IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF A. O.

BROOKS FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS
1 Phil. 55, G.R. No. 507, 5 November 1901, FIRST DIVISION
(Arellano, C.J.)

A soldier who is unconditionally discharged from the Army and who

then enters its employ as a clerk under contract as a civilian is not subject
to military regulation; [Hence], a breach of a contract of employment
entered into between a civilian and the Army can not be punished by
imprisonment and deportation.

[A.O. Brooks] had been an enlisted man in the United States (U.S.)
Army. Some time prior to the filing of his petition he had been granted an
absolute discharge from the Army as a soldier and had entered the employ
of one of the military departments under a contract. Upon his failure to
comply with the terms of this contract for personal services the petitioner
was arrested by order of the commanding general and was imprisoned
under an order of deportation to the United States. Thereupon [Brooks]
applied to the Supreme Court of the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus,
xxx.

ISSUE:

Should Brooks be granted liberty on the ground that his enlistment in

the U.S. Army had been terminated already prior to the breach of contract
he had committed against the latter?

RULING:

Yes, Brooks should be granted liberty.

It is an established fact that A.O. Brooks had obtained his absolute

discharge as a soldier. It is likewise a fact explicitly stated by the counsel
for the Government that the absolute discharge granted contained no
condition that the said Brooks should render services in a civil capacity to
the Army as an employee in its offices, and if the latter had entered into a
contract for the rendition of services he did so just as any private person not
previously in the military service might have done.

By the absolute discharge there was dissolved every legal bond that
bound him to the Army and thenceforth, since he no longer enjoyed the
privileges of the military, neither could he be held subject to the obligations
imposed upon the military nor subject to anything more than the terms of
the contract of employment which he had entered into with the Army. And
inasmuch as a private person who contracts obligations of this sort toward
the Army can not, by any law x x x, either civil or military, be compelled to
fulfill them by imprisonment and deportation from his place of residence, [it
is] wholly improper to sustain such means of compulsion which are not
justified either by the law or by the contract.