GohGinChye&AnorvPeckTeckKianRealtyPteLtd&Anor

[1987]2MLJ118
SuitNumber : CA74/1983

DecisionDate : 09April1987

Tribunal/Court : CourtofAppeal

Coram : LPTHEANWEECHONGJINCJPUNCHCOOMARASWAMYJ

Jurisdiction : Singapore

LandlordandTenantTenancyWhether`tenancy`orbare`licence`EffectofagreementsPrinciples

applied

GohGinChye&AnorvPeckTeckKianRealtyPteLtd&Anor
CaseDetails:

SINGAPORE COURTOFAPPEALCIVILAPPEALNO74OF1983
Judges LPTHEAN
WEECHONGJINCJ
PUNCHCOOMARASWAMYJ
Date 9APR1987
Citation [1987]SLR86, [1987]2MLJ118

Catchwords:
LandlordandTenantTenancyWhether`tenancy`orbare`licence`EffectofagreementsPrinciples
applied

Facts:
ThefirstrespondentsweretheownersofcertainpremiseswhichweregovernedbytheControlofRentAct(Cap
266).TheirpredecessorsintitlegrantedtooneTayPingKee,sincedeceased,amonthlytenancyoftheground
floorofthepremisesatacertainrent.

Thefirstrespondentsclaimedvacantpossessionofthesaidpremisesonthegroundsthatthepremiseswere
sublettothesecondrespondentinbreachofacovenantandthatthesublettingrentwasinexcessofthe
aggregateof110%oftherecoverablerentpaidforthepremises.

Theclaimwasagainsttheappellantswhoweretheadministratorsoftheestateofthedeceased,TayPingKee.

ThepartiesreliedonaseriesofagreementsmadebetweenTayPingKeeandtheappellantsontheonehandand
thesecondrespondentontheother.Itwasnotdisputedthatmostoftheseagreementswereexpressedas
`licenceagreements`.

Thelearneddistrictjudgeheldthatthefirstrespondentswereentitledtorecoverasagainsttheappellants
vacantpossessionofthesaidpremisesbuthedismissedtheclaimagainstthesecondrespondent.The
appellants`appealtotheHighCourtwasdismissed,andtheyappealedtotheCourtofAppeal.

Holdings:
Held,dismissingtheappeal:

(1).Theintentionofthepartieswasanimportantconsiderationindeterminingtherelationshipoflandlordand
tenantasinallothercontractualrelationshipsbutineverycasetheintention`hadtobesoughtnotfromthe
merewordsoftheagreementbutfromitssubstanceandfromtheconductofthepartiesandthesurrounding
circumstances`.Whatthepartiessaidorprofessedintheagreementalonewasnotenoughitdidnotalterwhat
was,ineffect,atenancyintoalicence,andviceversa.

(2).Therelationshipofthepartieswasdeterminedbylaw,havingregardtoalltherelevantcircumstancesand
notbythelabeltheychosetoputontheagreement.

(3).Amaterialcircumstanceintheconsiderationoftherelationshipoflandlordandtenantwasexclusive
possessionofthepropertyenjoyedbytheoccupierandexclusivepossessionwasanessentialrequirementofa
tenancy.However,exclusivepossessionwasalsonotthesoleandonlycriteriontheremaybeother
circumstancesnegativinganintentiontocreateatenancy.

(4).Inthepresentcasethecircumstancesandtheconductofthepartiesshowedthatwhatwasintendedwas
thatthesecondrespondentshouldbegranted,andhewasgranted,exclusivepossessionofthesaidpremisesat
arentandforatermtocarryonhisbusiness.Theoccupationbythesecondrespondenthadallthefeaturesofa
tenancy.

(5).Apartfromtheformsofthe`licence`agreementsmade,therewasnocircumstanceswhichnegativedthe
intentiontocreatetherelationshipoflandlordandtenant.The`licence`agreementswereineffectualtoturna
tenancyintoalicence.

CasesReferredTo(Precedents)Cases):

AbdulRahimvBritishandMalayaTrusteesLtd[19651968]SLR172,[1967]1MLJ118(refd)

AddiscombeGardenEstatesvCrabbe[1958]1QB513,[1957]3WLR980(refd)

BookervPalmer[1942]2AllER674(refd)

CobbvLane[1952]1TLR1037(refd)

ErringtonvErrington[1952]1KB290(refd)

FacchinivBryson[1952]1TLR1386(refd)

StreetvMountford[1985]AC809(refd)

LegislationReferredTo:

Lawyers:

Appellant/Defendant YRJumabhoyandVKSNarayanan(VKSNaraganan)
Respondents/PlaintiffsGanChooBeng(ChuChanGan&Ooi)
PBalagopal(ChanKamFoo&Associates)

Judgment:
LPTHEAN

(deliveringthegroundsofdecisionofthecourt):Thisappealaroseoutofanactionbroughtbythefirst
respondentsinthedistrictcourtagainsttheappellantsandthesecondrespondentforrecoveryofvacant
possessionofthegroundfloorofatwostoreyshophouse,knownasNo71,KampongBahruRoad,Singapore.
Thefirstrespondentsaretheownersofthepremises,whicharepremiseswithinthemeaningoftheControlof
RentAct(Cap266).TheirpredecessorsintitlegrantedtooneTayPingKee,sincedeceased,amonthlytenancyof
thesaidgroundfloor(thesaidpremises)atamonthlyrentof$40permonthinitiallyandsubsequentlyat$25
permonthwhichwaslaterraisedto$26permonth.TheappellantsaretheadministratorsoftheestateofTay
PingKeedeceased.Theclaimforpossessionofthesaidpremiseswasfoundedontwogrounds,namely:
 (i)thatthesaidTayPingKeedeceasedsubletorpartedwithpossessionofthesaidpremisesto
thesecondrespondentinbreachofacovenantnottoassign,subletorpartwithpossessionof
thesaidpremisesoranypartthereofwithoutthepriorconsentoftheownersand

(ii)thatthesaidTayPingKeedeceasedreceivedinrespectofthesublettingrentinexcessof
theaggregateof110%oftherecoverablerentpaidforthesaidpremisesandthatafterthe
deathofthesaidTayPingKee,theappellantscontinuedtocollectrentinrespectofthesub
tenancyinexcessofthesaidlimit.

Beforethelearneddistrictjudge,thedisputebetweenthepartiesresolvedintothreeissues:(i)whetherthere
wasaprohibitionagainstsubletting(ii)whethertherewasasublettingand(iii)whethertherentreceivedfrom
thesecondrespondentwasinexcessoftheaggregateof110%oftherecoverablerentpaidforthesaid
premises.Thelearneddistrictjudgefoundthatthefirstrespondentshadnotdischargedtheburdenofproving
thattherewasaprohibitionagainstsubletting,andaccordingly,thefirstgroundforrecoveryofvacantpossession
failed.Onthesecondissue,thelearneddistrictjudgefoundthattherewasasublettingofthesaidpremisesto
thesecondrespondentandrejectedtheappellants`pleathatonlyalicencewasgrantedtothesecond
respondent.Onthethirdissue,thelearneddistrictjudgefoundthattherentreceivedfromthesecond
respondentwasinexcessoftheaggregateof110%oftherecoverablerentpaidforthesaidpremises.
Accordingly,heheldthatthefirstrespondentswereentitledtorecoverasagainsttheappellantsvacant
possessionofthesaidpremises,buthedismissedtheclaimagainstthesecondrespondent.

Againstthedecisionofthelearneddistrictjudge,theappellantsappealedtotheHighCourt.TheHighCourt
affirmedthefindingofthelearneddistrictjudgethattherewasasublettingofthesaidpremisestothesecond
respondentinspiteoftheseveralsuccessiveagreementswhichweredescribedas`licenceagreements`and
thattherentreceivedfromthesecondrespondentwasinexcessoftheaggregateof110%oftherecoverable
rentpaidforthesaidpremises,anddismissedtheappealwithcosts.Againstthatdecisionthisappealwas
brought,andattheconclusionofthehearingoftheappealwedismisseditwithcosts.

Thepointcanvassedbeforeuswasthatthesecondrespondentwasalicensee,andnotasubtenant,ofthesaid
premisesandreliancewasplacedonaseriesofagreementsmadebetweenthelateTayPingKeeandthesecond
respondentandthelastagreementmadebetweenthesecondappellant,astheadministratoroftheestateof
TayPingKeedeceased,andthesecondrespondent.Itwasarguedonbehalfoftheappellantsthatthelearned
judgeintheHighCourtdidnotapplyhismindtothequestionwhethertheagreementsmadecreatedalicence
oratenancyofthesaidpremises,thatthisquestionturnedontheintentionofthepartiestobegatherednot
onlyfromtheevidenceadducedbutalsofromtheagreementsexecutedbythem,andthatifthelearnedjudge
hadapproachedthequestionwiththispointinmindhewouldhavefoundthattheagreementscreatedalicence.
Werejectedthisargument.

TherewerealtogethersixagreementsbetweenthelateTayPingKeeandthesecondrespondentmade
successivelyin1961,1964,1967,1970,1973and1975andoneagreementmadein1977betweenthe
secondappellant,astheadministratoroftheestateofTayPingKeedeceased,andthesecondrespondent.The
firsttwoagreementsmadein1961and1964respectivelyweretenancyagreements,underwhichthelateTay
PingKeeagreedtosubletthesaidpremisestothesecondrespondentattherentandonthetermsand
conditionsthereinrespectivelyprovided,andeachtenancyagreementprovidedforatermofthreeyearsthe
firstagreementexpiredon30November1964andthesecondagreementon30November1967.Ontheexpiry
ofthesecondagreement,thethirdagreementdated30November1967wasmade,butthisagreementwas
expressedtogranttothesecondrespondentalicencetousethesaidpremisesforatermofthreeyears,the
secondrespondentpayingtothelateTayPingKeeasumof$150permonthaslicencefee.Theotherterms
thereofweresubstantiallysimilartothosefoundinatenancyagreementbutwithnecessaryandconsequential
changesincludingchangesincertainterminologies,suchas`subtenant`to`licensee,``rental`to`licence
fee`and`subtenancy`to`licence`.Inaddition,itcontainedthefollowingprovisionincl6:

(ii)ThattheLicenseeshallinnowayholdhimselfoutasaTenantorasubtenantofthe
LicensedSitebuthisstatusshallbethatofabareLicenseewiththerightsandliabilitiesofa
bareLicenseeinlawsavefortherightofenjoymentconferredontheLicenseepursuanttocl
(5)hereof.
Subsequentagreementsmadesuccessivelyin1970,1973and1975werealsoeachexpressedtogivetothe
secondrespondentalicencetousethesaidpremises.The1970agreement,wasdraftedinamoreexpanded
formthantheearlieragreementwithacoupleofclausesaddedthereto.Butforsomeinexplicablereasonsthe
twosubsequentagreementsweredraftedinanabbreviatedformseveralprovisions,whichwerepresentinthe
earlieragreements,weredeleted,andinparticular,theprovisionquotedabovedidnotappearineitherofthese
agreements.AfterthedeathofTayPingKee,thesecondappellantmadeasimilaragreementwiththesecond
respondentin1975withthe`licencefee`increasedto$300permonthandwithotherchangesintheterms
whicharenotmaterialforthepurposeofthisappeal.Hereagaintheclausequotedabovedidnotappearinthis
agreement.

Commencingwiththefirstagreement,whichwasatenancyagreement,thesecondrespondenthadbeenhaving
exclusivepossessionofthesaidpremisesforthepurposeofcarryingonhisbusinessofaneatingshop.Whenthe
thirdagreementwasmade,whichwasexpressedtogranttohimalicencetousethesaidpremises,heremained
inexclusivepossessionofthesaidpremisesandcontinuedtocarryonhisbusinessthereasbefore.Therewasno
changeinthecircumstancesrelatingtohisoccupationofthesaidpremises.Therewasonlyachangeintheform
oftheagreementsmadebetweentheparties.Hence,theonlyfactoronwhichtheappellantscouldrely,andthey
didsorely,wasthatbothpartiestotheagreementsmadein1967andsubsequentlyagreedexpresslythata
licencewascreated.Inouropinion,themerechangeintheformoftheagreementsdidnotsucceedin
convertingwhatwas,ineffect,atenancyintoalicence.`Partiescannotturnatenancyintoalicencemerelyby
callingitone,`perDenningLJ(ashethenwas)inErringtonvErringtonandWoods[1952]1KB290,298.
ThiswasclearlydemonstratedinthecaseofFacchinivBryson[1952]1TLR1386.There,anemployerlethis
employeeintooccupationofahouseinconsequenceofhisemploymentatweeklysumspayablebythelatter.
Thehousewasnotletforthebetterperformanceofhisdutyandtheemployeewasthereforenotaservice
occupier.Theagreementexpresslystipulated,amongstotherthings,thefollowing:`nothinginthisagreement
shallbeconstruedtocreateatenancybetweentheemployerandtheassistant`.Notwithstandingsuchan
expressterm,theCourtofAppealinEnglandheldthatatenancywascreated.DenningLJsaid,atpp1389
1390:

Wehavehadmanycaseslatelywhereanoccupierhasbeenheldtobealicenseeandnota
tenant.InadditiontothosewhichImentionedinErringtonvErrington[1952]1KB290we
haverecentlyhadthreemore,Gorham(Contractors)LtdvField(unreported),Formanv
Rudd(unreported),andCobbvLane[1952]1TLR1037.Inallthecaseswhereanoccupier
hasbeenheldtobealicenseetherehasbeensomethinginthecircumstances,suchasa
familyarrangement,anactoffriendshiporgenerosity,orsuchlike,tonegativeanyintention
tocreateatenancy.Insuchcircumstancesitwouldbeobviouslyunjusttosaddletheowner
withatenancy,withallthemomentousconsequencesthatthatentailsnowadays,whenthere
wasnointentiontocreateatenancyatall.Inthepresentcase,however,therearenospecial
circumstances.Itisasimplecasewheretheemployerletamanintooccupationofahousein
consequenceofhisemploymentataweeklysumpayablebyhim.Theoccupationhasallthe
featuresofaservicetenancy,andthepartiescannotbythemerewordsoftheircontractturn
itintosomethingelse.Theirrelationshipisdeterminedbythelawandnotbythelabelwhich
theychoosetoputonit:CommissionersofCustomsandExcisevPoolsFinance[1952]
1TLR797.Itisnotnecessarytogosofarastofindthedocumentasham.Itissimplya
matteroffindingthetruerelationshipoftheparties.Itismostimportantthatweshould
adheretothisprinciple,orelsewemightfindalllandlordsgrantinglicensesandnottenancies,
andweshouldmakeaholeintheRentActsthroughwhichcouldbedrivenIwillnotinthese
dayssayacoachandfourbutanarticulatedvehicle.

InAddiscombeGardenEstatesLtd&AnorvCrabbe&Ors[1958]1QB513theplaintiffsexpresslybya
writtenagreementpurportedto`licenseandauthorise`thedefendantstouseandenjoycertainpremisesand
amenitiesthereinforatermoftwoyearsinconsiderationofapaymentofcertainfees.TheCourtofAppealin
England,uponadetailedexaminationoftheagreement,cametotheconclusionthatatenancywascreated,
notwithstandingthatthedocumentwasdescribedbythepartiesasalicenceandthedraftsmanhad`studiously
andsuccessfullyavoided`theuseeitheroftheword`landlord`ortheword`tenant`throughoutthedocument.
JenkinsLJsaidatp522:
 Astothefirstquestionwhetherthesocalledlicenceof12April1954infactamountedtoa
tenancyagreementunderwhichthepremiseswerelettothetrusteestheprinciples
applicableinresolvingaquestionofthissortare,Iapprehend,these.Itdoesnotnecessarily
followthatadocumentdescribedasalicenceis,merelyonthataccount,toberegardedas
amountingonlytoalicenceinlaw.Thewholeofthedocumentmustbelookedatandif,after
ithasbeenexamined,therightconclusionappearstobethat,whateverlabelmayhavebeen
attachedtoit,itinfactconferredandimposedonthegranteeinsubstancetherightsand
obligationsofatenant,andonthegrantorinsubstancetherightsandobligationsofalandlord,
thenitmustbegiventheappropriateeffect,thatistosay,itmustbetreatedasatenancy
agreementasdistinctfromamerelicence.

Andhelatersaid,atp528:

Thepresentcaseofcourse,hasnothingtodowiththeRentActs,buttheimportantstatement
ofprincipleisthattherelationshipisdeterminedbythelaw,andnotbythelabelwhichparties
choosetoputonit,andthatitisnotnecessarytogosofarastofindthedocumentasham.It
issimplyamatterofascertainingthetruerelationshipoftheparties.

Inboththesecases,thecourtsinEnglandheldthatthepartiescouldnotbymerewordsorexpressprovisionsin
anagreementturnwhatwas,ineffect,atenancyintoalicence.Thesameprinciplewasapplied,though
producingtheoppositeresult,inthecaseofAbdulRahimvBritishAndMalayaTrusteesLtd[1967]1MLJ
118.There,byanagreementinaprintedformtheownergrantedtotheoccupierstheuseofaspaceina
commonpassageofabuildingcalledTheArcadeona`monthlytenancy`ata`rent`of$40permonth.Winslow
Jheldthatnotwithstandingtheexpresstenancyagreementintheprintedformonlyacontractuallicence
terminablebyonemonth`snoticehadbeencreated.Hearrivedatthisconclusiononthefollowinggrounds.
First,heheldthattheintentionofthepartiesmustbesoughtnotonlyfromthemerewordsofthecontractbut
thesubstancethereofandtheconductoftheparties.Secondly,hefound(i)thatthespace`letout`wasnot
adequatelydemarcatedwithprecision,(ii)thatthecontroloftheentireArcadewasatalltimesvestedinthe
ownerandtheoccupiershadnoexclusivepossessionofthespace`letout`tothem,and(iii)thatthe`rent`
included`anelementfortheuseofelectricpower`suppliedbytheowner.Onappeal,theCourtofAppeal
affirmedhisdecisionthattheagreementdidnotcreateatenancybutacontractuallicenceterminablebyone
month`snotice.FAChuaJsaid,atp119:

Itisclearfromtheauthoritiesthatindeterminingwhetheranagreementcreatesbetweenthe
partiestherelationshipoflandlordandtenantormerelythatoflicensorandlicensee,the
intentionofthepartiesistheparamountconsideration.Theintentionofthepartiesmustbe
soughtnotfromthemerewordsoftheagreementbutfromitssubstanceandfromthe
conductofthepartiesandthesurroundingcircumstances.

TheleadingauthorityonthepointisthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinthecaseofStreetvMountford
[1985]AC809.There,MrStreetbyanagreementinwritinggrantedtoMrsMountfordarighttooccupy
furnishedroomsinaresidentialhouseat`licencefee`andsubjecttocertaintermsandconditionsprovided
therein.Theagreementexpresslystatedthattherightofoccupationwasa`personallicence`andwasnot
assignableandthatthe`licence`wasterminableon14days`writtennoticebyeitherparty.Further,oneofthe
termsexpresslyagreeduponbyMrsMountfordwasasfollows:

Iunderstandandacceptthatalicenceintheaboveformdoesnotandisnotintendedtogive
meatenancyprotectedundertheRentActs.

PursuanttotheagreementMrsMountfordwasletintoexclusivepossessionoftherooms,andtheissuebefore
thecourtwaswhethershewasalicenseeoratenant.TheCourtofAppealinEnglandheldthatshewasa
licenseebutonappealthedecisionwasreversedtheHouseofLordsheldthatshewasatenant.Lord
Templemansaid,atp819:
 Inthepresentcase,theagreementdated7March1983professedanintentionbybothparties
tocreatealicenceandtheirbeliefthattheyhadinfactcreatedalicence.Itwassubmittedon
behalfofMrStreetthatthecourtcannotinthesecircumstancesdecidethattheagreement
createdatenancywithoutinterferingwiththefreedomofcontractenjoyedbybothparties.My
Lords,MrStreetenjoyedfreedomtoofferMrsMountfordtherighttooccupytherooms
comprisedintheagreementonsuchlawfultermsasMrStreetpleased.MrsMountfordenjoyed
freedomtonegotiatewithMrStreettoobtaindifferentterms.Bothpartiesenjoyedfreedomto
contractornottocontractandbothpartiesexercisedthatfreedombycontractingontheterms
setforthinthewrittenagreementandonnootherterms.Buttheconsequencesinlawofthe
agreement,onceconcluded,canonlybedeterminedbyconsiderationoftheeffectofthe
agreement.Iftheagreementsatisfiedalltherequirementsofatenancy,thentheagreement
producedatenancyandthepartiescannotaltertheeffectoftheagreementbyinsistingthat
theyonlycreatedalicence.Themanufactureofafiveprongedimplementforannualdigging
resultsinaforkevenifthemanufacturer,unfamiliarwiththeEnglishlanguage,insiststhathe
intendedtomakeandhasmadeaspade.

NumerouscaseswereconsideredbyLordTemplemaninhisspeech,includingFacchinivBrysonand
AddiscombeGardenEstatesLtd&AnorvCrabbe&Orsandontheformerhesaid,atp822:

Thedecision,whichwasthereafterbindingontheCourtofAppealandonalllowercourts,
referredtothespecialcircumstanceswhicharecapableofnegativinganintentiontocreatea
tenancyandreaffirmedtheprinciplethattheprofessedintentionsofthepartiesareirrelevant.
Thedecisionalsoindicatedthatinasimplecaseagrantofexclusivepossessionofresidential
accommodationforaweeklysumcreatesatenancy.

Theresultsofthesecasesareasfollows.First,theintentionofthepartiesisanimportantconsiderationin
determiningtherelationshipoflandlordandtenant,asinallothercontractualrelationships,butineverycase
theintention`mustbesoughtnotfromthemerewordsoftheagreementbutfromitssubstanceandfromthe
conductofthepartiesandthesurroundingcircumstances.`Whatthepartiessaidorprofessedintheagreement
aloneisnotenough,itdoesnotalterwhatis,ineffect,atenancyintoalicence,andviceversa.Secondly,the
relationshipofthepartiesisdeterminedbylaw,havingregardtoalltherelevantcircumstances,andnotbythe
labeltheychoosetoputontheagreement.The`consequencesinlawoftheagreement,onceconcluded,can
onlybedeterminedbyconsiderationoftheeffectoftheagreement.Iftheagreementsatisfiedallthe
requirementsofatenancy,thentheagreementproducedatenancyandthepartiescannotaltertheeffectofthe
agreementbyinsistingthattheyonlycreatedalicence.`Thirdly,amaterialcircumstanceintheconsiderationof
therelationshipoflandlordandtenantisexclusivepossessionofthepropertyenjoyedbytheoccupier,and
exclusivepossessionisanessentialrequirementofatenancy.LordTemplemaninStreetvMountfordsaid,atp
818:

Therecanbenotenancyunlesstheoccupierenjoysexclusivepossessionbutanoccupierwho
enjoysexclusivepossessionisnotnecessarilyatenant.Hemaybeownerinfeesimple,a
trespasser,amortgageeinpossession,anobjectofcharityoraserviceoccupier.Toconstitutea
tenancytheoccupiermustbegrantedexclusivepossessionforafixedorperiodictermcertain
inconsiderationofapremiumorperiodicalpayments.Thegrantmaybeexpress,ormaybe
inferredwheretheowneracceptsweeklyorotherperiodicalpaymentsfromtheoccupier.

Lastly,exclusivepossessionisalsonotthesoleandonlycriteriontheremaybecircumstancesnegativingan
intentiontocreateatenancy.Suchcircumstancesarenumerous.InBookervPalmer[1942]2AllER674,a
landownerallowedanevacuee,whosehousehadbeendestroyedbybombsduringthewar,tostayinhishouse
rentfreethroughoutthedurationofthewar,andtheCourtofAppealheldthatinthosecircumstancestherewas
nointentiontocreatelegalrelationshipandnotenancywasthereforecreated.InErringtonvErringtonand
Woods[1952]1KB290atp298afatherboughtahouseforhissonanddaughterinlawtolive.Hepaidthe
initialsumandthebalanceofthepurchasepricewasfinancedbyabuildingsociety.Itwasagreedbetweenhim
andhissonanddaughterinlawthattheinstalmentstothebuildingsocietywouldbepaidbythem,andsolong
astheypaidtheinstalments,theywouldbeallowedtoliveinthehouse.ItwasheldbytheCourtofAppealthat
notenancywascreatedinfavourofthesonanddaughterinlaw.DenningLJ(atpp297298)gavemany
instancesofcircumstancesnegativinganintentiontocreatetherelationshipoflandlordandtenant,
notwithstandingthatexclusivepossessionofthepremiseswasenjoyedbytheoccupierconcerned,andhethen
said,atp298:

Theresultofallthesecasesisthat,althoughapersonwhoisletintoexclusivepossessionis
primafacietobeconsideredtobeatenant,neverthelesshewillnotbeheldtobesoifthe
circumstancesnegativeanyintentiontocreateatenancy.Wordsalonemaynotsuffice.Parties
cannotturnatenancyintoalicencemerelybycallingitone.Butifthecircumstancesandthe
conductofthepartiesshowthatallthatwasintendedwasthattheoccupiershouldbegranted
apersonalprivilege,withnointerestintheland,hewillbeheldtobealicenseeonly.

Again,inthecaseofCobbvLane[1952]1TLR1037,asisterboughtahouseandallowedherbrothertolive
therewithhisfamilywithoutpayinganyrent,andthesisterpaidtherates.Afterthesisterpassedaway,her
personalrepresentativeclaimedpossessionofthehouseanditwasheldthatnotenancyhadbeencreatedas
therewasnointentiontocreateanylegalrelationship.

Applyingtheprinciplestothefactsofthepresentcase,therecanhardlybeanydoubtthatthesecond
respondentwasatallmaterialtimesasubtenantofthesaidpremises.Hewasletintopossessionofthesaid
premises,payingtherentthereforetothelateTayPingKeeand,afterhisdeath,totheappellants.Apartfrom
theformsofthe`licence`agreementsmade,therewasnocircumstancewhichnegativedtheintentionto
createtherelationshipoflandlordandtenant.The`licence`agreementswereineffectualtoturnatenancyinto
alicence.Thecircumstancesandtheconductofthepartiesshowthatwhatwasintendedwasthatthesecond
respondentshouldbegranted,andhewasgranted,exclusivepossessionofthesaidpremisesatarentandfora
termtocarryonhisbusiness.Theoccupationbythesecondrespondenthadallthefeaturesofatenancy,anda
tenancyitwasthatwascreated.Accordingly,theappealfailed.Appealdismissed

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