EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2010

PER CURIAM:

This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated
member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the
decision.
The Background Facts

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya
Lolas Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.

Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese
army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in
houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.

Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department,
represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the
Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations. But that Department
declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.

On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Justice Mariano C.
del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its
decision: it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim
against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to
espouse their claims.

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More
than a month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr.,
announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition detailing plagiarism
committed by the court under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these
stolen passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino
comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to
Atty. Roques announcement.

On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty.
Roque announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of manifest intellectual theft and outright
plagiarism[1] when he wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.[2] They charged Justice Del
Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-

Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis,
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge
University Press (2005).

Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in the case has been put into
question by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The Court should thus address and disclose to the public
the truth about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[3] that resulted in gross
prejudice to the petitioners.

Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated,
Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when
he wrote the decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in
the pertinent part:

It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all

sources, whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious intent to
appropriate anothers work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice
included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during
the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27,
2010. Each time, suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in
the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or
deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes.

xxxx

As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained

in the above foreign materials were twisted, the same remains their opinion
which we do not necessarily share.[4]
 On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant
of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillos
verified letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.

In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author
Evan Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving
their work but Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was
the Courts conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally
binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.

On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning
his work, the Court may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them
for cross purposes.Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes.

On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the
Dean of the University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his
faculty, claiming that the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice and a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The
statement said that Justice Del Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors
work, and that the Courts decision amounted to an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in
order to mislead and deceive.[5]

On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although
relevant sentences in the Courts decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference
only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather
than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was
inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support
an approach to erga omnesconcept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of
nations) that is not consistent with what he advocated.

On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the summary manner of
administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the
Committee and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.

Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in
attendance so they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential,
involving the drafting process that went into the making of the Courts decision in
the Vinuya case. Petitioners counsels vigorously objected and the Committee sustained the
objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the
Justices court researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that
went into the making of the decision in the Vinuya case.The Committee granted the request.
 The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted
passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report
to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her
grievous mistake and grief for having caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del
Castillo and his family.[6]

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researchers explanation,
counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is
required is for a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from
anothers work. Counsel invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,[7] arguing that standards
on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective
memoranda.They filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the
Committee submitted its unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.

The Issues

This case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo
plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that
such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision.

The Courts Rulings

Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in
that case or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The
Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but
how the decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works
and for what purpose the decision employed the same.

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or
ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.[8] The passing off of the work of another as
ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

The Passages from Tams

Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams book, Enforcing
Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the
author thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that
the footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of referencing,[9] he and petitioners cannot
deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did
not pass off Tams work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the
passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned,
apart from Simma, Tams article as another source of those ideas.

The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy
the footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning
clarity of writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International
Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him
somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del
Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase cited
in rather than the phrase See would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than
a case of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices citations were imprecise,
it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise,
many would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and
for every technical detail of form.

The Passages from Ellis

and Criddle-Descent

Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without
attribution to the author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following
statement on page 27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are
morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary
international law. 65 xxx

Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that
footnote came almost verbatim from Ellis article,[10] such passages ought to have been introduced
by an acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case

Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The
concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new. This is not to say that
rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day
sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the
Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The article on crimes against
humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name.
(For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United
States provides that in time of war all women and children shall not be molested in
their persons. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King
of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss.,
8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85. The 1863
Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of troop discipline.
(Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm
of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It
specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The
1907 Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their
honour. (Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as
well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General
Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal;
General Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter established
crimes against humanity as the following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal
Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. INTL.
COMP. L. 667, 676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the Far
East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly
criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui,
Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible
for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their
authority. (THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST445-
54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when
Control Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes
against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in
Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10:
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for
Germany 50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War was the first modern-day international instrument to establish protections
against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by
enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against
humanity.

But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing

from Footnote 65.

Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying
footnotes appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law)
refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.71

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory
norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von
Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The
recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was
a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC
was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC
concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion
by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus
cogens.76 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated
that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be
worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.77Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is
undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles
and rules.78

Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-
Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.[11] Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried
into the Vinuyadecisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those
footnotes.

The Explanation

Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent
could be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed
attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the
beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the
decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For international
materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes.

In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case
for study and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books
and published articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of
the issue or for the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil
mark the item, and place the book on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He
would later paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his
manuscript on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute
the materials used to their authors or sources.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained,
most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic
diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the
researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into
her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The
researchers technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The
carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to
the object he has in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs,
cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of
the scraps.

Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that. She electronically cut relevant materials
from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her
computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used
the Microsoft Word program.[12] Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would
take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions
in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and
words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor,
demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use
everyday in their work.

Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in
the Vinuyacase and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent
and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing
and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.

First Finding

The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers explanation regarding the
accidental removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational
properties of the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions
to sources of research materials is not remote.
 For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example
similar to the circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of
such an accident happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the
inalienable character of juridical personality in connection with an assignment and if the book of
the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a website, researcher
X would probably show interest in the following passage from that book:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities
of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.15
xxx
_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is evident
that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from
Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.

When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-the-
making in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use,
automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if
the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23,
Tolentinos footnote would automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.

But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag
the Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject
description would be: The inalienable character of juridical personality.23 The footnote mark, 23
From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to
attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now
appear like this:

The inalienable character of juridical personality.23

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities
of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.24
xxx
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help
researcher X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what
texts, passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis,
and when she was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally
deleted the footnotes that went with such tagswith disastrous effect.
To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent would be researcher Xs removal
during cleanup of the tag, The inalienable character of juridical personality.23, by a simple delete
operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of
the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentinos book. Only
the following would remain in the manuscript:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities
of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm
when original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the
rest of the manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick
together had just been severed.

This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher
deleted the subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of
the sources of the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them
was not easily detectable.
Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified letter of July 22, 2010 is
inconsistent with his researchers claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They
cite the fact that the Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter despite the latters
confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By
denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to
whitewash the case.[13]
But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del
Castillo merely explained that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due and
that there was never any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it
turns out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once,
prompting major revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted. Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed,
it did not preclude a researchers inadvertent error.
And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researchers
error. He wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse
arising from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the
Court is confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the
attendance of the other parties.
Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting
attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly
respected professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have
exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors
when the decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the
lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del
Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works
of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that
a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and
acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.[14] Petitioners point out that the Court
should apply to this case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.[15] They argue that standards on plagiarism
in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.
But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where
intent to deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic
position considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that
is free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in
this case, have reasonable and logical explanations.
Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's
own.[16] Thus, plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers
work and pass it off as ones own.
Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent
to pass off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed
the academic freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student obtained based
on evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not
the case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages
to others.

Second Finding

The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-
Descent and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the
passages that he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others
remains self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages
to the sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag
and, accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like
this:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities
of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to Tolentino, the passage
remains to be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself
cites. The text and its footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation
of researcher X. It is the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such
passages remained attributed by the footnotes to the authors original sources, the omission of
attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations
of Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own
thoughts.
True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without
placing them in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert
Frost,[17] The woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before
I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep. The passages here consisted of common definitions and
terms, abridged history of certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that,
in the world of legal literature, already belong to the public realm.
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,[18] while the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which
encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The
judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision
lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws
from.

Third Finding

Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and
Ellis.The Court adopts the Committees finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting
or misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means to distort or pervert the
meaning of.[19] For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and
declares that Jose Palma who wrote it did not love his country, then there is twisting or
misrepresentation of what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or
implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the
Courts conclusion that the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse
Vinuya et al.s claims.
The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally
deleted, it is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of
those authors as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended
messages. And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the
state of international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could
support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order
the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of
international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of
the passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of twisting
or misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the
charge is reckless and obtuse.

No Misconduct

On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use
quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But
these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud,
corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action. This is not the case here. Justice Del
Castillos acts or omissions were not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable
motives. If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated
he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record.

No Inexcusable Negligence

Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result
of plain error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They
point out that he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have
surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter.
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to
his researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher
testified, the Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the
issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the
study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it. In every sense, Justice
Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually became
the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a law clerk in
the United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is
dictated by necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it
would be truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching
the internet, checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he
would have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for
decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing
of the decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researchers shoulder
as she cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justices
researcher was after all competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a
leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law
Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters degree
in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under
the Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post
graduate programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad
judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated
by human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the
courts should be as error-free as they themselves are.
Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits, the Committee noted
that petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement
was reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members,
in solid rows, with the letters Sgd or signed printed beside the names without exception. These
included the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.
Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty.
Roque to present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing.[25] He complied. As
it turned out, the original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the
list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth
in the original. Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to
be a statement of the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza
did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered
why the Dean submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying
machines.
Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning
the supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of
the same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s charges of plagiarism, twisting
of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;

2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their
known addresses;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research
and reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in
the Vinuyacase while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of citations
and footnoting is substantial; and

4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the
Court that can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over
to the en banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring
Integrity, a statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en
bancs consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty
statement.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO.

February 8, 2011

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges
of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo
in connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo.[1]
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the
commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else,
condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To
plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal and pass off as ones own the ideas or words of another. Stealing
implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English law dictionary
quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing presentation
of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own.[2] The presentation of
another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of
plagiarism errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For
instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that plagiarism is identified
not through intent but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones self
what is not ones work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not
excused.[3]
But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision
makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is
based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the
doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to
produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the
soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it
draws from.[4]
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for
instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a
specific view.[5]This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic
degree, honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others,
copies their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a cheat
deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in
dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the
commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would
be easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work
of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such copied
work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the
students work shows as a whole that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error
in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his
diploma.

In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original
piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public
good. Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who
ache for speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that need to be
protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that
they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality,
form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the
cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the
doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific
situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point.
Once the Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties or property are the same.[6]
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often
entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to
build up regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves,
often become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their
theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges
and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and
writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it
succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively
place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted,
criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without
fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words
is everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have
been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the
meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in conjunction
with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be sought in
articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of
lawyers have together contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and
expression which is common property and may be utilized, developed and bettered
by anyone.
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public
domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno
cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted
from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review
 article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a partys
brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever
sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of
reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for
two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases
are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.[8]
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from
the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not
on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These
omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by
magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never
in the judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and
demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their
decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate
each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The decisions
then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or
authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the
product of the judges creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their decisionsthat their genius,
originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing
sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that
the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their
resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign
authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they
developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the
peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his
discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his
work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or
expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers
handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule
they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they
render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should
not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers
of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either
previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges words
to lend weight to a particular point either with or without attribution. The words of
scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on reputation. Some
 encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England this place is given
to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer
can do little better than to frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of
the law in Halsburys. While in many cases the very purpose of the citation is to
claim the authority of the author, this is not always the case. Frequently
commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely
without attribution.
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It
is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the
established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so
they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale
abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy.[9]
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and
petitioners, joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law,
have unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as already
stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted
from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the
Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these
authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly
qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time
she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no
motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources
she cited in her research, had high reputations in international law.
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their
works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the originators. As
it happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to
them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to the
earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the
remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in
the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del
Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del
Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case, Ang
Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.[10] Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as
Justice Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in
fact made attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although
they at times suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-
intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
[G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999]
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER
POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI
MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR.
FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO,
and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No.
42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondents application for a writ of
mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of
a Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
(CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.
After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent
went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio
in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in
Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, Tamil
Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of
Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate
Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready
for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in
a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as
members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah,
Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans representative.
After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo
Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without
proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern
Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edyes
article entitled Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the
Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting
Navigation in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14
(1833).[2]
Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5,
1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral
defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form.These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason,
Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature:
Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her
Ph.D. thesis.[3]
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment:
Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng
dissertation.[4]
Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:
Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel ang bound copies.[5]
In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private
respondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the
amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held at the
deans office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel
present.[6] During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was
sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Deans
representative.
On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents
graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.
In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to
Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners
maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel
members in the final copies of her dissertation.
Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoros office on April 15, 1993 and
proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr.
Teodoro, relying on Dean Pazs March 5, 1993 statement.
Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval
form.[7]
Dean Paz then accepted private respondents dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course
requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology.
In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over
matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not
affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the
approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina
nor tried to obtain the latters signature on the revision approval form. She likewise expressed her
disappointment over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with
maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against
encouraging perfidious acts against her.
On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation
for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of
Regents for final approval, included private respondents name.
On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for
graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:[8]
Abril 21, 1993
Dr. Milagros Ibe
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Unibersidad ng Pilipinas
Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.
Mahal na Dr. Ibe,
Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na hwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y]
William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology)
ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral
defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.
Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms.
Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree
ng Unibersidad.
(Sgd.)
CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D.
Dekano
Apparently, however, Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because
the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the
graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993,
private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993,
that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations
contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.
In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medinas unfavorable
attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in
the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in
the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment.
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private
respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.[9]
On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from
various disciplines and chaired by Dr. Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge
against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr.
Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.[10]
In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against
her.[11]
On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least
ninety (90) instances or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted from sources
without proper or due acknowledgment.
On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation
to withdraw private respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the
University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same
recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.
On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study
the legal implications of its approval.[12]
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman
summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written
explanation to the charges against her.
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and
provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee.[13] Private respondent, on the
other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993.
Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private
respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27,
1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already
decided her case before she could be fully heard.
On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging
that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.[14] She sent another
letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents,
complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer
withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.[15]
Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council
in its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24,
1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.
On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-
investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of
dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized
penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.
On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondents transcript of
grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with
12 units of credit.
On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94
constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside
Diliman to review the University Councils recommendation to withdraw private respondents
degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee,
Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected
from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of
Regents. On August 31, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private respondent met
at U.P. Los Baos.
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a
copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation.
In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that
the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules
and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman,
dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications.
On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committees report, signed
by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree. The report
stated:[16]
After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy
William, the following facts were established:
1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for
word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the
source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings
were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90)
instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently
verified as correct by the Special Committee.These instances involved the following
forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment,
full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words
(e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an
acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the
documents for reference); and
2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of
plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting
 having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the
beginning.
In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms.
Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the
recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret
Celine Arokiaswamy William.
On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to
the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the
University either as a student or as an employee.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the
following letter:[17]
4 January 1995
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William
Department of Anthropology
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:
This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and
1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the
excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith.
Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994
resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P.
Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of
senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot
from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.
In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the
Board, the Board, at its 1082ndmeeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your
request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.)
VIVENCIO R. JOSE
Secretary of the University
and of the Board of Regents
On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez,
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commissions intervention.[18] In a
letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of Regents,
she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents
and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2,
1995.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[19] She alleged
that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording
her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay
her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost
earnings.
 On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition
for mandamus for lack of merit.[20] Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on
December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court.The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
decision reads:[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are
ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT
OF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENTS
DOCTORAL DEGREE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE
DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED
WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.[22]
Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance
of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her
degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the
enjoyment of intellectual property.
On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted
arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying
the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been
forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to
comment or refute their findings.
In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her
doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, does
not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college
committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must
be signed by a majority of its members.
We find petitioners contention to be meritorious.
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[23] In University of the Philippines
Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,[24] this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P.
from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of
dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition
for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from
carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to
dismiss the students petition, this Court said:
[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of
May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injustice to the
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and
good paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a
predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic
freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful
cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of
no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion
or judgment.[25]
In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of
academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied
due process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its
recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree,
petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was
consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.[26]
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been
formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the
investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the
university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there
were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a
finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on
the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[27] A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
claim to have been denied due process.[28]
In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her[29] and
afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she
forwarded on September 25, 1993.[30] Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and
the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to
the U.P. authorities explaining her position.[31]
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.[32]It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of
Regents.[33]
 Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla
committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,[34] we
held:
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity
to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14,
1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students participation in a
hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .
In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held:
First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After
graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the
ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and
enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only
arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioners right of
enjoyment to intellectual property.
Second. Respondents aver that petitioners graduation was a mistake.
Unfortunately this mistake was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that
the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men
and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver,
suspicion is aroused that the alleged mistake might not be the cause of withdrawal but some
other hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal.
At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a
consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by
restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related
requirements.
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution[35] and the 1973
Constitution[36] likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,[37] it is a freedom granted to
institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending
to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot
study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being
its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud,
a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy
that the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If she was able to
join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations
conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to
graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion.
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University
of the Philippines.[38] It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University
Council.[39] It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless
if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be
more objectionable than bestowing a universitys highest academic degree upon an individual who
has obtained the same through fraud or deceit.The pursuit of academic excellence is the universitys
concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.[40]
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a
committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent
committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The
Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on documents on
record including her admission that she committed the offense.[41]
On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain
her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her
responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered
its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the
performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.[42]
Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent
was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers
of the U.P., is private respondents contention that it is the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had
jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent invokes 5 of the
U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides:
Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under
the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit;
(a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or
(b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or
premises or in the course of an official activity;
Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases
involving students of such units.
Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in
relation to ones studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1)
year.
As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of
the student disciplinary tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not
seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent
is no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P. Private respondent cannot even be
punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary
proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board
of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent
an academic degree she obtained through fraud.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition
for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
 He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is
one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that
he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by
the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-
appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is
not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
 Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636,
June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant
further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring
the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration
as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of
time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed
from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act;
and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for
decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor
and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and
public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave
to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge,
you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to
you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me
cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye?
Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for
this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition.
On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath
that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members
of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute;
and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated
with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members
have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on
this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID
YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President,
 said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated
that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are
those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your
duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise
to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in
thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public
opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution
and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the
latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons
for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to
tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have
been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of
the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required
is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for
this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew
or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period
of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction
& Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days
in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon
by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the
motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco,
I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.
117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the
Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear
that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he
loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to
public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court
are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all
to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly
stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can
only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived
 of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty
to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips
of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court,
72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley,
v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
 We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth
or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as
such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature
as to justify the disbarment of its author."
 Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of
those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at
all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected
from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The
letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with
the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not
appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.
The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration
of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent
bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy,
111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court,
as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved
upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or
the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made
by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of
improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who
is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of
the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
 officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with
their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and
wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or
the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before
it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the
state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found,
for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult
was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his
associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise
by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than
by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile,
or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we
have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of
public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the
penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount
to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the
court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for
their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for
like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of
judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said
the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking
the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office
under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter
to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim
133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7
and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney
had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was
stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is
 I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned
in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it
will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one,
and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the
circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney
was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the
judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing
the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months
for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister
influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts
of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates
that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or
with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to
go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as
"a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding
him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement,
 are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the
one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under
the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to
the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586,
594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes
a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of
this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
 question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt
charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may
still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence
of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced
by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution
of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent
in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of
law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the
right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him
the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it
is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice."
And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he
caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but
to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of
all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It
is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath
and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need
therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that,
as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be
the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In
the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range
from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps
be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of
candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long
that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on
the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling
outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it
will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to
this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
[G.R. No. L-22979. June 26, 1967.]

RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners, v. ZOILO R. FERRER, ET

AL., Respondents.

IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION

REYNA, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO,
and JOSE S. ARMONIO, members of the Philippines Bar.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo, for Petitioners.

Jose T . Valmonte for Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:

Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by
counsel for petitioners
"One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to
whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without
due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is
overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract
through its decision the scope of its jurisdictions authority as conferred by law. This error is
manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Courts decision in the instant
case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue. . . .
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court when it applied the so-called rule against splitting of jurisdiction in its
Decision in the present case. As applied by this Honorable Court, the rule means that when an
employee files with the Court of Industrial Relations numerous claims relative to his
employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by said court under the law, while the others
pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all the claims to avoid multiplicity
of suits
drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with
for contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the
language used" and stated that" [i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be
disrespectful." They manifested that the language "was the result of overenthusiasm on the part
of Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to focus the attention of this Honorable Court to the
issue in the case, and was not in any way meant to slight or offend this Honorable Court." They
also said that the "unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was prepared and filed by Atty.
Armonio who had been personally handling the case since its inception at the Court of Industrial
Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in the case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Respondent members of the law firm namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full
responsibility" for what appears in the motion for reconsideration. They submitted, not as an
excuse, but as a fact, that not one of the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of
the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion
"without clearing it with any of the partners of the firm." The return winds up with an expression
of deep regret about the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen
again."cralaw virtua1aw library
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and
Armonio were orally heard.
1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall
into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making "any
reference to and analysis of" the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the
jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to
the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by
the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question
the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm when counsel labeled as "so- called" the
"rule against splitting of jurisdiction." 1
By now, a lawyers duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that" [i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more.
The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to
the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is
bound to uphold." 2
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege.
And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
courts decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished
and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney in a
motion for reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention
of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words
"superfluous." 4 It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought
best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him unbridled
license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issue involved. The language vehicle does not run
short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of
"harboring and encouraging discontent which, in may cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." 5 Stability of judicial institutions suggests that
the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to
repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the
one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts
in our system of government. 6
We are not unmindful of counsels statement that the language used "was not in any way meant
to slight or offend" this Court. Want of intention, we fell constrained to say, is no excuse for the
language employed. For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his word did not
mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability.
3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the
motion in which the questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office
at the time said motion was filed which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of
the firm known to all its members and associates that only the partners can sign court pleadings
except in rare cases where, for want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has
to sign the same." We understood Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in
his long years of practice, he knows that it serves no useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of
the Court. We may overlook the shortcomings of the members of the law firm; except that, as we
see it, partners pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of their law
firm. Seemingly, such control was absent here.
In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Armonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident
will be dealt with accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.
Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo,
Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequate
supervision and control of the pleadings and other documents submitted by their law firm to the
courts of justice of this country. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

[A.C. No. 6131. February 28, 2005]

EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O. NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ-ALVARICO and IMELDA L.
NUEZ, complainants, vs. Atty. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of disciplinary action;
thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven
serious administrative charges.[1]
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[2] filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez,
Eliza Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The material averments of the Complaint are
summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nu[]ez
executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[]ez Lot No. 106 covered by
OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq. ms. for a consideration of
P400.00. In the said contract, the stipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from the date
of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978. That said period of vendors right to repurchase
expired without any agreement of extending said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of
the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year after
the execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez and her son
Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[]ez, extrajudicially partitioned his
estate, among others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which
eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[]ez.
Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to
the present and it is also where his children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez,
grew and [are] presently residing.
By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez
and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well as on the alleged judicial
confirmation of respondents wife, as acknowledged natural child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent,
on the pretext of administering the properties of the late spouses, had been disturbing the
peaceful occupation and possession of complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants
have no right over the same. With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants
agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as
administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez, sold
and conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez and Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106 they were
occupying. After which Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as Criminal Case No. R-
4013-A.
Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the house of
Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to
kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by uttering the words ipaposil ta ka which means Ill have you shot. A
complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[]ez
before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte.[3]
In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, while respondent
was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yet filed his answer to the
Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to do so. The hearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002.[4]
On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was present. Respondent
filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another extension of fifteen
(15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus granted a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days within which to do so.[5]
On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer.[6] He denied that he had utilized
his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there were already several pending cases
involving the same issues raised by complainants in the present administrative action:
2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega Vda. De
Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be best threshed out in the amended
complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled []The Intestate Estate of the late Spouses
Ricardo O. Nuez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al[] for Rescission of Contract[.]
[T]he original complaint was filed in October 2001 at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of which is filed where one of the issues is the declaration
of invalidity of the foregoing questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase because if this
document is really valid and existing then why did complainant Eugenio Nuez [affix] his
signature as one of the instrumental witnesses in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among
Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have
protested at the time of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106,
one of the properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O. Nuez to take
control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the partition in 1969?
xxxxxxxxx
[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar that
herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestate estate but the same had been
duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O. Nuez, namely, respondents
wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan-Nuez who confirmed undersign[ed]s authority as administrator of the
aforenamed estate;
[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to repurchase only
recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as they now
[refuse] to recognize the ownership and long time possession of the real properties forming part
of the aforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late Ricardo O. Nuez;
[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent the law. Complainants
Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are actually renting the cornermost portion of the consolidated
Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area only of 201 square meters, more or
less, and when respondent was trying to eject them, complainants negotiated with the respondent
to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed
consideration until their father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existing document of sale with right
to repurchase when they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil
and administrative cases against respondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers, the
late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way of pressuring
respondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No. 106[,] including
[the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting of Lot No. 89;
4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the pendency of
Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa L. Nuez without the
intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no longer pending in the Municipal
Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was
ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by
Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated
the case for review to the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal
case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s] whereby this
administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of that petition for review by the
Department of Justice;
5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of the
complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at the instigation of the complain[an]ts
and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the Municipal Trial Court, Baybay,
Leyte which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same was filed at the
instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But before the filing of this present action initiated by Mr.
Caballess counsel and complainants Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez required Mr. Caballes to
execute a document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowing that the same has already
been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legal redemption, and despite Amado Caballes
having executed x x x a Deed of Resale which was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuez x x
x, the complainants convinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That
by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial question
and that further hearing of the present administrative action should be suspended until the
outcome of this criminal case;
6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part of the Intestate
Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar x x x.
7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence and
pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of this complaint because this will be
threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of the matter is that respondent had been already
acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 x x x.
8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there is also filed Crim. Case
No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuez and now pending in the
Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack of witnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of
this case will constitute a prejudicial question which necessarily will suspend further hearing of
the present administrative action until the final outcome of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-
A;
x x x x x x x x x.[7]
On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply.[8] Thereafter, IBP-CPD
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing on December 11, 2002.
On this date, respondent requested and was a granted a period of fifteen (15) days to file his
rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the
case was to be considered submitted for resolution.[9]
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
[10]
In her Report, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty of serious
misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for a period of one year.
In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent also filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-
346 of the IBP Board of Governors.
The Courts Ruling
We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but find respondents offensive
language against complainants and their counsel unbecoming an attorney.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public
or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.[11] In Gonzaga v. Villanueva,[12] this Court, citing Tucay v. Tucay,[13] held thus:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad
enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership therein.[14]
However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of disciplinary action
and must be imposed with great caution.[15] The allegations in the Complaint were not substantiated
by clear evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of respondents deceit and gross
misconduct.
The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him does
not ipso factoconstitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose
a prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of
merit, however, is the finding of the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the
same pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a
finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction,
such lawyer has become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of
good moral character.[16] In the present case, however, while respondent has been charged with
several criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them.
 Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted
serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for
disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of
attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBP investigating
commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation.[17] As borne by the records, Investigating
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002,
during which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his
Answer, as well as his Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the December 11,
2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on January
29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges
filed against him.
While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincingly proven the
charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive language in respondents
pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
In his Memorandum[18] dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego,
points out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer[19] and the Rejoinder of
respondent.[20] The latter suggested that complainants and their counsel had caused the filing of
several baseless suits, including the present charge, merely to harass and place him in a bad
light.[21] He hurled insulting language in describing the opposing counsel[22] and cast doubts on the
latters integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits,
violated the rules on non-forum shopping and committed malpractice.[23]
Indeed, these statements, particularly the words who he is despite x x x his shortness not only
in size but in arrogance, constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession and
cannot be countenanced by this Court.
A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but respectful
as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one gentleperson
to another.[24]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious
misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand
pesos.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and Adm. Case No. 5910

MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO,
Complainants, Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

 - versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION Promulgated:
JAVIER, September 21, 2005
Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By complaint[1] dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino
(complainants) charge Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the pleadings he filed
in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA), as
counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former
UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-
LRD (audit case),[2] and from the pleadings filed by respondent in another labor case as counsel
for the one hundred seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the East complainants
against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al.,[3] docketed as NCR-0D-0201-0005-LRD
(attorneys fees case).[4]
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on respondents Urgent Motion to Expedite with Manifestation
and Reiteration of Position (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case which complainants allege
contained statements which are absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation
of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFAs funds, destruction or concealment of UEFAs documents
and some other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon their persons.[5] Portions
of the questioned motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to manifest just so it can not be said later on that
he kept mum on the matter that when individual respondents-appellants realized that
an audit of Union funds was looming, it appears that they decided to destroy or
conceal documents as demonstrated by an Incident Report Re Robbery dated May
6, 2002 (a copy just recently secured by the undersigned), attached hereto as Annex
A, where the police investigator stated that no forcible entry was noted by him but
that air condition on the respective rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic) to mislead
that suspect as the same as their point of entry.[] The police officers stated that no
cash of (sic) money were stolen but instead claimed that still undetermined
documents/important papers were stolen by the suspects.
This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen officials who shredded
documents related to the Enron scandal when they thought nobody was looking. As
in the Andersen/Enron case, the individual respondents-appellants in the instant case
knew that the law was going to come knocking at their door, asking a lot [of]
questions about financial matters.
From the undersigneds standpoint, the alleged robbery of still undetermined
documents/papers was an inside job as investigation has shown that there is no
 evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would be a cinch to establish a motive by
individual respondents-appellants Torres and Celestino to destroy documents
related to the audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the
undersigned thinks that the legal process should go on. Lumang gimmick na yang
robbery ng mga evidensya. They may try to cover up the looting of union funds, but
there is such a thing as secondary evidence, not to mention the power of this
Honorable Office to issue subpoenas even to the unions depositary
banks.[6] (Underscoring supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorneys oath that he obey the laws and do
no falsehood, the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule
138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules of Court for directly pointing to them as the persons
who intentionally committed the robbery at the UEFA office, and for citing
the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the subject of quasi-
judicial inquiry.[7]
As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorneys fees case, respondent, in his
Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment filed before the DOLE, used
language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and improper,[8] inconsistent with the character of an
attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.[9]
As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondents statement in the aforesaid Reply, to
wit:
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their sons,
wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These
girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths and certify documents. x
x x,[10]
and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession, uncalled for and
deserve[s] censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial
document.[11]
By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry[12] while he was
preparing his Motion to Expedite in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that the UEFA
office had been burglarized and complainant Atty. Torres had been spreading reports and rumors
implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. [13]
Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss of the vital
documents so that the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by complainants
would be expedited;[14] and that the information regarding the burglary and his use of
the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were relevant in drawing a link between the burglary
and the audit the burglary having rendered the complete implementation of the audit
unattainable.[15]
With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did not in his
Answer confront the issues thereof but instead mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed] and distort[ed]
realities[16] by including malicious, libelous and impertinent statements and accusations against his
wife which exasperated him.[17] A portion of Atty. Torres Answer in the attorneys fees case reads:
x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got
only about P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect only [in] 1994, with no other
substantial improvements of the teachers benefits, and yet she spent for more than
half a million negotiation expenses from the UEFAs funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA
 was only a carbon copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with no substantial
improvements, with uncertain amount of her expenses, because she
removed/concealed all the financial records of the UEFA during her term. . . I and
the other lawyers/teachers denounced her unlawful deduction of 10% attorneys fees
from the small backwages received by the teachers on April 28, 1993 although there
was actually no lawyer who worked for itand there was no Board nor General
Membership Assembly Resolutions passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was
apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when she was booed while talking on the
floor, like a confused gabble (sic)[18]
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits having
responded with a counter-attack in his Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez)
Answer/Comment[19] wherein he stated:
What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres
just cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters
in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his teeth. The undersigned thinks
that if he has any common sense at all he should shut up about his accusation that
Prof. Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expensesshe
obtained only P2-increase in union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of
the damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his
life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case
No. NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain pogi points prior to the UEFA
election in 1994.[20]
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he should stop
making irrelevant, libelous and impertinent allegations in his pleadings. This means
changing his standard tactic of skirting the main issues by injecting a web or a maze
of sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matters.[21](Underscoring supplied)
Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLRs attention that Atty. Torres had
the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his wife to embarrass her, including one for unjust
vexation and another for collection and damages both of which were dismissed after trial on the
merits, thus prompting him to state that these dismissed cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres
pattern of mental dishonesty.[22]
Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres
accused his client, Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and of deliberately
us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax Certificate in order to justify the dismissal of the case
against him (Atty. Torres);[23] and that Atty. Torres continued harassing his clients including his
wife by filing baseless complaints for falsification of public document.[24] Hence, in defense of his
clients, the following statements in his Reply:
Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad falsified the said
petition by causing it to appear that he participated in the falsification when he did
not in truth and in fact participate thereat . . . obviously oblivious of the obvious that
it is highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have forged the signature of the notary
public. If he intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so? To save Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) for notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic)
petitioner Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded and
malicious.
 But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu,
Ramirez and Javier with the same crime of falsification of public document . . . by
causing it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had indeed participated in the act of
verifying/subscribing and swearing the subject petition before notary public Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth and in fact he did not participate thereat.
To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility, coming as it
does from a member of the Philippine Bar. There is no evidence to charge them with
falsification of public document, i.e. the verification appended to the present
petition. They did not even sign it. The crime imputed is clearly bereft of
merit. Frankly, the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student
would not oblige with such a very serious charge.
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public asking their
sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them.
These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths, and certify
documents. Believing that the said veification was signed by an impostor-relative of
the notary public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof.
Maguigad, the undersigned sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). On May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the undersigned to
inform him that he arrested in the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he
caught in flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and feigning to be Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.[25]
Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly trying to
prove that Profs. Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and Javier committed the
crime of falsification of public document reasoning out that they made untruthful
statements in the narration of facts in the basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books
is he reading?
He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners pleading
are absolutely privileged because the said allegations or statements are relevant to
the issues.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for using inappropriate and offensive
remarks in his pleadings.
The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the Manifestationand
alleges that Complainant implicated his wife in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent
alleges that Complainant has been engaged in intimidating and harassing his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondents wife have had a series
of charges and counter-charges filed against each other. Both parties being
protagonists in the intramurals within the University of the East Faculty Association
(UEFA). Herein Complainant is the President of the UEFA whereas Respondents
wife was the former President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this matter of
charges and counter-charges filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous,
peripheral, if not outright irrelevant to the issue at hand.
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in
his pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant
 was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained. Indeed, the
remarks quoted above are offensive and inappropriate. That the Respondent is
representing his wife is not at all an excuse.[27] (Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by
Resolution[28] of October 7, 2004, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its recommendation to
reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances
made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions,
are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however
false or malicious they may be.[29]
The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection given to
individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak
from beneath which private malice may be gratified.[30] If the pleader goes beyond the
requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.[31]
A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation
to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or
impropriety.[32]That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to
the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.[33]
The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondents allegation in his Motion to
Expedite that a burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to complainants of a
plausible motive for carrying out the burglary the concealment and destruction of vital documents
relating to the audit. The imputation may be false but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to
speed up the resolution of the audit case. In that light, this Court finds that the first cause of action
may not lie.
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by Atty. Torres
Answer to the complaint in the attorneys fees case wherein he criticized his (respondents) wifes
performance as past President of UEFA.
This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres incorporating in his Answer in the attorneys
fees case statements such as the assembly . . . was apparently irked by Mrs. Eleonor Javier when
she was booed while talking on the floor like a confused gabble (sic). But neither does it
countenance respondents retaliating statements like what kind of lawyer is Atty. Torres?, he lies
through his teeth, if he has any common sense at all he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets the
sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which
he filed to gain pogi points. Nor respondents emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling
baseless accusations against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against his wife, of
which Atty. Torres was the complainant, indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental
dishonesty.
The issue in the attorneys fees case was whether the 10% attorneys fees checked off from
the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the above-quoted statements of
respondent in the immediately preceding paragraph cannot be said to be relevant or pertinent to the
issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted himself improperly is not a justification for respondent
to be relieved from observing professional conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres.
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients
should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in
the case.[34]
In the attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as respondent and
complainant was acting as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although it is understandable, if
not justifiable, that in the defense of ones clients - especially of ones wife or of ones self, the zeal
in so doing may be carried out to the point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of
opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and
recrimination is far from edifying, and detract from the dignity of the legal profession.[35]
Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorneys fees case on the basis of the
alleged forgery of the notary publics signature, respondent did not only endeavor to point out that
Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an argument, but personally attacked Atty. Torres mental
fitness by stating that the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student would
not oblige with such a very serious charge, and [r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar [b]ut
what law books is he reading.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be dignified
and choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings.[36] In the assertion of his clients
rights, a lawyer even one gifted with superior intellect is enjoined to rein up his temper.[37]
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated
by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute
immunity does not extend. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote
unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided.[38]
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents
against respondents clients as a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate recourse in
law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the
courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a partys rights.[39]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to
another.[40] The language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[41]

As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public
basis of the last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the
legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document, respondent, who justifies the same as
legitimate defense of his client who was being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the
relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint Annex EJ-A[42] to the Comment of respondent filed by
his wife, Prof. Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be
consolidated with the present administrative case since the parties and causes of action of such
complaint are completely different from those of the present complaint.
WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, respondent
Atty. Jose C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Month, effective
upon receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-
NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions
and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a
circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no
avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as
assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon
receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on
or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the
Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies
for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to
expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could
be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the
Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective
bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of
Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en
toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union
security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-
proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security,
promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner
Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and
requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent
Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to
the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to
drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider
themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957."
By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their
demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the
remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the
Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands,
particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15,
1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which
would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former.
Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the
Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after
the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building
at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent
Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a
letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office
where comfortable cots have been prepared.
 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or
in the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958,
some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958
Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life
Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one
Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies
organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent
Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing
injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some
picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed
a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the
basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions,
issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court,
from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates,
entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of
the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the
strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our
decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open
for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if
there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to
report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be
forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases
involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as
the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on
June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials
and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific
acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra,
vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra,
president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani
Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-
NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being
dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep.
Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have
been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by
sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work,
with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they
might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards
readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of
participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the
complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of
merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the
said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually
to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the
strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and
members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the
legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
 4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a
legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to
the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that without
being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective
bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated
the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been
held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective
bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their
collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection
with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining
with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to
bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference.
Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work
on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference
with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th,
133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees
would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their
homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or
cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor
practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to
which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to
entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution
(NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it
contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not
report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of
benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d
70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with
"comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in
excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently,
of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the
employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following
acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the
making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying
employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of
inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for
the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement,
made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that
if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization,
accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states
that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return
to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First
Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work
and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the
strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the
Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were
calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted
activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be
such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not
proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the
criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the
meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it
may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights
under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if
there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an
adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws
1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should
be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters
should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the
basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of
and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of
opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be
culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the
particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection
with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations,
p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended
renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired
Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager
and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to
strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of
Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the
negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the
respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by
the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the
Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners
went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon
their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days
later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three
truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight
entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than
two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of
the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers.lwph1.t Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only
three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of
these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first
instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful
use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the
injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by registered
special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for
work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member refused to
admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when
almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly
refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-
strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23,
1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending
criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon,
Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact
that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies
adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the
interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed.
They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal
charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme
to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in
order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an
economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some
union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that
exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:
 TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go
on strike against
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from
January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on
collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the
respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which
so far as material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a
notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock
in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop."
(exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And
the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management
double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and
considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such
as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in
salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the
strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following
circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals,
their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not
drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the
petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to
the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the
petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners
to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the
group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee
must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no
criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he
would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the
respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the
first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second
condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members
of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However,
despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union
members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical
to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges
pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal
charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure
clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of
rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated
the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket
lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were
able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges
filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official
who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing
through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination
undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been
less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court
of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike,
dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination
against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the
striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and
Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air
Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of
discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the
power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of
the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the
unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees
having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike were hostile
to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the
strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery
of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union
official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was
imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co.,
7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and
around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in
exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee
admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19,
23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the
discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp.
7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the
Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision
whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been
empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during
the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was
serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of
slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis
for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the
evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other
strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents
refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except
three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still
refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in
the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU
Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute
sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving
you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your
service in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M.
OLBES
President, Insurance
Life
Acting President,
FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the
dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the
fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report
for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence
adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge
that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra
particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on
June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received
them and later directed them when Olbes refused them an audience to Felipe Enage, the
Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to
see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have
been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway
as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents
did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention
to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing
so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness
required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not
constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were
not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at
various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the
Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking
back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account
of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the
quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against
them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L.
Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused
readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when
an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the
duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the
Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant
union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this
allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness
stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred
to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on
a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52
(Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only
P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only
amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per
its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the
exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above
sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the
board examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed
revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip which the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and
advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act
875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the
right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of
informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the
truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the
strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent
Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the
supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an
expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a
constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor
oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working
conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the
records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring
opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89
L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed
not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy.
But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the
relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with
regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the
Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court
should not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at
that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude
that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo
Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly
because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente
Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies'
premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and
forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the
other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia;
that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted
"Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight
ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of
what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not
responsible for what happened.lwph1.t The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the
police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the
Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the
strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at
San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant
corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at
the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work
at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges
against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first
instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their
grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the
legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights
from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that
they did not resort to violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or
diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .
 We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic
weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising
passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The
transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is
difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature,
however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress
when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If
this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory.
We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of
this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p.
378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been
held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole
Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they
amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor
Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had
pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is
thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose
reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities
rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually
required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB
[1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because
he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU
Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force
and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the
non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if
this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that
incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the
picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive.
For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the
emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful
name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the
line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of
the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not
a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's
participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of
the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-
NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty.
Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) another matter which
emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good
ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This
act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union
activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion
of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to
constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges
result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer
and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is
committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective,
by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at
the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes
and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their
usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case,
coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor
practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work
upon the invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members
and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is
entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was
illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v.
Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d
606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106
F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these
union members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or
where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer
cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has
been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and
satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be
found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore
 the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's
improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id.,
p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay
payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to
reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused
by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions
just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to
unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the
employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and
Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA
124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily
dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is,
from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which
the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had
criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were
also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused
readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees
and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose
Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors
which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were
provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission
have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may
have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that
whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to
mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is
allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v.
Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed
employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under
Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in
the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to
justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the
employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the
absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination
of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to
terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination.
Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a
scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair
labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded
from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education
Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v.
Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private
respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the
instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents'
brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether
or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer
of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be
able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not
erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said
employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the
criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline
on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of
the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which
is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication
Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis
supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are
inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A
reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains
an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila
Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the
case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente
and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts
and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and,
therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair
labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the
doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine
whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether
the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against
them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified
privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof
under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's
interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be
remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against
him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act
 upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to
the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which
actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on
a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in
the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the
said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper
does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the
ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to
improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81.
Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..."
whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second
and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears
not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the
immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation
is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent
Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the
land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious
work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels
have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's
decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the
underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the
same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even
the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right
to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were
based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-
for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary
reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other
courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred
to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those
enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs.
Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not
faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be
misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check
and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from
other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as
be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change
in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for
their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing
jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents
to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively
similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual
reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them
to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court
finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who
manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law
professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and
democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds,
they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession,
and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court
for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decisions reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is
not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyones
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents explanations
whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable
professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention
or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was
respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Courts
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom
invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past
by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young
aspiring attorneys that respondents own non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo)
in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010,
the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
 I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts (sic)
assertion that the Executives foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited;
precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such
prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards,
including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if
fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to
jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque)
and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the
grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and
Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURTS
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND
AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN
IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE
PETITIONS CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision
were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized
parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on
the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the
Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one
of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his
work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddles response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism
in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Kus blog entry in this
wise:
The newspapers16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday
with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-
court/
The motion suggests that the Courts decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners [plagiarism] allegations until after
the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the courts jus cogens discussion is that it
implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not
jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Courts decision is
available here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to
the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr.
Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question
of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian
law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Courts Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive
Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine
chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the
London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-
28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court
may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes.
This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your
esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this
letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The
matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the
letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreaks website22 and on Atty. Roques blog.23 A report regarding the statement also
appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on
the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of
Laws bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said colleges website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual
signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the
notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law
faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal
stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act
of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.
In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another persons
work as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It
constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure
and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty.
Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme
Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no
longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman
of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the primary sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work of
organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources
all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is
a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the
Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In
this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of
the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty
of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role
of the injured parties home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the
petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second
World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But
instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to
take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the
Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of
the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a
democratic society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of
war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of
a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very
crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system
by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence
to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of
justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as
the petitioners therein;
 (4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing
in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

MAGALLONA Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of
Dean (1995-1999) Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.

(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
SALVADOR DAWAY
BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate
Assistant Professor
Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
 (SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his
sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams letter here:
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of
Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-
mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Courts Judgment, in the
section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter
shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of
my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as
this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an
appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgments
cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my
books central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been
widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory
chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the very mysterious
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of
international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been
cited to support as it seemingly has the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at
the way in which your Honourable Courts Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without
properly acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares exhibits during the August 26,
2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that
Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the
names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three
days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster
of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the
Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies
of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel
R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the
signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible
signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having
been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration
by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established
fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn
(Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P.
Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn
G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within
ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed
the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents,
excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the
charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the
"Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of law, and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public
concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with
the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause
Resolutions findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment that respondents indeed are in
contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have
violated Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the
courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the
Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not
to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure
continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced
by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents call in
the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar
to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" (under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes"
(under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest
and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these
unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law
schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity
Statement as an institutional attack x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted
and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was
reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the
matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did
nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Courts indifference to
the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled
them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo committed
plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic
writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits
of respondents charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism
charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified
in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance
included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M,
Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya
decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and
from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law
Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human
Rights Law" by Michael OFlaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that
Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but
this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have
likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various
published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of
respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine
Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian
Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinans call for the resignation
of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard
Today on July 31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former
dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for
sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they
may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair
and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
 In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their
position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing
their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement
was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher
learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which
provided that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic
freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as
to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty members field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and
credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students,
professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism
and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or
relevance to ones conduct."71
In closing, respondents Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following
portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to
wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the
bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too
vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid
of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of
a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common
Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and
officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their
"obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
 B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that
before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and
defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the production
of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts,
reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the
Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof.
Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein
she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the
findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring
Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the
best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part,
Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what
may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts
have no authority to interfere in the schools exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of
the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons
shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents
constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and
imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public
interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by
registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the
circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was
a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year
2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he
was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class;
and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the
same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a
lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public
officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente
Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the
Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on
respondents mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress
upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof.
Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused
the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the
same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the
intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty
made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court
has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal anothers work and to pass it off
as ones own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have
been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have
been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his
explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will
rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation
to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law
Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of
Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty
members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable
Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which
reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the
notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in
the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was
also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law
on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which
presently serves as the official file copy of the Deans Office in the UP College of Law
that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual
signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their
 printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight
(8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant
since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages
of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean
Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty
on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it
among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the
staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed drafts signing pages. Thus did
the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come
into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Courts Decision in Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that
the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonens staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Deans Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still
other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring
Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they
would sign as soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to
reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed
draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name.
Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of
non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for
aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that
"[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as among the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake
to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted
signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among
the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically
signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the
attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justices name among the "(SGD.)"
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice
Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza
 had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at
that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the
United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not
entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so
placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had
also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that
time unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendozas signature. It would turn out
that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the deans staff talked to Justice Mendoza on
the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did
not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to
leave for the United States. The deans staff informed him that they would, at any rate,
still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he
went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S.
This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received
from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the
hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from
the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he
predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under
those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former
Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovits name in the signature page of Restoring
Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous
description in Dean Leonens August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted
to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the
Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated
to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonens staff in the reformatting
of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included
in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that
38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement
that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of
the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the
same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statements] essential nature as a live
public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is
necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in
the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to
criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been
made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did not in
fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP
College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed
their desire to be signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or
Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the
Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their
desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of
Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the
same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latters information and proper disposition with
the hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing
Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required
quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for
the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard
of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the
Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence
and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of
the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he
first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the
same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that [d]ebate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he
believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting
opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that
"[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when
the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to
their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger,
clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill
of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he
"has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he
signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the
material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents academic freedom as law
professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should
not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in
relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation
of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
(G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause
Resolution, has interfered with respondents constitutionally mandated right to free speech and
expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Courts decisions and
actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors dissenting view on
what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged
one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels
in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in
the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents freedom of expression
when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco
both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second
motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not
want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to
the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and
further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in
his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice,
it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them
by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted
for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a
pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents theory, Salcedo is authority for the following
principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration
of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents Statement goes
way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was
an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing
to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed
was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition
was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before
the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle
that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of
public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such
criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same,
has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental
right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but
if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so
many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights
when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition
of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an
administrative complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot
criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court
to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court
and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of
offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and
offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the
judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil.
Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian,
130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under
his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct
for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the
occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair
attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement
presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how
they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any
previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors
can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar
discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case.
The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession
and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited
in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in
Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of
law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus,
their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance
that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the
development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the
demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to
avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective
regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law
professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.
The Courts rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents main arguments of freedom of expression and academic
freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of
their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure
motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so
unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in
public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should
be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case,
denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using
contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for
"proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas
was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the
same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino
women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who
have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)
Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid
basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are
two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it
highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents
even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against
Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit,
they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure
for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on
their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as,
among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and
respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send
a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to
their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in
full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of
these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are
the ones who would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously
took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to
the Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors letters underscore the
universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and
soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive
action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement
was primarily meant for this Courts consideration, why was the same published and reported in
the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was
prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part
of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents colleague on the
UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism
in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements
issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first
drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they
had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics
charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting
and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in
early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the
respondents outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then,
when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent
respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the
interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof
that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common
Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals
whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight
of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal
education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of
this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most
part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence
that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good
intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need
no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability
(13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the
facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed
and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention
constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court
is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers
it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases
supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim
of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect
to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who
showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward
account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement
to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion"
among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not
willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to
acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his position on
the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and
without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this
Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they
recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We
commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import
of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof.
Vasquezs Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused
from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor
in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct
to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound
by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and
respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal
standards of decency and fairness.
The Courts ruling on Dean Leonens Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for
submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true
and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the
text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring
Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public
manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur
thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent
the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonens implied view that the signatures in
the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement
was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its
signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely
in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statements persuasive authority
mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same.
Indeed, it is apparent from respondents explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of
their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did
not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11,
2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature
pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonens account, that there were errors in the
retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the deans office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II.
Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the
signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD).
This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for
posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed
document for the Courts consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In
most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a
photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he
deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August
11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this
Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism
with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents
and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to
this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason
therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonens explanations yield the answer. In the course of his
explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officers claim that Justice Mendoza
agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had
likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to
this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to
Dean Leonens proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a
person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed
the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of
Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the
Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors
who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some
signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures
before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither
parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather,
it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonens Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court
is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in
pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good intentions, the
Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the
Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for
hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may
be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonens
separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautistas Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment
that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is
this group of respondents premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full
due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs
largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance
therein on the majoritys purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding
and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in
the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the
same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral
to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is
only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of
Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases
supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court Br. 81, Romblon On the
Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also
inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination
of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases
supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they
shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance.
They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they
intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on
the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on
the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause
Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court
in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records
and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual
signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened
there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the
respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the
pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to
go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the
Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc.,
of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of
Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the
knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in
their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonens Compliance he narrated how as early as September
2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October
12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad,
predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a
hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the
Statements principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This
belies respondents claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective
compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on
being granted a hearing, that is respondents own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature
are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a
hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence
presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds
his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota,
Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio
 G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio
M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent
law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or
to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to
be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean
and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 100643. October 30, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, Respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel

for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the
court a quo 1 thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of
misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates
himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at, its mercy," and explains that
". . . whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he,
dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be appealed from have to be
quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or
order.
"In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular
paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain. He remembers,
however, that at the time he was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings
necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason why
his secretary committed a very grievous mistake. Such mistake though he does not condone and
he feels upset at the turn of events." 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly
his Secretary, stating among others that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it
was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said petition;
"4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a
petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
23773 entitled Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as stated in the Affidavit), Et Al., respondents;
"5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed
by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it .was only after our office received the
copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . . that Atty. Dacanay confronted
me and asked me where I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by
the Supreme Court, that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed;
"7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so
many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention
was distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en consulta
to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the possible sanction
that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible
counsels explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-the-
buck" stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga, 4 where the Court
observed thus
"Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the
filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the lawyers dereliction of duty is a
common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsels
shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own
negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude."cralaw virtua1aw library
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the
phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," without counsel
dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was
very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigants cause? Whatever be the
truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on
falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary.
Indeed, by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly
dictated and signed the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings,
more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the
reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession
demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or
prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the
court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound
by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders. 5
The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section
13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his
causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons
in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a
petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of
the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it
highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed, and by the secretary
at that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it
appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of
subject property when in fact it did not make such a finding is a clear indication not merely
of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue
advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this
Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The distortion of facts committed by
counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated
lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and
serious violation of ones oath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the
Code of Professional Responsibility directs that" [a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved"
(Emphasis supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of
the lawyer s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer
should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws.
Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others,
submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez
v. Viola 8 We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended
Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching
repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should be
dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice.
Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before the
Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the
blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said
". . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege one of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is
essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to
the courts, that they are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and
sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering
its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected of
him as a member of the Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is
hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given
address at Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City, entered upon
his personal records, and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.