's death, the Caliphate preserved this fundamental idea. As
successors to the Prophet, the Caliphs were obliged to preserve his religious and
political legacy in its moral, religious, and legal aspects. It was their duty to teach
the principles of Muhammad's revelation, to settle disputes, to maintain good
order, and to extend Muhammad's conquests to secure the benefits they brought
the community. In this regard the Caliph's position was unique and absolute.
No other person possessed religious or administrative authority in the umma as
a whole, except in so far as he served as the Caliph's delegate. Furthermore, the
Caliphs personified Islam - the one element of identity common to the tribal
factions that made up the community. The Caliph was the very person of the umma.
This seems to be beyond dispute. Yet despite the origins of Islam and its own
teachings about the relationship between religious and political life, Islamic
society has evolved in un-Islamic ways. In fact, religious and political life
developed distinct spheres of experience, with independent values, leaders, and
organizations. From the middle of the tenth century effective control of the
Arab-Muslim empire had passed into the hands of generals, administrators,
governors, and local provincial lords; the Caliphs had lost all effective political
power. Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular regimes -
Sultanates - in theory authorized by the Caliphs, but actually legitimized by the
need for public order. Henceforth, Muslim states were fully differentiated
political bodies without any intrinsic religious character, though they were
officially loyal to Islam and committed to its defense.
In the same period, religious communities developed independently of the
states or empires that ruled them. The 'ulamd' regulated local communal and
religious life by serving as judges, administrators, teachers, and religious advisers
to Muslims. The religious elites were organized according to religious affiliation
into Sunni schools of law, Shi'ite sects, or Sufi tariqas. The Sunni schools of law,
which are the best known, were groups of scholars and teachers who propounded
a particular version of the Muslim holy law, and groups of witnesses, judges, and
administrators who supervised the implementation of the law in the community
at large. Locally the schools embraced a populace that looked to the 'ulamd' for
guidance on how to live a proper Muslim life. The schools gave advice in matters
of family law - marriages, divorces, inheritances, and so on. They regulated
certain aspects of commercial life, administered educational institutions and the
properties endowed for their support, distributed charitable funds, provided
legal services, and settled disputes. In the wide range of matters arising from the
Shari'a - the Muslim law the 'ulamd' of the schools formed a local administra-
tive and social elite whose authority was based upon religion.1 Thus though the
1
For new studies on the period of the early Caliphate, see M.A. Shaban, The
'Abbdsid Revolution (Cambridge, 1970), and Islamic History A.D. 600-750 (Cambridge,
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 365

Muslim madhdhib were not organized in the same way as Christian churches,
they had many of the religious and social functions we associate with churches.
But whether or not we wish to speak of churches, religious organizations,
institutions, personnel and activities were clearly separate from the ruling
regimes.
As long as two decades ago, Sir Hamilton Gibb, in his essay ' Constitutional
Organization', showed that Muslim political thinkers themselves had become
aware of the separation of state and religion and recognized the emergence of an
autonomous sphere of religious activity and organization. For example, Ibn
Taymiyya held that apart from the Caliphate, the 'ulamd' constituted the true
umma of Islam, and that ruling regimes were 'Muslim' regimes not by any
intrinsic quality but by virtue of the support they lent the Muslim religion and
religious communities.1 Clearly, medieval history did not bear out the promised
unity of the golden age.
In fact the golden age was very brief and the early unity was lost in the early
centuries of Islam. When and why was the early unity lost? Our task in this
paper is to recount the socioreligious history of the Umayyad and ' Abbasid
periods, to trace the progressive differentiation of state and religion, and to
evaluate its significance in the evolution of Islamic societies. In analyzing the
history of the early Islamic period I shall try to join information that Islamic
scholars already know to specific research on the social bases of Hanbalism and
its role in the development of a separate religious sphere. The more general
interpretative section of the paper should illuminate the specific role of Han-
balism; the concrete example unfolds its implications for the larger question
about the relation of state and religion in classical Islamic society. Of course,
a great deal about this early period remains unclear and even unknown, but
I hope that this essay may nonetheless serve as an example of one useful, though
by no means exclusive, approach to the subject, and as a stimulus to further
research and reflection.
1971); F. Omar, The Abbasid Caliphate (Baghdad, 1969). For the early history of Shi'ism.
see also C. Cahen, 'Points de vue sur la Revolution 'Abbaside', Revue Historique, 230
(1963), 295-338; M. Hodgson, 'How did the Early Shi'a become Sectarian?' Journal of
the American Oriental Society, LXXV (1955), 1-13.
For the place of the 'ulamd' in the post-'Abbasid period and the schools of laws, see
R. Bulliet, The Patricians of Nishapur (Cambridge, 1973) and my essays, 'The Early
Evolution of Muslim Urban Institutions', Comparative Studies in Society and History, xv
(i973). 21-50, and ' Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies', Middle Eastern Cities (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1970),pp. 47-76. More general works on the 'ulamd' in Muslim societies
now include N. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1972); G. Baer (ed.), The 'Ulamd' in Modern History (Jerusalem, 1971).
1
H. A. R. Gibb,' Constitutional Organization', in Law in theMiddle East, M. Khadduri
and H. Liebesney (eds.) (Washington, 1955), pp. 3-27.
366 Ira M. Lapidus

THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGIOUS INTERESTS

APART FROM THE CALIPHATE

In the beginning, the Caliphate absorbed the umma, but the religious and the
political aspects of Muslim communal life came to be separated by a historical
process that involved three developments. In the first phase Arab rebellions
against the Caliphate caused the formation of sectarian movements within the
once unified body of Muslims. The Arab empire had caused an unexpected
revolution in the conception and practice of the Caliphate, which Muhammad
had bequeathed and the first Caliphs had ratified. As heirs to the Byzantine and
Sassanian empires, and students of former imperial servants, the Caliphs
increasingly stressed the imperial character of their office, the importance of
allegiance to the state, and the quasi-sacred nature of the Caliph. By developing
court ceremonials, adopting new coinages, constructing great monuments, and
supervising religious activities, the Umayyad dynasty (661-750) claimed an
absolute authority for the Caliph's rule. In policy decisions it favored the
preparedness of its armies, the efficiency of administration, and the maximiza-
tion of resources available to the central government. The Umayyads deepened
the political as opposed to the religious aspects of the Caliphate according to
Byzantine and Sassanian precedents.
Umayyad policy thus introduced a grave tension between the religious origins
and the political practices of the Caliphate. This tension caused vociferous
opposition to the Umayyad dynasty in the name of a true Caliphate and Islam,
numerous conflicts between the Arabs and the Caliphs, and revolts against
Umayyad rule. The most familiar opponents of Umayyad rule were the Khariji,
who alleged that the Umayyads had no particular right to the Caliphate, which
they felt belonged to any righteous Muslim chosen by the community, and the
Shi'ites, who held that only members of Muhammad's own family and in particu-
lar the descendants of 'All were entitled to the holy office. Implicit in their
opposition was the emergence of a body of Muslims who separated themselves
from the authority and leadership of the Caliphs. The early disputes over succes-
sion and Caliphal policy soon gave rise to theological and religious differences
and to the formation of sectarian religious movements as well as to political
opposition.
For our purposes, the Hashimites, who overthrew the Umayyad dynasty and
vested the 'Abbasid dynasty with the office of Caliphate, were particularly
important. The Hashimites and the 'Abbasids drew their support from the Arab
population of Khurasan, and particularly from those descendants of the original
conquerors who had become peasant cultivators in the villages around the major
garrison cities, especially around Marw. These Arabs had lost the treasury
stipends that they claimed as a matter of right as members of the Arab elite,
became subject to the authority of local non-Muslim landlords and tax collectors,
and were being taxed on the same basis as non-Muslim peasants, an affront
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 367

both to pocket and pride. Even in style of life the Arab settlers were being assimi-
lated to the local Iranian population. In fiscal position, in social status, and in
style of life the Arabs came to resemble the non-Arab, Iranian converts to Islam.
They came to speak Persian, dressed as Iranians, and adopted local festivals and
customs. The hard distinction between the Arab elite and the conquered Iranians
was breaking down in favor of a mutual assimilation of populations, which
merged distinct ethnic characteristics and social standing into a common Muslim
society.'
These Khurasanian Arabs who objected to the fiscal and social policies of the
Caliphate came to equate their own interests with Islam, and regarded the existing
Caliphate as a corruption of the true Caliphate, and its political policies as a
departure from religious principles. A Muslim movement opposed to the Cali-
phate on fiscal and social policy and different from the Caliphate in its sense of
Persian and Muslim as contrasted with purely Arab identity had come into
being. With heightened religious consciousness, indeed with intense and millennial
fervor, the Khurasanians believed that a new dynasty would restore the Caliphate
to Muslim principles and open a new age of universal justice and peace, an age
of equality among all Muslims, an age of the Mahdi, the Messiah. They dis-
tinguished the ideal or the office of the Caliph from its incumbents and under-
stood that the community of Muslims, the umma might well oppose its nominal
chiefs for reasons at once religious and political. It had become possible in the
name of the true Islam to oppose the reigning Caliph, but not yet possible to
imagine an umma without a Caliph.
Despite their rebellion, the Khurasanians, like other Arabs, continued to
cling to the doctrine of the unity of the community and its identification in
principle with the office of the Caliphate. This was the basis of their identity as
part of the ruling elite. Their common interest in the preservation of the con-
quests, in the enjoyment of the revenues, in their status as members of the military
class, in their distinction as bearers of the dominant religion and language of the
empire sustained loyalty to the conception of the Caliphate. In addition, for the
Khurasanians, the Caliphate was not less, but all the more, important as the
only available symbol of the new kind of multiracial Muslim society which had
come into being in Khurasan. For them, the traditional conception of the Cali-
phate had become an ideology, a way of thinking about social and political
affairs, which was of such symbolic importance that not even the transformation
of the reality upon which their conception was based could destroy its meaning-
fulness. The doctrine of a single brotherhood, a single community, a single
Caliphate descended from the Prophet served, whatever the realities, to suppress
the awareness that Muslim consciousness was polarized between the need for
complete unity and fear of a total collapse of society into hostile and warring
factions. In Islamic societies the demand for unity has a symbolic importance in
1
J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall (Calcutta, 1927), pp. 397 ff., and
M. A. Shaban, The 'Abbdsid Revolution (Cambridge, 1970).
368 Ira M. Lapidus

proportion to the weakness of experiences and institutions which are the

substance of social unity. Thus, in the midst of rebellion the Khurasanians clung
to the conception of the Caliphate stressing its original, vaguely religious
significance. By changing the dynasty, they preserved for a time the traditional role
of the Caliphate and the identity of Arab-Muslim society, but they nonetheless
envisioned a Muslim community with its own religious and political purposes.
The new dynasty gave only temporary relief to its supporters. The 'Abbasid
dynasty, like the Umayyad, regarded concentrated military forces, a centralized
administration, and an august semi-divine ruler enshrined by complex court
ceremonial as essential to the office. Similar conflicts of financial and status in-
terests and the old malaise over the political behavior of the Caliphate rose again.
The Shi'ites further articulated their opposition to the reigning Caliphs.
During the Umayyad epoch, the claims of the 'Alid family to be the rightful
successors to the Caliphate had been based upon family identity and the good
reputation of 'Ali among Muslims. Because the 'Abbisids made a similar claim
to represent the family of the Prophet, however, the Shi'ites now had to bolster
their claims with a specifically religious conception of the office. In the emer-
gent Shi'ite view, the true Imam, the true leader of the community, was not
merely an administrative successor to Muhammad, but a living continuation
of Muhammad's revelations, an infallible guide to the divine law. In this new
Shi'ite conception the Imam or Caliph was the very fount of the law, the know-
ledge of which was vested in him by a 'holy spirit'.
Though they were opposed to the 'Abbasids, the Shi'ites did not truly
question the traditional Muslim view of the Caliphate. Shi'ites continued to see
the Caliph as the sole embodiment of the unity of the community, the proper
guide for true Muslim behavior, and the guarantor that the divine will be
implemented. Holding to the traditional conception in which political and reli-
gious leadership, Caliphate and community, were integrally identified, Shi'ism
bolstered the old conception. In the short run, the Shi'ite response to the political
problem of the Caliphate was essentially anachronistic. To a generation that had
tried to reconcile Muslim beliefs with the political behavior of the Caliphs by
a change of dynasty and had failed, Shi'ism offered, in a new guise, no more than
the old solution of vesting the divinely intended heirs of the Prophet with the
office. Shi'ism made no immediate advance over the Khurasanian position.'
In the meantime, the process by which the religious and the political aspects
of Muslim communal life would be separated was furthered by another develop-
ment parallel to the emergence of political and religious opposition movements.
This second development was the emergence of religious activity independent of
the actual authority of the Caliphs.
Though they headed the community, the religion, and the state, the Caliphs did
1
In the long run, however, ithnd 'ashari Shi'ites would, by accepting the doctrine of
the hidden Imam, rupture the traditional conception by allowing a new religious com-
munity to develop without real concern for the union of religious and political authority.
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 369

not inherit Muhammad's prophethood, nor were they a source of religious

doctrine and law. At the core of their executive and symbolic primacy there
was a void, for neither the office nor the Caliph himself held the authority from
which Muslim religious conceptions and practices were derived. The Qur'an, the
revealed book, stood apart from the authority of the Caliph, and was available to
every believer.
Ever since the beginning of Islam private persons had given themselves to the
study of the Qur'an and to the practice of Muslim rites. Private students of
religions who were without office, without institutional means of support, and
without priestly status were the real authors of the new religion. By the eighth
and ninth centuries, the substance of Islamic teaching in Qur'anic studies,
hadith, law, theology, and mysticism was no longer directly related to the
Caliphate.
In the development of an autonomous religious life, the emergence of the
Muslim schools of law was of particular importance. In the course of the eighth
century distinct schools of legal and religious speculation had gradually taken
shape in Medina, Syria and Iraq. Out of the mass of scholars interested in various
aspects of Islam, the legal scholars in each locality grouped themselves into
exclusive bodies, each of which considered itself the repository of authoritative
religious teachings. Each group adhered to the common method and the common
body of law sponsored by the great teachers of the schools - the famous imams,
Abu Hanifa, Malik, and al-Shafi'i - and others - for whom the schools were
named. The essential activity of the schools was to study and comment upon the
Qur'an and the hadith, and to evolve the Shari'a, Muslim law, but the scholars
also became involved in differing degrees, according to schools, in the administra-
tion of the law and of community affairs. As judges, notaries, and administrators
of public or trust properties, the school members acquired positions of social as
well as religious leadership.
Most of the schools came to oppose the authority of the Caliphs in matters of
law. The early legal schools denied the Caliphs after the Rdshidun any authority
in the elaboration of the law, substituting for it either the ijmd' of the scholars, or
the legal reasoning of the imams.1
Moreover, the 'ulamd' generally - Qur'an readers, reciters of tradition, and
popular preachers, including the scholars of the several schools of law and theo-
logy - greatly influenced the Muslim masses, who turned directly to them rather
than to the Caliphs, for moral instruction and religious guidance as Muslims.
The various schools of law (not to speak of Shi'ite and Khariji groups) had
substantial followings in various parts of the Muslim world. Thus, the develop-
ment of religious authorities independent of the Caliphate was coupled with the
emergence of ' sectarian' bodies within the Islamic umma. From a religious and
a communal point of view, the Caliphate and Islam were no longer wholly
integrated.
1
See J. Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1953).
37 I M. Lapidus

The early ninth century brought a third step in the separation of state and
religious and communal life - the emergence of the Hanbali school of law. In
one respect the emergence of the Hanbali school followed earlier precedents, but
in another way it represented a novel variation and a step forward in the differen-
tiation of religion and politics. Hanbalism fused the tradition of autonomous
religious activity with the heritage of political activism and rebellion borne by
the ahl-Khurdsdn- a fusion with explosive implications for the religious authority
of the Caliphate and for the relations between state and religion. To explain this
development requires a long digression and close examination of the reign of
al-Ma'mun.

THE CRISIS OF THE CALIPHAL AUTHORITY: THE REIGN OF AL-MA'MUN

AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN BAGHDAD
The history of the reign of al-Ma'mun has several times been told from different
perspectives, notably by F. Gabrieli in Al-Ma'mun egli 'Alidi and in D. Sourdel's
article, 'La politique religieuse du Calife 'Abbaside al-Ma'mun.' 1 Each account
makes important contributions to our understanding of the period and the
policies of the Caliphate, but this history is worth reconstructing to bring into
focus some important aspects of the period which have hitherto been neglected.
In 813 al-Ma'mun came to power after a bitter civil war in which he had
defeated his brother, the previous Caliph al-Amin. Taking control of the Cali-
phate, al-Ma'mun appointed al-Hasan ibn Sahl, brother of his chief adviser and
minister, governor of Baghdad and Iraq. Nonetheless, he had yet to establish
his authority and control over the province, and the early years of his reign were
marked by rebellions, indeed by a multisided struggle for control of the province.
Some of his opponents were Shi'ite pretenders to the Caliphate. In 813 al-Hasan
al-Harashi revolted near Nil and proclaimed al-Rid& - the chosen one - as
Caliph; this was a familiar form of Shi'ite rebellion in which the rebel leadership
pledged to support the accession to the caliphate of an as yet unnamed member of
the house of 'All. This outbreak was followed by a rebellion of Nasr ibn Shabath
in the Jazira and then in 814-816 by a rebellion in Kufa led by Ibn Tabataba
and supported by Abu'l-Saraya. The rally cry of this rebellion was 'al-Rida' and
' 'amal bil-kitdb wal-sunna' - ' the chosen one' and ' action in accord with the
(holy) book and the tradition'. By the year 816 Basra was also in the hands of the
'Alids and there were 'Alid uprisings in Mecca and Medina as well.
The 'Alid revolts led to bitter hostility between the two branches of the Hashi-
mite family. 'Alids in Kufa drove out members of the 'Abbasid branch, and
fighting took place between the two groups in Mecca. When the 'Abbasid faction
later regained control of Iraq, it took its revenge on the 'Alids for these outrages.
'Alids were driven out of Iraq and the relations between the two branches of the
1
Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mun egli 'Alidi (Leipzig, 1929); D. Sourdel,' La politique religieuse
du Calife 'Abbaside al Ma'mun', Revue d'Btudes Islamiques, xxx (1962), 27-48.
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 371

family of the prophet were deeply embittered. A long-standing political antago-

nism degerated into fratricidal struggle; disagreement over policy became a feud.
In Baghdad itself, opposition to the new regime continued to smolder until
in 815 the people living in al-Harbiyya, the former 'Abbasid army, named the
abnd' the descendants of the supporters of the 'Abbasid revolution - rebelled.
After the death of al-Amin the abnd' had pledged their loyalty to al-Ma'mun
and had been promised a stipend, but various circumstances - including the
punishment of 'Abdallah ibn 'All ibn 'Isa ibn Mahan, one of the leading generals
of the abnd', the appointment of al-Hasan ibn Sahl, ' a Magian and the son of
a Magian' who threatened to completely subordinate the Iraqis to an alien
Khurasanian army and administration, and al-Hasan's failure to deliver promised
salary payments - led to a rebellion. Officially, the rebels continued to accept the
authority of al-Ma'mun, but they named Ishaq ibn Musa al-Hadi and later
Mansur ibn al-Mahdi khalifa, lieutenants of the Caliph in Baghdad, and
repudiated the administration of al-Hasan, The Baghdadis wished to preserve a
measure of autonomy within the framework of the new Caliphate - to refuse
foreign administration without denying the authority of al-Ma'mun.
Battles and negotiations followed. Al-Hasan made various efforts to divide
the rebels by promising pay to some but not to others, or to pacify the rebellion
as a whole with promises that the stipends would be forthcoming, but these
arrangements came to naught. When negotiations failed the rebels were strength-
ened by the adhesion of Muhammad ibn Abi Khalid and his son 'Isa, former
officers of Harthama ibn A'yan, the 'Abbasid general and governor, who deserted
al-Hasan. Thus reinforced, the rebels drove al-Hasan's forces out of Baghdad,
took control of the city, and pushed the battle into the Sawad. Control of the
countryside was essential if the rebels were to maintain themselves in the
city; in 816-817 the abnd' won several victories in Iraq.
Military success inspired new political demands. Various officers and members
of the Hashimite family proposed to depose al-Ma'mun and to declare Mansur
ibn al-Mahdi Caliph. Mansur refused to accept their plan, but they prevailed
upon him to take the title of amir of the Caliph in Baghdad and Iraq. Despite
the continuing protective cover of allegiance to al-Ma'mun, the rebels had
taken a more aggressive attitude toward the Caliph and reaffirmed their deter-
mination to drive al-Hasan out of Iraq.
Al-Ma'mun thus found himself opposed by both the 'Alids and by the
former 'Abbasid army led by members of his own family. In turn, however,
the rebels found themselves embroiled with local opposition to their own
claims. While the soldiers of al-Harbiyya district and of the 'Asker al-Mahdi
supported the rebellion, the populace of al-Karkh supported al-Hasan by
admitting his troops to the city during the fighting. In retaliation the soldiers of
al-Harbiyya plundered and burned the district. The opposition of al-Karkh may
reflect district and quarter hostilities within the Baghdadi populace; it may echo
the 'Abbasid-'Alid antagonisms; but we cannot say this for certain.
372 Ira M. Lapidus

In any case, law and order completely collapsed in Baghdad. With the break-
down of political authority, the populace of Baghdad was exposed to gangs of
thieves, shuttdr, and 'ayydrun. Houses were attacked, people were robbed or
kidnapped and held for ransom. Women were not safe on the streets, while
merchants and artisans were subject to extortions and the operation of protection
rackets. Even whole quarters or villages were attacked. The populace was in
despair because many of the thieves were 'Harbiyya', soldiers of the controlling
faction, or 'ayydrun, auxiliaries in the retinue of the leading officers. Baghdad
was being pillaged by a rebel army in the absence of the Caliph and his forces.
This crisis stimulated efforts at popular organization in Baghdad. Faced with
incessant assaults, the sulahd' - the good men - of each suburb and street
resolved to fight. The division of the city into quarters produced a natural
popular leadership. At the same time, various individuals began to incite their
neighbors and the people of the city against the bandits. Khalid al-Daryush
who lived in the Tariq al-Anbar called upon his neighbors and the people of his
mahalla (quarter) to fight the thieves and shuttdr. Using the religious slogan,
amr bil-ma'ruf wa-nahy 'an al-munkar, 'Command the good and forbid the evil',
Khalid mobilized volunteers called mutawwi'a to defend themselves against
the bandits.
Religious themes were even more explicit in a similar defense led by Sahl ibn
Salama al-Ansari, a resident of al-Harbiyya quarter and one of the ahl-Khurdsdn
in Baghdad. Sahl wore a copy of the Qur'an around his neck and called on the
people to ' Command the good and forbid the evil'. He appealed to his neighbors,
to the people of his mahalla, and to a larger audience including the Banu Hashim,
the Caliphal family, and to the people of high and low rank. While Sahl organized
his followers and marched through the streets and suburbs to keep order and
stop the protection rackets, his movement went beyond resistance to banditry.
Sahl signed his supporters into a diwdn, or registry, required that they uphold
the Qur'an and the sunna, 'amal bil-kitdb Allah wa-sunnat nabiyihi, and pledged
them to take an oath of allegiance to him to oppose whosoever opposed the
Qur'an and sunna. Beyond resistance to banditry Sahl envisaged allegiance to
a higher principle which justified opposing even the Caliph and the state authori-
ties if they failed to uphold Islam. On this point he and Khalid al-Daryush
parted ways. Khalid wished to mobilize the people to maintain order, but would
not oppose the Caliphal authority which he regarded as intrinsically legitimate,
while Sahl preached that allegiance to the Qur'an and sunna superseded obedience
to authorities who were compromised by failure to uphold Islam.
The vigilante movement and self-defense against criminals had further
political repercussions. Because Sard's efforts were directed against the soldiers of
al-Harbiyya, his patrols, his statelike organization replete with diwdns and oaths
of allegiance and his refusal to accept either the authority of al-Ma'mun or of the
rebel government, meant the opening of a third front of Baghdadi politics,
aimed against both the reign of al-Ma'mun and the regime of the rebel authori-
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 373

ties. The rise of Sahl turned the struggle for power in Baghdad into a three-
sided struggle for power in which Sahl and his people proved, for a time, to be
serious contenders.
In 817-818 the challenge posed by Sahl unnerved the leaders of the al-
Harbiyya rebellion. Mansur ibn al-Mahdi returned from the Sawad to Baghdad;
'Isa ibn Muhammad began to negotiate with al-Hasan to close ranks against the
threat posed by Sahl. 'Isa accepted an arrangement which assured amnesty for
him and his family. He was to become joint governor of Iraq with al-Hasan, and
six months' pay would be distributed to the rebel soldiers. Sahl's rising power
also seems to have frightened some of the military chieftains who had supported
him. Muttalib ibn 'Abdallah ibn Malik al-Khuza'i deserted Sahl to declare his
renewed allegiance to al-Ma'mun. Sahl refused to allow Muttalib to violate the
oath he had given saying ' This is not what you swore to me.' Evidently Muttalib
and other Baghdadi officers including Mansur ibn al-Mahdi, Khuzayma ibn
Khazim, and al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi' had previously given Sahl their oath. For
several days Sahl ibn Salama fought with Muttalib until Muttalib made
peace with Sahl. 'Isa, however, conspired to have Sahl assassinated. When his
plot failed 'Isa made excuses to Sahl and agreed to give Sahl his bay'a, or oath of
allegiance, to ' Command the good and forbid the evil', and to follow the Qur'an
and sunna. Having survived the desertion of Muttalib and the assassins of 'Isi,
Sahl was recognized as a major force in the struggle for control of Baghdad and
Iraq.
No doubt each party had its own reasons for this agreement. The military
chiefs delayed capitulation to al-Ma'mun by adopting the vague formula of
Sahl ibn Salama, while Sahl reserved the wider claims of his religious movement.
These claims became more explicit as Sahl adopted the slogan, Id td'a lil-
makhluq fi ma'riyat al-khdliq, ' No obedience to the creature in disobedience
of the Creator', an open allusion to the conflict, as he saw it, between God's will
and Caliphal authority. At the same time, from al-Harbiyya to Bab al-Sham,
Sahl's followers built burj (towers) in front of their houses, fortifying themselves
within the city - a beleaguered polity of the saintly in an imperfect world.
At this juncture the situation in Iraq took a new turn. Al-Ma'mun nominated
'Ali al-Rida, the eighth descendant of 'All, to succeed him as Caliph. This policy
may have been calculated to pacify Shi'ite opinion in Iraq and to reconcile the
'Alid and 'Abbisid branches of the Hashimite family, but in Baghdad it only
served to push the Banu Hashim into open rebellion against al-Ma'mun.
Embittered by the events of the last few years, fearful of being betrayed into the
hands of the Shi'ites, the Hashimites deposed al-Ma'mun and elected Ibrahim ibn
al-Mahdi to be Caliph. This more radical turn of events was supported by the
quwwdd, the military chiefs of al-Harbiyya, including Muttalib and 'Isa ibn
Muhammad, who switched their allegiance back to the rebellion. The new regime
quickly took control of Baghdad, Kufa, and parts of the Sawad.
In Baghdad the first order of business for the new regime was to crush the
374 Ira M. Lapidus

movement of Sahl. This was easily and quickly accomplished. When the anti-
Caliph Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi and 'Isa b. Muhammad decided to act, Sahl, who
proved so powerful against Muttalib a short while before, easily fell into the
hands of his enemies. 'Isa b. Muhammad came to arrest him, bribed the people
of his quarter for a dirhem or two per head, and took Sahl without resistance.
Why he should have fallen so easily I do not understand. Sahl was asked to
recant in public, but instead he again proclaimed his mission of 'amal bil-kitdb
wal-sunna and asserted that he supported the 'Abbasid da'wa. For this he was
beaten and imprisoned, and rumor was given out that he had been killed. In fact,
he was subsequently released, jailed again, and finally was set free by al-Ma'mun.
According to one source, Sahl recognized al-Ma'mun and was given a pension.
In any case, this is the last we hear of Sahl and the vigilante movement.
Nonetheless, the new government was not destined to last. 'All ar-Rida
died; al-Fadl ibn Sahl was assassinated; al-Ma'mun resolved to return to
Iraq; and the opposition wavered. Muttalib again proclaimed al-Ma'mun
Caliph; 'Isa ibn Muhammad urged Humayd, one of al-Hasan's generals, to
enter Baghdad. For this betrayal he was imprisoned by Ibrahim, but his
followers rebelled against Ibrahim's authority, drove his officials out of al-
Karkh, and helped al-Hasan's forces enter the city. Ibrahim was deserted,
deposed, and forced into hiding; the soldiers were promised their pay, and
Baghdad was once again in the hands of al-Ma'mun. In 819-820 the Caliph
entered the city for the first time in his reign. The rebellions were quieted;1
1
The fullest account of the movements of Khalid and Sahl is found in al-Tabari, Ta'rtkh
al-rusul wal-muluk, Husayniyya edition, x, 2413, 248-9. Abbreviated accounts with
occasional supplementary detail may be found in Ibn al Athir, al-K&mil fil-Ta'rlkh
Cairo, 1357 A.H.), v, 182-3, 191; 'Uyun al-Hada'iqfi Akhbdr al-Haqd'iq, M. J. de Goeje
and P. de Jong, eds. (Leiden, 1869), pp. 352-3 an account that stresses the connections
between the 'ayyarun and the army; Miskawayh, Tajarib al-Umum, M. J. de Goeje and
P. de Jong, eds. (Leiden, 1869), pp. 433-5, 4401; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya zoal-nihaya
(Cairo), x, 248; al-Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab (Cairo, 1958), iv, 29, points out that the
volunteers, the mutawtoi'a, were the chiefs of the common people and of their followers.
Al-Ya'qubi says that al-Ma'mun 'also gave amnesty to Sahl b. Salama al-Mutawwi'i
who used to clothe himself in a woollen garment, drape a copy of the Qur'an about his neck,
and urge the people to depose al-Ma'mun; but no one ever paid any attention to him'.
Or so al-Ya'qubi might have wished. See W. Millward,' The Adaptation of Men to Their
Time: An Historical Essay by al-Ya'qubi', Journal of the American Oriental Society,
LXXXIV (1964), 329-44.
For events in general, the main source is al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, years 198-204; Miskawayh
gives valuable details about the 'Alid-'Abbasid feud, pp. 424-5. See also Ibn al Athir and
'Uyun al-Hadd'iq for the same years.
Muttalib had a long history of changes of political heart. He was, as al-Ma'mun is
reputed to have remarked, the first and the last to be involved in every political dispute.
As governor of Mosul in 809-10 Muttalib supported al-Ma'mun rather than al-Amin,
who had appointed him. Between 813 and 816 he held two short terms as governor of
Egypt, during the second of which he was driven from the country by the outbreak of
civil war. In Baghdad he declared support for Sahl although this proved to be only a
holding action for al-Ma'mun, but he would soon oppose al-Ma'mun by temporarily
supporting the anti-Caliph Ibrahim ibn al-Mahdi before returning once again to his
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 375

the movement of atnr bil-ma'ruf prohibited.1 For the first time in almost ten
years Baghdad was at peace.

A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
Looking back over the events of the early years of the reign of al-Ma'mun, the
vigilante movement of Sahl seems to be a crucial aspect of a multisided struggle
for control of Iraq. The Caliph with the forces of al-Hasan ibn Sahl and unidenti-
fied loyalist elements in the Baghdad district of al-Karkh, Shi'ites in Kufa and
Basra, the abnd" led by elements of the Hashimite family were three of the crucial
contenders. The abnd' of al-Harbiyya formed a vociferous party allied to Hashi-
mite family interests in the city, but they usually pursued a narrow policy
defined in terms of salary payments and political power for opportunistic officers.
Out of this milieu also came the shuttdr or 'ayydrun, the criminal element preying
on the civilian population of the city. The movement of Sahl was directed
against the 'ayydrun and implicitly against the rebel army authorities and the
regime of Ibrahim ibn al-Mahdi, but it was equally opposed to recognizing the
authority of al-Ma'mun. The movement of Sahl was one of several political
movements, but what party or what interest did it represent?
Our sources give a few clues. Sahl's movement seems to have been a popular
or mass movement at base. Despite the participation of some Hashimite leaders
and the uncertain allegiance of some of the leading abnd' officers, such as
Muttalib and al-Fadl ibn al-Rabi', most of the leadership of the movement came
from the sulahd', from the men of good will of the neighborhoods and blocks, and
from the popular preachers such as Sahl and Khalid. Most of the followers are
called the 'dmma, the common people. As such, the movement is to be distinguished
from the activities of 'ayydrun or ahddth, paramilitary youth gangs familiar to
students of Muslim urban society. In fact, in this case the 'dmma clearly opposed
the 'ayydrun and other military elements.
Furthermore, Sahl's support seems to have been localized in al-Haribiyya
quarter of the city, the district once settled by the Khurasanians who brought
the 'Abbasid dynasty to power and became the mainstay of 'Abbasid military
power. A few identifications of individuals also suggest that Sahl's followers were
former Khurasanian supporters of the dynasty. Sahl himself was one of the ahl-
Khurdsdn, and he claimed to support the 'Abbasid da'wa. Another activist,
Ahmad ibn Nasr ibn Malik al-Khuza'i - to whom we shall return - was also of
Arab Khurasanian descent. The neighborhood of Khalid of al-Daryush, the
Tariq al-Anbar, was the residence of the famous traditionalist, Ahmad ibn

original allegiance. See al-Kindl, al-Wuldt wal-Qudat (Leiden, 1912), pp. 152-61;
al-Azdi, Ta'rikh Mawsil (Cairo, 1967), pp. 325, 342; Ibn Tayfttr, Ta'rikh Baghdad
(Baghdad, 1968), p. 32; Gabrieli, Al-Ma'mun e gli 'Alidi, p. 49; Ibn Taghribirdi, al-
Nujum al-Zahira (Cairo), 11, 157, 162-3.
1
Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Ta'rikh Baghdad (Beirut, 1966), xn, 350-1.
376 Ira M. Lapidus

Hanbal,1 who also descended from one of the original supporters of the 'Abbasid
movement. These clues relate the vigilantes to the descendants of the original
'Abbasid army, to people of KhurasanianArab descent who resided in al-
Harbiyya, but who were evidently assimilated to civilian pursuits and no longer
active in the army. Sahl therefore represented the civilian Arab descendants of
the original 'Abbasid da'wa who now opposed the military interests of 'Abbasid
soldiers who lived in the same section of the city and who shared a common
Arab-Khurasanian descent. Sahl's movement echoes the situation in Marw
before the 'Abbasid revolution, where sedentarized civilian Arabs found them-
selves opposing the military interests of other Arabs and of the Umayyad
Caliphate and administration in eastern Iran.
Moreover, these people had inherited the revolutionary tradition of their
forebears. Sahl's slogan, ' Command the good and forbid the evil', sums up the
demand for a righteous society, a community of the just living in accord with
God's law. While the Caliphs, perhaps beginning with al-Ma'mun who was the
first to replace the market inspector of Baghdad known as the sdhib al-siiq with
the official called the muhtasib, claimed that only they and their appointed
muhtasibs were responsible for 'commanding the good and forbidding the evil',
the popular preachers held that it was incumbent upon all Muslims to see to
the implementation of the holy law. Thus, Sahl's slogan embraces a conception
of Islam in which every Muslim was obliged not only to obey the legal, moral,
and ritual teachings of Islam, but also to prevent their gross violation by others.2
By employing this slogan Sahl sought to appeal to the populace of Baghdad on
grounds even broader than self-protection; he tried to mobilize the latent religious
sentiment which made each Muslim personally responsible for a just society.
Sahl was appealing to a sentiment akin to the sentiment for jihad, or holy
war - indeed his volunteers were called tnutazuwi'a, as were the volunteers for
frontier duty and for the holy war against Byzantium. Sahl was appeal-
ing to a sentiment which reached beyond the boundaries of Caliphal govern-
ment to an essentially communal conception of Islam. In this respect the
vigilante movement embodied a revolutionary conception of the structure of
Muslim society.
Similarly, the slogan 'No obedience to the creature in disobedience of the
Creator' also expressed a radical position. It was originally a Khariji slogan to
justify resistance to Caliphal authority, but by the beginning of the 'Abbasid
age it evidently had some currency in other circles. Ibn al-Muqaffa', the scribe,
1
For Ahmad ibn Irlanbal and Ahmad ibn Nasr, see below.
2
See the Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, in, 487. The Hanbali school holds that
al-amr bil-ma'ruf is a religious duty, but counsels against the use of violence. Ibn Batta,
La Profession de Foi, H. Laoust, ed. (Damascus, 1958), pp. 53-4. Later authors such as
al-Mawardl, al-Ahkam al-Sultdniyya, treat the injunction to command the good as the
responsibility of the muhtasib. Al-Ghazali gives the religious basis of the obligation in
Qur'an and hadith. See L. Bercher, ' L'obligation d'ordonner le bien et d'interdire le mal
selon al-Ghazali', Jnstitut de Belles Lettres Arabes, xvm (1955), 53-91, 313-21.
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 377

translator and author of the Risdlafi al-Sahdba,1 a treatise of advice on govern-

ment written for the Caliph al-Mansur, discusses the slogan as if it were a familiar
topic of debate. Extremists, he points out, take the slogan to mean that the Imam
who orders men to disobey God is no longer qualified to be the ruler, and that
only a person who gives (religiously) true commands is truly the Imam. Their
extreme opponents hold that obedience is due the ruler regardless of the nature
of his orders. The correct opinion, he holds, is that no obedience is due the
ruler in disobedience of God, but this does not cancel the obligation of obedience
in general. Ibn al-Muqaffa' distinguishes religious and political orders. No
obedience is due the ruler in violation of religious precepts, in matters of
fard'id and hudud, but he still must be obeyed in political matters - ra'y and
tadbir. A sacrilegious command is not binding, but it does not dissolve the
authority of the ruler.
In Sahl's movement, however, the plea for no obedience to the creature was
coupled with a bay'a to support the kitdb wal-sunna and to support Sahl himself.
Sahl thus adopted the extreme position and undertook to represent Muslim
communal and religious interests vis-a-vis the Caliphate and no longer accepted
the Caliphate as the embodiment of the community and its sole and necessary
spokesman.
Finally, the revolutionary slogan, 'amal bil-kitdb Allah wa sunnat nabiyihi, had
been used by the 'Abbasids themselves in their revolt against Umayyad rule.
Abu Muslim, organizing the 'Abbasid revolution in Khurasan, called on his
followers in the name of the Holy Book and the sunna and required them to take
the bay'a to the kitdb wal-sunna. In the late Umayyad period, other rebels used
the slogan. Al-Karamani, Bishr ibn Jurmuz, and Ziyad ibn Salih al-Khuza'i
who rebelled against Abu Muslim also adopted the appeal to the sunna. In the
time of al-Ma'mun, Abu Saraya called for the kitdb wal-sunna, as well as for
support to al-Ridd - the chosen one of the family of the prophet, the combination
of slogans meant to appeal to both 'Alid and 'Abbasid opinion. Thus, Sahl's use
of the slogan placed him in the revolutionary tradition of Khurasan and of the
precedents set by the 'Abbasid da'wa itself.2 Descended from the earlier move-
ment which overthrew Umayyad rule in the name of religious ideals, the

1
Ibn al-Muqaffa', 'Risala fi al-sahaba', Athar Ibn al-Muqaffa' (Beirut, 1966), pp.
348-9. The phrase Id td'a lil-makhluq ft ma'siyat al-khdliq is often translated ' No obe-
dience to the creature who disobeys God', but Ibn al-Muqaffa"s discussion makes it
clear that the moderates interpreted the issue as whether commands contrary to God's
law are to be obeyed.
2
For the use of the slogan 'amal bil-kitdb wal-sunna, see F. Omar, The Abbasid
Caliphate (Baghdad, 1969), pp. 86, 87, 95, 137, 159. Omar derives most of his materials
from the Akhbdr al- Abbas. See also al-Tabari, de Goeje edition, n, 1931-1989. For Abu
Saraya, see Ibn al-Athir, Kdmil, v, 173-4; 'Uyun al-ffadd'iq, p. 345; Miskawayh,
Tajdrib, p. 419; C. van Arendonk, Les Debuts de Vlmdmat Zaidite (Leiden, i960),pp. 96-7.
With this tradition in mind, al-Ma'mun also promised to deal with his subjects according
to the Qur'an and sunna. See al-Jahshiyari, Kitdb al-vruzard' wal-kuttdb (Cairo, 1938),
p. 279.
25 MES 6 4
378 Ira M. Lapidus

vigilante episode proves to be more than a peace-keeping device and more than
a struggle for power in an unsettled political situation; it revives the religiously
inspired political activism which had already replaced one dynasty with another
and which now opposed its own creature in the name of basic religious principles.

AN AUTHORITARIAN RESPONSE

The implications of the vigilante episode reach from the past into the future.
Though al-Ma'mun's return to Baghdad suppressed Sahl's activities, the vigi-
lante experience was important in shaping the policies of his regime. Confronted
by enormous political and ideological problems - civil war, bitterness between
'Alids and 'Abbasids, the various rebellions, the breakdown of the coalitions of
Hashimites, Iraqi soldiers, and Khurasanian administrators on which previous
'Abbasid Caliphs had based their rule, and the popular movement of Sahl ibn
Salama - al-Ma'mun prepared to rebuild the political and ideological foundations
of the Caliphate and to restore and enhance the prestige and authority of his office.
On the political front al-Ma'mun consolidated his power by removing the
Banu Sahl from power and replacing them with the T&hirid family which would
henceforth govern Khurasan, police Baghdad, and suppress rebellions in the
Jazira, Syria and Egypt. On the religious and ideological front, al-Ma'mun
reaffirmed, and indeed extended, the claims of the Caliphate by vesting it with
the Shi'ite conception of extensive religious authority and control of ritual and
doctrine.
The first thrust of al-Ma'mun's policy was to restore unity by adopting
a pro-'Alid position and by obliging the Hashimite family to accept this orienta-
tion and his authority over the succession. Al-Ma'mun required that the official
'Abbasid color, black, be abandoned in favor of the 'Alid green. Once the change
had been accepted he reverted to wearing the black. Otherwise, al-Ma'mun took
no active steps. In the period between 819 and 826 he is known to have consulted
theologians such as Bishr ibn Ghiyath al-Marisi, and to have discussed making
the doctrine of the created Qur'an an official belief, but his first active gesture
did not come until 826 when he proposed to denounce the Caliph Mu'awiyya
in the mosques. Al-Ma'mun's proposal had nothing to do with Mu'awiyya, but
was a way of asserting a pro-'Alid position. It was also a challenge to the anti-
'Alid position which was strongly held by the ahl-Khurdsdn. In counseling
against this declaration, Yahya ibn Aktham, al-Ma'mun's chief qddi, warned that
it would lead to disturbances among the 'dmma and the ahl-Khurdsdn, and that it
was wiser for the Caliph to avoid partisan involvements.
In the following year, al-Ma'mun proclaimed the superiority of 'All to all other
companions of Muhammad and to the Rdshidun Caliphs and announced his
support for the doctrine of the created Qur'an. In 830 al-Ma'mun declared new
variations in the standard prayer sequence and ordered that three 'takbir'be
said. He also considered legalizing the mut'a type of temporary marriage, both
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 379

measures being in accord with 'Alid religious views. Outside the government
this religious policy caused consternation in 'ulamd' circles, while inside the
government it was opposed by the qddi Yahya ibn Aktham. Yahya's removal from
office and his replacement by the Ahmad ibn Abi Du'ad in 832 was thus the
signal for a new stage in the progression of al-Ma'mun's program. In 833 al-
Ma'mun inaugurated a mihna or inquisition to force government officials and
religious leaders to accept his religious views and his authority in matters of
religious ritual and doctrine.1 Though the mihna was part of a general effort to
restore the ideological authority of the Caliphate, it was also a response to the
political activism of the ahl-Khurdsdn who asserted the priority of kitdb and sunna
against the authority of the Caliph. The close connection between the movement
of Sahl and the religious issues of the mihna will become apparent in the course
of a close study of the people and issues involved.

THE INQUISITION
In the inquisition, al-Ma'mun's officials examined groups of qddis and scholars
of hadtth for their views on the createdness of the Qur'Sn. Only people who
subscribed to the doctrine would be allowed to hold official positions; and those
who did not could lose their livelihoods, their physical security, and even
their lives. Our sources list a total of forty-eight persons who were subject to
official interrogation and biographical information is available for thirty-one of
them.2
The first group to be examined included seven persons, all of whom agreed
to accept al-Ma'mun's doctrine and who were no doubt selected in the expecta-
tion that they would. Of the seven, Muhammad ibn Sa'd, the scribe of al-
Waqidi, Abu Muslim, the mustamli of Yazid ibn HSrun, Yahya ibn Ma'in,
Zuhayr ibn Harb, and Ahmad ibn al-Dawraqi were well-known traditionalists
and scholars. Three were tnawdli of prominent Arab families. Yazid ibn Harun,
who figures indirectly, was born in Bukhara, and lived in Wasit before coming
to Baghdad. He is numbered among the people of al-amr bil-ma'ruf.
1
The fullest treatment and interpretation of al-Ma'mun's religious policy is Sourdel,
' La politique religieuse..." See also W. M. Watt, 'The Political Attitudes of the Mu'tazi-
lah', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, n.v. (1963), 38-57; J. van Ess,' Ibn Kullab und
die Mihna', Oriens, XVIII-XIX (1967), 92-142; W. M. Patton, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and
the Mihna (Leiden, 1897), pp. 52-5; Ibn Tayfur, Ta'rikh Baghdad, pp. 30, 42, 50; Ibn
Taghribirdi, al-Nujum, 11, 187, 201, 203, 213; al-Taban, Ta'rikh, Husayniyya edition,
x, 278-9, 281; al-Mas'udi, al-Muruj, iv, 40-1; al-Bayhaqi, Kitdb al-Mahdsin wal-mdsawi,
F. Schwally, ed. (Giessen, 1902), p. 151; Ibn al-Murtada, Die Classen der Mu'taziliten,
S. Diwald-Wilzer, ed. (Weisbaden, 1961), pp. 64-5; Miskawayh, Tajdrib, p. 463;
'Uyun al-Hadd'iq, p. 370.
2
For the mihna in the reign of al-Ma'mun, see Patton, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Tabari,
Ta'rikh, Husayniyya edition, x, 284 ff.; Ibn al-Athir, Kdmil, v, 222-6; Miskawayh,
Tajdrib, pp. 465 ff., 'Uyun al-Hadd'iq, pp. 376 ff.; al-Kindi, p. 451. See also al-Khatib.
Ta'rikh Baghdad (Beirut, 1966), v, 177; xn, 349, for a few additional comments about
people involved in the mihna.
25-2
380 Ira M. Lapidus

After this initial success al-Ma'mun turned to a second group of twenty-five

Baghdadis, which included people from whom serious opposition must have been
anticipated. This group was also composed of experts on hadith. Four of these
people were or had been judges: Bishr ibn al-Walid al-Kindt, qddi of Baghdad;
a descendant of the Caliph 'Umar, qddi of Raqqa; al-Fadl ibn Ghanim, qddi of
Rayy and Egypt; and al-Nadr ibn Shumayl, once qddi of Marw. Al-Dhayyal ibn
al-Haytham had been governor of al-Anbar. There were two mawdli. Noteworthy
are eight persons of Khurasanian background: Abu Nasr al-Tammar from Nasa;
Qutayba ibn Sa'id from Balkh; and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ishaq ibn Abi Isra'il,
al-Fadl ibn Ghanim of the Khuza'i clan, Muhammad ibn Hatim, Muhammad
ibn Nuh, and al-Nadr ibn Shumayl were all from Marw or descended from
people from Marw. Ahmad ibn Hanbal was the son of a man who had come to
Baghdad with the founding of the new regime, and he was the grandson of one
of the people who had comprised the initial 'Abbasid da'wa in Khurasan.
Under severe pressure only a few people in this group held out against the
Caliph's contention. Four men are said to have been imprisoned briefly: Ahmad
ibn Hanbal, Muhammad ibn Nuh, al-Hasan ibn Hummad Sajjada, and al-
Qawariri. According to al-Tabari, only two of these held out: Ahmad ibn
Hanbal and Muhammad ibn Nuh, both from Marw. The biographical sources
add that al-Fadl ibn Ghanim, Bishr ibn al-Walid, and 'All ibn Ja'd also refused
to accept the doctrine of the created Qur'an. Thus, in the first round of the
mihna, the people from Marw formed one noteworthy group and emerged from
the trials as leaders of the theological opposition to al-Ma'mun, though the
mihna was by no means limited to this particular group.
Moreover, the theological opposition is clearly linked to popular demonstrations
against the policy of the regime. Ahmad ibn Hanbal was considered the ' chief of
a sect who has gathered his 'dmma and ghawghd' (the commoners and riff-raff)
to proclaim in the streets that "nothing which is of God is created and the Qur'an
is of G o d " . . . " The scholars from Khurasan, like the preachers from Khurasan,
had a vociferous popular following.1
Two other persons are reported to have been examined at this time, though
not as part of the large group. Affan ibn Muslim was a mawla residing in Baghdad;
Abu Hasan al-Ziyadi was once qddi of Baghdad. Their biographers tell us that
they both refused to accept al-Ma'mun's doctrine.
Similar trials were carried on in the provinces. In Damascus the qddi Abu
Mushir wavered, but in the end refused to agree with al-Ma'mun. In Kufa four
persons are known to have been examined. One, Malik ibn Isma'il was a mawla.
The other, an outstanding traditionist who refused to accept the new doctrine,
al-Fadl ibn Dukayn, was active in the movement of al-amr bil-ma'ruf. On a visit
1
Ibn al-Murtada, Die Klassen der Mu'taziliten, S. Diwald-Wilzer, ed. (Wiesbaden,
1961), p. 124. Al-Jahiz reports that the mobs that fought for al-Amin against al-Ma'mun
in 813 were anti-Mu'tazilite. This may be an anachronism. See Sourdel, 'La politique
religieuse... ', p. 32.
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 381

to Baghdad in 819-820, al-Fadl was arrested and brought before the Caliph for
attempting to prevent a soldier from molesting a woman in the streets of Baghdad.
The mihna continued in the subsequent reigns of al-Mu'tasim and al-Wathiq.
In Egypt a large group of scholars, traditionists, lawyers, and others were
examined, but in this period five cases stand out. 'Ali al-Madini was known as
a great scholar of hadith. Yusuf ibn Yahya al-Buwayti was a famous scholar of
law and a companion of al-Shafi'i, who was brought from Egypt to Samarra to
be examined by al-Wathiq. Ghassan b. Muhammad al-Marwazi, qddi of Kufa,
was one of the ahl-Khurdsdn. Nu'aym ibn Hammid is of further interest. He
was a member of the Khuza'i clan, from Marw, one of the ahl-Khurdsdn, and an
associate of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. These three refused to accept the doctrine; all
were imprisoned and died in prison. The later mihna touched fewer people, but
it was all the more fiercely prosecuted and all the more resolutely resisted.1
The fifth figure in this period was Ahmad ibn Nasr ibn Malik. Ahmad, of the
clan of Khuza'i, was the grandson of one of the 'Abbasid agents in Khurasan,
a very highly regarded scholar of hadith, and an associate of Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
He was dedicated to the sunna, openly opposed the doctrine of the created
Qur'an, and was a leader of the movement of al-amr bil-ma'ruf in the time of
Sahl. In the reign of al-Wathiq Ahmad became the unofficial leader of the
opposition to the Caliph's religious policy, and in 845-846 he decided to revive
the movement of al-amr bil-ma'ruf. He took the bay'a or oath of political and
religious allegiance from his followers, declared his intention to ' Command the
good and forbid the evil', and began to organize a rebellion. His men, Talib on the
west side of Baghdad and Abu Harun al-Sarraj on the east, distributed money and
organized a following. Some of the recruits included men in the service of
Ishaq ibn Ibrahim, the chief of police, a Khurasanian Arab, clan chiefs, the
people of Ahmad's quarter, and men of the Banu al-Ashri clan. At the sound of
drums - the agreed signal - the conspirators were to rise against the Caliphate.
This naive plan was destined to fail. Two men of the Banu al-Ashri clan,
confused by drink, gave the signal on the wrong day. The attention of the police
was roused, and Ahmad and various others were betrayed. Twenty-nine of his
followers were imprisoned, a search was made of Ahmad's house, and, though no
weapons were found, he was taken to Samarra to be examined by the Caliph.
At Samarra, Ahmad was not tried for conspiracy, but for his religious views.

1
The biographical sources for people involved in the mihna include al-Dhahabi.
Tadhkirat al-Huffdz (Hyderabad, 1955); Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Tadhhib al-Tadhhib,
12 vols. (Hyderabad, 1328 A.H.). al-Khatib, Ta'rikh Baghdad, 14 vols.; Ibn al-'Imad,
Shadhardt al-Dhahab (Jerusalem, 1350 A.H.), II, 44, 46-8, 56, 64, 68-72, 85, 94-8. Ibn
Sa'd, al-Tabaqdt, E. Sachau, ed., 9 vols. (Leiden, 1905-21); Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Nujum
al-Zdhira, 11, 222, 229, 252, 254, 260,272,276^7,303, 306; al-Subki, Tabaqdt al-Shdfi'iyya
(Cairo, 1964), 11, 162-5; al-Sam'ani, al-Ansdb (Hyderabad, 1966), 11, 366^7; ill, 73-4;
v, 392-393; al-Waki', Akhbdr al-Qudat (Cairo, 1947-50), in, 191, 291-2, 272-3, 326.
Whenever page numbers have not been listed, the sources may be consulted alphabetically
or by convenient tables of contents.
382 Ira M. Lapidus

Refusing to submit to the Caliphal orthodoxy, he was condemned and executed;

his head, displayed in public to warn others of the fate of those who defied the
Caliph, made Ahmad a martyr.1

COMMUNITY AND AUTHORITY

The events of the mihna give us important insights into the evolution of Muslim
communal and sectarian movements in the early ninth century and bring into
the open implicit debates about the nature and limits of Caliphal authority in
religious matters. The mihna reveals that the leadership of the opposition to
al-Ma'mun's claims to legal and doctrinal authority came from that same
Khurasanian milieu which had earlier opposed him in the streets of Baghdad.
The numerous scholars from Marw, the leadership of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and
Ahmad ibn Nasr, their involvement in popular demonstrations and in the move-
ment of al-amr bil-ma'ruf show that the religious teachings of the traditionists
and the political activism of the ahl-Khurdsdn were part of a single movement.
The crisis of the early ninth century had fused the Khurasanian tradition of
militant opposition to the Caliphate for political and religious principles with
traditionist religious attitudes to create a new socioreligious movement.
In the following century the new movement took the form of the Hanbali
school of law. The teachings of Ahmad ibn Hanbal were codified to become the
basis of a new corpus of law and traditions, a new school in which religious
thinkers adhered to the principles of the master and expounded them for an
audience of disciples, students, auditors, visitors, and the public at large. The
new school, moreover, kept its popular following and preserved its activist
political heritage. Hanbali preachers or wd'iz, who gave sermons and harangued
the masses, continued to involve the populace of Baghdad in political and
religious questions.
At issue among the Khurasanians. the scholars, and the Caliphate was the
nature of the religious authority of the Caliphate and the limits of the obligation
to obedience. As opposed to the Shi'ite view adopted by al-Ma'mun, the popu-
lar slogans of the Khurasanians held that the precepts of the Qur'an and sunna
superseded political or even religious loyalties - that a Caliph who did not follow
Islam could not command obedience, and that the community of Muslims
itself was responsible for upholding the norms of Islam. The more precise
views of the 'ulamd' and particularly of Ahmad ibn Hanbal were essentially the
same. In the view of the traditionists, Islamic religious obligations derived not
from Caliphal pronouncements, but from the Qur'an and hadith as recalled,
interpreted, and explained by the leading scholars of the community. The
1
Al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, Husayniyya edition, xi, 15-17; de Goeje ed., in, 1343; Ibn
Kathir, al-Biddya, XI, 303-6; Miskawayh, Tajarib, p. 529; al-Azdi, Ta'rikh Mawsil,
p. 341; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, v, 273-4; Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Nujum 11, 259; al-Khatib,
Ta'rikh Baghdad, v, 173 ff.; Ibn Hajar, Tadhhlb, I, 87.
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 383

traditionists expected the Caliphate to uphold the truth and law, but not to define
its content, because as the ultimate object of Muslim devotion, the law stood
beyond the Caliph.
The political implications of this view were carefully nuanced. According to
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, it was the duty of the 'ulamd' to revive and preserve the law,
and the duty of all Muslims to ' Command the good and forbid the evil', that is,
to uphold the law, whether or not the Caliphate would properly do so. In general
however, Ahmad did not oppose the Caliph's authority over the machinery of the
state. The Hanbalis remained committed to the 'Abbasid dawla as the true
Caliphs of Islam. In the name of the law a Muslim could disobey the Caliphate
over a specific matter, but not rebel against the regime.1 The implication of
Ahmad's views is to circumscribe the authority of the Caliphs in religious matters
and, though Ahmad himself did not have a language to express it, to recognize
a practical distinction between secular and religious authority.
This tacit discovery had profound implications. By the middle of the ninth
century, the tradition of active militancy for religious principles a tradition
embodied by the ahl-Khurdsdn had acquired a religious point of view. This
development replaced ad hoc militancy with a radical revision of the whole concept
of the umma and of the Caliphate. The growth of religious loyalty to hadith and
the long struggle over doctrine and authority had crystallized a conception of the
umma of Muslims as a community founded upon loyalty to religious principles
which were formulated independently of the Caliph, under the leadership of
those private religious scholars who preserved tradition and elaborated the
law. Merging political activism, a popular religious movement, and the school
of law as a scholarly and religious tradition of study, late ninth- and early tenth-
century Hanbalism marked a new stage in the differentiation of religious and
political institutions in Islam. Hanbalism brought the potential for militant
opposition to the Caliphate into the very core of Sunni Islam. It made the
Caliphs' once devoted followers into a new sectarian community. Henceforth,
the Caliphate was no longer the sole identifying symbol or the sole organizing
institution, even for those Muslims who had been most closely identified with
it. The umma itself was now an independent and differentiated entity shaped
by religious beliefs - a social body whose continued existence was no longer
bound up with its nominal chief.
The crystallization of the Hanbali school of law seems to have completed a
process by which religious bodies with a defined sense of the meaning of Islam,
and a socially accepted means for recognizing its leaders and confirming the
authenticity of its beliefs, had come into being - communities which could no
longer look to the Caliphate as the sole representation of their religious identity.
The Caliphate, after all, had been conceived in an earlier age when neither the
substance of Islam nor a body of religious scholars had yet developed, but by
the middle of the ninth century the evolution of the Sunni religious communities
1
Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., article Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
384 Ira M. Lapidus

had grown beyond the confines of an earlier Muslim world, with its unified
community and with its religious identity concentrated in the Caliphate. The
Caliphate, descending in the family of the prophet, still signified the ultimate
unity of believers and the derivation of their faith within an historically continued
community. Though the Caliphs remained the heads of the Muslim umma, the
chief authority in Islam responsible for the overall functioning of the community
of Muslims, though the union of religion and politics remained valid in theory,
Islam had in fact passed beyond the age of this primal unity.

CHURCH AND STATE

In the development of Islamic institutions we have come from an early

identification of politics and religion to a differentiation of political and religious
life into organized and partly autonomous entities. In the early polity led by
Muhammad and in the early decades of the Caliphate, membership in the Muslim
community entailed participation in a state order, with one person, the Caliph,
representing both the religious and the political aspects of Muslim identifications.
By the process I have tried to describe - by the emergence of opposed communal
and Caliphal interests, the recognition of a communal life independent of the
Caliphate, and subsequently the organization of a politically active community
based on religion - Muslim religious communities evolved apart from the Cali-
phal polity. By the middle of the ninth century, the ahl-Khurdsdn and the Sunni
traditionalists had tested the boundaries of Caliphal authority in religion.
In subsequent centuries, this initial differentiation of religious and communal
institutions from the political institution of the Caliphate grew more profound
and more clearly denned. In later centuries, as we have indicated, the Caliph lost
his de facto political power to secular military and administrative regimes,
albeit to regimes nominally loyal to Islam. At the same time, the several religi-
ous communities, Sunni and Shi'ite, developed religiously organized forms of
socioreligious life independent from that of states and empires. Eventually,
Muslims everywhere came to be identified as subjects of a regime on the one
hand, and adherents of one or another religious body - a Sunni school of law,
Shi'ite sect, or Sufi tariqa - on the other. We know very little about this process
of centuries, and one of the most important desiderata in the social history
of Islam is to further explore this profound differentiation. We need to know
more about the 'ulamd', and their conception of religion, their values, and
their attitudes toward politics and the state. To what extent we must know,
did the 'ulamd' recognize a realm of religion separate from the realm of the
state?
Second, further research into the social structure of religious life is essential.
How were religious communities organized? What parts did the 'ulamd' play
within them? What relations did they have with the common people? How
deeply did religious and sectarian identifications penetrate the Muslim masses?
 Separation of state and religion in early Islamic society 385

And, of course, what social and religious functions did the 'ulamd" and organized
sectarian communities play in the ongoing life of Muslim communities?
Third, there is the question of the relations between Muslim communities
and Muslim states. How were these relations formed under different regimes,
in different localities; how did they change over time? To what extent did the
'ulamd' influence the development of the state? To what extent did the state
control the 'ulamd' and sectarian communities?
Finally, given the fundamental differentiation of state and religion which we
have explored, and its ramifications in later Islamic centuries - given the differ-
ences in values, in personnel, in organization, and in functions between Muslim
sectarian communities and Muslim states - may we not speak of a distinction
between church and state in Islam? How may we describe and explain the Islamic
situation if it represents neither the unity posited by Islamists for the early
Caliphate nor the thorough institutional differentiation evident in the Christian
Europe? The issue is important. Though the modalities of 'state' and 'religion'
in the Islamic world are quite different from those of' state' and ' church' in the
west, Islamic society, in fact, if not in its own theory, is one of those societies in
which religious and political institutions are separate. The implications of this
fact for the operation of regimes, for the structures of communities, for the moral
situation of the individual Muslim believer runs through the whole fabric of
Islam.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
BERKELEY